

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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FIRE ON THE *PRESIDENT EISENHOWER*  
SOUTHWEST OF SANTA BARBARA  
HARBOR, ON APRIL 28, 2021

Accident No.: DCA21FM026

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Interview of: RICK FRANCIS, Lead Firefighter  
TNT Salvage

BILLY FLAGEL, Marine Firefighter  
TNT Salvage

JOHN ALLEY, Marine Firefighter  
TNT Salvage

JOHN SIVERA, Marine Firefighter  
TNT Salvage

JOSH WILLIAMS, Marine Firefighter  
TNT Salvage

Los Angeles, California

Friday,  
April 30, 2021

## APPEARANCES:

BART BARNUM, Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

LCDR [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
U.S. Coast Guard

LT [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
U.S. Coast Guard

JOE WALSH, Attorney  
Collier Walsh Nakazawa  
(On behalf of the vessel owners)

RICK FRANCIS  
TNT Salvage

BILLY FLAGEL  
TNT Salvage

JOSH ALLEY  
TNT Salvage

JOHN SIVERA  
TNT Salvage

JOSH WILLIAMS  
TNT Salvage

I N T E R V I E W

(12:44 p.m.)

1  
2 LT [REDACTED] -- [REDACTED] with the United States Coast Guard. Today  
3 is April 30th, 2021. The time is 12:44. We're on board the motor  
4 vessel President Eisenhower at Berth LA 46 to investigate the  
5 engine room fire that occurred onboard the vessel, the morning of  
6 April 28th, 2021.

7 In the room with myself are the following individuals.

8 LCDR [REDACTED] Lieutenant Commander [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 MR. BARNUM: Bart Barnum, NTSB Office of Marine Safety.

10 B-a-r-n-u-m.

11 CWO [REDACTED] Chief Warrant Officer [REDACTED] [REDACTED] U.S. Coast  
12 Guard, sentry Los Angeles, Long Beach.

13 MR. WALSH: Joe Walsh, Collier Walsh Nakazawa, on behalf of  
14 the party in interest, AML.

15 MR. FRANCIS: Rick Francis, Lead Firefighter, TNT Marine  
16 Salvage.

17 MR. FLAGEL: Billy Flagel (ph.), Hazmat Special Services  
18 contracted to TNT, Marine Firefighter.

19 MR. ALLEY: Joshua Alley (ph.), Hazmat Special Services  
20 contracted with TNT, Marine Firefighter.

21 MR. SIVERA: John Sivera (ph.), Marine Firefighter, TNT  
22 Marine Salvage.

23 MR. WILLIAMS: Josh Williams (ph.), Hazmat Special Service  
24 contracted with Marine TNT, Firefighter.

1 LT [REDACTED] And Mr. Francis, do you consent to this interview  
2 being recorded?

3 MR. FRANCIS: Yes.

4 LT [REDACTED] Mr. Sivera, do you consent to this interview being  
5 recorded?

6 MR. SIVERA: Yes.

7 LT [REDACTED] Mr. Williams?

8 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.

9 LT [REDACTED] Mr. Flagel?

10 MR. FLAGEL: Yes, sir.

11 LT [REDACTED] And Mr. Alley?

12 MR. ALLEY: Yes, sir.

13 LT [REDACTED] All right. Thank you very much.

14 LCDR [REDACTED] So, John, we wanted to just touch bases and kind  
15 of get your take on what happened on board the vessel, and if you  
16 could go ahead and we'll just start -- I guess we'll go left to  
17 right in this case. And, if you could, just give us a very brief,  
18 quick overview of your experience in the maritime industry and  
19 then kind of go over what was your experience on the vessel.  
20 Mr. Williams?

21 MR. WILLIAMS: Joshua Williams, been in the environmental  
22 emergency response, industrial firefighting, marine firefighting  
23 for 30 years.

24 Basically, aboard the ship, we met with the captain, first  
25 mate and chief, in the cargo office and reviewed the video.

1 Watched it a couple times in length, myself and the team, and put  
2 together a plan to investigate the cargo hold or the engine  
3 compartment, and we went from there.

4 MR. SIVERA: I've been working different maritime  
5 operations --

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Who's speaking?

7 MR. SIVERA: I'm sorry, John Sivera. I've been working  
8 different maritime operations on motor vessels throughout this  
9 past year. I have about a little over a year's experience. I've  
10 had three years of maritime firefighting.

11 What we did was we showed up to the vessel, we were briefed  
12 by the crew as to what happened, saw a video, and then we decided  
13 to develop a plan of attack. That's how we were going to  
14 approach, and we went from there.

15 MR. ALLEY: Joshua Alley, about ten years in the industry.

16 Got here, boarded the ship, met with the crew, watched the  
17 video, came up with the plan, and executed the plan as we planned.

18 MR. FLAGEL: Billy Flagel, 23 years in the industry.

19 Arrived on scene, went with the crew, went up to meet with  
20 the entire boat crew, watched the video, talked about our plan of  
21 attack, and had a whole safety meeting and executed.

22 LCDR ██████ Okay. So of the team here, who was the first  
23 member to actually enter the -- that actually entered the engine  
24 room space?

25 (No audible response.)

1 LCDR [REDACTED] Okay, can you -- is it Mr. Williams? You raised  
2 your hand? Can you please, kind of, tell us what you first  
3 experienced and what you saw?

4 MR. WILLIAMS: Basically, our plan of attack was -- is to go  
5 in, make sure we didn't have any lazy fire, any smoldering, also  
6 to see what our CO levels were, VOC levels, any LEL levels. So  
7 what we did is we went in through the starboard entry into the  
8 control room. There's basically a little shelter there,  
9 basically. So you got a watertight door. We entered the  
10 watertight door, both doors. The door to the engine room was  
11 closed. The door to the control room was closed.

12 So what we did with the SCBA on and gear on is we checked the  
13 air quality for the engine room, and we checked the air quality  
14 for the control room. The control room still held 56 parts per  
15 million on CO, so it still had a good, strong CO reading. VOCs  
16 were in the 30s so we opened the door going in the engine room,  
17 pulled air samples on it. We had some VOC readings. The CO had  
18 already dropped out in there. We were reading six, seven parts  
19 per million on CO in the engine room, and me and the first mate or  
20 first engineer, Mike, entered the engine room. We went in to do a  
21 360 around the engine and the deck above it, which contained  
22 dunnage parts.

23 There was another area that had active fire, so we went in,  
24 took a five-gas PID meter, and a FLIR TIC with us. And we went  
25 in, we shot looking for hotspots with the TIC in the engine bay,

1 found nothing and came up to the next floor. We 360'd it with the  
2 TIC and found no smoldering, no hotspots. The only thing that we  
3 had with any heat signature on it was the number five piston. It  
4 was at 56 -- 156 degrees. That was the hottest source in there,  
5 so we felt comfortable that we did not have an ignition source for  
6 fuel, and we came back out, briefed Rick and the crew of exactly  
7 what we did, how we did it, what we'd seen, what we found.

8       And then First Mike said that we need to go in, close the  
9 fuel off manually, and to go check the grating on the level above  
10 the fire to check compromisation (verbatim) on it. Everything we  
11 did entering there, we entered on the starboard side because the  
12 fire loop was on the portside, and the stairwell took some heat in  
13 the grating there. So we felt by the video that it was safer to  
14 go in by the starboard passageway, so that's what we did.

15       We came back out, re-met, talked it out, got out of our gear,  
16 our air packs, drank some water, and we left it sealed up. We  
17 talked about it and then what we determined, about an hour to two  
18 hours later, was to go ahead and open it up slowly and let it  
19 start cross-ventilating. We let that work for two hours and we  
20 went back in and re-crossed again. We went from -- the original  
21 cross-ventilation we did was from port high to starboard low, then  
22 we came back in and went from starboard high to port low, and then  
23 we decided to go ahead and open the control room and the  
24 watertight passage doors out onto the main deck. And then we'd  
25 done a 30-minute rotation with a 360 camera, and with the five-gas

1 PID for the rest of the night. The morning, 6 o'clock, I took and  
2 cleared the ship from top to bottom, went all the way to the hull,  
3 checked CO levels, LEL levels and VOC levels, to make sure --  
4 determine that we didn't have a pocket of CO captured somewhere in  
5 the hull.

6 And then, at that time, we had met with the crew, the first  
7 mate -- the chief engineer, first mate engineer, and started  
8 talking about game plans, like, wanting to start an air compressor  
9 to build air. So we assisted on doing air monitor, continued with  
10 the TIC, checking for heat. We stayed with the air compressor the  
11 whole time it ran to build up adequate pressure, checking it with  
12 the TIC, making sure it wouldn't overheat, no chance for ignition  
13 source.

14 I believe about two hours after the compressor was running,  
15 they decided to manually start the generator. So all four of us,  
16 myself, Johnny, Josh, and Billy, went down below with the crew and  
17 we monitored the air compressors and the generators for about five  
18 hours, rotating out, reporting back to the top side (crosstalk) --

19 LCDR [REDACTED] Sir, could you repeat that? It was yourself and  
20 who?

21 MR. WILLIAMS: Myself, Johnny, Josh Alley, Billy Flagel --

22 LCDR [REDACTED] Oh. All four of you? (Indiscernible).

23 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. Mr. Rick was on the top side and we  
24 communicated with him what we were doing.

25 LCDR [REDACTED] Okay.



1 CWO [REDACTED] Hey. Just for comparison purposes, you said the  
2 number five piston head was about 156 degrees?

3 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes.

4 CWO [REDACTED] What was the reading on the other 11?

5 MR. WILLIAMS: The other ones were somewhere in between 80s  
6 and 90s.

7 CWO [REDACTED] Okay.

8 MR. WILLIAMS: The number five was the hottest, and that's  
9 the only one that sticks out in my head, because when I reported  
10 back to the top side of the rig, the highest temperature I had in  
11 the engine compartment was 156 degrees and it's on cylinder five.

12 CWO [REDACTED] Okay.

13 MR. FRANCIS: I think I might have said 164 but --

14 (Crosstalk)

15 CWO [REDACTED] Yeah.

16 LCDR [REDACTED] Okay. All right, thank you. We'll just go --  
17 actually, we'll cross over and -- you, sir?

18 MR. FLAGEL: So making entry --

19 LCDR [REDACTED] I'm sorry, you're -- this is who?

20 MR. FLAGEL: Billy Flagel.

21 LCDR [REDACTED] Thank you.

22 MR. FLAGEL: Mr. Williams said we did check the air levels  
23 for the control room and in the engine room. Once we found out it  
24 was safe enough to make entry, they made entry. We kept in radio  
25 communications while they were inside, checking on them

1 periodically, and they weren't in there more than maybe ten  
2 minutes. Came back out, let everybody know they didn't find  
3 anything smoldering, any hotspots, just hot metal.

4 At that point in time, we started ventilation. Once  
5 ventilation was adequate, then we made entry after that to  
6 basically to check out the areas totally, from top to bottom.  
7 When they got to a point that ventilation was good, no readings  
8 were above the action levels, we -- they wanted to start the  
9 compressors.

10 While they were starting the compressors, we did a 360 around  
11 the compressors to make sure there wasn't any standing fuel or  
12 anything that could spark off, took readings on everything around  
13 that compressors again, and found out it was safe for them to do  
14 so. They started the compressors. While they were running the  
15 compressors, we were checking them, making sure they weren't  
16 overheating, there wasn't a faulty wire. Let those run so they  
17 could open up the -- correct me if I'm wrong, louvers?

18 *UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, the louvers, air louvers.*

19 *MR. FLAGEL: That way they could get some better ventilation.*  
20 Once the ventilation was running a little bit more, we let them  
21 run through the night. The next morning, they started the  
22 generators. As the generators were running, Josh Alley and myself  
23 stayed at those two generators, number one and three, and took  
24 readings around those generators to make sure nothing was out of  
25 the ordinary while he -- while they were running.

1 After that, it was basically walking around the areas all up  
2 and down the different levels, checking for hotspots, checking any  
3 kind of heat coming through. We monitored the heat inside the  
4 ventilation systems inside the control room every 30 minutes to an  
5 hour.

6 LCDR [REDACTED] Thank you. Mr. (Indiscernible)?

7 MR. ALLEY: I'm Josh Alley.

8 LCDR [REDACTED] I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I didn't mean -- okay,  
9 sorry.

10 MR. ALLEY: So, as you said, I'm Josh Alley. Mr. Williams  
11 and the chief mate -- or chief first engineer went in, did their  
12 rounds, came out. We talked about it, what they found, their  
13 findings, everything. We came up with a plan of attack for that.  
14 Stayed outside for a little bit, ventilated, went back in, taking  
15 readings and everything else.

16 Once we did actually go in, it was safe for everybody to go  
17 in. Went in, like I said, did the 360, looked at everything with  
18 the crew, assisted them with monitoring. Started, you know --  
19 checked everything for the air compressor. Air compressor was  
20 good. We started it, opened louvers, ventilated a little bit  
21 more, and then once we felt safe enough, we started the one and  
22 three generators.

23 MR. WILLIAMS: I just want to clarify on Billy. I know time  
24 is running together working and doing -- the compressor and the  
25 generator were fired the same morning. I know he said

1 that --

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes --

3 MR. WILLIAMS: -- the following morning, but they were both  
4 started that same morning, just to clarify.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And then, Johnny, if you want to go.

6 MR. SIVERA: It's John Sivera. Mr. Williams, First Engineer  
7 Mike both made entry into the space and did their rounds, checked  
8 levels. After that -- about 10, 15 minutes of doing the rounds,  
9 they came back out, briefed the crew on what they found and how we  
10 were going to make a plan of attack.

11 After that, we then decided that we were going to get some  
12 natural circulation going through there to help ventilate some of  
13 those toxic levels in there. Over that, we let that sit overnight  
14 and approached the next morning. Mr. Williams did his round to  
15 check on levels. Once we determined that it was safe to enter, we  
16 then entered with our air monitors and TICs and confirmed all the  
17 way down to (indiscernible) that the air was safe for entry for  
18 crew and personnel.

19 Once we determined entry was safe, we then, again, spoke with  
20 the engine crew about getting the air compressor on, and we then  
21 went around, did a360 on the air compressor to confirm that there  
22 were no sources of ignition, there was no chance of anything  
23 starting up. So we confirmed that; we okayed it. They then  
24 proceeded to start their air compressor.

25 Once the air compressor was started and they were able to

1 build up pressure, we then went over to the number one and number  
2 three generator to confirm there was no hotspots over there, no  
3 chances of an ignition source, and we confirmed everything was  
4 okay to start up and they started up their generators, and that's  
5 where we're at.

6 LCDR [REDACTED] So Rick had then said earlier -- sorry. Mr.  
7 Francis mentioned had earlier that you had walked around with the  
8 chief engineer or that you were the escort for the Chief Engineer,  
9 is that correct?

10 MR. SIVERA: Yes.

11 LCDR [REDACTED] Okay. Can -- and then you were with him when he  
12 was looking at the cylinder (indiscernible) cylinders as well?

13 MR. SIVERA: I was with him when he was looking at the  
14 generators.

15 LCDR [REDACTED] Okay. But not the main engine?

16 MR. SIVERA: No, not the main engine. I was with the first  
17 engineer.

18 LCDR [REDACTED] Okay, so you were with the first engineer when  
19 you -- what did you see? Like, what did you discern when you saw  
20 the main engine?

21 MR. SIVERA: That the number five cylinder and around that  
22 area had been -- had heat on it, obviously. And past that, that  
23 was beyond -- that was for the engineers to look at. We just  
24 determined that there was heat in that area and there was fire  
25 damage.

1 CWO [REDACTED] So really for everyone, at any point, was there  
2 any discussion regarding the actual cause of the fire? I  
3 understand that number five seems to have quite a bit of heat -- -  
4 - okay. Nothing specific? Okay.

5 MR. BARNUM: Yeah. I have a couple questions. This is Bart  
6 with the NTSB.

7 Mr. Williams, so the fire roughly started around 0154, we're  
8 thinking, and then what time did you -- I think Rick mentioned.  
9 What time did you all get on board? Can you just reiterate that  
10 for us?

11 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, I wasn't keeping --

12 MR. BARNUM: And I know you guys gave us your log. It's a  
13 little rough you said but do you remember what time you entered  
14 the space with the first engineer?

15 LCDR [REDACTED] Like, if you had your TIC book, would that help  
16 you?

17 MR. WILLIAMS: Well, no. So I copied the thing that was sent  
18 off. It was copied straight out of the TIC book.

19 LCDR [REDACTED] Okay.

20 MR. FRANCIS: When I entered control room, to check for the  
21 level the first was time was --

22 MR. WILLIAMS: 15, or --

23 MR. FRANCIS: 1930.

24 MR. WILLIAMS: 1930.

25 MR. FRANCIS: We were in that safe area he's talking about.

1 It's a safe space between the -- that's where we were  
2 (indiscernible), and then at 2000, the crew made -- they made the  
3 entry (indiscernible) there.

4 MR. BARNUM: All right. And then you exited the space and  
5 took off your gear, drank some water, and a decision was made to  
6 ventilate. How long -- how long did you ventilate before you  
7 entered again?

8 MR. FRANCIS: Well, he -- they said the crew went ahead and  
9 started opening the port and starboard doors at 2030 hours. So 30  
10 minutes --

11 MR. BARNUM: So it's after -- an hour after initial entry --

12 MR. FRANCIS: Yes, sir.

13 MR. BARNUM: -- you started ventilating? Okay.

14 MR. FRANCIS: Yes.

15 MR. BARNUM: Was there any mechanical ventilation or was it  
16 just natural?

17 MR. FRANCIS: No. Everything -- the air louvers and the  
18 -- everything is run by the --

19 MR. WILLIAMS: Air compressor.

20 MR. FRANCIS: Yeah. So we had to start the compressor to  
21 kick off to get the louvers open, so that hadn't been done at that  
22 time.

23 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. So what we did was manual ventilation.  
24 We opened the port, main deck, watertight door, and the main deck  
25 gangway, and then we opened the engine room control door and the

1 watertight door on the starboard side. So we started getting  
2 cross -- which, the wind -- the way the wind was coming, it's  
3 coming down the tunnel, through the engine room, into there, and  
4 then we opened the engine compartment hatches. Up behind the top  
5 of the tower, there's two big hatches. We just took the wing  
6 nuts, opened them up, and then all of a sudden, we started getting  
7 a good Venturi effect in there, and it started pulling that heat.

8 MR. FRANCIS: It had suction pulling through from the outside  
9 through the bottom, so it was like a Venturi-type flow. We just  
10 used -- it was all just natural ventilation.

11 MR. WILLIAMS: What we wanted to do with that was -- is  
12 control ventilation. We didn't want to open every damn door on  
13 the boat in case something went south; it's less we got to go  
14 close manually, so that's why we only did two doors for about two  
15 hours. And then after that, everything -- went down, inspected  
16 again. Everything was still good, so we opened two more doors.  
17 And then, like I said, once we got that held, we let it sit  
18 overnight just like that, monitoring it every 30 minutes.

19 MR. FRANCIS: About 2 o'clock in the morning, I feel, they  
20 started started the compressor, 2 or 3 o'clock or something -- or  
21 was it later than that?

22 MR. WILLIAMS: No, we didn't start the compressor. It was --

23 MR. FRANCIS: Because I'd come down (indiscernible) engine  
24 room --

25 MR. WILLIAMS: -- about 9:30 in the morning?



1 MR. FRANCIS: Was it that late?

2 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah.

3 MR. FRANCIS: Wow.

4 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah. You know, because whenever I got with  
5 the chief and the first --

6 Mr. FRANCIS: (Indiscernible).

7 MR. WILLIAMS: I said, Mr. Mike, did we get the fuel cleaned  
8 up around the compressor? Yes, sir. Have y'all started it? No,  
9 sir. I said, okay.

10 MR. FRANCIS: That's why I say there's a lot of fuel up there  
11 come from -- and it might have been from a day tank or anything.  
12 We didn't investigate, you know, so we just knew -- we wanted them  
13 to clean that up before we had any type of ignition going into  
14 that -- any kind of power energized to any of the equipment --

15 MR. BARNUM: Mr. Williams, you indicated that the O2 levels  
16 were higher in the engine room than the control room when you  
17 entered?

18 MR. WILLIAMS: Control room was higher than engine room.

19 MR. BARNUM: O2 was, or CO?

20 MR. WILLIAMS: CO.

21 MR. BARNUM: What about -- so, okay. So CO was lower in the  
22 engine room. Did you guys notice any louvers open when you got  
23 here? Did you need to close any, or were they all closed?

24 MR. WILLIAMS: It was a sealed ship when we got there.

25 MR. BARNUM: Okay.

1 MR. WILLIAMS: When we 360'd, and we come in on the portside,  
2 and then we 360'd and entered on the starboard side.

3 MR. FRANCIS: It was locked down because they had locked  
4 everything down before they discharged the CO2.

5 MR. WILLIAMS: Yeah, everything was -- it was sealed when we  
6 came aboard. Like I said, when we approached, we came up the port  
7 main deck to the cargo office, watched the video. We seen the  
8 fire. We worked kind of backwards on the video, so the chief and  
9 the first was explaining it to us where things were at. Then we  
10 said, Okay. We need to make entry on the starboard side, so then  
11 we 360'd, went around the starboard side, went down the tunnel,  
12 and that's how we made entry. But everything was closed. As we  
13 went around to open it, we had to back all the wing nuts off,  
14 latches, you know.

15 MR. BARNUM: Who was the marine engineer? Was it John? Were  
16 you the main --

17 MR. FRANCIS: What's the engineer's name?

18 MR. BARNUM: Rick, I thought you said one of your  
19 firefighters had graduated AMM (sic) as a licensed engineer?

20 MR. FRANCIS: That's my man right here.

21 MR. BARNUM: John, you're the one who went around with the  
22 first?

23 MR. SIVERA: Yes, I went around with the first.

24 MR. BARNUM: Okay.

25 MR. SIVERA: I went around with the first. It was only for a

1 brief moment when we were inspecting the main engine, and then  
2 went with the chief engineer when we were starting up the  
3 generators.

4 MR. BARNUM: Okay. And what did you see in the main engine  
5 when you were looking up with the first? Did you find any fuel  
6 lines disconnected? What did you see?

7 MR. SIVERA: No. I just saw, you know, the five-cylinder and  
8 around that area, just on the ceiling above, the overhead, and  
9 just the charredness of all the components. Nothing too specific.

10 MR. BARNUM: Nothing causal or origin, you -- while you were  
11 there?

12 MR. SIVERA: No, not that I recognized or identified.

13 LT [REDACTED] How far from the cylinder were you with the first  
14 engineer at that point?

15 MR. SIVERA: Just on the pathway, right below -- right before  
16 you get to this stairwell or the ladderwell --

17 LT [REDACTED] Okay.

18 MR. SIVERA: -- that goes up there. We were mainly just  
19 inspecting with flashlights and the TIC --

20 LT [REDACTED] Okay.

21 MR. SIVERA: -- to see if there was any hotspots.

22 LT [REDACTED] Okay. And what was the closest point that you got  
23 to the cylinder with the first engineer?

24 MR. SIVERA: Just right below the stairwell.

25 LT [REDACTED] So you stayed in that area?

1 MR. SIVERA: Correct. We didn't -- I didn't get up close to  
2 that at all.

3 LT [REDACTED] Okay.

4 CWO [REDACTED] Did you see much fuel oil around the main engine  
5 with the --

6 MR. SIVERA: No.

7 CWO [REDACTED] -- when you first did the initial exam with the  
8 first?

9 MR. SIVERA: Not that I looked at, no.

10 CWO [REDACTED] Okay.

11 MR. SIVERA: Again, was just a brief moment with the first.  
12 It wasn't actually a full 360 walk around with him, it was just in  
13 that small space area.

14 CWO [REDACTED] Okay.

15 MR. BARNUM: You guys all set?

16 So relying on you guys' wealth of knowledge in this area, we  
17 already heard from Rick, how do you guys feel the crew responded  
18 to the fire?

19 MR. WILLIAMS: Absolutely great.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.

21 MR. BARNUM: All of you?

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. This could have been a lot  
23 worse.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, I've seen worse.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They were very informative, very  
2 helpful, when we came on the ship. They went right in, showed the  
3 video, and just made it down there. They did a great job.

4 MR. WILLIAMS: They've been very --

5 MR. SIVERA: We have lights because of their response. We  
6 have, you know, accommodations for the crew because of their  
7 response. It could have been much worse.

8 MR. FRANCIS: It was almost textbook. They followed the  
9 rules instead of panicking and freaking out and leaving things  
10 open and stuffing their CO, which we've all seen trillions of  
11 times (indiscernible) atmosphere. They're like, what the hell do  
12 you do? So they were very organized, they thought it through.  
13 They were very well trained on it. And so you can see they had  
14 talked about and drilled before.

15 MR. BARNUM: Would you -- maybe this is for you. Would you  
16 expect a water mist system to work better than it did?

17 MR. FRANCIS: No. I mean, I'm not really familiar with that  
18 type of water system, and I don't know exactly how it's set up. I  
19 was just listening to how -- just from the engineer, because I  
20 think they had 100 meters of pressure and once that runs out --  
21 this is all I guess gravity-drained or hydrostatic. I'm not sure  
22 how it works, so I can't even comment on that.

23 MR. BARNUM: Anyone else familiar -- have familiarity with  
24 water mist system? No? Okay.

25 All right. That's all the questions I had. Thank you.

1 LCDR [REDACTED] All right. Okay. I think we'll go ahead and  
2 we'll conclude and --

3 LT [REDACTED] All right. It's April 30th, 2021. The time is  
4 1312, and we have concluded the interview with Mr. Francis, Mr.  
5 Sivera, Mr. Williams, Mr. Flagel -- is it Flagle or Flagel?

6 MR. FLAGEL: Flagel.

7 LT [REDACTED] Sorry about that. And Mr. Alley.

8 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)  
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: FIRE ON THE *PRESIDENT EISENHOWER*  
SOUTHWEST OF SANTA BARBARA  
HARBOR, ON APRIL 28, 2021  
Interview of Rick Francis  
Billy Flagel  
Josh Alley  
John Sivera  
Josh Williams

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FM026

PLACE: Los Angeles, California

DATE: April 30, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

  
Milton Ordakowski III  
Transcriber