

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

TOWING VESSEL *KEVIN MICHAEL* *

ACCIDENT NEAR ALTON, ILLINOIS, * Accident No.: DCA21FM021

ON OCTOBER 20, 2021 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: JACKIE HENSHAW, Pilot
Hamm's Frontier Marine, LLC

Via telephone

Wednesday,
October 20, 2021

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL KARR, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DEREK JOHNSTON, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CWO [REDACTED]
United States Coast Guard

TONY ICE
Hamm's Frontier Marine, LLC

JIM MONDL, Esquire
MONDL LAW FIRM, LLC

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Jackie Henshaw:		
By Mr. Karr		5
By CWO [REDACTED]		16

I N T E R V I E W

(10:10 a.m.)

CWO [REDACTED]: A follow-up interview. We do plan on recording this interview so, Mr. Henshaw, do you have any objection to us recording this interview?

MR. HENSHAW: No, sir. Go ahead.

CWO [REDACTED] Okay. So -- all right, we'll go ahead and start the recording and then I'll do introductions. We'll kind of go around the room and state your name and your role.

So this is [REDACTED]. I'm at Sector Upper Mississippi River. Today is the 20th of October, 2021. It's about 10:10 a.m. and the purpose of this is a follow-up interview. So we'll just go around the room with the participants online. If you could just state your name and your role. And we'll start with Mike Karr, NTSB.

MR. KARR: And I'm Michael Karr, K-A-R-R, with the NTSB. And I am the investigator-in-charge for the NTSB's investigating of this accident. And I'll also introduce the new investigator who'll be listening in. His name is Derek Johnston. He just joined the NTSB last week. Thank you.

CWO [REDACTED]: Mr. Mondl, would you like to go next?

MR. MONDL: Sure. This Jim Mondl. I'm an attorney for Hamm's Frontier and for Jackie Henshaw.

CWO [REDACTED]: Mr. Henshaw, would you go?

MR. HENSHAW: Yeah, this is Jackie Henshaw, and I was the

1 pilot on watch during the incident.

2 CWO [REDACTED]: And then Mr. Henshaw, if we could just verify
3 your date of birth?

4 MR. HENSHAW: [REDACTED].

5 CWO [REDACTED]: Okay. And the last four of your Social if you
6 didn't mind?

7 MR. HENSHAW: [REDACTED].

8 CWO [REDACTED]: Okay. And then, Mr. Ice, would you introduce
9 yourself, please?

10 MR. ICE: Yes. Tony Ice, President of Operations for Hamm's
11 Frontier Marine.

12 CWO [REDACTED]: Okay. And then again Mr. Henshaw, we do have
13 your permission to record this interview?

14 MR. HENSHAW: Yes, you do.

15 CWO [REDACTED]: Okay. All right, we'll go ahead and get
16 started. Mr. Karr, I believe you have some questions.

17 MR. KARR: Yes, I do.

18 INTERVIEW OF JACKIE HENSHAW

19 BY MR. KARR:

20 Q. And, Mr. Henshaw, I would like this to be a conversation.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. After I finished the interview and I -- with you -- and I
23 wrote up a draft report, I sent it out for review by the different
24 parties, including the Army Corps of Engineers. And when I sent
25 it to the Corps of Engineers, they informed me that the sailing

1 line had been changed three years ago in 2018. And that was news
2 to me, and I want -- and I wanted to, you know, find out, you
3 know, have a conversation with you to find out what your, you
4 know, how you use sailing lines, how you get information from the
5 Corps of Engineers.

6 So my first question would just be, you know, as an operator,
7 you know, at the time of the collision before the time leading up
8 to the collision, you know, tell me about sailing lines and how
9 you used them, what you knew about them.

10 A. Well I mean, the sailing lines are basically, you know, a
11 reference. You know, I mean, you don't run them, you know,
12 exactly on the sailing line. I mean, some places you can but
13 most, you know, they're just a, you know, a reference point, you
14 know, in my opinion but, you know. Yeah, I do watch, you know, I
15 watch sailing lines, but like I said, you know, there's times you
16 can't just run it at 100 percent off the sailing line.

17 Q. Well, when you -- on the date of the accident when you took
18 over at 11:00, you know, can you tell me what you were -- can you
19 describe to me what you were thinking about the sailing line at
20 that time? Were you --

21 A. Yeah, I was watching the sailing line and everything, you
22 know. Like I said, you know, it's a reference, you know. Yeah, I
23 was following the sailing line.

24 Q. What was that last thing you said?

25 A. I said I was following the sailing line, you know, going down

1 in there. You know, like I said, it's mostly for a reference, but
2 I do follow the sailing lines, depending on where it's at but
3 that's the long story -- you know, it's more of a reference, but
4 you do pay attention to it in the approach.

5 Q. What were you using for ^{Navigation} ~~net~~ when you went under the bridge in
6 Alton, Illinois back in March? Were you using paper charts, or
7 what kind of charts were you using to look at the sailing line?

8 A. We was using the Rose -- using the Rose Point.

9 Q. Well, I had a -- well tell me about where you were in
10 relationship to the sailing line at that point or on that day.

11 A. Okay. The closer I got, the water blew me off the sailing
12 line toward the wall, that's what happened, you know what I mean.

13 Q. All right. Was there --

14 A. The wind, you know --

15 Q. Can you re -- you know, was there --

16 A. Pardon me?

17 Q. Was there any moment after you took over the watch at 11:00
18 in the morning when you had a thought in your mind that you were
19 moving away from the sailing line?

20 A. Yeah, the closer I got, the more I was moving away. I mean,
21 due to the wind and everything else -- so the thing to do was try
22 to hold to the sailing line and get down guide walls, as much you
23 could, if that makes sense.

24 Q. All right. Give me just, give me -- I'm going to look at --
25 I'm going to look at my notes a second so just give me a chance,

1 give me a moment.

2 (Pause)

3 Can you tell me if a -- were you aware that the sailing line
4 had moved closer to the Illinois side back in 2018?

5 A. I -- not that I can recall. I mean, like I said, I didn't
6 realize it -- exactly when they moved it.

7 Q. Had you ever noticed that it had changed?

8 A. Do what now? You're breaking up.

9 Q. Had --

10 A. What was the question?

11 Q. The question is do you recall receiving information that the
12 sailing line had been changed?

13 A. I don't recall specifically hearing that information, I mean,
14 in that timespan. I mean, I could have, but I don't recall.

15 Q. All right. Well, one of the issues that I'm -- Mr. Henshaw,
16 one of the issues that I'm looking into is how the Corps of
17 Engineers gets information to people like you who are actually
18 using the information. So one of the things they use are
19 navigation bulletins. Can you tell me when the last time that,
20 you know -- when you last read a navigation bulletin from the
21 Corps?

22 A. It would probably have been like, three days before that the
23 day I got on. I usually look at it when I first get on the boat
24 for sure. Hadn't been on but three days. So I'm sure I looked at
25 it the last, you know, three days, four days.

1 Q. And how are -- how do you locate the navigation bulletins? I
2 mean, how does that information get to you?

3 A. They send an email. Usually you got to look it up on the
4 email.

5 Q. Can you tell me about that email system that you used to find
6 out about this information?

7 A. Well, you just got to go back to the -- and scan the emails,
8 until you find anything on navigation of mariners.

9 Q. Is that a personal email account?

10 A. Well, that's the one on the boat, I mean, it's the boat's
11 account, I guess.

12 Q. Oh, okay. Mr. Henshaw, what I'm trying to, you know, what
13 I'm trying to find out -- what I'm trying to learn is, you know,
14 again, how safety information gets to you. And what I'm just
15 hearing is that when you get to the boat, you are looking at the
16 -- and let's be specific. So on that -- when you went on board
17 the boat back in March, you read through the emails looking for
18 navigation safety information.

19 A. Yeah, Notice to Mariners. Reading the Notice to Mariners is
20 how it comes out.

21 Q. All right, one moment. On the boat, what -- when you were on
22 the boat back in March, on the *Kevin Michael*, was there any
23 special notebook, or any information, or a file on the computer
24 that contained really important stuff about navigating?

25 A. Well, like I said, yeah, you have to go through the emails,

1 usually is where I get it.

2 Q. All right, well I'm looking -- I'm thinking about if anybody
3 had a really -- a real, you know, important email. Like, you
4 know, the navigation notice from three years ago, might someone
5 had filed that away somewhere as a record? Because --

6 A. I'm sure it's in the archives on the computer.

7 Q. All right.

8 A. We weren't crewing the boat three years ago.

9 MR. ICE: Well, that's true too.

10 Mr. KARR: Well, when did you start -- and who was that, was
11 that Mr. Ice?

12 MR. ICE: Yeah.

13 MR. KARR: Yeah, so when did you start running the *Kevin*
14 *Michael*?

15 MR. ICE: December 7th. December 7th of 2020.

16 MR. KARR: All right. Well, let me ask you, was there
17 anything on board like I just described -- some --

18 MR. ICE: No, there wasn't anything of that -- there wasn't
19 anything of that on board.

20 MR. KARR: All righty.

21 MR. ICE: And I've been in this industry a long time, and
22 I've -- I didn't even know they changed the sailing line on there
23 -- I don't think 90 percent of the people in the industry do.

24 MR. KARR: Well, well thanks for telling me that. And I
25 mentioned, I want to consider this a conversation, so let me ask

1 you Mr. Ice, where I found out about this was on the River
2 Industry Advisory Committee website. Are you on a distribution?

3 MR. ICE: I've never --

4 MR. KARR: Pardon me?

5 MR. ICE: No, I'm not on anything. I'm not on that -- I'm on
6 IRCA and RIAC where they send out notices. And then when I get
7 anything that's pertinent to, you know, what we're doing or
8 anything pertinent to, you know, I dispense it out to all the
9 vessels.

10 MR. KARR: And what -- you mentioned IRCA. What are those
11 initials?

12 MR. ICE: IRCA and RIAC. IRCA and RIAC.

13 MR. KARR: IRCA is India, Romeo, Charlie, Alpha?

14 MR. ICE: Yeah, Illinois River Carriers Association.

15 MR. KARR: Okay, good. And what's R-E-A -- what's RIAC?

16 MR. ICE: River -- that might be what you were talking about
17 -- River Industry -- it might be the abbreviation for it.

18 MR. KARR: Oh, yeah, you're right. R-I-A-C, okay.

19 MR. ICE: Yeah. Well, Bernie Heroff (ph.), he's the
20 chairman. He sends out notices and broadcasts and stuff that gets
21 from the Corps on dailies to us, and then I send it off -- which I
22 just started getting the stuff from RIAC right after the accident
23 happened or right after or right before. But thereagain, if this
24 was changed three years ago, we wouldn't have had any information
25 on it on that vessel, and I've never seen that myself.

1 MR. KARR: All right. Thanks for that.

2 MR. ICE: No problem.

3 BY MR. KARR:

4 Q. All right, and now Mr. Henshaw, I've got some miscellaneous
5 questions in no particular order, so just let me go through them.

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. So have you ever had conversations with other captains on
8 your -- other captains, other pilots, about the Melvin Price Lock
9 and Dam and how difficult it can be to get through there at high
10 water?

11 A. Yes, I have.

12 Q. At that time, did anybody mention that the sailing line was
13 changed to indicate a better route for landing on the guide wall?

14 A. Not to my knowledge.

15 Q. And you told us that prior to coming to Hamm's Marine, you
16 worked for Inland Barge Lines, so would you have worked for Inland
17 Barge Lines since 2018?

18 A. Yeah, I've made a couple trips over there.

19 Q. At that time when you worked for Inland, had you ever --
20 well, did you sail through the Melvin Price Lock and Dam working
21 for Inland?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. Anybody talk about any special concerns at that -- did anyone
24 at Inland or any of your fellow employees at Inland talk about the
25 sailing line at Melvin Price Lock and Dam?

1 A. No, they never discussed sailing lines.

2 Q. The last time we talked, you mentioned that after you went
3 through the bridge -- well, let's say some time after going
4 through the bridge, that you did not actually look at Rose Point
5 because you said you needed to look outside. I mean, that may or
6 may not be, you know, I'm not going to hold you to exactly that
7 but I mean as far as when you were navigating after you'd come in
8 under the bridge, were you cognizant of where you were in
9 relationship to the sailing line on Rose Point?

10 A. I was -- you know, coming (indiscernible) bridges was pretty
11 close and then it went to setting-off, you know -- I was -- that's
12 a major approach on the lock, to start setting toward the wind and
13 the current, set towards lock, (indiscernible).

14 Q. All right.

15 A. But like I said, once you get that close, you're pretty much
16 looking out the window and watching your radar for your distance;
17 how far you are above more than anything.

18 Q. The -- can you give me a -- can you describe the rudders and
19 engine orders you used when you became concerned about your
20 closeness to the guide wall? I think in your -- last time we
21 talked, you said about a thousand feet away you got concerned that
22 you weren't going to make it. So I'm trying to -- so I'd like to
23 know what engine orders and rudder orders you used to keep away
24 from the guide wall.

25 A. Well, somewhere around that point is when I went to back it

1 up and back of my stern (indiscernible) on the shore. So I was
2 probably back about half a stern, something like that or more.

3 Q. So help -- so what were you trying -- so help me understand
4 what maneuver you were trying to do. So you went to stern and you
5 want to the back toward --

6 A. I was trying to hold the fell off the wall, keep the fell
7 from going toward the wall as fast. I was backing back toward the
8 Illinois side.

9 Q. Were you successful in going towards the Illinois side?

10 A. Well, I laid it down on the wall, the empties -- I had
11 empties on the end. They landed on the wall, and that's when it
12 broke into -- you know, and the load end at the wall.

13 Q. Okay. Well, help me understand that because when I looked at
14 the video, and I didn't see the vessel moving towards the Illinois
15 side, I saw it drifting across towards the Missouri side.

16 A. It wasn't -- I was trying to go to the Illinois side. How
17 fast it was going, or if it's going or not was a different
18 question, but --

19 Q. Gotcha.

20 A. But that was my intention, you know, was holding it off the
21 wall.

22 Q. Right. And --

23 A. Long as I could.

24 Q. All right. Do you know where the rudder was when you were
25 backing down or when you had it in reverse?

1 A. It was probably about half way to -- I was backing toward the
2 port, so I was backing the rudders about half -- down to the port,
3 more somewhere in the neighborhood.

4 Q. And I'm going through my notes -- going through questions
5 that I have.

6 (Pause)

7 Q. And for right now, this is my last question. And like I
8 said, this is a discussion so if, you know, after -- I hope the
9 discussion -- after Mr. [REDACTED] answers -- or asks questions, you
10 know, I'm open for any input from Mr. Ice and Mr. Henshaw on this
11 subject. So my last question, Mr. Henshaw, is the two deckhands
12 that were on the bow of the tow, where were they when the
13 collision occurred?

14 A. They was out on the starboard head of the tow.

15 Q. So they -- so after the collision occurred, where were they?

16 A. Well, the empties broke off and then went to the center. You
17 know, over on the sails is on the center of the lock track.

18 Q. So they were -- they were on one of the -- they were on the
19 center -- they were on one of the lead barges, the one in the
20 center?

21 A. Yeah, the starboard lead barge.

22 Q. How'd they -- how did they get recovered?

23 A. It landed on the wall and they just got off on the wall, on
24 the inside wall.

25 MR. KARR: All right, thanks.

1 ██████, that's all --

2 CWO ██████: Mr. Henshaw, this is ██████ --

3 MR. KARR: Yeah, that's all the questions I have for now.

4 CWO ██████: Okay. Thank you.

5 BY CWO ██████:

6 Q. Mr. Henshaw, this is ██████ with the Coast Guard Sector
7 Upper. I just have a couple of questions. And, again, I kind of
8 agree with Mr. Karr to try and keep this at a conversational type
9 back and forth. But let me ask you, were you on watch when lock
10 arrangements were made on the day of the incident?

11 A. No, we was already making our approach when I cut my watch.
12 The captain's got to set it up, you know, and have permission to
13 go down and all that.

14 Q. All right. Were you aware of any notice when you relieved
15 the watch, were you aware of any notice made by Army Corps to the
16 master of the (indiscernible) any outdraft conditions or did the
17 cold current that you made experience on approach?

18 A. Well, I mean, it's common knowledge that was -- they was
19 running it wide open so I mean, it was as strong as it's going to
20 get. I mean, all the gates was at water.

21 Q. Right. I understand. I guess what I'm trying to get at is,
22 you know, some of the things on the approach are visible, you
23 know. Run in open river, all the gates are open, that's something
24 that's visible. But the currents and the outdrafts aren't nearly
25 as visible as seeing all the gates up out of the water. So what

1 I'm asking is is, you know, and this doesn't -- I guess this could
2 apply in any kind of abnormal condition where when making lock
3 arrangements, have you ever been given any advisement or notice by
4 an Army Corps lock master or ship chief notifying you that you may
5 experience some kind of currents or pull or draw that may make an
6 approach difficult?

7 MR. MONDL: This is Jim Mondl. If I can interrupt for just a
8 moment. [REDACTED], you asked that question, "ever", and you know,
9 you've been obviously doing this a long time. I just wonder if --
10 well, I guess maybe what I want to do is just, if nothing else,
11 emphasize to the captain that the question included the word
12 "ever" as opposed to, you know, sort of recently, but ever's a
13 long time.

14 Go ahead. Mr. Henshaw, go ahead and answer that question,
15 recognizing that he asked you "ever".

16 MR. HENSHAW: Okay, I'm aware of that. But, yeah, they used
17 to years ago. I mean, they'd tell you how wide to come down off
18 the end of the wall, you know, depending on sets of the walls and
19 stuff. They used to do that all the time as regular basis but the
20 last, I don't know, five, ten, 15 years, they've kind of gotten
21 away from that. But they used to advise you of that; how wide
22 people's coming down when they cleared in that long wall, how wide
23 the edge should be and all such as that. Like I said, that's a
24 thing of the past.

25 BY CWO [REDACTED]:

1 Q. Do you have any insight on why they stopped providing that
2 advisement or guidance?

3 A. I'd say all those guys retired (indiscernible) that -- you
4 know, it's just over time it's just something (indiscernible).

5 MR. ICE: I think some of that also has to do with the new
6 charting systems on the boats. You know, back 10, 15, to 20 years
7 ago, boats didn't have all that stuff and it was -- it's pertinent
8 information that the Corps was passing on and which I feel they
9 still should --

10 CWO [REDACTED]: This is Mr. Ice.

11 MR. ICE: -- but they don't anymore. I've been in some
12 pretty hairy situations that I wish the Corps would say, hey, the
13 outdraft's strong, so on and so forth. I, you know, I --
14 something I don't reckon -- I don't remember seeing, and it might
15 be there, is the orange ball on the end of the long wall. Is that
16 still there, Jackie? Did you notice that?

17 MR. HENSHAW: They weren't colorful.

18 MR. ICE: The outdraft sign? Yeah, the outdraft sign?

19 MR. HENSHAW: Shoot, I don't know if they got one of them --
20 (Crosstalk)

21 MR. ICE: Yeah, I went down in there, and I can't recall
22 seeing it. Maybe it's just because I haven't been down there in a
23 while, but the -- normally at the end of the long wall, the Corps
24 has a giant orange ball that they open up, and it stands for
25 outdraft conditions. I'm not sure if Mel-Price has that out there

1 and if they do -- if, I don't remember, it's probably not big
2 enough to remember or notice.

3 [REDACTED], do you know if they have -- do they have an outdraft
4 sign out there?

5 CWO [REDACTED]: That is -- no, that's not something I'm aware
6 of. I've asked the Army Corps for their procedures in terms of --
7 you know, on determining approaches and signals and things like
8 that, and it -- that is not something that they disclosed to me.
9 Basically these --

10 MR. ICE: I'd ask -- you might get on there and ask them
11 that.

12 CWO [REDACTED]: Other than the windsock -- they do have the
13 orange windsock out at the end of the long wall, the only thing
14 they told me about was the green, amber and red lights.

15 MR. ICE: Yes.

16 CWO [REDACTED]: There's -- they mention nothing of an orange
17 ball, but that's something that I could ask about.

18 MR. ICE: Yeah, [REDACTED], if I can, you also alluded to a
19 possible or -- I'm not sure exactly what you're getting to with
20 the locking arrangements and possible warnings or something. Is
21 -- did -- is the Corps of Engineers contending that they told the
22 captain about outdraft or something during their locking
23 arrangement?

24 CWO [REDACTED]: No. No, they did not.

25 MR. ICE: Okay, (indiscernible). I mean anymore, anymore --

1 last I remember going down there, the only thing they'd say is --
2 you have to actually physically ask them. Say, hey what are you
3 running on the dams? Would I start out out here? Like Jackie
4 said, 10, 15 years ago, 20 years ago, when they -- I started going
5 down there, they would give you the information. Cap, we're
6 running a hundred or some feet on the dam, you know, outdrafts are
7 minimal. Or they're 200 and -- or they're wide open, they're
8 strong, strong drafts. A thousand to -- you know, 1200 feet above
9 the wall, she starts pulling you. They used to do that and they
10 don't do that no more.

11 CWO [REDACTED]: All right. And Mr. Henshaw, let me ask you when
12 you're -- in your opinion, if you would've had, if you would've
13 had a better notice of the kind of outdrafts that were going on at
14 Mel-Price, would that have influenced your approach?

15 MR. HENSHAW: It could (indiscernible).

16 CWO [REDACTED]: I'm sorry, could you say that again?

17 MR. HENSHAW: There's a lot of static on this thing. Yeah,
18 it probably would have. I going to say yes.

19 CWO [REDACTED]: Okay.

20 MR. ICE: I can tell you too from making Mel-Price, you'd
21 want them wide open. Sometimes there's a real strong draft there,
22 and then sometimes there's not.

23 CWO [REDACTED]: It's --

24 MR. ICE: That lock is strange because when the two pools
25 meet, and say if you've got more flow coming out of the Missouri

1 River and coming off the Upper, that'll kind of back that water up
2 and there's not much of a draft onto that wall. And, you know,
3 the way I've made that lock is sometimes I've made it just like I
4 would every other time and then, you know, if I know that it's
5 real strong, say that the water's coming off of the Upper, which
6 we didn't know which where -- or I didn't know which way water was
7 coming up. Anyways, it'll have more of a draw to the wall. Are
8 you seeing what I'm saying? Because there's more of a downward
9 pull. Are you following me on that?

10 CWO [REDACTED]: Right.

11 MR. ICE: So --

12 CWO [REDACTED]: And I -- the thing that I'm trying to determine,
13 and I -- I've gone back and looked at some other casualties that
14 we've had at some of the other lock and dams with similar
15 conditions and the thing is, is mariners, they should have all the
16 information available to them. And some of that information is
17 clearly visible, right? Like dam gates are wide open. But
18 sometimes these guys are locking through at night so they may or
19 may not know whether or not the dam gates are open. But --

20 MR. ICE: Oh, I 100 percent agree with you. They should be
21 passing that information off.

22 CWO [REDACTED]: When there's information, like the amount of
23 water that's passing through or outdraft conditions that may
24 exist, those are things that may or -- the master or pilot may or
25 may not know. And, you know, when guys go through -- I know

1 people talk on the river, and I know that mariners, you know, if
2 they sense something, they'll probably tell the lockmaster, hey,
3 you know, just so you know, I got a pretty good pull or whatever.
4 But I just kind of wanted to get from Mr. Henshaw if that
5 information was passed, if that would be beneficial? And you've
6 --

7 MR. HENSHAW: Yes, it would.

8 CWO [REDACTED]: Do you believe that information would be
9 helpful, Mr. Henshaw?

10 MR. HENSHAW: Why yes, I do. I sure do.

11 MR. ICE: Those are (indiscernible) --

12 CWO [REDACTED]: -- have a --

13 MR. ICE: Hey, [REDACTED] --

14 CWO [REDACTED]: -- multiple questions?

15 MR. ICE: [REDACTED], this is Tony. Once more thing. Hey, do you
16 remember when we were on the dam? You remember that -- you know
17 where the dam ends and then they have this series of cells on that
18 right sending bank? The little levy that goes all the way over
19 there; you know what I'm talking about?

20 CWO [REDACTED]: The spillway?

21 MR. ICE: Yeah, the spillway. That is -- that's where I was
22 getting to -- real quick to clarify what I was telling you. When
23 that is under water, a considerable amount, there isn't a hard
24 pull on that dam because the water is going around it basically.
25 Are you following what I'm saying?

1 CWO [REDACTED]: Yeah.

2 MR. ICE: So that -- I mean, they're all-out with the dam,
3 but that water's going over the spillway, over the little
4 cofferdam they have on the other side, and that causes less of a
5 pull to the wall. So with the gate position out of the water,
6 it's hard to say if they're in all-out conditions, if it's going
7 to be a hard pull to the wall or not. Are you following me on
8 that?

9 CWO [REDACTED]: Yeah, and I think -- but I think at the same
10 time, conditions at the lock and dam, they're not constant. You
11 know --

12 MR. ICE: Exactly.

13 CWO [REDACTED]: Sometimes the gates may be closed and water is
14 going over the spillway. And then sometimes, at -- if there's a
15 higher pull, water's going over the spillway and they've got all
16 the dam gates open.

17 MR. ICE: Yeah, I've never seen what the wall with the gates
18 and the water going over the spillway.

19 CWO [REDACTED]: So I -- yeah --

20 MR. ICE: I've never seen that, but yeah, I know what you're
21 saying.

22 CWO [REDACTED]: The conditions of the lock, you know, and their
23 operations, I think change --

24 MR. ICE: Well they should be passing on the information to
25 everybody.

1 CWO [REDACTED]: Yeah, maybe. And -- you know, maybe they
2 should. So --

3 MR. ICE: Maybe they need to figure out a way that if they
4 could come up with some way that could -- when you approach, say
5 like Mel-Price or any other dams, that a little thing pops up --
6 because Rose Point's getting to that point. It can give you all
7 the pertinent information. It pops up and it tells you, okay this
8 is the CFMs of water running through the -- their CFS of water
9 running through the dam, this is how many gates are open, this is
10 the pull to the wall. They can major all that stuff, see how many
11 mile an hour it's pulling to the wall.

12 CWO [REDACTED]: Yeah, there's -- I'm sure there's lots of things
13 that can be done.

14 MR. ICE: Yeah.

15 CWO [REDACTED]: But to prevent future accidents --

16 MR. ICE: I mean, it's just ways to avoid the situation of
17 what happened, you know.

18 CWO [REDACTED]: Right. Right. Well, that's all I have.

19 Mr. Karr, did you have any follow-up questions?

20 BY MR. KARR:

21 Q. Yes. Mr. Henshaw, it's Mike Karr with the NTSB. When you
22 approached the guide wall, was there an amber -- was there a
23 green, amber or red light visible?

24 A. That'd be on your last standing watch, you know, but I had
25 the green light, I'm sure.

1 Q. Oh, so the light -- that's just --

2 A. The green light to come in --

3 Q. Oh, so that -- so --

4 A. Pardon me?

5 Q. That's just the -- so, Mr. Henshaw, that's just -- that's a
6 traffic light to let you know whether you can proceed into the
7 lock.

8 A. Right.

9 Q. Right. Okay, I -- as part of the discussion, I was thinking
10 that it -- this was an overall warning of what the approach is
11 like. You know, as you're coming through the Alton Bridge, you'd
12 see the light and if it was green, you'd think it was great
13 conditions, if it was yellow, take caution, and of course if it
14 was red, they'd probably -- they'd want you to stop.

15 A. Nope, and it was locked.

16 Q. But it's not like that. It's just about whether it's okay to
17 enter the lock, like as in the lock is --

18 MR. ICE: That's the big orange --

19 MR. KARR: Pardon me?

20 MR. ICE: That's the big orange ball I was talking about
21 there, Mr. Karr.

22 MR. KARR: So the orange ball is the one that would be used
23 to warn you if --

24 MR. ICE: It'd be on the end of the long wall. It should be
25 on the end of the long wall and it would be open, and it has an

1 amber light in the middle of it for at night so that way you
2 notice if it's -- outdraft conditions are present. The orange
3 ball is for a day beacon so you can see it during the day. It's
4 usually about five, six foot in diameter maybe, and -- with Mel-
5 Price as big as it is out in the middle, with something like that,
6 it needs to be like, eight to ten feet diameter. I mean, you need
7 to be able to see it to know that the outdraft conditions are --
8 or you know, are there.

9 MR. KARR: Yeah. Mr. Ice, I'm looking at the -- I just
10 pulled up the security camera video at minute 10:35, and it's got
11 a closeup of the bullnose on that guide wall, and I do not see an
12 orange ball.

13 MR. ICE: Yeah.

14 MR. KARR: All right.

15 CWO [REDACTED]: Was it that at the top of the --

16 MR. ICE: And then it --

17 CWO [REDACTED]: -- or like, at the end of the bullnose?

18 MR. ICE: No, it'll be all the way at the end of the long
19 wall, all the way out.

20 CWO [REDACTED]: Yeah, the only thing -- but it would be on the
21 top of the long wall, like where you --

22 MR. ICE: Yep, it'd be right -- it should be right underneath
23 the windsock.

24 MR. KARR: Oh, the windsock, the windsock. Okay, I'm not
25 looking at that.

1 CWO [REDACTED]: There's a windsock --

2 MR. ICE: Yeah, it should be right underneath the windsock.

3 CWO [REDACTED]: Yeah, the windsock is there but I do not recall
4 in the video seeing an orange ball.

5 MR. ICE: Yeah, it'd probably be black on the backside of it
6 from looking from the dam port but on -- and it should -- what
7 they do up there is they close them together and it latches so you
8 -- like when the outdraft's not present, they -- you can't see it
9 and then it opens up. It's like spring-loaded and that opens up
10 into a giant ball.

11 CWO [REDACTED]: Are you familiar with this ball, Mr. Henshaw?
12 This aid?

13 MR. HENSHAW: I've never seen it that I can recall. I mean,
14 most of them use, you know, outdraft signs where they turn them
15 around. They're big and red, and when the outdraft gets up to a
16 certain stage they go out there and they turn it around.

17 MR. ICE: That's the same thing I'm talking about, Jackie, is
18 that big -- it --

19 MR. HENSHAW: Yeah.

20 MR. ICE: It looks like a big orange ball. It's a big red
21 sign that looks like a big round ball.

22 MR. KARR: And this is Mike Karr. Where would that be
23 located? I'm looking at the guide wall, I see --

24 MR. ICE: It should be on the very upper end of the long
25 wall. All the locks have them.

1 MR. KARR: The long -- the guide wall, which is where they --
2 where the --

3 MR. ICE: Yeah.

4 MR. KARR: -- barges struck?

5 MR. ICE: Yep.

6 CWO [REDACTED]: Yes.

7 MR. KARR: Okay. Yeah, I don't see anything -- any balls
8 there. I see the lamp --

9 CWO [REDACTED]: You don't see anything under the windsock, Mr.
10 Karr? This is [REDACTED].

11 MR. KARR: I don't --

12 CWO [REDACTED]: He said it might be under the windsock.

13 MR. KARR: You know what? I don't see a windsock at the
14 bullnose, at the end of the wall. Let me see if there's one on --
15 is -- would the -- is the windsock at the end of the guide wall?

16 MR. ICE: It should be, that's where they all are. I mean,
17 you go to Lock 25, you go to any other lock, you'll see it. I
18 call it a ball; it's just a big round sign and it closes -- or
19 they turn it sideways so you can't see it when the outdraft
20 conditions aren't present. Then they turn it where you can
21 actually see it when the outdraft conditions are present.

22 And then there's an amber light in the middle of it for at
23 night, so you know the -- you'll have your two or three green
24 lights above -- three green lights on the upper end of the long
25 wall and you should have two green lights on your bullnose side.

1 And those will turn red when the lock is shutdown. But underneath
2 those three green lights, and underneath that windsock, there
3 should be a giant red sign roughly five, six foot in diameter that
4 turns and that gives you -- lets the approaching mariner know that
5 the outdraft is present.

6 MR. KARR: All right. Well, we'll --

7 MR. ICE: But I don't think that that is at Mel-Price lock.

8 MR. KARR: Okay. All right.

9 CWO [REDACTED]: Do you recall seeing that sign, Mr. Henshaw?

10 MR. HENSHAW: I don't recall seeing it.

11 CWO [REDACTED]: Do you recall seeing -- any other aid other than
12 the green light to enter the lock?

13 MR. HENSHAW: I -- no, I don't.

14 MR. KARR: This is Mike Karr. Mr. Henshaw, back in March,
15 was there someone at the lock and dam that you could pick up the
16 radio and talk to and ask about conditions?

17 MR. HENSHAW: I would suppose you could. I mean --

18 MR. KARR: Tony, do you have any --

19 MR. HENSHAW: Yeah, I guess you could.

20 MR. KARR: Do you have any background ON --

21 MR. HENSHAW: Pardon me?

22 MR. KARR: -- whether there's a -- the -- you know, someone's
23 at the radio 24/7?

24 MR. HENSHAW: Yeah, there's always someone at the radio most
25 times, I mean, sometimes it takes a little while for them to

1 answer, but yeah, there's always someone there.

2 MR. KARR: But is that some -- have you ever called them up
3 and asked them about -- not just on the day of the accident, but
4 have -- again, this is one of those -- have-you-ever questions.
5 Have you ever called and spoken to someone at the lock and dam?

6 MR. HENSHAW: Yeah, I have (indiscernible) years.

7 MR. KARR: Do you ever ask them for navigation information?

8 MR. HENSHAW: Yeah, I have before.

9 MR. KARR: All right. And then for Mr. Henshaw and Mr. Ice,
10 have you heard of, are you familiar with the Upper Mississippi
11 Waterways Action Plan?

12 MR. ICE: Yes, I am.

13 MR. KARR: How about you, Mr. Henshaw?

14 MR. HENSHAW: Yeah.

15 MR. KARR: And what if --

16 MR. HENSHAW: I am.

17 MR. ICE: WAPS.

18 MR. KARR: And how do you use WAPS when -- Mr. Henshaw, how
19 do you use the information in WAPS to help you navigate?

20 MR. HENSHAW: Oh, you know, watch it for changing conditions
21 and what have you.

22 MR. KARR: Did you -- on the day of the accident, as you --
23 in the time that you were on board before the accident back in
24 March, did you refer to the WAPS at all to look for any
25 information that may apply to navigating the river at that time?

1 MR. HENSHAW: I don't believe I did. I looked at the notice
2 there, and like I said, you know, that's usually where I get most
3 of my information. I don't believe I referred to that one.

4 MR. KARR: All right. Do you recall --

5 MR. ICE: That usually comes in through --

6 MR. KARR: Go ahead.

7 MR. ICE: That would usually come in through either the radio
8 transmission during the 8 and 2:00 hours of the local -- the
9 broadcast Notice to Mariners, or Bernie Heroff from RIAC will send
10 it out. Like I said, I didn't get Bernie -- Bernie didn't start
11 sending me emails until post-accident on that.

12 MR. KARR: And Mr. Ice, was there anything back then based on
13 what you knew about the conditions --

14 MR. ICE: I don't remember hearing or seeing anything of the
15 WAPS being put into effect that day. It may have been, but I
16 hadn't -- I had not heard of it.

17 MR. KARR: All right.

18 MR. ICE: That I can recall.

19 MR. KARR: So I have nothing more to add to discussion. So,
20 [REDACTED], Mr. Ice, Mr. Henshaw, or Jim, anything else you want to
21 make sure us investigators hear?

22 MR. MONDL: Well, yeah. This is Jim Mondl. The one item I
23 guess I want to throw out there, and you know, I don't know
24 whether you insinuated this, but to the extent anybody does, you
25 had asked whether Jackie Henshaw has ever picked up the radio and

1 asked about river conditions, and I think this kind of goes back
2 to a point Tony and Jackie made earlier, which is if this is
3 helpful information, and it sounds like everybody agrees that it
4 would be, getting the draft and the river flow and the like, that
5 rather than expecting or waiting for somebody to call and ask for
6 it, that it probably is something that the Corps just ought to be
7 providing without waiting for someone to ask. And whether it's
8 done by radio or whether, as Tony suggests, maybe they just ought
9 to put it online so that anytime you're -- it just pops up on Rose
10 Point. You know, whatever the method that's -- has everybody, I
11 think is sort of in agreement, that's probably a good -- something
12 -- some method ought to be chosen by the Corps and not put this on
13 us -- on every pilot who's coming into the lock to ask for it. So
14 I'll just leave it at that.

15 CWO [REDACTED]: All right, thank you for that.

16 MR. MONDL: You're welcome.

17 MR. KARR: That was -- so this is Mike at the NTSB. I will
18 be sharing our updated drafted the report with you all to read.
19 The way I see the current safety strategy right now is they don't
20 tell you what the cubic foot per second flow is, but they do tell
21 you what the river stage is, and that's what the Waterways Action
22 Plan is based on. And so they basically tell you when to take
23 extra -- be careful versus stopping, don't sail. And at the time,
24 it was take extra -- be careful, and that's the strategy. And of
25 course, then I'm looking at, hey they had this -- the same thing

1 happened three years ago, and the Corps working with the industry
2 moved the sailing line. So based on how safety works, everybody
3 should be using the sailing line, and what I see is that
4 information's not getting out there to benefit the mariners.

5 MR. ICE: I just got -- I just looked back at my emails of
6 the quickest -- the first I've seen the WAPS come out was in March
7 23rd, four days after the accident.

8 MR. KARR: All right. Well for your inform -- yeah, those
9 are the emails. What I did notice in researching this is that the
10 Coast Guard noticed the mariners didn't come out and say WAPS but
11 they -- one of the things they said was, hey, it's reached a
12 certain height so now all your operators should have highwater
13 experience. That was --

14 MR. ICE: Right.

15 MR. KARR: Yeah, that was in the Notice to Mariners, and that
16 comes right out of the Waterways Action Plan.

17 All right. Well, yeah, I just --

18 MR. ICE: Right.

19 MR. KARR: I just shared what I'm thinking; you'll see this
20 in my draft report and you'll be able to comment on it. So I'm
21 done speaking if anybody else wants to add to the conversation?

22 MR. ICE: No, I'm done.

23 MR. MONDL: We're good.

24 CWO [REDACTED]: This is -- (indiscernible) the Coast Guard. I
25 have nothing further.

1 Mr. Mondl, Mr. Henshaw, Tony, if you guys don't have anything
2 else to add, we'll wrap this up and we'll wait for Mr. Karr to
3 send out the updated brief.

4 MR. KARR: And Mr. Henshaw, Mr. Ice, thank you for
5 participating in our conversation.

6 MR. HENSHAW: All right, thank you.

7 MR. ICE: I want to thank everybody. All right, bye.

8 CWO [REDACTED]: Thank you. Bye-bye.

9 MR. KARR: And the interview ends at 11:57.

10 (Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: TOWING VESSEL *KEVIN MICHAEL*
ACCIDENT NEAR ALTON, ILLINOIS
ON OCTOBER 20, 2021
Interview of Jackie Henshaw

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FM021

PLACE: Via telephone

DATE: October 20, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Janet Deal Mendizabal", is written over a thick black horizontal redaction bar.

Janet Deal Mendizabal
Transcriber