



## National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594  
Office of Marine Safety

### Interview Summary – DCA21FM019

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**Interview of:** Marcario Dilig, master of the tank vessel *Bow Tribute*  
**Date/Time:** March 19, 2021, 0930 to 1030 CDT  
**Location:** Crew recreation room on board the *Bow Tribute*, alongside Bowland Marine Perry Street Wharf, Gretna, LA  
**Interviewed by:** Lt. [REDACTED], USCG and Adam Tucker – NTSB  
**Attendees:** Adam Davis, Phelps Dunbar (attorney representing Odfjell interests), Hermina Urica, Tagalog Translator  
**Accident:** March 16, 2021, Contact of the Norwegian flag tank vessel *Bow Tribute* with City of New Orleans Water intakes (NTSB No. DCA21FM019). Nine Mile bend, Lower Mississippi River, mile 104, New Orleans, Louisiana.

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This interview summary has been compiled based on NTSB and US Coast Guard investigator notes taken during the interview of Captain Marcario Dilig.

- Captain Dilig is directly employed with Odfjell management and has worked 23 years for the company. Since 2016 he has been working as master on vessels of the same class as the *Bow Tribute*. He has been on the *Bow Tribute* for about a month. Although he has worked on sister vessels of the same class, this was his first time on board the *Bow Tribute*.
- On the day of the accident (March 16, 2021) the *Bow Tribute* got underway in the Lower Mississippi River (LMR) at about 0900 from the LBC Sunshine dock (LMR mile 203.9) after discharging a cargo of Benzene. They were to go to an anchorage near the Alliance 66 refinery dock in Belle Chasse, Louisiana (LMR mile 63) to wait for a position at the dock to load gasoline destined for Central America. There was no cargo on board the *Bow Tribute* for the transit to the Alliance Anchorage.
- For the southbound transit, a New Orleans Baton Rouge Steamship Pilots Association (NOBRA) pilot boarded the *Bow Tribute* at the LBC Sunshine dock.
- When asked about the master pilot exchange, the master recalled telling the pilot that everything was working with the ships propulsion, steering and navigation systems. He told the pilot the propeller was fixed pitch right hand turning and that when going astern, the bow would go to starboard. He informed the pilot the *Bow Tribute* also had a 1000 kW bow thruster, and the bollard pull was 63 tons for the tugs.
- When asked what information the pilot provided to him, the master recalled being told of the pilots plan for placement of the two tugs for the maneuver and turn off the dock (they were port side alongside on the west bank facing upriver). There was to be one tug fast on the bow and one aft that was not fast. There was no further information from the pilot at that time.

- When asked if the pilot informed the master of the river stage or expected current conditions for the transit, the master said he did not.
- The master recalled being ready to go earlier than 0900, their scheduled departure time, but there were not enough mooring men on the dock. Once all there, they let go and got off the dock, and the ship was turned southbound for the transit downriver.
- At about 1100, the master said he departed the bridge leaving the pilot, and third officer and the helmsman. He spoke to the chief officer about the plans for loading the ship, had lunch about 1130. About 1200, the second officer called him in the mess and informed him there was a training pilot going to board the *Bow Tribute*. He went to the bridge for the embarkation of the training pilot who boarded from a launch. The boarding was normal.
- When asked if the training pilot issued any helm or propulsion control orders, the master said he did not give any commands. He was seated in a chair in front of the main console near the bridge windows to the port side of the centerline next to the NOBRA pilot.
- After the training pilot boarded, the master said he went below to his cabin to take a rest.
- The master said he was awakened by a phone call from the second officer who told him they were in trouble and requested him to come to the bridge. He got up and ran to the bridge. He recalled the time was about 1520.
- Upon entering the bridge, the master said he overheard the pilot issue a full astern command. He looked forward toward the bow of the *Bow Tribute* and saw a tug and tow on the starboard bow and noticed the *Bow Tribute* was close to the bank. They were so close that there was only one way to turn the ship, which was to starboard, but that was not possible because the tug and tow were close and in the way.
- The master then recalled the pilot requesting the starboard anchor let go. Over the radio, the second officer ordered the bosun, manning the bow, to let the starboard anchor go. The master recalled that as the starboard anchor paid out, he could hear it banging down the ships starboard side.
- On the port side of the ship, they touch the port side fenders for the water intakes. He remembered they were still making headway, about 13 knots groundspeed.
- The pilot did not request the starboard anchor brake closed until the speed started to come down. When he requested the brake closed, they had about 7 shackles of chain out.
- The master recalled the pilot issuing a slow ahead order and then a slow astern order once they were clear of the last water intake.
- The pilot then requested to heave on the starboard anchor once the port side of the *Bow Tribute* was clear. The ship started to swing with the bow going to starboard (stern to port). There were lots of commands given by the pilot. The master recalled the bosun informing them it was hard to heave the anchor, so the pilot issued a dead slow ahead order.
- Once the anchor was up, the pilot turned the ship downriver again. The master asked the pilot where they needed to go to which the pilot told him they would go to ferry street.
- After that, the made ready the pilot ladder on the starboard side for another NOBRA pilot to board the *Bow Tribute* and relieve the pilot on board.

- Once the relief NOBRA pilot was on board, the accident NOBRA pilot disembarked the vessel.
- The relief pilot then took the *Bow Tribute* north (upriver) which he explained to the master was the best course of action since he was unsure about the maneuverability of the *Bow Tribute* after the contact with the intakes. The relief pilot explained it was better to run against the river.
- The relief pilot conned the *Bow Tribute* to the Kenner Bend anchorage (LMR mile 113) and once there they dropped anchor and remained there.
- When asked if he noticed any noise or vibration at the time the *Bow Tribute* was in the bend, the master said there was a small vibration, but there is always some vibration between the dead slow and the slow ahead rpm so he could not attribute the minimal vibration to the contact with the bank or intakes.
- The master recalled sounding the general alarm shortly after arriving on the bridge.
- When asked if at any point he relieved the pilot of the conn of the vessel, the master said he did not.
- When asked where the pilot was located when he entered the bridge, the master said he was standing near the forward bridge window in front of the main console. The pilot had an ECDIS computer with him there.
- When the master was asked if he was aware of any special rules, regulations, or notices for the bend where the accident took place, the master said he was not aware of any.
- When asked if the pilot advised him of any location in the river where it was recommended for him to be on the bridge, the master said no.
- When asked where he went upon entering the bridge, the master said he went to the telegraph at the center console on the starboard side of it. The second officer was at the center and manning the propulsion control telegraph. Upon noticing they were very close to the bank; he went to the port bridge wing. The pilot remained standing at the forward bridge window. He did not notice where the training pilot was at that point.
- When asked who was on the bridge in addition to the NOBRA pilot and training pilot, the master said the second officer and helmsman were there. There was a lookout posted who was forward on the bow with a radio. That was the bosun.
- When asked if the anchor was let go either by remote control or manually, the master said it was manual as there was no remote control.
- When asked to confirm how many shackles of chain was out, the master said there were seven in the water.
- When asked if he had previously sailed in the Lower Mississippi River before, the master said that he has “many times”.
- Postaccident, when asked if he had any discussion with the NOBRA pilot regarding the contact with the water intakes, the master said there was no discussion, and the pilot did not explain what happened.
- After the contact with the water intakes, when asked if he saw the training pilot, the master said he did not see him.

- When asked about any interaction with Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), the master said the pilot communicated with VTS, but he had no recall of what exactly was communicated.
- When asked about his sleep, the master said the night prior to the accident, they were alongside the dock for a 12-hour cargo discharge and he had a good and undisrupted night sleep.
- When asked about the navigation watch officer organization on board, the master said the chief officer was a dayworker, and there were two third officers and one second officer on board. The second officer worked the 0000-0400 and 1200-1600 watch and the most junior of the third officers worked the 2000-2400 and 0800-1200 watch with the more experienced third officer working the 1600-2000 and 0400-0800 watch.
- When asked if the *Bow Tribute* was a dry ship, the master said that it was and there was no alcohol on board. He further said that no crew were allowed ashore when they were alongside the dock due to the COVID pandemic.
- When asked where his cabin was in relation to the bridge, the master said it was one deck directly below.
- When asked how many steering pumps were running at the time, the master said that both were running.

**End of summary**