

Statement of Darayl Pridham, JetBlue Captain, operating JBU 777 8 Feb 2024.

The following is to the best of my recollection:

1. I arrived early at the terminal and realized that there was potential need for de-ice for frost. I called the dispatcher to amend the release and add fuel for prolonged ground operations. Once onboard, I visually inspected the wings from the cabin to confirm the need to de-ice. I briefed the crew and completed briefing with the First Officer including de-ice review and need for type 1 de-ice.
2. I called Winter Ops about 40 minutes prior to push and told them we would need to de-ice. They told me that we would be going to the Earhart Pad. They told me to proceed and call when on B taxiway approaching the fire house. Preflight proceeded normally.
3. At approximately 25 minutes prior to departure time, I attempted to initialize CPDLC and received an amber error message. We called for Tech Ops to send someone to investigate the error. Over the base frequency we heard that other aircraft were having similar issues. I also had issues getting FD Pro and WSI to load our proper flight plan. We called clearance delivery and they responded that they did not have a flight plan filed for us. I called dispatch and they refiled our flight plan. Within a few minutes we again called ATC, they said they saw our flight plan and would send shortly. I was then able to initialize the CPDLC. We received our clearance, told Tech Ops onboard the issue was resolved, and we were clear. Normal door closing procedures, briefed departure and completed before start checklist. We were able to push 2 minutes early.
4. I recall normal push procedures and engine starts without any problems. We started both engines due to de-ice procedures. We pushed off gate C14 and when at the alley short of A taxiway made several attempts to contact ground. We were, after several minutes, able to get taxi instructions to go to Earhart; however, we were told we would be waiting on runway 22R short of E taxiway due to a long line forming for the de-ice pad.
5. Ground frequency was busy due to multiple aircraft needing de-ice and the ground controller relayed to other JetBlue aircraft that spots appeared available at Earhart Pad but he was not sure what was going on. We were the third JetBlue aircraft in line on runway 22R short E. There was another JetBlue aircraft on E between M taxiway and 22R short 22R facing west. I had the First Officer contact AEROMAG on [REDACTED] to inform them we were in line for de-ice pad entry. Normal procedures to call abeam the fire house were not able to be used and it seemed this was causing confusion for AEROMAG.
6. We monitored BOS Ground and AEROMAG while waiting for our turn. While parked, I recall that we discussed that AEROMAG seemed to be struggling today, particularly keeping track of aircraft waiting outside the Earhart pad for their turn to enter. We also heard them giving the aircraft ahead of us a verbal countdown on AEROMAG frequency to stop on their parking spot. This was different from past procedures of light bars on the follow me truck or a marshaller exiting and using standard wand signals.
7. My recollection is that about 30-35 minutes after push back we were told by AEROMAG they were ready for us to taxi to the Earhart Pad. We informed BOS Ground and were given

instructions for taxi. Follow Me truck was waiting at the entrance to the Pad and AEROMAG instructed us to follow to OnDeck 4 parking spot. We parked on OnDeck 4 and AEROMAG told us that we would go to either D1 or D2 depending on which aircraft moved first. I commented to the First Officer that I felt like the area was tight and did not like how it felt taxiing in the tight areas. I commented that in general I do not like the setup of the Earhart Pad, and it always feels like a tight space.

8. The aircraft on spot D1 started their taxi. AEROMAG moved the follow me truck back in front of our aircraft and told us we were going to move into spot D1. The aircraft in spot D2 also called for taxi with BOS Ground and was cleared out following company aircraft that was pulling onto J taxiway from spot D1. I felt the spacing was tight but in 15 years of operating in BOS have always felt tight at the Earhart Pad. I decided to ride the brakes and focus intently on the yellow taxi line. I felt that the space, visually, may feel tight but it is measured and marked such that if we do what we are supposed to do, and I stay on my taxi line that I have proper clearance.
9. We started to roll forward and several seconds into moving we heard a grinding noise and felt a vibration. It felt very similar to when the anti-skid system for the brakes engages. It sounded to me like the noise was on the right side of the airplane. I asked the First Officer if we hit anything on her side. She verified the right side was visually clear. I stayed focused on the taxi line. We discussed how we both felt like the grinding and vibration was very similar to anti-skid system for the brakes when it engages. The surface was completely wet, covered in de-ice fluid and we were right on top of the yellow taxi line so we thought the anti-skid system made sense.
10. We were still moving forward very slowly and heard another aircraft on AEROMAG frequency ask if something struck their aircraft. We stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake as at that point it seemed possible, we had hit them. We decided not to move until we could get visual confirmation that we were the ones that had hit them and that it was not a de-ice truck. I could not see the left sharklet very well as it was still dark, other than to note that it was there and intact. I could not see the tail of the aircraft on D2 as it was behind us.
11. While we were waiting for Massport and JetBlue Tech Ops and safety people to arrive and the sun started to rise I could see a black mark on the inner portion of the sharklet. We also spoke to people on the ground and confirmed we had hit the other aircraft. We discussed starting the APU and decided it was safe to do so. After starting the APU, we shut down the engines to allow closer inspections.
12. I called the Inflight #1 to brief him on what happened. He confirmed they were aware and that the cabin was stable, and they would await word from me. I made a PA to the cabin confirming the incident and stated that it was being evaluated outside. It became clear that there would be some time involved in the evaluation outside by Massport, safety, and others.
13. Throughout this period, we monitored Massport frequency and AEROMAG. After approximately 45 minutes of hearing no communications on AEROMAG, we contacted BOS Ops. We wanted to evaluate the next steps to get the aircraft to the gate and deplane the passengers. We were given a gate for when we did move and were told Tech Ops was coming to inspect the other aircraft. We requested a visual inspection as well, to ensure we could safely move the airplane. We discussed as a crew if we would taxi or be towed to the gate.

14. We eventually had someone identifying themselves as being from Tech Ops plug in to speak to us via headset. They confirmed damage to the sharklet and said they saw no other structural damage in their inspection and that it was safe to taxi the aircraft. Tech ops subsequently came back on headset and said it would be wise to allow them to get airstairs to get above the wing to confirm there would be no loose debris that could fall onto the taxiways. The other aircraft started engines and taxied to the gate. We waited for airstairs to arrive to complete that inspection.
15. After the airstair arrived and they completed their inspection, they came back on headset to confirm all debris was clear, and that it was safe to taxi the aircraft back to the terminal. We discussed with them leaving the flaps in position 2 pending any further inspections. We coordinated with the crew outside for wing walker support and monitor engine starts.
16. I recall confirming with Inflight #1 that the cabin was secure. We utilized normal checklist and start procedures. We called AEROMAG to leave the pad with no response and then called BOS Ground to taxi uneventfully to C17 for normal parking and shutdown procedures. We shut down and completed normal parking flows and checklists. We left the flaps in position 2.

Statement of Andrea LaBarbara, JetBlue First Officer, operating Flight 777 on February 8, 2024

The following is to the best of my recollection:

1. The day started as a normal early morning show for a two-day trip to Las Vegas with a Captain that I had flown with in the past, Darayl Pridham. I had awakened at 0310, was out of my house at 0350 after a breakfast, on a 0430 bus, and at the airport at 0500 for a 0601 scheduled departure.
2. When I arrived at the gate, Captain Pridham was already there. We agreed that Captain Pridham would fly us to LAS; so, I completed my cockpit prep and proceeded outside to conduct my pre flight walk around.
3. We concluded that there was a frost layer on the upper surface of the wings with no precipitation falling and that we would get deiced with a one-step process. We notified Winter Ops that we would be requiring deice and they responded that we would be taxiing to Earhart Pad.
4. Approximately 30 minutes prior to push we had an issue with our CPDLC connecting. Captain Pridham called maintenance and I called Clearance to try to get a verbal clearance. They informed us that there was no flight plan on file and that there were about 3 of us so far in the same position. Captain Pridham called Dispatch and resolved the issue with our filing. The CPDLC connected and our clearance was received. We completed our before start flows and pushed from the gate 2 minutes early at 0559.
5. After an uneventful pushback and engine start, we called Ground for taxi instructions. It was a busy, pre-dawn, morning with most JetBlue aircraft taxiing for deice to the Earhart pad. Instead of the standard taxi instructions of Bravo and contact Aeromag abeam the firehouse, we were given Bravo, Charlie, 22R, and hold short of Echo. When we turned onto 22R, we were either 3 or 4 inline for deice. While listening to both ground and Aeromag, I recall that we had made comments to each other of the congestion on the deice ramp. I believe that Ground had also made references to the deice pad being very busy.
6. When we were number 1 short of Echo, we called Aeromag, and they approved us to make our way to the Earhart pad. We received a clearance from ground to taxi Echo, Bravo. Approaching the Earhart pad, we made visual contact with the follow me truck who informed us to follow him to Oscar Delta 4 and that we would be taking spot Delta 1 or Delta 2, whoever taxied out first. Taxing into OD4, I recall Captain Pridham and I had conversation on the tightness of the ramp. My outside scan was focusing on the right wing of our aircraft to straight ahead to the follow me truck and centerline which I verbally confirmed were clear.
7. The aircraft on Delta 1 taxied first; so, we followed Aeromags instructions to follow him to spot D1. There were some vehicles parked on the right side of the centerline in front of the buildings. I continued scanning to verify centerline and safe from obstacles off our right wing. As we continued to taxi, we experienced what felt to me like anti-lock brakes engaging and disengaging, or a shutter feeling. My recollection is that Captain Pridham asked what was that? My first thought was that it was a malfunction of our brake system due to the large amount of deice fluid coated over all surfaces.
8. We heard JetBlue 551 Question if the deice truck had hit him. With that, we immediately stopped the aircraft, realizing we must have contacted their aircraft. Our first concern was passenger and crew safety. My recollection is that Captain Pridham contacted the flight attendants and confirmed that all crew members and passengers were safe. Aeromag confirmed to us that we had made contact with JetBlue 551.

9. For approximately the next hour, we had various departments inspecting that outside of the aircrafts with measuring equipment and pictures. After Maintenance did their exterior inspections, they plugged into our radio to confirm that we had contacted JetBlue 551's horizontal stabilizer with our left winglet. Our damage had created some loose debris. Maintenance assured us that all debris was clear and when ready we were safe to start engines and taxi to the gate, which we did.