




Commander  
United States Coast Guard  
Seventeenth District

P.O. Box 25517  
Juneau, AK 99802-5517  
Phone: (907) 463-2025  
Fax: (907) 463-2256

16130  
14 February 2020

## MEMORANDUM

From:   
M. P. Kahle, CDR  
CG SECTOR Juneau (sd)

To: COMDT (CG-SAR)  
Thru: 1) CGD SEVENTEEN  4/9/20  
2) CG PACAREA

Subj: CASE REVIEW OF THE SEARCH COVERAGE IN RESPONSE TO THE SINKING  
OF CFV SCANDIES ROSE

Ref: (a) Seventeenth District Search and Rescue (SAR) Plan, CGD17INST 16104.1B  
(b) U.S. Coast Guard Addendum to the National SAR Supplement M16130.2(series)

1. Purpose: This SAR Case Review was directed to evaluate the D17 SAR System effectiveness at providing early and sustained Coast Guard response to the sinking of CFV SCANDIES ROSE on 31 December 2019. Rather than a robust, full Case Study, this abbreviated SAR Case Review is intended to provide an expedited method for informing the SAR system in regards to one specific aspect of the overall SAR response.

2. Overview: At 2150 AKST on 31 December 2019 (010650Z JAN 20), Communications Detachment (COMMDET) Kodiak overheard a Mayday call on 4125 MHz (HF) from the 130ft crab fishing vessel SCANDIES ROSE stating that they were rolling over with seven people on board in position 56-29.0N, 157-01.0W approximately 190 miles from AIRSTA Kodiak, Alaska. No further transmissions were received. Weather on scene was seas 20-30 feet, winds 35-50 knots, cloud ceiling varying from 200-500 feet above ground level (AGL), rain / snow, heavy at times, water temp 39°F, and air temp 10°F. Early in the case, SMC was shifted from SEC Anchorage to D17 following confirmed location of distress. Approximately four hours after the initial Mayday transmission, the first asset to arrive on scene, CGR-6038, recovered two survivors from a life raft. Over the next 16 hours, three more MH-60 helicopters and two HC-130 aircraft from AIRSTA Kodiak, plus the CGC MELLON would join the response. No additional crewmembers were ever located and active suspension of SAR efforts was granted at 1808 AKST 01 JAN 20 (020308 JAN 20).

### 3. Relevant Policy:

a. Reference (a) directs, "As a general rule, SMCs should move rescue assets immediately (within CG SAR response standards and environmental limits) and to ensure assets are deployed in a manner that maximizes effort early during the period of highest survival probability. Crew staffing of aircraft and small boats shall include consideration of recalling or placing on standby of off duty personnel to continue the search until the point that no additional assets are available and crew fatigue limits are reached. **Early and sustained response is the priority consideration over having SAR standby assets available for later searching.**"

Subj: CVF SCANDIES ROSE SAR CASE REVIEW

16130

14 February 2020

b. In regard to Risk Management, reference (a) recognizes that “Night helicopter flights are inherently higher risk due to conditions not typically encountered during daytime flights. Because of these hazards, risk vs. gain shall be carefully considered prior to launching a helicopter.” It goes on to direct that “When a request for helicopter support for SAR occurs the CDO shall discuss with the AIRSTA ODO/OPS on the proper level of cover and self-rescue needed for the mission.”

c. Reference (a) directs that “Air Station Kodiak shall, to the maximum extent possible, maintain at least one Bravo-0 MH-60T and at least one Bravo-0 HC-130.” When impending weather conditions warrant relocating the Bravo-0 HC-130 from AIRSTA Kodiak to Joint Base Elmendorf/Richardson (JBER) in Anchorage, Alaska, D17 allows for a shift to Bravo-2 ready status to account for increased logistics at that location.

d. Reference (b) defines Bravo-0 as “ready to proceed within 30 minutes of notification of a distress.” Bravo-2 indicates “ready to proceed” in 2 hours of notification of a distress.

#### 4. Case Chronology:

a. 2150 AKST, 31 December 2019 (010650Z JAN 20). Communications Detachment (COMMDDET) Kodiak overheard a Mayday call on 4125 MHz (HF) from the 130ft crab fishing vessel SCANDIES ROSE stating that they were rolling over with seven people on board in position 56-29.0N, 157-01.0W approximately 190 miles from Kodiak, Alaska. No further transmissions were received.

b. 2158 AKST. COMMDDET Kodiak reported the distress call to D17 Command Center (D17CC).

c. 2201 AKST. D17CC notified Sector Anchorage of distress case and authorized launch authority for AIRSTA Kodiak. Sector Anchorage assumed SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC).

d. 2204 AKST. Further review of the SCANDIES ROSE last known position identify that the vessel was outside of SEC Anchorage SAR zone. SEC Anchorage chose to retain SMC.

e. 2208 AKST. SEC Anchorage requested AIRSTA Kodiak launch of MH-60.

f. 2211 AKST. SEC Anchorage and COMMDDET Kodiak issued UMIB.

g. 2212 AKST. D17 confirmed with AIRSTA Kodiak that they had been directed to launch an MH-60 by Sector Anchorage.

h. 2246 – 2320 AKST. Sector Anchorage Operations Unit (OU) and AIRSTA Kodiak Operations Officer (OPS) conducted a conference call and discussed the need for HC-130 support and the anticipated need and timing of additional MH-60 Helicopters/crew. By the end of the call, the Sector Anchorage OU and AIRSTA Kodiak OPS agreed to launch the HC-130 staged out of Joint Base Elmendorf/Richardson (JBER) in Anchorage, Alaska, and recommended recall of a second MH-60 crew. However, it was agreed that they would delay launch of the second MH-60 until either the first MH-60 or HC-130 located something in the search area.

i. 2326 AKST. Due to the complexity of the case and the fact that D17 had tactical control of all of the responding Coast Guard resources, D17 relieved SEC Anchorage as SMC and

Subj: CVF SCANDIES ROSE SAR CASE REVIEW

16130

14 February 2020

directed CGC MELLON to divert to the search area. CGC MELLON was approximately 185 miles from SCANDIES ROSE last known position (LKP) at the time of notification.

j. 2330 AKST. The first MH-60, CGR-6038, was reported airborne 1 hr 22 min after AIRSTA Kodiak received launch request.

k. 2351 AKST. D17CC Command Duty Officer (CDO) and AIRSTA Kodiak Operations Duty Officer (ODO) discussed the response to include refueling options and recall of crews. The ODO recommended that they recall a second MH-60 crew but keep them on the ground at the air station and only launch them if the C-130 detected survivors that needed to be hoisted. D17 CDO concurred with this course of action.

l. 0057 AKST, 01 JAN 2020. D17 CDO and AIRSTA Kodiak ODO re-engaged on the issue of refueling locations. Although the next MH-60 crew was not yet at the Air Station, the ODO believed that they could have them airborne at 0230 AKST for an on scene time of 0430 AKST. The ODO also explained that refueling in Sand Point, an alternate fueling location closer to the search area, would only provide them with 15 minutes of additional search time but would create added risk of icing for the aircraft. The ODO also explained that refueling at a second alternate fuel site, Sitikinak, could give the crew as much as 30 minutes of additional on scene time but would carry similar risk to Sand Point.

m. 0131 AKST. The Bravo-2 HC-130, CGR-2011, reported airborne from JBER enroute the search area.

n. 0146 AKST. D17 SMC and AIRSTA Kodiak OPS conducted a call regarding refuel locations and availability of additional crews. AIRSTA Kodiak OPS stated he had a back-up crew on station and that they could be launched immediately. OPS also indicate he could have a third MH-60 crew available at 0800 AKST. Both parties agreed that Sand Point would be the primary re-fueling location for responding MH-60s.

o. 0200 AKST. D17 CDO directed COMMDDET Kodiak to advise CGR-6038 that they are to refuel in Sand Point in order to provide additional on-scene search time.

p. 0210 AKST. CGR-6038 arrived at the search area and saw the light of a life raft as they approached the closest point of the search box. They immediately made an approach and lowered the swimmer who confirmed no one was in the raft. At same time, the pilot saw an additional light at 090 relative to their heading. They quickly hoisted the swimmer and repositioned the aircraft until they clearly identified a person waving a light in an opening of a second life raft. CGR-6038 re-lowered the rescue swimmer and recovered two survivors who quickly indicated they had not seen any other crew members get off of the SCANDIES ROSE before it sank.

q. 0211 AKST. CGR-2011 reported arrival in the search area.

r. 0226 AKST. D17 CDO requested AIRSTA Kodiak ODO to direct CGR-6038 to deliver the survivors to Sand Point, refuel the aircraft, and get back to the search area to continue the search for the five remaining crew. At the same time, CGR-2011 advised AIRSTA Kodiak ODO that CGR-6038 was committed to return to AIRSTA Kodiak with the survivors based on weather and icing concerns at Sand Point.

s. 0258 AKST. AIRSTA Kodiak ODO advised D17 Command Center that the second MH-60 crew was finishing up fueling and would be airborne within 20 minutes.

Subj: CVF SCANDIES ROSE SAR CASE REVIEW

16130

14 February 2020

t. 0324 AKST. The second MH-60, CGR-6037, reported airborne from Kodiak enroute the search area.

u. 0534 AKST. CGR-6037 arrived on scene 2 hr 10 min after departing AIRSTA Kodiak and commenced search efforts.

v. 0640 AKST. AIRSTA Kodiak ODO advised D17 CDO that CGR-6037 was returning to base (RTB) due to weather and fatigue. The crew was reported to be sick and unable to continue to effectively search. The AIRSTA Kodiak ODO also stated they were not in favor of recalling the oncoming duty crew early and were looking for an additional MH-60 crew to get airborne at approximately 1200 AKST. D17 CDO directed AIRSTA Kodiak ODO to recall and launch the oncoming crew immediately. Additionally, D17 CDO and AIRSTA Kodiak ODO discussed options for the next HC-130 crew. AIRSTA Kodiak ODO again shared concerns that recalling the oncoming HC-130 crew early would eat into their 24-hour duty day.

w. 0747 AKST. AIRSTA Kodiak ODO advised D17 CDO that CGR-2011 had 1.5 hours remaining on scene. Additionally, the oncoming HC-130 pilot would need to be cleared by a flight surgeon before the next C-130 could get airborne. The third MH-60 crew had reported to base and was making preparations to get airborne.

x. 0830 AKST. The AIRSTA KODIAK ODO requests from the D17 OU the expectation of continuous coverage with the C-130. ODO advises the OU they can get a C-130 airborne at 0930-1000 AKST but that they could have them airborne earlier if needed. The OU advises continuous C-130 coverage is desired.

y. 0840 AKST. CGR-6038 was airborne with the duty crew for the new 24-hour duty day.

z. 0854 AKST. CGR-2011 departed scene enroute AIRSTA Kodiak.

aa. 0900 AKST. The second HC-130, CGR-2006, was airborne from AIRSTA Kodiak with the duty crew for the new 24-hour duty day.

bb. 0933 AKST. CGR-2006 arrived on scene.

cc. 1038 AKST. CGR-6038 arrived on scene 1 hr 58 min after departing AIRSTA Kodiak and commenced search efforts.

dd. 1134 AKST. CGR-6038 was forced to RTB 58 min into their search due to an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) failure.

ee. 1426 AKST. After landing back at AIRSTA Kodiak and switching out rescue swimmers and aircraft, the crew of CGR-6038 was airborne in CGR-6041 enroute back to the search area.

ff. 1615 AKST. CGC MELLON arrived on scene and commenced search efforts.

gg. 1619 AKST. CGR-6041 arrived on scene 1 hr 53 min after departing AIRSTA Kodiak and commenced search efforts.

hh. 1725 AKST. CGR-6041 reported low on fuel and departed scene enroute AIRSTA Kodiak 1 hr 6 min into their search.

ii. 1733 AKST. CGR-2006 departed scene enroute to AIRSTA Kodiak.

Subj: CVF SCANDIES ROSE SAR CASE REVIEW

16130

14 February 2020

jj. 1808 AKST. D17 granted active Suspension (ACTSUS) and released CGC MELLON to resume scheduled patrol.

5. Facts:

a. According to NOAA meteorological data, on-scene weather at the time of distress was seas 15-30 feet, winds 35-50 knots, cloud ceiling varying from 200-500 feet above ground level (AGL), rain / snow, heavy at times, water temp 39°F, and air temp 10°F.

b. AIRSTA Kodiak is located 190 miles from the last known position of the SCANDIES ROSE.

c. Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson is located 417 miles from the last known position of the SCANDIES ROSE.

d. In Accordance with reference (a), AIRSTA Kodiak shall maintain at least ONE Bravo-0 MH-60 and at least ONE Bravo-0 HC-130. When relocating the ready HC-130 to JBER, the readiness requirement for this aircraft is reduced to a Bravo-2 due to additional locale-related launch delays.

e. The first response asset, CGR-6038, did not meet Bravo-0 readiness standards. SEC Anchorage requested MH-60 launch at 2205 AKST (010705Z JAN 20). CGR-6038 was off the deck from AIRSTA at 2330 AKST (010830Z JAN 20), 1 hour 25 minutes after AIRSTA notification. CGR-6038 Aircraft Commander associated roughly 30 minutes of launch delay due to longer than normal risk management discussions/crew brief and required low-visibility route planning as a result of the severe weather conditions. Additionally, the aircraft fuel tanks were topped off to "max bag" to maximize aircraft endurance.

f. CGR-6038 transit time was 2 hr 40 min from AIRSTA Kodiak to the commence search point (CSP) of the first search pattern. They arrived on scene 4 hr 12 min after the SCANDIES ROSE mayday call.

g. Due to the 380 mile roundtrip transit from AIRSTA Kodiak to the search area, the on-scene endurance of responding MH-60 helicopters was expected to be approximately one hour.

h. AIRSTA Kodiak provided a total of four MH-60 sorties utilizing three different aircrews (a fourth rescue swimmer was called in for the final MH-60 sortie).

i. During the periods between the departure of the first MH-60 and the on-scene arrival of the three subsequent MH-60s, there were three search coverage gaps of 3 hr 8 min, 3 hr 58 min, and 4 hr 41 min in duration, respectively, when no other SRU's were actively searching.

j. Over the 19 hr 43 min period from distress notification to ACTSUS, there was approximately 3.5 hr of total MH-60 search effort.

k. A total of two HC-130 sorties were conducted, providing 15 hours of on-scene presence and communications support. HC-130s were not able to provide search coverage due to on-scene weather conditions.

l. CGR-6038 recovered two survivors from a life raft immediately upon arriving in the search area. Five members of SCANDIES ROSE crew remain unlocated.

Subj: CVF SCANDIES ROSE SAR CASE REVIEW

16130

14 February 2020

6. Opinions:

a. Based on aircraft employment decisions throughout this case, there appears to have been insufficient focus on providing early and sustained search coverage.

b. Even after the first on-scene gap, D17 Command Center SAR planners failed to recognize the required aircraft launch sequencing that would have been needed to mitigate future search coverage gaps.

c. Knowing the anticipated distance to the search area and expected max on-scene endurance for each MH-60, subsequent MH-60 sorties should have been launched approximately every hour to achieve the goal of early, sustained, on-scene search coverage. This would likely have used up all available aircrews earlier in the SAR case, but would have focused that effort during the most critical first few hours.

d. Lack of availability of a fourth flight crew necessitated reuse of the same aircrew for the third and fourth MH-60 sorties. Therefore, the 4 hr 41 min on-scene coverage gap during this aircraft change-out seems to have been unavoidable.

e. Though only required to support one Bravo-0 SAR ready crew within a 24-hour duty day, AIRSTA Kodiak did a good job on locating two additional MH-60 crews to support a total of four MH-60 sorties. This was particularly challenging since many of the AIRSTA pilots/crew would have likely consumed alcohol within the previous 12 hours as part of their New Year's Eve celebrations.

f. Given the distance from AIRSTA Kodiak to SCANDIES ROSE's last known position and the poor environmental conditions, HC-130 support should have been immediately requested to provide cover and communications support for the responding MH-60s. Lack of deliberate HC-130 launch request by SEC Anchorage Command Center, coupled with lengthy discussion between the SEC Anchorage OU and AIRSTA OPS over appropriate aircraft mix and on-scene coverage expectations, unnecessarily delayed launch of CGR-2011 leaving the CGR-6038 unsupported during much of their transit to the search area.

g. It was reasonable, given the extreme environmental conditions anticipated by the first MH-60 crew, that the aircrew would take a few additional minutes in risk management discussion/crew mission brief and necessary low visibility route planning. However, given the severe nature of distress in this case and limited cold-water survivability, 1 hour and 22 minutes seems excessive and warrants review of AIRSTA Kodiak crew notification and launch procedures.

h. While on-scene, the two HC-130 aircraft (CGR-2011 and CGR-2006) were critical to providing primary communications relay to COMMDDET Kodiak and cover/"self-rescue" support to responding MH-60s.

i. AIRSTA Kodiak has insufficient number of personnel and aircraft to meet public/ Coast Guard SAR expectations. Due to the limited USCG surface assets across D17's vast SAR zone,

Subj: CVF SCANDIES ROSE SAR CASE REVIEW

16130

14 February 2020

AIRSTA Kodiak is the primary SAR response unit for much of the Gulf of Alaska, Bering Sea, and the Arctic and is not appropriately resourced to meet mission demands.

7. Recommendations:

a. Recommend further review of the Coast Guard response to this incident in coordination with the Marine Board of Investigation for the loss of the CFV SCANDIES ROSE, with appropriate D17 follow-on actions to address recommendations and lessons learned. This SAR CASE REVIEW is intended to provide an expedited method for improving the SAR System. Rather than a comprehensive look at the entire USCG response to the CFV SCANDIES ROSE, this review focused on evaluating D17 SAR coordinator and SRU effectiveness at providing an early and sustained Coast Guard response.

b. Recommend all D17 Command Centers and AIRSTAs conduct SAR mission focused discussions to address:

- (1) Command Center and AIRSTA lessons learned from SCANDIES ROSE response;
- (2) Overarching D17 SAR response priorities and impact on case/SRU management;
- (3) Roles and responsibilities of Command Center and AIRSTA during a SAR response;
- (4) Processes/procedures for ensuring effective Command Center and AIRSTA communication and coordination;
- (5) Procedures for ensuring safe and expeditious SRU activation and deployment; and
- (6) Unique challenges in effectively responding to SAR across D17 and recommended mitigation strategies.

c. Recommend expediting plans to replace four AIRSTA Kodiak MH-65 aircraft with four MH-60 aircraft and establish an additional year-round one B-0 MH-60 out of Aviation Support Facility (AVSUPFAC) Cold Bay, on the Alaska Peninsula. Due to their relatively long range, and search/recovery capabilities, MH-60's are the primary SAR assets in Alaska. Once established, the additional year-round B-0 MH-60 capacity and improved distribution will significantly enhance SAR response within the Gulf of Alaska, Bristol Bay, and the Bering Sea. If a B-0 MH-60 out of the Cold Bay forward operating location had been available for this case, the SCANDIES ROSE would have been nearly equidistant between Cold Bay and AIRSTA Kodiak. Availability of the additional aircraft and crews could have doubled the SAR response capacity for this case and provided additional flexibility for aircraft/aircrew recovery and refueling.

d. Recommend additional crew and MH-60 aircraft to support a year-round two Bravo-0 SAR readiness posture for AIRSTA Kodiak while maintaining the ability to support forward operating location (FOL) Cordova, FOL Arctic (Kotzebue, Barrow, or Dead Horse), and FOL Cold Bay.

#

Enclosure: SAR Case Review template, SCANDIES ROSE Response

7

**SAR Case Review Template - 2019**

**SAR CASE REVIEW**

**PART 1: Case Details**

CASE DATE: 31DEC2019 - 01JAN2020		MISLE CASE #: 1204391
CASE TYPE (OVERDUE, PIW, etc.): MAYDAY BROADCAST		UNIT SUBMITTING REPORT: D17
SMC (UNIT): SEC Anchorage / D17		RCC (UNIT): D17
RECOMMENDATION TYPE		BRIEF CASE SUMMARY
LESSON LEARNED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	At 2150 AKST on 31 DEC 2019 COMMDDET Kodiak overheard a Mayday call on 4125 MHz (HF) from the 130ft crab fishing vessel SCANDIES ROSE stating that they were rolling over with seven people on board 190 miles from AIRSTA Kodiak, Alaska. Weather was 20-30 ft seas, 35-50 kt winds, water 39°F/air 10°F. Response assets included four MH-60s and two HC-130s from AIRSTA Kodiak, and CGC MELLON. Two survivors were successfully recovered. ACTSUS was granted 1808 AKST 01 JAN 2020.
POLICY UPDATE/REVISION	<input type="checkbox"/>	
EQUIPMENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
TRAINING PROGRAM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
QRC	<input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMEND FULL CASE STUDY	<input type="checkbox"/>	
OTHER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

**RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:**

1. Recommend further review of the Coast Guard response to this incident in coordination with the Marine Board of Investigation for the loss of the CFV SCANDIES ROSE, with appropriate D17 follow-on actions to address recommendations and lessons learned. This SAR CASE REVIEW is intended to provide an expedited method for improving the SAR System. Rather than a comprehensive look at the entire USCG response to the CFV SCANDIES ROSE, this review focused on evaluating D17 SAR coordinator and SRU effectiveness at providing an early and sustained Coast Guard response.
2. Recommend all D17 Command Centers and AIRSTAs conduct SAR mission focused discussions to address:
  - a. Command Center and AIRSTA lessons learned from SCANDIES ROSE response;
  - b. Overarching D17 SAR response priorities and impact on case/SRU management;
  - c. Roles and responsibilities of Command Center and AIRSTA during a SAR response;
  - d. Processes/procedures for ensuring effective Command Center and AIRSTA communication and coordination;
  - e. Procedures for ensuring safe and expeditious SRU activation and deployment; and
  - f. Unique challenges in effectively responding to SAR across D17 and recommended mitigation strategies.
3. Recommend expediting plans to replace four AIRSTA Kodiak MH-65 aircraft with four MH-60 aircraft and establish an additional year-round one B-0 MH-60 out of Aviation Support Facility (AVSUPFAC) Cold Bay, on the Alaska Peninsula. Due to their relatively long range, and search/recovery capabilities, MH-60's are the primary SAR assets in Alaska. Once established, the additional year-round B-0 MH-60 capacity and improved distribution will significantly enhance SAR response within the Gulf of Alaska, Bristol Bay, and the Bering Sea. If a B-0 MH-60 out of the Cold Bay forward operating location had been available for this case, the SCANDIES ROSE would have been nearly equidistant between Cold Bay and AIRSTA Kodiak. Availability of the additional aircraft and crews could have doubled the SAR response capacity for this case and provided additional flexibility for aircraft/aircrew recovery and refueling.
4. Recommend additional crew and MH-60 aircraft to support a year-round two Bravo-0 SAR readiness posture for AIRSTA Kodiak while maintaining the ability to support forward operating location (FOL) Cordova, FOL Arctic (Kotzebue, Barrow, or Dead Horse), and FOL Cold Bay.



**SAR Case Review Template - 2019**

<b>PART 2a: NEXT LEVEL REVIEW (Sector Commander, District SC, or Area SC as needed)</b>	
DATE REVIEWED: 10 Mar 2020	REVIEWED BY (UNIT): D17(dr)
REVIEW RECOMENDATIONS	BRIEF SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN
RECOMMENDATION(S) ENDORSED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	See endorsement below.
RECOMMENDATION(S) PARTIALLY ENDORSED <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMENDATION(S) NOT ENDORSED <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMEND FULL CASE STUDY <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>ENDORSEMENT</b>	
Concur with recommendations. Will further review the CG response upon receiving the MBI report. Weather and on scene endurance challenged launch times and the ability to maintain continuous on-scene coverage. Intend to have Air Station Kodiak, and both Sector and District Command Centers review this case and the recommendations from this review. Emphasis to be placed on lessons learned in communications between operational units, the Sector, and the District Command Centers.	
<b>PART 2b: NEXT LEVEL REVIEW (Sector Commander, District SC, or Area SC as needed)</b>	
DATE REVIEWED: 01 Apr 2020	REVIEWED BY (UNIT): D17 SC
REVIEW RECOMENDATIONS	BRIEF SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN
RECOMMENDATION(S) ENDORSED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	See endorsement below.
RECOMMENDATION(S) PARTIALLY ENDORSED <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMENDATION(S) NOT ENDORSED <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMEND FULL CASE STUDY <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>ENDORSEMENT</b>	
Concur with recommended actions and first level reviewer's endorsement. Good lessons learned from a challenging response in adverse weather.	
<b>PART 2c: NEXT LEVEL REVIEW (Sector Commander, District SC, or Area SC as needed)</b>	
DATE REVIEWED: 04/09/2020	REVIEWED BY (UNIT): PAC SC
REVIEW RECOMENDATIONS	BRIEF SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN
RECOMMENDATION(S) ENDORSED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	See endorsement below.
RECOMMENDATION(S) PARTIALLY ENDORSED <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMENDATION(S) NOT ENDORSED <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMEND FULL CASE STUDY <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>ENDORSEMENT</b>	
Concur with recommended actions and D17 SC endorsement comments.	

**SAR Case Review Template - 2019**

<b>Part 3: HQ Final Action Authority Review (CG-SAR, CG-741, CG-6, etc.)</b>	
DATE REVIEWED:	REVIEWED BY (Office):
ACTIONS TAKEN	SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN
RECOMMENDATION(S) ENDORSED <input type="checkbox"/>	
FORWARDED TO OTHER FINAL ACTION AUTHORITY <input type="checkbox"/>	
SAR CASE REVIEW POSTED ON PORTAL <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECOMMEND FULL CASE STUDY <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>ADDITIONAL COMMENTS FROM FINAL ACTION AUTHORITY</b>	

**SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS**



16130  
SEP 15 2020

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG SECTOR Juneau memo of 14 Feb 2020

From: L. L. Fagan, VADM  
CG PACAREA (PAC-00)

To: COMDT (CG-SAR)

Subj: FIRST ENDORSEMENT – CASE REVIEW OF THE SEARCH COVERAGE IN  
RESPONSE TO THE SINKING OF CFV SCANDIES ROSE

1. I **concur** with Sector Juneau's SAR case review recommendations. All Pacific Area Districts and Sectors are directed to review the lessons learned and recommendations in this case review and ensure widest dissemination within the District SAR Coordinator's region. SAR mission focused discussions should include the following:

- a. Command Center and Air Station lessons learned from SCANDIES ROSE response and the importance of immediate initial action inside of Bravo response times.
- b. An emphasis on early, sustained and on-scene search coverage. It is imperative that maximum search efforts are utilized during the most critical first few hours of a case, maximizing chances of survivability.

2. This case review highlights the ever-increasing demands and challenges of Coast Guard SAR coverage in remote locations. PACAREA continues to assume additional operational risk in D17 as maritime activity in this vast region grows. I offer the following recommendations for consideration:

- a. **Recommend** CG-711 prioritize the acquisition of additional MH-60 aircraft to replace AIRSTA Kodiak's MH-65 aircraft. Replacing MH-65s with MH-60s increases our capacity to respond to increased SAR demand in this remote AOR.
- b. **Recommend** CG-711 increase staffing levels at AIRSTA Kodiak to support a year-round two Bravo-0 SAR readiness posture for AIRSTA Kodiak, while maintaining the ability to support forward operating locations. Accelerating the plan to add additional MH-60s and associated crews is the best option to close the near-term gap in resources and immediately create a more sustainable operations and personnel tempo in D17.

3. This SAR case review highlights the importance of immediate initial action and bias for action. Both are critical to successful prosecution of every SAR case. I commend the Sector Juneau SAR case review team for their hard work.

#

Copy: CGD ELEVEN (dr)  
CGD THIRTEEN (dr)  
CGD FOURTEEN (dr)  
CGD SEVENTEEN (dr)  
CG TRACEN Yorktown, National SAR School