



Factual Report – Attachment 6

**FAA Email Summary for Aircraft Accident at Presque Isle, ME (PQI) on
Monday March 4, 2019**

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

DCA19FA089

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Subject: Summary for Aircraft Accident at Presque Isle, ME (PQI) on Monday March 4, 2019

On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 11:32 AM EST (CommutAir) UCA4933/E45X landed in the snow next to Rwy 01 at Presque Isle Airport (PQI), Presque Isle, ME. UCA4933 was flying the Rwy 01 (PQI) ILS at the time of the accident. One missed approach preceded the accident landing. It is unknown why the pilot elected to go around on the first landing attempt. There were three crew and twenty-eight passengers aboard the aircraft; two passengers and one crewmember reported minor injuries and were transported to the hospital. There is substantial damage to the aircraft. The METAR observation recorded at 11:43 AM reported 3/4SM -SN SCT008 OVC013 M01/M04 A2967.

Air Traffic services were provided by Boston Center (ZBW). PQI does not have an Air traffic Control Tower (ATCT). An SRT was conducted and the event was color-coded yellow with QCG follow-up required.

The AOCC Team Lead/TOAAR determined the Rwy 01 LOC and GS are suspect and were administratively removed from service (by Notam) for after accident documentation and certification. The measured parameters were found within tolerance on both the LOC and GS. A ground check was performed and the LOC course was found to have shifted to the right.

The PQI ILS is remotely monitored by the AOCC. The AOCC archived the PQI ILS MASS data with no anomalies noted prior to the accident. The PQI ILS is not equipped with an ASYNC (go/no go) light at the airport.

On Tuesday, the PQI AWOS was removed from service for after accident as found readings and certification. The AWOS was certified with exception for the following elements that are OTS; the temp/dp sensor was OTS before the accident with parts on order. The wind sensor is also now OTS; the specialists realized the wind tower was hit by the aircraft and is out of azimuth alignment. A Notam was issued for the wind as unreliable. The ceilometer was operating intermittently during the accident; it was reset and RTS.

Prior to the accident, the area experienced rapid and large snowfalls that along with the previous accumulations resulted in 56" of snow in the area measured by the on-site specialists. Runway 01 and adjacent taxiways are cleared. Finding an acceptable area to dump the cleared snow is a challenge for the airport authority. There is an estimated 5' of snow between the Rwy 01 threshold and LOC antenna array. The snowpack extends for 1000'. The SSC provided pictures; the NTSB has also taken their own photographs. A TSOG ILS specialist is on site and in contact with the ILS engineers in Atlanta determining the extent of snow removal required.

The NTSB and an investigator from AVP-100 arrived on site Tuesday afternoon. Yesterday (Wednesday) afternoon, the accident investigators decided they wanted a flight inspection on the ILS prior to moving any snow. They asked for assistance in contacting the FICO and the investigators were connected with the scheduler.

The Flight inspection was scheduled for Thursday March 7, 2019 at 1:00 PM and completed with the following results; the OM is now OTS for being too tight. The RAIL had four of five flashers OTS. The LOC course was found to be 87 micro amps to the right.

Also, the GS was found to have a course reversal. The National Resource Engineer for Navigation provided the following explanation, "A glide slope reversal is when in a short period of time, the glide slope indicator will go from path low to high to low (or the other way around). Most autopilots cannot follow this rapid change of the glide path, so they disconnect. We don't allow this for CAT II/III. For CAT I we say autocoupled approaches are not authorized below some altitude. Someone hand flying would not even try to follow the glide slope change and would simply fly through this area of distortion."

The ILS specialists travel from the SSC office in Bangor, ME (BGR).

The next course of action is under discussion.

Ed Phillips
NAS Security and Enterprise Operations (NASEO)
National Tactical Operations Team/AJW-B620
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