| NOTICE: This report is required by 49 CFR Part 195. Failure to report can result in a exceed \$100,000 for each violation for each day that such violation persists except the penalty shall not exceed \$1,000,000 as provided in 49 USC 60122. | | OMB NO: 2137-0047 EXPIRATION DATE: 8/31/ | 2020 |
|--|--|---|---|
| | Original Report Date: | 09/18/202 | 0 |
| U.S Department of Transportation | No. | 20200256 - 34 | 4940 |
| Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration | | (DOT Use On | |
| ACCIDENT REPORT - HAZ PIPELINE SYS | | | ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, |
| A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of informa ion subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of informa ion displays a current valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for his information collection is 2137-0047. All responses to the collection of information are mandatory Send comments regarding this burden or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP-30) 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, D.C. 20590. | | | urrent valid are mandatory. |
| INSTRUCTIONS | | | |
| Important: Please read the separate instructions for completing this form before yo examples. If you do not have a copy of the instructions, you can obtain one from the dot.gov/pipeline/library/forms. | | | |
| PART A - KEY REPORT INFORMATION | | | |
| Report Type: (select all that apply) | Original: | Supplemental: Yes | Final: |
| Last Revision Date: | 03/02/2021 | Tes | |
| 1. Operator's OPS-issued Operator Identification Number (OPID): | 31618 | | |
| 2. Name of Operator | ENTERPRISE PRO | DUCTS OPERATING LLC | |
| 3. Address of Operator: | | | |
| 3a. Street Address 3b. City | 1100 Louisiana Stre HOUSTON | et | |
| 3c. State | Texas | | |
| 3d. Zip Code | 77002 | | |
| 4. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of the Accident: | 08/21/2020 08:02 | | |
| 5. Location of Accident: | 1 | | |
| Latitude / Longitude | 4005404 | | |
| 6. National Response Center Report Number (if applicable): 7. Local time (24-hr clock) and date of initial telephonic report to the | 1285164 | | |
| National Response Center (if applicable): | 08/21/2020 10:12 | | |
| 8. Commodity released: (select only one, based on predominant volume released) | HVL or Other Flamm Ambient Conditions | nable or Toxic Fluid which | is a Gas at |
| - Specify Commodity Subtype: | Other HVL | | |
| - If "Other" Subtype, Descr be: | Propane | | |
| If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is Ethanol Blend, then % Ethanol Blend: | | | |
| If Biofuel/Alternative Fuel and Commodity Subtype is | | | |
| Biodiesel, then Biodiesel Blend e.g. B2, B20, B100 | | | |
| 9. Estimated volume of commodity released unintentionally (Barrels): | 6,034.00 | | |
| 10. Estimated volume of intentional and/or controlled release/blowdown (Barrels): | | | |
| 11. Estimated volume of commodity recovered (Barrels): | | | |
| 12. Were there fatalities? | Yes | | |
| - If Yes, specify the number in each category: | | | |
| 12a. Operator employees | 0 | | |
| 12b. Contractor employees working for the Operator 12c. Non-Operator emergency responders | 0 | | |
| 12d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT | - | | |
| associated with this Operator | 5 | | |
| 12e. General public | 0 | | |
| 12f. Total fatalities (sum of above) | 5 | | |
| 13. Were there injuries requiring inpatient hospitalization? | Yes | | |
| - If Yes, specify the number in each category: 13a. Operator employees | 0 | | |
| 13b. Contractor employees working for the Operator | 0 | | |
| 13c. Non-Operator emergency responders | 0 | | |
| 13d. Workers working on the right-of-way, but NOT associated with this Operator | 4 | | |
| 13e. General public | 0 | | |
| 13f. Total injuries (sum of above) | 4 | | |

| 14. Was the pipeline/facility shut down due to the Accident? If No, Explain: If Yes, complete Questions 14a and 14b: (use local time, 24-hr clock) | No The line operates as a batch line and was not flowing at the |
|--|--|
| | |
| - If Yes complete Questions 14a and 14b; (use local time 24 br clock) | time. |
| | |
| 14a. Local time and date of shutdown: | |
| 14b. Local time pipeline/facility restarted: - Still shut down? (* Supplemental Report Required) | |
| 15. Did the commodity ignite? | Yes |
| 16. Did the commodity explode? | Yes |
| 17. Number of general public evacuated: | 0 |
| 18. Time sequence (use local time, 24-hour clock): | |
| 18a. Local time Operator identified Accident - effective 7-2014 | 08/21/2020 08:02 |
| changed to "Local time Operator identified failure": 18b. Local time Operator resources arrived on site: | 08/21/2020 08:30 |
| PART B - ADDITIONAL LOCATION INFORMATION | 06/21/2020 08:30 |
| 1. Was the origin of the Accident onshore? | Yes |
| If Yes, Complete Questi | |
| If No, Complete Question | |
| - If Onshore: | |
| 2. State: | Texas |
| 3. Zip Code: | 78407 |
| 4. City | Corpus Christi |
| 5. County or Parish | Nueces |
| 6. Operator-designated location: | Survey Station No. 171+97 |
| 7. Pipeline/Facility name: | Viola to Cantwell |
| 8. Segment name/ID: | TX219 |
| 9. Was Accident on Federal land, other than the Outer Continental Shelf | |
| (OCS)? | No |
| 10. Location of Accident: | Pipeline Right-of-way |
| 11. Area of Accident (as found): | Underground |
| Specify: | Other |
| - If Other, Describe: Depth-of-Cover (in): | underwater |
| 12. Did Accident occur in a crossing? | No |
| - If Yes, specify type below: | |
| - If Bridge crossing – | |
| Cased/ Uncased: | |
| - If Railroad crossing – | |
| Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled | |
| - If Road crossing – | |
| Cased/ Uncased/ Bored/drilled | |
| - If Water crossing – | |
| Cased/ Uncased | |
| - Name of body of water, if commonly known: - Approx. water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: | |
| - Approx. water depth (it) at the point of the Accident. - Select: | |
| - If Offshore: | |
| 13. Approximate water depth (ft) at the point of the Accident: | |
| 14. Origin of Accident: | |
| - In State waters - Specify: | |
| - State: | |
| - Area: | |
| - Block/Tract #: - Nearest County/Parish: | |
| - On the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) - Specify: | |
| - Area: | |
| - Block #: | |
| 15. Area of Accident: | |
| PART C - ADDITIONAL FACILITY INFORMATION | |
| 1. Is the pipeline or facility: | Intrastate |
| 2. Part of system involved in Accident: | Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites |
| If Onshore Breakout Tank or Storage Vessel, Including Attached | |
| | |
| Appurtenances, specify: 3. Item involved in Accident: | Pipe |
| Appurtenances, specify: | Pipe Pipe Body |

| 2h Mall this has a first | 210 |
|---|--|
| 3b. Wall thickness (in): | .219 |
| 3c. SMYS (Specified Minimum Yield Strength) of pipe (psi): 3d. Pipe specification: | 46,000 API-5L |
| 3e. Pipe Seam , specify: | Longitudinal ERW - Unknown Frequency |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| 3f. Pipe manufacturer: | Unknown |
| 3g. Year of manufacture: | Unknown |
| 3h. Pipeline coating type at point of Accident, specify: | Other |
| - If Other, Describe: | Coal Tar and Concrete |
| - If Weld, including heat-affected zone, specify. If Pipe Girth Weld, | |
| 3a through 3h above are required: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| - If Valve, specify: | |
| - If Mainline, specify: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| 3i. Manufactured by: | |
| 3j. Year of manufacture: | |
| - If Tank/Vessel, specify: - If Other - Describe: | |
| - If Other, describe: | |
| 4. Year item involved in Accident was installed: | 1968 |
| 5. Material involved in Accident: | Carbon Steel |
| - If Material other than Carbon Steel, specify: | |
| 6. Type of Accident Involved: | Mechanical Puncture |
| - If Mechanical Puncture – Specify Approx. size: | |
| in. (axial) by | 7.00 |
| in. (circumferential) | 5.00 |
| - If Leak - Select Type: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| - If Rupture - Select Orientation: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| Approx. size: in. (widest opening) by | |
| | |
| in. (length circumferentially or axially) | |
| in. (length circumferentially or axially) - If Other – Describe: | |
| - If Other – Describe: | |
| | |
| - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION | No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: | |
| - If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION | |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: Fish/aquatic | |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial | No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: | No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation | No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Fish/aquatic - Birds - Terrestrial 2. Soil contamination: 3. Long term impact assessment performed or planned: 4. Anticipated remediation: 4a. If Yes, specify all that apply: - Surface water - Groundwater - Soil - Vegetation - Wildlife | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION I. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION I. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION I. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION 1. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION I. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No No No |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION I. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No Yes |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION I. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes |
| If Other – Describe: PART D - ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE INFORMATION I. Wildlife impact: 1a. If Yes, specify all that apply: | No Yes |

| Integrity Management Program? | |
|--|--|
| Integrity Management Program? - High Population Area: | Yes |
| Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" | Yes |
| determination for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? | |
| - Other Populated Area | Yes |
| Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination | Vee |
| for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity Management Program? | Yes |
| - Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Drinking Water | |
| Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination | |
| for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity | |
| Management Program? | |
| Unusually Sensitive Area (USA) - Ecological | Yes |
| Was this HCA identified in the "could affect" determination | |
| for this Accident site in the Operator's Integrity | Yes |
| Management Program? | |
| 8. Estimated cost to Operator – effective 12-2012, changed to "Estimated | Property Damage": |
| 8a. Estimated cost of public and non-Operator private property | * • |
| damage paid/reimbursed by the Operator – effective 12-2012, "paid/reimbursed by the Operator" removed | \$ 0 |
| 8b. Estimated cost of commodity lost | \$ 121,600 |
| 8c. Estimated cost of Operator's property damage & repairs | \$ 1,967,000 |
| 8d. Estimated cost of Operator's emergency response | \$ 0 |
| 8e. Estimated cost of Operator's environmental remediation | \$ 0 |
| 8f. Estimated other costs | \$ 0 |
| Describe: | 0 |
| 8g. Estimated total costs (sum of above) – effective 12-2012, | ¢ 0.000 c00 |
| changed to "Total estimated property damage (sum of above)" | \$ 2,088,600 |
| PART E - ADDITIONAL OPERATING INFORMATION | |
| 1. Estimated pressure at the point and time of the Accident (psig): | 257.00 |
| Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) at the point and time of the | |
| Accident (psig): | 787.00 |
| 3. Describe the pressure on the system or facility relating to the | Pressure did not exceed MOP |
| Accident (psig): | |
| 4. Not including pressure reductions required by PHMSA regulations | |
| (such as for repairs and pipe movement), was the system or facility | |
| relating to the Accident operating under an established pressure restriction with pressure limits below those normally allowed by the | No |
| MOP? | |
| - If Yes, Complete 4.a and 4.b below: | |
| 4a. Did the pressure exceed this established pressure | |
| restriction? | |
| 4b. Was this pressure restriction mandated by PHMSA or the | |
| State? | |
| 5. Was "Onshore Pipeline, Including Valve Sites" OR "Offshore | Ver |
| Pipeline, Including Riser and Riser Bend" selected in PART C, Question 2? | Yes |
| | L Complete 5 a – 5 e below)" |
| If Yes - (Complete 5a. – 5f below) effective 12-2012, changed to "(5a. Type of upstream valve used to initially isolate release | |
| Sa. Type of upsileant valve used to initially isolate release | Manual |
| SOURCE: | |
| source: 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release | Manual |
| source: 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: | Manual |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): | Manual 29,040 |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal | 29,040 |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? | 29,040 |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - - If Other, Describe: | 29,040 Yes |
| 5b. Type of downstream valve used to initially isolate release source: 5c. Length of segment isolated between valves (ft): 5d. Is the pipeline configured to accommodate internal inspection tools? - If No, Which physical features limit tool accommodation? - Changes in line pipe diameter - Presence of unsuitable mainline valves - Tight or mitered pipe bends - Other passage restrictions (i.e. unbarred tee's, projecting instrumentation, etc.) - Extra thick pipe wall (applicable only for magnetic flux leakage internal inspection tools) - Other - | 29,040 Yes (select all that apply) |

| Executive debrie or eacle, way, or other wall buildup | |
|--|---|
| Excessive debris or scale, wax, or other wall buildup Low operating pressure(s) | |
| - Low operating pressure(s) - Low flow or absence of flow | |
| Incompatible commodity | |
| - Other - | |
| | |
| - If Other, Describe: | 200% CNN/C Desculated Truckling (Transmission |
| 5f. Function of pipeline system: | > 20% SMYS Regulated Trunkline/Transmission |
| 6. Was a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)-based | Yes |
| system in place on the pipeline or facility involved in the Accident? | |
| If Yes - | |
| 6a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? | Yes |
| 6b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? | Yes |
| 6c. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), | |
| alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with | Yes |
| the detection of the Accident? | |
| 6d. Did SCADA-based information (such as alarm(s), | |
| alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with | Yes |
| the confirmation of the Accident? | |
| 7. Was a CPM leak detection system in place on the pipeline or facility | Vee |
| involved in the Accident? | Yes |
| - If Yes: | |
| 7a. Was it operating at the time of the Accident? | Yes |
| 7b. Was it fully functional at the time of the Accident? | Yes |
| 7c. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm | |
| (s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with | Yes |
| the detection of the Accident? | |
| 7d. Did CPM leak detection system information (such as alarm | |
| (s), alert(s), event(s), and/or volume calculations) assist with | Vaa |
| | Yes |
| the confirmation of the Accident? | O s s tradit s r |
| 8. How was the Accident initially identified for the Operator? | Controller |
| - If Other, Specify: | |
| 8a. If "Controller", "Local Operating Personnel", including | |
| contractors", "Air Patrol", or "Ground Patrol by Operator or its | Operator employee |
| contractor" is selected in Question 8, specify: | |
| 9. Was an investigation initiated into whether or not the controller(s) or | No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the |
| control room issues were the cause of or a contr buting factor to the | controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary |
| Accident? | due to: (provide an explanation for why the Operator did no |
| | investigate) |
| If No, the Operator did not find that an investigation of the | The pipeline was struck by a third-party performing |
| controller(s) actions or control room issues was necessary due to: | dredging operation. |
| (provide an explanation for why the operator did not investigate) | |
| If Yes, specify investigation result(s): (select all that apply) | |
| Investigation reviewed work schedule rotations, | |
| continuous hours of service (while working for the | |
| Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue | |
| Investigation did NOT review work schedule rotations, | |
| continuous hours of service (while working for the | |
| Operator), and other factors associated with fatigue | |
| Provide an explanation for why not: | |
| Investigation identified no control room issues | |
| Investigation identified no controller issues Investigation identified no controller issues | |
| Investigation identified no controller issues Investigation identified incorrect controller action or | |
| 5 | |
| controller error | |
| - Investigation identified that fatigue may have affected the | |
| controller(s) involved or impacted the involved controller(s) | |
| response | |
| Investigation identified incorrect procedures | |
| | |
| - Investigation identified incorrect control room equipment | |
| operation | |
| operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected | |
| operation | |
| operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected | |
| operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller | |
| operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response | |
| operation - Investigation identified maintenance activities that affected control room operations, procedures, and/or controller response - Investigation identified areas other than those above: | |

| 1. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator employees tested | |
|---|---------------------------------|
| under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of DOT's | Yes |
| Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations? | |
| - If Yes: | |
| 1a. Specify how many were tested: | 1 |
| 1b. Specify how many failed: | 0 |
| 2. As a result of this Accident, were any Operator contractor employees | |
| tested under the post-accident drug and alcohol testing requirements of | No |
| DOT's Drug & Alcohol Testing regulations? | |
| - If Yes: | |
| 2a. Specify how many were tested: | |
| 2b. Specify how many failed: | |
| | |
| PART G – APPARENT CAUSE | |
| Select only one box from PART G in shaded column on left represent the questions on the right. Describe secondary, contributing or root of | |
| Apparent Cause: | G3 - Excavation Damage |
| | |
| G1 - Corrosion Failure - only one sub-cause can be picked from shace | ded left-hand column |
| Corrosion Failure – Sub-Cause: | |
| - If External Corrosion: | |
| 1. Results of visual examination: | |
| - If Other, Descr be: | |
| 2. Type of corrosion: (select all that apply) | |
| - Galvanic | |
| - Atmospheric | |
| - Stray Current | |
| - Microbiological | |
| - Selective Seam | |
| - Other: | |
| - If Other, Descr be: | |
| 3. The type(s) of corrosion selected in Question 2 is based on the followin | g: (select all that apply) |
| - Field examination | |
| - Determined by metallurgical analysis - Other: | |
| - If Other, Descr be: | |
| 4. Was the failed item buried under the ground? | |
| - If Yes : | |
| □4a. Was failed item considered to be under cathodic | |
| protection at the time of the Accident? | |
| If Yes - Year protection started: | |
| 4b. Was shielding, tenting, or disbonding of coating evident at | |
| the point of the Accident? | |
| 4c. Has one or more Cathodic Protection Survey been | |
| conducted at the point of the Accident? | |
| If "Yes, CP Annual Survey" – Most recent year conducted: | |
| If "Yes, Close Interval Survey" – Most recent year conducted: | |
| If "Yes, Other CP Survey" – Most recent year conducted: | |
| - If No: | |
| 4d. Was the failed item externally coated or painted? | |
| 5. Was there observable damage to the coating or paint in the vicinity of | |
| the corrosion? | |
| - If Internal Corrosion: | |
| 6. Results of visual examination: | |
| - Other: | |
| 7. Type of corrosion (select all that apply): - | |
| - Corrosive Commodity | |
| - Water drop-out/Acid | |
| - Microbiological | |
| - Erosion | |
| - Other: | |
| - If Other, Descr be: | |
| 8. The cause(s) of corrosion selected in Question 7 is based on the follow | ring (select all that apply): - |
| - Field examination | |
| - Determined by metallurgical analysis | |
| - Other: | |

| - If Other, Describe: | |
|---|--|
| 9. Location of corrosion (select all that apply): - | |
| - Low point in pipe | |
| - E bow | |
| - Other: | |
| - If Other, Describe: 10. Was the commodity treated with corrosion inhibitors or biocides? | |
| 11. Was the interior coated or lined with protective coating? | |
| 12. Were cleaning/dewatering pigs (or other operations) routinely tilized? | |
| 13. Were corrosion coupons routinely utilized? | |
| Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND (Question 3) is Tank/Vessel. | the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, |
| 14. List the year of the most recent inspections: | |
| 14a. API Std 653 Out-of-Service Inspection | |
| - No Out-of-Service Inspection completed | |
| 14b. API Std 653 In-Service Inspection | |
| - No In-Service Inspection completed | |
| Complete the following if any Corrosion Failure sub-cause is selected AND Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. | the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, |
| 15. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? | |
| 15a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and in - Magnetic Flux Leakage Tool | ndicate most recent year run: - |
| - Ultrasonic Most recent year: | |
| Most recent year: | |
| - Geometry Most recent year: | |
| - Caliper | |
| - Crack Most recent year: | |
| Most recent year: | |
| - Hard Spot | |
| Most recent year: | |
| - Combination Tool Most recent year: | |
| - Transverse Field/Triaxial | |
| Most recent year: | |
| - Other | |
| Most recent year: | |
| Describe: 16. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since | |
| original construction at the point of the Accident? | |
| Most recent year tested: | |
| Test pressure: | |
| 17. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on this segment? | |
| - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident:: | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: Most recent year conducted: | |
| 18. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? | |
| 18a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, select type recent year the examination was conducted: | e of non-destructive examination and indicate most |
| - Radiography | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Guided Wave Ultrasonic | |
| Most recent year conducted: - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| Wet Magnetic Particle Test Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Dry Magnetic Particle Test | |
| - Other | |
| | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |

| G2 - Natural Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from | n shaded left-handed column |
|---|--|
| Natural Force Damage – Sub-Cause: | |
| - If Earth Movement, NOT due to Heavy Rains/Floods: | |
| 1. Specify: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| - If Heavy Rains/Floods: | |
| 2. Specify: - If Other, Describe: | |
| - If Lightning: | |
| 3. Specify: | |
| - If Temperature: | |
| 4. Specify: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| - If Other Natural Force Damage: 5. Descr be: | |
| | |
| Complete the following if any Natural Force Damage sub-cause is sele | cted. |
| 6. Were the natural forces causing the Accident generated in conjunction with an extreme weather event? | |
| 6a. If Yes, specify: (select all that apply) | |
| - Hurricane | |
| - Tropical Storm | |
| - Tornado | |
| - Other | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| G3 - Excavation Damage - only one sub-cause can be picked from s | haded left-hand column |
| Excavation Damage – Sub-Cause: | Excavation Damage by Third Party |
| - If Previous Damage due to Excavation Activity: Complete Questions C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. | 5 1-5 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART |
| Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? | |
| 1a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a | nd indicate most recent year run: - |
| - Magnetic Flux Leakage | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Ultrasonic | |
| Most recent year conducted: - Geometry | |
| - Debilieury | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| Most recent year conducted: - Caliper | |
| Most recent year conducted: - Caliper Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Caliper | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Ard Spot | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year conducted: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Orbination Tool Most recent year conducted: Other | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Other If Yes: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year tested: | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psig): A. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline | |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psig): | dent: |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psig): 4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? Most recent year conducted: Most recent year conducted: | dent: |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year test been conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes: Most recent year conducted at the point of the Accident Most recent year conducted: If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident Most recent year conducted: If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: | dent: |
| Caliper Most recent year conducted: Crack Most recent year conducted: Hard Spot Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Combination Tool Most recent year conducted: Transverse Field/Triaxial Most recent year conducted: Other Most recent year conducted since original construction at the point of the Accident? If Yes: Most recent year tested: Test pressure (psig): 4. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident? Most recent year conducted: Most recent year conducted: | dent: |

| 5a. If Yes, for each examination, conducted since January 1, 2002, s | select type of non-destructive examination and indicate most | |
|---|--|--|
| recent year the examination was conducted: | ····· //· ···· | |
| - Radiography | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Guided Wave Ultrasonic | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Wet Magnetic Particle Test | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Dry Magnetic Particle Test | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Other | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| Describe: | | |
| Complete the following if Excavation Damage by Third Party is selected | ad as the sub equip | |
| | | |
| 6. Did the operator get prior notification of the excavation activity? | Yes | |
| 6a. If Yes, Notification received from: (select all that apply) - | | |
| - One-Call System | Yes | |
| - Excavator | Yes | |
| - Contractor | | |
| - Landowner | | |
| Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any | · Execution Domoro cub course is coloriad | |
| Complete the following mandatory CGA-DIRT Program questions if any | Y Excavation Damage sub-cause is selected. | |
| 7. Do you want PHMSA to upload the following information to CGA- | Na | |
| DIRT (www.cga-dirt.com)? | No | |
| 8. Right-of-Way where event occurred: (select all that apply) - | · | |
| - Public | | |
| - If "Public", Specify: | | |
| - Private | Yes | |
| - If "Private", Specify: | Private Business | |
| - Pipeline Property/Easement | Yes | |
| - Power/Transmission Line | | |
| - Railroad | | |
| - Dedicated Public Utility Easement | | |
| - Federal Land | | |
| - Data not collected | | |
| - Unknown/Other | | |
| 9. Type of excavator: | Contractor | |
| 10. Type of excavation equipment: | Unknown/Other | |
| 11. Type of work performed: | Unknown/Other | |
| 12. Was the One-Call Center notified? | Yes | |
| 12a. If Yes, specify ticket number: | TX2067555147 | |
| 12b. If this is a State where more than a single One-Call Center | | |
| exists, list the name of the One-Call Center notified: | Texas811 | |
| 13. Type of Locator: | Utility Owner | |
| 14. Were facility locate marks visible in the area of excavation? | Yes | |
| 15. Were facilities marked correctly? | Yes | |
| 16. Did the damage cause an interruption in service? | Yes | |
| 16a. If Yes, specify duration of the interruption (hours) | 1,488 | |
| 17. Description of the CGA-DIRT Root Cause (select only the one predon | ninant first level CGA-DIRT Root Cause and then, where | |
| available as a choice, the one predominant second level CGA-DIRT Root | | |
| Root Cause: | Other | |
| - If One-Call Notification Practices Not Sufficient, specify: | | |
| - If Locating Practices Not Sufficient, specify: | | |
| - If Excavation Practices Not Sufficient, specify: | | |
| - If Other/None of the Above, explain: | The accident is still under investigation | |
| G4 - Other Outside Force Damage - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column | | |
| Other Outside Force Damage – Sub-Cause: | | |
| - If Damage by Car, Truck, or Other Motorized Vehicle/Equipment NO | T Engaged in Excavation: | |
| 1. Vehicle/Equipment operated by: | | |
| - If Damage by Boats, Barges, Drilling Rigs, or Other Maritime Equipn Their Mooring: | | |
| 2. Select one or more of the following IF an extreme weather event was a | factor: | |
| - Hurricane | | |
| - Tropical Storm | | |
| - Tornado | | |

| - Heavy Rains/Flood | | |
|---|---|--|
| - Other | | |
| - If Other, Describe: | | |
| - If Previous Mechanical Damage NOT Related to Excavation: Compl | ete Questions 3-7 ONLY IF the "Item Involved in | |
| Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is Pipe or Weld. | | |
| 3. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of the Accident? | | |
| 3a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool and in | dicate most recent year run: | |
| - Magnetic Flux Leakage | | |
| Mognetic Hax Estilage Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Ultrasonic | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Geometry | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Caliper | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Crack | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Hard Spot | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Combination Tool | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Transverse Field/Triaxial | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Other | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| Describe: | | |
| 4. Do you have reason to believe that the internal inspection was | | |
| completed BEFORE the damage was sustained? | | |
| 5. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted | | |
| since original construction at the point of the Accident? | | |
| - If Yes: | | |
| Most recent year tested: | | |
| Test pressure (psig): | | |
| 6. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline | | |
| segment? | | |
| - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Accident: | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site: Most recent year conducted: | | |
| 7. Has one or more non-destructive examination been conducted at the | | |
| point of the Accident since January 1, 2002? | | |
| 7a. If Yes, for each examination conducted since January 1, 2002, si | elect type of pon-destructive examination and indicate most | |
| recent year the examination was conducted: | elect type of non-destructive examination and indicate most | |
| - Radiography | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Guided Wave Ultrasonic | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Wet Magnetic Particle Test | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Dry Magnetic Particle Test | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| - Other | | |
| Most recent year conducted: | | |
| Describe: | | |
| - If Intentional Damage: | | |
| 8. Specify: | | |
| - If Other, Describe: | | |
| - If Other Outside Force Damage: | | |
| 9. Descr be: | | |
| G5 - Material Failure of Pipe or Weld - only one sub-cause can be | selected from the shaded left-hand column | |
| Use this section to report material failures ONLY IF the "Item Involved in Accident" (from PART C, Question 3) is "Pipe" or "Weld." | | |
| Material Failure of Pipe or Weld – Sub-Cause: | | |
| 1. The sub-cause shown above is based on the following: (select all that | apply) | |

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| - Field Examination | |
|--|---|
| - Determined by Metallurgical Analysis | |
| - Other Analysis | |
| - If "Other Analysis", Describe: | |
| Sub-cause is Tentative or Suspected; Still Under Investigation | |
| (Supplemental Report required) | |
| - If Construction, Installation, or Fabrication-related: | |
| 2. List contributing factors: (select all that apply) | |
| - Fatigue or Vibration-related | |
| Specify: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| - Mechanical Stress: | |
| - Other | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| - If Environmental Cracking-related: | |
| 3. Specify: | |
| - If Other - Describe: | |
| | |
| Complete the following if any Material Failure of Pipe or Weld sub-cau | se is selected. |
| 4. Additional factors: (select all that apply): | |
| - Dent | |
| - Gouge | |
| - Pipe Bend | |
| - Arc Burn | |
| - Arc Bulli - Crack | |
| - Crack - Lack of Fusion | |
| | |
| - Lamination | |
| - Buckle | |
| - Wrinkle | |
| - Misalignment | |
| - Burnt Steel | |
| - Other: | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| 5. Has one or more internal inspection tool collected data at the point of | |
| the Accident? | |
| 5a. If Yes, for each tool used, select type of internal inspection tool a | nd indicate most recent year run: |
| - Magnetic Flux Leakage | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Ultrasonic | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Geometry | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Caliper | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Crack | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Hard Spot | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Combination Tool | |
| | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Transverse Field/Triaxial | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| - Other | |
| Most recent year run: | |
| Describe: | |
| 6. Has one or more hydrotest or other pressure test been conducted since | |
| original construction at the point of the Accident? | |
| - If Yes: | |
| Most recent year tested: | |
| Test pressure (psig): | |
| 7. Has one or more Direct Assessment been conducted on the pipeline | |
| segment? | |
| - If Yes, and an investigative dig was conducted at the point of the Acci | dent - |
| Most recent year conducted: | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | |
| - If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site - | |
| | |
| If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site - Most recent year conducted: | |
| If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site - Most recent year conducted: 8. Has one or more non-destructive examination(s) been conducted at the | |
| If Yes, but the point of the Accident was not identified as a dig site - Most recent year conducted: | elect type of non-destructive examination and indicate most |

| - Radiography | |
|--|----------------------------|
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Guided Wave Ultrasonic | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Handheld Ultrasonic Tool | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Wet Magnetic Particle Test | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Dry Magnetic Particle Test | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| - Other | |
| Most recent year conducted: | |
| Describe: | |
| G6 – Equipment Failure - only one sub-cause can be selected from t | he shaded left-hand column |
| Equipment Failure – Sub-Cause: | |
| - If Malfunction of Control/Relief Equipment: | |
| 1. Specify: (select all that apply) - | |
| - Control Valve | |
| - Instrumentation | |
| - SCADA | |
| - Communications | |
| - Block Valve | |
| - Check Valve | |
| - Relief Valve | |
| - Power Failure | |
| - Stopple/Control Fitting | |
| - ESD System Failure | |
| - Other | |
| - If Other – Describe: | |
| - If Pump or Pump-related Equipment: | |
| | |
| 2. Specify: | |
| - If Other – Describe: | |
| - If Threaded Connection/Coupling Failure: | 1 |
| 3. Specify: | |
| - If Other – Describe: | |
| - If Non-threaded Connection Failure: | |
| 4. Specify: | |
| - If Other – Describe: | |
| - If Other Equipment Failure: | |
| 5. Descr be: | |
| | |
| Complete the following if any Equipment Failure sub-cause is selected | i. |
| 6. Additional factors that contr buted to the equipment failure: (select all the | nat apply) |
| - Excessive vibration | |
| - Overpressurization | |
| - No support or loss of support | |
| - No support of loss of support - Manufacturing defect | |
| | |
| - Loss of electricity | |
| - Improper installation | |
| - Mismatched items (different manufacturer for tubing and tubing | |
| fittings) | |
| - Dissimilar metals | |
| | |
| - Breakdown of soft goods due to compat bility issues with | |
| transported commodity | |
| Valve vault or valve can contributed to the release | |
| - Alarm/status failure | |
| - Misalignment | |
| - Thermal stress | |
| | |
| - Other | |
| - If Other, Describe: | |
| G7 - Incorrect Operation - only one sub-cause can be selected from the shaded left-hand column | |
| Incorrect Operation Sub-Cause: | |
| Incorrect Operation – Sub-Cause: | |

| If Tank, Vessel, or Sump/Separator Allowed or Caused to Overfill o | |
|--|---|
| 1. Specify: | |
| - If Other, Descr be: | |
| If Other Incorrect Operation | |
| 2. Descr be: | |
| Complete the following if any Incorrect Operation sub-cause is selected | ed. |
| Was this Accident related to (select all that apply): - | |
| - Inadequate procedure | |
| - No procedure established - Failure to follow procedure | |
| - Palitie to follow procedure - Other: | |
| - If Other, Descr be: | |
| . What category type was the activity that caused the Accident? | |
| . Was the task(s) that led to the Accident identified as a covered task | |
| your Operator Qualification Program? | |
| 5a. If Yes, were the individuals performing the task(s) qualified for the task(s)? | |
| G8 - Other Accident Cause - only one sub-cause can be selected fr | om the shaded left-hand column |
| Other Accident Cause – Sub-Cause: | |
| If Miscellaneous: . Descr be: | |
| If Unknown: | l |
| . Specify: | |
| | |
| vater, Enterprise supplemented the existing cane poles with cane poles provided by | |
| vater, Enterprise supplemented the existing cane poles with cane poles provided by closer to he work area) to provide a "buffer" between the work area and Line 219. ear Line 219, and Enterprise instructed Orion to contact them if there were any cha 0n 8/21/20 at 8:02 AM, Enterprise's Controller received an alarm indicating low press ocated downstream of meter 1004, automatically closed. At ~8:07 AM, the Viola me Controller called local Operations Technicians to investigate the cause of the loss of rrived at Viola Station (upstream of the incident site) and Origin Station (downstream solate the pipeline. At 9:05 AM, valves at Cantwell Station (upstream of Origin Station control received a call from the Port of Corpus Christi notifying hem that a dredging ocal Enterprise Operations confirmed, based on available information, that line 219 interprise called the NRC at 10:12 AM and the report was taken at 10:52 AM. Addii 1285505. TRRC was notified at 10:18 AM (Incident #2251). On 8/24/20, an underwater inspection found evidence of mechanical damage and tw interprise is participating in the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) inve eplaced and the pipeline returned to service on 10/22/20. The damaged pipeline set and the pipeline returned to service on 10/22/20. | ked Line 219 on the shoreline and, for the portions of Line 219 in he Orion. The cane poles were placed ~5' to ~10' away from Line 219 During this meeting, Orion confirmed that no work would be performenges in the plans. Sure at Viola station. At 8:05 AM, the control valve at Viola station, eter registered no flow on the pipeline. At 8:09 AM, Enterprise pressure. Between ~8:30 AM and ~8:45 AM, Operations Techniciar m of the incident site) to manually close valves at both locations to on) were closed to further isolate the pipeline. At 9:47 AM, Pipeline opera ion had struck a pipeline and here was a fire. At ~9:53 AM, was struck by a 3rd party. tional NRC no ifications made: #1285319 (48-hr update) and ro punctures in the pipeline. |
| vater, Enterprise supplemented the existing cane poles with cane poles provided by closer to he work area) to provide a "buffer" between the work area and Line 219. ear Line 219, and Enterprise instructed Orion to contact them if there were any cha On 8/21/20 at 8:02 AM, Enterprise's Controller received an alarm indicating low press ocated downstream of meter 1004, automatically closed. At ~8:07 AM, the Viola me Controller called local Operations Technicians to investigate the cause of the loss of rrived at Viola Station (upstream of the incident site) and Origin Station (downstream ocal Enterprise Operations confirmed, based on available information, that line 219 interprise called the NRC at 10:12 AM and the report was taken at 10:52 AM. Addii 1285505. TRRC was notified at 10:18 AM (Incident #2251). In 8/24/20, an underwater inspection found evidence of mechanical damage and tw interprise is participating in the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) inve eplaced and the pipeline returned to service on 10/22/20. The damaged pipeline servestigation. Iotes: 113d: Based on information available to date, we understand that 5 individuals work <i>i</i> (th at least one overnight stay. On 2/8/21, Enterprise was notified of a 3rd party fate 118b: This was the estimated time of arrival of the Operations Technician at Viola Station 131: Based on information available to date, position of varying sizes (7" x 5" and 31:0-11: The work being performed at the time was dredging. 31:12-15: The One-call ticket was cleared by Enterprise based on information provide 31:12:15: The One-call ticket was cleared by Enterprise based on information provide area of the time that the method of excavation would be hydroexcav | ked Line 219 on the shoreline and, for the portions of Line 219 in he Orion. The cane poles were placed ~5' to ~10' away from Line 219 During this meeting, Orion confirmed that no work would be performenges in the plans. Sure at Viola station. At 8:05 AM, the control valve at Viola station, eter registered no flow on the pipeline. At 8:09 AM, Enterprise pressure. Between ~8:30 AM and ~8:45 AM, Operations Techniciar m of the incident site) to manually close valves at both locations to on) were closed to further isolate the pipeline. At 9:47 AM, Pipeline opera ion had struck a pipeline and here was a fire. At ~9:53 AM, was struck by a 3rd party. tional NRC no ifications made: #1285319 (48-hr update) and ro punctures in the pipeline. stigation of the incident. The damaged pipeline was cut out and egment is in NTSB's custody and will be analyzed as part of the ing for Orion sustained injuries that required in-patient hospitalization ality; Part A 12d and 13d is adjusted accordingly. tation based on phone log. 5" x 2.5"). |
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| Authorized Signer Name | Nhan Truong |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Authorized Signer Title | Manager Compliance |
| Authorized Signer Telephone Number | |
| Authorized Signer Email | |
| Date | 03/02/2021 |