

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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MULTISTORY STRUCTURE EXPLOSION

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NATURAL GAS PIPELINE LEAK

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Docket No.: DCA-14-MP-002

MAY 12, 2014

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HARLEM, NEW YORK

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Interview of: FRANK McCARTON

New York City Office of
Emergency Management
165 Cadman Plaza
Brooklyn, New York

Tuesday,
September 30, 2014

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: RAVI CHHATRE
Investigator-in-Charge

APPEARANCES:

RAVI CHHATRE, Investigator-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C.

KALU KELLY EMEABA, Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

LEON HEYWARD, Deputy Commissioner
New York City Department of Transportation

LEONARD SINGH, Chief Engineer
Gas Distribution Services
Con Edison
(Party Representative)

CHRIS STOLICKY, Utility Supervisor (Safety)
New York State Department of Public Service
(Party Representative)

STEVEN LEVI, Esq.
New York City Law Department
(Representative on behalf of Mr. McCarton)

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. CHHATRE: On the record. Good afternoon, today is Tuesday, September 30, 2014. We are currently in New York City's Office of Emergency Management facility, located at 165 Cadman Plaza, Brooklyn, New York. We are meeting regarding the investigation of natural gas distribution pipeline leak and multistory structures explosion that occurred on March 12, 2014 in Harlem, New York.

My name is Ravi Chhatre I'm with National Transportation Safety Board, located in Washington, D.C., and I'm investigator in charge of this accident. The NTSB investigation number for the accident is DCA-14-MP-002.

I would like to start by notifying everyone present in this room that we are recording this interview and we may transcribe it at a later date. Transcripts will be provided directly to the interviewee for review and identifying any typographical errors. The transcripts may be posted in NTSB's public docket.

Also, I'd like to inform Mr. McCarton that you are permitted to have one other person present with you during the interview. This is a person of your choice: your supervisor, friend, family member, or, if you choose, no one at all.

Please state for the record your full name, spelling of your name, organization you work for, your title, business contact information such as mailing address, and whom you have chosen to

1 be present with you during your interview.

2 MR. MCCARTON: My name's Frank McCarton. I'm the Deputy
3 Commissioner in the Office of Emergency management in charge of
4 operations for the City of New York. And it's
5 [REDACTED]. And Steven Levi from the law department is
6 representing me.

7 MR. CHHATRE: Now I'd like to go around the room, and
8 have each person introduce themselves. Please state your name,
9 spelling of your name, your title and the organization that you
10 represent, and your business contact information. Starting from
11 my left.

12 MR. HEYWARD: Leon Heyward, H-e-y-w-a-r-d, Deputy
13 Commissioner, New York City Department of Transportation. Phone
14 number [REDACTED]. E-mail address [REDACTED].

15 MR. STOLICKY: Christopher Stolicky, S-t-o-l-i-c-k-y,
16 I'm the Utility Supervisor (Safety) for the New York State
17 Department of Public Service. I'm the New York State party rep
18 for this investigation. E-mail address is
19 [REDACTED].

20 MR. EMEABA: Kalu Kelly Emeaba, NTSB investigator. K-a-
21 l-u, K-e-l-l-y, E-m-e-a-b-a. My e-mail address is
22 [REDACTED].

23 MR. LEVI: I'm Steven Levi, L-e-v-i. I'm an assistant
24 corporation counsel in the New York City law department. My
25 contact information is [REDACTED].

1 MR. SINGH: Leonard Singh, L-e-o-n-a-r-d, S-i-n-g-h,
2 Chief Engineer Gas Distribution, Con Ed. NTSB party rep on this
3 case. [REDACTED].

4 MR. CHHATRE: Thank you.

5 INTERVIEW OF FRANK MCCARTON

6 BY MR. CHHATRE:

7 Q. Mr. McCarton, would you tell us for the day of the
8 accident what happened, and before that your title with your
9 responsibility to the city?

10 A. My job is, I'm the Deputy Commissioner for Operations.
11 I oversee the field response and the 24-hour watch command here at
12 OEM. The job is that we respond to any multiagency responses in
13 the city, from building collapses to water main breaks to any type
14 of multi-alarm fires that involve one or more agencies within
15 inside the city. It's a 24-hour operation that we cover, 24 hours
16 a day, 7 days a week, and we're always activated here at OEM.

17 Q. And could you tell us on the day of the accident in
18 Harlem, how the day started for you, how you got involved?

19 A. Sure. I was finishing my -- I do a 9:00 meeting every
20 morning on -- with my ops management branch in my office. When --
21 I have a radio on in my office all the time that has the OEM
22 frequency on it, where they toned out that there was an explosion
23 at Harlem. I went down the block -- I went down the hallway to
24 brief Commissioner Bruno at the time, former Commissioner Bruno,
25 of what we were hearing. And basically it was there was some type

1 of explosion up in Harlem at 116th Street and Park Avenue.

2 When I spoke to watch command, watch command also said
3 that they're getting reports of also in the vicinity, by listening
4 to the radio, that they were getting report of a train derailment.
5 So it was kind of very much when you have that first several
6 minutes of a job, or even until you get there, there's a lot of
7 uncertainty about what was going on. There was a lot of units
8 that were responding.

9 I left at the office, got into my truck with my aide,
10 and we shot up to 116th street. We got up there pretty fast.
11 Probably within 10, 15 minutes we were up there, hopping up the
12 FDR Drive northbound, and then got off at 96th street, and then
13 went up the rest of the way to 116th street. And when we arrived,
14 you know, my initial expression to Wes was, holy shit. You know,
15 it was a lot bigger than anybody thought it was. Smoke, the
16 amount of resources that were there, people coming down -- people
17 were being removed into the ambulances, in the back of the
18 ambulances. So I knew I had a very big job on my hands. And
19 knowing that we were going to be there for several days, started
20 to think very far ahead about what would be needed, including very
21 heavy equipment that would be needed to start moving debris, where
22 we were going to be putting the debris.

23 I spoke with the first deputy commissioner who informed
24 me that the commissioner was coming en route, and the mayor was
25 being briefed. And I told him that he really needs to stand up a

1 team in here. We have a full EOC team. So he stood up the
2 situation room for us. That was able to give -- start some
3 planning on family assistance, where we were going to put people
4 for the night, because we did have -- and I got to be honest, we
5 didn't know how many buildings we had affected, but we knew we had
6 several buildings, which would be a few hundred people, and where
7 we were going to put those people for the night.

8 So we started to have that planning process put into
9 place here at headquarters. To support my operation I did ask for
10 a command truck to be deployed into the field so that we had
11 somewhere to work. I did get a follow-up call that the NTSB was
12 inbound based on the accident, and I briefed the incident
13 commanders, the incident commander and the police department
14 incident commander, that you were inbound, based on it was
15 involving some time type of pipeline or gas explosion, or possible
16 gas explosion, we used that. So that now put another level on top
17 of our coordination, of course, now, to make sure you guys get in
18 and come in. We have a very well-oiled machine talking to your
19 headquarters.

20 Once a month I have a conference call with the NTSB,
21 your liaison up there, Eric Kusoff (ph.), who I speak to
22 regularly, and he called me and informed me that he was coming on
23 the team to help with the coordination on site, which is another
24 very well done thing where, you know, coming into a city we know
25 who you guys are. I didn't know any of you, but I knew that Eric

1 was coming in and would help me be able to get through some of the
2 -- I guess the red tape through what you guys do. I never worked
3 a job involving a pipeline before. I've worked aviation
4 incidents, so I'm very well-rehearsed in what you guys do. But
5 the pipeline side of it was very interesting to me, and I think
6 that coordination helped me, the relationships with your
7 headquarters helped us to get through that.

8 Really the job of New York City's Office of Emergency
9 Management is to coordinate amongst all the city agencies. So as
10 the city agencies started to arrive on the scene, going back to
11 the scene of that day, we started having to reroute buses. We had
12 subway -- we had the Metro North being disrupted, we had to
13 coordinate with Metro North to make sure that they weren't getting
14 any backup in -- not in Penn Station, but Grand Central Station.
15 And we also started planning for the rush hour, because the rush
16 hour started to come on us very quickly. It was 9:00, 10:00 in
17 the morning, 11:00 in the morning, and we started thinking we
18 needed to get those tracks done. So we did have a phone call with
19 your guys up in Washington to say, hey, can we remove some of that
20 debris on the track, is it evidence, is it not evidence? Since
21 you guys were inbound, you guys gave us permission to remove to
22 reopen the tracks.

23 So we started that process with the NYPD and the Metro
24 North. We had to coordinate with the MTA in the sense of the bus
25 routes that were being rerouted. Also the Department of

1 Transportation, the Department of Environmental Protection all
2 started to arrive. So there was a lot of coordination on the
3 scene. We started to work with the Buildings Department because
4 we wanted to start to get a stability report on the surrounding
5 structures, including the ones that were across the street. We
6 weren't sure they were damaged. They just had some blown windows,
7 but we wanted to get people in there to get structural engineers
8 to look at them, can we put people back into those buildings. We
9 knew some of the buildings on 1652 and some of the ones on 116th
10 were not going to be habitable probably for a little while, and
11 they ended not being to for 3 weeks. And that's not just
12 including the ones 1644 and 1646.

13 This is a very complex job, and also the complexity then
14 started to be with the debris removal and then also with the
15 office of the chief medical examiner being involved with the
16 bodies, and how we were identifying them and removing them. It
17 took us several days to remove all the deceased from the scene.
18 It also was a lesson learned that we actually looked at debris on
19 the site, but then we also did a secondary search -- and I say we
20 as a city. The office of the chief medical examiner did two
21 surveys of the debris to make sure that we weren't missing anybody
22 or anything, and nothing was found on those secondary or third
23 searches that were done. But it took us several days to remove
24 all of the debris from the scene, and to get you guys into there
25 to start your investigation, which was important to us also.

1 Because the investigation now was a fine dance against us getting
2 water restored to that big building on the corner of 1652, where
3 we had to work with you guys and your investigators to make sure
4 that we were able to get those people back in their homes very
5 quickly.

6 So really that's in a nutshell. It's just the
7 coordination on site. I was there from probably like 9:45 that
8 morning until at least 2:00 in the morning the first day. And
9 then I came back the following morning. I think I met up with you
10 and Ravi sometime in midday as you started your investigation, and
11 Con Ed gave you -- I did meet your team that. Kelly was on the
12 team, and some of your press people, and the lead board member.
13 We gave them a tour and we gave them a kind of a understanding of
14 what was going on and where we were with the ongoing search and
15 rescue. But that kind of pretty sums up what our role and
16 responsibility is for the city.

17 Q. I mean, your coordination with Eric really helped us
18 tremendously. That really smoothed things out very well. The
19 cooperation was fantastic, so --

20 Now with the fire chief being the incident commander,
21 how does OEM's role play along with that?

22 A. We play a role of the coordinating agency. So that if
23 the fire department needs some type of equipment, i.e., heavy
24 equipment or contracts that were involved, our job is to reach
25 back into the agencies that are involved in that. And, for

1 example, they used the one of -- when we started the debris
2 removal, and removal of the equipment our job was to get the
3 Housing Preservation and Development, HPD, to come in. They have
4 a contract with a company called Russo Construction and they were
5 able to get that construction company in to help us start that
6 process with the debris removal. Light towers to light the scene
7 up for the nighttime operation. To make sure that all the housing
8 and the sheltering is done, that's all our coordination with all
9 the city agencies involved.

10 Q. So, Frank, walk on us that day of the accident. Once
11 you arrived, what did you see?

12 A. I saw a lot of rubble located on 116th street between --
13 I'm sorry Park Avenue, between 116th street and 117th street in
14 the front of 1642 -- 1644 and 1646 Park Avenue. There were
15 several cars, up to three to four cars, that were buried.
16 Rooftops, there was a heavy body of fire that was burning in the
17 vicinity of 1644 in the middle of the building that was going up
18 the side of the building. Heavy smoke conditions. It took us a
19 long time -- I don't want to say long time -- several hours to
20 figure out by looking at maps, and city maps if that was one or
21 two buildings, what type of buildings they were. There was some
22 discussion in the command post was it one or two buildings.
23 That's how much of it was gone and not recognizable for a while.

24 But that's -- it was a very well -- the incident
25 commander, with the fire department and the police department did

1 a phenomenal job of controlling the fire, and really keeping --
2 doing a search and rescue very quickly, which was very challenging
3 based on the conditions that they had.

4 Q. Were you present when the secondary explosion that
5 everybody talks about, were you there at the time?

6 A. I was there. I was probably in the incident command
7 post located right there where it says 116th street and Park
8 Avenue. So I would be far away from where the scene was. I was
9 located -- I was there.

10 Q. Oh, right there?

11 A. Yeah. So I did not witness it at all, but it was told
12 to me that it did occur.

13 Q. Did you hear about one explosion or two explosions; do
14 you recall that?

15 A. All I was told is that it occurred. I did not see it or
16 feel it.

17 Q. No, but, I mean, do you know if there were two or one?

18 A. I don't recall.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What time was that?

20 MR. MCCARTON: It was sometime later in the afternoon.
21 I want to say like 4:30, 5:00 or something like that, that I was
22 told it happened. I didn't see it though.

23 BY MR. CHHATRE:

24 Q. Do you ever get involved with other locations, whether
25 the water main break -- does OEM get involved into those kinds of

1 scenarios?

2 A. Yes. We do several of those a year.

3 Q. Can you tell us maybe one of the recent ones, water main
4 break? How did you learn about it and what happened?

5 A. Usually we get a call via either 911 or -- you know, we
6 listen to the radio that the police department or fire
7 department's responding to a water main break because they're
8 getting flooded basements or something like that. And we'll send
9 somebody out to coordinate with the Department of Environmental
10 Protection to get on scene, and we'll see what's going on with it.
11 Sometimes it could be a service line, sometimes it could
12 be a main based on what it is. Sometimes it could be a
13 construction accident where somebody hits a construction. They're
14 all shapes and sizes, and we deal with a lot of them. Basically
15 we're going there as the coordinating agency to see if there's any
16 other things that need to be done, if transit is involved with
17 subways, if buses need to be rerouted, if we needed to do
18 dewatering, which means the police department -- I mean, the fire
19 department would come in and dewater the basement to those places
20 that would be affected. So we do a lot of those a year. We
21 coordinate, we'll get phone calls from the Department of
22 Environmental Protection's emergency operation center to ask us to
23 respond with them, or we'll pick it up off the radio ourselves.
24 Q. Now, with the water main breaks, do you see the flooding
25 of the basements more often than flooding the street, or either

1 way?

2 A. It all depends on where you are. It depends on where --
3 it depends on what part of the city the break occurs. If you're
4 in a residential neighborhood, you know, in Queens you're not
5 going to see that. If you're in a commercial area or a high
6 density area like you have in Manhattan, you might see water
7 seeping into the people's basements. We had one several years
8 that affected the subway in the middle of 5th Avenue and 23rd
9 Street that flooded the subway system. It all depends on where
10 you are and where the water goes.

11 Q. But until the people complained you will not know about
12 a water break, or can the water -- DEP tell you that we have a
13 water main break?

14 A. Two things. One is we'll pick it off the radio that
15 somebody is responding to a report of a water main break, request
16 OEM. And the Department of Environmental Protection, they'll say
17 that over the radio or they'll call us. The fire alarm dispatcher
18 will give us a call and say, hey, we need you, chief's requesting
19 you out at this water main break. Or we'll get a phone call from
20 their emergency operation center to say, hey, we need you to help
21 us out with this water main break that's going on.

22 Q. But you would know how long the water had been leaking
23 or you would not?

24 A. No, no, no. Only if we're called out to the break. It
25 has to big break.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. It would have to be -- I mean, we don't go out to every
3 single water main break. We would go out to very large breaks
4 that would be affecting a large group, a large amount of people.

5 Q. When you say large, big, you mean the separation
6 distance wise or the diameter wise, or the pressure --

7 A. Just the amount of water.

8 Q. Amount of water, okay.

9 A. Right. I mean, that's the response. I mean, really
10 people -- we're going on what people are saying to us.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. We wouldn't know that until very well into the job.

13 Q. Okay. Anything on the Harlem accident? Did you have
14 any discussions internally about the lessons learned, anything
15 that went right, anything that wrong, so far or --

16 A. We always hot wash a big job. This was a very large job
17 for us, as the Office of Emergency Management, because we did
18 house several hundred that are still out of their homes, in front
19 of 1646 and 1644. We have to also remember 1642 is still out.
20 So, you know, we had to do a lot of emergency housing for that.
21 We looked at that housing program on how we did that. We always
22 look at our responses to see how we could make it better. But
23 nothing that's really glaring that comes out of this job.

24 Q. Can you, before I let you go, can you tell a little bit
25 of background on OEM, when it came into existence and what caused

1 it?

2 A. Sure. It was -- so back before 1995, it was agency that
3 was embedded with the New York City Police Department. It was a
4 bureau within inside the New York City Police Department. Former
5 Mayor Giuliani, in 1996, decided based on some actions that he saw
6 in the field, he decided to take the agency and make it a mayoral
7 agency. And it became the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management.
8 It's grown throughout the years. From '96 to 2000, from 50 people
9 to 89 to 189 post-9/11, and now it's over 200 people. And post-
10 9/11 for everybody that knows is that our main command center was
11 located in the second world trade center, and it was destroyed
12 during the attacks on New York. It was then moved to this new
13 building here in 2006. Also in 2002, the citizens of the City of
14 New York turned around and made this an agency, or a department.
15 So it became a formal Department of Emergency Management, which
16 made a commissioner and a first deputy commissioner and deputy
17 commissioners, and it's been that way since 2002.

18 So it's a fairly young agency built in 1995, or 1996.
19 And it has grown since.

20 Q. So now the agency reports directly to the mayor?

21 A. Correct.

22 MR. CHHATRE: Okay, that's all I have thanks. Kelly?

23 BY MR. EMEABA:

24 Q. Okay, this is Kelly. If you can repeat it again, what
25 time did you arrive to the site?

1 A. Within 9:40, 9:45, about that time frame, maybe as late
2 as 9:50.

3 Q. What opportunity did you have going close to the
4 accident properties 1642, 1644?

5 A. I was in the command post located at -- right here, at
6 -- right underneath the L train, right here was the first command
7 post was located. So I was here for several hours, and then I did
8 walk in front to look around. I also walked around to look around
9 several times. But not really -- I don't really like to go far
10 out of the command post.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Because that's my job is to be in there for the incident
13 commander. So, I mean, I had other guys there, but I like to be
14 there. So I was there for the whole time.

15 Q. Okay, so you never had the opportunity within the first
16 1 hour to actually go close to 1642?

17 A. Oh, yeah, yeah, I was there. I mean, I walked in front.
18 I mean, I was right here. I mean, I would walk over here, look
19 around, come back. So I was there.

20 Q. So in the process of you, you know, reviewing the site,
21 did you find any hole in front of 1642?

22 A. You couldn't see a hole because the debris was all over
23 the street. I mean, there was no -- the street was covered with
24 debris. There was an apparatus that was close there, that was set
25 up right on the corner. I never saw a hole at all.

1 Q. You mentioned your office called in the bulldozer, the
2 Russo group. What time did they come in to the site?

3 A. They didn't come until later on in the evening. They
4 got their equipment in -- the fire department -- there was a lot
5 of debris that was located -- the first course of action was to
6 remove the cars from the front of the building. We moved some of
7 the debris off the cars, then get the cars removed off from the
8 front of the building where -- because what the fire department
9 wanted to do was to make sure there was no bodies either in the
10 cars or in that debris, and so they could bring the heavy
11 equipment in. Once they brought the heavy equipment in, and
12 cleared the front, there was a -- then that depression was
13 discovered. And a discussion then was --

14 Q. Which depression?

15 A. The depression that was located in front of 1642, 1644
16 there. That depression that was discovered. Where our discussion
17 was is that we couldn't move any heavy equipment in there until we
18 came up with a plan on what we were going to do with that
19 particular depression. And it was discussed that they were going
20 to put fill into that depression and then plate it so that we
21 could get the heavy equipment in to remove the rest of the debris
22 located in -- located at 1644 and 1646.

23 Q. Okay, so there was a depression in front 1642 and 1644?

24 A. Yeah, it was right in the middle of 44, 42, 46. You
25 know, right in that middle -- it's more towards 44 as I remember

1 it as. But, I mean, I could be off. But the course of action was
2 is that it actually delayed us the start to remove debris because
3 of the depression. So now we had to figure out a plan on what we
4 were going to do with that depression. And what we came up with
5 -- I'm going to say we, fire department, OEM, DEP, all the
6 agencies -- was we were going to fill it and put a plate over it
7 so it would make it safe for us to bring heavy equipment that
8 would be able operate in front of 1644 and 1646 to maintain the
9 search and rescue operations that were going on.

10 Q. Okay. Really what I wanted to understand more is that,
11 yes, we know is that in the front of 1646 there was -- 1646, 1644
12 there was road depression, okay. That one, you know, we know, and
13 we see the patches. But what I'm interested to know is that in
14 front of 1642, apart from the hole which was later open more,
15 filled up, was there another road depression other than the one
16 close to between 1644 and 1646; was there another road depression
17 between 1642 and 1644 except the hole that was there?

18 A. Oh, there was a hole, not a depression. It was a hole
19 in front of 1642. Once we started clearing debris, there was a
20 hole. The hole was filled with water. Where that water was
21 coming from or what was happening with it, was not known. But all
22 I could tell you is that there was hole in front of that area that
23 had to be backfilled for us to put heavy equipment in there to
24 continue the search and rescue operations.

25 Q. Can you remember at what time was that hole observed,

1 estimate?

2 A. You know, late in the evening, because we started -- we
3 had to come to a complete standstill 4, 5:00. Because then we
4 didn't start debris removal much before 9. There was concern
5 because we were doing a lot of that stuff at night that it was
6 kind of unsafe. They didn't want to do the high stuff. We had
7 stuff that was hanging that was not allowing us to go into the
8 back of the building because of -- we wanted to search the back of
9 the building. And I say we, I mean the fire department, right.
10 So there was a lot of discussion to try to speed it up, but we
11 were at a standstill because we needed to get the heavy equipment
12 to move that stuff out to search that debris. Because we were
13 still at that point missing people. There was still a search and
14 rescue operation that was going on and we were missing people.

15 So I want to say late in the afternoon. I think when
16 you guys got there was, what, 6 or 7:00?

17 Q. The first team got there --

18 A. Well, you were there. Who was on the --

19 Q. I came in on the tour, but I arrived on the site on
20 (indiscernible) morning.

21 A. Okay, so the first, I think, the first people I brought
22 through when they arrived was, I think, when we were at a complete
23 standstill.

24 MR. CHHATRE: Our board members were there.

25 MR. EMEABA: Board member and our chief.

1 MR. MCCARTON: Right, right. So I think at that point
2 right then and there is when we were at a standstill, at that
3 point when they arrived, because I had really -- we were waiting
4 for the contractor to get the fill. We were waiting for the
5 plates to come. There was a lot of waiting going on, which was
6 worrying a lot of my management because we wanted to move the job
7 along. And we were starting to lose light, and the fire
8 department's concern was we hadn't had anybody injured now on this
9 job, we don't want to injure anybody for the future, so we kind of
10 want to not do the building that's up in the back; we'll wait to
11 morning, but we'll start to do the stuff that we can do in the
12 front once we get it plated. So --

13 MR. EMEABA: Thank you.

14 MR. CHHATRE: Chris?

15 BY MR. STOLICKY:

16 Q. This is Chris Stolicky. Did you ever smell gas?

17 A. I did. I did.

18 Q. When do you remember first smelling gas?

19 A. When we smelled gas probably 11, 12:00 when we moved the
20 original -- when they -- the command post was originally under the
21 L train closest to the greenway, right where that green market is,
22 right? We're right on that corner, and then we smell gas and we
23 moved it to the southeast corner of 116th Street and Park Avenue.
24 And that's where we ended up because of the smell. Very high
25 concentration of gas.

1 MR. SINGH: Frank, is that where they were doing the
2 stop hole?

3 MR. McCARTON: Well, there was stuff across the street.
4 You guys were going everywhere, right? You were doing a great
5 job, I mean. But the point is that we smelled something. So all
6 the sudden we decided that we were going to move away from the
7 site.

8 BY MR. STOLICKY:

9 Q. When do you recall them -- well, DEP recognizing that
10 there was a problem with the water main?

11 A. That afternoon when we -- you know, 3:30, 4:00, you
12 know, it was like around that late afternoon time when we found
13 this and we had to stop everything, and they shut the water down
14 which then stopped the leak. So -- which then really cut us, you
15 know, on Park Avenue with the water to that building out. So, I
16 mean, we knew had something there. We didn't know that until --
17 how big the break was until they actually were able to get down
18 and look at it. And more importantly was to first plate it, fill
19 it -- fill it, plate it, and continue the search and rescue
20 operations that were ongoing, before even fixing the water main.

21 MR. STOLICKY: That's all I have.

22 MR. CHHATRE: Lenny?

23 MR. SINGH: I'm good, thank you.

24 MR. CHHATRE: Kelly?

25 MR. EMEABA: The only thing I'll say, is there any other

1 thing spectacular, something you can remember you want to tell us
2 we did not ask you, I'll appreciate if you can tell us. Anything
3 at all, we've not asked you that you had --

4 MR. MCCARTON: No, I wish I could pin together, you
5 know, the time a little bit better, but -- you know, I wish I
6 could. I can't. There's no way -- you know, the day was like a
7 rocket as it was.

8 MR. EMEABA: Okay. Thank you.

9 MR. CHHATRE: Well, Frank, I don't have any other
10 questions, so thank you for spending time with us. Thanks for all
11 the help and cooperation, just for the record. I appreciate all
12 the help.

13 MR. MCCARTON: Thank you, Ravi.

14 MR. CHHATRE: Thanks much. Off the record.

15 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: MULTISTORY STRUCTURE EXPLOSION
 NATURAL GAS PIPELINE LEAK
 MAY 12, 2014
 HARLEM, NEW YORK
 Interview of FRANK MCCARTON

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-14-MP-002

PLACE: Brooklyn, New York

DATE: September 30, 2014

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Keith J. Maurer
Transcriber