



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

June 1, 2020

Group Chairmen's Factual Report – Attachment 2 Company Interviews

OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE

DCA20MA002

This attachment contains transcripts of interviews of the following Penair personnel:

Accident Pilots

- Justin Lunn, First Officer, PenAir
- Paul Wells, Captain, PenAir (interview on October 19, 2019)
- Paul Wells, Captain, PenAir (interview on December 4, 2019)

Company Pilots and Check Airmen

- Daniel Lackey, First Officer, PenAir
- Britt Goudey, First Officer and Ground Instructor, PenAir
- Sarah Boots, Captain, PenAir
- Chet Harris, Captain, PenAir
- Adam Hehl, Captain, PenAir
- Gregory Pfeifer, Captain, PenAir
- Steve Hakala, Captain and Former Check Airman, PenAir
- Dennis Fisher, Captain and Check Airman, PenAir
- Brandon Wilson, Captain and Check Airman, PenAir

Management

- Crystal Branchaud, Chief Pilot, Pen Air (interview on October 25, 2019)
- Crystal Branchaud, Chief Pilot, Pen Air (interview on December 4, 2019)
- Kirk Watson, Manager of Flight Standards, PenAir
- Richard Harding, Director of Operations, PenAir
- David Fiacco, Manager of Flight Safety, PenAir
- Tiffany Lease, Manager of Safety, PenAir
- Tony Santiago, Director of Safety, PenAir
- Ben Nygren, Former Chief Pilot, PenAir
- Deke Abbott, Senior Vice President of Flight Operations, Ravn

Other company personnel

- Dawn Samuelson, Pilot Records, PenAir
- Iain Connolly, Acting Director – Systems Operations Center, PenAir (interview on December 3, 2019)
- Iain Connolly, Acting Director – Systems Operations Center, PenAir (interview on December 5, 2019)

*note: titles reflect position held at time of accident

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: JUSTIN LUNN
First Officer, PenAir

Saturday,
October 19, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

ROGER YOUNG, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

DENNIS FISHER
PenAir

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Justin Lunn:		
By Mr. Frantz		9
By Dr. Silva		32
By Dr. Sevillian		54
By Mr. Fisher		57
By Mr. Young		61
By Mr. Frantz		69
By Dr. Silva		81
By Dr. Sevillian		86
By Mr. Fisher		88
By Mr. Young		90
By Mr. Frantz		92
By Dr. Silva		95
By Dr. Sevillian		97

I N T E R V I E W

(3:37 p.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: We're on the record at 3:37 p.m. That should be
4 good, right there.

5 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Good afternoon, Justin. How are you?
6 Been better? That's the answer --

7 MR. LUNN: I've definitely been better.

8 MR. FRANTZ: That's the answer we usually get, yeah.

9 MR. LUNN: Yeah.

10 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. This is an interview with the operational
11 factors/human performance group; it's a combined group. The way
12 the NTSB does investigations, we form specific groups on different
13 topic areas -- thank you, Morgan -- power plants, airplane
14 systems, airports, if necessary. And when we look at pilots and
15 airlines and training, that's what the operations/human
16 performance group -- that's human performance in that, why people
17 do what they do. And so, anyway, this is the -- we're from the
18 NTSB, because we're the core of the group.

19 And then we always, because we don't have the expertise, we
20 bring in outside expertise as we need it for any investigation.
21 And so, we have -- someone from the FAA is always a party to our
22 investigation, and I'll tell you more about their role in a
23 minute. And then we always get somebody from the operator, in
24 this case PenAir, and that's Dennis. And if there was a pilots'
25 union, for example, there would be a representative from the union

1 in the group. But since there's no pilots' union, he's not here.
2 So that's the core -- or this is the human performance/operational
3 factors group.

4 We do different things as the investigation progresses, but
5 typically the first thing we always do is we interview the crew,
6 and we try to get that as soon as we can after the event because
7 memories fade, change. So that's what we're here to do today.

8 As I mentioned, we're making a recording. We'll send the
9 recording out to get transcribed, and we'll have a copy, and we'll
10 -- the group will all have a copy of that transcription.

11 In coming weeks or months, we may have other interviews we
12 conduct. We may talk to folks at PenAir or folks at the training
13 facility. There'll be -- there could be others, but right now the
14 group's focus today is just to interview the crew, which is you
15 two guys.

16 This is not sworn testimony, so you're not under oath or
17 anything. And so, if any mistakes -- it's an informal interview.
18 Any mistakes or corrections you want to make, that's fine. If you
19 realize you misspoke or said something wrong, don't worry about
20 it, go back and fix it. If, after the interview, you have
21 anything else that you recall that you think would be important to
22 us, it's fine to contact us and, you know, submit anything that
23 you want to do after the interview as well.

24 What we do is we typically, one at a time, we go -- we'll
25 just go around the group, and we'll ask you whatever questions we

1 have. We don't have a list of questions, per se, but we'll try to
2 get the information we want, and then we might go around the group
3 a second time in case anybody has any follow-up questions like
4 that. And at the end, you know, you'll have a chance to add
5 anything or bring up something that maybe we didn't bring out that
6 you think is relevant. We ask you to just answer to the best of
7 your ability. If you don't remember or don't recall or you don't
8 know, it's fine to say those things.

9 We are -- the NTSB has got nothing to do with enforcement or
10 regulations or certificate actions. So even though we have an FAA
11 group member, Roger, he is not associated or working with any part
12 of the FAA that would do any kind of enforcement actions or
13 anything like that. He is strictly on the FAA accident
14 investigation side to participate in this investigation.

15 And our goal is not to assign blame or anything. We're
16 trying to figure out what happened, why it happened, and then is
17 there anything we can do in the future to prevent things like
18 this. The ultimate product of an NTSB investigation is a safety
19 recommendation, maybe to the FAA, maybe to the operator, maybe to
20 the manufacturer of the airplane. But any safety recommendation
21 that we think, if this, this recommendation would become -- or
22 would be implemented, that reduces the chance of something like
23 this happening again. So that's kind of what we're all focused
24 on. But today we're just focusing on gathering as much
25 information, learning as much as we can from what you know, since

1 you were there, about what happened.

2 The transcript that we make will ultimately -- the written
3 transcript, not the recording, but the written transcript will
4 become part of the public record at the end of the whole
5 investigative procedure when we release the final report. So we
6 can't say that anything you tell us will be confidential or give
7 you any kind of immunity; we can't do that because eventually, we
8 all know, it's all going to become public. But that's typically,
9 for an investigation like this, a year, plus or minus, to complete
10 it. So it's a ways down the line.

11 Since we're recording, just please try to avoid answering
12 with a nod or an uh-huh or some --

13 MR. LUNN: Right.

14 MR. FRANTZ: -- just something you can't --

15 MR. LUNN: You need a verbal confirmation.

16 MR. FRANTZ: If it's a yes or no -- exactly. Exactly. Make
17 sure I covered all the points.

18 Sathya? She's -- Sathya is the co-chairman. We're -- and so
19 I always have to defer to her because she always catches something
20 that I missed. Did I miss anything?

21 DR. SILVA: Nope. You're good.

22 MR. CAMPBELL: And because she's wearing a great watch.

23 DR. SILVA: Thank you. Is it still blinding people?

24 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, Justin, so we'll start by just letting you
25 know, as you already know, that you're allowed to have a

1 representative with you, but it needs to be someone of your
2 choosing. And so, if -- would you like to have a representative?

3 MR. LUNN: Yeah, Morgan.

4 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Can you state his full name just for the
5 record?

6 MR. LUNN: What was your --

7 MR. CAMPBELL: Remember, the soup.

8 MR. LUNN: That's right, Morgan Campbell.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. All right. Thanks. And --

10 MR. CAMPBELL: If you want to, I can -- there's a lot of
11 names. A lot of names right now.

12 MR. FRANTZ: And, Morgan, I know you've done this before,
13 but --

14 MR. CAMPBELL: Yeah.

15 MR. FRANTZ: -- I still just want to real quickly go over the
16 guidelines.

17 MR. CAMPBELL: Yeah.

18 MR. FRANTZ: You can't answer any questions for him. You
19 can't clarify anything he says. But if you want to have a recess,
20 that's fine. If you want to go talk to Justin privately, that's
21 fine. And you can advise him not to answer a question if you'd
22 like, if you'd like to. So, and that's -- okay.

23 All right. So, Justin, before we start --

24 MR. LUNN: Yes?

25 MR. FRANTZ: Any questions on anything that I just went over?

1 MR. LUNN: No, I don't have any questions right now.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Great, thanks. All right, well, let's
3 start with the easy stuff.

4 INTERVIEW OF JUSTIN LUNN

5 BY MR. FRANTZ:

6 Q. Can you just give us your name and any spellings that we
7 might need to make sure we get it right?

8 A. You want full name?

9 Q. Yeah, please.

10 A. First, middle and last? Justin Taylor, T-a-y-l-o-r, Lunn,
11 L-u-n-n.

12 Q. And how old are you, Justin?

13 A. I'm 39.

14 Q. Okay. What's your current position?

15 A. First officer at PenAir.

16 Q. Okay. And how long have you been first officer?

17 A. I was hired by the company on May 27th. It was my -- well,
18 that's the class date. That's when we started class. I don't
19 know the exact hire date, but it was May of this year.

20 Q. Okay. And the only -- what planes do you fly for PenAir?

21 A. Saab 2000.

22 Q. Okay. So can you give us a quick sketch of your aviation
23 background prior to PenAir?

24 A. I started flight training at University of Alaska Anchorage
25 in 2014 and finished my private in 2015. I continued flight

1 training down in Colorado, and I got my commercial -- let me see.
2 Let me get my dates out so I can give you the dates. I got my
3 commercial and my -- commercial multi and single all in 20- --
4 let's see -- 2016, in 2016. I got my CFI, my single-engines
5 flight instructor certificate in May of 2017.

6 I started flight instructing at Aspen Flying Club in
7 Centennial, Colorado, and ended up -- I did that from May until
8 December, came back to here for the month of December. I was down
9 there, away from my wife and my two children. I was flying out of
10 there when my wife was still up here. She's a nurse up here, and
11 so I came back every so often to visit.

12 And came back for the entire month of December, ended up
13 changing flight schools, started instructing out at Front Range
14 Flight School. Did that until May, and then I decided -- I was
15 offered a job with UAA up here as a flight instructor. And I came
16 back up here and start working for UAA in August of 2018 so I
17 could be closer to my family. While I was flight instructing
18 there, I also flight instructed at Angel Aviation, which is on
19 Merrill Field also. I did that until I got my hours and was hired
20 by PenAir.

21 I've primarily -- I had -- up to that point, I only had -- I
22 had 100 hours multi-engine time. I was just a single-engine
23 flight instructor. I focused mainly on that, and most of my time
24 was in Cessna 172s and Piper Warriors and Cherokees.

25 Q. Okay. So tell me about your current certificates.

1 A. Yes. I've got commercial -- I have both, commercial multi
2 and single. Well, and my ATP now. That was done -- I went down
3 to -- so we started ground school in May, the end of May. I went
4 down to Miami for ATP-CTP beginning of July. I was down there for
5 the first -- I think it was about 10 days for that. Flew up to
6 Orlando, took my written. A day or two later I did my oral at
7 SIMCOM in Orlando, Florida, and then did my -- we did our sim
8 training, and passed my check ride. I got my ATP temporary
9 certificate, and then came back up here, and OE started on August
10 1st of this year.

11 Q. Do you have any other type ratings besides the Saab?

12 A. No, just the Saab 2000 is the only type rating I have.

13 Q. Okay. Sorry, I had --

14 A. And I had a -- I have a restricted ATP because I had -- I
15 didn't have 500 hours of cross-country time. Because of flight
16 instructing, most of it was strictly local flying. I had over 250
17 when I got -- when I went in for my ATP. So --

18 Q. Okay. So you still have a restricted ATP?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I'm not quite to 500 cross-country hours yet.

22 Q. So, and you said you started OE -- when did you start OE?

23 A. August 1st.

24 Q. August 1st. Okay. So you got your ATP and your type rating
25 in the same --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- same flight?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Same ride? Okay. And that was at SIMCOM?

5 A. Yes, it was.

6 Q. Okay. And, sorry, I might have missed that. When was --

7 well, when was that?

8 A. That was in July, end of July.

9 Q. The end of July was the type rating, right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you said ATP, right? Okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Yeah. We finished, came back, and I had a couple of days off

15 and then went right into OE.

16 Q. Your ground school with PenAir, was that up here?

17 A. Conducted here, yes.

18 Q. Okay. And you started that in --

19 A. May.

20 Q. May of this year.

21 A. I believe it was May 27th.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. The first 2 weeks of that were general, and then after that

24 we went into systems.

25 Q. Okay. Okay. Your only other -- if I got this right, your

1 only other flying in Alaska outside of PenAir was as an
2 instructor?

3 A. As a flight instructor.

4 Q. And in Anchorage?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And I got my private up here. But, yes, I flew up here as a
8 flight instructor.

9 Q. Prior to PenAir, have you ever flown out to --

10 A. No.

11 Q. -- Dutch Harbor?

12 A. I had not.

13 Q. No. Okay.

14 A. All my flying here was to -- between Homer and Anchorage and
15 Anchorage and Talkeetna.

16 Q. Okay. Great. Okay, so take me back to the flight. You
17 don't need to -- anything that you consider uneventful from the
18 beginning of the flight, through the flight, you don't -- I don't
19 need to recap that. But maybe start -- if the flight was just
20 generic until close to the end, start somewhere on the approach or
21 when you were --

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. -- approach, when you were coming into the destination and
24 you were deciding what kind of approach and how you were going to
25 terminate there. Just in your own words, at your own pace, just

1 talk me through events and describe anything that you remember
2 about the flight.

3 A. While we were, you know, en route, we were talking about the
4 weights and the fuel burn and what we're going to -- what our
5 landing weight was going to be. So we did the calculations on
6 that and had that done.

7 As -- about 20 minutes out from the airport is typically when
8 we call up, between, you know, 25 -- 20, 25 minutes, we'll call
9 Dutch ops and Dutch weather, get the -- let them know how far out
10 we are, how many passengers we have, if we have any special needs
11 passengers. And then immediately -- usually weather is listening
12 in or we have to call in. They're not always listening, so we
13 have to make a separate call over the same frequency to Dutch
14 weather, and then they give us the current observations that they
15 have. And then we make a determination of what we're going to do.

16 That day, we determined that we'll load the RNAV 1-3 approach
17 in. And the plan was that we would go -- we would request our
18 RNAV 1-3. If we were approved it, we'd fly it. And, but once we
19 got down there, if we had visual conditions, we would make the
20 determination based off of the current observed winds, if we were
21 going to continue with RNAV 1-3 or if I would switch back off over
22 to center frequency and request a visual 3-1 so we could land with
23 the best winds. The plan was to always to land with whatever
24 winds favored the best runway.

25 So we started -- we did -- we briefed that before top of

1 descent. And after that was done, we were cleared pilot's
2 discretion, I believe. I can't remember the alternate. We were
3 cleared to pilot's discretion though, and we started our descent.
4 I completed the in-range checklist and we started down.

5 Everything was fine. We were looking at -- we saw clouds
6 ahead of us. And as we were coming down, Paul turned on the
7 anti-ice early because we were going to -- you know, we were going
8 to enter visible moisture, so we turned the engine anti-ice on.
9 And he was looking at the weather radar and noticed that there was
10 precipitation ahead of us, and we had discussed that. And
11 everything was normal all through the descent, and we set up.

12 There was precipitation. It was making it a little bit
13 difficult initially for -- he saw Eider Point and Hog Island
14 before I did, but we both were able to pick it out. And as we got
15 closer, it became more and more apparent. We had visual
16 conditions. We saw the airport and the runway.

17 That first approach, the winds were -- they were variable.
18 They weren't really high. I don't remember exactly what the winds
19 were or what the directions or anything, but there was nothing
20 that either one of us heard that would make us deviate from the
21 1-3 approach.

22 As we were coming in, it was bumpy and Paul was established.
23 We -- he asked for flaps 15; I gave him flaps 15. Then he asked
24 for flaps -- or for gear down; I did gear down. And as we were
25 coming in -- we were still outside Eider Point; we weren't quite

1 in the inlet yet -- he asked for flaps 20 before landing
2 checklists. So I accomplished that.

3 After that, we continued with the approach. I made the call
4 for Mobile 1 to clear the deck and close the gates, and we got the
5 all clear from him. As we were on final, I was reading off
6 speeds, and he noticed -- he remembered he still had the engine
7 anti-ice on, so he reached up and turned those off. In the moment
8 it took him to do that, we were slightly destabilized. Stopped
9 the descent momentarily, and we were off course.

10 And I noticed that, and I told him, go around. And he
11 immediately executed the go-around. We flew straight ahead. He
12 said, go around, max power, flap 7. We -- flap 7. We had the
13 positive rate, gear up, climbed out, and we circled around
14 Ballyhoo to the downwind. And I announced over CTAF that we're
15 going around. And got to the back side, and he made the comment
16 that, all right, we'll set up -- we'll come -- go out there and
17 we'll do -- we'll turn around and do the visual 3-1. And I asked
18 him if the winds were favoring 3-1 for that, if we wanted to
19 continue that way. And he said, no, I you guess you're right;
20 we'll go with 1-3.

21 And we requested a pilot (ph.) -- a wind check. Got the wind
22 check. And again, it didn't seem to indicate that we needed to
23 change, to deviate from that plan. While we were doing that, we
24 were getting radio chatter from a King Air that was coming in
25 behind us, so there was a lot of communication over the CTAF.

1 Weather was talking, they were talking, and it was getting a
2 little bit -- there was a lot going on at that point. But we
3 didn't hear anything that indicated to us that we needed to
4 deviate the plan.

5 We started setting up, and he asked for, again, flaps 15,
6 speed check; flaps 15, gear down, gear down. We were set back up
7 on final. Then he asked for the flaps 20 before landing checks.
8 Did that, and I called Mobile 1 again to clear the deck. We got
9 the all clear. We were coming in, and he wanted -- and I was
10 reading off the speeds to him as we were coming down and the
11 descent rates, and it was between 700 and 800 feet, and we --
12 about a mile out we were at plus 15.

13 And as we came in, getting to about a half mile, we were at
14 plus 10. As we were approaching the threshold, we're at plus 5.
15 The approach speeds and everything, to me, the -- visually,
16 everything looked normal. As we crossed over and we were getting
17 over near the touchdown zone, I called Ref, and he touched down in
18 the touchdown zone. And we had, we had already briefed that I was
19 going to get on the yoke early because we knew that we had winds;
20 we had a crosswind. And so I was going to get on the yoke early.
21 Normally we get down -- we call 80 knots and the captain will say
22 bottoms, and the FO will say top. So we'll take the yoke, and
23 they focus on the power levers and the tiller wheel and the rudder
24 pedals and the brakes. We agreed I would do that early.

25 And so as soon as we touched down, I took the yoke and saw

1 the windsock was pointing directly across the runway, and I turned
2 right into it. And he -- and I looked at the indicators to make
3 sure that as soon as I saw the Betas, called Betas, and he went
4 full reverse and was on the brakes. And I was looking at the
5 speed tape. I saw 80 knots, called 80 knots. And I looked up,
6 and everything initially was looking normal.

7 As we were proceeding down the runway, we were coming up to
8 where we would normally start thinking about taxiing off, and I
9 noticed that we were faster than normal. It didn't seem
10 excessively fast, but it definitely felt faster than normal, and I
11 made a comment to him, you're going to need to get on the brakes.
12 At that point he said, I'm full brakes right now. And I put my
13 feet up on the rudder pedals as well, and I pushed full brakes to
14 verify and they didn't budge. They were full -- he had full
15 application on the brakes.

16 We were continuing. I saw the inlet. The last thing I
17 wanted to do was to go off the end of the runway into the water,
18 so I told him, go right, right, go right. And I let off the left
19 brake, and I applied full right rudder braking action to try to
20 drive the plane to the right, because there was a road there that
21 we could try to avoid going off the end.

22 And we ended up -- I saw that there was a ditch. We were
23 going to hit the ditch. I don't know what else was there. I know
24 it was a pretty violent -- when we hit by where the road was, it
25 was pretty violent. And the plane lurched up and then back down,

1 and we started to go down the embankment towards the water, but it
2 came to a rest.

3 And Paul immediately told me to evac -- do the evacuation --
4 emergency evac. He called Crash Fire and Rescue, told them that
5 we were down, we needed help. And then he called to the back and
6 said, "Evacuate, evacuate, evacuate," and let them -- then said,
7 "Right side, right side," because we had a left engine fire
8 indication, so we didn't want anybody going out that side.

9 We completed the checklist, shut everything down, and then
10 tried to get out. He told me -- normally, I guess, the FO would
11 go out the top, but he told me not to; because of the way we were
12 positioned, I would've -- it would've been a big fall for me. And
13 I didn't -- the last thing I wanted to do was go in the water
14 anyways, because we were right there by it.

15 We turned around and tried to get out and -- the bulk of the
16 passengers were already off, but we had one passenger who was
17 incapacitated in the aisleway and was blocking the rest of the
18 passengers. It took -- I don't know how long. It felt like an
19 eternity, but they -- the EMTs were able to get him off, and then
20 we were able to exit.

21 I grabbed the flight can and my company iPad. Paul checked
22 the back galley and told me to get off the plane. So I got -- I
23 went out the left overwing exit. The fire had been put out, and
24 it was the safest exit, so we ended up going out that exit. And
25 Paul followed me right out after that.

1 Q. Did you -- you had a fire -- did you have a fire warning?

2 A. Yes, we had a fire indication warning.

3 Q. Did you see a fire?

4 A. I didn't see a fire.

5 Q. Okay. Did you -- what did you do when you had -- when you
6 first noticed the fire warning?

7 A. We did -- we pulled the handle and did the extinguisher.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. And the fire handle went out -- the light went out for that.

10 Q. Okay. Tell me about the procedures for getting the weather
11 at Dutch Harbor. You said you had -- did you have to call --

12 A. We call --

13 Q. -- the airport?

14 A. Yes, we call -- we have -- 129.5 is the frequency to talk to
15 Dutch ops and Dutch weather. And so we contact a person, and they
16 give us the current weather observations.

17 Q. There's no AWOS or ASOS broadcast?

18 A. There is one, but we -- it's company policy to call and get
19 the current observations.

20 Q. And so the first time you called was 20, 25 minutes out?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And do you happen to remember what the weather --

23 A. I wrote it down.

24 Q. -- what they told you?

25 A. I don't recall.

1 Q. Okay. But you determined -- at that point, what --

2 A. At that point --

3 Q. -- was determined was going to do?

4 A. -- that we were going to proceed with the RNAV 1-3 and then
5 make the determination if we had -- if it was -- well, I mean, if
6 we didn't have visibility and couldn't see it by the time we got
7 to the missed approach, we're going to execute a missed approach.
8 If we did have it in sight, we were going to request a visual.

9 If the wind still favored 1-3, we were just going to proceed
10 with the RNAV 1-3. If we had visual and the winds favored 3-1, we
11 were going to change -- I was going to call Center, inform them
12 that we were going to request -- or request the visual 3-1. If
13 cleared for that, we were going to proceed to 3-1, the visual 3-1,
14 so that we could end up doing the best approach.

15 Q. Okay. Did you call for the go-around?

16 A. I did, yes.

17 Q. Based on?

18 A. Based on the fact that we were too high and we were offset
19 from landing. It was -- there was no way we could safely land the
20 airplane. We would have to be destabilized. Everything was just
21 -- it was the right call.

22 Q. But you were -- were you visual?

23 A. Yeah, we were visual.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. We were visual, yes.

1 Q. Okay. How far out or what altitude do you think you were
2 at --

3 A. I don't recall.

4 Q. -- when you decided to do the go-around?

5 A. We were close. It was -- we were -- it was too close to even
6 attempt it. I don't remember the distance. I mean, we were a
7 short final -- very short final and too high.

8 Q. Sure.

9 A. Couple hundred feet too high, probably. I don't know the
10 exact altitude, though. But it was -- there was no way. So the
11 safe call was go around, and we went around.

12 Q. Okay. Did I understand you to say that you made the decision
13 to take the plane to the right, and when you realized that you
14 might go off the end, you --

15 A. I said, go right, go right, go right.

16 Q. Okay, and what did the cap -- what was his reaction to that?

17 A. He was already going -- I don't know. I mean, he went to the
18 right. He took the tiller wheel to the right. And I was pushing
19 on the right rudder pedal. I don't know if he pushed on the right
20 rudder pedal at the same time. I don't know. I -- all I know is
21 that I hit the right rudder pedal as hard as I could, the brake,
22 not -- but like the right rudder brake to try to do differential
23 braking so we went to the right.

24 Q. And so we haven't seen the accident site yet, so did your
25 turn off to the right, did that begin before you actually departed

1 the paved surface of the runway?

2 A. It was right at the end.

3 Q. Right at the end?

4 A. When I knew that we weren't going to stop on the -- when we
5 weren't -- when I saw that we were not going to stop on the runway
6 is when I, when I told him -- when I made that statement and then
7 hit the rudders, the rudder pedal to the right.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Because I knew -- after that, there's a road, and then it
10 drops off to the water. There is not much room on the other end
11 of that runway before the water.

12 Q. Okay. On the second approach, you said that you had -- as
13 you were going, coming around, you checked the wind again. Did
14 you --

15 A. Yeah. And I don't recall --

16 Q. -- by calling? Was it by calling?

17 A. Yeah, we called. Yeah, I called for -- I called wind check.
18 But, like I said, there was a lot of chatter going on. I was
19 listening for anything that sounded like we were going to end up
20 with a tailwind. And I didn't hear any call that sounded like we
21 needed to deviate our plan. I don't recall exactly what the winds
22 were, but it definitely wasn't anything that was going to change
23 our minds.

24 Q. For using 1-3?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Because I had -- we would have abandoned it immediately and
3 circled out and come back in. Or, at that point -- I don't know.
4 But I -- the winds, what we got, it still seemed to favor the
5 plan. Or it didn't -- it wasn't enough to make us feel like we
6 needed to deviate from what we had, that we were landing on the
7 safest runway.

8 Q. Okay. Does the Saab have a tailwind limitation?

9 A. Yeah. I can't remember off top my head right now. There's
10 -- but, yes, we do have tailwind limitations. Is it, is it 15? I
11 can't remember.

12 Q. Does PenAir have a specific --

13 A. Yes. It's in the manual.

14 Q. -- limitation? Separate from the Saab limitation --

15 A. I believe so.

16 Q. -- does PenAir have any -- got limited -- more limited
17 guidance?

18 A. I think it's, I think it's what the -- what Saab's
19 recommendation is.

20 Q. Okay. Does PenAir have any special procedures or
21 requirements for landing at Dutch Harbor?

22 A. Yes. It's a captain-only landing. So it's special airport.

23 Q. Okay. Is that the only restriction that you're aware of, is
24 captain-only for Dutch Harbor?

25 A. Well, I mean, we can't land there if there's any

1 contamination on the runway either. So, yeah. I mean --

2 Q. Did you -- okay. You talked about, as you were coming in,
3 you -- as you were approaching the airport, you did your
4 performance -- your calculations. Is that, like, talking about
5 landing performance numbers for --

6 A. Um-hmm. It is.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. The speeds that we were going to set.

9 Q. And then that was after you got the weather?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. And so --

12 A. But -- no, we did that before the weather, because that's
13 based on weight.

14 Q. Okay. And so, is that -- how does that procedure -- or how
15 do you do those calculations?

16 A. We have a performance binder that has the weights and the
17 speeds that we select based on those weights. And I went into the
18 performance binder, found the weights that we would be landing at,
19 and selected the speeds. We have clean and then we have ice
20 speeds. So --

21 Q. Okay. And so the -- was the end product of that calculation
22 anything other than just the V-speed that you would fly? Did
23 anything else come out or any other numbers come out of that
24 calculation that you needed or --

25 A. For the speeds?

1 Q. Yeah.

2 A. No, I --

3 Q. Other than the speed, is there anything else?

4 A. Well, we have landing distances and things. Well, I mean,
5 we've got the airport analysis one that tells us the distance for
6 the airport and things like that, but that's the landing distance.
7 As far as what we were -- as getting the speeds for our approach,
8 you know, it's -- and we have, we do have to bump up the speeds if
9 we've got winds and things like that. But he was -- we were
10 approaching at those speeds.

11 Q. And so how do you determine that airport calculation that you
12 talked about that determines landing -- or that gives you landing
13 distance? And then, how do you know that the airport you're going
14 to is suitable for the landing you want to make? Is that part of
15 a calculation that you make?

16 A. I don't -- what do you mean?

17 Q. How do you know you're going to have enough runway when you
18 get there? You don't take weather into account for the landing
19 performance calculations, right? That -- the purpose of that is
20 just to give you V-speeds --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- based on your weight?

23 A. Right.

24 Q. Okay. So you don't do -- there's no calculation that you
25 perform to tell you that you're okay to land on this runway with

1 this wind, for example?

2 A. Well, we do have a wind chart to tell us what limitations we
3 have on the winds and coming in. And, I mean, that's another way
4 we can determine -- we determine if we're legal to land there or
5 not. But as far as the distance, yeah, I --

6 Q. No, it's just whatever you guys routinely do. So the routine
7 calculation you make, then --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- is to determine the V-speeds --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- for any particular arrival.

12 A. That we should be approaching at for the weight that we're
13 approaching at.

14 Q. Do you happen to remember what the V-speed was?

15 A. Yes. It was 126, was the Vref, and the V clean was 148. And
16 then we bug ref plus 10. So 136.

17 Q. And is that the standard you always -- ref plus 10 is the
18 PenAir procedure?

19 A. Well, if there's -- yeah, for that, unless we need to add --
20 well, if we're adding a wind component to it, we can ref -- bug a
21 little bit higher. But we weren't because it wasn't -- we didn't
22 really have much gust factor to -- it was mainly just the wind.
23 You know, we didn't have gusting too much, so we just stick with
24 the plus 10.

25 Q. Does PenAir -- so do you have any guidance from PenAir about

1 a ref number if winds are calm or if you have a tailwind? Do you
2 still add plus 10 to whatever you get for ref regardless of --

3 A. We change it if we have the gust factors that are --

4 Q. For gust factors?

5 A. Yeah. You know, the --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. It'd be ref plus 10 or half the gust factor if it exceeds 10
8 knots.

9 Q. If half the gust factor exceeds 10 knots, you would add that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. But if you had a tailwind, you would --

12 A. Well --

13 Q. -- still do ref plus 10; is that correct?

14 A. Right.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Okay, I'm going to take a break and I'm
16 going to pass it to Sathya, see if she has any questions for you.
17 Thanks, Justin.

18 DR. SILVA: How are you doing, Justin? You need a break?

19 MR. LUNN: Yeah, let's do a break.

20 DR. SILVA: Okay. We'll come back in 5 minutes. Is that
21 good? Off the record at 4:10.

22 (Off the record at 4:10 p.m.)

23 (On the record at 4:18 p.m.)

24 DR. SILVA: Back on the record at 4:18.

25 We forgot, at the beginning, to do introductions. So let's

1 go -- we'll go around the room and do that now so you know who
2 you're talking to. You do know who you were talking to with
3 Marvin, but I'm Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance
4 investigator with the NTSB. And we work together within this
5 group, and we're really looking at pilot interaction with the
6 system, decision making, everything like that.

7 MR. LUNN: Can I give you a little background on me?

8 DR. SILVA: Sure.

9 MR. LUNN: I have a master's in aeronautics from Embry-Riddle
10 in human factors.

11 DR. SILVA: Okay.

12 MR. LUNN: I know exactly what you guys do. I've done a lot
13 of case studies. And one of the things that I'm struggling with
14 right now is -- you know, I've done all those case studies; I've
15 seen it. Now I'm going to be one. And it's hard.

16 DR. SILVA: Um-hmm.

17 MR. LUNN: Yeah.

18 DR. SILVA: Yep. We understand that. I mean, you're going
19 through something that most people don't have to face. But,
20 remember, you're here talking to us. And --

21 MR. LUNN: But I'm here talking to you guys.

22 DR. SILVA: And that's -- it's understandable. We're trying
23 -- we want to make this as painless as possible. You know, we're
24 here just to really get down to what happened so it doesn't happen
25 again.

1 MR. LUNN: I know.

2 DR. SILVA: Right?

3 MR. LUNN: I know exactly what it is.

4 DR. SILVA: Yeah.

5 MR. LUNN: I know the whole point of all this.

6 DR. SILVA: Um-hmm. Yeah. And we understand the difficulty
7 that you're going through, and we do appreciate that you're taking
8 the time with us now to talk to us, because we know --

9 MR. LUNN: The last thing I want is anything to happen to any
10 other pilot ever, and I don't want anyone to have to experience
11 what we experienced.

12 DR. SILVA: Yeah. So, what we'll, we'll also do, at the end
13 to -- I don't remember if Marvin mentioned this. Once we go
14 through all of our questions, we'll turn it back over to you and
15 see what else you might want to add or anything that you thought
16 of that could improve the system, things like that. So we'll come
17 back to that. So, again, if you need any other breaks, just let
18 us know.

19 MR. LUNN: All right.

20 DR. SILVA: Yeah, you're the expert here. You were the one
21 there, you know, so we're just trying to see things from your
22 perspective.

23 MR. LUNN: I understand.

24 DR. SILVA: There are no wrong answers. Yeah. Okay --

25 MR. LUNN: I feel like I won't have all the answers for you

1 guys, though.

2 DR. SILVA: And that's okay. And I think --

3 MR. LUNN: Like with the tailwind components, it's a memory
4 item. And right now, I -- like, I couldn't remember his last
5 name. And I know it.

6 DR. SILVA: That's okay.

7 MR. LUNN: You know?

8 MR. FRANTZ: I couldn't remember his last name, and I might
9 have even known him longer than you, so -- and I'm not near under
10 the stress you are, so --

11 DR. SILVA: Yeah.

12 MR. CAMPBELL: It's a forgettable name, anyway.

13 DR. SILVA: Yeah, so don't --

14 MR. LUNN: That's not a major company --

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I hope this doesn't end up in the
16 factual report.

17 DR. SILVA: Yeah. Don't worry. Again, if you need a break,
18 just let us know. We totally understand what you're going
19 through. And, you know, this is a stressful experience, and we
20 know what that does to people, so don't worry much about that.

21 I wanted to start with some -- oh, yeah, sorry. We stopped
22 introductions. I forgot.

23 MR. LUNN: I do well, as you know, on this part.

24 DR. SILVA: No, no, no, you're good. Okay, so -- yeah, so
25 I'm human performance. Dujuan is also a colleague of mine in

1 human performance. So --

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: And you have a fellow Embry-Riddle alumni
3 with you, so -- yes, I'm Dajuan Sevillian, human performance as
4 well.

5 DR. SILVA: Great. Go ahead.

6 MR. LUNN: I know Dennis Fisher.

7 MR. FISHER: You know me, Dennis Fisher.

8 DR. SILVA: Great.

9 MR. YOUNG: Roger Young. Once again, I'm not here in a
10 regulatory capacity. Just some experience in some of this stuff,
11 and so they asked me to sit in.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. Yeah, so we're not quizzing you.

13 MR. LUNN: I know.

14 DR. SILVA: So --

15 MR. LUNN: I know.

16 DR. SILVA: -- just keep that in mind. We're really --

17 MR. LUNN: I've gone over this every second since it
18 happened.

19 DR. SILVA: Um-hmm, yep. So we're just trying to capture
20 that, and you're the one who has it, so --

21 BY DR. SILVA:

22 Q. What's your total time?

23 A. I honestly am not a hundred percent sure. I've got -- I
24 haven't kept my logbook a hundred percent up to date. I've got
25 the company one. I usually do it at the end of every month.

- 1 Q. Okay.
- 2 A. I was getting ready to do it again. It's --
- 3 Q. Estimate?
- 4 A. Just over 1,600 hours. I think I've got 100 -- or I've got
- 5 -- flying the Saab, I have 141.2 hours.
- 6 Q. Okay.
- 7 A. And when I got hired on, I had 14-8-something. So I'm over,
- 8 just over I think 1,600 hours -- or, no, I'm over -- yeah, 1,600
- 9 hours.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. Not quite 1,700 hours.
- 12 Q. Had you flown into Unalaska before?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. How many times? About, again.
- 15 A. I believe Crystal said -- let me count real quick.
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. I've got my --
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. Fifteen times, not counting that flight.
- 20 Q. Okay.
- 21 A. So that was my 16th approach into Dutch Harbor.
- 22 Q. And all in the last 2 months? Yeah.
- 23 A. I did four in a row last week.
- 24 Q. Okay.
- 25 A. And two of those were with Paul.

1 Q. Two of those were --

2 A. With Paul Wells, the captain.

3 Q. With Paul. Okay.

4 A. We did -- and we did an approach and landed in 3-1, and we
5 did an approach and landed in 1-3.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Because we landed on both sides.

8 Q. Got it. And coming back to the approach, are there separate
9 approaches for each runway?

10 A. Yes, there's two different RNAVs.

11 Q. There are two different RNAVs. Okay. And can you walk me
12 through that decision making again as to why 1-3 was what you guys
13 were looking for?

14 A. 1-3 is more of a straight-in approach.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Unalaska is really -- the back side is -- you have to fly
17 through a corridor and do a -- you can come in and your base turn,
18 you're flying along the mountains, and then you have to make a --
19 not -- I wouldn't say it's really a steep turn to final, but it's,
20 you know, it's a pretty sharp turn to final. And it just -- from
21 my perspective, I don't -- you know, just from what I've seen, it
22 just leaves you exposed a little bit more.

23 Whereas, with 1-3, you have -- it's more open and it's more
24 that you can set up for more of a straight-in approach. You're
25 not at the mercy, so much, of a crosswind or -- the back side, you

1 have a lot of airflow coming down off the mountains, and it gets
2 real, real bumpy back there. The winds are really unpredictable.
3 It's a little bit more predictable on the front side, as far as
4 I've seen.

5 Q. When you say front side and back side, what do you mean?

6 A. 1-3 is the front side and then 3-1 would be the back side of
7 it.

8 Q. Okay. The approach end of those, right?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Okay. Is there any instrumentation in the cockpit that gives
11 you wind on the aircraft?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What does that look like?

14 A. It has a little arrow and it tells us the speed.

15 Q. Okay. Is that on a PFD or -- I'm assuming you have a PFD.

16 A. That is on the ND.

17 Q. Okay. Is that something that --

18 A. I was not looking at that.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I didn't look. I was focused outside and at our speeds.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I did not look at it.

23 Q. Is that something you would normally look at on final?

24 A. Not typically. I'm more looking at the -- what's happening
25 to the water, and looking for the windsocks and how the plane's

1 reacting to everything.

2 Q. Got it. Do you remember what the water looked like for that
3 approach?

4 A. Not as much. I was more focused on the speeds and inside the
5 cockpit. Paul was outside.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I was reading off the airspeeds for him as we were coming in,
8 making sure that we were progressing nicely, that we weren't fast,
9 you know, because -- and we weren't descending too fast. Just
10 trying to keep everything stabilized.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. As soon as I saw anything -- like with the previous one, if
13 we got destabilized in any way, go around. Because that's not an
14 airport you can -- there's not a lot of room for error there.

15 Q. And I think you were kind of getting at this, too, but what
16 are your normal duties? Like, what are you doing as first officer
17 in this approach compared to pilot flying?

18 A. I'm monitoring the speeds, the descent rates, and making sure
19 that everything looks normal. And if I see anything out of the
20 normal, I'll call for go-around or I'll tell him, you know, check
21 speed, check altitude, you know, things that he needs to -- I need
22 to make him aware of.

23 Q. How is it flying -- sorry, if I interrupted you.

24 A. No, you're fine.

25 Q. How is it flying with Paul?

1 A. I enjoy it. I've flown with -- there's only one captain I
2 haven't flown with at this company, and I have enjoyed flying with
3 everyone. Everyone's really professional. They know what they're
4 doing. They value -- they -- it's the crew environment; they want
5 the input of the FO. I have had nothing but good experiences.
6 Even with the accident, you know, Paul and I were working as a
7 team.

8 Q. Um-hmm. Did he react immediately to the go-around call that
9 you made that first time?

10 A. Absolutely. Yeah, instantly.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. As soon as I said go around, he said, okay. And then he
13 stated, go around, max power, flap 7, and then we went through the
14 procedure.

15 Q. Okay, got it. And you mentioned that you saw the windsock
16 was indicating a crosswind. What side -- do you remember what
17 side --

18 A. Of the runway it is?

19 Q. -- it was coming from?

20 A. The winds were coming directly across from right to left.

21 Q. From right to left? Okay. And do you remember -- this is a
22 very specific question. Do you remember if you pull the circuit
23 breaker for the CVR as part of the evac checklist?

24 A. It is not part of evacuation checklist.

25 Q. It's not? Okay, okay. Do you remember --

1 A. I didn't pull a circuit breaker.

2 Q. You didn't pull a circuit breaker?

3 A. I didn't pull any circuit breakers.

4 Q. Okay. That's okay. Let's see. So, from what we understand,
5 the runway is about 4,500 feet long.

6 A. Right.

7 Q. I don't have experience with the Saab, so can you tell me, is
8 that a normal runway length that you guys would fly?

9 A. I mean, I would say the Dutch Harbor's a fairly short runway.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I mean, but we have a couple of special airports. Dutch
12 Harbor's one of them. Sand Point's another one, and I had just
13 flown to Sand Point the day before. They're short runways.
14 They're captain-only runways, because there's a lot of factors
15 that go into it.

16 Q. Yeah.

17 A. You know, that the -- it's -- with the weather, with the
18 unpredictability of the -- I mean, Dutch -- one of the issues with
19 Dutch Harbor is our missed approach points really -- you can't --
20 it's outside -- you know, normally you have a 2-mile or whatever
21 distance you have to maintain. Well, it's -- their final approach
22 is outside that. So it's unique.

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. And that's why it's captain-only. And it's a challenging
25 airport. So -- and you have to be real careful going into it.

1 And everybody that I've flown with, and Paul included, has been --
2 is very careful going into that airport. He was calling for wind
3 checks. Like he'd -- get a wind check; get a wind check; get a
4 wind check.

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. And there were -- I mean, yeah. So --

7 Q. When you're doing these performance calculations, it sounds
8 like those are just charts, manual --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You're doing them manually? Okay. And the app that you kind
11 of mentioned on your iPad, is it the airport calculation? What
12 was the name of the --

13 A. It's a folder that we have inside that's stored on our iPad.

14 Q. Oh, it's a folder. Okay.

15 A. Yeah, it's a folder. It's -- and it's, you know, a little --
16 like a PDF.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. It has all the different -- it's got weights, temperatures,
19 things like that, you know, and for calculating our performance.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. For our V_1 , V_r , V_2 and V_t speeds.

22 Q. Got it. And then when it comes to landing distance, is that
23 a calculation that you normally do before a flight or --

24 A. No.

25 Q. -- or before your landing?

1 A. No.

2 Q. No? Okay. Okay, let's see, a question here that I can't
3 read my handwriting. Okay. So can you talk to me about what your
4 schedule looked like? Was this one of your first legs or --

5 A. Well, it was the only leg I had that day.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I had a -- the day before, I was supposed to fly from
8 Anchorage to Sand Point to Cold Bay back to Anchorage with a
9 layover, and then Anchorage to Fairbanks and back. The Cold Bay,
10 we couldn't fly to Cold Bay that day because the winds were
11 excessive, so we canceled that portion of the trip. So we flew --
12 the captain I was with, we flew to Sand Point and back, then had
13 about a 2-hour layover, and then we flew to Fairbanks and back.
14 Prior to that, I had the day off.

15 Q. Got it.

16 A. I'm pretty sure. I'd have to look again, but I'm fairly
17 certain I had the day off. I know I had -- I picked up an extra
18 flight the prior week, but I had the day off.

19 Q. Okay. So I want to kind of walk through the days prior in
20 terms of what you were doing, how you were sleeping, things like
21 that. So this happened Thursday afternoon.

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. Okay? So do you remember what time you woke up on Thursday?

24 A. Yeah, I was up at 7 o'clock.

25 Q. 7:00? Okay.

1 A. Yeah, because I help get the kids ready for school. We get
2 them up at 7:00 a.m., and they're out the door at 5 after 8:00.

3 Q. Okay. So what else did you do that day before? Anything?

4 A. I went back to bed.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I took a -- I slept for another 3 hours, got up, showered,
7 ate, made coffee, made my lunch -- or I didn't make lunch that
8 day. Paul grabbed lunch at the terminal for us.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. But, yeah, I got ready. And I, I usually get to work about
11 15 minutes early, before our show time, because my drive is pretty
12 short. I'm just down the street.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. So I leave the house 30 minutes prior. I usually get to work
15 about 15 minutes before show time.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Got there, was waiting. As soon as the flight attendant and
18 Paul showed up, I called -- did I call for a crew van that day? I
19 can't remember. I'm pretty sure the plane was already over there,
20 so we just -- we grabbed the crew, and the crew van picked us up
21 and drove us over there. Yeah, I did.

22 Q. To the aircraft?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yeah. I don't know if I called them or not, but somebody

1 called for the crew van, and we took the crew van over to the
2 aircraft.

3 Q. Do you remember when show time was?

4 A. Was it -- I do not.

5 Q. It's okay.

6 A. I can't remember.

7 Q. Okay. Do you remember when you woke up from your nap that
8 day?

9 A. God, I usually get ready an hour and a half prior to when I
10 need to leave, so --

11 Q. You have an estimate?

12 A. No, I don't.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Well, then maybe -- I'm not sure. I think our show time was
15 1:55. I can't remember, though. So that means I was going to
16 leave the house at about 1:30, so I probably got -- well, maybe I
17 got up at noon then because I was leaving at 1:30. So --

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But I don't recall a hundred percent. I'd have to look at
20 the schedule to tell you.

21 Q. How much sleep do you normally need to feel rested?

22 A. Seven, 8 hours usually. Seven hours. If I get -- yeah, 7
23 hours is a good number to put.

24 Q. Do you recall how you slept that night?

25 A. I slept fine. But I woke up and, you know, the kids were --

1 I helped get the kids ready, and I was just -- I want to go back
2 to bed.

3 Q. Um-hmm.

4 A. So I went back to bed, you know. I know sleep's important,
5 and I felt like I just wanted to go back to sleep a little bit,
6 and so I did.

7 Q. Okay. Do you have any sleep disorders or anything that would
8 affect the quality of sleep?

9 A. Not that I know of.

10 Q. Okay. Well, that's fair. Is -- okay, so that's Thursday
11 morning. Do you remember when you went to bed the night before?

12 A. I think around midnight. I usually watch TV in bed,
13 something mindless, to help me decompress from the day. And then
14 usually when my eyes start drooping, I'll turn it off, roll over
15 and go to sleep.

16 Q. Um-hmm.

17 A. I find that I sleep better when I go that way rather than
18 trying to force myself to sleep.

19 Q. What did you do on Wednesday?

20 A. I had a flight, so I came home, and then I had the kids --
21 so, so usually just, in the evening, we -- actually the kids were
22 already in bed. So I came home, ate, and watched some TV and went
23 to bed. I think I got back kind of a little bit later that night.
24 I think it was around 9:00, 9:30, so the kids were already asleep.

25 Q. Do you remember what time you woke up on Wednesday?

1 A. 7 o'clock.

2 Q. Is that a normal time for you?

3 A. Yeah, because the kids have to get up for school.

4 Q. Got it.

5 A. And my alarm, I just -- I try to stay on the same schedule
6 unless I have a really early flight. That way -- I mean, if I
7 need to take a nap, I'll take a nap. You know, but I try to stay
8 on a schedule because I do better. Just more with it. You know,
9 if I'm changing -- I did that a lot when I was in the Air Force
10 and I did shift work. I had my shifts -- when I would switch up
11 when I was going to sleep, and I'd just woke up a zombie. You
12 stay with a schedule -- I feel if I stay with a schedule, I'm
13 better, sharper.

14 Q. What did you do for the Air Force?

15 A. I was an avionics technician for F-15s and F-22s.

16 Q. Oh, cool. Okay, so we're now at Wednesday morning. Tuesday
17 night, do you remember when you went to bed?

18 A. Probably about the same time. Midnight's a good time that I
19 usually go to sleep because that's about 7 hours for me. I'm
20 usually in bed -- I mean, I'll get in bed at 10:00 or 11:00 and
21 just watch TV until -- usually midnight's when I start to nod off.

22 Based on the shift work I did, it's either 8:00 a.m. -- or,
23 I'm sorry -- 8:00 p.m. or midnight. Any times outside those I was
24 going to be awake until the next time frame.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. So if I have an early -- like, say, Fairbanks is a really
2 early show, I go to bed at 8:00 and I fall asleep.

3 Q. Um-hmm. Okay.

4 A. So -- and then I get up and I'm -- I feel good. And if I --
5 but if I try to go to bed at 10:00, it's usually tossing and
6 turning until about midnight.

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. So.

9 Q. How did you feel before this flight?

10 A. I felt fine.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. You know, I was excited. I was getting to fly with Paul
13 again. I love flying with Paul. And I enjoy -- enjoyed flying to
14 Dutch, so --

15 Q. Okay. Let's see here. Do you recall if there were any
16 maintenance issues with the aircraft at all?

17 A. Not that I can -- no, not that I saw.

18 Q. Okay. Any warnings come in aside from the fire annunciation
19 that you got?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. You know, the plane seemed fine. The taxiing and everything,
23 everything was fine. Brake checks were good.

24 Q. Okay. Do you have an idea of how far down the runway the
25 aircraft touched down?

1 A. Thousand-footers.

2 Q. Thousand-foot?

3 A. We were right about on the thousand-footers.

4 Q. On the thousand-footers? Okay.

5 A. Yeah, I -- as we were coming down, I looked down and I called
6 ref, and I looked up and the thousand-footers passed underneath
7 us, and we touched.

8 Q. Okay, got it. Do you know if you were flying with auto? Do
9 you have autopilot?

10 A. We do. He had disconnected it as we were coming in.

11 Q. Do you remember when that would have happened?

12 A. It was -- I don't know the exact distance, but it was before
13 we got to Eider Point. I don't know where we were at exactly when
14 he did, but it was -- I can't remember for sure when it was.

15 Q. Okay, but that probably --

16 A. But actually, he was hand flying it on that -- well, the
17 initial?

18 Q. Right. Okay.

19 A. Yeah, the initial one he disconnected autopilot. And, I
20 mean, because that was the one -- I'm not sure when he did that.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. He hand flew it for the go-around and come back in. He was
23 hand flying the whole time.

24 Q. Got it. Okay. Do you remember what the flight director was
25 doing? Do you have a --

1 A. At that point it had already -- we had passed the missed
2 approach point, and we had passed the runway.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. So there was nothing left for it to do.

5 Q. Okay. Do you have autothrottles on the aircraft?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Okay. When you did the circle for the second approach, which
8 way did you turn?

9 A. We turned out to the left around the mountain and just -- it
10 was set up for left traffic.

11 Q. Left traffic? Okay. Were you given any alcohol or drug
12 screening after the event?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. We went -- so after everybody got off -- it took a little
16 while. I don't know time frames. I mean, again, I mean, it was
17 -- there was a lot going on.

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. Initially they tried to get everybody together -- one of the
20 fire -- I think it was the fire chief, I don't know who -- I can't
21 remember if that's what he was or not, but he pulled Paul and me
22 aside and took us to one of the engines. We sat -- we jumped in
23 there real quick. He had some questions for us. I don't remember
24 what he asked us.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. We got out, and I checked on Connie, our flight attendant,
2 and she was in another vehicle. And then they got -- they drove
3 us over to the terminal, and they had -- that's where they were
4 gathering everybody together, because it started raining after we
5 landed. It was dead calm and rain. And so, they got us inside
6 because it was cold and wet, and ended up -- that's -- and then we
7 had a police officer come up, and she said that she had some
8 questions for us. And then she took us to the clinic, and we
9 waited for a while, and they did the -- they drew blood there.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And then it took a while. That portion of it seemed to be --
12 about the only disorganized thing going on is, like, getting all
13 that done, because we barely got the breathalyzer done within the
14 4 hours. It was tight.

15 Q. Yeah. Okay.

16 A. But we got all that done and then back to the hotel. And
17 then when we got back here, the next morning or the next
18 afternoon, and we were taken to get -- they did urinalysis and
19 another breathalyzer.

20 Q. Oh, they did another one. Okay.

21 A. The company said they needed that done, so we did it again.

22 Q. Okay.

23 (Interruption at the door.)

24 By DR. SILVA:

25 Q. Okay. Let's see. How do you like working for the company?

1 A. I love it. I was initially looking at going to SkyWest. And
2 I talked to Brian Swift, a guy with them; he's pretty high up in
3 their CRJ program, and somebody I had been put in contact with and
4 communicate a lot with. And he -- you know, I had talked to him
5 about where I should go and what I should do and laid out the
6 options between SkyWest and here. And he was like, you know what,
7 dude? Sounds like that's the better place.

8 I'm home with my family. I'm home every night. Pay's good,
9 upgrade's good. It's a good company. And so I had competitive
10 aircraft -- you know, somebody from a competitive airlines say --
11 recommend that this is a good choice for me. And he was right.
12 It's been amazing. I've loved working here.

13 Q. Let's say you have, like, a safety concern. Is there a way
14 for you to voice that concern?

15 A. Um-hmm.

16 Q. How would you do that?

17 A. We can -- we file -- well, it was a W, but I don't know -- I
18 can't remember, but it's on our iPads. We can file and we can
19 make a recommendation or anything, or I could talk to the safety
20 department. I mean, I would have no issue going to the safety
21 department and saying, hey, this is something I see.

22 Q. Okay. How is your eyesight?

23 A. 20/20 -- better than 20/20.

24 Q. Oh, okay. So no corrective lenses then?

25 A. No.

1 Q. How's your hearing?

2 A. It's pretty good. I mean, I spent 13 years on the flight
3 line, and not all of it did I wear double hearing protection. So
4 I know that there was some impact, but my hearing's great. Every
5 time I go in, I still have good hearing.

6 Q. Okay. Do you have any --

7 A. Just a little bit of ringing sometimes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Like right now. But my hearing's good.

10 Q. Okay, good. Do you take any prescription medicine at all?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you drink alcohol?

13 A. On occasion.

14 Q. Do you remember the last time you had a drink?

15 A. It was 2 or 3 nights before the accident night.

16 Q. Okay. Do you smoke tobacco?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Do you use illicit drugs?

19 A. Never.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I've never done anything in my life.

22 Q. And then in the last -- in the 20 -- sorry -- the 3 days,
23 really, before the accident, was there any drugs, prescription or
24 not, that --

25 A. I don't --

1 Q. -- would have affected your --

2 A. The only thing I'll take is ibuprofen.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I had been going back to the gym, and so I was a little sore
5 from that a couple days. But no, and I hadn't gone within a
6 couple days of the flight, but -- and I hadn't taken even
7 ibuprofen. So --

8 Q. Okay. Got it.

9 A. But I'll take lysine sometimes because I get cold sores and
10 that helps for that. But other than that, no. Ibuprofen and
11 lysine is about the only thing I take.

12 Q. How would you classify your workload during the flight
13 compared to a normal workload?

14 A. Like on the Dutch Harbor one?

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. I mean, it's -- you know, it's a normal workload for takeoff.
17 You know, the Saab's big and fast compared to what I'm used to.
18 So the first -- like going through OE, I felt like I was hanging
19 on by my fingernails on the tail of the plane. But I was caught
20 up, and I feel like I'm with the plane, and I feel good when I fly
21 it. You know, I don't feel like the workload's all that high
22 anymore on my takeoff.

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. Cruise is very low because we're up there usually pretty
25 high. We had -- and I've learned to -- you know, gotten the flow

1 down of things to do, so I don't -- you know, I'm not feeling like
2 I've got -- like I'm forgetting stuff constantly. You know, I
3 feel like I've learned the process, and I've got the airplane
4 down. And as we come in, you know, obviously the workload gets
5 high, especially with Dutch because it is so much to do, but I
6 don't think it's anything excessive.

7 Q. You didn't feel anything --

8 A. No.

9 Q. -- extra coming in that day?

10 A. The only thing that was getting a little stressful on that
11 one was the amount of radio chatter that was going on as we --
12 after we did the go-around and we were on the downwind getting
13 ready to set back up. Because we were trying to get a wind check,
14 and there was a King Air coming in behind us that was trying to
15 get a PIREP from us and getting weather from them. So there was
16 some discussion between weather and him after we had called for
17 the wind check. And so -- and Paul and I were communicating,
18 trying to figure it out. So there was a lot going on, but that
19 cleared up pretty quick. And I don't think that, that really
20 factored in too much --

21 Q. Yeah.

22 A. -- unless we missed something, and I don't know if we did.

23 Q. Okay. Let's see. When it comes to training, what kind of
24 training do you get with, let's say, these special airports or
25 landing on short fields?

1 A. Well, because I don't land on them, I didn't get any special
2 training for it.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So I don't fly them. I -- so, yeah, there wasn't any special
5 training for me to go in there because I am monitoring only.

6 Q. During your training for the aircraft, do you recall specific
7 landing -- training on landings that might have included tailwind,
8 potentially, or short runways or anything?

9 A. Not specifically off the top of my head. I don't recall.

10 Q. Okay. Okay. And then did you have CRM training?

11 A. Yes, we had -- that was part of our ground school.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And then we had a LOFT.

14 Q. You had a LOFT?

15 A. After we've completed our check rides, the very next day, we
16 had -- all three of us had a LOFT.

17 Q. Um-hmm. Got it.

18 DR. SILVA: Okay. I'm going to pause.

19 MR. LUNN: Okay.

20 DR. SILVA: Do you need a break? How are you doing?

21 MR. LUNN: I'm all right.

22 DR. SILVA: Okay. All right, Dujuan -- sorry. I was going
23 to -- technically Marvin should hand it to Dujuan.

24 MR. FRANTZ: Dujuan.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Good job, Marvin.

1 MR. FRANTZ: There --

2 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

3 MR. FRANTZ: -- you happy?

4 DR. SILVA: I didn't want to take the --

5 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

6 Q. So what guidance does the airline provide on special
7 airports?

8 A. As far as what?

9 Q. Just in general, use of, you know, at the special airports
10 and flying into special airports?

11 A. It's listed in the GOM, saying that who can do what and the
12 responsibilities and things like that. It's mostly in the GOM.

13 Q. Okay. All right. So, on either approach that you made to
14 Dutch Harbor, was there any sudden change of wind direction?

15 A. No, not that I could tell. It seemed to -- I mean, it was
16 variable. It was moving, but it didn't seem anything sudden. The
17 airspeeds were not all over the place. You know, there was some
18 movement up and down with the trend, but we were pretty solid as
19 far as we were just progressively increasing as we got closer and
20 closer at a predictable rate that I was looking for. We never got
21 destabilized; otherwise, I would have called for a go-around
22 again. And at that point, that would've been a second one, we
23 would have diverted.

24 Q. Okay. All right. And on the navigation display, I think you
25 mentioned that there's a wind --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is that part of the training for OE? Is it -- did you get
3 that, as far as training is concerned, how to use the information
4 related to wind direction on the ND?

5 A. I don't remember anything specific on it.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I mean, the way I see things like that, it's more of
8 advisory, and you don't take that as gospel. That's one of those
9 things where it could potentially be wrong. You look at the
10 external and see if what you're seeing outside the airplane
11 matches what you're seeing inside the airplane.

12 And, you know, that helps us more with performance and
13 cruise, so we know if we have a headwind or tailwind in cruise.
14 And then you can verify that real easy with our, you know, true
15 versus ground speed.

16 Q. Sure.

17 A. That's usually what we were doing.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I don't -- I never use that for landing myself.

20 Q. Are there any safety bulletins that the airline publishes
21 regarding wind speeds and how to handle wind speeds?

22 A. I'm not -- I -- what do you mean? Is there --

23 Q. Wind -- just general guidance, safety literature that the
24 airline publishes.

25 A. We've got the wind chart, you know, telling us what the

1 maximum winds are from quadrants on the airports. And then --
2 yeah, so we had definitely that.

3 Q. Okay. And at the airline, is there any threat and error
4 management training that you --

5 A. Yeah. We went through that in ground school as well. Yeah.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Yeah, that was part of our safety training.

8 Q. Okay. And earlier you mentioned that when you were on final
9 -- I don't know if this was the first approach, that Paul turned
10 on the anti-ice.

11 A. He turned them off.

12 Q. Turned off. Turned off the anti-ice.

13 A. Yeah, they were on, and he remembered that, and so he looked
14 up and turned them off.

15 Q. Okay. And that stopped the --

16 A. Yeah. That's when he -- what I think, you know, took his
17 eyes off of what he was doing. And I don't know if he pulled back
18 on the yoke when he reached up or what, but it -- our descent rate
19 stopped and -- enough to where we were high, and we drifted off
20 course a little bit. So at that point, we're destabilized, we go
21 around.

22 Q. Okay. And during the evacuation process, do you recall any
23 conversations that you had with Paul?

24 A. What do you mean?

25 Q. After the evacuation.

1 A. No, I don't. Like as -- in regard to what?

2 Q. You know, what had just happened, that type of conversation.

3 A. No. We were focused on getting people off the plane, making
4 sure everybody was safe. He was -- we didn't really converse much
5 at all. He said that we needed to get all the passengers
6 accounted for, we needed to make sure everybody was okay, find out
7 if we have any injuries, check on Connie, make sure -- he was
8 trying to coordinate and get the evacuation, and keep track of
9 everybody and get accountability, make sure we had head count, we
10 knew who we had and -- so he was focused on that. We did not talk
11 about the accident at all at that point. We were focused on other
12 tasks.

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. That's all the questions I have for
14 right now.

15 MR. LUNN: All right.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Dajuan.

17 Dennis, do you have any questions?

18 BY MR. FISHER:

19 Q. Mostly just some background on what you guys were thinking
20 and whatnot when you're getting ready to go into this place. I
21 mean, usually there's some chitchat between crew.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. So I'd be interested in hearing what you -- what was
24 concerning, what --

25 A. I mean, winds are always a concern going in there. You know,

1 that's why we had that backup plan that, you know, if we were
2 visual, and the winds did not favor 1-3, we would go -- if we --
3 if we weren't visual, we were going missed. I mean, that was a
4 non-issue. We were going missed and we'd divert. We didn't
5 specifically talk about diverting, but he said, you know, if we
6 don't have the visual, we'll go missed.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. If we have visual, and the winds favor 3-1 -- normally, if we
9 -- so as we come in over RASU (ph.), we're supposed to switch over
10 to common traffic advisory frequency, announce our positions and
11 everything, you know, make those normal callouts.

12 He said that -- you know, and the plan was that if we did not
13 have it -- if we did have it in sight, we decided we're going do
14 the visual 3-1. I would switch back over to Center, request a
15 visual 3-1. If we were approved it, we'd go back over; I'd get
16 back to CTAF and then we would announce that we're going to make
17 the visual 3-1. We would change it based on the winds, because
18 we're always concerned about making sure that we landed with the
19 best winds.

20 That was what we were -- that was our main concern. Did we
21 have the visibility? Could we see Split Top? Could we get in the
22 back door? Was that safe, and did the winds favor it? And if
23 not, we proceed, you know, as a normal approach into the straight
24 -- almost virtually straight in 3-1 -- or 1-3. That's what we
25 were discussing. We had that set up.

1 Q. Were there any concerns with the weather conditions before
2 you departed Anchorage?

3 A. Not really. Everybody -- like, from what I remember, the
4 briefing, when he talked to me, he said it looks like a nice day
5 in Dutch.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And I was -- so by him saying that, I was assuming that was
8 going to be light and variable winds, good visibility, you know,
9 like -- one of the first times I'd ever been in there was sunny
10 and calm; it was a beautiful day. I was expecting, okay, cool,
11 near that. Maybe some winds, but no big deal. But that's what I
12 was expecting. So --

13 Q. And did you have any concerns with the condition of the
14 aircraft?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. No, I had no concern with the aircraft at all.

18 Q. Okay. En route, did you did you contact anybody or use any
19 resources for updating weather?

20 A. Just with the contacts, we -- just calling Dutch weather.

21 Q. Okay. And would you have known who was in the weather --

22 A. I have no idea.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. I've only been inside once.

25 Q. Right.

1 A. Other than, other than the accident day.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. So normally, you know, my routine is when we land, I get out,
4 do my walk-around, and get back in.

5 Q. Was it pretty -- was it a -- describe the weather briefing
6 that you got from weather to --

7 A. We went through and we talked about what the visibility was,
8 you know, what the winds were reporting at the time of the METAR,
9 what's forecasted. And everything seemed to be exactly how -- you
10 know, that it was a nice day in Dutch. It wasn't forecasted to
11 get really horrible, that it was just going to be -- you know, the
12 winds were supposed to pick up a little bit, but it wasn't going
13 to be bad. It shouldn't mean anything outrageous. Not any
14 concern that, hey, maybe we shouldn't go into there.

15 Q. And was there any -- you said there was a lot of chitchat on
16 the radio. Was there other -- was there chitchat previous to the
17 first approach?

18 A. No, the -- we had passed the King Air a while back. So, the
19 first approach, everything was -- the way I heard him, he was
20 talking with Center just as we switched over to CTAF.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. It wasn't until the missed that he got on and was trying to
23 get weather updates. And then he heard about our go-around, so he
24 wanted more information. We didn't provide it because we were
25 focused on what we were doing.

1 MR. FISHER: Yeah, I can't really think of anything at this
2 point --

3 MR. LUNN: Okay.

4 MR. FISHER: -- further, so.

5 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Dennis.
6 Roger?

7 MR. YOUNG: Are you ready to press on or --

8 MR. LUNN: Yeah.

9 MR. YOUNG: Okay. So I may cover some of the stuff that's
10 already been covered and --

11 MR. LUNN: Okay.

12 MR. YOUNG: -- I'll apologize up front. I'm just trying to
13 keep up with it all.

14 BY MR. YOUNG:

15 Q. So, yeah, most -- and so you mentioned the special airports.
16 What can you tell me about those? You mentioned Dutch and Sand
17 Point, and what is -- for your job, FO wise?

18 A. There isn't much for me. It's a special --

19 Q. So there's no special requirements? No nothing with that?

20 A. Not that I know of.

21 Q. Okay. Do they have any -- is there, that you know of, any
22 kind of a special crew pairing? Is there required hours, anything
23 like that?

24 A. I know that -- not that I know of. As far as the FO and the
25 captain?

1 Q. Yeah, yeah, that's a low time or high time or if they --

2 A. Not that I know of. I --

3 Q. -- checked out, or -- I just --

4 A. Not that I know of.

5 Q. Yeah. Okay. All right. Did that. Do you remember any of
6 the weather? I mean, you said that you had a crosswind from right
7 to left when you were coming in to land on 1-3. And you said that
8 it was straight across, right to left?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. The windsock was -- and it was out. It was pretty much out.

12 Q. Okay. Now did -- is it the one midfield, the one on the end,
13 or --

14 A. Oh, man.

15 Q. Yeah, because I know they got a couple.

16 A. When we touched down, it would've had to have been the
17 midfield one that I was looking at because that's when I was
18 putting the crosswind correction in.

19 Q. Okay. All right. You mentioned look at the water. Have you
20 done any floatplane stuff before?

21 A. I -- no, and I --

22 Q. And --

23 A. -- and I wasn't really looking at the water too much. That's
24 -- I was looking at the wind -- or -- well, I was looking inside
25 the airplane.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. When we come in, I've -- I mean, looking at -- looking for
3 black water. You know, that's something I look for, for what's it
4 going to be like coming in; is this going to be really rough? But
5 other than that, I'm more inside the airplane at that point.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. So I'm not looking for those external factors as much as the
8 captain is.

9 Q. Okay. All right. And --

10 A. And I --

11 Q. What?

12 A. Oh, I was just saying, because I'm making the speed calls.
13 They want -- you know, every captain I've flown in with there
14 wants speed and descent rates. They want to know what the
15 performance is because they are really focused on what they're
16 seeing outside, making sure they're on descent and that we're
17 stabilized all the way in.

18 Q. Do you remember if Paul mentioned anything about what was --
19 what he was seeing on the water on the way in?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I was making speed callouts, and he was focused on what he
23 was doing.

24 Q. Okay. On the go-around, can you kind of walk me through your
25 decision process on the direction you went and how you came back

1 around and --

2 A. Well, there's only one way out of there. You've got -- I
3 mean, we're going to -- we're supposed to go that way. Well, I
4 don't know if we're supposed to go that way, but that's the only
5 way, really, you can go out of there. Because you're flying
6 runway heading, the only exit is to the left.

7 Q. Okay. Was -- did the weather -- was it a limiting factor to
8 a possible right turnout or --

9 A. No. It shouldn't have been, but --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- the proximity and the -- just, yeah, it's usually a left
12 turnout. Everybody I've flown into there with. And even when we
13 take off and there's a left turnout, it just seems to be whatever
14 he's comfortable with, because that's the procedure for a takeoff
15 from 1-3, is a left turnout.

16 Q. Okay. Okay. So, as you came back around and instead of --
17 for a 1-3 again, any indications wind-wise from that at all?
18 Anything off of Hog Island?

19 A. Not that I saw.

20 Q. Yeah. Do you remember any of the weather checks, where you
21 got them on that -- or for the wind checks, sorry, wind checks.

22 A. What the directions were?

23 Q. Yeah. And/or where in the process you asked for them even.

24 A. Oh, we -- so initially and then short final. But I can't
25 remember exactly what she said. Paul -- you know, we didn't -- I

1 didn't hear anything that would make me question it, and Paul was
2 satisfied with what -- the information she was getting. I was
3 really focused inside the airplane, making sure that we were --
4 the speeds were good. Because I -- the last thing I want is that
5 plane to get slow in that area.

6 Q. Okay. Okay. And I'm not as familiar with the 2000
7 performance and stuff. What -- were you anywhere close to your
8 fuel to go to the alternate --

9 A. We had enough, but that's like -- if we did another
10 go-around, we were going to head to our alternate.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yeah, we had sufficient fuel. I'm not sure exactly what it
13 was, but we had plenty of fuel to get to our alternate. But we
14 weren't going to -- a third attempt wasn't going to happen, as far
15 as I'm concerned. I don't know what Paul -- we didn't talk about
16 it, but I was -- I would've pressed that we go to our alternate at
17 that point if -- you're asking for trouble three times.

18 Q. Yeah. Do you remember what the alternate was for --

19 A. Dillingham.

20 Q. Dillingham?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. The weather at Cold Bay wasn't great, and I guess -- I knew
24 the weather at Cold Bay wasn't great. It hadn't been the day
25 before when I went up to Sand Point, and it hadn't really improved

1 much, so -- I don't know about King Salmon or anything like that,
2 but I do -- but the alternate was listed as Dillingham.

3 Q. Okay. But so, no problems on the first missed, coming
4 around, visual, maintaining visual, all that stuff?

5 A. No. We were VFR the whole way.

6 Q. Any precip in sight --

7 A. (Indiscernible) --

8 Q. -- at lead time?

9 A. -- yes, there was, as we came back around -- well, we were in
10 precip on the return.

11 Q. On the approach right?

12 A. Well, yeah, and on downwind too, I think.

13 Q. Well --

14 A. I can't say. I can't remember.

15 Q. On the back side of Ballyhoo?

16 A. No, not on the back side.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Not that I remember. But we did on the front side. As we
19 came back around, there was precip again. There was the first
20 approach and then the second approach.

21 Q. Okay. Did it block anything for seeing across the bay,
22 coming around at all?

23 A. Not that I could tell.

24 Q. On that bushed area, the outside portion of it?

25 A. Not that I could tell.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. We looked -- we had good visibility the whole way.

3 Q. Okay. And on the landing for the second one, you say -- did
4 he touch down -- I want to make sure I wrote it down right. Was
5 he -- on ref at touchdown, and it was just past the thousand
6 markers?

7 A. It was either on or just past. I mean, as they passed
8 underneath us --

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. -- we touched down.

11 Q. Okay. So it could have been on then?

12 A. Yeah, it could have been right on it.

13 Q. Oh, okay. All right.

14 A. No, it was a textbook landing at Dutch. I mean, he landed --
15 it was a short field. It was a nice, heavy landing. We were --
16 made good contact with the ground. We didn't bounce. Good
17 contact. The nose came down and immediately went -- we had Beta
18 lights. And I told him Beta, and he went immediately into
19 reverse.

20 And I felt the plane -- we slowed down pretty quick. I mean,
21 we -- the touchdown was 126, and I saw 80 knots at a normal rate,
22 like where I normally would. And I thought we were good. I
23 thought we were going to slow down, and we were going to taxi off.
24 And as soon as we, as we approached the taxiway, that's when I
25 realized we were carrying too much speed still.

1 Q. And at any time after 80 knots, did he pull it out of Beta?

2 A. Not that I know of.

3 Q. Did you stay in --

4 A. I'm not sure.

5 Q. Did he -- okay.

6 A. I'm not sure.

7 Q. Okay. Let's see. And you said you had -- I have to go back

8 a little bit -- just a little over 100 hours in the Saab so far?

9 So with a few trips into Dutch, like 15?

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. So -- okay. All right. I've done that. Just -- and it's

12 going to be a little bit tough for you to answer this, but I'm

13 curious as far as the company goes, which you said you liked. Is

14 there -- I know they're going through the merger right now.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Are you seeing anything with that that's affecting the crews

17 or --

18 A. Not really.

19 Q. Is it pretty smooth transition between them?

20 A. So far. From the line perspective, I haven't seen any

21 issues. I have no idea what's going on, on the managerial side.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. So from our perspective, from mine, I haven't seen any

24 issues.

25 MR. YOUNG: Okay. All right. I've got no further questions

1 at this point.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Roger.

3 I have just a couple of follow-ups. Going to continue?

4 MR. LUNN: Yeah.

5 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

6 BY MR. FRANTZ:

7 Q. We've talked a little bit about special airports, and you
8 mentioned Dutch Harbor and another one. Do you know what is it
9 about Dutch Harbor that makes PenAir designate it as a special
10 airport?

11 A. I think that it's a short runway. I mean, it's a pretty
12 short runway, and it's tight configuration with the relation to
13 the mountains. Where it is -- I mean, it -- there's a mountain --
14 like, the runway is here, you know. Well, looking to the south,
15 Mount Ballyhoo is just off to the east of it. And then there's a
16 -- it's ringed by mountains, and it's a volcano. So it's very
17 tight quarters in there.

18 And then, like I said, the -- for the approach plates, for
19 1-3, our -- the missed approach point, OGAM (ph.), is 4.7 miles
20 from the end of the runway. And we're supposed to have 4 miles'
21 visibility to be able to proceed, so we're outside even being able
22 to see the runway. So that's a unique thing for it. And that's
23 on the RNAV 1-3.

24 So, and 3-1 is DAKU (ph.), which is -- you can't even see the
25 runway because it's hidden by Ballyhoo, and that's 5 miles from

1 the approach end of the runway. So that's one of the things that
2 makes it unique, is that the --

3 Q. Okay. When you didn't -- I didn't get to -- and you
4 mentioned briefly your background. Before you started flying,
5 2014, you were in the Air Force?

6 A. I was.

7 Q. How long were you in the Air Force?

8 A. Thirteen years. I did 6 active duty, 7 as a full-time
9 reservist. So basically, I wore the uniform every day, was a
10 civilian, but I -- and did my one weekend a month. So --

11 Q. And then before that, what did you do, before you joined the
12 Air Force?

13 A. A year of college.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. And I joined when I was -- when, when I was 20 years old.

16 Q. And then you went to Embry-Riddle after you got out of the
17 Air Force?

18 A. I was -- I did the worldwide program.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. But, yeah, I did Embry-Riddle while I was in. I got my
21 bachelor's from them in aeronautics. And then, when I -- my
22 master's was when I got out. I was a flight instructor -- or
23 flight training, going to UAA, and working on the master's at the
24 same time.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. So that was a heavy workload.

2 Q. When you -- at Dutch Harbor when you -- and you have a
3 limited experience there, but in your experience there, when you'd
4 call for weather, did you feel like it was always accurate and
5 quick response when you would ask them for weather?

6 A. Yeah, I mean, it -- sometimes it took a few calls to get
7 them, but it was never usually an issue. I don't feel like
8 they're -- I don't feel like we had an issue getting weather from
9 them.

10 Q. And your practice at PenAir was not -- tell me if I'm wrong
11 -- was not to listen to AWOS? Was there a --

12 A. We could -- they have an ASOS there, I'm pretty sure.

13 Q. They have an ASOS? Okay.

14 A. And you can listen to it. I don't know -- it's just what --
15 going through OE and everything, it's just been we call Dutch
16 weather.

17 Q. Okay. What -- is that runway at that -- Dutch Harbor, would
18 you, would you characterize that as well within the capabilities
19 of the Saab as far as its length goes, or is it close to the
20 boundaries of what you would be comfortable taking the Saab into?
21 I mean, how would you personally characterize it?

22 A. I mean, other than the accident day, usually we are stopped
23 with plenty of room near -- from the end. We usually, at least,
24 see the discs. Normally we're -- the taxiway off of it is a
25 pretty big taxiway, and usually we're able to get off coming in on

1 the 1-3 side.

2 We have to back-taxi on the 3-1 side. If you land 3-1, you
3 really have to back-taxi. And I'd say we're usually down and
4 stopped and able to taxi off or do the back-taxi within the first
5 two-thirds of the runway or once we're about two-thirds down the
6 runway. So we would have a remaining one-third to go. And that's
7 the normal -- what I've seen every other time I've gone in there.

8 Q. And on this flight, before -- or before and up to the
9 touchdown on the second one, on the landing --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- anything strike you as abnormal or --

12 A. No.

13 Q. -- unsafe or even out of the ordinary from your previous
14 experience at Dutch?

15 A. No, it looked completely normal. The only thing that seemed
16 a little abnormal -- and it stood out to me because the previous
17 day I landed at Sand Point, and on touchdown, we had high
18 crosswind on that one, direct crosswind. And that one was from
19 left to right. As soon as we touched down, again, you know, as
20 briefed, I was going to take the top stick early. And I called
21 Betas, and he went Betas and full braking, and we stopped fast.
22 We stopped real fast.

23 And that wasn't the case this time around. We still stopped
24 initially really well, but I don't feel like I was thrown against
25 my harness like I was a day before. And we -- but normally, you

1 know, we touch down, and I don't feel like it's violent. The day
2 prior was kind of a violent stop. I mean, we stopped quick. This
3 one just seemed -- it seemed like every other Dutch landing, like
4 it was normal initially. It wasn't until we got near the taxiway
5 that I realized we're still -- that we're fast and we're not
6 slowing down anymore.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So that was the only thing. Like, from every other Dutch
9 landing I've seen, everything -- that final approach, when we
10 touched down and everything, it seemed normal. The approach to it
11 seemed normal. The glide slope seemed normal. Everything seemed
12 normal. The touchdown was normal. The initial braking action was
13 normal. And it just -- we didn't -- it didn't slow down after a
14 certain point. Or it did, just not very -- not fast enough.

15 Q. Okay. You have GPWS?

16 A. Yes, we do.

17 Q. Does it have the wind shear mode?

18 A. I can't remember off the top of my head.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I haven't heard it.

21 Q. Is it part of your preflight test to test --

22 A. The first --

23 Q. -- test the first flight of the day?

24 A. First flight of the day.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. And we were the second flight of the day.

2 Q. But you were the first -- before that, you were the first
3 flight of the day on that airplane or somebody else --

4 A. Somebody else flew that plane before us.

5 Q. Oh, okay. So you didn't do the test?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Okay. So did you get any GPWS or wind shear warnings from
8 the box on either approach or --

9 A. No.

10 Q. Okay. And no terrain --

11 A. No.

12 Q. -- low, too low flaps or anything like that? Okay.

13 A. No warnings like that.

14 Q. So during your first approach in and during the go-around,
15 how would you characterize the turbulence? Or was there
16 turbulence?

17 A. It didn't seem like it. I didn't feel any significant
18 turbulence. It may have been a little bit bumpy, but it wasn't --
19 definitely was not what I would call turbulent.

20 Q. Any indications to you of any wind shear --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- at any point during either of the approaches?

23 A. No. Like I said, you know, we have the vector on our
24 airspeed indicator, and it was showing that -- it would track up
25 and down occasionally, but our airspeed was staying pretty solid.

1 So I wasn't seeing major changes in our airspeed, just the vector
2 itself.

3 And those were minor, like 2 or 3 knots here, plus or minus.
4 But the airspeed itself stayed fairly solid. It wasn't moving
5 around. It was coming down, like I said, predictably, like I'd
6 want to see it.

7 Q. Well, you -- VFR from the final approach fix on --

8 A. Oh, yeah. Yeah.

9 Q. -- for the first time, and then you were VFR the whole --

10 A. The whole way.

11 Q. -- entire portion?

12 A. Yeah, we never went back in IFR.

13 Q. And that was left traffic. The go-around, you basically --
14 was it just basically one big circle?

15 A. Yeah, we sort of looped around. It was more like a
16 racetrack, you know, looped around and came back and then set back
17 up again.

18 Q. As you do that at that airport, if you're doing that
19 go-around, do you ever lose sight of the airport itself?

20 A. Yes, behind the mountain.

21 Q. It goes behind the mountain? Okay. Does Dutch Harbor have
22 any particular reputation among pilots at PenAir as far as the
23 type of airport or difficulty or challenge or anything like that?

24 A. Just that, I mean, it's a special airport, and it's -- the
25 winds can be very challenging because a lot of times you can end

1 up with a tailwind on one end and a headwind on the other because
2 of how the airflow around Ballyhoo is. And you can -- I mean,
3 there's -- the way the air flows into it, it just can be very
4 unpredictable at times. And that's why wind is a concern for us
5 there.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And visibility. We look for black water, you know, things
8 like that. That's all stuff to let us know where the winds are
9 and what -- if it's going to be turbulent, how bad is it going to
10 be coming in. So --

11 Q. Okay. Describe, you know, a little bit about your training
12 here. Just give me a quick rundown about your ground school here.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Let's start with that. How would you rate it?

15 A. I thought it was good. I mean, I have never -- I mean, this
16 is my first carrier that I've operated at, so I can't -- I don't
17 have anything really to gauge it against. But I feel like they
18 did a really good job of running through everything. Systems was
19 really in-depth. I thought the training was pretty good from my
20 perspective, but again, it's fairly limited.

21 Q. Okay. Tell me about your sim training.

22 A. Okay. Like what?

23 Q. Where was that?

24 A. That was in Orlando, Florida, at SIMCOM.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. We were in a Saab 2000 full motion.

2 Q. Okay. And instructed by PenAir --

3 A. No, they had --

4 Q. -- yeah, PenAir instructors or --

5 A. No. We had two SIMCOM instructors.

6 Q. Okay. How many -- how much sim time did you get in the
7 program or how many sim sessions?

8 A. I can't remember exactly how many sessions. So like 12 to 14
9 hours total, though, that we got.

10 Q. Okay. Were you paired captain/FO or two FOs?

11 A. No, we had -- there were three FOs, and we -- so we had to
12 rotate through it. We would spend 6 hours a day there: 2 hours
13 in the seat, 2 hours assisting, and then 2 hours jump seating it.

14 Q. Okay. So what do you think of the quality of the training
15 there?

16 A. It was -- I thought we -- I thought the training was good.
17 We had a challenge because we didn't have a captain, but it gave
18 us the perspective of the left seat too. So there were some
19 positives and negatives with it. It would have been nice to have
20 the experience of a captain there.

21 At the LOFT training, there was a situation where we had
22 electrical failure, and I had the FO -- I had another FO next to
23 me, and he started running the checklist. And I wasn't on -- you
24 know, I was focused on flying the airplane in the emergency. And
25 one of the steps was to turn off avionics or a glass cockpit, you

1 know. And I was a little slow to react to what he said to me
2 because I was focused on flying. I knew the -- and as soon as he
3 said, all right, avionics off, and he reached up to push the
4 avionics button off, I knew I was going to lose my displays, and
5 it was too late.

6 So there are certain things that, you know, having had a
7 captain would've been nice because I would've had somebody to lean
8 on. But I learned something big that day, you know. So I don't
9 think that that was a hindrance to us.

10 Q. Okay. What did you think of the SIMCOM instructors?

11 A. I thought they were really good. They had two different
12 approaches. One of them let us make mistakes and learn from them.
13 The other one gave us a lot of information. And so, we had two
14 different styles. And I think that it really benefited to have
15 two different styles.

16 Q. Okay. Did you get your type rating and ATP from an FAA
17 person or a --

18 A. No, from one of the --

19 Q. -- training center examiner?

20 A. Yeah, we had a primary -- yeah. One of them was our primary
21 trainer, and then the other one conducted our check ride.

22 Q. Okay. So no complaints about any of that training there --

23 A. No, I thought it was pretty good.

24 Q. -- that you went through?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. If you do a go-around or if you have to divert at PenAir, do
2 you have to make any special reports, notifications --

3 A. What do you mean?

4 Q. From the company point of view, I mean, do you have to --

5 A. We would contact dispatch and let them know.

6 Q. -- explain what happened?

7 A. Well, we let them know that we're going -- we diverted, and
8 this is the reasoning.

9 Q. Okay. And at the end of the day, do you have to --

10 A. I don't -- I've never had to do it.

11 Q. -- call the chief pilot or call somebody and say, hey, we did
12 a go-around or we diverted, here's why, here's the situation? Has
13 that ever --

14 A. I'm not sure. I haven't had to do it yet.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Other than go-around, and we didn't have the opportunity to
17 deal with that situation after the fact.

18 Q. Okay. How far away was your alternate?

19 A. Dillingham?

20 Q. Yeah. Any --

21 A. I don't know the distance. It's over an hour.

22 Q. Over an hour. Okay.

23 A. But that wasn't a factor in our decision to do the attempt.

24 We -- at the -- other than -- I mean, the approach was fine other
25 than getting -- you know, him reaching up. I -- my preference

1 would have been for him to ask me to do it. But he thought of it,
2 and he just did it real fast.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Had I reached up and done it, we would've been fine. I think
5 we would've landed safely. Or who -- I mean, I don't know. Based
6 on what happened on the second one, I don't know what happened,
7 why we couldn't stop. But the approach was fine up to that point.

8 So that's the only reason, and that's the only complaint I
9 would've had on that, is that he should've just asked me to do it.
10 That's why I was there. You know, I could do it really easy, so
11 he can focus on what he was doing.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. But other than that, that was the -- so, and that was the
14 only reason for the go-around. It wasn't that there was something
15 that blew us off course or anything like that. It was just
16 momentarily he took his eyes off and, one -- a couple seconds in
17 an airplane traveling at those speeds could change a lot of
18 things.

19 Q. But you were visual at that point?

20 A. Yeah, we were visual.

21 Q. Yeah.

22 A. Yeah, a hundred percent.

23 Q. Okay. I think my last question -- during that go-around,
24 lots of chatter. Talked about radio traffic.

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Was it just one other aircraft there, the --

2 A. Yeah, the weather --

3 Q. -- King Air?

4 A. The weather lady was talking to them also.

5 Q. Okay. Did the King Air, did they say anything about winds or
6 wind shear or anything like that in what you heard from their
7 talk?

8 A. Well, she -- he was trying to get the -- no, I didn't hear
9 anything about wind shear. No.

10 Q. Okay. What were you -- you said he was -- what was he --

11 A. Oh, I thought you were asking if he experienced --

12 Q. Was he trying to get the weather too?

13 A. He was trying to get weather because he was inbound.

14 Q. So he wasn't near the airport yet?

15 A. He wasn't, no. No.

16 Q. He would -- just he was coming in and called for weather, as
17 you had done?

18 A. Yeah. Exactly.

19 Q. Okay.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Justin. I think I'm finished.

21 We'll just make a quick -- see if anybody else has any follow-ups?

22 DR. SILVA: I just have a few.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

24 BY DR. SILVA:

25 Q. What are you -- well, when you're preparing for a flight,

1 what does your interaction with dispatch look like?

2 A. I don't have any interaction with dispatch.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. That's the captain.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. So --

7 Q. Do you get any paperwork or anything regarding --

8 A. Me personally?

9 Q. -- planning? Well, as the crew, but --

10 A. Yeah, I mean, we get the weather.

11 Q. What do you see?

12 A. You know, I get -- I'd go with -- over the packet with them.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. It's got all the weather and everything and NOTAMS and all

15 the information concerning the route of the flight and all that.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And then I -- once we get in the plane, it's got the weights

18 on it, burns and everything like that, and I -- our flight levels,

19 whatever, and the flight plan. And I input all that into the FMS

20 and do the calculations for speeds based on the weight and the

21 temperature. So --

22 Q. Did -- I thought I heard that you -- or maybe it was the

23 captain that was talking to somebody about weather before the

24 flight?

25 A. We discussed the weather.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yeah, we always -- that's part of our brief, discuss what the
3 weather's going to be like en route, are we going to experience
4 any bumps. And he discusses that with the flight attendant also
5 to let her know, hey, at this point you might experience a bump.
6 I'll tell you to sit down or something like that, you know, just
7 -- he -- Paul, especially, keeps everybody up to date and informed
8 on what we can expect.

9 Q. Okay. You mentioned black water. Can you explain that to
10 me?

11 A. It is just, when the wind's coming down and it hits, it just
12 makes it -- to me, it's just where it makes -- there's not -- it
13 doesn't look like there's a disturbance, it just looks really dark
14 compared to it, and that's water coming down off of it, and it's
15 just, like, a churning effect.

16 Q. Interesting. Okay.

17 A. It is an indication of wind shear. So that's one of the
18 things we're looking for.

19 Q. When you were coming in, did ATC offer you a specific
20 approach or --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- give you guidance for anything? Okay. So what was that
23 conversation like with the ATC when you were coming in for the
24 aircraft -- for the airport?

25 A. They just gave us the descend to at pilot's discretion. And

1 I said, all right, descend to and request RNAV 1-3.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. They said cleared for the RNAV 1-3, RASU, change
4 (indiscernible). Your frequency approved. Report back with us.
5 Cancel your IFR.

6 Q. Okay. Got it. Do you get -- are you able to reach ATC from
7 the ground?

8 A. On the ground, yes.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. It's Center.

11 Q. Oh, yeah, Center. Okay. Did Paul mention anything about
12 what happened after, like while you guys were hanging out for 4
13 hours?

14 A. Not really. I mean, we --

15 Q. Did you guys talk about it?

16 A. Well, we were pretty -- I mean, it's like, what -- I don't
17 know what happened.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. You know, it's one of those things, is like we just -- we're
20 incredulous. We couldn't believe that we weren't able to land.
21 It just did not make sense.

22 Q. Okay. Do you remember how long it took to power the aircraft
23 down?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Okay. And I think you've answered this in different ways,

1 but kind of succinctly, why was it that when you were making these
2 decisions on changing runways, why is it that you would have
3 chosen to request the visual for 3-1 versus the RNAV for 3-1?

4 A. Because we would've had to go back out and reset back up and
5 come back into it.

6 Q. Okay. Do you use Jepp charts or --

7 A. No. Oh, that one -- those ones for Dutch Harbor are Jepp
8 charts.

9 Q. Okay. Did you notice any sounds on the rollout that were
10 odd, anything out of the ordinary?

11 A. I mean, when we start hitting things, you know, as we were
12 going off the runway, we -- you know, bangs and stuff like that
13 because we're hitting stuff. But other than that, like I didn't
14 hear any -- what was odd, though, is when we were trying to make
15 the right turn, it was smooth, like the plane just continued to
16 slide.

17 Q. Oh, okay.

18 A. There was no vibration. There was no sound. There was
19 nothing. You know, it just rotated and just slid.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. It was odd.

22 Q. Um-hmm. Do you have any idea where the weather sensor is on
23 the airport?

24 A. No.

25 Q. So what they're reporting? Okay. And let's say there were

1 any issues -- again, I'm not very familiar with the aircraft, but
2 let's say there were any issues with braking or tires or anything.
3 Would you get alerts or indications of that in the cockpit?

4 A. I don't believe so. I'm not sure.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Like, not that I know of. I mean, it's just hydraulics.

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. So, I mean, we could get a hydraulic indication maybe if we
9 had low hydraulics. But other than that, not that I know of.

10 Q. And did you see anything like that?

11 A. No, it was -- part of the preflight is to check the -- you
12 know, we've got the brake pins that show you how much wear is on
13 it, and they were fine. We had brake pads.

14 Q. Got it.

15 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all I had. Thank you.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Sathya.

17 Dujuan, any follow-ups?

18 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

19 Q. Just some follow-ups here, Justin. So when were the thrust
20 reversers applied? Can you recall?

21 A. Almost immediately after touchdown. As soon as that nose was
22 down, and -- so you have to take it back to ground idle and then
23 probably have to let the props get to, you know, flat. And as
24 soon as those Bs come up for Beta, I called Beta, and he went
25 immediately into it. So it was really quick into it. It was

1 almost -- like, we touched down, boom, Beta. And he went Beta.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. About that fast.

4 Q. Okay. All right. And then you indicated earlier that the
5 tiller was used and then the right brake for differential braking.

6 A. I put my foot on the right brake.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. I was on both brakes initially. After he said we were -- he
9 had full brakes applied, then I put my feet on to make sure we had
10 full brakes. And then I let off -- when I told him to go right,
11 go right, I let off the left brake and just maintained, pushed --
12 just pushed as hard as I could on that right brake, trying to make
13 that plane turn.

14 Q. Um-hmm. Okay.

15 A. There is a road that we were trying to -- you know, pavement
16 still, avoid the water, go that way, save the plane.

17 Q. And as far as the -- I haven't had a chance to look at the
18 flight controls in depth, but spoilers for the aircraft --

19 A. No spoilers.

20 Q. No spoilers? Okay.

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, that's all I had.

22 MR. LUNN: Okay. Thank you.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Hey, thanks, Dujan.

24 Dennis, any follow-ups?

25 MR. FISHER: Just a couple.

1 BY MR. FISHER:

2 Q. On the first go-around, you guys went out the back door. Did
3 you notice -- because you mentioned there was rain later on, did
4 you notice any rain showers or --

5 A. On the back side?

6 Q. Anywhere in the process: To the north, to the south, to the
7 east, to the west?

8 A. It was -- we -- I don't recall any rain on the south side and
9 around, back around Ballyhoo, until we got back down near the
10 downwind and approach end again. Then we got back into the rain
11 there.

12 Q. Okay. So all that weather was coming --

13 A. It seemed to be on the north side of the airport.

14 Q. Okay. Did you guys experience any turbulence going out the
15 back door?

16 A. No, actually, it wasn't that bad. It seemed pretty smooth.

17 Q. Do you recall what altitude you were --

18 A. I don't.

19 Q. No?

20 A. I don't recall.

21 Q. And then coming around Ballyhoo, any --

22 A. It didn't seem to -- yeah, no, I mean, it seemed -- there
23 were some bumps, but it wasn't really turbulent. You know, didn't
24 feel any wind shear really.

25 Q. Okay. You mentioned you landed -- touched down at the

1 touchdown zone.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Was there a delay? If so, how long?

4 A. For the nose to touch?

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. No, it was down -- like, he touched, and the nose came down,
7 and I took the yoke and called for -- as soon as I saw the Betas,
8 called Betas. It was pretty quick. There wasn't any abnormal
9 delay.

10 Q. Okay. But would you -- what would you describe your profile
11 versus a typical landing?

12 A. What do you mean?

13 Q. Your nose pitch up?

14 A. On the landing itself?

15 Q. On the approach and then on the landing.

16 A. I mean, it seemed normal to me.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. You know what I mean? Like 5, 7 degrees, somewhere in there.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. It wasn't abnormally high.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. So, and it wasn't -- I wouldn't say nose low, for sure. I
23 mean, came in on a normal approach. We were bleeding off speed
24 properly. Everything looked good.

25 MR. FISHER: Okay. That's all I have.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Dennis.

2 Roger?

3 MR. YOUNG: Yeah. Just a couple.

4 BY MR. YOUNG:

5 Q. Was there -- were you the first flight into Dutch Harbor --

6 A. No.

7 Q. -- with Pen?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Okay. How -- what -- who else had been -- I mean, not by
10 name necessarily, but who else --

11 A. There was a flight -- I can't remember how far -- it was a
12 couple hours before us. And they said the same thing that we were
13 getting from the weather reports: It was a nice day in Dutch.

14 Q. Okay. Any other kind of PIREP from them at all? Did you
15 talk to the -- did you talk to that crew at all?

16 A. I didn't.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And I don't know if Paul did.

19 Q. Yeah. Okay. All right. Just so I can make sure -- I'm
20 trying to picture it. As you're going and you're getting near the
21 turnoff of the taxiway -- I know the road you're talking about
22 that's off to the right side.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. You tried to stay in the dirt road, I guess, is what you were
25 insinuating?

1 A. I don't even know. Well, there's -- you got the road crosses
2 over the approach end of 3-1, the departure 1-3. I think that,
3 that road -- I don't know. All I know is that it went -- there
4 was, there was a road that went around like that and up, and we
5 were trying to get to that area. I was, at least. That's where I
6 wanted to go.

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. Because I didn't want to continue that way. That way led to
9 water; this way, at least there was something resembling something
10 that was made for wheels. I was trying to keep to the wheels on
11 something made for wheels.

12 Q. Do you remember any traffic over there?

13 A. No, there wasn't anything.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Not that I can remember.

16 Q. Yeah. You stated that the airplane rotated, so is that after
17 your input --

18 A. It was --

19 Q. -- or how does it --

20 A. Yeah, after we --

21 Q. Can you explain just so -- I'm kind of confused on it.

22 A. Yeah. It's like when you hit the brakes in your car and you
23 start to slide on -- like on ice or something like that; you know
24 what I mean? Just rotated a little bit, and we just kind of
25 continued. And at some point, we did catch a little bit of

1 traction because we started veering off to right a little bit. I
2 don't know if that was when we hit the grass or when, but we --
3 the plane felt like we were starting to rotate and slide. It felt
4 like we were in a slide.

5 Q. Did it start before the rudder input or after?

6 A. With the --

7 Q. With it --

8 A. -- with the rudder input.

9 Q. Okay, so it actually kind of felt like you rotated the
10 plane, but it didn't --

11 A. It did not want to go --

12 Q. -- make the turn?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. It continued straight?

15 A. Exactly.

16 Q. So the -- okay.

17 MR. YOUNG: All right, that's all I've got.

18 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Roger.

19 I do have two quick ones.

20 BY MR. FRANTZ:

21 Q. So after he went Beta, and you felt like captain was on the
22 brakes, and then you got on the brakes to make sure you were
23 applying max brakes --

24 A. That was when I -- like I said, we were --

25 Q. Right.

1 A. Initially, I wasn't on brakes. I was doing what I was doing
2 with the yoke. My feet were flat on the floor like they normally
3 are until we were getting closer to where I would expect to us be
4 getting off. And we weren't slowed down enough, and I mentioned
5 to him, hey, got to get on brakes. And he said, I'm full brake.
6 At that point, I jumped on.

7 Q. Okay. Do you have an anti-lock system?

8 A. We have anti-skid.

9 Q. Anti-skid, yeah. Have you ever experienced that system
10 operating --

11 A. No.

12 Q. -- and you felt -- did you feel anything during this landing
13 that indicated that, oh, that's the anti-skid system operating?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Any pulsating or -- so do you know if the anti-skid system
16 was engaged?

17 A. It was -- I believe it was engaged. I didn't look to make
18 sure. I --

19 Q. Do you have a way of telling? Is there --

20 A. I believe that there's a switch that's just engaged. I'm not
21 sure. I'd have to look.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I don't recall off the top of my head.

24 Q. Okay. In your training, do you ever recall talking about the
25 anti-skid?

1 A. We talked about -- we went over the anti-skid system.

2 Q. Did you ever do that in sim?

3 A. Not --

4 Q. To the point of activating it and feel what it felt like, if
5 it felt different?

6 A. Not that I recall.

7 Q. Okay. But nothing felt different about this braking --

8 A. No.

9 Q. -- other than you didn't feel like you were slowing down as
10 much as --

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Brake pedal pressure felt normal to you or when you were --

13 A. Well, when I got on, it was -- it felt like it was fully
14 depressed.

15 Q. Yeah. Okay, okay.

16 A. When I stepped on them, they didn't go any further than it
17 was.

18 Q. Okay. You've used this expression, and it sounds like a
19 PenAir expression because I don't know what it means. But you
20 talked about front door and back door?

21 A. So it's just that the approach for 1-3, we call that the
22 front, and the 3-1 side is the back.

23 Q. 1-3 is the front or front door, 1-3 approach? Okay. And
24 3-1's the back door?

25 A. Correct.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks. And I think Sathya has --

2 DR. SILVA: I had two more.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, two more also. Sorry. Then we're done.

4 DR. SILVA: Yeah, then we're done.

5 BY DR. SILVA:

6 Q. So you mentioned that the plane seemed to be decelerating
7 normally up until --

8 A. Initially.

9 Q. -- a point.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Do you remember about where that was, that it -- you noticed
12 that it changed?

13 A. As we were approaching, like, the initial touchdown, initial
14 application Betas, you know, with the reverses, everything seemed
15 -- you know, we decelerated normally, like this --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. You know, I'm looking inside for 80 knots because that's when
18 we're just -- that's normally when you say tops and bottoms.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And that's when I would normally take over. And when we got
21 to 80 -- when I told -- when I called 80 knots out, and I looked
22 up, we're in normal position on the runway. It was the first
23 third of it still.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. You know? And so, usually what I'm used to is, the next

1 third of the runway is when we would continue to decelerate to a
2 taxi speed. And at that point, it wasn't happening anymore.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So I didn't see what I was looking for as we got further down
5 the runway.

6 Q. Okay. So about two-thirds down the runway is --

7 A. It was probably closer to half --

8 Q. Half. Okay.

9 A. -- maybe two-thirds. Yeah, halfway to two-thirds range when
10 I noticed that we weren't getting the deceleration we should've
11 had when it -- you know, we were too fast. And I made the comment
12 to him, and we're too fast.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I mean, at that point I still thought that, okay, I don't
15 know what's going on. Maybe we were -- just wasn't on the brakes
16 hard enough, and so we'll just -- because, like I said, the
17 taxiway is pretty big there to get off and on it. And we would
18 just take a nice roundabout exit at the very edge of the taxi, we
19 just -- for whatever reason.

20 Q. Um-hmm. And with this aircraft, are there any restrictions
21 on performing a go-around once you've touched down?

22 A. I mean, not that I know of, but -- as far as safety wise
23 goes, I mean. But the problem with that one is there's not a lot
24 of room to do it.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. We would had to have gone around almost immediately on
2 touchdown, probably.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. When we saw 80 knots, there was no way we would've had the
5 speed -- the distance to get back up to speed for a safe takeoff.
6 If we had done a go-around, we would've ended up in the inlet and
7 killed everybody.

8 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all I had. Thank you.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Great.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: Two more.

11 MR. LUNN: I like how hesitant you were there.

12 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

13 Q. Anything that you noticed on the windscreen on either
14 approach? Anything that just pops up, that you saw anything on
15 the windscreen?

16 A. As far as?

17 Q. Cracks on the windshield or anything?

18 A. No, not at all. No.

19 Q. I haven't had a chance to look at the flight deck yet --

20 A. No, the windscreen, everything's fine.

21 Q. Okay. And any glare?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Anything that could obscure your vision? Okay. All right.

24 A. No, because we had -- it was, you know, it was overcast
25 coming in.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. So --

3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. So now we're done. So before we finish,
4 anything we didn't ask you that you think we should have?

5 MR. LUNN: Not that I can think of right now.

6 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Anything to add?

7 MR. LUNN: Not really.

8 MR. FRANTZ: No? Okay, as I said, feel free to reach out.
9 You have both our cards, I believe?

10 MR. LUNN: I have all three.

11 MR. FRANTZ: So you can reach out to us.

12 MR. LUNN: I don't know if I have yours.

13 MR. FRANTZ: If you --

14 MR. YOUNG: Not yet, I don't think.

15 MR. FRANTZ: If you come up with anything later you want to
16 throw in, feel free to give us a call or contact us.

17 With that --

18 DR. SILVA: Yeah.

19 MR. FRANTZ: -- we can stop the recording and we'll be
20 finished.

21 DR. SILVA: Yes. Off the record at 5:37.

22 (Whereupon, at 5:37 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Justin T. Lunn

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE:

DATE: October 19, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Kimberlee Kondrat
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/16/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: PAUL WELLS
Pilot, PenAir

Saturday,
October 19, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

ROGER YOUNG, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

DENNIS FISHER
PenAir

MORGAN W. CAMPBELL, Attorney
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Wells)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Wells:		
By Dr. Silva		7
By Mr. Frantz		33
By Dr. Sevillian		44
By Mr. Fisher		46
By Mr. Young		49
By Dr. Silva		63
By Mr. Frantz		75
By Dr. Sevillian		83
By Mr. Fisher		84
By Mr. Young		85
By Dr. Silva		86
By Mr. Frantz		87

I N T E R V I E W

(5:46 p.m.)

1 DR. SILVA: We're on the record at 5:46 p.m.

2 So thank you, Paul, for agreeing to talk to us.

3 MR. WELLS: You're welcome.

4 DR. SILVA: Before we get too much into it, we'll do some
5 introductions so you'll know who you're talking to. My name is
6 Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB.

7 And on either side of me are also NTSB colleagues. I'll have
8 them run around with their introductions, but the reason that you
9 see so many people around the table is that we operate on a party
10 system. So while we have expertise in investigations we're
11 investigating, we rely on others for their expertise in company,
12 aircraft, and the FAA as well.

13 The FAA's role here is 100 percent safety. They're here for
14 the investigation not any kind of -- no interaction with
15 enforcement at all.

16 MR. WELLS: All right.

17 DR. SILVA: So you should know that. So let's go around the
18 table real quick. Marvin.

19 MR. FRANTZ: Marvin Frantz. I'm what we call operational
20 factors investigator, and operational factors for us means airline
21 procedures, operations manuals, training, pilots, background of
22 pilots, anything that has -- dispatch, anything that has to do
23 with operating of flights. That's my specialty or that's the area
24
25

1 that I work in.

2 DR. SILVA: All right. Dajuan.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan Sevillian, human performance
4 investigator, NTSB. My main focus is primarily the human-machine
5 interface, human factors, so from that perspective.

6 MR. WELLS: Okay.

7 MR. YOUNG: And you know Dennis, so --

8 MR. FISHER: Okay.

9 MR. YOUNG: Roger Young with the FAA, local here. Like I
10 said, I'm not here in a regulatory capacity in any way. I have
11 some experience with the airport and the airline, and so they've
12 asked me to sit in on this.

13 DR. SILVA: Dennis, can you state your name for the
14 recording?

15 MR. FISHER: Dennis Fisher, line pilot for PenAir.

16 DR. SILVA: Perfect. So that's who you're talking to today.
17 We're here for safety. We're not here to assign blame,
18 liability, any of that sort, so we really want you to be as open
19 as possible.

20 MR. WELLS: I will.

21 DR. SILVA: Appreciate that. You're the expert here. You
22 have information that nobody else has, and so what we're trying to
23 get is really everything that happened from your perspective and
24 what you were looking at, what you were thinking. All of those
25 things are relevant for us. So keep that mind when you're asking

1 -- answering questions.

2 MR. WELLS: Yeah.

3 DR. SILVA: There's no right or wrong answers. Again, we're
4 here to learn from you. As much detail as you can provide would
5 be great. If you have any questions or you don't understand a
6 question, feel free to clarify, ask for clarification. If you
7 need a break, feel free to ask for a break. It should pretty --
8 be pretty low key there. Let's see.

9 So we will -- I'll start with a handful of questions myself
10 and then we'll go essentially around our table, usually twice, to
11 make sure that everyone has a chance the questions that they need.
12 And then at the end of that, we'll turn it over to you to see if
13 you have anything to add or anything that maybe we missed you'd
14 care to share with us.

15 MR. WELLS: Okay.

16 DR. SILVA: You are entitled to have a representative of your
17 choice sit with you today. Would you like a representative to sit
18 with you?

19 MR. WELLS: This gentleman, Mr. -- Mr. Campbell.

20 DR. SILVA: Okay. Can you state his name for the record?

21 MR. WELLS: Morgan W. Campbell.

22 DR. SILVA: Okay, great. Okay. Let's see here.

23 So since we are recording this, I'll ask that you verbalize
24 your responses instead of nodding or any gestures or anything like
25 that as much as --

1 MR. WELLS: I'll do my best. If you catch me doing that,
2 please --

3 DR. SILVA: Okay. Yep.

4 MR. WELLS: -- could you voice that?

5 DR. SILVA: Yep. And we totally understand and we'll remind
6 you for that. Any questions before we start?

7 MR. WELLS: No.

8 DR. SILVA: Okay. Great.

9 INTERVIEW OF PAUL WELLS

10 BY DR. SILVA:

11 Q. Easy question first, hopefully. Can you state your full name
12 for the record?

13 A. Paul Eric Wells.

14 Q. How do you spell your last name?

15 A. W-e-l-l-s.

16 Q. And what's your position here at PenAir?

17 A. I am the director of training.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And line pilot. I also fly the line.

20 Q. Okay. And can you run through a Cliff Notes version of your
21 history in aviation and what got you to where you are now?

22 A. Well, what -- yeah. I'll start -- well, after high school,
23 went and took -- went to West Texas to start college, flying. My
24 dad was a Delta Airline pilot. My -- that didn't really drive my
25 decision to be a pilot. I was wanting to fly as a kid. But went

1 to West Texas to school for a semester and came back from West
2 Texas and decided I needed to be near home, wasn't getting
3 anything done. I went to San Jac college there in San Jacinto
4 college in Pasadena. Did that for 3½ years. Didn't get a degree,
5 but got a lot -- I took every aviation course I could get my hands
6 on.

7 Went to Cliff Hyde Flying Service Center. Was doing most of
8 my flying there to get my private license and stuff. And ended up
9 getting a -- I had my commercial multi after that, commercial
10 multiengine. And then I got MEII instructor certificate. And
11 then did some flight instruction out of Bayport Aviation. And
12 then that's also -- Port of Houston.

13 Left there -- well, as I was doing that, I was out of school
14 and I was doing part-time working for Piedmont, the original
15 Piedmont Airlines. And I worked for them on their ground crew as
16 a station operations -- they call it station agents and -- or
17 specialists. And we were trained in pretty much every aspect of,
18 you know, ground crew, ticketing, all that stuff. Did that part-
19 time, instructed -- flight instructed part-time. Did that for 3½
20 years till US Airways bought them, which is -- and then ended up
21 leaving there and started making a transition to come up to
22 Alaska. Between that time was 1986 and '88.

23 So made a transition to come up to Alaska. I was going to go
24 in the Navy, decided to -- I wanted to fly in the Navy, I did. My
25 dad said no. He had 12 years in the Navy. So I had to listen to

1 what he said. And so, came up here and worked briefly in
2 construction just to keep food on the table, right? Then did that
3 in Juneau, then I did it here in Bradley Lake. And then I was --
4 in 1988, with Era Aviation. I started on the ground crew, 5 or 6
5 -- almost 6 months I was on ground crew. I went through the
6 ground school for the Twin Otter while I was working, then got
7 into Twin Otter in '89.

8 After '89, I flew Twin Otter up until near the end of 1990,
9 and started flying the Dash 8, of course. And then went through
10 flying the Dash 8 from that point up until 2012. In that time
11 period I became a ground school systems instructor, also a check
12 airman in all aspects of the aircraft simulator IOE and flight
13 training. I did that up until the time I retired in 2012.

14 I retired to keep a promise to a friend that was ill, to
15 watch over his business for him. And then when that was done and
16 he passed, he's gone, then I came -- I was asked by the director
17 of operations if I wanted to come back to fly. And I missed
18 everybody I worked with and I took the offer.

19 I was initially supposed to come back and do flight training
20 there, but I came back as their flight operation training manager
21 and got trained later on because it was just the way it went,
22 (indiscernible), but --

23 Then I did that up until -- and went into the ground school
24 training over there, flying the line, was in simulator training.
25 But I trained general subjects. I trained the ground schools for

1 systems in the Dash 8. And then came over here when they started
2 this merge with the company. Crystal needed help. Nobody wanted
3 to jump in that, so I said I would take the position to help her.
4 So that's what I did. Yeah. That's why I'm here.

5 Q. When was that approximately? When did you start here?

6 A. May 22nd.

7 Q. Okay. Of this year or last year?

8 A. I'm making sure that that date's the right -- the date they
9 gave me on this, though, is the 15th. Nope, nope, it's May 22nd.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yeah. They said the 18th here, but that was different. That
12 was a different, that's when -- I hope -- I'm in this thing where
13 I'm actually in both companies, Ravn and PenAir.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So we're trying put things together, so it's -- yeah, it was
16 May 22nd.

17 Q. Okay. May 22nd this year or last year?

18 A. Yes, this year.

19 Q. Okay. '19. So you were hired on as training manager?

20 A. Director of training.

21 Q. Director of training.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. When did you start flying for the company?

24 A. Well, I started training almost immediately. And then, I
25 want to say it was July, is the best of my recollection. July is

1 when I started actually doing IOE with Dennis.

2 Q. Oh, okay. Do you know how many hours you have approximately?

3 A. Do you want to include the simulator training?

4 Q. Yeah. Just your total flight hours.

5 A. With simulator training as an instructor and in flight hours,
6 we're looking at 20,000.

7 Q. Okay. Do you know approximately how much you have in the
8 Saab 2000?

9 A. Oh, yeah, 101. If we look at SkedFlex, I can give you an
10 exact number.

11 Q. Oh, that's okay. An estimate is fine.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. And you said you started flying the line in July? You said
14 you started flying the line in July; is that right?

15 A. Yes. Yeah, I was -- that's when I started training for IOE,
16 doing my IOE flights.

17 Q. Okay. I understand. Great. Let's see here.

18 Do you fly outside of work at all?

19 A. No.

20 Q. All right. So can you run through from when you got to the
21 airport the day of the accident, kind of run us through all of the
22 events leading to the accident and then evacuation and everything?

23 A. Okay. All right. So normally we meet here at this building,
24 downstairs in the crew meeting room. We'll call for a van to take
25 us to the gate because we're -- normally pick up the plane at the

1 gate if you're on evening crew.

2 Before I did that, Dutch -- you know, we previously had just
3 -- prior to that, Dutch had had weather problems that I
4 couldn't -- we can't get in, couldn't go. So we didn't go. Came
5 in this day, I had been watching the weather from my phone and
6 checking weather all day long before I even came into work, just
7 to see what was trending and what was going on. And everything
8 looked fine, so -- but I still came up here and talked with Herb,
9 the dispatcher. He briefs me on the flight, any concerns, any
10 safety issues that maybe have a concern during the flight, any
11 reports he may have gotten from pilots, anything of that sort.

12 This day -- and I actually talked with -- on the way in, I
13 talked with Adam, a pilot who just came back from Dutch, and he
14 gave me a report that, you know, it was a nice day in Dutch.
15 So --

16 But I got up to Herb. He gave me a complete briefing of all
17 the weather NOTAMs, everything that was a concern weather wise on
18 the day of the flight. I reviewed what he had on the screen for
19 flight planning, fuel, et cetera. Went downstairs, briefed my
20 crew on what we have, what we expect, that we didn't see any
21 inherent threats, and asked if they had an concerns. No one had
22 any concerns. We got in the crew van and went to the gate.

23 And got to the gate, we pick up our flight release paperwork,
24 safety -- you know, do a safety sheet, risk analysis for the
25 flight. And then we go from that to discussing the load, you

1 know, what's the load with the operations person. And once we do
2 that, we sign our fit for duty forms, which is right here.

3 Q. Um-hum.

4 A. Okay. And then I look -- see the release. I reviewed the
5 release and reviewed what's going on here, and that it complies
6 with what we needed to be able to do the flight and we're
7 operating within the specifications of the aircraft.

8 Q. Yup.

9 A. So we go out, get to the airplane. The co-pilot has done a
10 preflight on there. I do a check of all -- everything's in the
11 proper positions and stuff -- I do an overhead flow of the cabin
12 oxygen systems, fire extinguishers, crash ax, check all the safety
13 devices on board, make sure all the life vests are on board, make
14 sure there's flow -- I always check for flow through an oxygen
15 mask and stuff. And do a preflight, you know, of the cockpit.

16 Again, check with the flight attendant to see if she's ready
17 to board. She's ready to board, we make a call to operations.
18 Operations says, okay, we'll have our people come out.

19 At that point, you know, we sign these -- I thought when we
20 would get there, normally what -- and the first flight, you only
21 have one of these, and the crew shows up in the operations area
22 and everybody signs the fit for duty. Then we just hand the
23 station copy and the risk analysis to the operations person. We
24 take the rest out to the airplane with us --

25 Q. I see.

1 A. -- the weather and the packet, the weather planning packet.
2 Everybody boards the aircraft. Weight and balance is done,
3 and do a before-start checklist, and wait for -- get our final
4 paperwork, final fuel planning and paperwork, weight and balance.

5 So we get that. We complete the weight and balance form.
6 Door gets closed, and we finish what we call the last items on the
7 checklist, and start the airplane and just do our normal
8 procedures for starting the airplane and leave. After we do that,
9 we do an after-start check, all our checklists, go in the airplane
10 and we depart the airport.

11 Everything was normal, just a nice flight. It was a really
12 pleasant flight, taking off out of here, climbing out of here.
13 There were no unexpected changes or events, no icing event, no
14 turbulence to speak of, maybe a bump here, bump there, but
15 nothing. But, yeah, it was very uneventful. You know, we started
16 our descent at the top of descent and at that point we got a
17 weather reporter from Dutch Harbor radio -- or not Dutch -- Dutch
18 Weather we call it. Got a report for there, it was favorable,
19 still favorable.

20 We planned for RNAV 1-3 approach. Did all of our checklist
21 procedures for going into Dutch. We're both familiar with that
22 approach. And as we're coming in to the approach and everything,
23 we also briefed the -- the weather wasn't looking very good, but
24 the lady, as we were on the approach, mentioned that there were
25 some rain showers. Visibility was still good enough for the

1 approach, but, you know, there was a rain shower.

2 I looked to the left and saw Split -- I'm having a mental
3 block -- Split Top? No, Split -- is it Split -- yeah, it's Split
4 Top, isn't it? Split Top Mountain, the Twins. I call them the
5 Twins, but they're two peaks there that's on the base to go in the
6 back door into Dutch, what's considered the back door approach.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Everything looked nice there. And if we didn't pick up what
9 we needed to see to be able to land on 1-3, since I realized that
10 (indiscernible), you know, for us it looked like it was fine to
11 land on 1-3, performance wise and everything else.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. So if it didn't, if it got worse and we couldn't see that, I
14 told -- I talked and prebriefed with Justin to get back as soon as
15 I get a visual for the back door going into Dutch Harbor.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Okay? And then he said -- and I asked if he was okay, is
18 that okay with you? Yes. Because we had done it -- we actually
19 had done that before. It works fine. You know, I'm comfortable
20 with that.

21 And so after that, we did our checklist, got the airplane
22 configured for landing by the final -- got the final approach fix
23 configured. We got down to a missed approach point. I could see
24 Hog Island into the runway. There was a little bit of
25 precipitation, but I could see just fine. I could see the runway

1 just fine. But I could also see a little black water coming off
2 of Hog Island.

3 So -- and what that is, is -- I also noticed cat paws. So it
4 turns black when the water gets roughed up by wind. Right? And
5 so it was coming from a -- since it was -- basically it was coming
6 more from, I would say, southwest to west direction. And then
7 there was a little pile of air coming off the hump from the right
8 side of the threshold and -- but it didn't look, you know,
9 menacing or threatening at that point. I had my engine anti-ice
10 on because I was going through clouds. I didn't get any ice, but
11 it's required for us to have that on.

12 I came in on base. I was -- and everything was fine until I
13 reached up to push my anti-ice back off, because I want the
14 performance on -- everything is about performance. In Dutch
15 Harbor that is what it is. So I put -- what we have is a high RPM
16 button. I pushed -- I took away high RPM because I wanted the
17 response from the engines. I turned the anti-ice off. And when I
18 went to turn the anti-ice off, I got out of position on final. It
19 became an unstable approach. About 300 feet or so, I'm looking
20 and I'm going, that's -- I'm thinking that's not good. And Justin
21 goes, yeah, that's not -- let's go around. So we went around.

22 We did a go-around, performed a go-around procedure. I said,
23 well, we'll just go around Ballyhoo. Informed Flight Service that
24 we're coming around and doing a visual -- we did a go-around, and
25 we're going to come back around and do a visual for 1-3 again. We

1 got wind checks from the weather lady on the back side of Ballyhoo
2 when we were there and on base. I can't recall exactly what she
3 said there because I was busy. This time I wasn't going to get
4 off; I wanted to be stable. My focus was on making sure that it
5 was a stable approach all the way to the runway.

6 Wind, the cat paws had gone away, so the wind was dying down.
7 And I looked down the runway. To me it appeared that the windsock
8 was pretty much direct crosswind, but not strong by any stretch.
9 Saw cat paws out to the right side of the runway that were
10 confirming what I see on the sock.

11 Came in. Everything looked good. We were going -- normally
12 we run what's called REF plus 10. On approach I was REF plus 15.
13 Right about 300 feet, I'm REF plus 10. Maybe right at runway I'm
14 REF plus 5, and at touchdown I was on REF -- I was planted it
15 pretty much on the thousand -- right on the touchdown zone. Hit
16 the touchdown zone -- oh, sorry. I need to backup just for one
17 second.

18 Q. Sure.

19 A. We had briefed that because the winds were changing so much,
20 because we were aware that they were changing -- they were
21 changing so much that we knew the crosswind was going to be from
22 the right, and when we were going to leave we were going to -- I
23 was going to have Justin turn the controls into the wind and push
24 pressure on the nose wheel to stabilize the airplane if there was
25 any unexpected gusts coming from that direction. So, and we were

1 going to do it prior to what we would call our normal 80 knot
2 call. And because I wanted to have hands on controls, be in
3 reverse, nose on the ground, and firm on the ground.

4 So but -- so we came in. We touched down normally. For
5 Dutch it's normally stiff. You hit your spot, it's going to be a
6 stiff landing. Stiff, boom, you hit, put it in reverse. When the
7 nose wheel came down, he called Beta lights. I'm on brakes and
8 I'm on the steering. I called bottoms; he called tops. That's
9 what we called that when we switch.

10 So as we're rolling out, airplane decelerated fairly quickly
11 to 80 knots, and then I noticed that it stopped decelerating a
12 little bit and then I pushed as hard as I could. I was starting
13 to push as I could on the brakes, and I'm pushing -- pulling it
14 all the way in reverse. It's slowing, but it's not slowing at the
15 rate it normally would. And Justin's recognizing, I start
16 recognizing as we're coming up to where we're normally slow, we're
17 not as slow as we should be and I'm not getting a response from
18 the brakes.

19 There's no response from the brakes, end of the runway's
20 coming up. And as we approach the end of the runway, I'm looking
21 to see what can I turn in on. And Justin goes, turn -- I'm going
22 -- I'm looking at the road, and he goes turn right, and I'm
23 turning; I'm trying to get it to go right. And we're turning, and
24 trying to get it to go that direction. I'm pushing on the brakes
25 still just trying to get it to stop, just trying, because that's

1 all -- all I have is engines and brakes at this point. We're
2 going -- I could not, I could not go around with the distance
3 remaining in that runway. We wouldn't have made it.

4 And so, we went off to the right, went down an embankment.
5 We came to rest on the embankment. Engine -- left engine fire
6 light came on as I was doing my shutdown, and I noticed the engine
7 fire. I went to the shutdown and shut down fuel off, fuel off.
8 Reached up, pulled fuel off handle and fired the bottle.

9 I called for the evacuation out of the right-hand side.
10 Flight attendant immediately got on PA, was ordering -- and I
11 could hear her making her -- I mean, she did a perfect job. And
12 then I made a call for Crash Fire Rescue as we're shutting down
13 the rest of the airplane. And then as we're -- I turned around
14 and got back -- I think I went back and made another call to Crash
15 Fire Rescue just to be sure.

16 And so turned around and went out. As we got out of the
17 cockpit, I saw that the light on the fire of the engine was out.
18 That's why we're leaving. So that's out, we're getting out of the
19 airplane. And I told Justin, get out. I elected not to make him
20 go out the hatch because of the position of the aircraft, he could
21 have been harmed.

22 And so I said, you're not going out the hatch; stay right
23 here. I looked, evaluated what was going on outside the aircraft,
24 what was going on inside the aircraft. At that point in time the
25 evaluation was there's a gentleman that's incapacitated in an

1 aisleway. EMT was helping along with the flight attendant. That
2 was a critical injury, and this man needed treatment. There was
3 no immediate danger to anybody in that aircraft at that point in
4 time. That man was -- that was the priority. The EMTs were
5 treating that gentleman and they elected to try to get him out of
6 the airplane as quickly as possible to get him to an ambulance to
7 get him even better care.

8 Then once he was taken from the airplane to the ambulance, I
9 noticed that half the other passengers had already left, and I
10 made sure that I told the firefighter crews, since the flight
11 attendant was there, make sure you keep them at a central
12 location. Keep them in a central location so we could account for
13 them later, of course.

14 And then they took him out. The rest of the people that were
15 on board exited the aircraft. Flight attendant exited the
16 aircraft. Justin exited the aircraft as I went to the back of the
17 aircraft. One EMT was still -- or firefighter was still on board,
18 and I told him, okay, it's clear back here, it's clear in front,
19 you need to get off the aircraft. I was the last one off the
20 airplane. And I told him we need to (indiscernible) to secure the
21 site and make sure that nobody touches anything.

22 They secured the site. We all were at the airport because it
23 was cold, raining, and they had an area sealed off, cordoned off
24 for the passengers. I went with the passenger list and all the
25 data and stuff that I had, the logbook and paperwork, to account

1 for passengers. Gave it to one of the firefighters, which he
2 already had a list. I don't remember why he already had one. I
3 don't know how he got it, but he had one. And he went down the
4 list and we did roll call. We accounted for all the passengers
5 that were injured that weren't at the site that were taken to the
6 hospital. All passengers were accounted for.

7 And at that point it was now, you know, contacting my boss
8 and people here to enact the team to -- the care team and
9 everybody else in what they do. I can't be more -- sorry.

10 Q. That's okay. Take your time.

11 A. I couldn't be more proud of the team.

12 Q. Would you like a break? You're welcome to --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. All right. Let's pause.

15 (Off the record.)

16 (On the record.)

17 BY DR. SILVA:

18 Q. Great. So I'll just -- I have some follow-up questions on
19 your debrief there of the accident.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. When you were coming down the runway, did you hear any sounds
22 or anything that were outside of normal?

23 A. Nope.

24 Q. Okay. And when you -- you mentioned back door, front door.
25 Can you explain what that means?

1 A. Okay. It's just terms we use for -- we consider that the 1-3
2 approach is a front door approach into, the front way into Dutch
3 Harbor, and the back door approach is on the back side of the hill
4 where you come in a back entry path into that runway.

5 Q. Okay. Is there a runway that's preferred when you go in
6 there?

7 A. Yeah, I think pretty much everybody prefers 1-3. But I was
8 just as equally comfortable with the other one.

9 Q. Okay. Why is that? Why is 1-3 generally preferred?

10 A. It's more open. It's not quite as tight. This plane's a
11 little fast and it's a tight turn to base to final on that back
12 door entry.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. But it generally runs (indiscernible) --

15 Q. Um-hum. Do you recall what kind of weather that you got in
16 your dispatch package?

17 A. Not from memory.

18 Q. That's okay.

19 A. I know it was good. That's all I can tell you, it was good.

20 Q. Okay. Any -- do you recall when you were on approach, did
21 ATC give you any weather?

22 A. ATC did not give us weather.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. We got weather from Dutch Weather.

25 Q. Okay. And then how did that approach conversation go with

1 ATC? Did they offer you an approach or did you request an
2 approach?

3 A. Oh, we requested the 1-3 approach.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah, line up 1-3.

6 Q. Okay. When you left the gate were you on time?

7 A. No. About 5 minutes late, maybe, I think. That's just from
8 my memory.

9 Q. Yeah. Do you remember what show time was?

10 A. Showtime was 1355.

11 Q. 1355. How much in advance is that from departure?

12 A. Hour and 15 minutes.

13 Q. Were you pilot flying the whole trip or the whole leg?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Okay. How did that transition --

16 A. We transitioned halfway. Since our co-pilots aren't allowed
17 to go -- take off the runway in Dutch, the co-pilot -- you know, I
18 give him the option if he wants to take off out of here so he can
19 get more experience.

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. And I gave him the option to take off, and he did the
22 takeoff/climbout and aloft, about halfway we transitioned, you
23 know, right seat, left seat, transition duties.

24 Q. Right. What about before top of descent or --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. Where was that in terms of planning for the approach?
2 Before you --

3 A. We had already transitioned to -- I was flying pilot. That's
4 what we --

5 Q. Okay. Let's see. Were you using autopilot at all?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. When did you disengage the autopilot?

8 A. Normally I disengage it when I'm going to start maneuvering
9 off a path and making a visual transition to a path to land.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And then I'll disengage it and start flying.

12 Q. Do you remember when that was on this one?

13 A. I don't exactly. That I don't recall, but I know I
14 disengaged it.

15 Q. Um-hum. Okay. How often have you flown into Dutch Harbor?

16 A. You know, here and there over the years with a Dash 8.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Okay? And I flew pretty much our whole first week with
19 Dennis, a week and a half or so, just going in and out of Dutch
20 Harbor.

21 Q. Do you remember the last time you had done this or come into
22 Dutch Harbor before the accident?

23 A. Oh, less than 5 days previous.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. And you mentioned that there was a case where you decided not
2 to take the flight because -- or the -- I don't know if you --

3 A. Oh, winds were too high.

4 Q. -- canceled the flight over the winds that were too high?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. It was a joint decision, of course, with dispatch. And
8 dispatch informed me that the winds are too high, we can't go.

9 Q. Okay. Is that a limitation that you have on the aircraft?

10 A. No. It's a limitation on a wind data chart.

11 Q. Okay. Can you run us through how you do performance
12 calculations when you come in for a landing?

13 A. Performance calculations are done through the ATOGs program.
14 We have sheets that have performance data on them. Then I'm
15 flying pilot, I'll look at the performance data, calculate it to
16 get a weight, you know, weight versus speed, to get our REF
17 speeds. He'll plug in those REF speeds. He'll get the REF speed
18 and the ground VT speed.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Are there any calculations done on landing distance or
21 anything along those lines?

22 Q. They're all based on weight. They say whether or not you
23 have enough runway to land at that weight.

24 Q. And that's done -- when is that done, in terms of --

25 A. En route.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Normally that's on the way en route.

3 Q. So based on weight?

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. Okay. Are winds input at all, weather input into that
6 calculation?

7 A. Winds, yeah. There's wind correction and things. But at
8 this point, the point where we did that, the wind was 6 knots, I
9 think, right in that area.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I know that when I saw him look at pad, we had the weather.
12 So --

13 Q. Okay, okay.

14 A. I believe it was 6 knots. Yeah.

15 Q. Do you remember what direction it was coming from?

16 A. Uh-uh. No, I don't. I don't recall. I know it was 6. I
17 go, boy, that's -- for Dutch, that's low.

18 Q. Yeah. Are there -- do you have limitations on landing with
19 tailwinds at all?

20 A. I do the posted limitation, but you try to minimize any
21 tailwind less than 15 knots. Of course, depending on weight.

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. So less than 15 knots on the tail if you're light. And it
24 can go to you can't fly with a tailwind. Okay. Yeah, based on
25 performance.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. So that wasn't, at that point wasn't a concern because the
3 winds that I heard were calculating out to pretty much, much of
4 anything. It was only maybe 1 knot, 2 knots. And there's -- it's
5 like a 10-knot correction there.

6 Q. So I noticed that the runway length is about 4500 feet. How
7 is that length in terms of the performance of the aircraft? Is
8 that plenty of space for the aircraft to land? Is that tight?
9 Give me an idea.

10 A. Everything done properly, it's fine. It seems tight. It's a
11 fast airplane. It seems tight, but it's doable. I mean, it's not
12 anything that would be out of the ordinary. I do -- what I
13 prefer, to have a short field takeoff and landing airplane like a
14 Dash 8. I'm sorry to say this, Dennis, but yes. You know?

15 Q. When you normally land there, not for this case, do you
16 remember kind of how much runway you have left?

17 A. Oh, it varies depending. Yeah. If there was -- desirably
18 it's a direct -- direct headwinds are the best thing in the world,
19 you know, for landing distance. In a direct headwind, 2300 feet,
20 maybe 2,100. You know, if you get on the brakes, you probably can
21 stop pretty easily in 10- -- or 2,000 feet. Sorry.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. With zero wind.

24 Q. Yeah. Okay. Were there any maintenance issues or anything
25 on the aircraft that you noticed before?

1 A. There was no deferred items in the weather packet. There was
2 nothing in the logbook. There had been previous write-ups, but
3 none of them pertained to the brakes.

4 Q. Okay. Are there any -- aside from the engine fire indication
5 that you got, were there any alarms or warnings that came in
6 during the accident flight?

7 A. I'm sorry. Say that --

8 Q. Aside from the engine fire, the left engine fire --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- indication, were there any other alerts or warnings that
11 came in?

12 A. I did not see any other alerts.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. If you're asking other -- presumption, was there a brake
15 failure fault light or anything else, there was not.

16 Q. Anything out of the ordinary there?

17 A. No caution warning lights.

18 Q. Okay. Do you have an idea of how far down the runway the
19 airplane touched down?

20 A. Touchdown zone.

21 Q. What's your definition of touchdown zone?

22 A. You're on glide path, you want to -- and they've got white
23 markers there, there's a touchdown. Normally I try for the
24 nearest side to --

25 Q. Of the markers?

1 A. Yeah. And may hit right on them or maybe right on the end of
2 them, is my recollection.

3 Q. Do you remember what your speeds were?

4 A. 126.

5 Q. 126 for VREF?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Okay. Do you have an alternate -- did you have to have an
8 alternate for this flight?

9 A. Dillingham.

10 Q. Dillingham. Was there a plan for if you didn't make this
11 second approach what you would do?

12 A. Yes. We were going to Dillingham.

13 Q. Okay. Was that discussed in the cockpit? Was that just an
14 assumption you and Justin had?

15 A. I'll tell you, when we came around on a second approach, if
16 it looked the same as the other one, we were just leaving and
17 going to Dillingham.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I -- at that point it was that's where we're going, we're not
20 trying again.

21 Q. Okay. How would you rate your health overall?

22 A. I'm fat.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And I smoke.

25 Q. Okay. Do you remember the last time you smoked before the

1 accident?

2 A. Probably before I left here.

3 Q. Do you know how many -- is it packs per day kind of thing?

4 A. Today is more than normal.

5 Q. Okay. Is that --

6 A. Previously, it's like maybe a half pack a day.

7 Q. Half pack. Okay.

8 A. Personally, I don't think that has anything to do with this,
9 but -- yeah.

10 Q. No, but -- that's fine. We have --

11 A. I get it, human factors. I get it.

12 Q. Yeah, yeah.

13 A. I had to do --

14 Q. It's part of our questions. Yeah. How would you rate your
15 vision?

16 A. Good. I (indiscernible) corrective lenses, right, for teeny
17 print like your name. Not your name, but this number.

18 Q. Did you -- is it required that you wear corrective lenses --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- on your medical?

21 A. Yes, ma'am.

22 Q. Were you wearing them the day of the accident?

23 A. I did not need them. There was no tiny print on approach.

24 Q. Okay, okay.

25 A. It was visual.

1 Q. So on your medical certificate is there a limitation for
2 corrective lenses?

3 A. Oh, they're not corrective. They're just, I --

4 Q. So reading glasses?

5 A. They're just reading, yeah.

6 Q. Oh, yeah. Okay. When was your last medical; do you
7 remember?

8 A. Let me think about that. I can look. I don't have to
9 remember. I can look.

10 Q. Oh, you have it. Okay.

11 A. 6/25/2019.

12 Q. Is that first class?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Any limitations on that?

15 A. Must have available glasses for near vision.

16 Q. Okay. How would you rate your hearing?

17 A. Huh? No, I'm fine. I'm just kidding.

18 Q. Do you take any prescription medicine?

19 A. Yes. For hypertension.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I gained weight.

22 Q. Do you drink alcohol?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you recall when your last drink was before the accident?

25 A. No. I don't know. It was the day before, probably --

1 normally I have one drink and go to bed, if I even have a drink.

2 So --

3 Q. Do you use an illicit drugs?

4 A. No.

5 Q. And in the 72 hours before the accident do you recall if you
6 took any kind of medication that may have affected your
7 performance?

8 A. No.

9 Q. And this flight in particular, how would you rate the
10 workload compared a typical flight?

11 A. You know, with the go-around, to go around is a little extra
12 work, of course. But after landing, it was high workload.

13 Q. Right. How do you like flying with Justin?

14 A. Justin's a very good -- he's a good man. He does a good job.

15 Q. How often do you fly with him?

16 A. I flew with him, I think, in Dutch, a couple times the week
17 before. Yeah.

18 Q. Do you feel --

19 A. That's just from memory. I --

20 Q. That's fine. Do you feel like he'd speak up if he had any
21 concerns or anything?

22 A. Absolutely.

23 DR. SILVA: Okay. I'm going to pause a minute. I'll let
24 Marvin take over. How are you feeling? Do you need a break?

25 MR. WELLS: No. I'm doing okay.

1 DR. SILVA: Okay. All right, Marvin.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you.

3 BY MR. FRANTZ:

4 Q. Thanks for coming in, Paul. We appreciate it. I know it's
5 not easy.

6 How old are you?

7 A. [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] I'm 56.

9 Q. Fifty-six. Okay. Any previous accidents or incidents?

10 A. No accidents. Incidents, I was hit by lightning in a Dash 8
11 and lost all the instruments and engines. But I don't know where
12 that paperwork ever went. Got back here. Just damaged the
13 airplane. I believe the damage was that the paint job had painted
14 between the static wicks, caused major damage to the plane. So
15 that's -- and then I had an extreme turbulence encounter out of
16 Cordova, the only other things that would be, I guess, considered
17 an incident. We had a diversion, a declaration of emergency or
18 something.

19 Q. Okay. You said you started at Era in '88; is that right?

20 A. Yeah. I was on the ground crew. I started flying in '89.

21 Q. And at that time you were an instructor, flight instructor?

22 A. I had a current flight instructor certificate. I hadn't done
23 any flight instruction in the state of Alaska at that point.

24 Q. So was -- outside of instructing, was that your -- was Era
25 eventually, when you got on as an FO, was that your first flying

1 job --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- outside of flight instructing?

4 A. As a real flying job, yes.

5 Q. And you said you flew the Dash 8 and the Twin Otter for Era?

6 A. Yeah. Started on the Twin Otter and advanced to the Dash 8.

7 Q. Through 2012?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Okay. You mentioned a risk analysis, and when you talked
10 about dispatch. What's the PenAir risk analysis process you go
11 through for a flight? Give me a top level overview of what you
12 consider for risk analysis.

13 A. What you're doing is you're looking at the factors that may
14 affect safety, including the human factors that might affect, such
15 as fatigue, personal wise, that could affect decision-making
16 processes in the safety of flight. Anything involved with an
17 airport becomes a safety of flight issue or risk. They give a
18 risk value for each thing. You circle the risks that are involved
19 with going in and out whatever airport it may be. And you -- they
20 give you -- you add up all the numbers and you get a total. And
21 then you got a range of risk that is acceptable risk and then a
22 range that's not acceptable.

23 Q. Okay. Do you remember what it was for this flight, what the
24 number was?

25 A. I think it was maybe a 10 or 11.

1 Q. And where does that fall on the scale of -- high or low?

2 A. It's below needing upper management authority to do.

3 (Off the record.)

4 (On the record.)

5 MR. WELLS: The route is sufficiently -- I look at a chart,
6 and you can do the calculation based on weight. And if you're at
7 this weight, the runway is 4500 feet, you meet the criteria for
8 landing in the, you know, required distance for that
9 (indiscernible). So it says, you know, you've got, what is it, 60
10 percent, and if it's an alternate setting.

11 BY MR. FRANTZ:

12 Q. But does that take into account, though, the current winds or
13 the winds that you're expecting on arrival, that calculation
14 about --

15 A. It does. But, again, that -- so what it does is, it ends up
16 taking weight away from the airplane. If you have a tailwind,
17 then you have to land -- you know, it may have a take off,
18 subtract X amount of pounds per knot. You know, and then you can
19 still land at that airport.

20 Q. But once you're on your way to that airport, you've -- your
21 dispatch with the calculations said, yeah, you're going to be okay
22 to land here, you've got the 60 percent, 70 percent. That's from
23 the dispatch. But en route, is that -- any chance of that
24 changing where --

25 A. Oh, absolutely.

1 Q. -- anything you'll do en route will say, uh-oh, now we can't
2 land at this airport because of --

3 A. Yeah. Yeah, wind's picked up, you're too heavy to land at
4 that wind.

5 Q. Okay. But nothing of that came up in this flight?

6 A. Never was a concern.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. I mean, you look and listen to it, but the Dutch Harbor winds
9 change all the time and we'd be doing calculations till we hit the
10 ground at Dutch Harbor. And you just, you can't think that fast.
11 I mean, you can't -- first of all, these books will do this.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. And come up with a number with 10 seconds to land.

14 Q. You mentioned -- did you say that up to the point of
15 touchdown and including the touchdown, as far as you could tell,
16 everything seemed --

17 A. Normal.

18 Q. -- normal. Okay. And then you were on the brakes, and then
19 later you said you felt like you were getting no response from the
20 brakes.

21 A. Yeah, I felt the initial --

22 Q. Initial, yeah.

23 A. -- pull of the brakes and -- I already had reverse, and then
24 I was on the brakes. And I felt the initial pull and then it was
25 slowing, and at that point the slowing rate decreased. In other

1 words, what I'm saying is that the rate of slowing the aircraft
2 decreased. And it decreased, and then I was pushing as hard as I
3 could to maximum brakes, maximum reverse.

4 Q. So what was going through your mind right then about what's
5 happening here?

6 A. Initially I looked down at what my speed was. I was well
7 below 80 knots. And we're coming up -- now we're coming up on
8 less than maybe 1,000 foot's left on the runway. And I had a
9 fleeting thought of can I go? No, I can't. I just said I have to
10 try and stop it because I can't get off the ground.

11 Q. Okay. Did you have any initial impression or thought about
12 what's wrong with the airplane, why am I not stopping or why the
13 brakes stopped performing?

14 A. My concern was just to get the airplane stopped.

15 Q. Okay. Right.

16 A. Yeah. I -- that's -- everything that I could possibly do to
17 try and get that plane stopped.

18 DR. SILVA: I got it.

19 MR. FRANTZ: We okay?

20 DR. SILVA: Yep.

21 MR. FRANTZ: Oh, okay.

22 BY MR. FRANTZ:

23 Q. Does this airplane have anti-skid?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Have you ever experienced the anti-skid?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What is, what's -- as a pilot, how do you know the anti-skid
3 is kicking in?

4 A. For example, let's say if you were on a runway with patchy
5 puddles. It would go du-du-du-du and it would jerk a little bit,
6 right?

7 Q. So what -- would you call it chatter?

8 A. Chatter, yeah.

9 Q. Chatter. Yeah, okay.

10 A. We didn't have any of that.

11 Q. So you didn't -- as far as you know or could tell, the anti-
12 skid system was not kicking in on this landing?

13 A. Or either it was and I -- it could have been. I don't know.
14 I didn't see an error, so I have to assume it may have --

15 Q. But you don't remember getting any of that chatter or
16 pulsating --

17 A. No chatter.

18 Q. -- anything like that?

19 A. No pulsing. I had full brakes on. From my experience, also
20 in another airplane with anti-skid, it felt to me, right, in
21 hindsight, like, you know, braking on ice.

22 Q. Um-hum. Okay. Do you remember any of the wind reports you
23 got from the weather at Dutch Harbor?

24 A. It was (indiscernible) like anywhere from, from what I can
25 recall, 2-4-0, 2-2-0, 2-7-0. There was one 3-1-0 in there

1 somewhere. And anywhere from 10 to 20 knots, anywhere from that,
2 direct crosswind to partial quartering tailwind to headwind to --
3 yeah, they were changing.

4 Q. And on the go-around, did you call back -- or did you have
5 the FO call back for --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- a wind during the go-around?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Or as you were -- and do you remember what that answer was?

10 A. I heard a -- I think at that time was a 3-1-0 report, out of
11 3-1-0. And then we called for another one. That was a 2-4-0. I
12 thought I heard a 2-4-0 degree wind on base. And looking at the
13 water visually, checking for cues of what the wind was doing, it
14 looked like it was coming a direct crosswind from the right, from
15 everything I could see.

16 Q. And on any of those reports do you remember the velocity that
17 was reported?

18 A. One was a 14, and I think there was a 10. Or maybe a 20 at
19 one point, but that was prior to the others. That's just a trend
20 though.

21 Q. Yeah. Any gust reports that you remember receiving from the
22 Weather?

23 A. I don't remember hearing gust.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I don't remember hearing it. Don't quote me on it.

1 Q. So tell me about your training in the Saab. PenAir taught
2 the ground school?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And who was the instructor? Who taught the ground school?

5 A. We had a couple of different instructors in. Kirk, Kirk
6 Watson. Brett, he did -- he taught, too, Brett.

7 Q. How -- that's all right. How do you rate the ground school?
8 What did you think of it?

9 A. Oh, it was --

10 Q. For the Saab.

11 A. They did a very fine job. Can things get better? Of course,
12 there's always improvement that can be done. The only thing I
13 would add, just adding -- they do a fine job, but they could do a
14 little more on FMS navigation training with their system. You get
15 most of that when you got to sim. But they could have a trainer
16 here for that, that would help in that area.

17 Q. Yeah. All right.

18 A. But that -- in this case, that -- it was a non-issue.

19 Q. Okay. Tell me about the sim training. How much time did you
20 get in the sim?

21 A. Four hours a day for 10 days; about 40 hours. That's my
22 estimate.

23 Q. Was it 10 sim sessions?

24 A. Well, one was a check ride, so -- yeah, and then there's a
25 LOFT.

1 Q. And were you training with a new hire FO when you went
2 through the --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- training in the sim? Okay. But you were trained -- okay.
5 So how do you -- how would you rate your sim training
6 experience in Florida in the Saab?

7 A. They have some -- they have good instructors. They do. And
8 they're -- we were observed by the FAA for me because the
9 instructor was getting an observation, and he was an APM -- AP.
10 Sorry.

11 Q. Besides the Saab and the Dash, do you have any other type
12 ratings? No? Okay.

13 You said -- you mentioned something and I'm not sure I wrote
14 it down right. Did you say you can't land with a tailwind? Is
15 that a PenAir --

16 A. I did not say that.

17 Q. Okay. So that's not a PenAir restriction as far as you know?
18 There's not a prohibition against that?

19 A. Not that I'm aware.

20 Q. And do you know if the Saab has a tailwind limitation?

21 A. Oh, yeah; 15 knots.

22 Q. Fifteen knots? Okay. Have you ever landed the Saab with a
23 known tailwind?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. At Dutch Harbor?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah. It was recording less than 10 knots.

4 Q. Was -- I mean, routine, nothing scary about it?

5 A. No. Nothing at all.

6 Q. Okay. During the initial approach or during the go-around in
7 the second approach and landing, did you get GPWS warnings at all?

8 A. Thinking. I'm thinking that I was -- even (indiscernible), I
9 might've heard one. I might have heard one. But to
10 (indiscernible), I pulled back to stop the (indiscernible). I
11 might have. It's just vaguely in my head.

12 Q. Yeah. Does the Saab have the wind shear mode of GPWS, where
13 you can get wind shear warnings?

14 A. (No audible answer.)

15 Q. Don't -- it doesn't have that? Okay.

16 During when you -- during the go-around, after you initiated
17 the go-around -- well, let me back up. Can you tell me again the
18 reason for the go-around?

19 A. Just not a stable approach.

20 Q. So it was -- as far as you're concerned, it wasn't weather
21 related at all?

22 A. It might've been because it was a little gusty on that
23 approach than the next approach, but it was just -- when I reached
24 up to hit those anti-icing performance on the engines, because it
25 was out of any icing conditions or potential for the engines, and

1 I got too far -- too far and high, too high. I was too high. And
2 rather than do a destabilized approach and continue to runway, we
3 elected to go around.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. We didn't want a push a bad situation.

6 Q. Have you ever done a go-around in the Saab?

7 A. In the sim. Yeah.

8 Q. Oh, in the airplane?

9 A. Yeah, the other day in Dutch.

10 Q. But before that?

11 A. No, no. No. No, I didn't --

12 Q. So this was your first one inflight?

13 A. In flight in the Saab, yes.

14 Q. In the Saab. And you said there was some discussion after
15 the go-around, as you were coming around for the second landing,
16 you said there was discussion about you were going to go to the
17 alternate if this didn't work, or what was --

18 A. I don't know if we actually had time to discuss that at that
19 point. I know that in my mind if we didn't do it that second time
20 we were going to Dillingham. I don't -- and the fuel situation
21 dictated that I had one shot to do one more approach. If I didn't
22 make it, I had to go. It is a longer alternate than we normally
23 have for Dutch. In order to make that alternate safely, I would
24 have to leave after that attempt.

25 Q. And do you recall if there was any reason that you were

1 thinking of then that you might not make the second approach?

2 A. Actually, the second approach didn't have any -- once I came
3 around and saw the winds dying down on the water and everything
4 else, I had no doubt that this was going to be a fine approach.

5 Q. Okay. Were there any other aircraft in the area?

6 A. There was a King Air, I think. Don't quote me. I'm guessing
7 it was a King Air.

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. Who was trying to get a weather report from us, which we were
10 busy and we couldn't answer him.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I'm going to take a break. That's all of
12 my -- that's on my list for now. Thanks.

13 DR. SILVA: All right. Dujuan?

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes. Thanks, Paul.

15 MR. WELLS: Thank you.

16 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

17 Q. The question I had was, you indicated that there was no
18 response in the brakes when you were on the last approach.

19 A. Yes, sir. On the runway.

20 Q. On the runway. And is there -- has that ever occurred in the
21 past on that aircraft? Have you ever felt any difference in the
22 condition of the brakes previously on that aircraft?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I mean, I've felt -- again, I have experience with anti-skid

1 aircraft and I know what it feels like. And, to me, whatever
2 occurred there felt like, you know, nil braking -- I can't say
3 that's what it is -- on ice. But that's what it felt like.

4 Q. And when were the thrust reversers applied?

5 A. After the nose was pushed, put down.

6 Q. Right, nose down. Okay. Any safety bulletins that have ever
7 been published with the airline regarding winds or -- come into
8 Dutch Harbor, to your knowledge?

9 A. Safety bulletins?

10 Q. Or any type of awareness?

11 A. Yes. Would you like me to show you?

12 DR. SILVA: We'll request it later when we --

13 MR. WELLS: Okay.

14 It's a -- they use a wind chart out of the Medallion
15 Foundation for maximum winds and directions.

16 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

17 Q. All right. Okay. So on either approach that you made to
18 Dutch Harbor, was there any sudden change of wind direction?

19 A. There was changes in wind the whole time.

20 Q. Okay. Is there any system on the flight deck that shows wind
21 direction or any changes in wind direction?

22 A. Reliably in real time, I would have to say no. There is a
23 wind direction indicator in the FMS system, but it blanks out
24 sometimes. So it -- there's -- there must a lag in it. Or, you
25 know, it can have a lag or whatever. Because there's only one FMS

1 in there, so it only has one data. I don't rely on it.

2 Q. Okay. And is Dutch Harbor a special airport, considered a
3 special airport?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And what -- is there any specifics on the special airport,
6 any information about -- from the airline about special airports?

7 A. Oh, yeah. We do special airport training. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. Special airport training?

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. Okay. And during the evacuation sequence --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- were there any conversations you had with Justin during
13 the evacuation process?

14 A. He was concerned that he had done something wrong, and I had
15 -- I said, at this point we've got everything that needs to be
16 taken care taken care of, we just need to get these people safe
17 off this aircraft. And I'm sure there was probably a comment
18 maybe like, what happened? I mean, I said, I had no brakes, I had
19 no brakes.

20 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Thanks, Paul. That's all I have for
21 right now.

22 MR. WELLS: Thank you.

23 DR. SILVA: All right. Go ahead.

24 BY MR. FISHER:

25 Q. Paul, you mentioned there weren't any write-ups on the

1 aircraft; it was a clean aircraft. Did you by any chance, were
2 able to review previous write-ups?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And was there anything that stuck out at you that was --

5 A. Nothing that wasn't fixed or repaired. And I -- from an
6 experience set, from being around for a long time, yes, I take
7 them into note. I take into note what those write-ups are. And
8 but I don't base a failure of the aircraft on a previous write-up
9 because that can be hazardous.

10 Q. When you guys did your preflight -- presumably you were doing
11 the preflight you do inside --

12 A. Inside.

13 Q. -- like we normally do things here, your FO was doing
14 preflight of the aircraft.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did he bring to your attention anything out of the ordinary
17 about the aircraft?

18 A. He did actually. I will say he did. He pointed out a rubber
19 reverberation a little bit, maybe just a slight bald spot on one
20 of the tires.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. But it wasn't showing cord. It wasn't down past the red line
23 on the tire and didn't, to me, appear to be of any concern.

24 Q. How about in the cockpit? Anything out of the ordinary that
25 you can recall he may have -- you may have saw and/or your first

1 officer may have saw, that was just something completely out of
2 the ordinary?

3 A. In the cockpit?

4 Q. Yeah. Anything. I mean, you're picking it up from another
5 crew.

6 A. Yeah. No.

7 Q. Did you have to reset any safety switches or guards?

8 A. No, I didn't.

9 Q. Okay. Weather in Dutch, do you remember who you spoke with
10 for your --

11 A. It was a women's voice.

12 Q. Okay. And you got the general briefing from the weather
13 observer. Did they give you anything different that you -- from
14 what you've experienced?

15 A. No. She told us the conditions she saw and --

16 Q. PIREPs?

17 A. She didn't give us a PIREP from anyone, that I can recall.

18 Q. Okay. You mentioned there was some black water around
19 Ballyhoo. I'm sorry. No, around Hog Island.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. Can you describe which side of Ballyhoo?

22 A. The easy way to say it would be the side I was coming from.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. So we were on the downwind side of that.

25 Q. So the Broad Bay side, is that --

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah. So we're coming here, higher wing, I can see the black
4 water coming this way towards me.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. So I knew that was more southwest than Dutch.

7 Q. On the go-around you guys went around Ballyhoo?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you notice any weather or --

10 A. It improved.

11 Q. Improved. Okay. Any turbulence?

12 A. Light.

13 Q. Nothing out of the back door?

14 A. No, it was light. Yeah. At least that's my recollection is.

15 Q. Okay. And then on touchdown you mentioned you touched down
16 in the touchdown zone. Do you recall when the nose --

17 A. Almost immediately after that.

18 Q. Do you recall maybe a pitch angle or anything that might have
19 been different than normal or --

20 A. No.

21 MR. FISHER: Okay. That's all I got.

22 DR. SILVA: Okay. Roger.

23 BY MR. YOUNG:

24 Q. Let's see. I'm kind of spread out here a little bit, so --

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Kind of go back to the training a little bit. Can you give
2 us kind of a description of your flight time in the Dash 8 and the
3 Twin Otter compared to the -- I mean, is that stuff you were
4 flying up until --

5 A. Oh, yeah.

6 Q. -- you did all this stuff? So what kind of time figure in
7 Dash 8s, Twin Otters?

8 A. Otter was maybe 15-, 1800 hours, and then the Dash 8 over
9 14,000.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Not including the sim. With the sim, you're looking at
12 probably at 1,000.

13 Q. Okay. So what can you tell me -- you mentioned something to
14 Dennis about you'd kind of like to have the STOL aircraft for
15 that.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Did you notice a big difference between flying the Saab and
18 the Dash?

19 A. They both have their advantages. They both are good
20 airplanes or good aircraft.

21 Q. But performance wise, did you -- is it similar aircraft?

22 A. No, no. No, the Dash is slower.

23 Q. It's got a difference -- yeah.

24 A. It has a lower ceiling, and it can take off and land slower
25 than a Saab. It has a huge responsive reverse thrust, but it

1 doesn't have curved props. And, you know, it stopped -- it flies
2 slow, it has an immediate -- once the mains are on the ground, you
3 get ground spoilers up and then the nose comes down, you get eight
4 ground spoilers that come up, they're all spoilers -- the ground
5 spoilers in that. This one dumps the flaps to get weight on the
6 wheels. So when you hit, there's an auto track -- retraction for
7 the Saab.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. And it lands fine as to the (indiscernible), but it does
10 depend on the brakes more than the Dash does.

11 Q. Yeah. So as far as the inflight, the handling and stuff, are
12 they similar that way? Or --

13 A. Once again, you have differences depending on -- because the
14 style of aircraft. The Dash 8 is a extremely responsive airplane
15 in maneuver. Saab is a little slower and heavier. But that's
16 just the feel.

17 Q. Yeah. Okay. And you said you've got -- did just over 100
18 hours in the Saab?

19 A. 100 hours past IOE.

20 Q. Okay. Yeah.

21 A. Yeah. So 103, 104, right in that area.

22 Q. Yeah. Okay. How many times did you say you've been into
23 Dutch previously with the Saab?

24 A. Ten times.

25 Q. Ten times?

1 A. That's a guess.

2 Q. Okay. How about with the Dash or the Twin Otter?

3 A. Oh, dear God.

4 Q. Yeah, I know. Ballpark is fine.

5 A. Maybe -- I mean, because it was mainly charter work, I can't
6 remember. We were down there doing stuff in the Otter. I can't
7 remember that one. I'm sorry.

8 Q. That's all right.

9 A. I know we were there, but -- we were all over there during
10 the accidental oil spill. And then -- and the Dash, I would say
11 at least, here and there, 20 times, I guess, charters.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I'm guessing. I don't know. It just seems like a lot.

14 Q. Yeah.

15 A. We were doing a lot more charters in the last few years
16 and -- but we just -- we flew with these guys.

17 Q. So when they mentioned that the special airports kind of a
18 deal, so that qualifies then, as I understand it?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. What -- did they kind of ask what special -- what
21 requirements are for you or what do you have to do to get checked
22 out to go to special airports? What are the requirements that
23 PenAir has?

24 A. They have you going there with a check airman, and then you
25 have to go through Dutch qualification training and get qualified

1 to transit -- or fly into Dutch.

2 Q. Is there a hour requirement or a time requirement as captain,
3 or --

4 A. They do have an hour requirement, but they -- there's a
5 definite -- I think it's hard, you know -- they -- it depends on
6 experience of a captain and the check airman recommendations and
7 things of that sort. So they have the ability -- they take that
8 option to be able to waive it. It's not a regulatory thing. It's
9 a company option.

10 Q. Okay. Yeah, so do you know what that hard number is
11 normally?

12 A. It can vary. It's up to the management here.

13 Q. Okay. All right.

14 A. But they -- I think it's -- I'm guessing. Right now my brain
15 is in 15 different things going on inside. But I want to say it
16 was, I want to say it was 300 hours.

17 Q. Now what was your training for Dutch Harbor like? I mean,
18 can you describe --

19 A. It was great. It was great.

20 Q. Well, I mean, the process, I mean, as far as was it all check
21 airman, was it --

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. And how did that go?

24 A. It went very well. Excellent check airman. He gave me tips
25 on doing things to make it as safe as possible going in and out of

1 there. I -- did a great job.

2 Q. So point out the differences for the Saab and the Dash kind
3 of a thing, and --

4 A. I -- yeah, well, he just -- he said tips, these are tips and
5 things that you can do coming into Dutch that make it safer, and
6 this is how we do it; we have to keep it as safe as possible. And
7 took all those tips to heart.

8 Q. Okay. Do they have any kind of -- does PenAir have any kind
9 of a pairing requirement for captains and FOs time wise for
10 special airports and --

11 A. Not for special airports. It's not a pairing requirement.
12 It's an hourly requirement, in that you can't -- you have to have
13 over I think 75 hours. You can't fly with anybody under 75 hours
14 if you don't have over 100 hours.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I think that's what it was.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. That's my recollection. I go to (indiscernible) over here.

19 Q. Yeah, yeah. Okay. So do you recall the weather? I mean,
20 you said it was good when -- before you left for Dutch. Do you
21 recall what the ceiling and winds were, or ballpark?

22 A. Broken, high ceiling, or what I consider high, around 3-,
23 4,000 feet.

24 Q. Okay. And winds?

25 A. Good visibility. Six -- that one I can't remember. I know

1 what the last one en route was, was -- I heard 6 knots, and --

2 Q. Yeah. Okay.

3 A. But right now I can't recall that.

4 Q. Yeah. Direction wise when you were at 6 knots?

5 A. I think it was a direct crosswind. Most of them I saw that
6 morning were low winds. I had monitored -- from my phone, I was
7 looking at the winds there. It's a good idea to always start as
8 early as you can looking at what the trends are in an airport
9 especially like Dutch Harbor.

10 Q. Okay. So you broke out on the approach well outside of the
11 final approach fix, then?

12 A. Oh, yeah.

13 Q. So -- okay, so you had everything in sight on the way in?

14 A. I could see Hog Island -- I'm sorry -- Ballyhoo. I could see
15 just a little bit of the tip of Hog Island. And as we got a
16 little bit closer, then I picked up the end of the runway, and it
17 was in sight, I could see there's just a rain shower there, but I
18 could see through it.

19 Q. And where was the rain shower located at?

20 A. Right in the neighborhood of Hog Island.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. All right. So as you got the wind checks on the way in, what
24 do you remember about the wind checks as you're -- kind of walk me
25 through your approach, the missed approach to -- or the go-around,

1 rather. Sorry.

2 A. Yeah. So the wind checks were -- see, I couldn't remember
3 any exact numbers at that point. I knew that they were still
4 favorable if we're landing on 1-3, but I was actually looking for
5 -- because they change so quick, she can give me a wind check and
6 then 2 seconds later you get -- keep going the other direction.
7 But I watch for cues on water, windsocks, things blowing. Smoke.
8 You know, you look for anything you can to see any rapid changes
9 in wind. It's -- that's just how you have to do it. If you
10 don't, you're -- you really are, you're in trouble.

11 Q. Okay. So where do you recall getting the updates in -- along
12 on your approach with this stuff? You get the wind check --

13 A. We got one update out there -- jeez, near top of descent.

14 Q. Yeah.

15 A. Another one on the approach, she mentioned the winds. And, I
16 mean, she -- still fine for the approach. And I know I -- when we
17 were transitioning, I went -- transitioned from outside visual, I
18 don't think we got any more wind checks. And I was looking at Hog
19 Island, looking for black water, looking for the wisps, anything
20 that I could get a clue how rapidly it was changing. But
21 everything I was seeing was a pretty much direct crosswind.

22 Q. Okay. So then you did the go-around.

23 A. Did the go-around.

24 Q. And out the back door and back around, and you still -- there
25 was a wind check in there somewhere?

1 A. Yeah. There's one on the downwind -- back side of Ballyhoo
2 on a downwind -- basically a downwind coming back around to do a
3 left base. And then there was another one, I know, from base,
4 like I said, like 10 or 2-0, 2-4-0. That's kind of popping in my
5 head, but don't -- I know what I was looking at and I know the
6 wisps on the water were gone, the wind was calming down.

7 Coming in on final, I vaguely recall maybe any crab at all to
8 maintain centerline was 5 degrees from runway bearing. So it
9 wasn't much of a crab needed to maintain centerline, 5 to 10
10 maybe, as far as I can remember.

11 Came down, it was smooth, on path, on glide path.

12 Q. Okay. Did -- were you the first PenAir aircraft in that
13 morning?

14 A. No.

15 Q. And were you able to get a PIREP from the crew right before
16 you?

17 A. Not the right-before crew. I got one from a pilot who just
18 returned to this hangar when I showed up for work.

19 Q. Okay. So there had been a couple flights in --

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. -- prior? Okay. Now you -- how far ahead was the aircraft
22 that was right before you, between the two flights, I guess?

23 A. A couple hours. I'm guessing. That's the best --

24 Q. Yeah. All right, answered most of that stuff. You mentioned
25 the black water off of Hog Island. And so that was showing you

1 that it was still favoring the 1-3 approach?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. What you saw off of Hog Island?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. All right.

6 A. Are you -- okay, let me clarify. Was that -- are you talking
7 about the first or second approach?

8 Q. Well, either, actually. Did it change for you?

9 A. Yeah, it was definitely there on the first one, and it showed
10 it to be, on the second one, that it was calming down even
11 actually better. Visibility improved immensely.

12 Q. Okay. It had something to do with the shower passage or did
13 you --

14 A. I'm guessing it dissipated and (indiscernible).

15 Q. All right. So what's the normal procedure for a landing in
16 Dutch? Is it different than any other as far as your use of
17 reverse or is there a procedure; do you do deep reverse? Is there
18 a difference in the reverse, amount of reverse you use?

19 A. No.

20 Q. It was constant throughout?

21 A. No. No, no, no. Not in this, no. On a normal day, you use
22 what's needed to bring the aircraft to a gentle stop without, you
23 know, pulling everybody into their seatbelts if you can. But if
24 you have to, you will put on the brakes and you will use reverse.

25 Q. So at what point on your rollout did you change the amount of

1 reverse from normal?

2 A. Okay. He had called 80 knots and we were Beta -- we were
3 already Beta. He called 80 knots. And I was on the brakes. I
4 felt the initial -- like I said, I felt the initial pull of the
5 brakes. I distinctly remember feeling it. I noticed after maybe
6 -- estimates, these are all just rough estimates from trying to
7 picture this in my head -- about 65 percent down the runway I
8 noticed it wasn't slowing as it should, as fast or quick as it
9 should. So I went further, all the way in reverse and I started
10 just pushing the brakes as hard as I could. And I -- at that
11 point we're maybe -- I'm going to guess in the 50-knot range, and
12 it's still not slowing like it -- and I'm not getting a response,
13 and I'm coming up at a point where there's -- the only option is
14 to try and get the plane stopped.

15 Q. Okay, okay. Got that. You mentioned landing in Dutch with a
16 tailwind before. Is there any kind of limitation on the Saab
17 going into Dutch? I mean, is it allowable, is it not allowable,
18 is there a limit, is there -- does it change the landing distance?

19 A. Oh, sure you got to change the weight, but --

20 Q. So how do you fly into that --

21 A. It reduces your weight.

22 Q. That you can take in?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Okay. And then you got to do that calculation --

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. -- well, when?

2 A. Well, depending on when -- you can do it en route. It could
3 be -- if it -- again, if there's any contamination on the runway
4 you don't -- you can't -- don't do it.

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. It's not a good idea.

7 Q. Do you recall what the runway conditions were at the time?

8 A. Time -- I mean, I think when we actually touched down on that
9 one, we calculated for a tailwind that didn't produce. It wasn't
10 there when we got there.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. That's my recollection of that one. But we did calculate for
13 one just in case.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Not on this trip. This is not this trip. This is a previous
16 one he was asking me about. I want to make sure that's clear.

17 Q. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, and I'm just -- I'm just
18 trying to familiarize myself with the PenAir procedures for --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- Dutch Harbor specifically.

21 A. You know, it was a -- like I've been told before is, plan for
22 the worst and hope for the best. So that's what we were doing.

23 Q. Okay. All right. Let's see. Got that. The tailwind. And
24 I probably just missed it. Did you say you've either simulated or
25 felt the anti-lock in the Saab?

1 A. Oh, I've felt it before. I mean, it --

2 Q. In the Saab, I mean, not the Dash or --

3 A. Not on this -- sure. Before.

4 Q. No, not necessarily on this landing. Just experienced it
5 before?

6 A. No. Yeah, I have experienced the performance of the brakes,
7 yes.

8 Q. With the Saab?

9 A. Maximum performance, yes.

10 Q. Okay, okay. Sounds good. Oh, on the tailwind -- I'm sorry.
11 Like I say, I'm bouncing around.

12 A. That's fine.

13 Q. What would be the reason for landing with a tailwind at
14 Dutch?

15 A. Like the condition's favorable, the aircraft's light enough,
16 it's within the performance parameters. But it would be always
17 good to -- just in case the wind did change right over the runway,
18 you would know you can't land. You know, it's -- you can't land
19 it that way, you know, with X amount of wind.

20 Q. Is there a reason not to switch runways?

21 A. Is there a reason not to switch runways?

22 Q. Yeah. So if you -- as opposed to taking a headwind instead
23 of the tailwind; is there a reason not to go to the other side?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Okay. I was just checking. On the anti-ice change, you

1 mentioned you wanted it for the go-around to have more available
2 power. Is --

3 A. I'm sorry?

4 Q. The anti-ice?

5 A. It's a prompt, the -- I wanted it off for landing.

6 Q. Yeah, yeah. It's because you mentioned you wanted more power
7 for the takeoff -- for the departure so you don't have to --

8 A. I wanted heated air, maximum performance for my engines.

9 Q. Absolutely. Yeah. So is having the anti-ice on, did that
10 change your landing distance in Dutch?

11 A. Yes. It reduces performance, which increases your landing
12 distance.

13 Q. Okay. All right. So -- all right, that and that. All
14 right. I know PenAir's going through the transition between
15 PenAir and Ravn. Have you noticed any difficulties with that
16 transition of flight crews, anything like that at all? Is that
17 anything that is discussed or --

18 A. You're going to have to clarify that one.

19 Q. Are you finding -- you yourself came over from Ravn, right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And so are you finding the folks that have been in PenAir,
22 are they receptive to the changes that are coming? Have you found
23 anything that -- differences between companies that's caused any
24 friction? Do you guys have anything on that -- the merger deal
25 that's different, I guess, than --

1 A. I think -- yeah, I've been through a number of sales where
2 companies have bought -- when I was with, Era/Ravn. Nothing out
3 of the ordinary for a transition of a company with adding other
4 pilots. This is -- it's normal pains. When I say it's normal
5 pains, is that's everybody needs to get used to everyone,
6 understand we're all on the same team, and understand that both
7 companies have great people working for them.

8 Q. Okay. Yeah. No, and I was just curious because it was --
9 you mentioned you didn't talk to the crew that had been right
10 there before you, a couple hours before. And I just didn't know
11 what the contact was between crews and stuff like that, I guess.

12 A. That's never an issue. I'm sure, in knowing the people here,
13 they have the same -- they have a great group of folks. If -- I
14 think it was Sarah Boots (ph.) that was the crew that was on the
15 way back as we were going down. If there was a concern that she
16 had for another flight going out, I know she would have told us.

17 MR. YOUNG: Okay. That's all I've got.

18 DR. SILVA: All right. How are you doing?

19 MR. WELLS: I'm fine.

20 DR. SILVA: Need a break? Okay.

21 BY DR. SILVA:

22 Q. How often would you say that you would pull out the max
23 braking?

24 A. Not often.

25 Q. Like once a month kind of thing, or --

1 A. It depends on where you're at. But every once in a while,
2 like if you're trying to make an intersection to -- here in
3 Anchorage for it to be -- you know, to shorten your taxi in --

4 Q. Right.

5 A. -- you may have to go to max braking just to get stopped by
6 that intersection. If you -- or missed your spot, which, you
7 know, it can happen. But normally it doesn't. But you come in,
8 you hit on base leg, you think, well, hey, if I get off here. Or
9 you want to roll out to delta and they give you a permission, so
10 they go, we need you to turn golf. Well, you're on max braking,
11 you know, you can make the turn. And it will throw you in your
12 seatbelt. It will -- literally, you -- almost knock the wind out
13 of you if you hit them really hard.

14 Q. Okay. And going back to the -- essentially the PenAir
15 interface with Ravn. You mentioned earlier that they moved you
16 over here because the chief pilot needed help; is that correct?

17 A. They had a director of flight position open. I had applied
18 for the sim check airman job on the other side, to do that,
19 because I like training. I like to do training. I enjoy the Dash
20 8. And that didn't come to pass and they thought, well, this
21 might be a better transition over here and help to bring the two
22 groups together.

23 Q. Um-hum. So just so I understand, you started as director of
24 training at Ravn?

25 A. Operations training program manager.

1 Q. Operations training program manager.

2 A. It was a weird title.

3 Q. Okay. But is it equivalent to a training manager or director
4 of training at Ravn?

5 A. Yes. Roughly equivalent to, yes.

6 Q. Okay. Okay. And then you applied for this position at
7 PenAir?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. It was -- they asked if I would be willing to, and I think
11 Sarah and Nick do a fine job, and they're good people. And I said
12 if you need my help to do this, yes.

13 Q. Yeah. Okay. Can you elaborate on the difficulties that they
14 were having? Like what did they need your help for specifically?

15 A. They needed somebody, (a), to fill the position, somebody who
16 had experience, long-term experience in the airline with Ravn.
17 And they wanted me to learn PenAir's way of doing things, and try
18 and see where those two would come together, or is there anything
19 that we could do to put this together smoothly.

20 Q. Um-hum.

21 A. And now, you know, getting more experience in the airplane
22 was to get me at a point where I could see and talk with their
23 check airman at some point and get them together and say what are
24 the good ideas. And the whole goal was to take the best from both
25 companies, the best things that both of these companies do and put

1 them together.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Then you have not just one good company, you have a great
4 company.

5 Q. Do you hold any positions with Ravn currently?

6 A. No. Not -- I have no responsibility -- no, I take it back.
7 Excuse me. I misspoke.

8 Q. Sure.

9 A. I do Dash 8 systems training on request. I am a systems
10 trainer in the Dash 8 over there.

11 Q. Okay. And between your director of training duties and line
12 flying, how is your time split between those two?

13 A. Oh, right now they've just got me flying mainly. I don't get
14 a lot of time to do any director of training stuff, but I do talk
15 and discuss things with Crystal.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. I haven't had -- not enough time yet to meet with the
18 director of training on the Ravn side, but we have discussed some
19 things and putting manuals together.

20 Q. Okay. So what would you say your responsibilities are on the
21 training side?

22 A. To help put these two companies together and merge the
23 training programs in a cohesive fashion that benefits both
24 companies.

25 Q. Is there a goal in terms of combining -- are the certificates

1 combined already or no?

2 A. I don't know. They haven't --

3 Q. That's okay.

4 A. They don't give me that information.

5 Q. Okay. Is there a goal for when you have to get that, the
6 collaboration or manuals --

7 A. I know that they are shooting for, I think, February. But
8 don't quote me. That's rumor. That's a rumor.

9 Q. Okay. So who do you report to as director of training?

10 A. Crystal.

11 Q. Okay. Do you have staff in the training department that
12 you're in charge of?

13 A. They have -- not that I'm in charge, that I have official
14 duties over. At this point, not yet. The structure's not in
15 place for me to dictate anything to anybody I work with.
16 Everybody's a team.

17 Q. Yeah. Okay.

18 A. Everybody's an equal with me.

19 Q. Got it. Okay. I want to switch gears to what was going
20 on -- essentially what you were doing in the 3 days before, just
21 to document -- and we'll run through it, again, as you remember.

22 So the accident occurred Thursday afternoon/evening. Do you
23 recall when you woke up that day?

24 A. I guess maybe 9 o'clock. That's just a guess.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Nine the morning, 9 o'clock. Yeah.

2 Q. What did you do before you showed at the airport?

3 A. Drank a lot of coffee. I like coffee. I'm sorry. It's -- I
4 drink coffee and watch the news, and I pet my dogs.

5 Q. Okay. What about the day before? Did you fly the day
6 before?

7 A. You know, with all this that's gone on, it is really getting
8 hard --

9 Q. That's okay.

10 A. -- hard to remember.

11 Q. If you don't remember, that's fine.

12 A. I -- yeah, really, I can look at my schedule and tell you.

13 Q. Okay. That's fine. We can, we can grab your schedule. Any
14 idea when you could have gone bed that night?

15 A. The night before?

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. Oh, I want to say it's 10:30, 11 o'clock.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I didn't fall immediately to sleep. Just, you know, maybe 20
20 minutes.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. But -- and I might have -- during the night I may have got up
23 at one point to let my dogs out. Some -- but I can't verify that
24 for sure.

25 Q. Okay. That's fine. Do you live in Anchorage?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. So that was Wednesday. Do you remember when you woke
3 up that day? On Wednesday?

4 A. That was -- didn't I just -- I thought it was around 9.

5 Q. Oh, okay. Was that Wednesday or the day of the accident?

6 A. Oh, I thought that was the day you were talking about, when I
7 woke up the day of the accident.

8 Q. Yeah. So when you went to -- yeah, you went -- yeah. So do
9 you know the night before, about when you woke up? Or the day
10 before.

11 A. Oh, the day before?

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. I'm trying to think of -- I can't -- would you mind if I
14 looked at my schedule?

15 Q. Sure. Yeah, that's fine.

16 A. Thank you. I just need something to --

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. -- jog my memory.

19 Q. Yeah, ground your -- ground yourself with times.

20 A. And that was -- the day before the accident, you're saying
21 the 16th?

22 Q. Um-hum.

23 A. So -- I'm trying to see the pad. Oh, that's right. That day
24 it was supposed to be -- I think that one was supposed to be a
25 Dutch-Fairbanks -- or a Dutch, but it went to Fairbanks.

1 Q. Oh, okay.

2 A. So, yeah, I got here in time to do -- or I woke up about the
3 same time. I want to say it was 9, 9:30.

4 Q. Okay. And then do you know what time you flew, about?

5 A. Oh.

6 Q. Does it have it in there?

7 A. I departed the air at 1645 to Fairbanks, I think. No. Let
8 me see. Wait a minute. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay. And was that just an out and return?

10 A. I'm sorry?

11 Q. Was that an out and return flight?

12 A. Yes, ma'am.

13 Q. Okay. One more day. Did you fly on Tuesday, the 15th?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. When was it? When did you fly?

16 A. I showed up 10:30, and I went to King Salmon.

17 Q. Okay. Do you remember when you woke up that day?

18 A. Normally it's about the same time.

19 Q. Nine?

20 A. Yeah, 9 or 9:30.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Oh, that one would have been more. That would've been
23 probably about 6:30, 7 o'clock.

24 Q. Okay. And then when you came back from King Salmon, that was
25 just one leg or one flight that you had that day?

1 A. It was Anchorage-King Salmon back, yes.

2 Q. Would you have gone to bed about the same time?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Ten, 10:30?

5 A. Um-hum.

6 Q. Okay. How many hours of sleep do you need to feel rested?

7 A. Sometimes I feel rested after 6½, 7 hours; 8 hours are great
8 but normally I feel better at 7, 7½.

9 Q. Um-hum. Any sleep disorders or anything --

10 A. Apnea.

11 Q. Apnea? Okay.

12 A. CPAP.

13 Q. You have a CPAP? Okay.

14 A. Yes, ma'am.

15 Q. And you -- do you use it consistently?

16 A. Absolutely.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. That is the best invention they've ever had. He must use
19 one. He's shaking his head --

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, but I, I've been threatened.

21 MR. WELLS: If you snore, it keeps your wife from hitting
22 you.

23 DR. SILVA: Well, there you go.

24 BY DR. SILVA:

25 Q. Okay. How did you sleep -- do you remember how you slept,

1 how you felt the night of the accident, or the day of the
2 accident?

3 A. I felt great. I did, because I'll (indiscernible) all day up
4 to the time, that time.

5 Q. Any naps or anything before you showed?

6 A. (No audible answer.)

7 Q. (Indiscernible), okay. I just wanted to follow up on that
8 special airport training for Dutch Harbor.

9 A. I'm sorry?

10 Q. Do you recall when you did that training?

11 A. That was pretty much our first day of IOE when we started
12 going to Dutch.

13 Q. So it was during IOE?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Okay. Did you do any different approaches? Was it just one
16 flight out there?

17 A. We did the front door approach most of the time.

18 Q. Okay. So was it multiple flights over to Dutch Harbor?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. As part of that training?

21 A. Um-hum.

22 Q. Okay.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dujuan. I'm sorry. Was that a yes? You --

24 MR. WELLS: Yes. I'm sorry. Yes. Thank you.

25 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

1 BY DR. SILVA:

2 Q. And do you recall pulling the CDR circuit breaker during the
3 evacuation?

4 A. No. It doesn't call for us to do that.

5 Q. It doesn't? Okay.

6 A. I made sure power was off, which saved the (indiscernible).

7 Q. Right. Do you recall how long it took to get to that point
8 where you pulled -- turned the power off?

9 A. Less than a minute, maybe a minute and a half.

10 Q. To shut it down? Okay. Okay. And during preflight, that
11 tire that the first officer mentioned to you, do you remember what
12 side it was on?

13 A. That I don't remember. Sorry.

14 Q. Any idea where the weather sensor is located on the field at
15 Dutch Harbor?

16 A. I don't recall where that is, no, off my --

17 Q. Okay. Wouldn't know. Do they have multiple windsocks or is
18 it just --

19 A. There's one midfield and there's a number of things that,
20 like I said, you look for.

21 Q. That you look for otherwise. Okay. And then, again, coming
22 back to the landing distance calculation, and you mentioned in a
23 previous flight that you had accounted for a tailwind?

24 A. In the event that it turned into a tailwind, that we'd land
25 with a 15-knot tailwind. Yes.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But it turned out we didn't.

3 Q. Okay. So is that -- you mentioned -- is that calculation
4 done every time? Every flight?

5 A. Yeah, that's something we look at to see if we can land it
6 that way in (indiscernible), yes.

7 Q. And is there a briefing required or any kind of communication
8 that's required between the two of you regarding the landing
9 distance?

10 A. No. There's no required does this -- as he's going through
11 the calculation as the non-flying pilot, there is nothing saying
12 I'm calculating this and I'm doing this. He's not going to be
13 verbalizing everything he's doing. He's going to say we can do it
14 under these conditions at this speed, and these are our speeds.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. At this weight. Sorry. I'm sorry, I said speed. That was a
17 misstatement.

18 Q. Okay. Do you recall what he said for this flight regarding
19 the performance?

20 A. He gave the numbers for the flight, REF speed and VT speed.
21 And normally when -- if he gives you the speeds and we -- it's,
22 yeah, we're capable of doing that landing at that airport.

23 DR. SILVA: Okay. Great. We'll go around the table one more
24 time. Do you need a break before we do that?

25 MR. WELLS: No.

1 DR. SILVA: Okay. Marvin.

2 BY MR. FRANTZ:

3 Q. What's VT speed?

4 A. It's go around -- VT speed is your go-around speed on the two
5 -- on one engine. Sorry. So in the event you lose an engine,
6 it's VT minus 10 and you accelerate to VT to pull flaps up and
7 retract speed.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Would you characterize your touchdown as normal, firmer than
11 normal, very firm?

12 A. A normal Dutch landing is firm. So it was firm.

13 Q. Okay. Any sounds or feels, feelings after the touchdown of
14 tire failure?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Do you know what kind of avionics system the Saab has?

17 A. Avionics system?

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. As far as the 4200?

20 Q. Is that what it's called?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Is it -- oh. Do you have an ICAS system?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. Oh, I thought you were talking about the -- I'm sorry.
25 My mistake.

1 A. Avionic -- yes. Is it a, is it Honeywell or --

2 Q. ICAS. Honeywell, I think.

3 A. Okay. So after the touchdown -- on a normal landing, from
4 touchdown to stopping, do you ever -- do you routinely get chimes
5 or dings from the ICAS system or anything that routinely comes up
6 as you're -- after you touch down, as you're rolling out? You
7 know, ICAS messages or chimes indicating there's a message, is
8 that normal at all?

9 A. Not that I -- you know, the only we're looking at is for the
10 Beta lights, the B's, Beta lights.

11 Q. Okay. So, and you didn't recall hearing anything, any
12 systems or airplane sounds out of the ordinary after this
13 touchdown --

14 A. No.

15 Q. -- is that correct?

16 A. Everything was normal.

17 Q. Where did you do your Dash 8 type rating?

18 A. FlightSafety -- oh, I'm sorry. God, it's been so long. It
19 was in Toronto, Canada at the de Havilland factory -- next to
20 de Havilland factory at FlightSafety.

21 Q. Okay. And how would you compare that quality wise to the
22 Saab training? You got sim training in the Saab.

23 A. The sim training?

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. It was fine.

1 Q. I mean, how would you compare it, the Dash 8 in terms of
2 how --

3 A. FlightSafety does -- I think they do a better job here. I
4 mean, than FlightSafety did, when I got my type rating. But I've
5 done training in the Dash. The training made major improvements
6 when it became a company training program over secondary
7 contractors. Because of the terminology and continuity and
8 everything else and familiarity with aircraft, the training
9 improved.

10 Q. But right now the Saab training is still contracted to
11 Simcom; is that right? The sim training.

12 A. The sim trainers are at this point, yes.

13 Q. Is that something that's looking to change?

14 A. They're going to -- what they're doing now? Whether that
15 changes or not, I can't confirm. I know they're planning on
16 having instructors from here train in the -- I was one of them.
17 Kirk's another one. I think Dennis, we're going to look at Dennis
18 here to do that, too. But -- and I don't think it was -- we were
19 going to work with them as APDs or something. It's actually good
20 to have a different set of eyes. That's an excellent idea.

21 But I -- they're getting instructors. They come here, they
22 monitor what we do or they come in and watch flights during the
23 summer, come down here and they go on a flight to see if what
24 they're telling people is correct, which is a very good way of
25 doing it.

1 Q. Are you talking about the instructors from Simcom do this?

2 A. Yes. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. Ever fail a check ride?

4 A. Not that I can recall. I don't think so. I have pretty much
5 all my records here. Yeah, as far as -- I never failed one here
6 at all.

7 Q. Before here, any time in your aviation?

8 A. I can't think of one.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I just don't, I don't -- no.

11 Q. So I'm not clear on the position of these rain showers. Did
12 you end up ever flying through any of these rain showers during
13 either the first or the second approach? Did you fly --

14 A. Oh, light rain showers you could see through, yeah.

15 Q. Okay. As you flew through it, did you notice any downdrafts
16 or turbulence or --

17 A. No.

18 Q. -- wind change or airspeed change or anything that --

19 A. I think on the first approach, which is the only time we went
20 through this shower, I think there was a little fluctuation in
21 speed but it wasn't much. A little bit, a little turbulence, but
22 light.

23 Q. How did you end up --

24 A. That's weather.

25 Q. How did you end up off the centerline of the runway?

1 A. What? Okay, at what point? Are you talking the go-around or
2 after the --

3 Q. No, no. I'm sorry. After the landing, after you --

4 A. Oh, okay.

5 Q. -- went off the end of the runway, off --

6 A. After -- as we were going down the runway and it wasn't
7 coming to a stop, and my options became very -- there were no
8 options at that point. I couldn't take off -- in my mind there
9 was -- a takeoff would've been -- everybody, we wouldn't have made
10 it. No way. And so we're coming up on the road. I see cars
11 stopped here on the left, and I see the road right, and Justin --
12 at the time I'm looking at the road, I'm starting to turn the knob
13 and Justin goes, go right, go right, the road. And I'm turning
14 the knob. That's how we came off centerline.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I don't know if it was -- because I don't think if it -- I
17 know Justin's feet were also on the brakes. I know that. I felt
18 him hit them because I had them all the way to the floor, but I
19 felt a bump from his feet. I could just feel how hard his feet
20 hit the pedals. So I know his feet were there; I don't know what
21 he was doing with them. But I was -- I understand that.

22 But I was turning the knob when he said, road, road, road,
23 and I was doing -- my goal was to not go off that into the rocks,
24 but to maybe end up on that road if it was at all possible.
25 Because at that point, that was the thing, was to try and maintain

1 that aircraft in one piece.

2 Q. Was the runway dry?

3 A. Completely dry or damp. It was considered -- they call it
4 wet, but it's a grooved runway, which is, as performance is, you
5 know, is considered dry runway. There was no puddles, visible
6 puddles or standing water that I could see.

7 Q. Did you have a field condition report from the operator from
8 the airport of the --

9 A. Yeah, we had -- it's in our weather packet here, but very --
10 5-10 report is in there, 5-5-5, good braking action, is what --
11 the report we received.

12 Q. Was that when you -- before you left or --

13 A. Oh, yeah, that was before we left. And I believe -- don't
14 quote me. It could be because I hear this all the time in my
15 head, when -- can hear ATISs and things of that sort. A runway
16 condition report, condition is 5-5-5.

17 I thought the voice, the same voice that I heard over the
18 radio, in my head, I heard somewhere not -- you know, runway
19 condition report 5-5-5. I know I heard it. Was what I
20 experienced 5-5-5? No. It was -- it may have been 5 on initial
21 touchdown, but the rest of that runway was not -- or either the
22 brakes failed. I don't know.

23 Q. But before you landed you didn't have a -- did you have a
24 perception of contaminated runway just from your vision of how --

25 A. I didn't see from -- I mean, it's, you know, thousands of

1 feet away.

2 Q. Um-hum.

3 A. The only perception I had was it was damp. But it was not
4 standing water or anything of that sort.

5 Q. Have any other PenAir pilots come over from Ravn? I mean,
6 you said --

7 A. I'm sorry?

8 Q. You came over from --

9 A. Crystal has. Um-hum.

10 Q. And who's Crystal?

11 A. Our chief pilot.

12 Q. And did you say that she's your immediate supervisor or your
13 boss?

14 A. Well, technically my --

15 Q. You named your position as training manager here?

16 A. Yes, she has -- she is over me, and so is Brian, who is vice
17 president.

18 Q. Is there anybody here at PenAir higher than you in a training
19 position?

20 A. You know, I don't ever look at things like that. But I --
21 you know, technically, I guess, maybe I'm above others, but I look
22 at everybody as the same.

23 Q. Yeah, but I mean in the company structure, do you occupy the
24 top --

25 A. I think --

1 Q. -- training position at PenAir?

2 A. I think I'm an equal with the flight standards trainer, Kirk
3 Watson.

4 Q. Does he also work for Crystal?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. He is (indiscernible). So she is over -- the chief pilot is
7 the supervisor and the manager of the training personnel here?

8 A. She watches over us, yes.

9 Q. And then who is her boss?

10 A. I think Brian is.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. The vice president here.

13 Q. Okay. What other aircraft does PenAir have besides the Saab?
14 What other aircraft do they fly?

15 A. PenAir?

16 Q. Yeah.

17 A. None that I know of.

18 Q. Just the Saab?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Okay. Do you know how long they've been doing that, how long
21 they've had the Saab --

22 A. They were doing the Saab 340s prior to the 2000. So they've
23 been flying the Saab brand for a while.

24 Q. Does Crystal have a type rating in the Saab?

25 A. Yes.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think that's it.

2 MR. WELLS: Okay.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Paul.

4 MR. WELLS: You're welcome.

5 DR. SILVA: Dujuan.

6 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

7 Q. All right, Paul. I have some questions that -- at which --
8 at what altitude was the landing gear deployed?

9 A. On which approach?

10 Q. On the last approach, the second approach.

11 A. At roughly 1,000 feet. Because we were maintaining VFR. So
12 I wanted to make sure I stayed with the good visibility.

13 Q. Yeah. In the previous times that you've flown into Dutch
14 Harbor, have you ever noticed any foreign object debris on the --
15 foreign object debris on the runway?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Okay. Where is the autopilot disconnect switch located?

18 A. On my thumb. On the yoke.

19 Q. And as far as approaches are concerned, in general, what's
20 the transition from autopilot to manual? Or is that -- does that
21 ever happen?

22 A. I'm sorry?

23 Q. Do you manually fly, do you manually fly approaches?

24 A. You can. It's a very stable airplane. It's a good handling
25 airplane. Just disconnect by pushing a button.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And you state disconnecting the autopilot. We also state
3 when we engage the autopilot.

4 Q. Okay. And you stated earlier that risk assessments are done
5 prior to departure, departing the airport field.

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Is there any type of risk assessment that's done after a
8 flight?

9 A. No.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. That's all I had. Thank you, Paul.

11 MR. WELLS: You're welcome.

12 DR. SILVA: All right. Dennis.

13 BY MR. FISHER:

14 Q. I wanted to ask earlier, but I didn't. Was there any bird
15 activity --

16 A. I didn't see any birds.

17 Q. -- anywhere in the vicinity of the airport at all?

18 A. I -- there was no reports of bird activity that I saw, and I
19 did not see any birds.

20 Q. After going around, did you take a moment to speak with the
21 passengers at all?

22 A. I was more focused on the safety of the flight than making a
23 PA for the passengers at that point.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yeah. Just maintaining where I was going, what I was doing,

1 and situational awareness of outside was more important to me.

2 Q. Okay. And can you tell me if you modified the original brief
3 for the approach, how does that change from the go-around? So
4 you've learned something going in there you didn't like. How did
5 you modify -- did you modify --

6 A. I said in the event that it was as gusty again, and I was
7 maintaining -- I was on path and I needed to use both hands for a
8 moment, you know, you might have to make a minor adjustment power
9 outcall for a power change. You know, I'll call for a power --
10 bump the power, a couple power units. That's not uncommon, and I
11 have seen that done in a numbers of aircraft, but -- but then it
12 wasn't necessary; it was stable and smooth. But I think I may
13 have asked at one point -- I can't remember on which report,
14 but -- which approach that was, but it was not -- had really no
15 effect on anything.

16 MR. FISHER: Okay. That's all I have.

17 DR. SILVA: Okay. Roger.

18 BY MR. YOUNG:

19 Q. Just a couple of questions. On that last part of it, is that
20 something that you guys train in the sim, with the -- to have the
21 FO assist with the power on landing?

22 A. Actually, one of the sim trainers said that, you know, if it
23 was needed and you were going to do a two-handed landing, you may
24 be able to, you know -- it is not an unacceptable thing to say,
25 okay, I've got both hands on the controls, because you want all

1 your muscle there for some reason. He didn't say it was a -- he
2 said you could have the -- hey, just have him pull the power back
3 a couple power units and, you know, put the airplane where you
4 need to put it, just hit -- you know, the idea is hit your mark.
5 That's it.

6 Q. Okay. Yeah, I was just curious.

7 You mentioned Crystal's the chief pilot, and I don't know who
8 Crystal is.

9 A. Yeah, she's the chief.

10 Q. Yeah, when -- do you know when she got her type rating in the
11 Saab?

12 A. Maybe a couple months before me. That's my guess. I guess.
13 That's a guess.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Did you need to know something --

16 Q. No, no, just curious. I'm just trying to get a feel for the
17 structure with the merger and stuff.

18 A. Oh, yeah. I understand.

19 Q. So all that, so -- I don't think -- okay. Did you have any
20 concerns with taking the director of training job on the PenAir
21 side of it with just being new to the aircraft?

22 A. No, I looked at it more as a challenge than a concern. There
23 was no concern really.

24 MR. YOUNG: All right. That's all I've got.

25 BY DR. SILVA:

1 Q. Does Ravn have any Saabs?

2 A. No. Well, now they do. They own PenAir.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. But, you know --

5 Q. But before they didn't have any?

6 A. No. I'm sorry, I just -- I'm a little tired.

7 Q. Nope. You're good. That's it for us. Do you have anything

8 you want to add that we didn't necessary ask you or think we

9 should have?

10 A. No. I can't think of anything.

11 Q. Well, you have our information. If you do --

12 DR. SILVA: Yeah. Go ahead.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Sorry. Just one more. It's a good one, though.

14 Well, maybe it's not.

15 BY MR. FRANTZ:

16 Q. So I know you've had some time to think about this in the
17 last couple days. Have you reached any conclusions just in your
18 own head about what you think went wrong or what happened?

19 A. I try, I try, I do -- I try not to come to a final
20 conclusion. I am -- I know I am not perfect. I don't think
21 there's anyone here that is. But if I had to make my best guess,
22 I don't think it was a brake failure. That's my guess. I think
23 more than likely, to me, after things I had found out after the
24 fact and the way it felt, that just so happens it was unforeseen
25 circumstance that one of those showers put down sleet or hail on

1 that -- in that runway, and I couldn't see it. There was no way
2 to tell that was there. There was no report of it. I don't --
3 that's the only thing I can think of.

4 Q. That's good. That's good.

5 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks.

6 DR. SILVA: Yep. So feel free to reach out if you can think
7 of anything else. But we really appreciate your time.

8 MR. WELLS: All right. I'm sorry you had to do this, but I
9 appreciate what you do.

10 DR. SILVA: Yeah.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Hey, Paul, we really appreciate you coming in
12 and talking with us.

13 DR. SILVA: We're off the record at 7:46.

14 (Whereupon, at 7:46 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Paul Wells

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE:

DATE: October 19, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Kay Maurer
Transcriber



Autumn Weslow
Contract Administrator
Corrections made 9/30/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: PAUL WELLS
Captain, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Wednesday,
December 4, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Wells)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Paul Wells:		
By Dr. Sevillian		5
By Dr. Silva		9
By Mr. Frantz		16
By Mr. Wilson		19
By Mr. Fischer		20
By Dr. Sevillian		27
By Dr. Silva		28
By Mr. Frantz		35
By Mr. Wilson		38
By Mr. Fischer		41
By Mr. Frantz		46

I N T E R V I E W

(10:43 a.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SEVILLIAN: My name is Dajuan Sevillian, National
4 Transportation Safety Board. Thanks for coming back to talk with
5 us. We appreciate it.

6 So what you're seeing around the room is we've got NTSB
7 investigators, but we also have parties to our investigation. And
8 the parties help us with information, gathering information, et
9 cetera. As you, as you know, you are the expert. We want to hear
10 from you throughout this interview. So if there's a situation
11 that comes up that you don't know something, just say you don't
12 know; we'll go on. You're allowed one representative. Who would
13 you like to represent you?

14 MR. WELLS: Morgan.

15 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Okay. So what we'll do is we'll
16 go around the table. But before we do that, I wanted to let you
17 know that all of this discussion that we have is going to be
18 available in the public docket in the future.

19 So let's go around the table. We'll start off with Marvin.

20 MR. FRANTZ: I'm Marvin Frantz from our first interview. I'm
21 an operational factors investigator with the NTSB.

22 MR. WELLS: Hi, Marvin.

23 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva, human performance investigator.

24 MR. WELLS: Say that louder again.

25 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva.

1 MR. WELLS: Sathya. Okay. Thank you.

2 MR. WILSON: Brandon, one of the check airman.

3 MR. WELLS: Hi, Brandon.

4 DR. SILVA: Tony?

5 MR. FISCHER: I'm Tony Fischer from the Denali CMO. I'm an
6 aviation safety inspector.

7 MR. WELLS: Hi. Nice to meet you, Tony.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: And he's also -- he's here, he's here for
9 safety and not enforcement, so yeah.

10 MR. WELLS: Roger. Got it.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: And I'm also a human performance investigator
12 as well.

13 MR. WELLS: Human factors. Okay.

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay? Is there anything before we get
15 started? Any questions or comments?

16 MR. WELLS: None that I can think of, no.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Okay, all right.

18 INTERVIEW OF PAUL WELLS

19 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

20 Q. So just some follow-up questions from our last interview. Do
21 you -- could you tell us your perspective or your thought process
22 on the airport qualifications requirement for special airports?
23 What does that consist of?

24 A. First, it has to meet the regulations, FAR regulations. And
25 then also it consists of being observed by an IOE check airman,

1 check airman seeing you -- watching you going in and out of that
2 airport. And then there -- they have in the general operations
3 manual a minimum hourly requirement, things of that sort. But the
4 observation normally takes place prior to that -- you reaching
5 that hourly qualification, so --

6 Q. And what's -- do you know what those hours are?

7 A. I think it can be 100 or 300, depending.

8 Q. Okay. And what's the determination for the 300 versus the
9 100?

10 A. Pilot experience, more than likely.

11 Q. Experience?

12 A. Um-hmm.

13 Q. Okay. And is that requirement for all the special airports
14 or just Dutch?

15 A. There's a few others, I believe, that fall under those rules,
16 but I don't, I don't recall which ones they were.

17 Q. All right. As a, as a captain, when you have a safety issue
18 or safety hazard that comes up, how do you -- what's the reporting
19 mechanism that you have here at PenAir?

20 A. The safety requirement.

21 Q. And what is --

22 A. Vistair. It's a new one. They just changed from the old
23 system to the Vista system. Vistair or something like that.

24 Q. Okay. And how do you -- do you fill out information? What's
25 the --

1 A. You can go online and you can fill out information. There's
2 a link on our iPads directly to the safety department. You can
3 walk in there and talk directly to them. And you can anonymously
4 fill out a safety report if you feel that there might -- which
5 there never has been, but as far as I know, if they felt -- if you
6 felt that there could be a repercussion of some sort for you
7 saying something about safety, you can anonymously put a safety
8 report in.

9 Never been a problem doing that. They want to make sure
10 that, if there is a safety issue, that they are aware of it.
11 That's been the company policy since they've gone through the just
12 culture system.

13 Q. Speaking of just culture, what do you think about the culture
14 here at PenAir?

15 A. It's great. It's really good. I mean, they -- you know,
16 PenAir is good. Ravn was good. They've always followed up on
17 everything that I know of. They take it, they take it very
18 seriously.

19 Q. And what's been your interaction some time ago when Crystal
20 was chief pilot? What was your interaction with her?

21 A. She was chief pilot.

22 Q. And how, and how was that relationship as chief pilot, with
23 you being captain?

24 A. I've known Crystal for a long time. I trained her in the
25 Dash-8, so I have -- had open, very open, clear conversations with

1 her.

2 Q. And if you had to make a decision, you know, that you thought
3 was -- did you feel empowered to make that decision and --

4 A. In the area of moving towards safety? Is that what you're
5 referring to?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Absolutely. She would support any decision I said if it was
8 moving us toward safety, yes. I mean, actually, well, she'd
9 evaluate my observation, and then she would say whether or not
10 that's a good idea and we should move that way because it provides
11 a safer system. She would do that.

12 Q. Have you had any interactions with Dennis Fisher?

13 A. Yeah, he was my IOE check airman.

14 Q. Okay, all right. And how was that relationship?

15 A. Fine, so far as I know.

16 Q. Okay. So the NTSB put out a preliminary investigative update
17 on the accident. Did you get a chance to read it?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What were your thoughts about the preliminary?

20 A. Missing stuff. But as far as -- from my initial interview,
21 you know what I think happened, so --

22 Q. When you say "missing stuff," what are you, what are you
23 referring to?

24 A. Well, from our initial interview, I don't know what you guys
25 know, so I can't really answer. So I'm not privy to your

1 information, so I can't logically say what you know and I don't
2 know. There was information that I was made aware of that I
3 wasn't aware of. I mean, I didn't know that a tire blew. I
4 didn't know that, so just -- that was in that information.

5 Q. Okay. All right. And the -- on the accident flight date,
6 did you take a look at the tires by any chance on that day?

7 A. Absolutely. I said so in the initial interview. Yeah, there
8 was a picture given to me by the first officer. Yes.

9 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Those are the questions I had for
10 right now. Sathya? Go ahead, Sathya.

11 BY DR. SILVA:

12 Q. So going back to that airport qualification -- and I know
13 some time has passed. You've learned things since the accident.
14 You've gone through the accident. So I want you to do you best to
15 kind of put yourself back in July when you started flying the
16 aircraft and started flying into Dutch Harbor with Dennis.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. What was your understanding then of special airports
19 qualification?

20 A. You're observed by a check airman and you have to get a
21 signoff by a check airman going into Dutch Harbor. And of course,
22 but the FAR regulation says that you only had to have been in that
23 airport once in the last 12 months? Or there's a number of other
24 things under that regulation, so --

25 Q. Okay. So in terms of PenAir's procedures, what was your

1 understanding of their procedures for special airports?

2 A. That you would go in the -- initially, I think everybody -- I
3 went in. So from my -- you know, I went in pretty much the first
4 2 weeks with straight -- there was a whole, pretty much, schedule
5 to Dutch. And every day, you went in and out of Dutch.

6 For the first 2 weeks in through -- until you got signed off
7 for IOE, you know, you would -- you were with a check airman and
8 not with anybody else less than a check airman, because you're
9 doing IOE. And you're getting observed, and they're evaluating
10 you this whole time. So doing IOE, you're always evaluated.

11 Q. So from your understanding, after you received that
12 qualification from Dennis, were you cleared to fly into Dutch
13 Harbor as PIC?

14 A. I was signed off as being Dutch Harbor qualified, but I
15 realize that there was -- I think it was -- they had a 100-hour
16 requirement that you had to have. That's what it says.

17 Q. Okay. So what was your understanding about that?

18 A. I believe that they, the company, through their general ops
19 manual, says that they have to get to 100 hours to -- before you
20 can go. But it doesn't mean that you have to get signed off at
21 100 hours. He could have signed you off back after the end of IOE
22 that you were qualified, and then you get your 100 hours and you
23 go. You wouldn't see a check airman again before you go to Dutch,
24 even if you went to 300 hours.

25 Q. So where did you gain that understanding? Was that something

1 told to you?

2 A. It's in the -- it's in there. Yeah, it's the way -- that's
3 the way they do it. And it's -- I believe it's in the GOM. I
4 don't know for a fact. I don't have it in front of me.

5 Q. When you say that "that's the way they do it," where did you
6 get that information? Because you had just started with the
7 company, right?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. So how did you know that that was how -- that they had been
10 doing it?

11 A. It just was my understanding is that's how it was done. You
12 were observed going in and out of Dutch by a check airman. Check
13 airman can sign you off at any point, at any time that you're
14 qualified. You know, there's a number of ways they can do it, I
15 assume, I'm assuming.

16 But that was the way they chose to do it. Because you could
17 go in, you could fly 100 hours in the airplane to anywhere else on
18 the planet, okay? And then you can only fly once to Dutch and be
19 qualified.

20 Q. So when you did the qualification, was your understanding of
21 that process that, in the past, that for airport qualifications,
22 you were able to get that qualification before you have the
23 minimum time requirements and then --

24 A. I never saw that there was -- I never understood -- my
25 personal belief was it didn't -- the hours were just an hour

1 requirement. The signoff was a signoff. You know, they didn't
2 coincide with each other.

3 Q. Did not. Okay. I understand. Have you ever filled out a
4 safety report?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What was that about?

7 A. Which one?

8 Q. Multiple are fine. Yeah. What kind of issues did you
9 report?

10 A. You know, it's been so long, I truthfully can't recall
11 exactly which ones now. I've got so many different things going
12 through my head. But I've actually discussed safety issues with
13 the safety department also where they took the ball after that and
14 ran with it.

15 Q. Have you ever used the form to submit anything?

16 A. I believe I have, yeah. But right now, I'm just -- my mind's
17 not in that realm, so I can't specifically tell you. I've come up
18 with safety suggestions and things of that sort, yes.

19 Q. Okay. So you mentioned that when you were hired here, you
20 were hired as the director of training.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Were there other projects you were working on outside of line
23 flying?

24 A. For this company?

25 Q. Um-hmm.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can you describe what those projects were?

3 A. There's a performance program that we were trying to get
4 approved, which answers one of your questions from the previous
5 interview, was were we moving to get more accurate data for
6 performance and quicker, more efficient data? Yes, we were. It
7 was one of my concerns, and Crystal answered that. They
8 immediately agreed that, yes, we will move that way.

9 And so we had to evaluate this program and then see if it
10 would work and how well it would work. It was -- it would tell
11 you exactly, this is how many feet you're going to use, this --
12 and everything. I mean, it was -- it's a huge step forward in
13 safety in the plane. And that was a concern. How do, how do you
14 do this? And I think we had that discussion last time.

15 And they were moving exactly that way, trying to -- hey, they
16 saw something, they knew it could be fixed and they were moving
17 that direction at this point. Just so happened this occurred.

18 Q. Okay. Can you describe the program?

19 A. It's Aircraft Performance Group. And it's weight and
20 balance, runway analysis and -- program.

21 Q. How were you testing it?

22 A. You would evaluate it -- he would do his numbers. I would do
23 the numbers on there, compare the numbers to see how they're
24 working and how closely they were related. He came up with the
25 company-approved method; I came up with that one. How closely are

1 they related?

2 Q. Is that something you were documenting somewhere?

3 A. Initially we were just checking it, because we had just --
4 this is all brand new, okay? So it's just an evaluation of how
5 close is the data they have versus what are we coming up with, the
6 same V-speeds numbers and distance, et cetera.

7 Q. When did you start testing that?

8 A. Maybe a month ago? Well, it's been a month, so time is --
9 it's like, this is yesterday for me today. But it was maybe 2
10 months prior to this.

11 Q. To the --

12 A. Well, then I started getting it approved and started getting
13 to where we could actually see it and see how it worked, how the
14 system worked, how the program worked. And so we were going
15 through that process. And then develop a training program, get it
16 approved by the FAA, et cetera. Go through all the steps and
17 everything.

18 Q. Okay. So did you use the program during the accident flight?

19 A. I evaluated the program just like I did on most flights, just
20 to see if it -- how close are our numbers.

21 Q. Do you recall when in the flight that evaluation was?

22 A. It was in cruise. Upper cruise.

23 Q. Okay. Was that the typical time where you would normally do
24 a performance evaluation?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. How do you document -- once you do the performance
2 evaluation, how do you document those speeds and flap settings,
3 whatever you've done the math for?

4 A. They do have what's called a TOLD card that they use. And a
5 lot of people will go just directly from the iPad to the aircraft
6 itself and plug it in and put it in the data itself, right there
7 on the screen on your EFIS --

8 Q. Do you recall if you guys were using a TOLD card that day?

9 A. He used one for takeoff, yeah. I know that for sure.

10 Q. Do you recall anything for landing?

11 A. If he did, I don't recall that. But I know, I know I saw him
12 looking at his iPad as he was popping numbers in the box, so --

13 Q. What numbers is he putting in the box?

14 A. He's putting in the V-speeds, your VR, Vt and all that, so --

15 Q. Okay. So what about flap setting? Is that something
16 recorded anywhere for future reference? Is that put in the box
17 also?

18 A. No, you make the decision on flap setting. And you brief.
19 Or you'll brief or you'll just -- yeah, you would -- standard line
20 is 20, nonstandard -- you go 35 flap --

21 Q. Okay.

22 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all I had.

23 MR. WELLS: Okay.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya. Marvin?

25 MR. FRANTZ: Hey, Paul, how are you?

1 MR. WELLS: Yeah.

2 BY MR. FRANTZ:

3 Q. During the second landing, do you have a recollection of what
4 you were expecting for winds?

5 A. What was -- well, what I could see. And what I was seeing
6 was that it was changing. It was changing from, you know, a
7 crosswind over from Hog Island, and it was going more to a direct
8 crosswind as we came up on the airport from water and windsock and
9 everything else.

10 Q. Was this on the second -- on the circle-around?

11 A. Yeah, on the second one. And then I -- like I said before, I
12 think, in the initial interview, that there was a lot of chatter
13 on the radios. And if she said something, I couldn't --

14 Q. Sure. Do you have any recollection of, in your head or out
15 loud, talking about landing performance based on the wind,
16 landing, distance or anything based on what you, what you thought
17 the winds were?

18 A. I knew that we had plenty of performance, judging from what I
19 was seeing with the wind and what was going on, that the aircraft
20 could easily have stopped.

21 Q. So during the rollout after the touchdown, just in the first,
22 say, 10 or 15 seconds, do you recall any cautions or tones or
23 anything abnormal that the aircraft --

24 A. Definitely no --

25 Q. -- chimed into you or told you about, tried to tell you

1 about?

2 A. At that point in time, no. I don't remember any warnings or
3 caution lights. I didn't see the caution flash or --

4 Q. And you said initially -- I believe you said initially for
5 some period of time, 2 seconds, 10 seconds, that you felt braking
6 and deceleration --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- was as expected; is that correct?

9 A. Normal. Yes. Yeah.

10 Q. And then at some point, it became less than expected.

11 A. A lot less than expected, yeah.

12 Q. Okay. Okay, yeah, that's fine. So I just want to know, what
13 was -- did someone recruit you or try to get you to come to
14 PenAir, you know, to take this position because --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Who was that?

17 A. Well, the chief pilot.

18 Q. Crystal?

19 A. Crystal and Sarah, at the time.

20 Q. Was it -- had you -- is this something, a move, you had been
21 thinking about doing, or somebody came to you out of the --
22 unexpectedly and said, hey, would you like to come be director of
23 training at PenAir?

24 A. No, actually I would have loved to have stayed at Dash-8 the
25 rest of my life, to be honest with you. I love the -- you know, I

1 love Dash-8s.

2 Q. Okay. But Crystal approached you?

3 A. Initially, Crystal and Sarah, yeah.

4 Q. And talked to you about entering or coming to PenAir as --

5 A. I think it was Sarah first, then Crystal.

6 Q. For a director -- or for a training position; is that
7 correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Yeah. Okay.

10 A. I really originally wasn't going to be director of training.
11 I just wanted to come and do training, simulator training, and
12 what I've been doing in a Dash-8 for 17½ years.

13 Q. Okay. Did they -- but that was -- you wanted to come -- when
14 you decided to come, you thought you'd be involved in training --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- not just a line pilot.

17 A. Right.

18 Q. Okay, okay. Do you know Deke Abbott?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did you work with him previously or under him when you were
21 at another Ravn position? Was he ever someone you had dealings
22 with?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Do you remember what his position was?

25 A. He's COO. President.

1 Q. At --

2 A. Ravn.

3 Q. -- Ravn? And that's when you were working there?

4 A. Um-hmm.

5 Q. Okay.

6 MR. CAMPBELL: I'm sorry --

7 MR. WELLS: Yes. Yes.

8 MR. CAMPBELL: -- you have to say yes for the court reporter.
9 Sorry, yeah.

10 MR. WELLS: Yes, I'm sorry. Sorry. Yes. I forgot
11 because --

12 MR. FRANTZ: Was he influential, or did he have any input in
13 your decision to come to PenAir and --

14 MR. WELLS: I'm sure he did. He was the president. I don't
15 know exactly what his conversation with Crystal, between them,
16 were.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Did you have any conversation with him about
18 coming to PenAir?

19 MR. WELLS: When everything was already put in motion and I
20 was coming over, yes, I did.

21 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Okay, thanks. I think that's all I have.

22 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay, thanks, Marvin. Brandon?

23 BY MR. WILSON:

24 Q. Who were your check airmen again for your OE?

25 A. Dennis Fisher, Dennis Fisher and Hakala. Hakala was with me

1 during the FAA observation.

2 Q. Who signed you off of OE?

3 A. Who signed me off of OE? I believe had to be Hakala, because
4 I had to have the observation.

5 Q. And who signed you off for Dutch Harbor?

6 A. That'd be Dennis.

7 Q. Did you ever fly to Dutch Harbor prior to 100 hours without a
8 check airman?

9 A. Not that I recall. No. I don't believe so.

10 Q. Okay.

11 MR. WILSON: That's all I have for now.

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay, thanks, Brandon.

13 MR. FISCHER: Thanks.

14 BY MR. FISCHER:

15 Q. Paul, you know I don't know anything about your history or
16 how you -- you know, you're a, you're a high-time pilot, and how
17 you got to be there. Would you mind giving us a rundown on how
18 you started flying in Alaska and who you worked for?

19 A. Well, starting from the time we came up to Alaska, originally
20 I came up with my future in-laws at that time. And Donna and I
21 did some construction work while I was waiting to get a flying job
22 with Era, 1988. Era Aviation. And got on flying with them in
23 '89, first part of '89. I was -- went through their -- to their
24 ground school.

25 And then in December 1990, I got checked out in the Dash-8 as

1 a co-pilot, and had been in the Dash-8 from 1990 till 2012. June
2 of 2012. And then I was a check airman in the aircraft ground
3 school, systems trainer. And taught a number of people, giving
4 check rides myself to a whole bunch of folks over the years.

5 And then I had a brief retirement out of choice, because a
6 friend of mine was ill. And then came back out of retirement. I
7 was asked to come back to do -- get back in the Dash-8 and teach.
8 And that's what I was supposed to be doing, is teaching Dash-8,
9 flying here and there, and systems training.

10 And then few years went by flying the Dash-8 that never --
11 and the training in the Dash-8 never occurred. Company's
12 decisions. You know, that's what they do. And then they offered
13 me the position in the Saab. And so that's where we're at.

14 Q. Okay. So you went through the transition from -- I think it
15 was called Era.

16 A. Era. Era Aviation to Air Alaska, you know. From Air Alaska
17 to Ravn to Ravn Alaska, and then I've been here -- and you know,
18 and now it's going to be Ravn again. So it's all going to merge
19 together.

20 Q. Okay. So at Era and Ravn Alaska, you didn't hold any
21 management positions?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You did.

24 A. No. Era.

25 Q. At Era?

1 A. Now Ravn is different than --

2 Q. Right, right.

3 A. After it came back, it, you know, was Ravn. Yes, I did. And
4 that was -- initially, it was the director of flight operations
5 training. It was a position they created to hold me till I could
6 get trained in the sim and all that. Do the sim training.

7 Q. Okay, so you -- in doing that, you were teaching ground
8 school.

9 A. Yes. Yeah. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay. When you, when you were coming over to PenAir, did you
11 expect to be flying the line and doing the director of training
12 job at the same time?

13 A. I understood that that was going to be part of it, but it was
14 going to be -- once I got X amount of hours, then it would be
15 drastically reduced so I could complete those duties.

16 Q. Okay. And for that director of training job, did you -- you
17 know, you said Crystal talked to you, but did other PenAir
18 management get involved in that decision, such as --

19 A. I'm sure they did, but some of them I didn't talk to.

20 Q. Yeah. Did you talk to the director of operations, or have
21 you interfaced with Mr. Harding?

22 A. Oh, yes.

23 Q. Yeah?

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. About that position?

1 A. Not at the time, no.

2 Q. No? Okay.

3 A. No.

4 Q. When you, when you were going through training for the Saab
5 2000, was Justin your stick buddy when you were in training, or
6 did you go through the simulator training with Justin?

7 A. No. Oh, Justin. Justin Lunn. Yes. He was in class with
8 me, the initial ground school, but not -- he was not my sim
9 partner.

10 Q. Yeah, he was -- okay. Okay. Can you, can you articulate
11 some of the differences between the Dash-8 and the Saab 2000? You
12 know, that jump out, that jump out at you?

13 A. Holy -- oh, yeah. Well, the Dash-8 is extremely highly
14 maneuverable airplane. It's a lot slower and you can cruise. It
15 can fly a lot slower in the final. It can take off -- I mean,
16 it's an extremely maneuverable aircraft. It's basically based off
17 a STOL airplane, the Dash-7. So it's got very high performance,
18 short takeoff and landing airplane.

19 You know, and then the Saab is a high-speed airplane. It's
20 more of your airliner type, but still has great performance. You
21 know, the plane has a great performance at cruise. It's a --
22 they're both really good airplanes for what they do. They're
23 great airplanes. But I mean, I have a preference -- for
24 20-something years, I have a preference to the Dash. It has
25 nothing to do with the Saab being different.

1 I mean, I'm sure over time, I'd love the Saab just as much.
2 And I did. I actually love flying the Saab. The Saab's a great
3 airplane, you know. It's just a matter of, you know, what you're
4 attached to. I was really -- you know, like I said, I have a firm
5 attachment to the Dash-8 for 28 years. I do have a bias.

6 Q. I see. You have talked a little bit about the approach into
7 Dutch. What approach were you cleared for?

8 A. RNAV 1-3.

9 Q. Okay. And you've done that approach quite a few times
10 before. So once you're inside and you're following the track
11 around to the runway, what's your understanding of executing a
12 missed approach once you're inside the front door there?

13 A. Well, once you're passed the missed approach point? Is that
14 what you're saying?

15 Q. Yes. Yes. Yes, that's what I'm saying.

16 A. Okay. Well, you're on your own at that point. I mean, and
17 you're avoiding terrain and everything else. I mean, there is no,
18 there is no set, this is how you get out of jail card there. So
19 you do, you do it as safely as possible. You just go out the back
20 door, maintain your separation from terrain and everything else.
21 If it's clear and you're still on the approach, you can do a
22 visual approach back in, if you balk the landing or decided to go
23 around. There's nothing saying you cannot do or continue another
24 approach.

25 Q. Okay, but I guess --

1 A. It's still part of the same approach. You're just
2 reestablishing yourself.

3 Q. So to run that back to you, when you decide that you're going
4 to get out of there, this isn't working out for whatever reason,
5 you have to proceed visually back to the missed approach point?

6 A. If you're passed the missed approach point, absolutely.

7 Q. Okay. So once you're, once you're inside --

8 A. If you've determined that it's not safe to land the airplane.

9 Q. Okay. Yeah, for whatever reason. So once you're, once
10 you're inside and you're maneuvering for 1-3, and say you decide
11 1-3 is not the right runway.

12 A. Then you're missed.

13 Q. You're free -- are you free to maneuver for 3-1?

14 A. There is nothing saying you can't, because --

15 Q. Nothing saying you can't.

16 A. Yeah. There's nothing saying you can't.

17 Q. Okay. You know, I've talked to some other --

18 A. Because it's a visual procedure.

19 Q. It's a visual procedure. Okay. Had you ever done that
20 before?

21 A. What?

22 Q. In your, in your experience in the Dash-8 and the Saab 2000,
23 had you done the, say, RNAV 1-3 and maneuvered for 3-1?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. And the opposite. You've done the RNAV 3-1 and you

1 end up maneuvering for 1-3?

2 A. Most of the time, when you accept the 3-1 approach, you're
3 going into 3-1. There's an extreme reason for it.

4 Q. Okay. One other scenario. You're maneuvering for 1-3 and
5 you decide 1-3 is not right, and you want to, you want to take
6 another look at it. You want to -- instead of going out the back
7 door, as they say, have you ever made the right turn?

8 A. The right turn is tight on turning in an airplane. It's
9 preferable not to do that. If you can visually maneuver around
10 Ballyhoo, that is the safest course of action.

11 Q. All right. How about your -- you've done the RNAV 1-3 and
12 you decide you're going to land 3-1. Do you ever maneuver over
13 Standard Oil Hill there rather --

14 A. I'm sorry, say that one more time.

15 Q. Rather than going out the back door doing a course reversal
16 for 3-1, have you ever stayed inside and flown over the town?

17 A. If I, if I can avoid doing that, I will, because too much
18 terrain too near the aircraft. It'll set off your terrain
19 warnings.

20 Q. Okay. So you haven't done that.

21 A. I won't do it if I can avoid it, and I haven't had to.

22 Q. Okay. All right.

23 MR. FISCHER: Well, that's all I have for now.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay, thanks, Tony. Appreciate that. So we
25 were going to start the second round of questions. But before we

1 start, do you need a break or anything?

2 MR. WELLS: Can I take a little break, if that's all right?

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah, that's fine. Yeah.

4 MR. WELLS: I'm sorry.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: No, that's fine.

6 MR. WELLS: Is the recorder still on, or can I say

7 something --

8 COURT REPORTER: We can, we can go off-record.

9 DR. SILVA: Let's go off.

10 COURT REPORTER: Off-record.

11 (Off the record at 11:14 a.m.)

12 (On the record at 11:22 a.m.)

13 COURT REPORTER: On the record at 11:22.

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, thanks, Paul. We'll start the
15 second line of questions.

16 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

17 Q. So how -- since the accident, have you had a chance to speak
18 with Deke Abbott or Crystal?

19 A. Deke. Yes. Prior to -- the last time I had -- well, I did
20 ask him a question. I can't remember what the phone call was, to
21 be honest with you. It was just -- hold on. I'm trying to think.
22 Pause for one second. I'm thinking. I know we talked after the
23 accident when I got back here. Just, I think just prior to the
24 initial interview.

25 And he was going to tell me this is how things are going,

1 this is how this works. He was just guiding me on -- like,
2 because this is, of course, something new for me. And along with
3 Morgan. And this is, like, this is how this is going to go. The
4 people are going to come in. This is going to be this process.

5 After that, I can't remember -- it was, it was when they were
6 setting up my counsel, which I would like to mention that I do
7 have my own counsel also and provide you with her information.
8 Kathy Yodice. So if you need to set up another meeting with me or
9 something of that sort and you talk to somebody, you can talk to
10 her, and she'll -- okay. You know, and then that was pretty much
11 it. They provided me with counsel and things of that sort.

12 Q. Okay. And Crystal? Any conversations with Crystal?

13 A. Crystal. Nothing more than what we had at our initial
14 interview. That's all I can -- well, and then I -- and then when
15 she said she had resigned her position, and that she was just
16 informing me that she had resigned her position. Sad.

17 Q. Did she tell you why she resigned?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Did you -- do you have any -- are you still working in the
20 merger between PenAir and Ravn Air? Anything with the merger?

21 A. I'm not doing anything with it now. Since this has happened,
22 I've -- I'm basically isolated.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right, thanks, Paul. Sathya?

24 BY DR. SILVA:

25 Q. Do you know about how much time you have in the left seat

1 total?

2 A. Of what?

3 Q. Any aircraft. Captain.

4 A. Holy mackerel.

5 Q. Estimate is fine.

6 A. Roughly 11,500, just off the top of my head, not including
7 the simulator training and all that.

8 Q. Was it 10,500?

9 A. 11,000. Somewhere in that area.

10 Q. 11,000. Okay.

11 A. Possibly. That's just a guess off the -- right.

12 Q. Have you ever taken any sort of captain leadership training?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Where was that?

15 A. Ravn.

16 Q. Okay. What did that look like?

17 A. They had leadership training personnel come in and teach a
18 course for leadership training. CRM. Cockpit resource
19 management. That kind of stuff.

20 Q. So before the accident, can you, can you walk through -- I
21 know Marvin asked this a different way, but what was your
22 interaction with Deke when you were here at PenAir?

23 A. Interaction with Deke. Not much. Not much at all. There
24 was -- I will say there was one concern, and that was my fault
25 because I tend to -- when I see something I don't like, I'll speak

1 up directly. And I went around Deke and he got a little upset at
2 me, so --

3 Q. Can you describe the situation?

4 A. Co-pilot had a concern that something wasn't right, and he's
5 thinking that he was going to get called on the carpet for
6 something. And I said, well, file a safety report. And he did.
7 And then the -- it wasn't my co-pilot. It was just, since I was
8 in a training role over there, people confided in me and stuff.
9 So, well, just do that. And everything was going to be fine. He
10 just assumed that he was in a lot of trouble and he wasn't.

11 But it sounded like the situation was something that would
12 lead to pilots not wanting to speak up in the future, so I thought
13 it was something that could -- and Dave Pflieger was a great CEO.
14 He said, if you ever have a concern that something's really bad,
15 then I want your opinion on it; come to me directly. And I did
16 that. And he -- it went from me to Dave directly when there was
17 that concern. And Dave met that concern right immediately and
18 said that this -- you know, he went right to Deke, and Deke got a
19 little upset because I went directly to Dave.

20 And that was the only thing. And I -- and there was a --
21 it's just one of those.

22 Q. When was that?

23 A. Over a year and a half, 2 years ago.

24 Q. Yeah. What was Deke's response?

25 A. He just said, you know, a heads up would have been nice,

1 pretty much. And he's right. He is right. I should have just
2 went directly to him. I was wrong in that case. I was wrong.
3 But Dave handled it very well, and he went directly to Deke and
4 said, this isn't going to happen. You know, we're going to
5 address these safety concerns immediately, especially when it's
6 something like this. He always has.

7 Q. Have you been present at any of the pilot meetings they've
8 had here at PenAir?

9 A. At PenAir?

10 Q. Yeah, with PenAir.

11 A. A couple. Most of the time, I was either flying or working,
12 so -- or on vacation.

13 Q. Yeah. Were you aware of any -- yes.

14 A. Yeah. No, no. You're right. Go ahead.

15 Q. Were you aware of any changes that were being discussed
16 regarding airport qualifications?

17 A. No. It wasn't an airport qualification, like, for a special
18 airport. There was -- it was a -- they had a concern about
19 approach procedures and departure procedures out of Anchorage and
20 the tower here. Had nothing to do with anything with this
21 accident, but they brought up some stuff at a meeting and asked if
22 I had any concerns. I said, yes, I have concerns.

23 Q. How were those received?

24 A. Very well, actually. Yeah. Because the tower was no longer
25 informing us of a special procedure and giving us a clearance that

1 you could easily have gone the wrong way as far as altitude
2 restrictions. And then the tower and those people worked it out
3 with our management, and everything got solved and everybody's
4 safe. So it's good.

5 Q. Could you walk through -- I know you mentioned that you use
6 Dutch Weather coming in. Can you walk through why there's a --
7 why you have a preference to use Dutch Weather over the AWOS?

8 A. Because that weather changes from one end of the airport to
9 the other. Having eyes on the ground, there's no substitute.

10 Q. Can you go into a little more detail about what they provide
11 versus what Dutch Weather can provide?

12 A. They should -- what they should provide and what they do
13 provide are two different things sometimes. But in most cases, in
14 most cases, when you have a weather observer on the ground, they
15 should be informing you of changes as they occur. Changes in what
16 they've told you or changes as they occur.

17 You would -- from history, from a history standpoint, not
18 this incident, previously going in the Dash when the lady -- I
19 think her first name was Connie. But you would go in there, and
20 she would tell you if there's birds crossing the threshold,
21 there's this -- everything you needed to know as you're coming
22 around that approach, you were made very aware of it. And if it
23 was something she didn't think you should be in there for, she'd
24 tell you, don't even try it.

25 Q. Did you ever have any concerns about the integrity of the

1 weather coming from the AWOS compared to what information Dutch
2 Weather had?

3 A. It depends on the airport and where that AWOS is located,
4 yes.

5 Q. In Dutch Harbor.

6 A. Okay. Yes. Dutch Harbor. Yeah.

7 Q. Do you have -- did you have concerns about the AWOS?

8 A. Because yeah, again, the wind on both ends of that airport.
9 You know, you only have one AWOS, but winds could be changing from
10 this threshold to this threshold. There's times, and people can
11 tell you, that from their aspect, that sometimes those windsocks
12 can point at each other. You know, the winds could do this. So
13 which one's right, you know? So that's where you have to observe
14 what you're seeing and evaluate what you're seeing also as you
15 come around that approach.

16 Q. Okay. So when you were going through the special airports
17 training qualification, was your understanding was that the
18 process that you were going through was a standard process that
19 PenAir had been conducting?

20 A. It was my understanding, yes.

21 Q. Did you get any indication that there could have been an
22 exception made for you?

23 A. Not a great -- not a big exception. I knew that they weren't
24 going to the maximum 300 hours. I knew that they were reducing
25 the 300-hour one for sure. Yes. I did know that. That's what I

1 did know.

2 Q. So was it your impression that you would be -- you would fall
3 into that 100-hour waiver to the 300 hours or --

4 A. It was -- yeah. It would have to have been, because
5 that's -- yeah.

6 Q. And can you walk me through how you make a decision in terms
7 of what flap setting to use coming into an airport?

8 A. It depends on characteristics of the aircraft versus wind
9 conditions, weight, aircraft weight, everything. Yeah.

10 Q. So coming into Dutch Harbor that day, do you recall what
11 factors you were, you were thinking about in terms of flap usage?

12 A. The gusty winds. And most planes and full-flap landings,
13 including a Dash-8, as they get into ground effect, will tend to
14 float if you do a full-flap landing.

15 And it's a little more difficult to pinpoint your spot and
16 landing in -- at a landing spot. And you could run into an issue
17 of a balloon, and you don't want a balloon. That's the last place
18 you want a balloon. There's a few airports like that in the
19 state, so --

20 Q. How does the use of flaps 20 versus flaps 35 affect your
21 landing performance?

22 A. It's not that -- in the Saab, it's not that -- there is not
23 that much performance difference.

24 Q. Can you give me an order of magnitude?

25 A. Maybe you might have -- roll an extra 150 feet. Maybe.

1 Yeah, that's my guess offhand. That's just off the top of my
2 head.

3 Q. Do you recall if you did landing performance for flaps 20?

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. Okay.

6 DR. SILVA: Okay, that's all I had.

7 MR. WELLS: Okay.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya. Marvin.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Just a couple ones.

10 BY MR. FRANTZ:

11 Q. Prior to PenAir, how experienced would you say you were with
12 Dutch Harbor specifically, going into and out of Dutch Harbor?

13 A. Fairly experienced. You know, you go -- we get charters off
14 and on over the years, over the -- in and out of there. So you'd
15 have -- it was more recently than in the very far past. We had --
16 you know, the more we got, the bigger the airline got on the Ravn
17 side, then you'd start picking up a charter more here, a charter
18 here, charter there. I think even within -- prior to the last
19 month of me making the switch over, I'd been into Dutch in the
20 Dash-8, so --

21 Q. At Ravn, was there a special airport -- or special training
22 required for special airports like Dutch Harbor? Did you -- was
23 there --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- a signoff or a process you went through?

1 A. Yeah, it was pictorial, and you had a thing in the -- in your
2 ground schools that gave you a pictorial and assessment of the
3 airport and everything around it. So pictorial assessment of the
4 airport.

5 Q. Okay. And so you were a high-time person most of your time
6 there. But for new captains at Ravn when you were there flying
7 the Dash, was there any restriction on them? Was there any hour
8 requirement or other requirements for them to be able to get
9 qualified to fly to a special airport like Dutch Harbor?

10 A. Other than being there within the last 24 -- 12 months.

11 Q. The FAA's requirement?

12 A. The FAA requirements is what --

13 Q. But Ravn didn't have any requirements that you know of for
14 Dutch Harbor.

15 A. They had no other requirements at all.

16 Q. PIC.

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Okay. And in your, in your time at PenAir, have you ever
19 experienced or do you have any knowledge if anyone experienced any
20 apprehension about making a safety report and/or turning down a
21 flight because fear of any kind of repercussions or counseling or
22 anything like that?

23 A. Say that one more time.

24 Q. In your time at PenAir, have you ever, have you ever
25 experienced or do you know of anyone who's experienced fear of,

1 say, turning down a flight? They might not want to turn down a
2 flight because they're afraid they would get counseled or they
3 could get in trouble with the management? Was that an issue that
4 you've ever been aware of or encountered yourself at PenAir?

5 A. No. I have not seen that at all. Not at, not at PenAir.
6 Now in the distant past at Ravn, in the old days, a whole
7 different story. But that changed really fast when they went to
8 the just culture. Then everybody just said we're good to go.
9 Yeah, you know, we can cancel a flight for any reason.

10 Q. And how long ago -- when did that happen at Ravn? Do you
11 know?

12 A. Oh my gosh, that was years ago. I can't recall a specific
13 date. But no, they tightened up so much with safety there that it
14 was, it was an impressive thing. And even from when I retired and
15 when I came back, they really -- see, I'll even give credit to a
16 guy here, a Bill Kolstad, who, I mean, really did some amazing
17 work with safety and the just culture stuff.

18 Q. Okay. And was it your impression that the same culture was
19 carrying over to the --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- PenAir during the acquisition or merger between PenAir and
22 Ravn?

23 A. Absolutely. Yeah. Yeah.

24 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, that's all I have.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah, thanks, Marvin.

1 Okay, Brandon.

2 BY MR. WILSON:

3 Q. Paul, can you walk me through the process of exchanging
4 flight controls?

5 A. Exchanging flight controls. Yeah, at any point, at any time
6 -- we do have standard areas where we do split controls,
7 basically, and where the co-pilot takes what's called uppers and
8 then I take bottoms. Tops, bottoms. So I move the bottoms. The
9 bottoms are -- I've got rudders, throttles, and nose wheel
10 steering. He operates, when he has the controls, the yoke, okay?

11 And that's normally on landing or just prior to takeoff. And
12 then there's a transition period where now I've got the controls
13 or the flying pilot has the controls, as they call it. Now they
14 have pretty much control of the aircraft completely.

15 In flight, now in flight, we'll have times where we will say
16 we are changing controls, or you have the controls as somebody's
17 briefing an approach, okay? So, for example --

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dujuan.

19 MR. WELLS: -- Dujuan here is next to me. Dujuan is here.
20 And I'm flying the airplane, but I'm going to be shooting the
21 approach. Either I'm going to brief it, and if I'm going to brief
22 it, I'm the one that's the flying pilot. I will say, you have the
23 controls. So somebody is always monitoring that aircraft. So as
24 I say, you have the controls, and he'll be looking at his screen.
25 He has the controls.

1 DR. SEVILLIAN: I have the controls.

2 MR. WELLS: Then I'll brief the approach. Once I'm done
3 briefing the approach and speed and everything else, then I'll
4 say, I have controls again. And then, you know, he -- I said, I
5 have controls, and he'll acknowledge that I have the controls
6 again. And then I'm monitoring the plane again. And that's --
7 those are the two times that are distinct that we will transfer
8 control or split controls.

9 BY MR. WILSON:

10 Q. Are there any other situations where you might --

11 A. Emergency situations. Yeah. But that's, again, dependent on
12 the situation.

13 Q. Would there ever be a situation where maybe you're hand-
14 flying the airplane and the other pilot is manipulating any other
15 of the controls?

16 A. Absolutely. Yeah. The nonflying pilot has his nonflying
17 pilot duties, such as selecting things that you call for. And
18 he'll be manipulating buttons and putting in speeds or something
19 of that sort while you're flying the aircraft.

20 Your job is to maintain the path of that aircraft the whole
21 time. And if he's assisting in that, he'll be manipulating other
22 parts of the aircraft. That's part of a dual crew operation.
23 Yeah.

24 Q. As far as this meeting that's been brought up, was there
25 anything other than the new departure procedures out of Anchorage

1 that was brought up --

2 A. At this, at this meeting?

3 Q. -- during the meeting that was asked about for August? The
4 pilot meeting?

5 A. The one that I'm recalling was due to the ATC changes and
6 procedures out of Anchorage. That was the only meeting I remember
7 where I spoke up and said -- well, there might have been
8 something, now that you recall. But I mean, it was like, just
9 airports in general, in general. They weren't talking, I don't
10 think, at the point I interjected --

11 And I did talk to Deke. Sorry. Now that you refresh my
12 memory. And he was receptive, very receptive. They were saying
13 that, well, these are maximum components of winds for these
14 airports and so on and so forth, and that if the aircraft is
15 capable, you know, for this wind and this wind, then the pilot
16 should be capable of landing the airplane with those winds.

17 And I told him, well, pilots should be able to evaluate
18 whether they're capable of handling the winds or not, period. It
19 shouldn't be a chart that tells them whether they're capable.
20 They should be able to determine that themselves.

21 And that's where I had a little interaction there in one of
22 those meetings, and I spoke up because I believe that a pilot, a
23 pilot could be having a bad day and say, I'm not up for a 40-knot
24 or 36-knot crosswind today; I'm just not up for it. I can handle
25 maybe a 10 or 20, but not a 40- or 36-knot crosswind. That should

1 be a pilot determination of his capabilities at that point in time
2 and his experience, whether he feels he's capable. That shouldn't
3 be a chart telling him he's not capable. You know, oh, you're
4 capable because the chart says you're capable is not a correct
5 assessment in my view.

6 And they were very receptive at that meeting for that -- I
7 don't think they did -- I remember that. Somebody had mentioned
8 that, and I think it was something that -- and that was Deke, the
9 one that had brought it up. And I said I disagree with that. I
10 disagree with that statement.

11 MR. WILSON: Okay. That's all I have for now.

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah. Thanks, Brandon. Tony.

13 BY MR. FISCHER:

14 Q. Paul, did -- what flaps did you select?

15 A. 20.

16 Q. 20?

17 A. Um-hmm.

18 Q. Okay. Did you, did you float or balloon down the runway at
19 all?

20 A. No. No.

21 Q. You hit your touchdown point.

22 A. I was aiming for a spot, and I was going to hit it.

23 Q. And what was that?

24 A. The touchdown zone. The 1,000-foot mark.

25 Q. The 1,000-foot mark?

1 A. Um-hmm.

2 Q. Okay. You know, I noticed when you and Justin exited the
3 aircraft, you got -- you did an emergency evacuation, right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. I noticed the iPads were not in their holders. Did
6 you take -- did you guys take those with you? I'm assuming you
7 must have.

8 A. Well, one of the last things that is that we do is we've got
9 the logbook, and I grab iPads for information. I need -- that
10 contains all the company information, my contact information and
11 things that I need to contact people. So I do grab that so I can
12 get a hold of the people I need to get a hold of.

13 Q. So did you guys take the flight can out of the --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. All right. You know, there was a Stratus handheld
16 device found in the --

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. -- found on the flight deck.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you're familiar with what those are and --

21 A. Um-hmm.

22 Q. Yeah. What was it, what was it used for?

23 A. Supplemental information. Just looking at it.

24 Q. Okay. And what kind of information was it giving you?

25 A. Not very good information. Just general weather. Doesn't

1 get good reception in the plane. They were looking at getting it
2 approved, and we knew that was in the process of being approved.
3 But yeah. We really didn't use it for anything that we were
4 making a determination on that flight on.

5 Q. I see. So Paul, I wasn't privy to a lot of the things that
6 went on at your first interview at all. But how do you think, how
7 do you -- why do you think you guys ended up where you ended up?

8 A. Well, it's my opinion.

9 Q. Okay, that's what I'm looking for.

10 A. And this is just from what I felt, so it's just an opinion.
11 As I told them in the initial, and what I felt is that we came in
12 -- the reason I did my initial missed and go-around was because I
13 reached up, got unstable. It was not a stable profiled approach.
14 Did what I'm supposed to do. It's not stable, not good. Co-pilot
15 says it's not good. Just go around. Yeah, I agree, go around.
16 Then I came around and did another visual. And this one was
17 stable. We were on iPad glideslope speed coming in.

18 So we touched down, touched the -- you know, boom, hit the
19 touchdown, get the nose down, get to reverse, then start applying
20 brakes normally. At that point, everything was fine. Slowing
21 down normally. Looked like we were just going to stop. Normal
22 Dutch landing. Okay? I did things I'm aware of now that I won't
23 mention because it wasn't in the first one, but I'm telling you
24 what I believe I remember telling them on the first interview.

25 I believe at some point, braking ceased to exist at all. I

1 mean, I was in -- I went to max reverse. I went to max braking.
2 Plane was slowing, but not slowing at a rate that was normal
3 anymore, okay? What I believe was nil braking, okay? Zero
4 braking.

5 Knowing what I know now and what I found out not too long
6 after the accident is that there had been hail at the airport that
7 had fallen on the airport. And it -- when I saw that, it came
8 back to me because I'd been on nil braking in the Dash a number of
9 times, and that's what it felt like. Exactly like nil braking on
10 ice. There's no tugging left or right. There was no anti-skid
11 brake chatter at all. It was just sliding straight, okay?

12 And now I didn't have enough speed to take off. So I was
13 trying to get the aircraft stopped any way I could, and that
14 wasn't happening. It was slowing at a very slow rate. Coming up
15 onto the end of the runway, look at cars left, water straight
16 ahead, road to the right. I'm starting to turn right as the co-
17 pilot says, go right. The road, the road. I'm going, you know.
18 I'm trying to get the thing to go to the right.

19 And it started skidding, and I -- at that point, eventually
20 we got moving that direction. And I realized it was really hard
21 now. At one point, it was really hard to try and stay on the
22 airport -- or try and get on that road. And I was trying, still
23 trying to get it stopped even though we went down the road. And
24 as we're coming up onto that bank, I thought -- I think maybe we
25 were probably -- my guess, best guess, is probably at the bank we

1 were maybe doing 5 knots, 6 knots as we tipped over. That's my
2 best guess.

3 But I believe that what occurred is a situation changed from
4 the time we got our braking action report and weather from the
5 lady on our initial report. There was a change in that weather
6 from the -- and the condition of that runway prior to us landing
7 that we weren't made aware of. That's what I think caused it.
8 That's my opinion.

9 Even if we had -- which I do know now that there was a blown
10 tire. But even with the blown tire, I believe that airplane had
11 the performance to stop if that runway was -- braking action could
12 do it. Because that's what I was told.

13 Q. Did you, did you think at one point that you were going to be
14 able to turn into the ramp?

15 A. I was looking at it, but it was sliding. And I might have
16 tried to try it, but it wasn't going to make. We were at that
17 point maybe -- my best guess on speed, best guessing, and this is
18 just a guess, ground speed-wise. By the time I was coming up on
19 that taxiway, I was maybe at 35 knots. Best guess.

20 And there's no taking off at that point. There was no --
21 there was a brief, like I told them initially in the initial
22 interview, there was a brief thought of, hey, can I just cut off
23 the power and take off? There was no way at that point that we
24 realized that we weren't coming to a stop that we would have made
25 it. We would have -- we would not have made it. And so that

1 didn't -- that never came to fruition. It just -- at that point,
2 it was a decision to stay on the ground and try and stop that
3 aircraft.

4 MR. FISCHER: Okay, thank you.

5 MR. WELLS: You're welcome.

6 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Tony. Okay. So that was the second
7 round of questions. Marvin, you have something else?

8 MR. FRANTZ: Oh, I'm sorry. Is there going to be another
9 round?

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: We can -- go ahead.

11 BY MR. FRANTZ:

12 Q. No, I just -- you brought up the meeting with Deke, or the
13 pilot meeting that he was at, and somebody brought up -- was
14 talking about the wind charts? That was the issue that was being
15 discussed?

16 A. There was an issue back then, and it was the wind charts.
17 The ones that are put out by the Medallion Foundation, we use to
18 base our decision making.

19 Q. Yeah. What was it called? Wind -- what do you call those
20 things?

21 A. Yeah, the wind --

22 Q. Each airport has their --

23 A. Wind charts. We call them wind charts.

24 Q. Yeah. So the discussion, what was the nature of the
25 discussion about it? Why was that even being talked about?

1 A. Yeah, why. At one point, Deke had the opinion that, you
2 know, well, it's the -- the chart says you can do it. The
3 limitations of the aircraft can do it. The pilot should be
4 capable of doing it. And well, yeah, that can -- but that can
5 vary.

6 Q. Did he state that at the meeting with the pilots or --

7 A. I don't remember if he stated it quite that way. But it was
8 -- that was my assumption as what he was trying to say. So I just
9 wanted to clarify that I didn't agree with it. And I think that
10 that came up, and I believe that later on they said, yeah, you're
11 right. You know, it should be a determination of whether it's
12 safe to do, and that's the pilot feels he's capable at that point
13 in time, considering other conditions.

14 Q. Okay. What was the -- was there a sense of yes/no from the
15 pilot group in general about Deke's idea or Deke's position about
16 wind charts?

17 A. In general, anybody who's been at one of these meetings can
18 tell you that, a lot of times when you have management in a
19 meeting and there's a bunch of people and your peers around,
20 people are a little apprehensive to speak up. It's like when you
21 guys have been in meetings and somebody said, so anybody have
22 anything to say? You know you have something to say and you just
23 don't say it? Well, that tends to happen at meetings. I'm
24 probably one of the few people who actually will speak up. So
25 it's just my history.

1 I just, I mean, you know, the goals, the goals here, and I
2 know the goals of the management and the people that work here, is
3 safety. We don't -- you know, we want to keep people safe. A lot
4 of these are our families and friends that travel on us all the
5 time, and it's -- they want to be safe. They do.

6 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. That's all I had. Thank you, Paul.

7 MR. WELLS: Yeah.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: Sathya, anything else?

9 DR. SILVA: I'm fine.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. So that concludes the second round of
11 questions. Is there anything that we haven't asked you that we
12 should have asked you?

13 MR. WELLS: No, I can't think of anything offhand.

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Is there anyone else that you think we
15 should speak with?

16 MR. WELLS: I don't know who you've spoken with, so I can't
17 honestly say.

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right, so with that being said,
19 that concludes the interview.

20 MR. WELLS: Okay.

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: And thanks for coming back and talking with
22 us.

23 MR. WELLS: Okay. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you.

24 (Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Paul Wells


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 4, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Eileen Gonzalez
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 5/28/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: DANIEL LACKEY
First Officer, PenAir

PenAir Headquarters
Anchorage, Alaska

Friday,
October 25, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

ROGER YOUNG, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

DENNIS FISHER, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLP
(On behalf of Mr. Lackey)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Daniel Lackey:		
By Dr. Sevillian		5
By Mr. Frantz		13
By Dr. Silva		27
By Mr. Young		44
By Dr. Sevillian		49
By Mr. Frantz		51
By Mr. Fisher		57

I N T E R V I E W

(1:50 p.m.)

1 DR. SILVA: On the record at 1:50.

2
3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. One of the things I want to say is
4 you're the expert. You are here to help us understand, you know,
5 whether it be processes or procedure, et cetera. So I just want
6 to let you know that. So from that, we'd like to start around the
7 table. We will start with you, Marvin, just kind of introduce
8 yourself and we will go around the table.
9

10 MR. FRANTZ: I'm Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational factors
11 investigator with the NTSB.

12 DR. SILVA: I'm Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance
13 investigator with the NTSB.

14 MR. FISHER: Dennis Fisher, line pilot, check airman.

15 MR. YOUNG: Roger Young, FAA. Just to reiterate, I'm here in
16 a non-regulatory capacity, strictly here to assist with the NTSB.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. So everyone that we interview has
18 -- you know, can have a representative with them. Who would you
19 like to represent you today?

20 MR. LACKEY: I got Morgan here to represent.

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right.

22 Sathya, Marvin, have I missed anything before we get started?

23 DR. SILVA: How the interview is going to run.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. So the interviews are going to run --
25 so we will start with myself, and then we will go to Marvin and

1 Sathya, then around the room. We'll go -- first time we will go
2 around the room, and then we will do a second round for questions.

3 MR. LACKEY: Okay.

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: Just in case anyone missed anything.

5 MR. FRANTZ: And, obviously, it's not sworn testimony. It's
6 not testimony. It's just an informal interview. So it's fine to
7 say, I don't know. It's fine to change your answer later if you
8 remember something different or even after -- 2 weeks down the
9 road, if you think of something else that you wanted to let us
10 know about or change, that's fine; you can throw it back, and
11 we'll put it -- you know, we will incorporate that as we need to.
12 So that's kind of the level we are at now. Okay.

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. With that being said, anything
14 before we get started?

15 MR. LACKEY: No.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right.

17 INTERVIEW OF DANIEL LACKEY

18 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

19 Q. So can you provide your full name?

20 A. My name's Daniel Johann Lackey.

21 Q. And that's -- how do you spell the last name?

22 A. L-a-c-k-e-y.

23 Q. Okay.

24 MR. FRANTZ: How do you spell the first name?

25 MR. LACKEY: Daniel, D-a-n-i-e-l.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

2 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

3 Q. All right. And date of birth?

4 A. March 1st, 1981.

5 Q. Okay. So I want to talk a little bit about your aviation
6 background. What certificates do you hold currently?

7 A. Currently I hold a -- I received private instrument,
8 single-engine commercial, multi-engine commercial, a CFI, and I'm
9 typed in the Saab ATP and typed in a Boeing 737-NG.

10 Q. Okay. And how many, approximately, total hours do you have?

11 A. 1,900.

12 Q. Do you know how much in the Saab?

13 A. I have about 400 hours. A little over 400 hours.

14 Q. Okay. And in the 3-7?

15 A. I don't have -- I've only got simulator time in the 7-3.

16 Q. Okay. And what's your current role, position?

17 A. I'm an FO in the Saab 2000.

18 Q. Okay. And any previous jobs you had prior to PenAir?

19 A. No. No previous -- oh, previous job prior to PenAir?

20 Q. PenAir, yes.

21 A. Just aviation wise?

22 Q. Aviation wise.

23 A. I worked for Grant Air, Grant Aviation. And I worked for ACE
24 Air Cargo and Marine Military Academy as a flight -- CFI.

25 Q. Okay. And either one of those, are they 121 or 135?

1 A. Let me see. Grant aviation is 135, ACE Air is 135, and it's
2 teaching so it's different; it's Part 91.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Or Part --

5 DR. SILVA: 61?

6 MR. LACKEY: Yeah, 61. That's right. It's been a while.

7 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

8 Q. Okay. Do you fly outside of work sometimes?

9 A. Currently, no.

10 Q. Okay. All right. So I kind of want to switch a bit here
11 from the information here as far as background. Have you ever
12 flown into Dutch Harbor?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Dutch Harbor. Yeah.

15 A. I have flown into Dutch Harbor before.

16 Q. And what aircraft do you typically fly into Dutch Harbor?

17 A. Currently in the Saab 2000, as an FO.

18 Q. And when you fly into Dutch Harbor, can you walk me through
19 how you would conduct an initial approach into Dutch Harbor as FO?

20 A. As an FO? The whole process?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Okay. Usually the first thing I like to do is get -- work on
23 the weight, burned fuel, landing weight, which I get from burned
24 fuel and the total weight we took off with, takeoff weight. Then
25 I will get our V speeds and write it down in a TOLD card. After

1 that, I'm about 40 miles out of -- 60 to 40 miles out of MORDI, I
2 will pick up Dutch Weather, the official weather that's going on
3 at that time.

4 And with that information I will decide which approach we're
5 planning on or which runway we're going to land on, front door or
6 back door of 3-1 or 1-3, and make that clearance with ATC. And
7 the captain and I will decide and we'll brief on it, go through
8 the checklist usually in range descent, and then we'll execute.

9 Q. Okay. So as far as the TOLD card is concerned, do you know
10 specifically how that's used or what's on that TOLD card?

11 A. Pardon me? What do you mean by that?

12 Q. The takeoff and landing card --

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. -- is there specific information on that card that you fill
15 out?

16 A. Oh, yes. It has the -- you put in your -- oh, you're talking
17 about the speeds, right?

18 Q. Let me --

19 A. The ref speed?

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. You got plus -- you got ref speed, you got your Vt, and then
22 Vt plus 10 -- I mean ref plus 10. I'm sorry.

23 Q. Okay. You were mentioning that at 40, 60 miles out of MORDI,
24 you talk to Dutch Weather.

25 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. When -- the time you have flown into -- how many times have
2 you flown into Dutch Harbor?

3 A. Probably, like, around -- in the Saab, probably around 20
4 times or more. I'm not sure. That's a rough guesstimate.

5 Q. Okay. And when you're flying into Dutch Harbor, what types
6 of performance calculations do you do when coming into Dutch
7 Harbor?

8 A. Performance? You go through the chart that we got -- we were
9 provided by the company, because you take your landing distance
10 and all things like that. If you -- you know, by headwinds,
11 temperature, and also, you know, you got your landing speed that
12 goes with the sea level, you know. It has it all charted out for
13 you, so it's pretty easy.

14 Q. Do you know the exact name of that chart? Is it a booklet or
15 a guidance?

16 A. Oh, it's airports and (indiscernible) chart --

17 DR. SILVA: Here, I've got it open, too.

18 (Background conversation.)

19 MR. LACKEY: Oh, okay. Oh, that's right. It's in the AFM
20 2000.

21 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

22 Q. Oh, it's in the AFM?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. So you were talking about the -- you determine which runway,
25 coming in front door, back door, 1-3, 3-1. has there ever been a

1 time when you have flown into the -- choosing either one runway
2 where you've had to make a decision on the winds as far as -- is
3 it -- you know, how do I determine the winds coming into Dutch
4 Harbor? Has there ever been discussion about wind limitations --
5 A. Oh, yes. We have a wind chart. Is that what you're talking
6 about?

7 Q. Yeah, wind chart.

8 A. Yeah, for that specific airport, yeah, that gives our
9 limitation.

10 Q. Okay. Is that used often?

11 A. Oh, we look at it every time before we take off. At least my
12 experience has been most captains will go through it. It's just
13 that it's calm -- I mean that's calm, so -- but, yeah, we just
14 determine -- we try to land in headwind, you know, so --

15 Q. So you indicated to try to land in headwind. Have you ever
16 landed in a tailwind?

17 A. There, no. Usually -- it's always been a headwind in my
18 knowledge.

19 Q. Okay. Is there any other method that you get weather other
20 than Dutch Weather?

21 A. No. I usually go with Dutch Weather because they're up to
22 date. They're right there on the field, so you get the actual,
23 what's going on picture instead of something that's been, you
24 know, out for a while.

25 Q. Okay. Do you know -- so the term special airport, is that

1 ever used? Are you familiar with that?

2 A. Special airport? Yeah.

3 Q. Is Dutch Harbor considered a special airport?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. And what's the reason behind it being categorized as a
6 special airport; do you know?

7 A. Well, it's -- well, the runway length, and in a shorter
8 runway we have wind limits, limitations per that particular
9 airport, so -- and it has higher, you know, (indiscernible)
10 standards. It just -- it has more restrictions on the captain and
11 the crew that can be in a particular aircraft -- I mean the
12 airport to land.

13 Q. Are there any requirements for flying into that airport as
14 far as --

15 A. Well, I'm not sure about that because I'm an FO. So it's
16 kind of -- that's more a limitation of the captain.

17 Q. Okay. And as far as training is concerned, is there any
18 simulation training on special airports such as Dutch Harbor? Do
19 you ever go through scenarios, you know, looking at winds flying
20 into Dutch Harbor in a sim session?

21 A. Sim session going into Dutch Harbor. I don't recall.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. For particularly for Dutch Harbor, I don't recall. It's been
24 a while.

25 Q. In general, any special airports -- have you had any

1 experience in sim training for that, for special airports?

2 A. I can't recall. I think I went to Sand Point maybe. I'm not
3 exactly sure. It's been a while. I have to look through my
4 logbook for that, but -- I don't know.

5 Q. Okay. And when flying into Dutch Harbor, have you ever had
6 any discussions with the -- let's just say the captain, at any
7 times about the wind, wind direction, whether it's suitable to
8 land? Have you ever had any discussions?

9 A. Like I say, we go through the checklist. So we brief the
10 flight, so during that time we got the weather, and then we will
11 discuss it, and we'll brief what's going to happen. If it's too
12 high, that's bad, we'll turn around and divert --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. -- go to another alternate.

15 Q. So how often have you flown with Paul?

16 A. Oh, the captain?

17 Q. Yeah, the captain.

18 A. One time.

19 Q. One time. And how was that experience flying with him?

20 A. Very good. He's a very positive guy, very open. On the
21 first flight with him I actually -- this was the first time I've
22 flown with him, so I ended up telling him, hey, sir, you know,
23 I've never flown with you before, so if you see something or would
24 you like me to change something or adjust, please let me know.
25 And he said the same exact thing, if I see something that he needs

1 to change on. He was a very open guy, and I was -- just a
2 standard flight, you know. I don't know (indiscernible).

3 Q. Have you ever been in a situation where -- let me ask you
4 this. Is there a limitation as far as winds are concerned at
5 Dutch Harbor?

6 A. Yeah, the wind chart. We have an actual chart, tells you
7 what directions and everything.

8 Q. But there is a limitation for Dutch Harbor?

9 A. Yeah, it's recommended. We have a wind chart, yeah.

10 Q. Okay. As far as before you take off, is there any risk
11 assessments that you do before you line up to the runway taking
12 off?

13 A. Which airport? Here or at all times?

14 Q. All times.

15 A. Yeah. You know, we always go through the weather and NOTAMs
16 and, you know, the captain goes up to talk to dispatch and comes
17 back. So -- and then he briefs me on it.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And I do my own research like every pilot does.

20 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right. That's the questions I
21 have for right now. I'll -- Marvin.

22 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks.

23 BY MR. FRANTZ:

24 Q. Do you go by Daniel or Dan?

25 A. Dan.

1 Q. Good morning, Dan; how are you?

2 A. Good afternoon.

3 MR. LACKEY: I'm sure you guys had a long day.

4 DR. SILVA: We've been here a little while, yeah.

5 MR. FRANTZ: You caught that, good morning --

6 BY MR. FRANTZ:

7 Q. How long have you been at PenAir?

8 A. Seven months, I believe.

9 Q. So when did you get your type rating in the Saab?

10 A. I believe I received it in April or -- yeah, I believe April.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. End of April.

13 Q. Okay. So talked about briefings and you mentioned approach
14 brief, landing brief -- no, you didn't mention approach brief.
15 You mentioned descent brief, landing brief, you do these
16 briefings. Is there a published requirement in your manuals, in
17 PenAir manuals, that says these are the briefings you will
18 conduct, blah, blah, blah, and is one of them called an approach
19 briefing or is it called descent briefing; what is it?

20 A. Oh, no, not a briefing -- descent checklist. And there is
21 actually an in-range checklist, and there is an actual in-range
22 that says brief has to be completed.

23 Q. And what brief?

24 A. For the approach.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. So when you -- so what do you -- what's covered when you do
3 the approach briefing?

4 A. Well, first, you know, on the brief -- approach brief, you
5 know, that portion of it on our checklist is just for the approach
6 checklist -- you know, for the approach, for the type of approach
7 we're doing. So if we're doing GPS 3-1, you go through the actual
8 approach itself, the chart.

9 Q. So what prompts you to do all the performance stuff and the
10 review of landing data and stuff? If that's not part of the
11 approach brief, what --

12 A. Oh, why do I do that? Well, so I can -- you know, I just
13 want to be ahead of the game, right? So, you know, like I said,
14 I'll get the weather, 40 miles -- 60, 40 miles out of MORDI.
15 Before that, prior to reaching that point, I just like to, you
16 know, be ahead of the game because I don't want to be rushed in
17 that time. So I end up --

18 Q. Right.

19 A. -- getting the speed and the weight and --

20 Q. Is there a checklist item on any of your checklists that you
21 can say completed or done that validates --

22 A. Yeah, that's in-range. It's in the in-range checklist.

23 Q. And what's in the in-range checklist that makes sure you've
24 done the performance calculations? Is there something that says
25 performance or landing data checked or something like that in --

1 A. Yeah. It tells you right on there, on the in-range
2 checklist. It's not something I'm going to memorize. It's
3 listed. So you read off each one and make sure you complete it
4 and then stop.

5 Q. But one of those things is the performance or landing
6 calculation?

7 A. Yes. It has landing bugs checked and set. So --

8 Q. It has what?

9 A. It says, make sure it's bugged and set. Or I don't have
10 my --

11 Q. You're talking about minimums or approach speed?

12 A. Yeah, approach speed, your arrest speed, all that, it says
13 right on there. I don't have my checklist or I could read it off
14 for you if I did.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Want me to (indiscernible)?

16 DR. SILVA: Yeah. I mean, you can use whatever you need.

17 BY MR. FRANTZ:

18 Q. I'm just trying to find out if there's something that let's
19 both pilots know that, yep --

20 A. Yeah. It's in the in-range checklist. So it has a list of
21 items. So it has like brief (indiscernible) thing, make sure you
22 got your ATIS. I think it goes ATIS -- it goes in a certain
23 order, but I think it's ATIS for the weather. Obviously, it makes
24 sure both of us got it and heard it. There's briefing, make sure
25 we brief the approach, approach plate and bugs checked and set.

1 It's the speed's entry bugged into our FMS is set for the
2 approach. And then out speeds are set, right, for the ref speed,
3 Vt speed, and the, obviously, ref plus 10; it's all bugged. And
4 what's the next one? AP resolved. The FAA's been notified, FAA
5 notified, APR (ph.) off, and I think that's the end of the
6 checklist. Thank you, sir, appreciate it.

7 So in the in-range it says ATIS checked, right? So both
8 pilots have to verify. EFBS configured. So make sure EFB is
9 configured. So that's electronic flight (indiscernible) briefing
10 and bugs, complete and bugged; flight instrument and radios, FMS.
11 So it's right here if you want to see. In-range checklist. So it
12 makes sure you're completed with everything before you get into
13 descent.

14 Q. So briefing, you said briefing was just briefing a plate --
15 the plate briefing of the approach. Is there more than that?

16 A. Oh, any concerns or anything like that, you know, like if --
17 on the brief, hey, I'm planning on doing this. And you brief the
18 plate, but if something changes when you get further weather, you
19 know, you'll brief, yeah, if something --

20 Q. So where is my checked item to say -- to know that we have,
21 yeah, we've looked at -- done all the performance numbers to make
22 sure that we're okay to land as far as the wind and runway? What
23 I am --

24 A. So if you look at ATIS, right, that gives you the weather.

25 Q. Gives you the weather.

1 A. Okay. So that helps you determine which runway it's going to
2 be. So on the brief part you're going to set up -- your EFB is
3 going to pull up the plates, right, you're briefing bugs. So
4 that's briefing and bugs. Bugs means you bugged the speeds.

5 Q. Right.

6 A. Right? And your briefing's completed, right? So you're
7 going to talk about the approach, how you're going to do the
8 approach, what's going to happen with the approach, if you're
9 going miss and things like that. It's all in the brief and also
10 in your approach plate.

11 And then flight instruments and radios, make sure your flight
12 instruments -- so your radio, if you can see for doing ILS, VOR,
13 it's all computer there. And FMS. So FMS is the actual computer.
14 You type in what kind of approach I'm going to do, make sure
15 that's all set up.

16 So what's your question again?

17 Q. How do you know that the weight you're going to land at and
18 with the current conditions, the wind specifically at that
19 airport, that you're okay to land on that runway? How do you know
20 that?

21 A. So you got your ATIS, right?

22 Q. Okay. So I know what the wind is.

23 A. That gives you -- yeah, the wind and the temperature and
24 what's going on with the runway, okay? So what's your question?

25 Q. So how do I know if I got -- ATIS says there's a 10-knot

1 tailwind for the runway approach I want to do; how do I know I can
2 still land on the runway I want to land on with a 10-knot tailwind
3 with the weight that I'm going to land at?

4 A. At what period of time? Are you saying if -- say that you
5 choose a runway --

6 Q. Any time before you land, how do you --

7 A. Why would I choose a runway --

8 Q. All right. So you don't -- so you choose a runway --

9 A. I don't understand your question.

10 Q. The wind's calm; how do you know you can land at the weight
11 you intend to land at? Is there any limitation on runways and
12 landing weight?

13 A. Yeah, in the AFM, you can check on that. It's in our --

14 Q. Is it part of your routine every --

15 A. Oh, yes.

16 Q. -- every time?

17 A. Yeah, we check every time because we have an actual
18 limitation on the aircraft. You can't land past 48,500 pounds,
19 right? So we take our calculation of our takeoff rate, our fuel
20 burn, and that weight is going to be below that particular
21 airport.

22 Q. Right.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Is that all that matters is that your -- the weight you've
25 calculated you're going to land at is below that maximum landing

1 weight? Is that all that matters for the landing?

2 A. That's why we go through our -- oh, jeez. Look through this
3 whole thing. Just a second, sir. I apologize. Just a second.

4 Q. No, take your time.

5 A. Here's your landing performance. So you can look at it.

6 Q. Okay. So --

7 A. And then figure out from each airport what the weight and
8 the --

9 Q. Okay. So this is -- I've seen this chart. So where in the
10 flight does the -- I assume it's the non-flying pilot. Where does
11 he pull that up and look at it and say, okay, we're good, now
12 that's it's --

13 A. Oh. When I ask for, hey, what's the landing weight, right?
14 And then he will tell me what the landing weight is, and I plug it
15 in with our performance document.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And that's when we verify, you know, everything is good.
18 Because you don't want to just be like --

19 Q. Is that done before the descent or before the in-range
20 checklist? When would you do that?

21 A. Oh, yes, everything is done prior to in-range checklist.

22 Q. Everything as in this check --

23 A. Yeah, everything here, checking everything, it's done before
24 in-range.

25 Q. Okay. There's this thing called the Medallion wind chart,

1 the compass rose around different airports. Do you know what I
2 mean, for wind?

3 A. It's the wind, yeah.

4 Q. I think it's called -- is it called the wind chart?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Okay. What do you use that for?

7 A. For special airports, certain airports like Dutch Harbor. We
8 have a limitation of which direction winds come from, how much
9 wind you can have.

10 Q. And is that limitation what's on the chart on that circle
11 itself and winds in different sectors?

12 A. I just want to make sure we're talking about the same chart.

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. I want to pull it up. Just (indiscernible) --

15 MR. FISHER: Okay. When you don't have it set up, it's all
16 one big jumble of documents.

17 MR. LACKEY: Yeah. Oh, there it is. So you're talking about
18 this particular --

19 BY MR. FRANTZ:

20 Q. That one. Yeah.

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Yeah, that one. So yeah, how do you -- what do you use that
23 for? What requirements does it impose on you? And just tell me
24 what you know about it.

25 A. What do I know about it? Pretty much what I know about it

1 is, you know, you fly Unalaska, so there's a lot of hills and a
2 lot of mountains. So certain wind directions causes problems for
3 us, so we have limitation and this wind chart, especially for
4 Dutch Harbor -- here let me pull that up. That's where we're
5 talking about, that subject. Unalaska, it specifically states
6 which wind direction and how many knots you're limited to.

7 Q. Sure. All right. So if the wind is at -- in any particular
8 sector, if it's higher than the value that's on the chart for that
9 sector, does that mean you can't fly into that sector or you can't
10 fly into the airport at all?

11 A. Yeah, we won't go to the airport. We will get to a missed
12 point and then we turn around and go back, or we won't even get
13 dispatched.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. That's all I know. That's how I've been operating so far.

16 Q. Okay. So if you get dispatched you assume that everything --
17 you're okay with the limits, right?

18 A. Well, we got the current weather, what's going on there.
19 That's why we go talk to Dutch Weather. We call them up and
20 figure out what's going on at that moment.

21 Q. And if they tell you something different than what you
22 dispatched on and it exceeds --

23 A. All this limitation, yeah.

24 Q. Then you can't go and you --

25 A. No. We turn around and we go to our alternate.

1 Q. Okay. So that's something you pretty much have to look -- do
2 you look at that every time you're going into Dutch, on that
3 chart?

4 A. Yeah, I do, and the captain does, too. And usually he'll
5 brief me on it: Hey, this is what's going on; our TAF looks good
6 for that particular time.

7 Q. Okay. How did you get -- what kind of training did you have
8 on using those -- like that performance chart you just showed me,
9 when did you get -- how did you get trained on that?

10 A. Went through ground school. Our ground school covers all
11 that, and also, you know, captains are very knowledgeable here,
12 and they really helped out.

13 Q. Did you get -- or do you remember when you did your sim
14 training, did you also use those performance charts as part of the
15 sim training?

16 A. Oh, yes, in the -- yeah.

17 Q. Right. So you used those actually in the sim?

18 A. Yeah, we would pull it out --

19 Q. And verify --

20 A. -- yeah, verify stuff, yeah.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. There's a paper copy there.

23 Q. Okay. Does the Saab have any tailwind limitations?

24 A. It has a 15-knot tailwind limitation, but we don't get
25 dispatched, I'm very sure, if it has more than 10 knots.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But that's not -- I mean, also you got to go through that
3 wind chart, too, you know. So --

4 Q. Okay. Okay. Have you ever been into Dutch Harbor with a
5 tailwind? I think we might have talked about that, but do you
6 remember the times you've been in --

7 A. No, not with PenAir.

8 Q. With other operators?

9 A. It's different operators with different limitations, so --

10 Q. Okay. Did you fly much into Dutch Harbor before you got to
11 PenAir?

12 A. A little bit when I flew with ACE.

13 Q. Okay. What kind of airplane was that?

14 A. Beech 1900.

15 Q. Okay. What have you been taught and/or what's the policy of
16 PenAir about if you get a GPWS sink rate warning and you're inside
17 the outer marker -- so you're on an approach and you're on the
18 descent, but you get GPWS; do you have specific guidance on how
19 you should respond, or do you not have specific, you know, company
20 policy or procedures?

21 A. It's in our approach procedure. It's in our company manual.

22 Q. Do you know what it says?

23 A. What, the (indiscernible) corrections, usually a non-flying
24 pilot will make, hey, this is going on (indiscernible), and then
25 you make corrections.

1 Q. Okay. Not mandatory to go around?

2 A. Not in the outer marker thing.

3 Q. Okay. I mean, inside the, inside the marker?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. It's still not? Okay. Are there any rules of thumb, general
6 tribal knowledge, things that everybody knows about flying into
7 Dutch that aren't necessarily published in a manual or anything,
8 but everybody -- it's common knowledge that these are what you do
9 or don't do at Dutch Harbor?

10 A. Most captains are here for a long time, so they have their
11 own way of doing things, you know. Deeg (ph.) was telling me
12 like, hey, you pick a point on the runway; if your wheels don't
13 touch before that point, just go around. That's what they told
14 me.

15 Q. Okay. What does black water mean to you?

16 A. Just, it's a downwind force on the water, downdraft.

17 Q. Okay. Do you use that -- where and how do you use that term
18 and that observation?

19 A. Say that again.

20 Q. Where and how do you use the observation of black water? How
21 does that come into play in your flying --

22 A. Oh, you try to avoid it. You know, we go around black water.
23 We try to stay away from it.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Because it's very turbulent air and it's down force, so --

1 Q. Okay. Tell me about your simulator training at SIMCOM, and
2 what --

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Just describe it. How long were you there, what was the
5 quality of instruction, how much time did you get in the
6 simulator? Anything you can remember about your impressions,
7 general memories, evaluation.

8 A. It was about a week long. I believe I was in the sim about 6
9 days -- 6, 7 days. I can't remember exact dates. About 2-hour
10 sessions each session. To be honest, it was very knowledgeable.
11 The crew, the instructor was very -- he answered all the questions
12 that, you know, might come up. My partner was, I'd say, a
13 seasoned captain here, so he gave me a lot of feedback on how to,
14 you know, perform better. So that was actually a real plus for
15 me.

16 Q. Was he getting a type rating as well?

17 A. Oh, yes. Yeah, he was just transitioning from 340 to 2000.

18 Q. Okay. How many different instructors did you have in the
19 simulator?

20 A. Two.

21 Q. Two. Okay. Was it one of them that gave you the type rating
22 ride?

23 A. Yes. And I had one instructor all the way through and --
24 okay. Let me rephrase. I apologize. I had one instructor went
25 all the way to the last day of instructing, and then the other

1 instructor did the type rating.

2 Q. Yep.

3 A. Sorry. I apologize. I just didn't phrase that correctly.

4 Q. No, that's fine. So overall, what did you think of the
5 training, quality of the training?

6 A. For me it was pretty good. It was good. I went through all
7 -- you know, got me pretty prepared how to fly the aircraft
8 but, you know, overall good quality, in my opinion.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, I think that's it for me for now. Thanks.

10 MR. LACKEY: No problem.

11 DR. SILVA: How you doing? Do you need a break?

12 MR. LACKEY: I'm good.

13 DR. SILVA: Okay. Just let us know any time.

14 BY DR. SILVA:

15 Q. So you flew with Paul once.

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. Do you remember when that was?

18 A. It was the day before the accident.

19 Q. Okay. Can you just describe that flight for us?

20 A. It was a typical flight. Pretty easygoing. I mean, it was
21 just -- nothing special came up. It was just a flight to
22 Fairbanks. I guess Paul and I discussed what was going on in the
23 aircraft, like I had never flown with him before and comments had
24 been made where, like, he wanted me to let him know if he's doing
25 anything wrong or vice versa. Other than that, it -- you know,

1 just a -- he was really a positive dude the whole time and was
2 very -- made me feel very comfortable in the aircraft. Yeah.

3 Q. Were you pilot flying, pilot monitoring?

4 A. We switched off.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Because our first leg -- I can't remember if he flew or --
7 no, the first leg going to Fairbanks he flew. Coming back, I was
8 flying.

9 Q. How would you rate his proficiency compared to the other
10 captains you have flown with?

11 A. I think it was comparable to all captains. I mean, he's a
12 very seasoned guy.

13 Q. Uh-huh. Can you walk us through an approach into Dutch
14 Harbor as first officer? Let's say, starting at 500 feet up
15 until --

16 A. To landing?

17 Q. -- to land -- past landing, through rollout. So what are you
18 doing and what are you looking at; what are you saying?

19 A. So, I mean, there's a verbal in that. Usually -- so we get
20 to 500 feet.

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. Now we're kind of committed to what runway we're going to go
23 to. So we're -- I'm watching airspeed, and I'm telling him either
24 he's plus or minus the ref speed the whole time, telling him what
25 altitude he's at. And I'll make radio calls saying, you know,

1 what traffic we're in or coming in, and what the distance, what
2 runway we'll land at.

3 And then when the captain rolls over, I make a left bank or
4 right bank depending on the runway we're going to be landing at,
5 make sure they close the gate, and there's a call to Mobile 1:
6 Close the gate, clear the deck; got to close the gate on the road
7 and make sure the runway is clear of vehicles.

8 Q. Uh-huh.

9 A. After that, I look inside, make sure, you know, he's on speed
10 that he said he was going to fly. I'll look outside. I just want
11 to make sure there's nothing going on, no birds and traffic. Then
12 he comes to the final. I'm just constantly reading out his
13 speeds, so it is very -- you know, plus 10 or plus 5 or the ref
14 speed all the way down the touchdown.

15 And then soon as we touch down, when he pulls his power
16 levers back, we would call out beta, make sure you have beta on
17 both sides, two betas. And when he hits 80 knots, I'll just call
18 out 80 knots. Then you'll just call out, you know, he got tops.
19 That means I got the yoke. And he would steer. And after that
20 come to a stop, come off the runway. Then I will make radio calls
21 saying that we're clear out the rack, the runway, and close cancel
22 center our clearance. And he will just say, after landing
23 checklist, he'll go through the landing checklist.

24 Q. Is there a preferred runway coming into Dutch Harbor?

25 A. I believe it's always the front door is more preferable since

1 you have a bigger base to final.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. But that's all depending on winds.

4 Q. Uh-huh.

5 A. You know, we always try to land on a headwind, so --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. We always land on a headwind.

8 Q. Right. So given your experience really throughout your
9 career at Dutch Harbor, how would you describe the local
10 environment? Let's say you are teaching a new person to fly into
11 Dutch Harbor, what would you tell them about the environment?

12 A. It's not the -- on a beautiful day, beautiful calm day, it's
13 an easy airport to land at. But if it's a windy day, depending on
14 the winds, it could be a pain in the butt because the wind could,
15 you know, go each -- whatever direction it wants to. And I will
16 always talk to the weather person down there, call her -- and,
17 like, call him or her, get the current -- what's going on, current
18 situation. And it's -- it has its -- yeah, it gets a little windy
19 down there. So --

20 Q. Are there specific wind patterns that you're looking out for?

21 A. We always look for black water, make sure that's not going.
22 Obviously try to go around that. And also, you know, just a
23 headwind makes it possible really. And cone direction, windsock
24 directions.

25 Q. When was the last time you flew into Dutch Harbor?

- 1 A. Let's see. It's been 1 -- 2 weeks ago.
- 2 Q. Two weeks ago? Okay. Because you had said you had been
3 there about -- was it 20 times?
- 4 A. Twenty plus times.
- 5 Q. Since you started here?
- 6 A. Yeah. Yeah, for this company. Yeah.
- 7 Q. So how often is that, let's say, per month like?
- 8 A. Per month? Generally like -- it depends on what's going on,
9 but usually like three -- two to five times a month, three to
10 five.
- 11 Q. Okay. Now I just want to switch back to this performance
12 calculation. You were referring to a chart. What chart was that,
13 that you were showing Marvin?
- 14 A. It's the airport chart.
- 15 Q. Sorry. I know we keep going back to this guy, but use it as
16 needed.
- 17 A. Which one are you talking about? The landing performance, or
18 are you talking about --
- 19 Q. I think you mentioned, you -- there was one -- it was the
20 landing performance, right, for the airport specifically. That's
21 okay if you don't remember. I can ask you a different question.
- 22 A. You can ask a different question.
- 23 Q. Okay. That's fine.
- 24 A. Save you guys some time.
- 25 Q. So let's say -- I'm just going to give you a scenario, and

1 I'd like you to run through, in as much detail as you can, how you
2 would do that performance calculation. So keep that out.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. So let's say you are coming into Dutch --

5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. -- and you have an estimated landing weight, I'm going to say
7 about 4,500 -- 45,000.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. Right? Yeah, that's the right order of magnitude. Can you
10 kind of walk us through what charts you're looking at; what are
11 you looking for?

12 A. Okay. So much easier online.

13 Q. Yeah. That's what it sounds like.

14 A. Sorry.

15 Q. No, take your time.

16 A. It's all charted out. There it is. Okay. So I'm going to
17 go through the performance binder. All right.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And it gives you for our Vt 44, 45,000, it's going to 148 and
20 V clean plus ice is going to be 169, and our ref speed, depending
21 what flap setting you want, 20 or 35, for 45,000 weight is going
22 to be 126.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And plus ice is going to be 146.

25 Q. Uh-huh.

- 1 A. That's one way of doing it. That's -- yeah.
- 2 Q. Okay. So that's how you get the speeds. Is there more you
3 would do --
- 4 A. Do that, and then --
- 5 Q. -- to performance calculations?
- 6 A. For performance wise just for the speeds?
- 7 Q. No, not just for the speeds, in general.
- 8 A. In general. Oh.
- 9 Q. Yeah.
- 10 A. Let me go through this list just to make sure, you know,
11 what's going on with that.
- 12 Q. Okay. So what is that?
- 13 A. You get the performance charts, you want to have an idea
14 what's going on.
- 15 Q. Landing field length?
- 16 A. Yeah. Field length and landing, depending on the winds.
- 17 Q. Okay. But is that something you would typically use?
- 18 A. Depending on what runway we are going to. For me, like, you
19 know, landing in Anchorage, I typically don't.
- 20 Q. Right. But going in at Dutch Harbor, is that a chart you
21 would use?
- 22 A. I do check, yeah.
- 23 Q. Okay.
- 24 A. I do look at it.
- 25 Q. Okay. Is there a chart that you would use to make sure that

1 your weight is within limits going into Dutch Harbor?

2 A. Yeah. It's usually we're within the weights anyways going in
3 for -- landing wise for the airport, and you can check that with
4 the airport -- let me pull it out. Yeah, it tells you right here.
5 This chart -- well, let me give it to you.

6 Q. Okay. So this is the landing --

7 A. Airport landing. That's for --

8 Q. -- airport analysis.

9 A. -- particularly for Dutch Harbor, yeah.

10 Q. Okay. So can you walk -- oh, sorry. Turning it doesn't help
11 me. So in this case, let's say -- because we talked about, say
12 you have a landing weight of 45. Can you talk me through how you
13 would run that calculation? You can assume, let's say, zero wind.

14 A. Oh, zero wind. Okay. Okay, flaps right here it tells you,
15 depending on temperature, the weight limit for that particular
16 aircraft on that particular day, so you've just got to be within
17 that.

18 Q. So what's the limit there?

19 A. This one is -- let's see. Let me make sure this is correct.
20 Okay. It says 40 -- for zero winds, right?

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. It's going to be 46,653.

23 Q. Okay. And which -- are there any conditions for that number?

24 A. No conditions zero and -- for runway 1-3.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. With dry, flaps 20.

2 Q. Okay. Flaps 20?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And then if you're going flaps 35, it's going to be 48,500
6 pounds.

7 Q. Okay. So is that a chart that you would typically pull up?

8 A. Yeah, we look at it. But things -- I do look at it, but it's
9 -- what would you call it? When you pull up the numbers, you can
10 see it, so it's, like, there. Then you know you're within the
11 limit. Because when you're doing your landing weight --

12 Q. Uh-huh.

13 A. -- yeah, you're like -- usually you land there, like, at
14 44,000 sometimes.

15 Q. Okay. So you know based on the airport --

16 A. Yeah, the airport and weight limit.

17 Q. -- what you are looking at? Okay. Got it.

18 A. We do pull it up though.

19 Q. How do you decide what prop setting to use coming in?

20 A. Typically I don't really land there, but usually it's because
21 of the winds.

22 Q. Okay. So the captain makes that decision?

23 A. The captain lands there. Yeah.

24 Q. When you're flying into Dutch, have you -- do you typically
25 use 20; 35? Is there a norm?

1 A. Usually we use 35, normally.

2 Q. Okay. We talked about how you communicate between the two
3 when you do your briefs.

4 Thank you.

5 How much time do you have in Alaska? Is all of your flying
6 up here?

7 A. 1,700 hours -- no, no. I'm sorry. 1,650 probably in Alaska.

8 Q. Okay. You did a little bit down in --

9 A. Yeah, my training time was down in Florida.

10 Q. Got it. How do you like working here?

11 A. PenAir?

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. Oh, it's pretty awesome. It's really laid-back here. People
14 are good and really helpful.

15 Q. What's your favorite thing about the job?

16 A. I have to say people I work with.

17 Q. Yeah?

18 A. Yeah, they -- you know, they're good people here. It's kind
19 of rare.

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. Yeah, people you actually like working with. I came out of
22 oil and gas, so --

23 Q. Oil and gas.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Right. Okay.

1 A. I did that for 12 years.

2 Q. Okay. If there was anything you could change about your job,
3 what would it be?

4 A. More money, better schedule. Sorry.

5 MR. FISHER: The pilot creed.

6 DR. SILVA: Yeah.

7 (Laughter)

8 BY DR. SILVA:

9 Q. Have you ever had to report a safety issue?

10 A. No, I have not. Not yet. What do you mean by safety issue?

11 Q. Just any kind of safety concern you may have had.

12 A. Actually, I told the captain once we had, like, a sticker
13 stuck on to the intake.

14 Q. Oh, okay.

15 A. Yeah, so I told him, like, hey, this is happening.

16 Q. So you told the captain?

17 A. Yeah. And he put it in his report.

18 Q. Okay. Got it. Is there a way to report safety issues to the
19 company?

20 A. Oh, yeah. We have about a whole box full of (indiscernible).
21 It's on the iPad.

22 Q. Is it like a form or an app?

23 A. It's just an app. Yeah.

24 Q. Okay. Do you know if that's anonymous or --

25 A. It's anonymous. It's -- yeah. Or at least I think it is.

1 Q. But you haven't had to use it? Or you haven't --

2 A. No, I haven't had a chance to use it yet.

3 Q. Okay. Do you feel comfortable reporting safety issues or
4 anything to the company?

5 A. Yeah. I don't think there'd be any issues.

6 Q. Uh-huh. Have you ever felt any external pressures to fly?

7 A. External pressure? What do you mean by that?

8 Q. Just pressure from the company or passengers or anything to
9 take a flight when you might not have.

10 A. No, not at all. I don't think so. No.

11 Q. Okay. How would you characterize morale amongst the pilot
12 group?

13 A. I think the morale here is really good because everybody is
14 pretty happy here, you know.

15 Q. Uh-huh.

16 A. I mean, I would say much less complaining, I guess, here than
17 any other company I've worked for.

18 Q. Yeah. Okay.

19 DR. SILVA: I'm going to pause here. How are you doing? Do
20 you need a break?

21 MR. LACKEY: Getting close, but I can push for one more.

22 DR. SILVA: All right.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dennis?

24 BY MR. FISHER:

25 Q. Oh, okay. Well, I won't be too crazy. Dan, with your time

1 with PenAir, how do you feel you matter in the cockpit? Do you
2 feel like you're part of the team? Do you feel like you're just,
3 you know, a stump?

4 A. I feel like I'm a part of the team. They always include me.
5 You know, we both have to agree; we have that pretty much clear
6 from the get-go. We both make that decision if we're going to do
7 something, change something. So I definitely feel like I'm a part
8 of the crew. I don't just sit there. I'm not a dead stone.

9 Q. Do you feel that's the norm here?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. When you first met Paul in your first time to fly with him,
12 did you -- were you concerned about his background coming from
13 Ravn?

14 A. Not really. I don't think I have any concern like that. You
15 know, I flew with Crystal, our chief pilot, a lot, and she came
16 out of the same place, flying the Dash-8. So, you know, I didn't
17 have any concerns.

18 Q. Did he give you a lot of stories?

19 A. A little bit here and there.

20 Q. He likes to do that.

21 A. Yeah. He's a good guy, always (indiscernible). It was a
22 really positive -- like I said, it was a very positive thing. I
23 just got engaged and he goes -- you know, he was like, hey, you
24 know, I've have been married for -- since 1981. That's my birth
25 year, if you noticed. I said, wow, you've been married for, like,

1 38 years. You know, things like that, jokes and (indiscernible).
2 So it was a very positive, you know, guy. I don't know what else
3 to say. A very professional dude.

4 Q. Regarding how you guys calculate the numbers to come up with
5 your plan of attack for landing, how do you keep all that
6 information? Do you write down? Do you enter it into the
7 computer? What is your normal process?

8 A. So, for our -- the landing speeds and everything, it's -- I
9 do it on my TOLD card I get from the captain, or I'll look in our
10 chart to make sure our landing weight's proper -- for our, you
11 know, specific landing weight, so we know what it's going to be.
12 I write that down. Get the weather. It's on the TOLD card also.
13 I'll put it down. And then we decide which approach we're going
14 to do since we've got the weather. Then I will automatically put
15 in our approach.

16 Q. Can you give us your best recollection of what it is you're
17 writing down without looking at the chart, I mean, without the
18 TOLD card to write it down on? It's formatted; it wants
19 particular information.

20 A. Oh, yeah. So I usually write down our -- some weird reason,
21 they put the Vt, that the speed's on top. But anyway, it's ref
22 speed, ref plus 10, and Vt. And there's runway length, airport
23 temperature, landing weight and max landing weight.

24 Q. Okay. So you're coming into Dutch. You talk to Michelle at
25 Dutch Weather. She gives you the winds 220 at 35 gusting to 40.

1 This is just a random number.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. What does that say to you as a crew member when you get that
4 wind? How does that affect your plan of attack? I mean, I
5 understand limited experience going in there, and you may not have
6 experienced that kind of wind going in there, but is that
7 something that would --

8 A. Yeah, alarming a little bit? Is that what you're saying?

9 Q. Well, I'm asking is that --

10 A. Oh. You know, first I'm like -- either captain or I are
11 like, hey, that's a lot of winds, and we'll pull out the wind
12 chart.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. That's the first thing we do. I'm like, hey, verify we're in
15 limitations. If we're not, we'll continue our missed approach and
16 keep talking to the weather girl and -- or weather lady or ma'am
17 or the weather person, politically correct -- and make sure, you
18 know, it's all good before we get in. And if it's not, we just
19 turn around, do our missed approach that we briefed and go from
20 there. Either we try again on a hold until it gets better, or we
21 go to our alternate. That's my experience so far here.

22 Q. Okay. I want, just for clarification -- you were describing
23 your approach into Dutch Harbor. You made a comment that you
24 would turn base at 500 feet, I think. It was asked if you would
25 -- what would you do at 500 feet. Was that a visual approach or

1 was that the instrument approach?

2 A. It's visual. Sorry. At 500 feet I'm usually visual. Yeah.
3 We got a missed approach point; beyond that it's all visual. So
4 it's -- sorry -- after that --

5 Q. At what altitude would you be at a missed approach if you --

6 A. 500.

7 Q. Okay. So then it would be normal to proceed inbound?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. At that altitude?

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. In visual conditions?

12 A. In visual conditions.

13 Q. Okay. And then you had one flight with Paul?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. And it was to Fairbanks?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. And I can imagine that's pretty benign. Did you have any
18 issues like, you know, engine ice coming on, you know, overheat or
19 anything like that? Just, you know, the normal run of the mill
20 stuff that happens that isn't concerning but may justify actions
21 on your part?

22 A. To be honest, I can't recall. There wasn't anything -- it
23 was a very uneventful flight.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Just good conversation, good flight. You know, how you want

1 it.

2 Q. And one final question. Have you been asked by other
3 captains to turn on or turn off the engine anti-ice?

4 A. To turn it off?

5 Q. Or on.

6 A. On?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. I've turned -- I verify it's off every landing.

9 Q. Sure.

10 A. It's part of our after-landing checklist. So I don't recall.
11 I apologize, but I don't recall who turned it off.

12 Q. No, that's fine.

13 A. I think captain -- or they usually turn it on.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Like they turn it -- they will turn it on for me if I'm
16 flying. So --

17 Q. Sure.

18 MR. FISHER: All right. That's all I have.

19 DR. SEVILLIAN: Anyone want to take a break right now real
20 quick?

21 MR. LACKEY: Yeah, sure.

22 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

23 (Off the record.)

24 (On the record.)

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. So we will start with you, Roger.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. I don't have a bunch of questions.

2 BY MR. YOUNG:

3 Q. I'm just going to kind of catch up a little bit. You said
4 you had some time with Grant and with a little ACE there. What
5 kind of time did you have with Grant? What were you flying?

6 A. At Grant I was flying a GA8. I got 700 hours with them.

7 Q. Okay. And how long with ACE? I mean, I'll say hours, but
8 maybe hours that --

9 A. I got 350 hours with them, at least.

10 Q. All SIC, I take it?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. All right. And what made you make the switch over to Pen?

13 A. From Grant? That's where I was last.

14 Q. Oh, so it was ACE and then Grant and then --

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Okay, okay.

17 A. To be honest, better quality of life, great flying here, Part
18 121, and wanted to fly something bigger and faster.

19 Q. Okay. Did you get much experience going down to Dutch Harbor
20 with ACE and any with Grant?

21 A. None with Grant. I flew and landed at Dutch Harbor with ACE.

22 Q. Yeah. Okay. Did you -- quite a few trips or --

23 A. Yeah. I can't recall. It's been, like, 7 years since I
24 worked for them, so --

25 Q. Yeah, yeah. Not a big deal.

1 A. Quite a bit.

2 Q. Okay. All right. Do you notice for the -- between the -- I
3 mean, it's been a while since you have flown the 1900. Did you
4 notice a big performance difference for the way it flies between
5 the 1900 and 2000?

6 A. Oh, absolutely. There's a big difference.

7 Q. Can you kind of explain it just in general terms, I guess?

8 A. In general terms? Since it's bigger and faster in comparison
9 to the 1900, the performance is different. You know, it's a lot
10 more power. It's totally faster and, you know, inputs are a
11 little bit slower. Like 1900, it flies like a 172. Literally,
12 you turn the yoke over, it's going to start churning right away.
13 Like snap and roll. But, you know, just -- I think that's the
14 major difference. And the way you handle the aircraft is a little
15 bit different too. The power, the way you adjust power settings
16 and -- just small pilot stuff, I guess.

17 Q. Okay. All right. So going to the wind charts --

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. -- does PenAir have wind charts for just the special use
20 airports? Is it all the airports?

21 A. I believe it's -- can I see it? I don't remember actually.
22 I thought it was all special. I could be wrong.

23 Q. So do you find you use those pretty regular or --

24 A. I use it for usually at the special airports.

25 Q. Okay.

1 a. To be honest.

2 Q. While you've got them there and stuff, how do you -- is there
3 something in there that helps -- that allows for gusts or -- so is
4 it a steady wind? Is it gusts? How does that work with the
5 charts?

6 A. It tells you right here on the top what the cautions and
7 everything. It usually goes to the greatest -- where is it? It
8 includes the gusts, whatever the maximum wind is, max reported
9 wind.

10 Q. Okay. And that's max including gusts?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Okay. So on the approach, you mentioned that you'll brief
13 the approach coming in with the weather that you got, picture
14 stuff like that. Is there a time when, say, you brief the
15 approach for 1-3, but you get there and things change?

16 A. Oh -- oh.

17 Q. As far as you decide to use a different runway, wind switch,
18 whatever --

19 A. Oh, yeah, yeah. It has happened before during our descent.

20 Q. Uh-huh.

21 A. Say, there's traffic in front of us, and they were checking
22 for some reason, and they're like, oh -- like ACE will be in front
23 of us, and they were, like, switching to a different runway
24 because the wind shifted.

25 Q. Uh-huh.

1 A. And then we'll report again with the weather person, and they
2 will give us a new, updated weather. And sometimes they will
3 actually tell us that wind has shifted to a different runway, and
4 we have switched and redid our -- we'll call up the center and
5 then ask for a new clearance.

6 Q. Oh, okay.

7 A. Yeah. For that particular runway. Say, if we were going
8 from 3-1 to 1-3, you know, vice versa, and so we get a new
9 clearance for it.

10 Q. Okay. So if you've already -- if you're already on the
11 approach and you're inbound, and somebody ahead of you gets a wind
12 check -- if they've already cancelled. Say, ACE has already
13 cancelled, and you've started your approach going in, they get a
14 wind check and things are different, and you decide to switch
15 runways. What's the procedure for that? You talked about maybe a
16 different approach, but say you're already in sight, do you ever
17 just switch to a different runway or --

18 A. Only time that would ever happen in my knowledge -- has
19 happened is when we were in visual conditions. Like it was just
20 clear skies and we're coming and literally we just, hey -- we're
21 like -- we just request a clearance for the visual with ATC, and
22 then we'll switch to 3-1. And it's exactly the same line until
23 you get there. So, yeah, it's an easy transition.

24 Q. Okay. Is there -- obviously the wind chart will be different
25 for different directions out there.

1 A. Uh-huh.

2 Q. Is there a difference in the landing performance coming in
3 one way or another? Are the charts the same?

4 A. Landing performance wise?

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. There's a slight difference, but that's dealing with the
7 airport knowledge chart. Let me see. Actually it's the same.
8 The numbers are exactly the same.

9 Q. Oh, okay. All right. Sounds good. Let's see. You
10 mentioned a wind check, maybe, or something from a plane ahead of
11 you and stuff like that. How often do you get the wind check?
12 What kind of makes that happen for you guys? Who are you talking
13 to?

14 A. So it's depending on -- I mean, it's a visual day. We'll
15 just kind of call up as we get about 10 miles out, like before we
16 hit Arc 1, I'll just go, hey, can we get a wind check? And
17 they'll report back what the winds are doing right away. Or if
18 it's a severe change and we're, like, a little bit out in the
19 middle, the weather person will just call us over our Comm 2.
20 It's always up, so --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And let us know there's some -- like the ceiling's dropped
23 dramatically on one side versus the other. Yeah.

24 MR. YOUNG: All right. Got no other questions.

25 MR. LACKEY: Yes, sir.

1 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. So this is the -- we'll go back around
2 one more time for any updates. So I'll start. I only have a
3 couple questions.

4 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

5 Q. As far as that Medallion chart that we have been referring to
6 here, during your time here, have you -- are you aware of any
7 updates to specific airports --

8 A. On these?

9 Q. To the special chart, yeah, yeah, special reports? Do you
10 know if any updates to that have been made to those, or are those,
11 like, regularly updated?

12 A. Updates with our -- our Foreflight updates automatically when
13 it comes out, there's new updates. It's not something we do
14 physically.

15 Q. And how are those updates -- are those updates briefed as far
16 as, hey, you know, a couple weeks ago we had in this quadrant --

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. -- it was X-amount of knots, but it seems like it's moved or
19 it has changed; does that ever happen?

20 A. I'm not sure. I don't recall. I'm not exactly sure about
21 that particular question, how to answer that.

22 Q. So as far as -- what I mean by that is, obviously we have
23 different quadrants here --

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. -- that display based off the knots. What I'm saying is

1 updates that are made to the chart essentially fall into the Dutch
2 Harbor report.

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. Have you seen anything that's been different about the chart,
5 if it's been updated?

6 A. I'm not sure.

7 Q. Okay. So there's really -- if there's an update, there's not
8 a process necessarily to assess whether things have been updated
9 on the chart?

10 A. If there's something that does update, it will show up a
11 little dot on the actual document itself. Like right here it will
12 be, like, updated and it'll have, like, a little dot on it or on a
13 page -- let's see. It'll be a list of things that's been
14 updating.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Yeah. So usually I notice by, like, there's an actual --
17 like, a little dot. I believe it's a dot.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Reddish dot.

20 Q. All right. The other question I had is, as far as scheduling
21 is concerned, how is the scheduling process here at the airline?
22 Is it -- do you feel like it's pretty smooth as far as getting
23 schedules in for flying?

24 A. Oh, yeah. Yeah, it's a bidding process. So it's just -- you
25 kind of put -- you decide which, p.m. or a.m., and what days you

1 want off. So it's been a pretty nice process for me anyways.
2 Can't speak for everybody, but -- yeah, this hasn't been too bad.

3 Q. Okay.

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. So I will go around the table
5 again. Marvin?

6 BY MR. FRANTZ:

7 Q. Of all your years flying Alaska, flying into Dutch --

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. -- how many times do you think you have gone missed at Dutch?

10 A. That's a tough question. At the runway, or are you talking
11 about, like, as you're going and the minimums drop and it'll be
12 before we hit our MDA we turned around?

13 Q. Either one.

14 A. Either one? Oh, probably like four or five times.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And I've diverted; the ceilings dropped, so --

17 Q. Okay. During pre-flight inspection, what are you looking for
18 in the tire/brake area of the Saab?

19 A. I usually make sure there's no flat spots, make sure I don't
20 see any threads, make sure I have rubber all the way around, looks
21 nice, make sure there's nothing wrong with that. And I look and
22 see if the brake area -- we have these little brake wear pins that
23 sticks out, make sure they're out, showing that it has good brake
24 pads front and back. And I always check the brake lines, make
25 sure it's not leaking anywhere, I don't see any kind of residue of

1 any kind of fluids. And I check -- there's, like, a little rubber
2 pad that goes up when the landing gear goes up, make sure that's
3 not worn off, or it's not missing for that particular tire.

4 Q. Have you had any issue with tires that you've had to report
5 to the captain or that had to get written up from something you
6 observed during your pre-flight?

7 A. Yeah. Just one tire looked a little bit too worn. I
8 reported it. Told the captain, hey, can you go look at it? And
9 they'll just hop out and look at it. And they're like, oh, that's
10 okay. And then he'll come back and let me know. He'd physically
11 inspect it. Because I don't know what the -- because I don't have
12 a lot of time with this particular aircraft, what wear is good and
13 bad. So I would -- I usually -- I'm kind of more on the cautious
14 side, so I just asked the captain to look at it.

15 Q. Okay. Do you remember from your sim training, did you have
16 any tire failure scenarios?

17 A. Yes. On landing.

18 Q. On landing?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Do you remember what it was like, what happened, what you
21 felt, what sensations you got?

22 A. I would say all of a sudden I landed, single-engine landing,
23 boom, landed, and all of a sudden I start -- I couldn't control
24 the aircraft. I was, like, major inputs to keep the airplane on
25 the runway. I was kind of starting to turn off to the right or

1 the left. I can't remember which way. I think it was turning to
2 the right.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. But, yeah, and then it came to a stop before I went off the
5 runway. So --

6 Q. Was that -- so were you expecting that, or did you know you
7 were going to have a tire failure?

8 A. No, I did not know. He put that on.

9 Q. But afterwards he told you? Afterwards they told you that,
10 that was a -- what you had was a blown tire?

11 A. Yeah, yeah. I'm pretty sure that's what it was, yeah.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. It spooked me a little bit. I was like, what's going on?

14 Q. How's the merger going? Do you have any sense of changes or
15 attitudes or feelings on the part of the pilot group about what's
16 happening with the merger, you know, the acquisition, you know,
17 PenAir and Ravn?

18 A. Well, since we don't have that much interaction with the Ravn
19 group, we don't ever really see them except kind of wave at them
20 when they're in the aircraft, so it's -- I don't know. I haven't
21 really had any negative feeling or feedback or anything like that.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I just -- I went through a merger with an oil company, so
24 it's like -- it's just, like, growing pains.

25 Q. Are there any changes that have come down since you have been

1 here that you think are the result of -- changes in procedures or
2 anything that are the result of the merger?

3 A. Scheduling was the big one.

4 Q. Scheduling?

5 A. A thing that they changed. We used to have a line bidding
6 system where you knew what schedule you were going to be flying
7 and what days you're going to have. This one is more of a -- now
8 we're just bidding for either you're going to fly a.m., p.m., and
9 what days you're off. Before you could actually see the whole
10 schedule and be like, okay, this month I'm going to be flying
11 these particular lines, I will say.

12 Q. So is it better or worse from your point of view, the
13 scheduling change?

14 A. It's kind of a hit or miss. I just don't prefer either one.
15 But I do like the fact that I can say I want these days off, since
16 on the seniority I'm number 7 or something like that. So I got
17 Thanksgiving off. So it was a benefit for me.

18 Q. When did you -- and we may have talked about this. When did
19 you first start flying?

20 A. Flying?

21 Q. Yeah.

22 A. Like 2010-ish.

23 Q. Okay. And you became a CFI?

24 A. Uh-huh.

25 Q. Did you work as an instructor?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. For how long?

3 A. For about 6 months.

4 Q. Okay. So before you started flying, what were you doing?

5 A. I was a (indiscernible) control specialist, a manager for oil
6 companies. I did scheduling and cost engineering.

7 Q. Okay. Was that your educational background as well?

8 A. Yes. Yeah.

9 Q. Are you an engineer?

10 A. Oh, no. I'm sorry. I am a -- I got my degree in business
11 management, global logistics management.

12 Q. Okay. Oh, wow. Okay. So 1 to 10, 10 being ultra-difficult,
13 of all the airports you've flown at in Alaska, what do you rate
14 Dutch Harbor?

15 A. One being the most difficult?

16 Q. Ten being the most difficult.

17 A. Oh, 10 being the most difficult. I'd probably give it, like,
18 a 7 -- maybe 6, 7. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I flew bush, so that's -- I landed in really tiny runways.

21 Q. Okay.

22 MR. FRANTZ: All right. I think that's all I got. Thanks,
23 Dan.

24 MR. LACKEY: Okay.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Sathya?

1 DR. SILVA: No questions.

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Dennis.

3 MR. FISHER: I just have one for, like, more clarification.

4 BY MR. FISHER:

5 Q. You flew for ACE and you mentioned black water. Can you tell
6 us what black water means?

7 A. Black water? Oh, it means -- it's a down force on the water,
8 and it creates a black mark on the ground -- I mean on the water
9 surface, and it kind of gives you a really turbulent area. It's a
10 downdraft. So we usually watch out for it.

11 Q. Is that a term that was used at ACE?

12 A. Black water? It was used in ACE and Grant also. You watch
13 out for black water.

14 Q. Did they use any other terms for describing wind conditions?

15 A. Oh, you talking about the whitecaps and stuff like that or
16 white --

17 Q. Just general -- any tribal knowledge terms?

18 A. Tribal knowledge? We watch water surface a lot, the way the
19 waves are coming. You see a whitecap coming over, white cloud,
20 depending on what you want to call it. I usually saw -- whitecaps
21 is a wave that is getting pushed by the wind. So you will see a
22 folding over because of the wind, so you know where the wind
23 drifting is coming from.

24 Q. Have you heard the term cat's paw?

25 A. Cat's paw? Oh, yeah.

1 Q. Describe cat's paw, and maybe compare it to black water.

2 A. So a cat's paw -- lots of different terms, but it's -- you
3 know, cat's paw is something that's coming off the water surface.
4 It's how the wind is pushing out. So it's just a wave. That's
5 how I know it. But just wind direction coming off the water.

6 Q. How would you compare it to the term black water? Would they
7 be the same?

8 A. Oh, gosh, it's different because -- well, for me it's
9 different. Black water is winds that can push all direction.
10 Cat's paw is the direction of the wind that it's going. It just
11 shows you which direction the water's going.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Yeah. The wind's going, pushing the water.

14 Q. So would black water tell you where the wind is coming from
15 or would a cat's paw tell you that direction?

16 A. Cat's paw will tell you. And black water will just show you
17 that it's a down force right there.

18 Q. Okay. Any other terms that you may be aware of?

19 A. I don't know.

20 Q. I'm just curious.

21 A. Oh, okay.

22 Q. Different companies have different terms. I'm just curious.

23 A. Okay.

24 MR. FISHER: That's all I have. Thank you.

25 BY MR. YOUNG:

1 Q. Basically I was going to get by without any questions until
2 just then, but -- no, I just got one. But it's interesting that
3 ACE and PenAir also use black water. Does anybody else use that
4 kind of terminology?

5 A. When I flew Grant, some of the -- because everybody's coming
6 from everywhere, you know, and Shockney (ph.) -- some of the guys
7 I flew with a long time ago, you know the guys, they flew with
8 each other here. So I think that's just a -- you know, like,
9 tribal knowledge pretty much, from one pilot to the next.

10 Q. Do you think it's used a great deal in Dutch or is that --
11 because it's -- is it common? Is it --

12 A. Yeah, it's common because we're next to the water. So, like,
13 any -- I think any time that's mentioned, it's an airport that's
14 nearby water, because you can't see it if there's land. It's
15 water surface tension being broken down by down force.

16 Q. Is that a term you hear from weather?

17 A. Black water -- yeah, you do hear at Dutch Harbor. They
18 announce that, hey, there's some black water over here and over
19 there in front of -- they'll give you, like, direction sometimes
20 exactly where, you know, they see it and northwest or blah, blah,
21 blah.

22 MR. YOUNG: Okay. That's all I got.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. So that concludes the interview.

24 MR. LACKEY: Okay.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: We really appreciate it.

1 MR. LACKEY: Thanks. Thanks, guys. Appreciate it.

2 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: One thing, is there anything else that we
4 should have asked you or anything that you want to know or any
5 questions?

6 MR. LACKEY: I don't have any question at this time. If I
7 do, I have you-all's business cards, and I'll talk to you.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Thanks a lot.

9 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: Appreciate it, sir.

11 DR. LACKEY: Thank you.

12 DR. SILVA: Off the record at 3:17.

13 (Whereupon, at 3:17 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Daniel Lackey

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: October 25, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Letha J. Wheeler


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/13/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: BRITT GOUDEY
First Officer and Ground Instructor
PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Monday,
December 2, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Goudey)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Britt Corning Goudey:		
By Mr. Frantz		7
By Dr. Silva		19
By Dr. Sevillian		30
By Mr. Wilson		31
By Mr. Frantz		31
By Dr. Silva		41
By Mr. Fischer		48
By Mr. Frantz		51
By Mr. Fischer		51
By Mr. Frantz		53

I N T E R V I E W

(2:56 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Britt, I'll give you a little intro, and
4 tell you what's going on here, and what we're doing, and then let
5 everybody introduce themselves, and we'll tell you what's going to
6 happen during the interview.

7 We're investigating the Dutch Harbor accident, and when the
8 NTSB investigates accidents, we form groups based on different
9 specialty areas. Like, there might be airframe, power plant
10 systems. This group is called operational factors, and it's
11 combined with another group that sometimes operates separately,
12 sometimes we work together, the human performance. So that's
13 Sathya and Dujuan on the human performance side, and I'm from the
14 operational factors side of the investigation. So we've combined
15 to make one group.

16 And one of the things we look at is training. And so that's
17 the reason we asked -- wanted to talk to you today is because
18 you're a ground instructor, and you're involved in PenAir
19 training. So that's one of the reasons we wanted to ask you some
20 questions. But we're just looking for the best answers you have.
21 If you don't know or you can't recollect something, that answer is
22 fine. If you think of something after the fact, you can get in
23 touch with one of us or Brandon, who is our company representative
24 on the group, and pass it on. There's no problem with that.

25 We're going to -- basically each of us will ask a few

1 questions. We'll just go around one at a time, and after one
2 person is done asking questions, the next person. And typically
3 we'll go around twice because sometimes people have follow-ups
4 that were prompted by something somebody else asked or something.
5 So we'll probably go around the room twice.

6 The NTSB -- have you ever been involved in an NTSB
7 investigation before?

8 MR. GOUDEY: No, no.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Well, I'm sure you know that as a pilot
10 we are primarily looking at determining the cause of something.
11 We're not trying to apportion blame or point fingers. We're
12 trying to figure out what happened, and then what can be done, if
13 anything, in the future to mitigate the chances of that same thing
14 happening again.

15 So we're not -- even though we have an FAA representative on
16 our group, and he'll introduce himself in a second, and I think
17 you already know Tony.

18 MR. GOUDEY: Yes.

19 MR. FRANTZ: But he's not from the enforcement slash -- that
20 part of the FAA. He's from the -- or he's representing the
21 accident investigation side of the FAA, which is a separate branch
22 that always works with the NTSB in investigation. They're always
23 a party to our investigation, and -- just like they always have a
24 party member from the company. In this case, Brandon, because
25 he's the expert on the Saab and on PenAir operations and manuals

1 and things like that.

2 So you -- we're going to have some questions for you. During
3 the interview, you're allowed to have a representative. It can be
4 anyone of your choosing, but it has to be someone you select. So
5 do you have anyone you want to have as your representative today?

6 MR. GOUDEY: Yeah, Morgan will be my representative.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Very good. Okay.

8 Let's -- I'll just let everybody go around again, tell you
9 who they are. I'm an operational factors investigator from the
10 NTSB.

11 DR. SILVA: And Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance
12 investigator with the NTSB.

13 MR. WILSON: You know me, Brandon Wilson.

14 MR. GOUDEY: Hi, Brandon.

15 MR. WILSON: Company line pilot.

16 MR. FISCHER: And, Britt, I'm a -- you know I'm an aviation
17 inspector, and I'm assigned as a POI to Lynden Air Cargo at this
18 time. So I'm representing the FAA.

19 DR. SEVILLIAN: I'm Dujuan Sevillian, human performance
20 investigator, NTSB.

21 MR. FRANTZ: So before we get started, Britt, do you have any
22 questions for us?

23 MR. WILSON: No.

24 MR. FRANTZ: And you'll have a chance at the end to add stuff
25 or whatever. If you have anything to add when we're done, you'll

1 get another chance to put stuff on -- in our record of the
2 conversation. Okay? So let's start out.

3 INTERVIEW OF BRITT GOUDEY

4 BY MR. FRANTZ:

5 Q. Can you just give us your full name with any spellings that
6 we might need?

7 A. My full name is Britt Corning Goudey, B-r-i-t-t,
8 C-o-r-n-i-n-g, G-o-u-d-e-y.

9 Q. Okay. And what's your current position at PenAir?

10 A. I'm a first officer and ground instructor.

11 Q. Okay. And how long have you been both of those things?

12 A. I've been a first officer for 18 months and a ground
13 instructor for -- gee, I don't remember when I -- when they
14 trained me up for that, but I would say probably 13 months, maybe
15 12 months.

16 Q. Do you -- how do you divide those jobs? Are you a full-time
17 line holder? Do you fly the line with a regular schedule and then
18 occasionally teach ground school, or how does it --

19 A. Yes. Occasionally teach ground school. But if they -- well,
20 yeah, occasionally teach ground school. I taught one class and --
21 one full class, and then this last class they had to use me for
22 just a few days.

23 Q. Okay. How many flight hours do you have total?

24 A. About 23,000.

25 Q. Okay. Can you give us a rough sketch of your aviation

1 background before PenAir? When did you join PenAir?

2 A. 18 months.

3 Q. 18 months. So before PenAir, what's your aviation history?

4 A. Before PenAir, I worked for 22 years at Everts Air Cargo, and
5 I was a DC-9 captain, a DC-6 captain. I also flew for the Everts
6 Air Fuel occasionally, and I was a C-46 first officer. I also
7 worked for Cape Smythe Air Service and MarkAir Express under the
8 Part 135 at both of those places.

9 Q. Okay. Were any of those that you named 121 operators? They
10 were all 135s?

11 A. Everts Air Cargo is a 121 supplemental cargo carrier.

12 Q. Everts. Okay. Okay. When did -- you joined PenAir 18
13 months ago as a first officer, and did you get trained in the Saab
14 2000 at that time?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. So how many hours do you have in the Saab 2000
17 roughly?

18 A. 800.

19 Q. 800. Okay.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry, Britt. How many?

21 MR. GOUDEY: 800.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 800. Okay.

23 BY MR. FRANTZ:

24 Q. So when you teach your -- there's other ground school
25 instructors, is that correct, that teach ground school? And when

1 you teach ground school, do you teach an entire course of whatever
2 the basic ground school is or do you teach just elements of it or
3 both?

4 A. Yeah. I teach whatever is required to be taught on that
5 particular day.

6 Q. Okay. Let's -- okay, let me talk about that for a minute.
7 So have you ever taught a performance curriculum?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Specifically, I'm talking about, well, the landing
10 performance and using the airport analysis charts. How long of a
11 course is that for the -- for a new hire pilot? How much time do
12 they spend on that particular element?

13 A. Well, I don't know off the top of my head. I'd have to look
14 at the curriculum. But that's in the FOTM, whatever the breakdown
15 is for that. But I would do the required time or whatever is
16 required to satisfactorily explain it.

17 Q. Have you ever taught -- you have taught that particular
18 element?

19 A. Um-hmm.

20 Q. Okay. Is there any testing that specifically involves that
21 element, the performance element, for the new hire pilots?

22 A. I don't think there is.

23 Q. Have there been any changes in the way performance is taught
24 since you've been here where that element is taught?

25 A. No.

1 Q. No.

2 A. No. I mean, regarding testing, you know, I may have given
3 them -- and I probably did, because that's the way I would do it.
4 I would give them an example with some performance information,
5 and I'd have them work it up, and then we'd go over the answer in
6 the class, and that would be the extent of any testing that
7 probably would occur on that subject.

8 Q. How many times have you taught that, the performance block
9 and curriculum?

10 A. Just once.

11 Q. Just one time. When was that? Do you remember the month or
12 the year?

13 A. No. It would have been -- well, it was wherever that class
14 was with Paul and Justin were in there.

15 Q. Oh, you've taught the class that Paul and Justin were in?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. So during that one time was there ever any -- do you
18 recall any particular difficulties or issues for people
19 understanding how to use those charts or what they were for, when
20 they were used? I'm talking about the airport analysis.

21 A. Right. The airport analysis chart?

22 Q. Is that an easy concept or is that a difficult concept some
23 people struggle with, or --

24 A. It can be a difficult concept. The way those charts are laid
25 out, they need explaining for certain.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Did you have any -- was it any challenge for you when you
4 went through the training when you first joined PenAir
5 understanding the performance?

6 A. Yeah. I find the -- I found the landing distance section and
7 calculating the critical tail wind component to be a little --
8 require a little explaining.

9 Q. Is that on the -- in the airport analysis volume or binder
10 you're talking about?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Yeah. Okay. When you went and got your training at SIMCOM,
13 was there any actual training down in SIMCOM on use of those
14 charts?

15 A. I don't think there's any training on it. I can't recall. I
16 can't accurately recall that.

17 Q. Did you, as a -- when you were in training down there, did
18 you use those charts in training as part of your -- a typical sim
19 session? Would you pull out your airport analysis binder and
20 verify that you were okay to land at a particular airport or
21 something?

22 A. No.

23 Q. It wasn't part of the sim training?

24 A. No. I don't think so. Most of it, you know, was assumed. I
25 think it was assumed that was already taken care of. Yeah. I

1 can't say for sure.

2 Q. What did you think of the overall training experience in
3 Florida?

4 A. It was difficult for -- it was a difficult session for myself
5 when I went through it.

6 Q. Were there things that you thought SIMCOM or the instructors
7 should have or could have done better or more efficiently or?

8 A. Yeah. There's a -- I mean, yeah. It was difficult for me
9 coming out of different equipment to understand where they wanted
10 to go with the profiles right away. And so it took some building
11 to get there. Why they wanted a certain call-out, et cetera.

12 Q. Okay. So you were coming off of flying which airplane
13 primarily at that point?

14 A. DC-9.

15 Q. DC-9. Okay. How many -- you have about 800 hours as an FO
16 with --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- PenAir? Okay. Let's switch gears from performance for a
19 second. When you do a preflight, what are you looking for when
20 you look at the tires?

21 A. Condition, inflation, brake wear pins, dry.

22 Q. Have you ever noticed anything that you called to the
23 attention to the captain for the tires on any tires since you've
24 been here?

25 A. Yes. Yes. Brake wear pins.

1 Q. Okay. What about the tires themselves? Any issues with the
2 tires that you recall?

3 A. No. The tires always seem to be in very good condition.

4 Q. Okay. How many times do you think you've been to Dutch
5 Harbor with PenAir roughly?

6 A. Yeah, roughly. With PenAir probably, oh, I don't know.
7 It's safe to say I've been down there at least 2 dozen times,
8 maybe 3 dozen.

9 Q. Okay. You ever remember landing in Dutch Harbor at -- you
10 didn't land, but did the captain landing in Dutch Harbor with a
11 tailwind? Any tailwind, even slight?

12 A. Maybe just slightly. Maybe 2, 2 or 3 knots.

13 Q. Okay. Is there a preferred approach? If it's VFR, is there
14 a preferred runway -- discounting the winds, is there a preferred
15 direction to land at Dutch Harbor?

16 A. No. If there's --

17 Q. If the wind were calm, would you pick one versus the other?

18 A. If there were other factors that, yeah, dictated it, sure.
19 We'd go either way, whichever way was required, yeah.

20 Q. Is one more difficult or challenging than the other? VFR so
21 you're not doing an --

22 A. Well, the back door, you know, the back door approach has the
23 -- runway 3-1 has kind of a tight right-hand turn to the -- from
24 the right base to final, and if the pilot flying is left seat,
25 that certainly poses a little more of a judgment -- little more

1 challenge of judgment for them than lining up for a nice easy
2 2-mile final out there for runway 1-3.

3 Q. Okay. Can you just briefly describe the process, procedure
4 that you're going to use as part of the crew when you're coming
5 into Dutch Harbor when it comes time to determine which approach
6 you're going to use and what kind of flap setting you're going to
7 use? When does that start, and how does -- what's the process for
8 determining all that?

9 A. Well, we start -- well, that starts with the preflight
10 planning. Plan the trip, and the conditions of the trip are laid
11 out on the flight release. And then when we get down there, we're
12 going to be making a decision as to what we need to do, and that
13 will be done before top of descent.

14 And most people probably prefer the runway 1-3 approach,
15 yeah. But the 3-1 is certainly a -- I mean, it's certainly a
16 pretty good option. It's just it takes -- it's a roundabout ways.
17 You've got to around the back, back side of the airport to get
18 there, of course.

19 Q. Have you ever been past top of descent heading into Dutch and
20 had anything dictate a change in your plans about which runway
21 you're going to use?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What was the item? What caused you to --

24 A. The weather. The winds do change -- can change down there.
25 Those weather systems can move through slowly, and they can move

1 through very quickly sometimes. And a calm airport can certainly
2 turn into a windy airport in just a matter of moments.

3 And then there's atmospheric phenomena. If we're planning a
4 -- if we're planning -- we could have, we could have been given
5 some weather planning, and we're planning to go in the back door
6 off the GPS runway 3-1, and we get down there, and we see the back
7 door's got a shower in it, then that changes that -- the plan.

8 Q. What percentage of the time, and I know you're just kind of
9 winging it, would something like that happen where you've got to
10 make a change as you get closer in, and you're flipping around
11 your plan?

12 A. Well, that -- you've got airports that are out in the open,
13 and they have very consistent weather, and then you've got a place
14 like Dutch Harbor that's nested in the mountains like that in a
15 marine environment with a lot of moisture, and it happens more
16 often at a place like Dutch Harbor. It certainly does.

17 Particularly on days where it's showery. So I couldn't give
18 you a statistic on when it's showery, but when those showers are
19 rolling through there, yeah, the visibility can go down, and then
20 it can -- and 5 minutes later, it can come back up, and it can do
21 it -- on some days it can do it rhythmically. And then on some
22 days it's not rhythmic and not predictable.

23 Q. Okay. Have you ever gone around or gone missed at Dutch
24 Harbor?

25 A. I don't think so. Have I gone missed? Yes. I haven't gone

1 around, but we've gone missed several times.

2 Q. Okay. Is that a -- is executing a missed approach there more
3 challenging than the average airport because of airport -- you
4 know, the location, the terrain, weather, complexities?

5 A. It certainly can be. I mean, for example, one of the more
6 recent trips I took down there, I think we ended up doing the
7 first approach to runway 1-3, and we got down there, and it just
8 -- it wasn't going to work out. So we went missed approach, and
9 we got another weather report. It sounded like the back door was
10 good, so we shot the approach to the back door, runway 3-1, and we
11 got back down there.

12 It was one of those showery days. The weather was good over
13 here or it was bad over there or it was vice-versa. So we shot
14 that approach. That one didn't work out. We went missed
15 approach, and we came back in on the runway 1-3 approach again,
16 and that was successful. So in this kind of situation you've got
17 to be making sure that you turn in the right direction on the
18 missed approach.

19 So in that regard, that's pretty serious. I mean, going
20 missed approach is -- can be a challenge for people that aren't
21 proficient, of course.

22 Q. Okay. How about if it's VFR? Is it going to be difficult,
23 challenging if I go -- am going out the back door because, say I
24 missed, and now I decide I want to come back in for a 3-1, doing
25 that kind of turnaround to come back, is that -- because of the

1 terrain and everything, if it's VFR, is that a difficult or a
2 complex process?

3 A. So you're going to go missed approach -- you're going to
4 execute the missed approach?

5 Q. Let's say you missed or --

6 A. Or you just decided the back door wasn't good enough?
7 Because --

8 Q. You decided the front door -- you came in on 3-1, you went
9 around -- sorry -- 1-3. 1-3 is the front door; is that right? 1-
10 3 is the front door?

11 A. 1-3 is the front door, yes.

12 Q. So you come in the front door, doesn't work out for whatever
13 reason, and now you hear -- you think the winds are now better for
14 the back door. So how are you going to go out and get turned
15 around and come back for the back door? How difficult is that if
16 it's VFR?

17 A. It's not difficult. We're just going to turn and go back out
18 to the missed approach point, and from there we're going to get
19 clear for the -- for another approach. But you're saying it's
20 VFR. So we're not going to go missed -- to the missed approach
21 point or to the holding fix?

22 Q. Are you? I don't know. Would you?

23 A. I said a missed approach point. Wrong language. Sorry.
24 Well, yeah, that's a debatable -- one of those debatable and
25 somewhat confusing processes. The approach is a fly to -- fly

1 visually to approach. It's not a circling approach.

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. This is a debacle. Because here you are, yeah, you're
4 looking at the back door and it's all socked in. If you were
5 planning on landing runway 3-1, and you did the GPS approach to
6 3-1, you get down there and the back door is socked in but you can
7 see clearly over the front door, it's clear in a million going
8 that way, are you constrained to doing -- to sticking with the
9 back door approach and going missed approach?

10 Q. So this isn't a -- it isn't a trick question, but what would
11 you do, if you were the captain and that -- you were in that exact
12 same scenario, how would you fly it? Because I don't know what
13 the right answer is.

14 A. I don't --

15 Q. I would be curious to know what you -- I haven't been there.

16 A. I'm telling you, we have -- this has been, yeah, this has
17 been discussed. It's a tough -- that's a tough, that's a tough
18 one because it's a fly visually to the airport approach.

19 Q. Okay. So there may not be an easy answer or a known answer
20 to that. That's fine. That's fine. Have you ever flown into
21 Dutch Harbor with a captain who has less time in the airplane than
22 you do?

23 A. No.

24 Q. No.

25 A. I don't think so. I don't believe so.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I'm going to take a break. Thanks.
2 I'm going to pass it to Sathya, and see if she has any
3 questions.

4 BY DR. SILVA:

5 Q. Do you need a break at all?

6 A. No. I'm fine. Thanks.

7 Q. Okay. Can you describe the CRM training here? What does it
8 consist of, how is it taught?

9 A. Well, I pull up the PowerPoint, and I start reading the
10 points off the PowerPoint.

11 Q. Is there any component that's scenario-based in the CRM
12 training?

13 A. What do you mean, when it's scenario-based? That I give them
14 a scenario and --

15 Q. Yeah. So that's what a typical scenario-based training would
16 be. But just in terms of what the PowerPoint says, what -- can
17 you kind of walk me through what's in the PowerPoint, and how you
18 teach that?

19 A. Well, no, I can't because I -- I'm not -- I mean, the
20 PowerPoint is pretty extensive. If you're asking me to recall the
21 PowerPoint, I can't do that.

22 Q. Is CRM -- in what training curriculum is CRM covered to your
23 knowledge? Is it just initial?

24 A. If it's in the FOTM that it's covered during recurrent, then
25 it will be recovered during recurrent. I mean, the way it works

1 in training -- the ground training is the Director of Standards,
2 Kirk Watson, generates the course syllabus, and he gives me a copy
3 of it, and it's all scheduled out by the day, and I cover the
4 required elements of that curriculum on the appropriate day.

5 Q. Do you teach any components of recurrent training as well or
6 is it just initial?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Both. Okay. Does PenAir have a captain's leadership
9 training when it comes to the cockpit crew resource management?

10 A. I don't believe they do.

11 Q. Have you --

12 A. What is the captain's lead -- what are you referring to? The
13 way we generate a captain or transition -- or upgrade, excuse me,
14 upgrade a captain?

15 Q. So, yeah, during upgrade or even hiring in a captain.

16 A. Right. Yeah, I don't believe that we do.

17 Q. Okay. Have you flown with Paul Wells?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you recall the last time you flew with him?

20 A. Not exactly, but I do recall flying with him. I've flown
21 with him just a few times.

22 Q. Okay. What do you recall of those flights in terms of him as
23 a captain?

24 A. Paul and I get along well. I mean, I do recall, perhaps, if
25 Paul -- on one particular flight he may have been, you know, what

1 you might refer to as maybe a little bumbling a little bit, and I
2 attributed that to perhaps he was -- he had been out of the
3 airplane for a little bit, and he wasn't really feeling proficient
4 or comfortable, but not terribly so. It was just there were just
5 a few things that I caught.

6 Q. But can you give me some examples?

7 A. Oh, it might have been something to do with the FMS. Usually
8 that's, you know, that's usually something, fat fingering the FMS.
9 They weren't big, big things. They were just little things.

10 Q. Have you flown with him into Dutch Harbor?

11 A. No.

12 Q. What would you say are his strengths as a pilot?

13 A. Paul's good at working with you. He's open. He
14 communicates. He communicates what he's thinking.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And so -- yeah, there are no secrets, of course. You don't
17 have to ask. I mean, but, you know, if you have to ask, that's a
18 good thing because he's going to answer your question for you. I
19 get along well with Paul, yeah.

20 Q. Is there anything that you thought based on your flights with
21 him that he could have improved on?

22 A. No, not really. I flew with him as a new -- when he was a
23 new captain. He still is a new captain, of course. So there's
24 going to be certain things that -- the nuances about the airplane,
25 little things that I know because I've had -- I've just got a

1 couple more hours in the airplane than he does really, and stuff
2 that I can convey to him to help him out.

3 Q. Do you have any examples of that knowledge?

4 A. I don't know. No, not really. Maybe there's one
5 peculiarity, of course, when you take the runway, and you start
6 pushing the throttles up, if you don't pause at the -- if you
7 don't pause just after you come across the flight idle gate, and
8 if you just push right through that area right there and go up to
9 takeoff power, you'll probably get a caution, and you'll have to
10 abort the takeoff. So that's one thing. So, and that's not
11 mentioned -- I don't believe that's mentioned anywhere in the
12 manuals. So there's a nuance.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Yeah. Tuning the radio, helping him out, helping him get set
15 up with the radios. Those RTUs are very -- they're very
16 complicated at first.

17 Q. What's the RTU?

18 A. Radio Tune Unit.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And -- four buttons on each side of the screen, and what do
21 you get when you hit that button? And how do you check that? And
22 how do you know if you're transmitting even? When you key the mic
23 in this airplane, there's no way -- you don't see an X or a T to
24 indicate that the radio is actually transmitting. So did you --
25 so how do you get there? You know, push this button.

1 Q. Right.

2 A. And now it displays -- it gives you a display that will show
3 you you're transmitting you see.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. So there's another little secret, little trick.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Yeah, no, I've found flying with Paul to be just fine, yeah.
8 He was the kind of guy that uses you. So it's good to be used.

9 Q. Okay. Did you feel like he was open to suggestions, and you
10 would be fine voicing them?

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. Have you ever been asked by a captain of PenAir to do a
13 partial transfer of controls, whether it's controlling -- one
14 person controlling the yoke and the other controlling the throttle
15 or rudders or anything like that?

16 A. No. No. No. Now I can't -- not here at PenAir, but in my
17 flying experience, it -- I can think of one scenario. When I was
18 in the DC-6, we'd be doing a two-engine circling approach on check
19 rides, and it was not uncommon to say to the engineer, power for
20 140 knots, and he'd run that throttle. There's no autopilot in
21 the airplane, so you're hand flying it, and you're busy keeping
22 track of the runway. So that was a good thing to do, let the
23 engineer worry about the airspeed, and then -- and you just keep
24 the airplane level at the altitude. So --

25 Q. Is there any ground training on special airports?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What does that look like?

3 A. There are slide modules, PowerPoint presentations.

4 Q. Okay. Do you recall what's in those PowerPoints for Dutch
5 Harbor?

6 A. Yeah. Details are on the instrument approaches, topographic
7 maps, I believe. There are pictures of the terrain and the
8 airport and the layout of the terrain. And that's the design.
9 That is -- that's the design. That's the purpose of the special
10 use airport, and that's why it's designated special use airport,
11 right, for precipitous training in the vicinity of precipitous
12 training.

13 Q. So do you go into weather differences when it comes to the
14 different kinds of airports in that PowerPoint or in that
15 training?

16 A. I believe there are some remarks in there about --

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yeah, yeah. And, of course, the wind chart that we have, the
19 recommended wind chart is very good information on the
20 characteristics of the local wind down there.

21 Q. So if you were to teach someone about the weather going into
22 Dutch Harbor, what kind of things would you mention?

23 A. We'd start right off talking about wind out of the north.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Because that's the most hazardous.

1 Q. And why is that?

2 A. Because it comes across the mountain.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. The mountain -- the runway sits to the north of -- to the
5 south of the mountain. And, yeah, there will be wind shear at
6 the, there will be wind shear at the threshold at each end. The
7 last 100 feet there will be -- definitely be wind shear.

8 Q. Is there anything else you would mention in terms of what to
9 look out for in terms of weather?

10 A. In terms of weather?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. Well, wind out of the west is going to push, push moisture in
13 there, cause low ceilings, probably. Wind out of the east is --
14 might not be so likely to do that. And we stress, just stress,
15 and everybody practices. All the captains that I've flown with
16 down there, they look at the wind book. They look at the wind
17 chart, and they use it to keep track of the winds as they become
18 dynamic. Very common to see a guy pull that up on his iPad after
19 we get a new wind report and to determine whether he can actually
20 get in there with that wind.

21 Q. So going back to landing performance, is -- so you teach the
22 charts. Is that the only way of determining whether it's --
23 there's enough landing distance available at the airport to land
24 on?

25 A. No. In fact, the chart -- the airport analysis is just -- is

1 really for determining whether we have the regulatory planning
2 requirement for -- to land within 60 percent of the available
3 landing distance. But the -- when you get down there, time of
4 arrival, it's going to be the performance binder that has
5 unfactored landing distances, and it -- for flaps 20 and flaps 35.

6 Q. Okay. Is there an automated way of determining performance?

7 A. Not to --

8 Q. As far as you know.

9 A. There is, but it's not, it's not used by PenAir.

10 Q. Okay. As far as you know, is there something that PenAir is
11 developing on that -- along those lines?

12 A. Well, there's the APG app.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And that was, as I understood, to be in development.

15 Q. Have you used it before?

16 A. I've taken a look at it. Not extensively. I would just plug
17 some numbers into it to see what it did.

18 Q. Were you working with anyone in particular when you were
19 exploring that app?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Okay. When you're coming into Dutch Harbor, how do you get
22 the weather information?

23 A. You have to wait until you're within a line of sight
24 distance, and we call it the -- forget the name of the company,
25 but there's a contracted weather observer down there, and we call

1 her up, and she gives us the weather.

2 Q. Do you ever use the AWOS frequency?

3 A. I do occasionally, yeah. Mostly though -- but it's not
4 receivable from approaches from the direction that we normally
5 approach the airport. When you get in close, yeah, you may get
6 it. But, so generally I use it when we're taking off.

7 Q. Okay. Is there a benefit between using AWOS and using Dutch
8 weather?

9 A. Well, the AWOS has a little bit of a lag in it. There's
10 nothing better than a set of eyes on the ground to tell you how
11 things look, and that's the benefit of a human observer, yeah.
12 She can tell us if a shower is rolling in. When a situation is
13 dynamic, those eyes are very valuable. The back door is socking
14 in as she's looking at it. I think it's going down, trending
15 downwards. So, yeah, so we'll wait for something like that.

16 Q. And you mentioned that there were aspects of the performance
17 training module that were difficult or challenging to pilots. Can
18 you elaborate on what parts of that training are particularly
19 challenging?

20 A. Well, just the reading the APG documentation. They have a --
21 they do have an -- they have a section in the front of the manual
22 that does explain it, but it's always helpful to have someone that
23 already knows it explain it to you. Because there's just little
24 things in there that are not necessarily intuitive, little coding,
25 and that sort of thing.

1 Q. So you were here prior to the Ravn acquisition, correct?

2 A. Um-hmm.

3 Q. Have you noticed any changes in terms of operations from --
4 as a result of that -- of the acquisition?

5 A. Not really. Nothing substantial. I mean, there's been
6 little changes, additions to the manuals. We've seen the Ravn
7 name start to appear occasionally.

8 Q. Anything in terms of management or management involvement in
9 operations, anything along those lines?

10 A. Well, they -- when the chief pilot position vacated, they put
11 one of their personnel in there. And that's, I guess, that's a
12 major change.

13 Q. Was that transparent essentially to you --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- as a line pilot?

16 A. Oh, yeah.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yeah. We all knew Crystal was a Ravn employee.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And had been on the dash.

21 Q. So after that transition, were there any changes in terms of
22 how you run the operation after the change of management?

23 A. I wouldn't say so. I mean, not apparent to myself.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Is there some particular area you're looking for?

1 Q. No. I'm just asking.

2 A. Yeah. Yeah, not really. PenAir, the prior PenAir was kind
3 of -- I mean, all I can say is the prior PenAir kind of had that
4 warm family feel to it. And then -- and I knew it. I could see
5 it coming, and I've been around a bit, and I -- Ravn is going to
6 be the somewhat cool corporate feel. And that was probably -- I
7 mean, yeah, that's, that's the way it was going to go. So that
8 was what I expected.

9 Q. How would you rate the safety culture here?

10 A. Safety culture is very good.

11 Q. Have you ever encountered any pressure to fly?

12 A. No. No.

13 Q. Any questioning of your decisions, safety decisions?

14 A. No.

15 Q. How would you classify the morale amongst the pilot group?

16 A. Morale is an up and down thing. It's not easy, you know, for
17 a guy that's worked here a whole long time -- not myself, but I'm
18 talking about the guys who I've worked with, of course, yeah, they
19 -- when you're in bankruptcy and everything they've worked for
20 they're seeing kind of become a little unstable, you know,
21 definitely it's a challenge for -- it's a challenge for some
22 people, I'm sure. There are some people that are better hiding it
23 than others.

24 DR. SILVA: All right, that's all I have. Thank you.

25 MR. GOUDEY: You're welcome.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Dujuan, do you have any questions?

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes, just some questions.

3 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

4 Q. How do you report safety concerns with the company? What's
5 the process?

6 A. We're supposed to fill out -- well, we have the WBAT system
7 and an app. There are some other forms that we're -- that are
8 available to us. The SUCH (ph.) report, as well as the captain's
9 irregularity report.

10 Q. Have you ever filled out one before?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you know pilots that have filled out the reports?

13 A. Yeah. Oh, and then there was the ASAP system, of course.
14 Failed to mention that. We have an ASAP program. But, yeah,
15 yeah, I know guys that have filled the ASAP out, used the ASAP
16 system. And I think a couple of captains have used the captain's
17 irregularity report to report things.

18 Q. So in the captain's irregularity report, how does that
19 process work? The captain fills the report out. Where does it go
20 from there when the report is filled out?

21 A. Well, I'm not sure what the dissemination is of that, but I
22 would assume it goes to the chief pilot and/or the DO. I mean,
23 that's generally the process with those forms. I think they are
24 responsive to it, yes.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all I have for right now.

1 MR. GOUDEY: Okay.

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Brandon, do you have any questions?

4 BY MR. WILSON:

5 Q. Going back to the ground school, you talked about the
6 performance module. Did you -- were there final exams at the end
7 of ground school?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So people were tested?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And then was there a homework assignment that people had
12 every day?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you know if any performance questions are on any of those?

15 A. I don't believe, I don't believe so.

16 MR. WILSON: That's all I have.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Mr. Fischer, do you have any questions?

18 MR. FISCHER: No.

19 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. All right, well, that's once. Second
20 time around might be quicker.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Double jeopardy round.

22 MR. GOUDEY: Okay.

23 BY MR. FRANTZ:

24 Q. So one more time on the performance training modules, now
25 that you've instructed it once and been through it once, are there

1 any changes that you would like to see or you would recommend in
2 that particular training for new pilots?

3 A. Well, I mean, clearly, obviously we -- because of the
4 questions you're asking me, we need to have some testing that
5 pertains to that subject matter. The PowerPoints are --
6 PowerPoints, there's a lot of slides in the PowerPoints, and as an
7 instructor, sometimes it's hard to get through those, all those
8 slides. And I, personally, I like to -- I'm the book guy. I like
9 to pick up the book and open up the book because I want people to
10 know where to find the material, where to find that information to
11 do the job.

12 And the slide -- with the slide program, the PowerPoint
13 program, most people just end up orating. When I went through the
14 class, we didn't pick up the -- we didn't open the manuals up very
15 often. It was just we look at the PowerPoint and we read -- we
16 listen to the instructor, and he just goes through the slide after
17 slide after slide. And so --

18 Q. So who is your boss as a -- on your ground school instructor
19 job?

20 A. Kirk. Kirk Watson.

21 Q. Has he ever solicited any ideas from you about improving
22 training? Not necessarily performance, but just the ground
23 training in general or --

24 A. No, he isn't, but I'm the kind of person, too, that I'll
25 just, you know, I'll tell him. I'll tell him up front, very

1 frankly that -- and he knows there's a lot of slides too. I mean,
2 there have been times when I did get out the manual, and we just
3 went into the manual. It's, and it's funny because I did -- I
4 mentioned -- like, every ground school, it seems like this ground
5 school is different than the last one I taught. So that's weird.

6 Just the way they progress. I think it's because the
7 students are in there. And as students ask you questions, that
8 feedback indicates to you what areas aren't clear to them, and
9 then you have to go there. And so different students ask
10 different questions.

11 Q. What do you teach a new hire about the wind chart? How is it
12 used? What are they supposed to do with it?

13 A. Well, I open that book up, and we start in the front of the
14 book because it tells you how to apply the wind chart. First of
15 all, it's recommended. And it's very good recommendations. There
16 are some little nuances about how to apply the wind chart. Is the
17 gust a limiting factor or is it the steady-state wind that's the
18 limiting factor?

19 Q. Have you ever seen a captain change a plan at Dutch Harbor
20 because the wind has changed, and he consulted the wind chart, and
21 now it's beyond some limit indicated on the wind chart, and so
22 he's changed either the runway or he's diverted because of the
23 limitations of the wind chart?

24 A. Yeah. We've launched down there, and the winds are more than
25 the recommended wind, and we've diverted. Yeah. Yeah. One of

1 the things about Dutch Harbor -- and there's no pressure to land
2 down there because it's a CPA agreement. Nobody feels any
3 obligation to make it happen. There's none of that. We get paid.
4 The company makes money on that flight whether it lands or not.

5 Q. Did you say Justin Lunn was in your ground school that you
6 taught?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So in your limited exposure you had during the ground school,
9 did he strike you as someone who was more or less likely than the
10 average new FO to speak up if he had a safety concern or saw
11 something that wasn't quite right?

12 A. I would think Justin would speak up. He seemed to be a
13 well-read and a well-educated neophyte aviator. When we talked,
14 when we were discussing accidents, the various elements of
15 accidents, and various accidents, he corrected me on a couple of
16 the details. He was, obviously, a well-read aviator. And, yeah,
17 he had no trouble engaging in conversation. And, yeah, yeah,
18 yeah.

19 Q. So you don't think he'd be reluctant at all to speak up to a
20 senior captain if he had some safety concern about something?

21 A. I don't think so. I really just don't. Yeah, I just don't
22 think so. And that's definitely something that's crossed my mind
23 many times. I can't wait to, I can't wait to discover more of the
24 details of the event.

25 Q. The planning that occurs just prior to top of descent where

1 you get the weather, and you're going to try to determine which
2 approach, which runway, which flap setting, to determine if it's
3 going to be -- the weather is going to allow you to land on the
4 runway you want to land on based on your weight, I guess.

5 My question is, are you looking at the airport analysis
6 binder at that point? Or are you looking at the performance
7 binder just to see, what is my unfactored landing distance and,
8 therefore, I know that it will be okay? Or am I going by the
9 limitations set in the airport analysis, which is at this weight
10 -- if you're more than this weight, you can't use this runway?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Which of those is the governing at that point?

13 A. The unfactored, unfactored distance. The requirement to land
14 with 60 percent of the available runway is a planning requirement,
15 and that's the way it's been explained to me here. And, honestly,
16 not until I worked here did I -- I usually applied -- I usually
17 stuck with the 60 percent wherever I went.

18 Q. But not -- but would you say -- are you saying that is not a
19 limiting factor once you're --

20 A. Yeah, it's not.

21 Q. -- once dispatch is behind you and now you're en route?

22 A. From -- yeah, from the -- yes, that's correct. That's the
23 understanding of it. And that's why, you know, that's why we have
24 the performance binder and the unfactored information in there.
25 Turbojet programs have programs for reassessment at the time of

1 arrival, but that doesn't apply to the turboprops.

2 Q. Okay. So if I looked at my airport analysis at the top of
3 descent, and I determined because of the winds we want to use this
4 runway, but because of this wind condition my limiting landing
5 weight is X, and I know we're over X. I can -- could I then go to
6 the performance binder and just look up my landing distance based
7 on our weight and know that I'm okay to land on X? I mean, on
8 that runway. If it's okay --

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. -- in the performance binder.

11 A. So that would be standard.

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. That would be the standard, and I've seen --

14 Q. That's -- okay.

15 A. Yeah, yeah. I can remember one particular trip where I was
16 with a check airman, and he pulled the, he pulled the binder out,
17 reevaluated his situation, and things were good, and we landed.

18 Q. So if you pull out the binder, and you determine you need
19 X -- you know, you should take X hundred or X thousand feet to
20 land with this wind and this weight --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. -- is there any guidance given to the pilots that says, okay,
23 then you'd better have X thousand plus Y? Or as long as, as long
24 as you've just got whatever that number is, if you've got that,
25 you're okay, regardless if there's not a foot past that? I mean,

1 is that general guidance?

2 A. Like a landing distance factor we're talking about?

3 Q. Yeah, yeah.

4 A. Yeah. Landing distance factors are included in the
5 performance binder.

6 Q. But I mean, if you determine, oh -- but if you determine that
7 you need 4,300 feet to land unfactored landing distance based on
8 your weight and the wind --

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. -- right? And then you look at that airport and it's only --
11 it's got 4,300 feet --

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. -- that's the runway, usable runway, you're okay?

14 A. No. That's way too tight for anybody.

15 Q. Okay. So --

16 A. Yeah. That's test pilot --

17 Q. But there's no guidance -- but there's no specific guidance
18 there, is that you should have this much more X -- for the general
19 captain or the crew? There's not -- it's just the captain's
20 sense. So he would say, well, I'm not going in there with zero
21 margin.

22 A. Yeah. So the performance binder does have some landing
23 distance factors in there that you -- are guidance for applying.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. But as far as I under -- as far as I understand, there is no

1 compulsory requirement --

2 Q. Right.

3 A. -- to do that.

4 Q. And in ground school, we talked about the airport analysis
5 charts, but is there also a module or is it part of the
6 performance where you look at the info that's in the performance
7 binder, and the pilots understand how to use that, how to
8 determine the actual landing distance? Is that something that's
9 done in ground school as well, performance?

10 A. Yeah. I think so. I mean, yeah. The ground school is
11 tremendously long, lots of material. That I'm sure that I -- I'm
12 sure I would have gone through that stuff because it's important
13 stuff. And, yeah, no question about it. Performance binder is
14 used -- it's used a lot. It's a book that's pulled out often,
15 and, yeah, I hope -- I'm sure I pulled -- take guys through it and
16 show them the material in there.

17 Q. Is it used as often or more often than the airport analysis
18 book, volume?

19 A. Yeah, I think so. Because the procedures of generating
20 flight planning, the airport analysis is mostly utilized by the
21 dispatcher. They generate the flight release. They establish the
22 weights. PIC is responsible for -- to do that, too, but they're
23 familiar with the numbers.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And so if there's any -- they only have to pull that book out

1 if there's any question as to the planning.

2 Q. Okay. I think I'm done. Just a second.

3 I asked you if you had any -- ever had any tire issues, and
4 you said no. Did you ever have any skid issues with the Saab,
5 any --

6 A. No.

7 Q. -- write-ups or cautions or anything that you noticed, you
8 remember?

9 A. No. It's been very reliable. I do recall once a captain was
10 saying that the airplane pulled to the -- pulled in one direction
11 when she applied the brakes, but it never -- it was just one
12 mention of it, and it wasn't, it wasn't a radical pull-off in one
13 direction. So I don't know. And I didn't have my feet on the
14 brakes, so I couldn't tell you what she was really experiencing.
15 So --

16 Q. Have you ever experienced the anti-skid system operating when
17 you've been landing, braking?

18 A. No. And -- no, I haven't.

19 Q. Have you been in an airplane that did because of the
20 captain's braking, if the captain was landing? Have you ever
21 experienced the sensation of anti-skid?

22 A. At PenAir?

23 Q. Yes. Yeah, with the 2000.

24 A. No. Because I haven't -- we haven't gone -- honestly, in my
25 experience here, as ironic as it sounds, I haven't gone anywhere

1 that had less than 5s runway condition report. So, yeah, I find
2 that remarkable.

3 Because, you know, when I worked at Everts, pretty much we
4 started off our morning going to some unknown runway surface. And
5 it was not -- you know, applying the brakes and not feeling any
6 deceleration is a very uncomfortable feeling.

7 And I do explain that to guys in the ground school that this
8 anti-skid doesn't feedback. It doesn't vibrate the pedals or
9 anything. And the same thing as DC-9. You step on the brakes,
10 and you might not be certain that the anti-skid is actually
11 working. And then you move into a different friction zone on the
12 runway, and suddenly the airplane starts to decelerate. Now you
13 know it's working. But that can be a very uncomfortable
14 sensation.

15 Q. So how do you -- if you haven't experienced, how do you know
16 in the Saab there's no tactical feedback when it operates?

17 A. Oh.

18 Q. Is that just part of what you learned --

19 A. Oh, well, the anti-skid works during landing. Well, in the
20 simulator, I've honked on the brakes in the simulator. But,
21 honestly, as a first officer, I don't -- I rarely -- I don't honk
22 on the brakes. I mean, I don't get on the brakes aggressively in
23 any way. In fact, most of the time the only braking I do is a
24 brake check during the taxi check while we're taxiing out. That's
25 really the only time I would touch the brakes. And, yeah, yeah,

1 in fact, I -- yeah, I find that interesting too.

2 Q. But if the system is working, you think that it would be
3 transparent to the crewmember even if it was releasing, braking,
4 releasing, braking, however it -- whatever --

5 A. No, it's not --

6 Q. -- frequency that happens, would that be something you
7 wouldn't necessarily notice as a pilot?

8 A. No. No, you wouldn't. And I've seen -- yeah, I have seen
9 some pictures. I mean, I saw your initial whatever you call that,
10 that initial issuance of --

11 Q. Preliminary report.

12 A. -- preliminary report. And the picture of the onion tire --
13 what we call an onion tire. That's, yeah, that's not -- it's not
14 uncommon, honestly. And so a person with some experience in the
15 airplane, an appreciable amount, might not notice pulling off in
16 one direction or the other, yeah, if that wheel wasn't doing its
17 job. But I have seen anti-skid fail before, and the tires were
18 trashed because of that.

19 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Britt. I think that's all the
20 questions I have. So we'll go around one more time, see if
21 anybody else has any.

22 DR. SILVA: Just a few follow-ups.

23 BY DR. SILVA:

24 Q. When typically in a flight are you doing the performance
25 calculations for landing?

1 A. When it becomes questionable. When the planned information
2 becomes questionable.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And, yeah, so I mean we're coming up -- we're coming in
5 range. We call for the weather, and they would report something
6 affecting the friction for certain.

7 Q. So I just want to make sure I understood this properly. So
8 you're saying in flight, unless you're concerned about the planned
9 performance calculations, you wouldn't reference the airport
10 analysis chart? Is that fair?

11 A. That's correct, yeah.

12 Q. So how do you decide -- can you walk me through how you do
13 the performance? How you decide essentially what flap setting to
14 use, approach -- that sort of thing? When are those decisions
15 made?

16 A. Well, so the Dutch Harbor flights plan with flaps 35 and alt
17 CG numbers. And at -- after we get our initial runway report, if
18 for some reason we needed to reassess that information, well, the
19 guys, they're going to -- the guys are going to land down there on
20 flaps 20, and everybody is familiar with it already.

21 So they're not going to -- they don't -- generally don't get
22 out the performance binder to look and see if it doesn't -- it's
23 not questionable to them. Now, if we had a friction report, if
24 there was snow on the runway or something like that, and it became
25 questionable, a guy might pull it out and look at it.

1 Q. So you mentioned the Dutch's plan for flaps 35 and alt CG --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- 2. In what conditions would you consider maybe a flaps 20
4 landing? Would that require further analysis, if you dropped down
5 to a flaps 20?

6 A. Yeah. The difference between the two is generally 300 feet.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So, yeah, this is an interesting topic, of course.

9 Q. 300 feet on the rule or total landing distance?

10 A. Unfactored total landing distance, yeah, unfactored distance,
11 yeah. And that's just, that's right out of the performance
12 binder. It's very close to 300 feet. Yeah. So really the only
13 requirement -- only reason you get out the performance binder to
14 check it is if you had some other element that required you to
15 verify that you could do it. Yeah. What else are you interested
16 in?

17 Q. Do you have anything else? So the -- so from what I'm
18 hearing, you don't necessarily pull out those binders, whether
19 it's unfactored landing distance, for airport analysis. It's a
20 performance binder and the airport analysis -- are they two
21 separate things?

22 A. Right. The airport -- they're two separate things.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yeah. The airport analysis is produced by APG, and that is
25 the required -- that's the regulatory -- that's the information

1 that helps us assure that we're satisfying the regulatory
2 requirements as far as distance and performance go. And then the
3 performance binder, performance binder has a lot of charts taken
4 from the AOM. It has a random selection of charts in it.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And one -- a couple of those charts are unfactored landing
7 distances for flaps 20 and flaps 35.

8 Q. All right.

9 A. And so, and then there's other charts that lay out the
10 landing distance factors for various contaminants; dry runway, wet
11 runway. And then contaminated runway with various contaminants.
12 So and then there's crosswind limitations in there for those
13 various scenarios too. So these are the pages that are going to
14 help a guy -- a person figure out whether they can land the
15 aircraft and stop it within a comfortable distance.

16 Q. So is it fair to say that you don't necessarily pull out
17 those binders on every single flight?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. All right.

20 A. Yeah. Well, we do pull it out on every single flight. The
21 binder we do --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- because the speeds are in there.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. To set out speed bugs we queue up the performance binder.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. So when would you decide what your speeds would be? When in
4 a flight would you say? Is that something that's done early,
5 after --

6 A. Some people do it early. Some people do it later. Some
7 people do it -- some people have done -- do it right at 18,000,
8 they're working on the card. And sometimes it's just -- we just
9 wait until the top of descent because we get the -- getting the
10 weather and time to generate the landing data card.

11 Q. So would you typically wait until you have weather to do that
12 or is that -- is weather information not necessary to --

13 A. Actually, the weather is not necessarily necessary. The
14 margins on the numbers are sometimes a couple thousand pounds. So
15 they're going to give you one number that's going to cover the
16 swath of 2,000 pounds, 3,000 pounds maybe. And so there's --
17 you're able to estimate your landing weight well in advance of
18 when you get there. So the numbers can be generated at any time
19 prior to top of descent really. So --

20 Q. Okay. You mentioned a CPA agreement coming into Dutch. What
21 does that mean?

22 A. Capacity Purchase Agreement.

23 Q. Okay. So can you elaborate on what that means?

24 A. Well, I'm not an expert on that. All I know is what I've
25 been told by others --

1 Q. Right, right.

2 A. -- my peers, you know, and you can --

3 Q. What's your understanding?

4 A. -- look it up and Google it of course and read about them.
5 From my understanding is Alaska Airlines buys the flight, and they
6 pay for us to go down there, and it's a fixed rate, fixed fee or
7 something like that. I mean, I don't even know what the fee is,
8 honestly.

9 But all I know is that with that kind of arrangement there's
10 no, there's no jeopardy for us to go down there because it's a
11 long flight, sometimes difficult to make that decision to launch.
12 Because what -- how will it be when we get down there? So, I
13 mean, that's a good arrangement because it's just -- nobody feels
14 any -- and as professionals, I mean, that's really not part of our
15 decision --

16 Q. Yeah.

17 A. -- to consider that, but, I mean, you have to admit that it
18 probably is in the back of some people's minds when they have to
19 go around or go missed. But so it's a good thing I think.

20 Q. Is that common knowledge amongst the pilot base would you
21 say?

22 A. Common, like what kind of -- what would common be? 90
23 percent of us understand it?

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I think probably 80 to 90 percent of people understand that,

1 yeah.

2 Q. Okay. In terms of CRM, is that tested at all in ground
3 training? Is there any kind of CRM evaluation?

4 A. Yeah, there might be a question on that in the test. I can't
5 say for sure. Kirk generates the tests, and he provides me with
6 the tests.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So there could be a question.

9 Q. So it's a comprehensive test not purely based on one module?
10 It's --

11 A. Yeah. There's several. There's several tests.

12 Q. Do you know how many ground instructors there are?

13 A. Well, there's -- I believe there's Kirk, there's myself, and
14 I believe Greg Pfeiffer is also a ground instructor.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I think he's been recently trained. I don't know if he's
17 taught any classes though.

18 Q. Okay. There's the three of you sounds like.

19 A. I'm not sure about that. Yeah.

20 Q. Okay. And then what was your training like to become a
21 ground instructor? What did that look like?

22 A. It's only a couple hours, and it can be done in a day. I
23 also -- I have a CFI. But it's laid out in the FOTM exactly what
24 to do to train a ground instructor, and I think it's -- I mean,
25 I'm not certain, it might have been 6 hours of -- I think it was a

1 6 -- there's a 6 and a .5 or something like that. And it has to
2 do with fundamentals of instruction.

3 Q. Did you seek out the opportunity, or was that presented to
4 you?

5 A. No. It was presented to me. Yeah, I didn't really want to
6 do it, but once I got to doing it, I enjoy it. So --

7 DR. SILVA: Okay. Great. That is all the questions I have.
8 Thank you.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Dujuan.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: I do not have any further questions. Thank
11 you.

12 MR. WILSON: Nothing from me.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Tony.

14 MR. FISCHER: I've got a couple.

15 BY MR. FISCHER:

16 Q. Britt, did you do this ground instructing or any kind of
17 instructing at the previous operator?

18 A. No.

19 Q. No. So at Everts you just -- you flew the line --

20 A. I was a line captain, yeah.

21 Q. I think you alluded to that most of the braking that you
22 experienced in the Saab 2000 is done with the propellers. I think
23 that's what you alluded to when you say you hardly touch the
24 brakes.

25 A. Yeah. Well, that's true. And I, honestly -- actually, so

1 the scenarios here is we have a lot of special airports, and
2 during my time here, we've had a lot of captains upgrading -- new
3 captains. So I've flown with a lot of new captains.

4 There have been some occasions when I did fly with a check
5 airman and, of course, so what this leads to is I end up landing
6 in, I end up landing in Anchorage an awful lot, and there's no
7 reason to get on the brakes in Anchorage. Runway is super long,
8 and there you have it.

9 Q. Okay. So --

10 A. So the transfer of controls is also going to occur before
11 there's any need to step on the brakes.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. 80 knots.

14 Q. Right, right. And that's usually typically of a turboprop.

15 A. Yeah, right. So and the propellers do -- they do a lot of
16 the work, yeah.

17 Q. Now, have you ever landed at Dutch with flaps 35? And I
18 under --

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. I understand why flaps 20 because it's weight on wheels for
21 braking, I'm assuming.

22 A. Well, yeah. This is an interesting thing. Why wouldn't we
23 land with flaps 35 in Dutch Harbor? Why wouldn't we? Why
24 wouldn't anybody just land with all the flaps they can land with a
25 3,900-foot runway? I mean, on a marginal distance -- because

1 every airplane has got its own stuff.

2 And I have pondered this, and the only thing I can establish
3 is -- and I haven't been here, of course, that long, but the
4 stories I hear from fellows is when the plane first came on there
5 was some pilot-induced oscillation with flaps 35 on final. Okay.
6 So the electric tail -- there's a gearing for airspeed involved.
7 And so the inputs to the elevator, sometimes they would get
8 themselves in a bit of turbulence and start chasing the pitch
9 control, pilot-induced oscillation, right.

10 So don't land with flaps 35. Land with flaps 20. It's way
11 better, way more stable at places like Dutch Harbor, Sand Harbor
12 [sic], the shorter runways, right. And then when we come back to
13 Anchorage, the runway is super long. So what do you think
14 captain's going to say? Why don't you just run flaps 20, right.
15 Then we'll just, we'll roar right off and get off the runway
16 quicker. So it's become an institutionalized concept.

17 Q. One thing in the ground school or the ground instruction that
18 you did, did you -- you talked about any tactile clues for, say,
19 special airports, and I'm foggy on whether you did special
20 airports training with these guys or --

21 A. Yeah, I think I -- I'm sure I did. I mean, the module should
22 have been included. Tactile or do you mean textural maybe?

23 Q. Well --

24 A. Are we talking about the black water -- reading the water?

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. Yeah. It's in the -- I know it's in the PowerPoint.

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. I know it's in there. So --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah. I mean, I'm pretty, I'm pretty darn sure. If it isn't
6 in there, I'll sound bad, of course.

7 Q. Sure you would have --

8 A. Yeah. I found those PowerPoints to be very interesting. The
9 people that designed them included a lot of carnal knowledge, and
10 they're pretty -- they're very -- I think they're very good.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Tony.

12 I have one more thing.

13 BY MR. FRANTZ:

14 Q. Before PenAir did you have much -- or how much experience did
15 you have going to Dutch Harbor? Any?

16 A. I went down there, you know, I don't know how many -- exactly
17 how many times, but I did go to Dutch a couple of times in the DC-
18 6. Probably not more than a dozen times.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And --

21 MR. FISCHER: Marv, do you mind if I ask one more question?

22 MR. FRANTZ: Oh, sure.

23 BY MR. FISCHER:

24 Q. I'm a little bit baffled when you say you're cleared for the
25 -- 1-3 approach, do you feel you're only limited to landing 1-3?

1 Because I think that if you --

2 A. Yeah. This is the conversation. That's the way it goes.
3 Are we limited to landing 1-3? Because this is not a circling
4 approach. This is a non-precision with a fly to leg.

5 Q. Right.

6 A. And a fly to leg is the dash line, and it's depicted on the
7 approach plate. The minimums for both approaches are the same.
8 They're 500 feet. So when you arrive at the MDA for runway 3-1,
9 you're going to go in the back door --

10 Q. Right.

11 A. -- and you see clearly that it's got a shower in it. We
12 don't -- and the -- now we're in the blind spot, too, and we can't
13 talk to the weather observer because we're on the back side of the
14 mountain. But when we look off to our right it's wide open, it's
15 clear. There's no precipitation over there at all. It's a high
16 ceiling. It's a beautiful, beautiful day right there. So the
17 minimums are the same on going both ways.

18 So this is the way the conversation goes. Why can't we go
19 that way? I mean, there's people that say -- would say, yeah, you
20 can't, you can't do that because it's not a circling approach.
21 Technicality.

22 Q. Okay. But say you're -- you've done the approach, you're on
23 a visual of 1-3 right now, you do a go-around, and you just circle
24 down like you would come around again. That's -- you're
25 maneuvering for a visual approach. Does the pilot group feel that

1 they're limited to landing 1-3 or that they can maneuver for 3-1?

2 A. No. I think the pilot group would certainly go the other
3 way. They would -- I'm sorry. Did you mention why we went
4 around? I don't think I heard you say that we went around, like,
5 because of a tailwind or something like that.

6 Q. I, I --

7 A. Or the wind's changed or something. But if it certainly
8 became apparent to us that the winds were not favoring landing on
9 1-3, there's no question in my mind people would turn around and
10 go the other way. They would land it in the wind. Yeah.

11 Q. Yeah, but they wouldn't do a missed approach. They'd do a
12 go-around, and then --

13 A. No.

14 Q. -- maneuver a visual?

15 A. Yeah. Yeah. In fact --

16 Q. That's what I'm getting at.

17 A. In fact, yeah, in fact, yeah.

18 MR. FISCHER: I don't know if I went --

19 MR. FRANTZ: No, I think that clarifies something for me.

20 BY MR. FRANTZ:

21 Q. So here's one thing I just want to get your impression of.
22 You got 800 hours in the Saab?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Roughly. So you -- potentially, you could be flying with
25 captains with less time who are going to --

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. -- Dutch Harbor.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So right now PenAir requirement is 300 hours in the airplane
5 to get qualified for a special airport or even 100 with a waiver.
6 That's the PenAir policy now to go to a special airport like
7 Dutch. Is that sufficient in your view?

8 A. First officer has been down there numerous times. He's got
9 experience in the environment down there. Is 300 hours necessary
10 for as -- is 300 hours PIC necessary to go? Yeah, hard to say.
11 There's no substitute for experience, of course. Yeah.

12 Q. Okay. Good. Thank you. Do you have anything that we didn't
13 ask you about that you think we should have?

14 A. No, no.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Talked about the flap, the flaps 35 thing. That's always
17 been puzzling me, and I wanted to talk about that when I came in
18 here.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. So --

21 Q. Anything else you want to add?

22 A. No, no. Just regardless of how I answered a question, I just
23 want you guys to know that I appreciate what you do.

24 DR. SILVA: We appreciate you talking to us.

25 MR. GOUDEY: The FAA too. I really appreciate the FAA too.

1 When those guys come around the ramp, I always tell them they
2 raised the bar for me. So it's very important.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you.

4 Okay. We can go off the record.

5 (Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Britt Goudey


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 2, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Katherine Motley
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/21/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: SARAH BOOTS
Captain, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Wednesday,
December 4, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Ms. Boots)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Sarah Boots:		
By Dr. Sevillian		6
By Dr. Silva		11
By Mr. Frantz		31
By Mr. Wilson		43
By Mr. Fischer		44
By Dr. Sevillian		45
By Dr. Silva		48
By Mr. Frantz		56
By Mr. Wilson		59

I N T E R V I E W

(8:56 a.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Good morning, Sarah. How are you doing
4 today?

5 MS. BOOTS: I'm good. How are you?

6 DR. SEVILLIAN: Good. My name is Dajuan Sevillian. I'm an
7 NTSB investigator, and we really appreciate you coming in to talk
8 with us for the interview.

9 So what you're seeing around the table is we have NTSB
10 investigators and members of our parties. Our party system is
11 built so that they -- folks that are part of it help us with the
12 investigation. They provide resources, et cetera.

13 You're here because you're the expert. We want to hear from
14 you because your knowledge and background is going to help us with
15 the investigation.

16 MS. BOOTS: Okay.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right? As we've stated before,
18 everything is being recorded. The things that we're going to talk
19 about today are going to be a part of a public docket in the
20 future. So just to let you know that everything that we talk
21 about will be available in the public domain.

22 What we'll do today is we'll go through a series of
23 questions, and then we'll have about two rounds of questioning,
24 and then we'll ask you if you have any comments or questions as
25 well.

1 You're allowed one representative. Could you state for the
2 record who you'd like to represent you today?

3 MS. BOOTS: Mr. Morgan Campbell.

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

5 MR. CAMPBELL: In spite of the serious danger, I'll steal her
6 coffee.

7 MS. BOOTS: I think mine's a little more obvious than anyone
8 else's.

9 DR. SEVILLIAN: And when we're going through the interview,
10 it's okay if you -- if there's something that you don't know, to
11 say that. I don't know, et cetera. So that's fine as well.

12 So what we'll do is we'll go around the table, have everyone
13 introduce themselves, and then we'll go on to commence with the
14 interview, so --

15 MS. BOOTS: Okay, sounds good.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Marvin, go ahead.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational factors
18 investigator with the NTSB.

19 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance
20 investigator with the NTSB.

21 MR. WILSON: Brandon, check airman.

22 MR. FISCHER: Tony Fischer. I'm an aviation safety inspector
23 with the Denali CMO.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah. And another thing to know is that the
25 FAA is not here for enforcement at any, at any point, just for

1 safety.

2 MS. BOOTS: Okay.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: So with that being said, do you have any
4 questions or comments before we get started?

5 MS. BOOTS: I don't think so.

6 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

7 INTERVIEW OF SARAH BOOTS

8 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

9 Q. So for the record, Sarah, could you please state your full
10 name with spelling?

11 A. Sarah, S-a-r-a-h, Bethany, B-e-t-h-a-n-y, Boots, B-o-o-t-s.

12 Q. Okay. And what is your role here at PenAir?

13 A. I have been a captain here at PenAir since June of this year.

14 Q. Okay. And could you briefly state your roles and
15 responsibilities as captain?

16 A. To the safety of the flight, to be in charge of the crew, to
17 make decisions concerning -- decisions related to the starting,
18 continuation, and completion of the flight.

19 Q. Are there any other positions that you hold with the company?

20 A. No. That's all.

21 Q. Can you give us just a brief sketch of your aviation
22 background?

23 A. I started at Eastern Kentucky University in 2009 for a pro
24 flight degree and got all my ratings there. I became a flight
25 instructor there, got my CFI, MEI, all that, and continued to

1 instruct there part-time for about 3 years. And then I moved up
2 to Alaska for this job in October 2016.

3 Q. Okay. Do you have any flight experience in the Saab 2000 or
4 Saab 340?

5 A. None in the Saab 340. All my flight experience has been in
6 the Saab 2000 since I started flying up here.

7 Q. Okay. How many total hours do you have flying in general?

8 A. Just roughly over 3,000, a little bit over 3,000.

9 Q. 3,000. And how much in the Saab 2000?

10 A. It's about 1,700, I believe. 1,800.

11 Q. Okay. So as far as, you know, flying experience, et cetera,
12 when you became captain, what sort of qualifications from the
13 standpoint of airport qualifications did you have to go through?
14 You know, obviously there's special airports around here. Did you
15 have to go through any airport qualifications?

16 A. Not for anything but this. I mean, we had to do at least 20
17 hours of IOE once I got on the line, but it wasn't anything in
18 regards to which airports you were going through. It's just 20
19 hours of time to make sure that you were ready to be in the left
20 seat by yourself. And then once -- I would -- to get -- were to
21 get 300 hours, that's when I would start getting special airport
22 qualifications.

23 Q. And what's your, what's your knowledge of the 300-hours rule?

24 A. The 300-hour rule has been around for as long as I have been
25 here that I know of, where, once you reach 300 hours of PIC in the

1 type of aircraft that you, you know, are flying, then at that
2 point you can go with a check airman who checks you out, you know,
3 whenever you feel comfortable -- whenever they feel comfortable
4 that you have the experience and knowledge to operate there safely
5 without a check airman. Then you get signed off by them, and you
6 are free to be scheduled to those airports.

7 Q. How often do you fly up to Dutch Harbor?

8 A. Not very much now, because I just got to 300 hours. So I've
9 gone maybe three or four times since I've upgraded, just with a
10 check airman to get some more experience going in there.

11 Q. Okay. When did you get checked out for Dutch Harbor? When
12 was it?

13 A. I haven't.

14 Q. You haven't? Okay. So you've been to Dutch Harbor three or
15 four times --

16 A. Since upgrading.

17 Q. -- since the upgrade.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Can you describe your experience flying into Dutch?

20 A. I've been flying in there since I was a first officer. So
21 about 2½ years, several times a month. Several -- you know, 30,
22 40 landings in there probably. And I don't even -- like, hundreds
23 of times going in there as a first officer.

24 Q. And when you fly into Dutch, how do you get the weather?

25 A. We call up the -- we have a weather person, a weather

1 observer on the ground there. So once we get -- I usually call
2 about 50 miles outside of MORDI, one of our approach fixes, and --
3 about 20 to 25 minutes before our scheduled time of landing and
4 tell her when we're going to be there. And then she or he will
5 report the weather to us.

6 Q. And in terms of the weather in Dutch Harbor, is it, is it
7 constant weather patterns or is it variable? Or how is that in
8 that experience?

9 A. I mean, it depends on the day. Like, in the winter, you
10 might get a lot of snow squalls. It just depends on the weather
11 patterns. I wouldn't call it constant. It changes a lot, but I
12 think there are changes that you learn to expect, I suppose.

13 Q. Is there any type of mechanism or information that you use to
14 get the wind coming into Dutch?

15 A. We talk to our weather observer there, and then whenever
16 you're -- you know, can see the water. We look at the water to
17 see what it's doing out in the bay before we get behind Ballyhoo.
18 Once we're on approach, we can also look at the water and see what
19 direction, like, it's coming from. Usually our weather observers
20 are pretty good about giving us two or three more calls on the
21 winds, especially if it's a windy day, while we're on the
22 approach.

23 Q. So when you're calculating the -- you're coming in, let's
24 just say, from MORDI, and you're trying to get the weight and
25 comparing information. What documentation are you using to get

1 the flight prepared for landing?

2 A. We can look at our airport analysis to make sure -- and
3 that's what we're dispatched off of, to make sure that we can
4 legally land there. And then if it's, you know, a question, from
5 there, if you want to figure out what's your actual unfactored
6 landing distance, how much runway are you going to use, we can go
7 into our performance binder. And there's a chart in there that
8 shows, based off the current winds, you know, whether you have a
9 5-knot headwind, a 10-knot headwind, you can figure out how much
10 runway you're going to use without taking into account the landing
11 within 60 percent of the runway.

12 Q. And at what point in the flight are you using the performance
13 binder?

14 A. I'll usually use it maybe 30 minutes outside of landing. So
15 I'll get all of the numbers -- when I was going in as an FO, I'd
16 get all the numbers based on our calculated fuel burn and our
17 landing numbers for flaps 20 and flaps 35. And then maybe 30
18 minutes outside of landing, look at that, you know, performance
19 calculation to make sure it looked like it was completely doable.

20 Q. Okay. Has there ever been any situations where you've had to
21 land in a tailwind?

22 A. Not that I can remember.

23 Q. Okay. Okay.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Those are the questions I have for right now.

25 MS. BOOTS: All right.

1 DR. SEVILLIAN: Sathya?

2 DR. SILVA: Sure.

3 BY DR. SILVA:

4 Q. Can you describe your upgrade training?

5 A. I was approached by Crystal if I wanted to upgrade, so I was
6 put into an April -- I think it was April 22 class. And then we
7 did 3 weeks of systems and took a final exam and several exams
8 throughout that class, and then went down to -- we did three
9 different sit sessions, where we'd sit in our little, you know,
10 "paper tiger" and go through flows and everything with our sim
11 partner, and then a little over 2 weeks of sim training before the
12 check ride.

13 Q. Did you have CRM training as part of the upgrade?

14 A. It's part of the, you know, ground class as far as I remember
15 for the systems. It's kind of built in there. And all the
16 initial hires, I know they get, like, a week and a half or 2 weeks
17 of all that, a little bit more focused on that and company policy.

18 Q. Do you know whether that CRM training went into captain
19 leadership roles or anything along those lines?

20 A. I don't know.

21 Q. Do you not remember, or you don't think they did?

22 A. I don't, I mean, I don't -- I guess maybe restate the
23 question. I'm not sure if I understand.

24 Q. So was there any aspect of captain leadership in your upgrade
25 training?

1 A. I would say not, like, any formal, you know, sit down and
2 have a class on it type training.

3 Q. Okay. Do you feel like you were adequately prepared after
4 going through that training to sit left seat?

5 A. I think so.

6 Q. So you mentioned you have just over 300 hours. Do you know
7 how much as captain?

8 A. 325.

9 Q. 325. When did you start flying into Dutch as captain?

10 A. I haven't been signed off to do it, so I've only done it with
11 -- I think, three or four times with Dennis Fisher as a check
12 airman, kind of just as, like, a -- to, you know, give me more
13 opportunity to see it before I were to get to the point where I
14 had 300 hours to get checked out.

15 Q. Did that all happen before you got 300 hours?

16 A. Yes, ma'am.

17 Q. Do you remember about when in the last couple months that
18 you've been into Dutch?

19 A. I was the last airplane in there on -- was it October 17?
20 And then I'd been in, I think, a couple times, like, the week
21 before and then the week before that. I'd say, like,
22 mid-September to mid-October. Yeah.

23 Q. Do you know if that's -- that training into Dutch is part of
24 your formal training, or is that --

25 A. It's not. It was just something extra that, you know, I

1 decided and our chief pilot had decided would be a good idea.

2 Q. Okay. Did you approach her with that?

3 A. Well, originally, it wasn't really a conversation. She put
4 me on the schedule to be checked out to go to Dutch Harbor with
5 150 hours. And I got a call from our manager of scheduling asking
6 if I was ready for that and okay with that. And I told him I
7 wasn't; I'd like to wait until I got 300 hours. So I think he
8 broached it with the chief pilot, and then a meeting later, we
9 decided that -- you know, she asked if that would be something
10 that I was interested in, and I said absolutely.

11 Q. Okay. So she put you on the schedule at 150?

12 A. Um-hmm.

13 Q. Okay. And you hadn't had any specific training in Dutch
14 before?

15 A. No, nothing specific. Just, you know, going there as a first
16 officer.

17 Q. Do you remember if that flight was with a check airman, or
18 was that for you, PIC -- as PIC, going into Dutch?

19 A. I never -- so I never got put on the schedule after she said
20 that, because I told her I wasn't ready. So then those flights
21 after were still -- I was still a PIC as far as I understand, and
22 Dennis was just sitting there more as, like, a teaching pilot, you
23 know.

24 Q. So why did you, why did you want to wait till 300?

25 A. I just felt like, if there was a rule in place, it's probably

1 for a reason. And that's what our senior pilots had decided was a
2 good safety net for all of us. And I felt like it was completely
3 worthwhile to get a little more experience in the left seat and be
4 a little bit more comfortable with it, you know, on a day-to-day
5 basis before I kind of broadened my horizons and started going to
6 more challenging airports.

7 Q. Do you remember when that conversation happened? 150 hours?

8 A. That was August 30, is when that conversation with Iain
9 happened. And then the later conversation with Crystal was, I
10 think, a week after that.

11 Q. Okay. What were -- what was -- I know there's been a lot
12 that's happened since the accident, a lot of information that's
13 come out. But at that time, what was your understanding of the
14 minimum requirements going into a special airport?

15 A. The minimum requirements were 300 hours of PIC in the type of
16 aircraft, and then you went with a check airman until you were
17 each sufficiently comfortable with being signed off together. I
18 know there's a caveat that -- I think it's a letter of
19 recommendation from the chief pilot and the check airman. They
20 both have to be in agreement that you can go there earlier if
21 everyone's on the same page about it.

22 Q. But you were aware of the caveat at that point?

23 A. I was.

24 Q. So is that -- from your understanding, do you wait to start
25 training until you meet those minimum requirements or essentially

1 get that qualification check? Or can you get the training
2 beforehand, get signed off before you hit 300 and then just start
3 flying?

4 A. If I understand the question right, you can, you can start
5 the training earlier than 300 hours, but that's only if, you know,
6 your check airman and your chief pilot are all in agreement for
7 you to do so. So that was an option, but it was never really one
8 that I think we'd taken advantage of in the past before recently.
9 Like, I don't remember really anyone actually getting their
10 sign-off to go to special airports until they reached 300 hours
11 and then started going with a check airman.

12 Q. Okay. So with your experience at Dutch, both as captain and
13 first officer, if you were to talk someone through going there the
14 first time, how would you do that? What would you, what would you
15 explain?

16 A. I would probably show them both approaches and then make sure
17 we have a good -- you know, have all our landing information
18 written down, our ref speeds and all of that, and then get
19 weather. Talk to them maybe about what different altitudes you
20 want to be at what point, what airspeed. Talk about what you're
21 going to see once you get there. And then, depending on the
22 runway, maybe what you're going to expect based on what the winds
23 are going to be.

24 Q. How would you describe the weather patterns?

25 A. I mean, I think there's certain -- I wouldn't say they're

1 consistent necessarily. It just kind of depends on whether you
2 have a front moving through or a squall moving through or
3 something like that, or whether it might be a nice, calm, clear
4 day in Dutch Harbor.

5 But I think you see a lot of weather patterns there, so you
6 get used to understanding what to expect when you have a certain
7 -- you know, wind from a certain direction and how you would
8 approach it based on where the wind is coming from, maybe.

9 Q. Are there any -- is there anything unique to Dutch Harbor
10 that you would convey in terms of the weather?

11 A. I don't know. I mean, it's just kind of its own, its own
12 airport. You have to just understand what you're getting into
13 before you go in there, I think. I don't know if -- I mean, it's
14 very unique, I would say. Absolutely. But I don't have a
15 specific word to put to it, I guess.

16 Q. Okay. So when you come in, you mentioned you talk to Dutch
17 weather. Do you ever listen to the AWOS? Is that a normal
18 procedure?

19 A. No, it's not a normal procedure. I don't think I've ever
20 listened to the AWOS going into Dutch Harbor. I might do it if
21 I'm sitting on the ground and it looks like -- or I know the
22 altimeter's dropping, or it looks like there's something coming
23 through. I might listen to it on the ground before we take off,
24 but I've never listened to it --

25 Q. Okay. Do you -- why do you have that preference to talk to

1 Dutch weather?

2 A. Because you're talking to a person who has a lot of
3 experience understanding Dutch Harbor weather for the most part,
4 especially Michelle. She's been down there for a while. So I
5 think you get a lot better information when you're talking to her,
6 because she's getting basically what the AWOS is doing, and then
7 she can elaborate on it.

8 And, you know, you can ask her questions, like, okay, you
9 know, has it been pretty consistently out of that direction in the
10 last 30 minutes? Or have you seen any squalls moving through? Or
11 does it look like the ceilings are lower in the back door or in
12 the front door? So you just get a lot more, I think, bigger
13 picture when you're talking to Dutch weather.

14 Q. Do you -- have you ever had any concerns about the AWOS not
15 being accurate?

16 A. No, because I don't really -- yeah, we don't really use it,
17 honestly.

18 Q. So when it comes to using Dutch weather, is that really
19 training-based, that you've always been instructed --

20 A. Yeah, that's the way that we've always been taught to do it,
21 and that's the way that we've always done it in the past.

22 Q. Okay. You mentioned you had 30 to 40 landings at Dutch
23 Harbor? When did you get those landings?

24 A. I'd say probably starting from maybe a year, year and a half
25 after I was first officer all the way up until I upgraded.

1 Q. Okay. So were you with check airmen at those times?

2 A. Um-hmm.

3 Q. Okay.

4 MR. CAMPBELL: I'm sorry. You have to say yes or no for the
5 benefit of the court reporter.

6 MS. BOOTS: Yes. Sorry. Yes.

7 BY DR. SILVA:

8 Q. Okay. Was that a typical procedure where, as the first
9 officer, you would get to land at Dutch Harbor?

10 A. Once you, like, once you've flown with check airmen enough,
11 and they think that you're ready to start seeing that and
12 experiencing it firsthand, yes, they'll start letting you -- on
13 nice days in Dutch, I would say, start letting you land in Dutch
14 Harbor, just so you can get more practice going in there. I mean,
15 it's kind of disconcerting if your first landing in Dutch Harbor
16 is one in the left seat.

17 Q. Yeah. Yeah. You mentioned landing performance calculations.
18 Is that something you do for every single flight?

19 A. Yeah, pretty much.

20 Q. And when -- you talked about when you do that in the flight,
21 but is that -- are you using weather information to do that -- to
22 do the calculations?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Which weather? Like --

25 A. Mostly the winds. So if you have, if you -- once you can get

1 your weather and you know, okay, well, we're going to have a
2 10-knot headwind, then you can see what your landing performance
3 is going to be based on that versus -- I think we're dispatched at
4 0 winds.

5 Q. Right. Okay. So are you using the wind information in the
6 dispatch paperwork, or are you waiting till you get more current?

7 A. Waiting until we get current -- you know, we call Dutch
8 weather and get current information there.

9 Q. Okay. Have you ever flown with Justin Lunn?

10 A. I have not.

11 Q. Did you have any experience with Paul Wells at all?

12 A. Not outside of just seeing him around and, you know,
13 occasionally chatting to him. I have not flown with him or been
14 in a classroom with him or anything like that.

15 Q. What were your interactions like with him?

16 A. He always seemed nice. He seemed friendly. I think he
17 seemed pretty excited about his new role.

18 Q. What's your favorite thing about working here?

19 A. I love just, like, the little sense that it's a small
20 airline, and we all know each other. And I came in as an
21 outsider, you know, not knowing anyone. So this kind of group of
22 people, they've taught me a lot about flying and just been kind of
23 like a family to me, I would say.

24 Q. How have things changed since the bankruptcy and the merger?

25 A. I think there's less of a sense of that. I think we lost a

1 lot of quality employees and very experienced employees throughout
2 the start of the bankruptcy. And whenever, you know, we realized
3 who we were going to be a part of, I think that also scared some
4 people off. So it's -- and it just seems like less of that. It's
5 more of a business and less of that community, and just more
6 focus, I think, on getting the flights going than whether they
7 should be going or not.

8 Q. Okay. So with that change in focus in terms of whether they
9 should be going, have you ever received any kind of pressure to
10 take a flight?

11 A. Yes, ma'am.

12 Q. Can you describe that instance or multiple instances?

13 A. August 30, it was the same day that Crystal wanted me -- she
14 was going to put me on the schedule for Dutch Harbor. I'd come
15 into work at 5:55 in the morning to do a Dillingham and then a
16 King Salmon flight.

17 And the weather -- by the time that I'd got my weather
18 briefing and got over to the hangar with the airplane, the weather
19 had gone completely downhill and was, like, three quarters of a
20 mile visibility and not even legal to launch at that point. So we
21 delayed for a bit, and then somewhere around 9 o'clock decided to
22 cancel the first flight.

23 So our next flight, I believe, was between 10:30 and 11:00,
24 somewhere in that range, to go to King Salmon. And then crew
25 scheduling decided they really wanted to go to Dillingham for some

1 reason, even though the weather was still below minimums out
2 there. So they changed our King Salmon flight to a Dillingham
3 flight. So then we sat around, I think, until 11:00, and it was
4 still -- I was calling 2 miles visibility and 500 as either broken
5 or overcast. I don't remember. Very low. Right at the edge of,
6 you know, what we would need to get in there.

7 And I told them I wasn't really comfortable with going there
8 just off of what the current -- because it was completely
9 unforecast. You know, weather was supposed to be 10 miles all
10 day. It was smoke. It was fog. And the cameras that I was
11 looking at didn't really look like they were portraying it
12 actually being 2 miles' visibility, so I said I wanted to see more
13 of a positive trend of it actually clearing up before I headed out
14 there.

15 So we waited another hour until noon, and then it was still
16 the same weather. So our dispatcher asked me what I wanted to do,
17 if I wanted to wait another hour. At that point, I was kind of
18 frustrated because we'd been at work for over 6 hours and we're
19 going to wait another hour, so 7 hours before we even got into an
20 airplane, and the crew that's pretty exhausted.

21 So I asked to speak to crew scheduling, and I asked the
22 person in crew scheduling how long they planned on holding onto
23 this flight because we had other people on reserve. So basically,
24 how long are you planning on trying to make this work? And he
25 told me, as long as it takes.

1 So at that point I told him, well, my crew and I don't really
2 feel comfortable being -- you know, showing up at work at 6:00
3 a.m., being here for 6 hours already, and going out to Dillingham
4 and doing a non-precision approach down to minimums and probably
5 going missed off of it, quite frankly, with where the weather was
6 at. And he said, well, it's legal. So I responded with, that
7 doesn't mean it's a smart or a safe decision. And he said, fine,
8 we'll cancel, and then, like, hung up, hung up the phone on me.
9 So I'm like, okay, well, I guess that's that.

10 So I was sitting in there waiting to figure out what we were
11 doing with the airplane, whether we needed to taxi it back or get
12 a ride in the crew van. And then I got a message from Crystal
13 asking if she could see me in her office. So when I got back
14 here, her and Deke Abbott were waiting for me and dropped me into
15 her office and asked me what happened and pretty much how I felt
16 about it. And I explained basically all that stuff. And they
17 didn't take it very well.

18 Q. What do you mean by "didn't take it very well?" How was --
19 what was their response?

20 A. Their response was they didn't understand what was unsafe
21 about it. Deke told me that it was unprofessional and immature
22 and that I didn't get to have my own set of standards. He told me
23 if I had a legal airplane, legal weather, and legal crew, then it
24 was my job to go. He said that the only thing I should be worried
25 about was what the forecast visibility was, because that was the

1 only thing that was legally binding. He said that if I stood by
2 my decision and told him I'd do it the next day, that he didn't,
3 he didn't trust my decision-making in the left seat, and he didn't
4 think I deserved to be on the flight line anymore.

5 Q. In your opinion, was that a threat on your continued job
6 here?

7 A. I think -- yeah. I perceived it as a threat.

8 Q. What was Crystal's response?

9 A. She wasn't as aggressive, I would say, as Deke, but she 100
10 percent agreed with him. She didn't see why it was unsafe in any
11 way and agreed that, if it was, you know, if it was legal, it was
12 our job to go.

13 Q. So how did that end?

14 A. I told them I understood where they were coming from, you
15 know, that yes, it's our job to check it out, but I didn't, I
16 didn't agree with, you know, every -- all the factors leading into
17 it. I still didn't think it was a smart decision. And I told
18 them, yeah, like, if you want -- I don't understand it, but if
19 it's something that I feel safe about in the future, I will go.

20 I know their -- that I knew their opinion about it now, and I
21 think Deke was pretty much like, well, if it were up to me, you
22 wouldn't be flying tomorrow; we'd take you off the flight line.
23 But it's not my decision; it's Crystal's. So Crystal said that
24 she'd think about it and call me later that day. So she called
25 later that day and pretty much just asked what I'd learned,

1 basically, and said that we could consider it a counseling session
2 and that I would still be on the schedule tomorrow. I could show
3 up to work.

4 Q. So how did you feel about that?

5 A. Pretty angry, I would say. It was just completely different
6 from, like, the PenAir that I'd always known. And I try to take
7 the responsibility pretty seriously for being a captain, so it
8 felt like that responsibility and that decision was taking --
9 like, being taken away from me. So that was not a good feeling.

10 Q. So how were your interactions since then?

11 A. More civil, I would say. I didn't have to talk to Deke
12 anymore. I was supposed to talk to Deke again for whatever
13 reason, but that never came to fruition. I talked to Crystal a
14 week later, and she once again asked me what I learned about it,
15 and we had some discussion and what-if scenarios.

16 And from there on out, I just kind of went into it expecting
17 to -- if the weather was legal, then I was going to be expected to
18 launch. And unless I really felt like it was an unsafe decision
19 to put an airplane in the air, I'd just take a lot of gas and do a
20 missed approach and come back. Because what they seemed to really
21 want is just an airplane off the ground, whether there was any
22 shot of it making it to its destination or not.

23 Q. So would you say that you changed your behavior based on
24 their -- that conversation?

25 A. Absolutely.

1 Q. What were you supposed to meet with Deke about?

2 A. I don't know. I had known Sarah Fraher, Ravn's chief pilot,
3 previous to this encounter. So Crystal wanted me to meet with
4 Sarah the following week, so I met with Sarah. It was a lot more
5 of a calm situation, and we talked about it. And then I guess
6 Deke wanted to see me again because I think he felt like I had an
7 attitude about the entire situation and wanted to make sure that I
8 knew what was expected of me. And then I had to meet with Crystal
9 again later in the following week, kind of for the same reasons.

10 Q. Okay. How was your conversation with Sarah?

11 A. Like I said, it was a lot more calm. She just asked me to
12 tell her what happened. I told her the story, and she's like,
13 okay, I see where you're coming from, and kind of gave me some
14 advice. Like, maybe next time just call fatigued if that's what
15 you guys are feeling. Or try to, you know, call Crystal
16 beforehand when you have a problem with the crew scheduler. Just,
17 you know, different ways that I could have changed it where it
18 might not have been such a reaction from them.

19 But she did say it seemed like they kind of overreacted a
20 little bit. And she gave me a scenario of what a Ravn pilot had
21 done a few months prior that might be a cause of why they
22 responded the way that they did. And she's just like, you're
23 fine; don't worry about it. You're doing good. Just keep going.
24 So it was a lot more productive, I think, of a conversation.

25 Q. Would you feel comfortable calling fatigue if you felt it?

1 A. Yeah. Yeah, I would. It's kind of been -- I think in the
2 past it's something that we don't really get to the point of very
3 much here, just because we were never expected to sit on weather
4 hold for 6 hours. You know, they would understand, like, okay,
5 this is -- we're pushing too much. And you had the decision as a
6 captain to just be like, hey, this is -- why are we trying to make
7 this work so hard? Maybe we should look at canceling it.

8 And that seemed to be a decision that was respected in the
9 past, so it didn't -- I would be, and I have in the past, called
10 fatigued. But it was more of it never, ever got to that stage, I
11 would think, in the past.

12 Q. Do you feel like you would have gotten lash back for calling
13 fatigue?

14 A. I think I might have.

15 Q. So you didn't use those words necessarily, but you --

16 A. No.

17 Q. -- described it.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. And so her advice was to --

20 A. Actually use the words.

21 Q. -- actually use the words. Okay.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. What is Deke's -- role might not be the right word,
24 but I'm going to use it. What's his role around here in PenAir?

25 A. As far as I was aware, he didn't have a role, because it's

1 two still, like, separate certificates. So Crystal was my boss
2 from what I understood. And he might have -- he was the VP or
3 still is the VP of flight operations for Ravn, so he was in charge
4 of that company. Eventually he was going to be somebody I had to
5 report to, but I don't -- before that, he didn't really have a
6 role, as far as I knew, other than when he did, you know, like,
7 the townhall meetings, he might speak at those.

8 Q. Okay. So if he didn't have an official role, what would you
9 say his unofficial role -- what was he here doing, from your
10 perspective?

11 A. That was, like, the second time I'd ever seen him in the
12 building, so I don't know. He did, he did interview me before I
13 became a captain, so I guess that was one of his roles. But
14 outside of that, he -- as far as I knew, he didn't have a role at
15 PenAir.

16 Q. Are you, are you aware of any potential changes to the
17 airport qualification requirements that were in the works?

18 A. After the accident?

19 Q. Not after. Before the accident.

20 A. Not after. Yes. I wasn't there firsthand, but I know that
21 Deke Abbott had mentioned in a meeting with a group of our pilots
22 that they were trying to get rid of the 300-hour rule. He felt
23 like Dutch Harbor -- I think he used the words "were just like
24 Aspen" and that, if you were a captain, you should be expected to
25 fly to all these airports. And if you couldn't fly to Dutch

1 Harbor, then you didn't deserve to be a captain, type thing. So
2 it seemed like they were very much on the track to get rid of that
3 rule all together.

4 Q. Did you get a sense of -- actually let's start with what you,
5 what you thought about that.

6 A. I thought it was pretty ridiculous since he's never flown
7 there and never flown this airplane, and that it was -- I don't
8 know the correct word, but just, he didn't trust our experienced
9 pilots who've been doing this for 30 years, and I thought that was
10 a very poor decision, to not trust the people who have been in
11 charge of it forever, essentially.

12 Q. So what did you get in terms of a sense of what these -- the
13 other pilots at the hangar, what their feelings were on that
14 change -- potential change?

15 A. Just that it was a completely different company than we were
16 used to working for, and that they didn't really have a regard to
17 safety as -- at the level that we did at PenAir, at a high level.
18 And they were more concerned with making it work, you know, as far
19 as making flights get out there and making the schedule, you know,
20 the schedule easier to build and making it an easier, you know,
21 airline to operate, and less concerned about why those rules were
22 put in place to begin with.

23 Q. From what you know, did that feedback have any effect on
24 management in terms of the rule going forward?

25 A. Like, as far as how the managers operated?

1 Q. Yeah, so they planned on making this change. Was there any
2 change in course for that change, or did they kind of just press
3 on?

4 A. I mean, Crystal -- I would assume, I would consider her a
5 manager -- was pretty adamant about most of -- we had, you know,
6 that whole upgrade class that -- there was three of us that came
7 through. She was pretty adamant about us ignoring that rule. And
8 I heard of, you know, her pressuring check airmen to sign people
9 off. And so yeah, I think that it wasn't officially -- the rule
10 was not officially taken away yet, but they used that caveat to
11 their full advantage to try to operate that way until it was
12 officially taken away.

13 Q. Who else upgraded with you?

14 A. Greg Pfeifer, Ross Myers. And Britt Goudey was in our
15 upgrade class but did not make it through training.

16 Q. Who was your first officer for that -- I'm going to call it
17 troublesome --

18 A. Heather DeRemer.

19 Q. Heather DeRemer?

20 A. Um-hmm.

21 Q. Yeah. What was her involvement? How did she interact with
22 you and the decision and that --

23 A. I thought we had a really good communication as a crew. I
24 mean, we had 6 hours to think about what our decision was. So we
25 were all kind of -- the longer it dragged on, the more frustrated,

1 I guess, we were, and especially not seeing any changes that would
2 put either this in the mindset that this was, you know, going to
3 clear up or get better, and lack of communication from operations
4 about changing schedules.

5 We were all kind of on the same page of, hey, do we really
6 want to do this? Is this a smart idea? How do we feel about it?
7 And her and I talked about it. And, you know, the flight
8 attendant, you know, was getting pretty tired at that point. So
9 it was kind of a joint decision, I think, between all three of us.

10 Q. Were you just sitting at the airport?

11 A. Yeah. I mean, we've got a little crew room over there at the
12 hangar where there's four, five chairs. And yeah, just sitting at
13 the airport kind of delaying it hour by hour and updating hour by
14 hour.

15 Q. Who was the person you spoke to at crew scheduling?

16 A. Ron -- I can't remember his last name off the top of my head.

17 Q. Ron. Okay.

18 A. Ron.

19 Q. Had you ever received any kind of pressure or feedback from
20 crew scheduling before?

21 A. Yeah, I think him specifically, he's pretty notorious for
22 getting frustrated easily and hanging up on people and not really
23 taking captains' decisions seriously. Like, he's got -- I think
24 he feels like he has a say in whether the flight goes or not.

25 Q. What's your understanding of his role in dispatch?

1 A. He doesn't have a role in dispatch. It's a pilot -- yeah, I
2 guess it's a pilot and a dispatch decision on whether a flight
3 goes. And it's his role to kind of manipulate the schedule and,
4 you know, work around what our decision is.

5 Q. Okay.

6 DR. SILVA: All right, I'm going to pause here --

7 MS. BOOTS: Okay.

8 DR. SILVA: -- because I've been talking for a while.

9 Thanks.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes, Marvin, go ahead.

11 MS. BOOTS: Hi, Marvin.

12 MR. FRANTZ: So many questions.

13 MS. BOOTS: So, 10:30. It's okay.

14 BY MR. FRANTZ:

15 Q. How many hours did you have in the Saab when you upgraded?

16 A. I think -- I wrote it down if you don't -- like, 1,700.

17 Q. As SIC?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. And you had a type rating?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. So when you went back for your upgrade, did you spend -- did
22 you go through a full 2-week sim course down there?

23 A. Yeah, the only thing that I didn't do was the, like, week and
24 a half of initial indoc. We did the whole systems and the whole
25 sim.

1 Q. What did you think of the -- you said you've been down at
2 SIMCOM twice now for two full training blocks. What'd you think
3 of the -- what's your impression of the training down there?

4 A. I think they do a great job. I think when I went down
5 initially, they were still kind of figuring it out. I mean, they
6 still did a great job, but it felt a lot more organized this time
7 around. Just really quality instruction and good people. I think
8 it was a good training environment, and they did a nice job.

9 Q. How did you get your initial type rating? Was it with an FAA
10 examiner? Was it a designated training center examiner from
11 SIMCOM?

12 A. It was a designated training center examiner.

13 Q. From SIMCOM.

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Okay. As far as you know, is there any prohibition against
16 first officer landing at Dutch Harbor?

17 A. Yes. In our GOM, you're not supposed to land as a first
18 officer unless you're with a check airman and they allow you to.

19 Q. So there's allowance in the GOM for doing it with a check
20 airman. Okay.

21 A. Um-hmm.

22 Q. All right. Crystal came to you at some point before this
23 event where we're just talking about and asked you if you were
24 interested in getting Dutch Harbor qualified, special airport
25 qualified, before you hit 300 hours; is that, is that correct? Is

1 that right?

2 A. She never approached me about it. She just kind of took it
3 upon herself to tell crew scheduling to get me on the schedule to
4 do it. So she never asked me if I was --

5 Q. To get qualified.

6 A. Yeah. She never asked me if I was comfortable or wanted to
7 do it. She just kind of took the first step of making it happen.

8 Q. How'd you learn about that?

9 A. The manager of crew scheduling, Iain, called me and was like,
10 hey, did you know that you -- you know, the chief pilot wants you
11 -- has told me to put you on the schedule to get checked out for
12 Dutch Harbor? And I was like, no. So he asked if I was okay with
13 that and comfortable with it, and I told him that I wasn't. So he
14 said, all right, well, I'll let the chief pilot know. And that
15 was kind of --

16 Q. So who let the chief pilot know?

17 A. Iain.

18 Q. He did or you did?

19 A. He did.

20 Q. He did. Okay. Did you ever get any feedback from Crystal on
21 that decision, when you, when you told him and he told her that
22 you weren't interested in early --

23 A. I did. So when I went back a week after that event to talk
24 to her about it, I brought up just kind of, like, some -- I guess
25 some questions or fears I had for the future. And an example was,

1 okay, so if we're supposed to go when it's legal, our wind charts
2 going to Dutch Harbor don't have anything to do with legality;
3 it's just a company suggestion more or less. So if I don't want
4 to go down there when it's out of the wind charts, how's that
5 conversation going to go with you?

6 She told me it's a different conversation and then said
7 something along the lines of, you know, I heard that you're afraid
8 to go to Dutch Harbor. I'm like, I'm not afraid to go to Dutch
9 Harbor; I just would like to get more experience, you know, get my
10 300 hours before I start doing that. And she's like, okay, fair
11 enough.

12 And she said that when she had me put on the schedule, it
13 wasn't necessarily to get checked out. It was just to fly with a
14 check airman down there for experience, and asked if I'd be okay
15 with that. And I told her, absolutely, I think that's a good
16 idea. So she, you know, told Iain to put me on the schedule
17 before I had 300 hours, but she said she wouldn't push me until I
18 was ready and came to her to tell her I was ready to get signed
19 off.

20 Q. Did she use that term? "I heard you're afraid to fly to
21 Dutch Harbor?"

22 A. Yeah, something -- I don't want to, like, specifically quote.
23 But what I have in my head is, like, word on the street is you're
24 afraid to go to Dutch Harbor.

25 Q. And how did -- what was your reaction to that when you heard

1 that?

2 A. Just kind of --

3 Q. I mean, what did you feel? Whether you said it or not, what
4 was your impression of that comment?

5 A. Just kind of annoyance, I would say. Because it's like, no,
6 that's not the case. I just want to follow our procedure and be -
7 - I don't know. Just follow our procedure that was probably there
8 for a reason.

9 Q. So did -- so no one in this event of the early approval
10 process that was attempted, no one actually talked to you and
11 said, we want to get you the 100-hour waiver -- we want to qualify
12 you under the 100-hour waiver. That was not -- it was just, we
13 want to qualify you now. And then you said you weren't
14 interested. Okay. Okay.

15 Deke Abbott, is he -- does he have a presence here at PenAir
16 -- a common presence? Is he seen around here often? Does he
17 interact with crews or pilots often, in your experience?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Do you have any sense of what his relationship is with the
20 chief pilot -- with Crystal? Were they perceived as working
21 together or having common goals? Or was he mentoring her or
22 helping her in her role as chief pilot here? Or what's the
23 perception of anything like that?

24 A. My perception of it was that he was kind of the puppet
25 manipulator. And she was, you know, there as her role as a chief

1 pilot, but she was from Ravn. So he's kind of the head honcho in
2 Ravn, so I think they were pretty aligned in their -- in how they
3 wanted to run a company.

4 Q. Do you know if they worked together previously at Ravn?

5 A. I know Crystal was a pilot there, so I assume that he would
6 be -- you know, as the VP of flight operations, that they would be
7 involved, and she would technically be working for him, but I
8 don't know about their relationship.

9 Q. So you said after the -- when you went to Crystal's office
10 and you had the exchange, there -- you had -- there were some
11 changes in your behavior, or you made some changes to your
12 behavior?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Is that correct? What did you -- what was that change that
15 you made after this event?

16 A. I think I was kind of resigned to the fact that, even though
17 technically it was my decision as PIC whether we went or not, that
18 I needed to be less conservative with that and understand that,
19 even if there wasn't a chance of, you know, really making it into
20 an airport based on weather, then it was my expectation to go.

21 So I told myself, as long as it's not something that I feel
22 like is a safety concern, you know, as long as I have two or three
23 different places I can make it to and plenty of gas and, you know,
24 it's not -- I don't feel concerned about the safety of flight,
25 that I'll put aside my opinion of whether we're actually going to

1 get into where we're going and launch and do a missed approach, or
2 do a hold and go to my alternate and --

3 Q. Was it a safety concern when you refused the flight?

4 A. Yes. I think it was.

5 Q. Based on -- what was the safety concern?

6 A. Based on just the weather going in there. And, you know, it
7 was a new first officer. I was a new captain. We were both
8 exhausted. We'd been at work for 6 hours. You know, I didn't
9 really feel like it was a smart idea to put us in the situation to
10 make a mistake.

11 Q. Did the first officer have any -- suffer any consequences of
12 this that you know? Was she counseled, or do you know if there
13 was anything along those lines for her?

14 A. Yes. She met with Deke and Crystal directly after I did.
15 And we talked about, kind of, our different meetings and how they
16 went. And hers pretty much went quite similar to mine. And she
17 was one of the newer FOs that was supposed to upgrade, and she --
18 her upgrade basically got threatened. They said they didn't know
19 if -- you know, if she agreed with this decision and she was part
20 of this decision, they didn't know if she should be put in the
21 left seat.

22 Q. You got that in discussion with her after she had the meeting
23 with Deke and Crystal as well?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Was it one meeting with both of them, as far as you know?

1 Deke and Crystal were there, and she went -- she was -- had a
2 meeting with them; is that --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. They weren't separate? Okay. Had you flown with her before?

5 A. One time.

6 Q. Okay. How long -- do you know how long she had been -- you
7 said she was a new FO. Do you know how long she'd been at PenAir
8 at that point?

9 A. She was in the same class that I was upgrading, so I think
10 she got on the line at probably the beginning of June.

11 Q. She was coming in as an FO when you were upgrading to
12 captain?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. Did you fly with her in the sim?

15 A. I did not.

16 Q. Okay. Is she still here?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you -- did her upgrade get canceled or delayed as far as
19 you know?

20 A. Not based on that scenario. They all -- all of those, that
21 group of three really new FOs, have gone through all the training
22 and passed their check rides. But as far as I'm aware, we're
23 honoring the 500-hour rule that's in our documentation. So now
24 they're sitting right seat until they get at least 500 hours in
25 the airplane and then will be sent back down to sim and complete

1 their upgrades then, is my understanding.

2 Q. Have you flown with her much since this incident you
3 described at this point? No?

4 A. Not once, I don't think, honestly.

5 Q. Before this -- just turn now to the conversation with Crystal
6 and Deke. Have you had any other interaction -- previous
7 interactions with Deke Abbott?

8 A. He interviewed me in May, I want to say, at some point to
9 have the job for captain here.

10 Q. Was that your -- to upgrade --

11 A. Um-hmm.

12 Q. -- to captain. Okay. He didn't -- did he interview you, did
13 he interview you when you were hired to PenAir?

14 A. No, he wasn't here. Yeah.

15 Q. How'd that interview go?

16 A. I don't know. I don't necessarily agree with everything that
17 he said, but it was fine. He told me that I was going to do a
18 good job and gave me some pointers and gave me some stories or
19 whatever on what he had done and expected me to do, I guess,
20 and --

21 Q. Did the result of this -- refresh my memory. You met with
22 Crystal just alone. Was Deke there as well --

23 A. Yeah, the first --

24 Q. -- when you went to her office?

25 A. Yeah, the first meeting, she asked me to meet with her in her

1 office, and I showed up, and both of them were there.

2 Q. And he was there.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Okay. There was -- I assume there was no offer to you of any
5 kind of representative or anyone to be with you during that
6 meeting.

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you know if that -- and later, did you say that it was
9 agreed, that it was agreed that that would be just called a
10 counseling session? That was -- did Crystal tell you that after
11 the fact, that --

12 A. Yeah, she called me 2 or 3 hours later that day and said
13 those words.

14 Q. Do you know if that was something written that went into some
15 pilot or personnel record?

16 A. Not that I know of.

17 Q. Did you -- you didn't sign anything that said, I have been
18 counseled for this particular behavior, or anything like that?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Okay. Have you had similar interactions with this crew
21 scheduler before, where there -- it sounds like it was
22 contentious. Was that a good word to describe it?

23 A. Yeah, I'd say that's a good word.

24 Q. Have you had that with this particular -- or any crew
25 scheduler?

1 A. I don't remember off the top of my head. I know I've had --
2 and I just, I mean, as a first officer, we don't really, like,
3 interact with crew scheduling, I would say, as much in relation to
4 the decision of the flight. I vaguely remember him getting kind
5 of angry at, you know, situations in the past, but I can't
6 remember anything specific. I know he has with other people,
7 though.

8 Q. Okay. For this flight that you ultimately decided not to
9 take, you had -- there had been some discussion with dispatch,
10 with -- just SOC. And they were -- did you say they were kind of
11 determined to get the flight going as soon as you agreed? They
12 were just, they were saying it was okay, and they were just
13 waiting for your approval; is that a correct characterization?

14 A. Yeah, that's -- yeah, that's kind of the feel I got from it.

15 Q. Okay. And did you feel like there was pressure from the
16 dispatch side for you to, you know, come on, get onboard, let's
17 get this thing going?

18 A. I don't --

19 Q. Or were they just, were they completely deferring to you and
20 making sure you knew it was your call or --

21 A. I think it was -- there wasn't really pressure from dispatch.
22 I started out with Jennifer as my dispatcher in the morning when
23 we canceled the flight, and then Mike became my dispatcher later
24 in the day. And he was, he was still pretty new. So he was just
25 kind of giving me the information, and I was telling him, well, I

1 don't -- you know, I want to see more of a positive trend. And he
2 was like, okay, so do you want to wait another hour?

3 It wasn't -- there was no -- never any discussion of, like,
4 okay, let's stop doing this. It was just, all right, you don't
5 want to go, so let's wait another hour. I wouldn't say it was
6 necessarily negative from the dispatch. Just kind of, okay, well,
7 we know that you're not going to go, so that's fine, but we're
8 going to wait another hour.

9 Q. And during that time when the, when the decision was still
10 pending, did you ever get a call from Crystal or anybody from that
11 end talking -- or asking you or talking to you about your
12 decision?

13 A. No.

14 Q. So it was only after the fact when you said -- to your
15 knowledge, has any other pilot at PenAir been through any kind of
16 similar experience where they've been counseled, reprimanded,
17 talked to for delaying or not -- or canceling a flight for their
18 own reasons?

19 A. I don't, I don't know if anyone's been through necessarily
20 the same situation, but I know of pilots who have felt similar
21 pressure from Crystal to take flights.

22 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thank you. I'm going to pause there.

23 MS. BOOTS: Okay.

24 MR. FRANTZ: See if anyone else has any questions.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Marvin. Brandon?

1 MR. WILSON: I got a couple for you, Sarah.

2 MS. BOOTS: Okay, Brandon.

3 BY MR. WILSON:

4 Q. Who did your OE, most of it?

5 A. Steve Hakala did most of it.

6 Q. Did you fly with Dennis at all on OE?

7 A. I flew with him once for my FAA check ride.

8 Q. Did you go to Dutch Harbor at all with Dennis?

9 A. Not with Dennis.

10 Q. Did you do any training flights after OE?

11 A. Yes, I did -- I believe it was three training flights with
12 Dennis after OE to Dutch Harbor.

13 Q. Did he pass along valuable information about Dutch Harbor?

14 A. Yeah, Dennis is great. Every time I fly with him, I learn
15 new things. He's a great mentor, he's a great teacher, and really
16 good at conveying the information. So it was very helpful to me
17 to do those three flights with him to Dutch Harbor.

18 Q. Do you look at the wind charts regularly?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Would you ever do a flight if the winds were outside the wind
21 chart?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Would dispatch send you on a flight if the winds were outside
24 the wind chart?

25 A. Yeah, they'd try.

1 MR. WILSON: That's all I have for now.

2 MS. BOOTS: Okay.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Brandon. Tony?

4 MR. FISCHER: Yeah.

5 BY MR. FISCHER:

6 Q. Sarah, do you know who the -- oh, I'm sorry.

7 A. I know, right?

8 Q. Do you know who the director of operations is for PenAir?

9 A. Dick Harding.

10 Q. Okay. And do you see Dick around here much?

11 A. Yeah, I see him in his office pretty frequently.

12 Q. Okay. Have you talked to, talked to him?

13 A. I honestly have not.

14 Q. Okay. You know, the -- I'm trying to get at the interface of
15 Deke into PenAir. And, you know, wouldn't Dick run some
16 interference there or --

17 A. I would think. I don't know. I think his role is more of a
18 placeholder, from what I understand, as, yes, that's his job, but
19 they knew the companies were merging. So I don't know how much --
20 easy there. I don't know how much say he actually had, to be,
21 yeah, to be honest.

22 Q. Okay. But he's here fulltime, right?

23 A. I believe so.

24 Q. Yeah. Just a curiosity question. Who was the FAA guy that
25 did your OE observation?

1 A. John Posey.

2 Q. John Posey. Okay. And you were flying with Steve Hakala at
3 that time or --

4 A. I was flying with Dennis Fisher that day.

5 Q. Dennis Fisher. Okay.

6 MR. FISCHER: I think that's all I have. Thank you.

7 MS. BOOTS: Okay. You're welcome.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay, that's fine. Do you need a break or
9 anything right now, Sarah?

10 MS. BOOTS: I think I'm good if you guys are.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. We'll go ahead and do the second
12 round.

13 MS. BOOTS: All right. Round two.

14 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

15 Q. So do you, do you know why Crystal is no longer with PenAir?

16 A. I don't. I just know that she resigned short notice.

17 Q. Okay. So earlier you were talking about the interaction
18 between Crystal, Deke, and yourself in a meeting. And you were
19 talking about that you thought it was a safety hazard, you know,
20 what you had to do that day. What is the mechanism at PenAir in
21 reporting safety hazards?

22 A. We have a -- we can -- we used to call them WBATs. I think
23 they've changed now because we've gone over to Ravn's system. But
24 we have a website we can go into and put in -- write up the safety
25 report. You also have an option to do it anonymously as well.

1 Q. Did you write a safety hazard report for this situation?

2 A. I did not.

3 Q. Why didn't you write one?

4 A. Because I knew, whether it was anonymous or not, they were --
5 Crystal and Deke would obviously know who it was coming from, and
6 I was afraid of how that was going to affect my job here.

7 Q. So who was in charge of the WBAT system?

8 A. It used to be -- I think it used to be Tiffany Lease, but I'm
9 not sure if that's changed recently or not.

10 Q. And Tiffany Lease reports to -- do you know who she reports
11 to?

12 A. I don't.

13 Q. Okay. So a safety hazard, this is -- you have the choice of
14 anonymous reporting, or you can put your name. So at the time,
15 Crystal would have seen those reports that come in --

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. -- as chief, as chief pilot?

18 A. I believe so. I think they have a meeting about them every
19 month, and the chief pilot is part of that meeting.

20 Q. Are there any other pilots that have submitted safety hazard
21 reports or felt empowered to submit safety hazard reports?

22 A. Not that I know of as far as being pressured for flights. I
23 don't think so.

24 Q. Is there any sort of pilot committee meetings that the
25 company has where you can voice your opinions and thoughts or

1 concerns beyond just the reporting?

2 A. Not that I know of.

3 Q. And as captain, do you feel empowered to make decisions? You
4 can make different decisions now that Crystal is gone?

5 A. Absolutely.

6 Q. Okay. So what is -- at this point in your career now, do you
7 feel that safety is paramount at PenAir?

8 A. I think it's -- I think we're in -- stepping back in the
9 correct direction, I will say, for sure.

10 Q. And why --

11 A. Sorry, go ahead.

12 Q. No. Why do you feel that way?

13 A. Mainly because -- well, I know this has put a spotlight on
14 safety in general, so there's more of a focus on it. Clearly
15 there was something wrong, so they're trying to fix it. So
16 there's always going to be that. What we have is a building block
17 from there up.

18 And Dennis Fisher has played a huge role in stepping into
19 being a chief pilot. He's someone that I have called and -- can
20 trust that I can call and run by, hey, this is what's going on;
21 how do you feel about it? And he has a lot of experience in the
22 airplane and the, you know, airports that we're flying into. So
23 he's an opinion that I trust, but also know at the end of the day,
24 if I'm not comfortable with something, he'll have my back on it.

25 Q. Did you get a chance to read the preliminary report that the

1 NTSB put out?

2 A. I did.

3 Q. And when you read that, what were your thoughts as far as the
4 company policy procedures towards flying into Dutch Harbor and
5 things like that? Did anything go through your mind when you read
6 the report?

7 A. Yeah. Kind of, well, only a matter of time type deal. You
8 know, with the way that they were trying to operate this airline,
9 I felt like it was only a matter of time until we had some type of
10 incident. And I think it doesn't really -- experience is
11 important, but that crew together didn't have a lot of experience
12 in that airplane or that airport, and I think that played a role
13 in it.

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Thanks. That's all the questions I
15 have for now. Sathya?

16 BY DR. SILVA:

17 Q. Along the lines of safety reporting, have you ever submitted
18 a safety report?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What was that about?

21 A. I had one -- we had an unaccompanied minor who got on our
22 airplane without our operations telling anyone in the crew about
23 it. So I had to submit a safety report for that. I feel like
24 there have been one or two others, but that's the one that comes
25 to mind.

1 Q. Okay. So it sounds like, in this specific case, you didn't
2 feel like the system would have worked, necessarily, in terms of
3 anonymous reporting.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. What's your, what's your gauge on how the rest of the pilots
6 around here feel about the safety reporting?

7 A. I don't think we probably use it to its fullest potential,
8 honestly. And I know it's gone through some changes recently, and
9 it was kind of a headache to do the safety report that I had to
10 do. So I think it's not -- we've kind of always had, like, a --
11 at PenAir in the past, if you have a problem, like, hey, you just
12 bring it up to your chief pilot and have a conversation about it,
13 unless you really feel like it's something that needs to be put in
14 writing.

15 Q. Do you think that people are taking the initiative to do it
16 that way versus filing a report?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. Do you feel like that approachability changed at all between
19 when Ben was chief pilot and when Crystal came in?

20 A. I think so. I think -- I mean, Ben I knew fairly well, and I
21 knew I could approach him with something. I don't know if there
22 was going to be a result out of it necessarily, but I always felt
23 comfortable approaching him about something.

24 Q. What about with Crystal? Let's say before the -- before
25 August 1.

1 A. Yeah, I mean, decently comfortable. I didn't -- she didn't
2 have, necessarily, a lot of experience at our company, so I felt
3 like it was a little bit less valuable going to her, because she
4 might not understand our company and culture and all of that. So
5 if it was something I felt strongly about, I'd go talk to her, but
6 if it was something that, you know, wasn't really that important
7 in my mind, then it would be something I'd let roll.

8 Q. You mentioned that dispatch might try to send you when winds
9 are outside of wind charts. Can you give me an example of a time
10 that that's happened?

11 A. It's not happened with me, and I don't think it's something
12 they regularly do. I know with Dutch it can be a little tricky of
13 whether it's actually going to stay that way or whatever, and it's
14 a 2, 2½ hour flight, so there might be a little bit more pressure
15 from that. But I think they were receiving pressure as well, kind
16 of to the point where they felt like they had to make, you know --
17 have that conversation.

18 It generally just didn't feel like dispatch or the PIC really
19 had as much of a say in the launching of a flight as we have in
20 the past. It was more of a -- it came down to, well, is it legal
21 based off what management says, and what does crew scheduling want
22 you to do?

23 Q. You mentioned that, during your interview, you didn't
24 necessarily agree with everything that Deke said. Can you give us
25 some examples of that?

1 A. Sure. He asked me a question, just a vague question, of what
2 were my thoughts on holding. And I spat out some information of,
3 you know, know what your destination weather is doing, know what
4 your alternate weather is doing, what's your bingo fuel, make sure
5 you're trying not to hold in ice. Just some basic stuff. And
6 he's like, okay, that's fine.

7 And then he asked if I wanted to know his opinion on holding,
8 so I told him sure. And he said he had a rule that he didn't do
9 more than two laps in the hold, ever. Okay. So I'm like, I'll
10 bite; tell me why. And he kind of struck me as odd, because he's
11 like, well, I figure two laps in the hold, that's about 12
12 minutes. If nothing has changed at that point, then I'm going
13 home or going to my alternate. Like, (a), your math is wrong, but
14 whatever. And, like, it just didn't seem very -- it seemed very
15 black and white to me and not really something that you can --
16 that fits in all scenarios.

17 He asked what I would do if there was an airplane behind me,
18 I believe, that was on fire and declared an emergency and tower
19 told me to go around. I told him I would go around. And he's
20 like, okay, well, now you're getting low on gas; what would you
21 do? I'm like, well, I would declare minimum fuel, and if it was
22 an emergency situation, I'd declare an emergency and come back and
23 land.

24 He's like, okay, well, the airport shut down because of that
25 airplane on fire. Like, okay, all the runways at Anchorage are

1 shut down? He's like, yeah. Okay, well then I'd go to Kenai if I
2 had enough gas. Can't go to Kenai. Okay, I'd go to Elmendorf.
3 Oh, they won't let you in. I'm like, you're telling me Elmendorf
4 is not going to let me in if I'm going to run out of gas? Yeah.
5 Like, well, I don't know, Deke. I'd put it down in a farm or in
6 the Cook Inlet.

7 So that just kind of struck me as odd. Like, well, I don't
8 really know what you want out of those questions, because there's
9 only so many options here, and I'm not going to let an airplane on
10 fire not land.

11 Q. Do you feel like that's what his intent was?

12 A. Yeah, that was, that was the answer he wanted, was to tell
13 tower no and land anyway and make the airplane on fire behind me
14 go around.

15 Q. Okay. Interesting.

16 A. He also told me -- he asked, you know, a gear malfunction
17 scenario. And I ran through everything I'd do. And he said -- I
18 think he was in an airplane once where they couldn't get the
19 emergency gear handle to pull, so they used the crash ax to pry it
20 up. And I don't know. That was what he wanted me to do out of
21 that, I guess, instead of coming in for an emergency landing.

22 Q. To force the lever up --

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. -- using the crash ax? Okay.

25 A. Yeah, I don't know. That's just, like, not something I'd do

1 unless guided by maintenance, but whatever. Worked for you, so
2 congratulations.

3 Q. So you haven't interacted with Dick, really, in your role
4 here?

5 A. No. After that interview, I showed him around the airplane
6 for a little bit. And then since then, the next meeting I had
7 with him was that one with Crystal. So that's the next time I --

8 Q. Oh, Deke. That was Deke.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay. What about Dick? Sorry. Dick Harding.

11 A. I'll wave as I go by his office, but I've never really had a
12 conversation with him.

13 Q. Okay. We've talked about Dutch Harbor a lot. Is that
14 because the pressure you're getting or the important route is
15 Dutch Harbor, or does that apply to the other special airports as
16 well? Getting qualified and --

17 A. It applies -- so the special airport rule applies -- the 300-
18 hour rule applies to Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Sand Point. All of
19 our special airports.

20 Q. Is there -- was there any push to get people qualified into
21 those airports as well?

22 A. Yeah, generally the way that it's been done in the past is
23 you get qualified for all three of them, kind of, at once. So you
24 just get, like, a group special airport checkout. You know,
25 you'll do one or two flights to Dutch, one or two flights to

1 Kodiak, and one or two flights to Sand Point.

2 Q. So from that perspective, it wasn't just Dutch that was being
3 pressured.

4 A. Yeah, I think we focus on Dutch the most because we go there
5 the most out of those places. But it wasn't just Dutch Harbor.

6 Q. Okay. You said you flew into Dutch right before the
7 accident. Do you remember when that was, what time?

8 A. What time of day it was?

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. I think we landed there -- we left around 10:00, so landed
11 12:30 or 1:00, I want to say, that day.

12 Q. How was that flight?

13 A. It was good. The winds were, if I remember correctly, 240.
14 Like 6, gusting 15 or something. 240 was the direction. I'm not
15 entirely sure on the speed.

16 Q. Okay. Any other notable weather phenomena that day?

17 A. Not really. I think we passed through maybe a shower on the,
18 you know, on the approach. But once we got below the clouds, it
19 was -- I mean, we were at least -- I think we broke at least 1,000
20 feet before minimums, and it was really nice down there once we
21 broke out.

22 Q. Who were you flying with for that flight?

23 A. Dennis Fisher.

24 Q. So, since you've had the conversation with Crystal, have
25 there been any specific flights since then that you've taken that

1 you wouldn't have necessarily taken if it was a month before?

2 A. Yeah, maybe one. A situation where we'd gotten -- it was,
3 like, a 9:45 departure, and we'd gotten updated weather that we
4 were just looking at, you know, on our phones, basically, in the
5 airplane. And they were calling for, I think, light freezing
6 drizzle in Bethel.

7 And there's not really any guidance in our policy as far as
8 -- you can, like, dispatch into it from out of Anchorage or
9 wherever you're leaving. But there's not really good policy on
10 whether you can dispatch where they're forecasting it at your
11 landing destination. So it's kind of a gray area that I called
12 dispatch and talked about. And they were like, oh, well, we're
13 not really sure.

14 So then Crystal got involved with it. I think even Sarah
15 Fraher got involved with it and sat in the airplane, and I got a
16 call back from -- I believe it was Robert, who's in charge of
17 dispatch, and said you're good to go. And I could tell my first
18 officer was a little uncomfortable with it, and I was like, well,
19 this -- (a), this doesn't really seem smart, because it's light
20 freezing drizzle. I know it's not doing that there, but it is
21 forecast. And once we get on the ground, we only have type I
22 deice fluid there, so our holdover time is, like, 2 minutes. So
23 we're going to get stuck there, like, even outside of the safety
24 aspect of it.

25 So I called Crystal just to make sure that's what she wanted.

1 And she pretty much was like, yeah, there's nothing that says you
2 can't do it. So we launched. The first officer and I decided
3 that if we started, you know, picking up ice, and we got concerned
4 about it at any point, that we would turn around and come home. I
5 don't think any of us -- it was, like -- either of us, it was
6 really a decision we necessarily would have made without
7 understanding the implications of it. So we landed and sat in
8 Bethel for, like, 5 hours.

9 Q. Okay. So you got stuck.

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. Who was your first officer for that one?

12 A. Teri-Ann -- R-a-b-e is her last name. Rabe, I think is how
13 you pronounce it.

14 DR. SILVA: Okay, that's all I had.

15 MS. BOOTS: Okay.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya.

17 Marvin?

18 MR. FRANTZ: Just a couple, Sarah.

19 MS. BOOTS: Okay.

20 BY MR. FRANTZ:

21 Q. What was your understanding of why Deke Abbott was
22 interviewing you for the captain upgrade?

23 A. It's something that they did at Ravn, so they were trying to
24 just kind of apply that policy to PenAir as well, is my
25 understanding.

1 Q. So before the acquisition, was there, was there a different
2 process for selecting captain upgrade candidates?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What was that? Do you know?

5 A. You had to -- generally a chief pilot talked to all the check
6 airmen and a few of the senior captains and asked their thoughts
7 and opinions and whether they thought the person was ready or not.
8 And if you got the go-ahead from those people, then whenever, you
9 know, the schedule allowed and whenever -- it was loosely based
10 off order of seniority, but you still had to get those people's
11 approval to upgrade.

12 Q. Okay. Did any of that apply to you when you went to upgrade,
13 or was it strictly based on the Deke Abbott interview that you got
14 selected?

15 A. It was kind of weird, because I was already -- had been in
16 class -- the systems class for, like, a week and a half, 2 weeks.

17 Q. Sorry, to upgrade?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. So you had already been selected for upgrade.

20 A. Yeah, it was more of a formality thing, I think, for them of,
21 well, this is what we do at Ravn, so we're going to do this to
22 PenAir. But Crystal had already approached me and asked me to
23 upgrade. So it was -- I think it was more of a formality than
24 anything.

25 Q. But as far as you know, was a decision made when you walked

1 into that office, and it was just a formality? Or were you -- was
2 it a, was it a concern that he could veto your upgrade if it
3 didn't go well in the interview?

4 A. I think I would have had to really mess it up for him to say
5 no. I think it was more of a formality, try to make the two
6 companies the same in the way that they operated.

7 Q. Okay. So what's your understanding of what that was for
8 Ravn? Rather than interviewing with Deke or some senior person at
9 the company, did Ravn, as far as you know, have any other process
10 to select captain upgrades?

11 A. I don't think so. I think they had to do their interviews
12 with Deke before they were selected. I know they had a class that
13 they went through, kind of, maybe, like, a CRM-type thing, or how
14 to be a captain class. And I think they had a condensed version
15 of systems and sim training. I don't think theirs was the same
16 process as ours.

17 Q. But the -- getting into that initially, it's like they took
18 over for that upgrade. Other than just an interview with Deke,
19 was there -- do you know if Ravn had to go through other processes
20 or approvals?

21 A. Yeah, I don't know.

22 Q. That's fine. Okay. So if the same thing happened today, the
23 same call, the same flight, same weather situation, but now
24 knowing what you've been through, what would you do?

25 A. I think with, you know, Dennis in the office now, I would

1 have made the same call that I did. And I probably would have
2 asked his advice a lot sooner and told him, hey, this is where I'm
3 at; you know, like, getting really tired here with -- my crew's
4 really exhausted. And I think I would have had a lot more support
5 and him just saying, well, just call fatigued, you know. It
6 doesn't seem -- seems like it's adding up. Let's just be done
7 with it. So, yeah, I think I would have made the same decision.

8 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Okay, thanks. That's all I had.

9 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Marvin.

10 Brandon?

11 MR. WILSON: I just maybe have a couple of follow-up
12 questions.

13 BY MR. WILSON:

14 Q. Check airmen at this company, myself, Iain, and Dennis. Do
15 you trust our judgement?

16 A. Absolutely.

17 Q. Would we ever mislead you in any way?

18 A. No.

19 Q. So would we ever pressure you to do something that you didn't
20 want to do?

21 A. No.

22 Q. And then you kind of got me worked up on this dispatch trying
23 to pressure you.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Are they trying to pressure you to go if the winds are

1 outside of the wind chart, or is somebody above them trying
2 anything?

3 A. I think it's some -- and I've never been pressured. I've
4 never honestly -- I don't think I've been in a situation where the
5 winds are above the wind charts. And I know it applies mostly to
6 Dutch Harbor. But I know of -- I don't think it's them, or at
7 least all of them. Maybe a select one or two that kind of think
8 in the literal, well, it's not, you know, it's not a legality
9 issue, so why not try it, type thing. But I think most of the
10 pressure is coming -- their opinion of that is coming from above
11 them.

12 Q. So dispatch isn't the one that would try to pressure you?

13 A. No, I don't think so. It might be coming out of their mouth,
14 but I think it's from somewhere else.

15 MR. WILSON: Okay, that's all I have.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Brandon.

17 Tony?

18 MR. FISCHER: No, nothing else.

19 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. So that concludes our second
20 round. Is there, is there anything that we should have asked you
21 that we should -- you think we should have asked you?

22 MS. BOOTS: I don't think so.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Is there anyone that you suggest that
24 we speak to?

25 MS. BOOTS: I know you guys are interviewing with Crystal and

1 Deke later. The only one that I could suggest is maybe Heather,
2 if you're interested in that scenario.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Heather?

4 MS. BOOTS: Heather DeRemer, the first officer on that
5 flight.

6 DR. SEVILLIAN: And what's her -- how do you spell her last
7 name?

8 MS. BOOTS: D-e-R-e-m-e-r.

9 MR. CAMPBELL: Make sure you capitalize the second [sic] R.

10 MS. BOOTS: Yeah.

11 MR. CAMPBELL: She'll get you.

12 MS. BOOTS: Feisty.

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Yeah, so we appreciate you coming in
14 to speak with us. And do you have anything else for us? Any
15 comments, questions?

16 MS. BOOTS: I don't think so.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Off the record.

18 (Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Sarah Boots

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 4, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Eileen Gonzalez
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/22/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

* * * * *

Interview of: CHET HARRIS
First Officer, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Monday,
December 2, 2019

APPEARANCES:

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot and Check Airman
PenAir

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Chet Harris:		
By Mr. Frantz		8
By Dr. Silva		20
By Dr. Sevillian		40
By Mr. Wilson		42
By Mr. Frantz		43
By Dr. Silva		49
By Dr. Sevillian		61
By Mr. Wilson		63
By Mr. Frantz		64
By Dr. Sevillian		66

I N T E R V I E W

(9:51 a.m.)

1
2
3 MR. FRANTZ: Good morning, Chet.

4 MR. HARRIS: Good morning.

5 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks for agreeing to come in and talk with us.
6 As you know, we're here as part of the investigation of the Dutch
7 Harbor accident. And I'll give you a little briefing about what
8 we're doing, how the NTSB does it, and kind of what your role is
9 going to be today.

10 When we investigate accidents like this, the NTSB forms what
11 we call groups to look at particular areas of the accident, like
12 there might be a powerplants group or a systems group. This is
13 the human performance/operational factors group. So the name is
14 kind of self-explanatory, tells you the kinds of things we're
15 looking at. It's a combined group.

16 And on our groups we not only have NTSB people, but we need
17 expertise outside for each particular investigation, so typically
18 we have an FAA representative on our group. Today we don't have
19 an FAA representative here but normally there's an FAA
20 representative, part of the accident investigation part of the
21 FAA, not part of the enforcement/violations part of the FAA. But
22 he's not here today.

23 But besides the FAA we'll -- if there's a union, a pilot's
24 union, there'll be a union representative on the group typically.
25 There's no union here, so we don't have one.

1 And then we have a representative from the operator that
2 knows how the company does operations and also knows the airplane
3 and the type of flying the company does, and that's Brandon. So
4 he's our PenAir representative on the group this morning.

5 So the group typically -- the primary activity a group will
6 do is interviews. We were here previously, we interviewed the
7 crew, we interviewed the chief pilot, we interviewed the crew --
8 the last crew that flew with the accident crew. We did that when
9 we were here initially. And now we've come up to do some more
10 wide-ranging interviews across the company.

11 The result of this interview will be a transcript. And I
12 should have asked you before we started but, we just want to let
13 you know and ask you if it's okay if we record this because we
14 want to record it to make an official transcript so it's accurate
15 and we know that everything is captured correctly.

16 MR. HARRIS: Fine with me.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. The result of this interview will be a
18 transcript and all the members of the group will get that
19 transcript and they'll have a chance to review it for accuracy and
20 we'll all agree that, yeah, this is how the interview with Chet
21 went, and all the other interviews we're going to do this week.

22 What we're going to talk to you about is just a couple of
23 topics. And this is not sworn testimony, it's not a disposition.
24 Your answer is what you know. If you don't remember something or
25 you don't know something, that's a fine answer. If later on you

1 think there's something that you wanted to tell us or you
2 remembered something you didn't know, you can contact us later and
3 we can take that into consideration. So it's an informal
4 interview. It's nothing particularly challenging in that respect,
5 but I know it's, you know, it's a little intimidating going in a
6 bunch of different people.

7 What we're going to do is take turns going around the room
8 just ask you a couple of questions. We probably will go two
9 rounds just in case somebody has some follow-ups, you know, after
10 the first round of questioning.

11 We do allow -- anybody we interview is allowed to have one
12 representative, you know, with them. Could be a company attorney,
13 could be their best friend, their mother, could be anybody you
14 want; has to be someone of your choosing. So before we go any
15 further, do you have anyone that you want to act as your
16 representative today?

17 MR. HARRIS: I'll have Mr. Campbell act as my representative.

18 MR. FRANTZ: Very good. Okay, thank you. Oh, and since
19 we're recording, just try to refrain from uh-huh or nods or
20 anything when we ask questions so we can get an audio recollection
21 of an answer --

22 MR. HARRIS: Makes sense.

23 MR. FRANTZ: -- recording of an answer. So we'll go around
24 the group real quick and everyone can introduce themselves a
25 little more formally, what they do, and then we'll start the

1 questioning. Before we do that, do you have any questions of us?

2 This shouldn't be too long. There's only a couple of topics
3 we want to, you know, speak to you about. And then a -- well,
4 yeah, we'll get started in a second.

5 So anyway, Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational factors
6 investigator with the NTSB.

7 DR. SILVA: I'm Sathya Silva. I am a human performance
8 investigator with the NTSB.

9 MR. WILSON: Chet, you know me, Brandon, one of the check
10 airmen at PenAir.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: And I'm Dajuan Sevillian, NTSB human
12 performance investigator.

13 MR. HARRIS: And I am Chet Harris, a line pilot. And I guess
14 one question I would have, is the transcript going to be public
15 and will I have a chance to review it?

16 MR. FRANTZ: The transcript will eventually become public,
17 not soon, but eventually it will as part of what they call the
18 docket for the investigation. Anything that we produce, any
19 written products that we produce as the investigation goes along
20 will end up publicly released down the line.

21 Typically, you -- the group reviews it, but we don't
22 typically give a copy out to the individual. I don't know if
23 there's any prohibition against that rule.

24 DR. SILVA: If you -- so once it does go public, you're free
25 to review it and if there's anything that you want to correct or

1 clarify, you're welcome to let us know and we can include that in
2 the public information as well.

3 MR. HARRIS: All right. Thank you.

4 MR. FRANTZ: Again, this is not a -- there's no trick
5 questions. It's not a test of your knowledge --

6 MR. HARRIS: Yeah.

7 MR. FRANTZ: -- how much you know, don't know. We're just
8 trying to get a picture of a certain slice of information from the
9 operation and you are, unfortunately -- maybe for you
10 unfortunately, the person, one of the people designated to give us
11 a slice of this, you know, particular couple of questions or
12 issues we want to look at. So but it's not -- we're not
13 investigating Chet, you know.

14 MR. HARRIS: Okay.

15 INTERVIEW OF CHET HARRIS

16 BY MR. FRANTZ:

17 Q. All right, let's get started if you could just give us your
18 name, full name, and any spellings we might need.

19 A. Full name is Chet Allen Harris, C-h-e-t, a single t. That's
20 the full name.

21 Q. A-l-l-e-n?

22 A. A-l-l-e-n, yes.

23 Q. Okay. And what's your current position here, Chet?

24 A. I'm a first officer on the line; pilot for Ravn/Peninsula
25 Airways.

1 Q. Okay. And how long have you been here at Ravn/Peninsula?

2 A. I was hired in February was my hire date, February 27th. And
3 I went through ground school. The company paid for me to get my
4 ATP and I started flying the line in May of 2019. So May, June,
5 July, August, September, October -- 6 months.

6 Q. How many total flight hours do you have, approximately?

7 A. 3,400.

8 Q. And how many in the Saab?

9 A. 411.

10 Q. SIC?

11 A. SIC.

12 Q. Okay. But you said you do have a Saab type rating?

13 A. I do have a Saab type rating, ATP and type rating --

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. -- for initial on Saab.

16 Q. Can you give us a quick sketch of your aviation background
17 before you joined PenAir?

18 A. I became a private pilot in 1995. I originally was mostly
19 interested in exploring Alaska via general aviation, so I owned a
20 Maule. The first Maule I owned was in 2000 -- starting in 2000,
21 July, I owned a Maule. And until 2018, I was just a general
22 aviation private pilot. I pursued some ratings like instrument
23 and commercial, but I didn't really intend to use them; it was
24 just proficiency.

25 But at some point, in May of 2018, I decided I would like to

1 try flying -- I flew -- for a profession, I flew for Rust's
2 Aviation, 135 operator, floatplanes, single engine C-206, and
3 Beaver, primarily. And then I decided that I enjoyed flying as a
4 career, so I flew for a short time for ACE Air Cargo, and they're
5 a 135 operator right across the ramp. I only flew for ACE, I want
6 to say, November through February, when I was hired at PenAir.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. And I got my ATP in April of 2019.

9 Q. Okay. At the same ride as the 2000 type?

10 A. Yeah, same.

11 Q. Okay. I understand you -- well, do you recall the last you
12 flew the accident airplane?

13 A. I flew the accident airplane on the day of the incident. I
14 believe I was the last person to successfully land the airplane,
15 if you will. If I'm correct, that was October 17th, 2019.

16 Q. How many flights did you have that day in that airplane?

17 A. I had one flight to Dutch Harbor and back.

18 Q. Okay. Did you do the pre-flight inspections for those
19 flights?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. Okay. Do you recall any anomalies at all in the pre-flight
22 inspection of the airplane?

23 A. No, none whatsoever.

24 Q. Okay. When you look at -- as part of your pre-flight, what
25 are you looking for when you look at the tires?

1 A. I look for there being tread, visible tread. And if the base
2 of the tread is not visible, there's smooth surface, then I would
3 say tire's not good to use.

4 I was -- perhaps two times I've seen tires that I thought
5 were close as I walked around an airplane. And the first time I
6 pointed one out to a captain and he said, yeah, there's still
7 tread depth, do you agree? And I said yeah. And so that was the
8 -- and only one other time I saw a tire that was close to what I
9 would consider like somebody else -- asking somebody else about
10 it. And since it was only two times, it wasn't that day that one
11 of those two times happened.

12 Q. And so the other time, one time you said the captain looked
13 at it and said -- did the captain look at it or did he just ask
14 you was there still --

15 A. The time -- the first time it happened, captain actually
16 looked at it.

17 Q. Okay. And thought it was okay to go?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. What about the other time?

20 A. He asked me if there was tread depth. I said yeah, there was
21 still tread based --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Different captain. And I can't even remember who the second
24 captain was to be honest.

25 Q. Have you ever seen a tire -- well, in any of your flying, not

1 just here, anywhere, with a flat spot or just a particular portion
2 of the tire flattened or ground down or worn down?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. You have seen that?

5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Okay. You ever seen that at PenAir?

7 A. I have not seen a full flat spot in a tire here.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I can't see the whole tire.

10 Q. So both the instances that you've had with tire -- or
11 questions about tires, did not result in a maintenance write-up;
12 is that correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Okay. How many times, if any, have you with PenAir -- well,
15 anytime, outside PenAir or with PenAir, have you flown into Dutch
16 Harbor, approximately?

17 A. Somewhere between 6 and 12.

18 Q. Have you been to Dutch Harbor other than with --

19 A. Closer to 12.

20 Q. -- other than with PenAir?

21 A. Yeah. I did go in there with ACE Air Cargo.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. In the Beech 1900.

24 Q. So total maybe 12 times?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. It could be even more than that. I should have looked that
3 up, but --

4 Q. That's Okay. Have you ever landed there with a tailwind that
5 you recall?

6 A. Never.

7 Q. Have you ever landed there with variable, problematic, high,
8 gusting winds?

9 A. Variable for sure. Problematic is --

10 Q. That's probably --

11 A. -- relative, yeah. Gusting and variable, for sure.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. That day, even.

14 Q. The day that -- was that the day before the accident?

15 A. No the day of the accident.

16 Q. Oh, the day of. Because that's -- you were in there that
17 day?

18 A. I was in there that day.

19 Q. Do you recall what approach you used?

20 A. We landed 3-1. You know, we set up with our special
21 approach, the RNAV 3-1 approach, but the ceilings were -- allowed
22 us to be visual.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. But we landed 3-1. The back door is the nomenclature.

25 Q. Is there a -- at PenAir, either formally or informally, a

1 preferred approach at PenAir?

2 A. The one that --

3 Q. I mean -- sorry -- at Dutch Harbor.

4 A. The one that favors the wind.

5 Q. If it's visual, is one approach, 3-1 versus 1-3, more
6 difficult than the other? Forgetting about winds, if winds are
7 calm, is there -- would you choose one or the other if it was
8 visual?

9 A. Probably 1-3. I have -- it's easier; you have a longer final
10 approach and view of the runway. But they're both very -- I mean,
11 they're fine -- they're fine to fly either way.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I might -- I mean, I might even say that it's fun to fly the
14 backdoor, but -- it's closer to terrain.

15 Q. Okay. When you're approaching Dutch Harbor, give me a -- can
16 you give me a quick sketch about when and how you're planning for
17 which runway and flap settings and things like that. When does
18 that begin and what's that process?

19 A. So it begins as early as practical to complete all the tasks.
20 Normally we, in all instances, somewhere outside of 20 minutes,
21 will contact -- look for weather. Before we do our in-range
22 checklist, we get the weather.

23 On the way to Dutch, you know, because of the terrain, it's
24 not -- you can't always reach Weather maybe as far out as --
25 initially -- I always wanted to call early but somewhere before

1 MORDI you call. I think when you're -- I forget -- Port Heiden,
2 somewhere -- just as soon as I can get it, I'll call and get the
3 weather. Because then after I get the weather I go to the airport
4 analysis resource, which is on our electric flight book,
5 electronic flight book, and compare our landing weight to the
6 dispatched information and the limited landing -- the field length
7 distance and the weight associated with landing at Dutch.
8 And usually that's the Alt 2 CG table, flaps 35.

9 At that point I can determine whether, based on the winds, we
10 can bug 35 or 20 -- flaps 20 speeds.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And a lot of times I'll write down both because the wind
13 might change. But I compare it to make sure that those are --
14 which one of those is the most applicable situation. Then I go to
15 the performance binder and get the actual VREF, VClean speeds for
16 -- you always do it with and without ice, and then put the
17 maneuvering speed in based on that.

18 Q. How many times in your experience or in tribal knowledge, how
19 many times once you're inside that 20-minute point, you begin your
20 descent, you're closer now to Dutch Harbor, has your plan had to
21 change -- runway plan had to change because of changing weather
22 information? And maybe specifically winds, how often has that
23 happened where you have to flip -- you flip your plan once you're,
24 after you're heading in?

25 A. At least three times.

1 Q. In your experience?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay. Is that, can you -- how do you characterize the
4 increased workload or whatever you want to call it associated with
5 that changing during your final 10, 15 minutes of the flight?

6 A. Well, the landing distances are set the same and so the
7 workload changes -- the only time it's ever been done is visually,
8 by the way, I'd just like to add. So if there weren't visual
9 conditions, I don't imagine anybody would change runways because
10 it's a whole different approach and you would go missed, go back
11 out, hold at ROFSU (ph.), reestablish what it is you're trying to
12 do. I think. Because I've never -- I've only done it visual.

13 So the workload isn't that significantly higher. You have
14 the V speeds for 35 and 20 already bugged, so you don't have to
15 change that.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. I mean it, you know, it requires a change in frame of
18 reference and how you're going to -- you know, what you're going
19 to do. But it's still a landing on point on speed.

20 Q. Okay. The use of the airport analysis charts, how is that
21 taught and checked or tested in your training, like your initial
22 training at PenAir? What was that like, that training for those
23 particular items?

24 A. We were -- you know, a lot of this I think gets cemented
25 while on IOE with check airman, but we did -- we were given a TOLD

1 card, a takeoff and landing distance card, the one that we use.
2 In the class, we were given scenarios with winds and asked to do
3 this, use the available data, shown how to do it. Like here,
4 first, you know, here's how you do it; show you, then ask you to
5 do it, then do it, look for corrections and errors.

6 Q. Using that -- specifically using the airport analysis volume?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. Did you do that in the simulator, during your sim
9 training, use the airport --

10 A. Yes, we definitely did.

11 Q. Did you do it for each landing in your flight training?
12 Would you pull out the airport analysis info and check the
13 validity of your plan?

14 A. They were -- I think most times we did, but there were some
15 scenarios -- I wouldn't say always. I think there were some
16 scenarios where we were doing repetitive cycles into, say, the
17 same airport with the same basic wind speeds, not changes that
18 were significant. But if we changed a -- if we went to a
19 different airport or we changed winds or if it became, especially
20 if it became limiting. It wasn't -- it's not always the most
21 limiting factor, the airport analysis part of it.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. But it was reinforced that this is something you're going to
24 do when you fly, is use this information.

25 Q. What'd you think of the sim training?

1 A. You know, it was my first experience with a -- well, actually
2 it was my second because the week before I was in Miami and I got
3 my ATP -- CTP, a requirement to get my ATP, and I flew the 737 in
4 the full motion simulator. So it's really only my -- it was my
5 first time with real directed training. I would say the training
6 was better than that CTP training, which was more of an upset and
7 they had a little less structure. So this was much more
8 structured.

9 And, I mean, I had been a stick and rudder guy and so I was
10 like, really, this simulator can give me the sensation and ability
11 to fly an aircraft? And I was impressed by -- I was impressed by
12 the instruction I got and that the simulator really did captivate
13 the feeling of flight.

14 And, I mean, Brandon might have answered the question better.
15 I wasn't ready to be captain the day I left there maybe, but I
16 could land the plane safely and with some amount of confidence
17 with crosswinds, didn't pick that up as well -- but training was
18 good. I was impressed. New experience to me. You can learn to
19 fly a plane in a simulator.

20 Q. You ever had any accidents or incidents?

21 A. I have had an accident.

22 Q. Can you give me just a quick description of that?

23 A. Yeah. In 2011, I was sheep hunting and I was landing at a
24 strip. I was a flying Maule, M-5. I was landing a strip at 5,500
25 feet, had a 15 to 20-degree upslope. I failed to go around -- I

1 had a tailwind. I failed to go around at an early enough point.
2 I ended up having to choose an alternate landing site that was not
3 nearly as good as my primary landing site, and I did significant
4 damage to that aircraft. Nobody was injured.

5 Q. Have you ever seen the -- are any maintenance or caution
6 issues for the anti-skid system in the Saab 2000 since you've been
7 flying it?

8 A. No.

9 Q. No?

10 A. I have not.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I hit the brakes one time harder than the captain -- I got on
13 the brakes a little early and harder than I intended to and my
14 experience was that I was surprised at how well it worked. It was
15 -- I mean, I hit the brakes too hard and it -- but it didn't -- I
16 thought it should have skidded more compared to how hard I hit the
17 brakes.

18 Q. What was -- did you feel like the anti-skid system was
19 kicking in --

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. -- during that? And what was that -- what was your feedback
22 or what was the pilot sensation when that happened?

23 A. I remember it specifically because I hit the right brake with
24 the rudder and it felt like it was going to yaw right, but it
25 stopped and it kind of, just with a minor correction, re-centered

1 towards the left. So I was like, wow, it just -- I mean, you
2 asked that -- it really dawned on me, that anti-skid kept me from
3 doing this possibly.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. But I, as a first officer, we don't often really use the
6 brakes much. It's not needed.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. At 80 we switch, you know, tops to bottoms, and captains do
9 most of the braking.

10 Q. Yeah.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think that's all I have for now.

12 Thanks. Pass it to Sathya.

13 BY DR. SILVA:

14 Q. Have you flown with Paul Wells before?

15 A. I have flown with Paul Wells.

16 Q. Do you recall when or/and how often?

17 A. I had, I believe I had three flights with Paul. Maybe the
18 last one was about a week before this incident. I'm not 100
19 percent sure on that timeline. But I think I will remember about
20 Paul, flying with Paul, the very first time and every -- actually
21 all three times -- I know it's two; it could be three.

22 Q. Uh-huh.

23 A. I'm trying to think because I can specifically remember two
24 flights. But anyways, he was, he was very -- I really liked the
25 way -- and all of the captains at PenAir have been very good about

1 this, but somehow his demeanor and presence about this is a crew
2 and we're going to work together to solve these problems was
3 marked. He just immediately introduced himself and said I'm the
4 captain but if you see something wrong, don't hesitate to say
5 anything; we're a fully functioning crew here.

6 Q. Um-hum.

7 A. So he did that well.

8 Q. From what you recall of these flights, can you run us through
9 the flight with both of those, I guess, you said you remembered?

10 A. I can -- I can't -- the second one or the last one I can
11 remember.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And we -- I guess the thing I remember about it is we went
14 into Dillingham and we'd already gone to King Salmon, and that was
15 -- I don't remember -- in Dillingham there was a significant
16 crosswind. And he had a slightly different technique. It was a
17 strong crosswind and he -- I don't -- and maybe I just didn't
18 notice it before, but he let go of the throttles at about 25 feet
19 to correct for that crosswind. And I was -- and he got right back
20 on them, but I just -- it was a -- I noted that in my mind as
21 being slightly different than other captains I'd seen fly the Saab
22 in a crosswind. And even my own experience, I never remembered
23 letting go of the throttles, you know, in a landing situation.

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 A. So that I remember. And --

1 Q. Okay. Is there any transfer of controls at any point in
2 landing?

3 A. Yeah, we -- the pilot flying -- or the pilot monitoring calls
4 out 80 knots, and then it's my controls, your -- or tops and
5 bottoms, the first -- if I'm the pilot flying and hear the 80
6 knots call, I give up the bottoms and take the tops. If the
7 captain is flying, I take the tops and the captain does the
8 bottoms. The rudders and the brakes are the captain's pretty much
9 at 80 knots.

10 Q. No matter what?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Okay. Was that something that was taught in the sim or is
13 that more PenAir?

14 A. It's part of the checklist and we did it in the sim. But
15 it's -- I remember it from the very first time I actually rode
16 along in the -- as just an observer, the switch at 80.

17 Q. In the aircraft?

18 A. Yeah. It was marked. And that -- that tops also includes
19 the throttles.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Reverse.

22 Q. So overall how would you characterize Paul's CRM?

23 A. I thought his CRM was very good. He was very interested in
24 input from me as the first officer. And he seemed, you know,
25 genuinely interested in learning and that we all constantly be

1 learning. That was a --

2 Q. Have you ever had a situation flying here where the controls
3 were split in the air in terms of one person handling throttles
4 versus the other handling the controls or anything along those
5 lines that --

6 A. In the air, I can't think of a situation where there was
7 split control. It would be full transfer of control in any
8 experience I had.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I mean I guess -- I can't even -- could be a situation where
11 that was necessary, but --

12 Q. Um-hum. You haven't encountered it?

13 A. No, I have not encountered that.

14 Q. In this case where Paul let go of the throttles, you said 25
15 feet or so?

16 A. Yeah, it was pretty close to --

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. -- I mean, we were flare.

19 Q. Um-hum. Did he maintain control of the throttles at that
20 point? Did he ask you to get on them, or --

21 A. No.

22 Q. From what you recall.

23 A. That, you know, that does remind me -- okay. No we did not
24 in that instance, but it makes me think that -- one time perhaps
25 in a heavy crosswind -- and I can't remember the captain.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. It may well have been Paul. Somebody asked for a little bit
3 of aileron help after, you know, after touchdown, but like before
4 the 80 knots tops to bottoms. Like just hold it into the wind.
5 But it was a clear and concise communication that made sense to me
6 perfectly at the time. I remember going, huh, that's not happened
7 before. But heavy crosswind, a little bit of help, there's no --
8 I don't think there would be any point of confusion there.

9 Q. Um-hum. Did any of these flights with Paul go into Dutch
10 Harbor?

11 A. No. No, ma'am.

12 Q. Okay. And did you recall -- actually, can you just walk me
13 through when you would do your performance calculations in terms
14 of determining speeds and flap settings?

15 A. So I will often do -- depending on the airport, but if I --
16 if it's not Dutch or Sand Point and I know that it's not -- the
17 runway length is not generally the limiting factor, after 10,000
18 feet I'll do the fuel burn calculation --

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. -- and get the initial speeds out of the performance binder.
21 But I always check them against -- once I get the weather to make
22 sure that that all works with the airport analysis.

23 Q. That's after climbing through 10,000 or on the way down?

24 A. First, climbing through -- after climbing through 10,000,
25 I'll get the -- out of the performance binder I can get VREF,

1 VClean, and the MM speed. But I don't have the winds yet, so then
2 I do a final check. I just would -- I can pull this card out just
3 to think about even doing it. I just would, you know, put in my
4 VREF, VREF plus ICE, VT, VMM, get those written down because that
5 really doesn't change unless we decide to switch flap settings or
6 something else based on the airport analysis.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. And then I would recheck those numbers again approximately 20
9 minutes out. I get weather, local weather for landing airport.

10 Q. With this last flight with Paul, do you remember when you did
11 those calculations by any chance?

12 A. Well, and that's a good point because we were going from King
13 Salmon to Dillingham, and that's a short flight and it's a -- the
14 workload is higher so we can do, in that instance, based on
15 weather there, we can actually calculate those speeds before we
16 leave King Salmon so that the workload is reduced.

17 Q. Okay. Do you typically fly into Dutch Harbor with flaps 35?

18 A. I'd say it's been a mix actually.

19 Q. Okay. Like 50/50?

20 A. Yeah, pretty close.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Maybe a little tilted towards flaps 20.

23 Q. And when would you use flaps 20 over 35?

24 A. If -- when and only if the airport analysis allowed it.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. And it was gusty.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. But it would have to first be -- it has to meet the
4 requirement of that airport analysis chart otherwise there would
5 have to be significant discussion why I weren't doing that.

6 Q. Okay. So let's say it wasn't gusty but you -- and you had a
7 solution for both flaps 20 and flaps 35, would you still -- would
8 you pick one over the other? Let's say without gusts.

9 A. You know, because I'm a first officer I've never landed at
10 Dutch Harbor, so at this point I -- if it wasn't gusty, no, I
11 wouldn't -- I've been practicing flaps 35 landings recently.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. The plane stops much shorter at flaps 35, so I'd probably, if
14 it was my decision and it wasn't gusty, I'd probably tend towards
15 a flaps 35 landing just because of that margin.

16 Q. So how does that communication look in the cockpit, if you're
17 doing the analysis and the captain's making that decision, how
18 does that communication go typically?

19 A. I've enjoyed flying at PenAir compared to perhaps some other
20 places where I flew, because that communication is clear and good
21 and they're very -- first time -- not the first time; the first
22 time I went with Brandon and it was -- I mean, I remember being
23 impressed with how big this aircraft was the first time I went
24 with PenAir, how well briefed it was. But the second time when I
25 had a little bit more to go on and I was starting to really become

1 I think a better crew member, I started looking at the numbers.
2 And the captain said he wanted flaps 20 speeds, so I asked him
3 why, and he showed me in the APG where, with the headwind and the
4 weight we were at, we could actually make the flaps 20 landing,
5 and it was kind of gusty and he preferred it. So that's kind of
6 how the discussion goes. But he also educated me and he showed
7 me. He showed me the Alt CG -- there were things that I had been
8 briefed on but it just -- until you do it with somebody, it didn't
9 make -- isn't -- you know, like oh wow, these are all the pieces
10 starting to come together.

11 Q. Um-hum.

12 A. And I know Brandon was trying to show me that, but when you
13 start there's a lot going on and it takes repetitive cycles, I
14 think, to -- you're -- anyways I am, I'm able to absorb more
15 information as I've done more cycles.

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. And I was still in that stage.

18 Q. So how about now, now that you've gotten some experience in
19 the aircraft? Do you have -- are you providing any input in terms
20 of what flap setting is going into -- let's say Dutch. Let's just
21 use Dutch as the example?

22 A. Yeah. I think most of the captains are very open to a
23 discussion about that. Like what's the flap setting, why. You
24 know, I think different pilots have different preferences. I'm
25 not 100 percent sure how they've developed those preferences, but

1 it seems that some land flaps 35 more often than others at all
2 airports.

3 Q. So do you tend to give them both options, let's say you had
4 -- you were able to do both options.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. And they'll just come back with a decision?

7 A. I often write down both options or ask.

8 Q. Okay. All right. When you do your walk-around is that prior
9 to every flight or is that prior to the first flight of the --

10 A. Prior to every flight.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And after every flight.

13 Q. So when you walked around the aircraft in Dutch Harbor prior
14 to coming back to Anchorage, did you notice anything anomalous
15 there?

16 A. Not at all, no.

17 Q. And then same thing, you did do a walk-around back in
18 Anchorage?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. And did you notice anything abnormal?

21 A. No, no. I'll say this just about my walk-arounds, they're
22 pretty thorough and I use a flashlight -- I think I have it on me
23 now -- even post-flight. And I was flying with Adam Hehl that
24 day, and Adam is -- he's one of the captains that even though the
25 walk-around can be outsourced to the SIC, Adam will often walk

1 around anyways. But just recently he's started to say to me --
2 not every time, but sometimes he says, Chet, I know you do a
3 thorough walk-around; this plane is good if you say it's good.

4 Q. Um-hum.

5 A. But he'll often look anyways. And so I do a thorough walk-
6 around every time.

7 Q. Can you describe how your flight was that day, in as much
8 detail as you can provide, to Dutch Harbor and back?

9 A. Can I go back just 1 day even?

10 Q. Sure.

11 A. So the day before I was supposed to go to Dutch with Adam
12 Hehl, and the wind charts that we use as part of our planning were
13 outside of the limits, and just barely, and Adam said I'm not
14 interested in going if we don't get a better on the ground weather
15 report for winds. And we did a weather hold and we didn't go, and
16 we spent -- but in that process then we got to talk about winds a
17 little bit and review the weather chart, and even though we've
18 done it before, it was just kind of educational because it was the
19 first time that I hadn't gone to Dutch Harbor based on winds. And
20 so it was a reinforced idea.

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. Then the next day, we went to Dutch Harbor and the winds
23 were, you know, more favorable quadrant and the wind speeds were
24 -- you know, they were going to allow us to go. And Adam's
25 experience and compared to the wind charts, and he talked about

1 the most likely scenario, which would be going in the back door.
2 Even then we started kind of briefing it at the planning stage.

3 Q. Uh-huh.

4 A. But, so we got -- we were flying and I was going to fly the
5 approach and Adam was going to make the landing. And he's done
6 that a few times just because he's required to make the landing.
7 I'm not allowed to make the landing, but he's let me build some
8 experience flying these approaches.

9 Q. Uh-huh.

10 A. We briefed it, we talked about it, he said it's going to be
11 bumpy from the missed approach point in. We talked about the
12 landmarks, and he got the weather. A lot of times the pilot -- a
13 lot of times the SIC will get the weather no matter what, but
14 pilot monitoring does sometimes. I like to do it as the SIC.
15 But, anyways, he got the weather.

16 Michelle, the weather -- the gal that does the weather down
17 there, she, you know, she said I'll give you updates. The wind's
18 been variable. It was variable and gusty. I want to say -- I
19 wrote it down. It was 2-8-0, 19, gusting 27, but there had been
20 variability. And Adam said that that is going to favor 3-1
21 landing.

22 Q. Uh-huh.

23 A. And I, you know, I did the -- I got -- once he gave me that
24 information -- I heard it too, but he likes to make sure that you
25 don't miss any communication so he says here's the weather and

1 transfers it to you.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. And you have to have that trust, but I heard -- I always kind
4 of, can't help but listen for the wind and the altimeter and a
5 couple of things I always just habitually, I think most pilots
6 pick up.

7 Q. Uh-huh.

8 A. So then we went through the airport analysis. He, you know,
9 he specifically asked me to bug 35 and 20 numbers or have them
10 both available.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And but it was a strong, good strong headwind so we said
13 we'll be able to land flaps 20 unless something changes. And it
14 was bumpy, but it was really -- I felt like I got great experience
15 even though I didn't make the landing.

16 Q. Uh-huh.

17 A. Like it was a serious crosswind on what kind of we call base,
18 and but you're still looking at a hillside, and he just, you know,
19 minor corrections telling me what inputs to put in at these winds.
20 And he -- I mean flying, all the captains who've been to Dutch a
21 lot, just every time you learn here's what we're going to
22 experience with the wind. And Adam, in particular, just a ton of
23 experience. Like this is what the weather pattern will like, this
24 is what the cloud cover will likely do, based on the wind and just
25 previous experience. And so we talked about that on the way down

1 even before we got to our actual briefing, reviewed this stuff.

2 But it -- I mean, it was a strong wind but it seemed totally
3 uneventful to me. It was normal Dutch, kind of variable gusty
4 wind.

5 Q. Um-hum.

6 A. He made a good landing and with that wind. It was relatively
7 short really.

8 Q. When do you typically switch controls if you were doing the
9 approach and he was doing the landing?

10 A. He always briefs that really well, and he says when we turn
11 final, we'll do a transfer of controls.

12 Q. About how many -- how high is that in altitude?

13 A. It's -- it depends on, you know, if you were flying -- we had
14 plenty of cloud cover. That really depends on the cloud cover.
15 At this point, you know, in a day like that, 700 feet.

16 Q. Um-hum. Okay.

17 A. Maybe 5; 5 to 7.

18 Q. How was the landing back at Anchorage?

19 A. It was my landing; it was really good. It's a long runway
20 too.

21 Q. Yeah.

22 A. It's easy to make a -- I've been -- my landings have gotten
23 better and I -- you know, it was fine and good landing.

24 Q. Good landing, okay.

25 A. It actually was flaps 35 because Adam let me practice it.

1 Q. Did you use max braking --

2 A. No.

3 Q. -- too or just flaps 35?

4 A. Thirty-five. Early on, handful of reverse thruster, light
5 idling, quickly.

6 Q. You were discussing an instance where you did accidentally
7 use max braking.

8 A. I don't know if it was max, but --

9 Q. Or, sorry --

10 A. Unintended.

11 Q. -- more braking than you intended.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. When was that?

14 A. It was at Fairbanks, and it was early because I was still --
15 I wasn't slowed down enough to -- I mean, it was just -- it was a
16 place where I shouldn't have used brakes at all. It was just
17 accidental. I was trying to rudder and I had my feet there ready
18 to use the brakes, and I just tapped them early. It was early in
19 the rollout phase of the landing.

20 Q. Okay. So you did say you bugged both -- this is again
21 switching topics here. But you bug both V speeds typically?

22 A. I can't bug both, but I write both down.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. I can only bug one set of speeds.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. But I write one down. And some -- one captain in particular
2 if he's going to do a flaps 35 landing, likes the VM -- the VM
3 speed or maneuvering speed is at our discretion and he likes that
4 speed to be flaps 20 until he's closer to final -- actually on
5 final with flaps 15 already in.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And it just -- and he explained well. The reason he does, it
8 gives a better margin above a stall speed in that situation.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. But he's the only -- well, there's only one captain I can
11 think of that does that.

12 Q. Uh-huh. So -- sorry.

13 A. That VM speed is kind of at our discretion. Wind increment
14 can be involved or --

15 Q. Is that an approach speed or maneuvering?

16 A. It's a maneuvering speed.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yeah. VREF is the approach speed --

19 Q. Right.

20 A. -- point 2, 3 --

21 Q. Right.

22 A. -- stall speed.

23 Q. So when you have let's say two options for V speed, which one
24 do you choose to bug?

25 A. Again it depends on what the wind analysis, what the --

1 Q. Right.

2 A. -- airport analysis chart says and what the captain asks for.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Or if it's my leg, if whether or not I'm going to land flaps
5 20 or flaps 35.

6 Q. Right.

7 A. I mean, it still depends on which configuration I'm going to
8 put the plane in to land it.

9 Q. Did you get any wind updates going into Dutch from what you
10 can recall?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you know what the -- do you remember what those were
13 coming in?

14 A. I don't remember what they were but they continued to favor
15 runway 3-1. They -- I remember they were variable. And Adam said
16 they would be variable but they were from that 2-8-0 maybe.

17 Q. Uh-huh.

18 A. So, I have to remark that I think the human weather reporting
19 at Dutch is mostly really just excellent. And they seem to know
20 where we are. I mean, we make our reports and they will often
21 give reports based on that. Sometimes they'll give them even
22 before we make those reports. Like, you know, wind shift 2-7-0
23 gusting 20.

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 A. But I remember it moved 270, 280, 300 -- we got at least

1 three, and they moved every time but they were always from that
2 kind of northwest quadrant.

3 Q. So were they unsolicited or did you request them?

4 A. That's a -- again, you know, there's this thing that happens.
5 Adam has a rapport with some of these folks, and he said,
6 Michelle, can you give us wind updates as we come on in?

7 Q. Okay. So he asked for that.

8 A. But I think she -- every time I've been there and, whether or
9 not that was asked for, she's done it. But Adam specifically
10 said, can you give us wind checks on the way in?

11 Q. Right. Is there any point where you would tune in the AWOS
12 frequency to get weather going to Dutch?

13 A. I sometimes do it on the ground.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Just to compare it.

16 Q. Yeah.

17 A. I've taken -- I've done that. But I don't recall doing it in
18 the air. Maybe once a captain said, let's just listen to this and
19 compare the two.

20 Q. Okay. Is there a reason why you prefer Dutch Weather?

21 A. Partly because I've compared it on the ground and their wind
22 reporting is better than the AWOS in my experience.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. I don't -- I'm not exactly sure how the AWOS is configured
25 and where. I should know probably where that is on the airfield,

1 but there are two windsocks that you can look at and see, or three
2 actually. I know of at least two, maybe a third one that's not on
3 the airport. You can, and you can take -- and you can look at the
4 water. But the AWOS doesn't have any ability to look at the water
5 and see what's going on. Sometimes they'll give us, you know,
6 white caps in the bay. They give us water information as well.

7 Q. All right, okay. Is all your flying, has all of your flying
8 been in Alaska?

9 A. Primarily. Not all of it. I flew my plane to Montana and
10 back. And then the sim training.

11 Q. Right. Okay. But mostly here?

12 A. Mostly here.

13 Q. Okay. When you were doing OE do you recall how those flights
14 were documented as part of your OE?

15 A. In part they were documented because there was a checklist of
16 items that we had to go through.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And we would work through those items. And Brandon and
19 Dennis Fisher were my two -- and actually Steve Hakala, I had
20 three check airman fly with me. And they had a paperwork
21 requirement and I don't know that I was fully aware of what that
22 was.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. But they would -- we would look at this list of items that we
25 needed to cover and have both oral discussion and, you know, work

1 on components of my training.

2 Q. Uh-huh. Did you ever have to sign any paperwork when it came
3 to the completing OE?

4 A. When I completed OE I did. I signed a document that I'd had
5 a line -- well, I don't know if it was called a line check. You
6 know, I should probably know the phraseology, but I don't know the
7 phraseology. But yes, I signed a form.

8 Q. Do you recall what it looked like, what information was on
9 there?

10 A. Yeah. It looked like -- I can almost think of the number on
11 it, but I can't.

12 Q. That's okay.

13 A. It had a lot, it had -- you know, it had a lot of those
14 things that we discussed on various flights. But, you know,
15 crosswind landing, emergency procedures, and there were checkmarks
16 in various areas. Maybe -- I don't know if this is verbal, some
17 of the things were done as a verbal for the final check ride. I
18 did that with Dennis Fisher.

19 Q. Did it have -- have you seen any documentation in terms of
20 all of the flights that you did for OE? Were those listed
21 anywhere?

22 A. I don't know if it did have those. I think it did though.

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. But I'm not 100 percent sure.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I could probably --

2 Q. That's okay.

3 A. -- look at my log and -- I mean, I kept track like from the
4 day I started to when I finished, and I have the finish date so I
5 could look at all of my flights and know which ones were IOE
6 flights for sure.

7 Q. Okay. But you sign that at the very end?

8 A. I signed that at the end, yes.

9 Q. Okay. Had you seen the form before that?

10 A. I might have seen it a day before, a couple days before.

11 Q. So that's something that the check airman fill out?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And I, you know, I have to confirm it though because I signed
15 it. And I don't know, I think less than a week later I did a line
16 check and it was the same form.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. I don't know if it requires -- because I'm not the trainer in
19 this, I don't know if it requires the same exact -- I got the
20 feeling that my IOE check ride was more complete than just the
21 line check. I've done two line checks since then, just randomly.
22 One was because somebody else was becoming a check airman and for
23 them to do that they had to give me a check, and so they did my
24 line check for them to become a -- and then I was told I would
25 probably only do one every 6 months, but then my 6 months came up

1 from my initial one and I did another one.

2 Q. Oh, okay. I see.

3 A. So I think I've had more than most second in command.

4 Q. Um-hum. You mentioned you flew about 12 times into Dutch.

5 How many of those would you say were with PenAir?

6 A. Eight.

7 Q. Okay. Did you fly, start flying into Dutch immediately after

8 OE, or --

9 A. I went into Dutch on an OE.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And then -- yeah, I don't, I don't know that there was a

12 limitation. I don't -- I didn't -- yeah, pretty much.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I think would be -- I'm trying to think. Yeah. I went there

15 three times on IOE. At least. It might have been there more than

16 eight times.

17 Q. Estimate is fine. Not a big deal.

18 DR. SILVA: All right, I'm going to pause here.

19 MR. HARRIS: Okay.

20 DR. SILVA: And then I'll pass it over to Dujuan.

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

22 DR. SILVA: How are you doing, do you need a break at all?

23 MR. HARRIS: I'm fine.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay.

25 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

1 Q. So how common is it for pilots to use the anti-ice system on
2 the approach or landing phase into Dutch?

3 A. I have never encountered icing on the way into Dutch, the
4 landing phase for sure. It's usually warmer.

5 Q. So there'd be no reason to activate the system typically?

6 A. Unless there's, you know -- I was never in icing conditions.
7 Maybe one time on the MORDI to ROFSU leg, I might have had to -- I
8 might have used the deicing system.

9 Q. Okay. And I think Sathya spoke on this, but has there been a
10 situation where Dutch Weather was not available when you were
11 trying to reach them and you had to use an alternate source like
12 AWOS?

13 A. For me no, never.

14 Q. No? All right. And has anyone ever discussed with you their
15 concerns about flying into Dutch Harbor?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And what were those concerns?

18 A. Well, that they're special -- it's a company designated
19 special airport and that it's got unique wind and weather that can
20 be an issue there, and that the runway is short compared to many
21 runways we use.

22 Q. So when pilots go through the training for special airports
23 and they go through that process, does that ever come up? Do you
24 know, has anyone ever talked to you about, hey, I'm trying to get
25 trained for a special airport and still had concerns with flying

1 into Dutch?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And what were those reasons?

4 A. Just that it's, again, that the winds are complicated, can be
5 complicated; it's short and maybe -- because captains are, you
6 know, it's a captain's responsibility, that more experience making
7 the command decisions as captain is better. I've heard a captain
8 say I just would like to go in there with those people who have
9 more experience more times.

10 Q. Uh-huh. Okay.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all I had. Thank you.

12 DR. SILVA: Brandon.

13 BY MR. WILSON:

14 Q. So when you were going in Dutch, that TOLD card, is that from
15 the 17th?

16 A. It is.

17 Q. Okay. And then when you bug VMM, do you go VREF and then add
18 10 and that's your VMM speed?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Unless there's some other -- like we could have a discussion
22 about a wind increment, gust, shear, but typically that VMM is a
23 safe margin.

24 MR. WILSON: Okay. I think that's all I have for now.

25 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Let's do a quick second round.

1 BY MR. FRANTZ:

2 Q. So yeah, I'm not sure I remember reading this. What is the
3 PenAir policy on adding numbers to your REF speed?

4 A. Well, VMM is defined as VREF plus 10, but there's a -- in the
5 CFM there's a note about it being a discretionary speed for the
6 pilots and you could add a wind increment or any kind of increment
7 actually. I believe in the CFM it talks about the ability to add
8 particularly -- mostly I think it talks about the wind increment.

9 Q. Is there guidance or a requirement to add numbers to VREF
10 based on wind or is it just, is it discretionary?

11 A. Well, the number is discretionary and there is some guidance.
12 For example, gust, and I'm -- the guidance -- there is guidance.
13 But most typically I bug VREF plus 10.

14 Q. And what does the MM stand for, the VMM? Is if VMM you're
15 saying?

16 A. VMM, yeah. Maneuvering is how I remember it.

17 Q. But there's two M's.

18 A. There's two M's, yeah.

19 Q. Okay. But that's your -- is that the target speed you fly
20 the approach at, MM?

21 A. Yeah, until above -- the 50 feet above the threshold.

22 Q. Okay. Yeah, okay. The wind charts, are those ever used,
23 consulted, or do they dictate your course of action after you've
24 left, once you're in flight at the top of descent? For example,
25 do you ever look at the wind charts then and say, well, now the

1 latest wind indicates that this sector and it's out of limits? Or
2 is it just a pre-dispatch tool?

3 A. No. I mean, it is primarily a pre-dispatch tool, but no,
4 I've looked at them in flight before the in-range definitely.

5 Q. Have you ever experienced or heard of anybody changing their
6 plan of action or diverting based on consulting the wind charts
7 once they're in flight and they saw that now they were over some
8 limit and they went someplace else or changed the plan?

9 A. I haven't heard of it, but I'm certain it would happen if it
10 really was outside of the -- if it was outside those limit, I'm
11 certain that there are -- most captains would say I'm not going
12 there. I mean, I've had it reinforced that those things, even
13 though they're not regulatory, per se, that they're effective
14 tools for decision making.

15 Q. Based on the other captains you've flown with, how would you
16 characterize Paul Well's judgement as a captain?

17 A. I really don't feel like I can second guess his judgement. I
18 mean, outside of this incident, it seemed like his judgement was
19 sound to me.

20 There's one -- he was -- he had an application that was on
21 the computer that he was using, or not using -- he was introducing
22 to the company made by the same people, APG, who make our landing
23 data, and it -- I looked at it quite a bit and compared it to
24 actual landing numbers and it -- plus or minus a knot almost
25 everywhere, but it was obvious it could do some interpolation that

1 we're not allowed to do based on our landing weights. But again,
2 it was really a knot, every time I looked at it and compared it to
3 my actual data, but -- and I'm -- gosh, maybe this is stepping
4 outside the length/bounds of the question, but based on that Paul
5 said that he could land at Dutch with a tailwind, and I heard
6 another captain say that was a bad idea.

7 Q. How would you characterize his decision-making skills
8 generally as a captain?

9 A. I'd say they were good.

10 Q. What about aircraft handling skills?

11 A. I'd say that in the Saab, that he was still a little green.
12 And I feel like I don't have nearly as many hours as he does and I
13 only have 400 in the aircraft, but he seemed like there were still
14 some things he was working out in the aircraft. But good, he had
15 good stick and rudder skills I mean.

16 Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion or what do you think about the
17 PenAir allowance that you don't have to have 300 hours to fly into
18 Dutch Harbor if you get a waiver? Is that something that you
19 think is a workable and fine and safe idea? Do you have any
20 concerns about the fact that somebody without -- you know, with
21 only 100 hours in the airplane or at PenAir could fly into Dutch
22 or a special airport?

23 A. You know, I -- initially I thought this could -- something
24 like this could benefit me, but then I realized I could also be
25 sitting in SIC with more experience than somebody going there, and

1 I -- so I had concerns, yes. Because I realized there's -- you
2 know, this takes some training and there's great training at
3 PenAir but you have to be exposed to it.

4 Q. Have you had that experience of flying with a captain who has
5 less time than you or you were a little bit of concern about going
6 into a special airport?

7 A. I have not had that experience.

8 Q. No? Okay.

9 A. And I will say that I know people were concerned with the
10 idea that there could be a waiver on that. Even though if it's
11 theoretically possible, is it -- just because it's allowed, does
12 it mean it's safe? That's a question that was raised.

13 Q. Do you have any -- I don't know if I would think that you
14 know this or not, but do you know when that policy came into
15 effect of the 100-hour option for special airports?

16 A. I'm not -- I don't know, but I had this -- you know, I read
17 through the manuals. When I was -- when it was explained to me, I
18 was told that there was a 300-hour limit, and then I actually read
19 it later that there was a way around that, that that letter could
20 be written. And I was, it wasn't the way it was explained to me,
21 so I feel like that -- and I didn't -- it's not that I went and
22 looked at revisions and checked, but it seemed like that change
23 was relatively recent related to my date of hire, which was the
24 end of February. Because it didn't correspond with what I was
25 told.

1 But there's a lot of information there so, I mean -- and I
2 might have heard wrong, but I thought there's a 300-hour hard
3 limit and then at some point I was like, oh, there's an exception
4 to that rule. But I never heard of it -- I hadn't heard of it
5 being used.

6 Q. Specifically about training on how to use the airport
7 analysis information, would you -- most of that training came in
8 ground school; is that correct? And -- go ahead.

9 A. Yeah, in ground school. We also just to confirm its validity
10 in ground school; we did an exercise where we actually used the
11 AOM in the charts to kind of like see how much work was being
12 saved in this process.

13 Q. Okay. Any extra training or repeat of that training happen
14 in the sim, specifically on how to use the airport analysis info?

15 A. Yes. Yes, actually. Just not a lot, but definitely like
16 this is the tool. And we did a LOFT flight to Dutch, and the idea
17 that specifically that's a, you know, weight limited compared to
18 field length airport. And that's a scenario that you can get
19 into, there's a weight limit compared to field length.

20 Q. Okay. So, of the three types of training, three places you
21 might have gotten trained on using that data: a little in the
22 simulator, ground school, and then during OE, where does -- from
23 your point of view, where does most of your comfort level and
24 understanding of how to use that come?

25 A. IOE is where it really -- even though it sometimes, and it

1 could be the type of learning I do; I'm tactical, tactile. And to
2 be in the airplane and actually make those decisions and then have
3 a discussion with a captain about what those decisions mean
4 reinforce the idea to me.

5 Brandon was very good about it. Steve Hakala was very good
6 about it, and Dennis Fisher. I went to Dutch with all of those
7 guys, and then you're looking at that airport analysis book and
8 going these are the criteria that we make this decision on.

9 And when you're in the sim you're trying to get through
10 training. I happened to do the training with somebody who was
11 also getting their ATP, so didn't necessarily have that extra
12 experience to rely on to make that an ingrained idea. But we used
13 it. I don't know, in IOE is when it clicked for me.

14 Q. And during IOE when you were using it real world, real life,
15 anything you did there conflict or have any difference in the way
16 you were trained in the sim or in ground school?

17 A. No. But I did -- one day, I was flying with Steve Hakala and
18 I was like, whoa, I don't think, Steve, we can -- I don't
19 understand why we're going to bug flaps 20. And that's when he
20 showed me here's the headwind component, like here's the wind,
21 here's the wind that she gave us, it's steady, here's why, and
22 there's the, you know, 46114 there's a -- that's our weight limit
23 in there, we're less than that; here's another reason, here you
24 can actually follow the chart down. Now we're at this headwind,
25 you know, so we have this headwind component, we can actually --

1 we could land shorter and we can land with flaps 20. Ah, it makes
2 sense.

3 Just details of it that clicked after asking -- I mean, I can
4 even -- I don't have it in front of me, but I know if a tailwind,
5 if it's like -- for every knot tailwind, there's a correction
6 factor. You have to subtract a 1,100 pounds from your --
7 approximately, from your landing weight. And so right away you
8 go, oh, you can't -- according to this information, you -- 5,000
9 pounds, 10 knots, 10,000 pounds, that's -- all of a sudden you're
10 below the basic empty weight of the aircraft.

11 But all that didn't make a big picture to me until IOE
12 reinforced and what he -- you know, captain's going, what are you
13 looking at? What number are you looking at right now? Oh, jeez.

14 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think that's all I have, Chet. Thank
15 you. We'll go around one more time see if anybody has any follow-
16 ups.

17 DR. SILVA: You doing okay?

18 MR. HARRIS: I'm doing fine.

19 DR. SILVA: Okay.

20 BY DR. SILVA:

21 Q. Okay. So I'm going to go back to this application that Paul
22 was using on your flight. Was that the first time you had seen
23 this app?

24 A. No. He showed it to me the very first time I flew with him,
25 and he just said that this is a potential tool that we might use.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And he introduced it to me and he asked me would I compare my
3 numbers with its numbers when we were in the planning stages. And
4 I was like, yeah, sure.

5 Q. So from your understanding, that was something the company --
6 was that something the company asked him to check out for them or
7 was that something -- again, your understanding of that?

8 A. My understanding, it was going to become a part of the
9 toolset that we used and that he was in an analysis phase of that,
10 was testing it, an analysis. But very clearly he was like these
11 are not the numbers we're going to use; we're using the
12 performance binder and the airport analysis.

13 Q. Okay. So from what you understood, that was company
14 sanctioned, the application?

15 A. Well, not to use as data to land but to explore as a
16 possibility.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. It was not to be used for actual configuration and landing.

19 Q. Have you experienced or encountered that app with any other
20 pilots or was it just with Paul?

21 A. It was just with Paul.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And I think he got authority. I'm not 100 percent sure. It
24 seemed like it was sanctioned by the company because at one point
25 I asked him could I have a copy of it just to look at, and he said

1 it wasn't available, it wasn't authorized. And then it became --
2 he said now we're in a beta testing kind of phase of this and so
3 he released it to a few people. I don't know if he released it to
4 everybody, but I'd asked him about it. Because I -- to me, it
5 appears to be a valuable and useful tool and it could cut down on
6 the workload. And it has a -- you know, like I said, it
7 interpolates. And again, how different is a 1 knot on a VREF of
8 -- if it's 126 or 125. But it seemed valuable, like it would cut
9 down on the workload, so I had asked him about it. And then I
10 know he released it to some first officers and some captains to
11 just beta test it.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Which again, with the very, very clear and distinct warning
14 that this wasn't to be used as actual data.

15 Q. You mentioned an example with discussing how he mentioned
16 that you could land with a tailwind, but there was another captain
17 that said that was a bad idea. What was the context of that
18 conversation?

19 A. We were getting ready to fly, we were doing our preparatory
20 work. I was with Paul. We were going to King Salmon and
21 Dillingham that last time I flew with him. And Greg Pfeiffer was
22 the other captain. He was in the room, and he -- I think he was
23 getting ready to leave. I'm not exactly sure what his schedule
24 was.

25 Q. Uh-huh.

1 A. But Paul said specifically, Greg, I was looking at the
2 numbers in the app and there's a situation where I could land with
3 a tailwind 10 knots at Dutch. And Greg was -- Greg cursed and
4 said that's a bad idea. He said -- and then he stopped. He said,
5 well, maybe if you were really light. And Paul said no, and he
6 gave a number. I don't remember what the number was. It was in
7 the 40s, I think. And Greg stood up and he said that app doesn't
8 fly the airplane. He said this -- that app does not fly the
9 airplane, Paul; I would not land with a tailwind at Dutch. And he
10 left the room.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And Paul said, well -- right before he left he said, well, I
13 can tell you the exact number of feet it should require to land
14 even with that tailwind. And Greg was like, I don't care. And
15 that was the nature of that conversation.

16 Q. Okay. So you mentioned that you had concern about the waiver
17 for captains to have to be able to fly into Dutch with less than
18 300 hours.

19 A. Yeah, when I first started I didn't know -- you know, here we
20 are, we're qualified. But as I saw Dutch, yeah, I just thought
21 300 hours, that's not a lot to require somebody to have trained to
22 go to Dutch, to be PIC in the airframe.

23 Q. Did you voice your concerns to anyone?

24 A. Not as much over that, no.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I do remember talking to Dennis Fisher about it, saying this
2 seems unusual.

3 Q. What was his response?

4 A. He said you should -- he gave good advice. He said, you
5 should mention that to the current chief pilot; you should
6 document your concern.

7 Q. Okay. Did you follow up on that at all?

8 A. No.

9 Q. So --

10 A. It didn't seem like it was likely to -- didn't seem like it
11 was likely to become an issue. That's partly why, I think.

12 Q. Okay. So when you're flying with captains that you know
13 haven't flown into these special airports very much before, do you
14 change your behavior or awareness or anything along those lines as
15 a first officer who has experience with these airports?

16 A. I'm going to say I'm fortunate in that I have not had to fly
17 into any of these special airports with anybody who wasn't vastly
18 more experienced than I was.

19 Q. Okay. So then hypothetically, would you?

20 A. I think that there's a -- yes, maybe, in that I might ask a
21 few more questions. I might see how open that person is to a
22 dialogue about why we're doing whatever it is we might be doing,
23 just to make sure it makes sense to me. Not necessarily to
24 question their abilities but just to understand better their
25 decision making.

1 Q. Uh-huh.

2 A. But it wouldn't be that much different. And again, I think
3 all of the pilots I've flown here with, captains would be open to
4 that discussion.

5 Q. So, in particular, what specific concerns would you have
6 about newer captains flying into Dutch with less experience?

7 A. You know, just in general -- I don't even know if it would be
8 just Dutch. In general, I just have -- my concern would be newer
9 captains who haven't seen a full compliment of weather in Alaska
10 for a season, who haven't spent much time in the airframe. I
11 don't know that specifically to Dutch it would be --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I mean, it might be have you landed flaps 35; are you
14 comfortable with landing flaps 35? That might be specific to
15 Dutch, I might ask. But mostly it would just be are you familiar
16 -- you know, more concerned about first officers upgrading to
17 captain who had just less experience.

18 Q. And why specifically with those compared to new hire
19 captains?

20 A. Same thing with new hire. I don't -- I think that one thing
21 that's nice about PenAir is there doesn't seem to be much in the
22 way of new-hire street captains. I have not experienced that
23 phenomenon here. Everybody's gone through the process of sitting
24 -- or almost everybody, sitting in the second in command and being
25 a first officer. And I just feel like that's valuable from my

1 perspective. I don't have a long career in a crewed environment
2 but I was more comforted by that idea and culture.

3 Q. Okay. So just so I'm clear, you have less concern about
4 people who have upgraded through the first officer or --

5 A. I have less concern. My only concern in that regard seems to
6 be that, like the 300 hours, there was a reduction in the amount
7 of time in hours. I don't know if there even is an hour
8 requirement.

9 Q. Oh, okay, to upgrade.

10 A. Yeah, to upgrade.

11 Q. Okay. Got it.

12 A. And so that, those people then don't have experience going to
13 Dutch. If they upgrade in a short amount of time, that's
14 problem's worse with a street-hire captain.

15 Q. Okay, got it.

16 A. I guess that's the vernacular, street hire.

17 Q. I'm sorry. I might have made that up.

18 A. No, I think I did.

19 Q. Okay. Got it.

20 A. Is that clear?

21 Q. Yes, I understand that. So when you're coming in on
22 approach, can you walk me through what speeds you're aiming for
23 from, let's say, final through rollout or touchdown really?

24 A. So from final VMM is the target speed, and until -- you know,
25 you can start dialing it back a little bit, but never want to go

1 below the VREF speed until you're 50 feet above the threshold.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And that's -- there's variability in there, but primarily
4 target speed VM from the final approach fix until touchdown zone
5 elevation 50 feet or -- I mean above the touchdown zone. And then
6 -- maybe a little bit earlier, but you know, it's going to be --
7 the whole callout is REF, you know, REF plus 10, REF plus 15, and
8 like to touchdown at REF.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. You know, sometimes I see REF minus 5. But at REF it seems
11 to be smooth and controlled. I see REF minus 5 quite a bit too,
12 but on a long runway where you're just holding it a little bit.

13 Q. Okay. So is that how it was taught to you in terms of
14 landing the aircraft, is aim to touchdown at REF?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay. Did you have CRM training when you came in here?

17 A. I mean, we discuss it all the time. At the sim it was part
18 of our -- definitely, that was actually a bit part of the sim
19 training is CRM. You know, if there's an emergency who's going to
20 do the QRH, how are we going to do the memory items, let's go over
21 check, you know, check your list, rigor. It's a regular
22 discussion, CRM.

23 Q. Was there any formal training that you received on CRM that
24 you can recall?

25 A. Discussions in the ground school that revolved -- there was a

1 module on CRM. And then again at sim and the sit sessions. Even
2 the sit sessions were CRM training, you know, that checklist
3 discipline; here's your call, here's the response. So definitely
4 there was CRM --

5 Q. Did you find that that training was effective that you
6 received on CRM?

7 A. Yes. But I think that, to be honest, I think the training
8 works because the environment is open to it.

9 Q. On that note, how would you describe the safety culture here?

10 A. I'd say there's a strong safety culture. I'm glad to be here
11 as compared to the 135 operator I worked at before. And I think
12 that safety culture is very attractive and right away makes you
13 feel apart of a culture that is PenAir. And it's -- just because
14 it's legal, doesn't mean its right. We're going to do the safest
15 thing always. It's going to be legal, but -- I mean, it's just
16 right away everybody was just -- you know, here's the missed
17 approach point; there's no reason for us to go past this point;
18 these regulations are written in blood.

19 All positive. I really am very grateful for the safety
20 culture at PenAir and the way the pilots approach CRM. As a first
21 officer with very little experience, I feel like my decision, my
22 input, mattered right away. Which is impressive, because the
23 other place I flew, that was not as well ingrained.

24 Q. Have you had to report a safety issue at all?

25 A. Not at PenAir.

1 Q. Let's say you did notice something you wanted to report, how
2 would you go about doing that?

3 A. We were taught there's the WBAT system, and it's nonpunitive.
4 You can do that as part of the -- mostly it's a tracking and
5 understanding how to improve safety. But I've never filled one
6 out.

7 Q. Okay. Do you feel empowered to fill them out if you see the
8 need?

9 A. Yeah. I think there's this thing about maybe just -- this is
10 a part of pilot culture too, I think: It's also more work that
11 I'm not getting paid for. I still feel empowered to fill one out
12 but I haven't seen a need to.

13 Q. Uh-huh.

14 A. But I think -- I don't know, if it was a super minor item
15 like, you know, I might have made a slip -- I didn't fall, but I
16 might have slipped on the way from my car to here, is that a --
17 and that's a safety concern, but it's one I face every day in the
18 winter in Alaska. I'm not going to fill out a WBAT about that
19 because I was looking at my phone and it's my fault.

20 Q. Have you ever had any pressure to fly, externally or from the
21 company?

22 A. Not from the company. I have not.

23 Q. If you do receive pressure, where does that come from?

24 A. You know, I haven't felt it. And as a first officer, I think
25 we're insulated a bit from it. But I think -- well, I'll back up.

1 I think as pilots I think a lot of the pressure comes from the
2 self -- reflecting not on the company, but when I worked at Rust's
3 and I was the PIC, they didn't pressure me, I pressured myself.

4 Q. Uh-huh.

5 A. So there's that pressure. I mean, I know of one instance
6 here from secondhand, that somebody was -- felt pressure from
7 management, and that's not common.

8 Q. Can you describe that instance?

9 A. I don't -- it's all pure hearsay on my part because I wasn't
10 there. But somebody chose not to fly and then they were -- you
11 know, they had to sit down with chief pilot and a representative
12 of management and explain their behavior. And that kind of seemed
13 antithetical to what I'd been taught was the safety culture.

14 Q. Um-hum.

15 A. And then I've seen -- but I've seen others like when, you
16 know, Adam said with the wind, we're not flying, I'm not flying,
17 it didn't seem to be any repercussions. So that's what I -- I was
18 like, okay, I've heard the one story, I've seen this thing, so I
19 know which one I like better.

20 DR. SILVA: Can we go off the record for just a second?

21 (Off the record at 11:22 a.m.)

22 (On the record at 11:22 a.m.)

23 BY DR. SILVA:

24 Q. So how would you classify morale in the company?

25 A. I mean, when I started morale was I thought pretty high.

1 There were some complications that the airline had been through,
2 bankruptcy, and that had affected morale, but I think there was a
3 general sense that people who weren't comfortable with the
4 bankruptcy and buyout had kind of moved on, and morale was high
5 that there was a good core group of pilots, there's a good
6 airframe, and, you know, we're in it for the long haul and this
7 will work out. So initially morale was high.

8 Q. Uh-huh.

9 A. Morale did drop after the pilot was -- I think, at least my
10 morale even, and there was pressure outside of just the captain
11 has the right to make a decision like this without question.

12 Q. Um-hum. When did that happen, about?

13 A. Oh, that's -- I'm trying to think -- September, late
14 September. I'm not 100 percent sure.

15 Q. This year?

16 A. Yes, this year.

17 Q. Okay, got it.

18 A. Not that long ago. It was still fall.

19 Q. Okay. So when you started, you said, February, was this
20 after the management change from Ravn?

21 A. It was in transition. And, you know, it was reinforced --
22 and I wasn't -- I hadn't really been involved in the PenAir
23 culture or any culture. It was "One Ravn," was the motto, and we
24 were going to take the best of both companies. And that seemed
25 like a really positive approach to integrating two companies.

1 Q. Yeah.

2 A. So I felt like it was positive all the -- it was positive
3 throughout.

4 DR. SILVA: Okay. All right, I'll let you off the hook. I'm
5 done for now. Thank you.

6 Dujuan.

7 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

8 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

9 Q. We talked a bit about the 300-hour requirement for special
10 airports and the 100-hour waiver. Do you in your opinion, do you
11 feel that that requirement should be a blanket require for all
12 special airports?

13 A. I think that Dutch and Sand Point might be a little bit, I
14 don't know, more complicated than, say, Kodiak, which is the other
15 airport that we -- that the company specifically, not the FAA
16 special airports, but the company-designated ones. But that's
17 just my impression. Going around at Kodiak is complicated too, so
18 I don't know. Again, the question?

19 Q. Yeah, the question is do you think that the 300-hour
20 requirement and the 100-hour waiver should be a sort of a blanket
21 requirement for, like you said, Kodiak, Dutch, and Sand Point?

22 A. I think -- well, I'm skeptical on the waiver in general. But
23 I don't know that 300 hours should be a hard requirement either.
24 I'm not 100 percent sure on how that -- I think there might be
25 situations where somebody less than 300 could effectively be a

1 captain there, but I'm really skeptical on 100-hour pilot being
2 captain there.

3 Q. Did the company ever have any discussion, PenAir, have any
4 discussions with the pilots about the reasoning behind the
5 requirement for 300 versus 100?

6 A. You know, I -- there was a pilot meeting and I flew the day
7 there was a pilot meeting. I can't remember the date. But it
8 would have been when I was just off of IOE, and I think I might
9 have been on a -- it was very near when I had just got off IOE.
10 And I missed it because, again, I was flying. But I just know at
11 that point there was resistance to changes to some requirements,
12 the 300-hour requirement I remember was mentioned, but it was
13 hearsay. I wasn't there. And so, I -- people were saying we
14 shouldn't make these changes without more input from pilots who
15 have experience.

16 Q. And when you say people, you're talking about members of
17 management?

18 A. No other pilots were saying --

19 Q. Other pilots were saying.

20 A. -- they shouldn't make these decisions without input from
21 pilots. But I was relatively new so I was -- you know, it kind of
22 made sense but I'm like there's got to be operational changes in
23 airport -- you know, two companies merge.

24 Q. Have you been involved with the company merger, any role,
25 have you had role in the company merger?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Okay. Has there been any discussion about changes to
3 operations, flight ops, based on the merger, you know, between
4 pilots?

5 A. Just this change in that -- I guess change in operations
6 would include that historically PenAir seemed to require a year in
7 the right seat and certain number of hours to upgrade to captain,
8 and that was changing. And again I was initially excited by that
9 because I'm a first officer, that means I'll be a captain sooner,
10 and then I was like wait a minute, that also means I'll be a first
11 officer with people who don't have that same level of experience
12 as the very experienced people I flew with. So that was one
13 thing. And then the 300 -- that was changing, and there -- nobody
14 gave a real sound rationale for that, why that change would
15 happen, except maybe that they needed more captains. I mean, I --
16 that's just supposition on my part.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks. I have no further questions. Thank
18 you.

19 DR. SILVA: Brandon.

20 BY MR. WILSON:

21 Q. You know, you mentioned a couple of times about company-
22 designated airports. Is there anywhere else where an airport
23 might be designated as a special airport?

24 A. GOM has a list of airports -- the FAA has a list, and it's in
25 our GOM, and there's one for the United States in general, and I

1 couldn't list them all. There's one for Alaska, there's -- Alaska
2 and Hawaii, and it -- I mean, I can add to those three that we've
3 designated specifically as company. There's Juno, Rangel,
4 Ketchikan. So those are FAA-designated special airports.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And there's more, but -- there's Kodiak, Dutch --

7 Q. But you do know where that list is?

8 A. Yeah, GOM. And there's special training requirements to go
9 to those as mandated by the FAA. These other airports are also
10 specific -- the three airports, well, four actually in our GOM.
11 There's also St. George, but we don't go there in the Saab 2000.
12 I mean, I -- you might have briefed me on it. I am not 100
13 percent sure, but they're there and I've looked at them.

14 MR. WILSON: Okay. That's all I have.

15 BY MR. FRANTZ:

16 Q. So you mentioned -- so we've been around twice.

17 A. Yeah. That's okay.

18 Q. Sorry. One more thing came up. You mentioned, you said at
19 this point -- I think it was the point where you came into PenAir,
20 those pilots that were uncomfortable with the bankruptcy, a lot of
21 them had already left. What's your understanding, what's the
22 word, what's your feeling about why people left, why were they
23 uncomfortable? What about the bankruptcy made people say I'm out
24 of here in larger than normal numbers, I guess?

25 A. I think, I mean, personally I think a lot of it was

1 uncertainty. Mostly it was uncertainty about schedule and
2 probably pay. I've specifically only talked to one pilot about
3 that and mostly it was schedule for him. I've heard that some
4 people had a concern that about safety potentially. But I have
5 not talked to anybody who specifically said that.

6 Q. Is that -- was it at that point when it was known that Ravn
7 was going to be taking over, buying PenAir, was going to be
8 eventually buying, controlling PenAir, was that happening at the
9 time you came on?

10 A. It had already happened. And I just want to be clear, I
11 don't want to -- I wanted to fly the Dash-8 for Ravn. That's
12 really what I wanted to do. And partly it was because -- and
13 this, in all fairness to Ravn, I went through a 135 interview at
14 Ravn and I took a different 135 job. And the Ravn 135 interview,
15 they highlighted safety so much and I was impressed by that. And
16 then I went and worked for another 135 operator that didn't seem
17 to highlight safety at all in the interview, and as I reflected on
18 it, I felt like I missed an opportunity to fly at Ravn. And so I
19 went back, and I -- but it was also because I didn't really want
20 to fly the 135 side, I wanted to fly the 121 side. Was I
21 qualified? Yeah, I -- and so I went back and I said, you know
22 what, I'm really interested in flying 121 for Ravn.

23 At that point PenAir wasn't even a thought for me because I
24 was -- they're in bankruptcy; that's got to be complicated, who
25 knows what's going on. And Ravn asked me to fly the Saab. They

1 said we can -- if you wait, you can get in a seat in the Dash-8,
2 but if you're ready now we could use people to fly in the Saab.
3 And I was reluctant to do it. I'm glad that I did it. But I
4 think that's Ravn's approach -- I mean I was back at Ravn because
5 of the idea of safety. I specifically returned because they had
6 highlighted that in my earlier interview.

7 Q. Okay. So I think my last question is, now that you've got an
8 idea the kind of things we're looking at or what kind of
9 information we're interested in, is there anybody else at PenAir
10 that you think we should talk to, any other pilots specifically
11 you would think would be a good source for the kind of information
12 we're looking at here?

13 A. I can't think of anybody specifically. Other -- oh, Sarah
14 Boots.

15 Q. Is there anything that we didn't ask you about that we should
16 have?

17 A. No. I can think of nothing.

18 Q. Anything to add?

19 A. I think I've added too much.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, last chance for the group?

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: I've just got one more question. This
22 won't --

23 MR. FRANTZ: Uh-oh, there's always one.

24 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

25 Q. I know you were talking about Paul earlier and some of his

1 comments about the windspeed and the 10 knots, et cetera. After
2 the accident, did Paul ever contact you to just kind of talk about
3 the accident?

4 A. No.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right, thanks.

6 MR. HARRIS: I hope he's doing well.

7 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all I had.

8 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

9 DR. SILVA: Okay, we're off the record.

10 (Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
 DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
 OCTOBER 17, 2019
 Interview of Brandon Wilson

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 2, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Betty Caudle
Official Reporter



Tamara Candeloro
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: ADAM HEHL
Captain, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Monday,
December 2, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot and Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Hehl)

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Adam Hehl:	
By Dr. Silva	6
By Mr. Frantz	19
By Dr. Sevillian	26
By Dr. Silva	32
By Mr. Frantz	41
By Dr. Silva	47

I N T E R V I E W

(12:21 p.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: All right, thank you for agreeing to talk to us.
4 As I mentioned, I'm Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance
5 investigator with the NTSB.

6 We have a few people around the table, and I'll run through
7 and have everyone introduce themselves. But before I do that, I
8 just want to explain the reason that we have so many participants
9 is that we operate on a party system. So while we as the NTSB
10 have expertise in investigations and investigating, we rely on the
11 rest of the industry in order to get information specifically on
12 the operation, the aircraft, things like that. So today we've got
13 Brandon here as our -- as representation for the company.

14 Typically, we also have the FAA involved, but this is part of
15 the FAA that is purely accident investigation. They have no
16 connection to the enforcement side of things, again, so we can
17 maintain our goal of safety.

18 So, again, we're here for safety. We're not here to assign
19 blame, liability, any of those sorts. We really want to prevent
20 this accident from happening again.

21 You're the expert here. We want to learn from you. Anything
22 you don't understand or need clarification on, feel free to ask.
23 If you need a break, let us know. I know it's very warm in here,
24 so totally understandable.

25 You are entitled to have a representative here of your

1 choice. Would you like a representative?

2 MR. HEHL: This gentleman here is with me today.

3 DR. SILVA: Okay. Can you state your name?

4 MR. CAMPBELL: Morgan Campbell.

5 MR. HEHL: Sorry. I --

6 MR. CAMPBELL: No worries. No worries.

7 DR. SILVA: Okay. So let's go around the table here.

8 Marvin, go ahead.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational factors
10 investigator with the NTSB.

11 DR. SILVA: Dujuan.

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: I'm Dujuan Sevillian, human performance
13 investigator, NTSB.

14 DR. SILVA: And Brandon.

15 MR. WILSON: Adam, known me a long time. Brian Wilson, line
16 pilot, PenAir. And check airman.

17 DR. SILVA: Perfect. So I will start with asking a handful
18 of questions, and then we'll go around our table here. Usually
19 twice by the time everyone has a chance to ask what they need to.
20 And then we'll turn it over to you to see if you have anything
21 else to add, anything else we didn't ask you that you think would
22 help. Any questions before we start?

23 MR. HEHL: No questions.

24 DR. SILVA: All right.

25 INTERVIEW OF ADAM HEHL

1 BY DR. SILVA:

2 Q. Can you state and spell your full name for the record,
3 please?

4 A. Adam Hehl. First name A-d-a-m, last name is H-e-h-l.

5 Q. Okay. And can you run through a CliffsNotes version of your
6 background from when you started flying to what brought you here?

7 A. Started private pilot license when I -- let's see -- 1985,
8 1986, commercial instrument in '87. Started flying for PenAir in
9 1989. Worked out of Kodiak for -- at the PenAir hub in Kodiak
10 flying, started out in Saratogas and went into a 206 Amphib
11 Islander, twin-engine Islander, Grumman Goose after that.
12 Caravan, a little bit of Widgeon, and flew the bush till 2000, '99
13 -- winter of '99, 2000. Moved to Anchorage -- transferred to
14 Anchorage with PenAir.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Spent, oh, 9 or 10 months in the right seat as a co-pilot of
17 a Metro. We were operating Metros at that time, Metros and Saabs.
18 But, anyway, I was in the Metro. I did that for -- from here on
19 out it's going to be ballpark. I flew the Metro for, like, 2½, 3
20 years. Then I got checked out in the Saab 340. And I stayed in
21 the Saab 340 till -- I started ground school the day after we
22 filed Chapter 11. What day was that?

23 MR. WILSON: I think it was before I was working.

24 MR. HEHL: Yeah.

25 BY DR. SILVA:

1 Q. That's okay. Whatever your estimate is.

2 A. Yeah, that was 3 years ago, 2 years ago.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Yeah. Through ground school for this hub 2000. I've been in
5 that since -- 2017. And most of those -- most of that Saab 340
6 flying was Cold Bay, Dutch Harbor every day.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. We ran a cargo run to Cold Bay and Dutch Harbor 501. Take
9 off, go to Cold Bay, land. Go to Dutch Harbor. Turn around, come
10 back, 5 days a week.

11 Q. When you --

12 A. That's -- go ahead.

13 Q. Sorry.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Is that it?

16 A. That's as accurate as I can get, yeah.

17 Q. All right. So when you transitioned to the Saab 2000, did
18 you come in as a captain? Were you training as a captain or first
19 officer?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I came in as a captain.

23 Q. Okay. How many hours would you say you had about estimate?

24 A. Total time?

25 Q. Total.

1 A. Total flight time when I got into the Saab 2000?

2 Q. Or from now, your estimate now.

3 A. Probably about 30,000 total flight hours when I got into the
4 Saab 2000.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And until somewhere -- yeah, 31, 30 -- somewhere between 30-
7 and 33,000 total time.

8 Q. Do you -- so how much would you estimate is in the 2000? How
9 much time do you have in the 2000?

10 A. 1,500 -- 12-, 1,500.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. Them close enough answers?

13 Q. What's that?

14 A. Them close enough answers? I mean --

15 Q. Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. Whatever you can remember. No
16 right answers or wrong answers. It's what you recall.

17 A. It's real accurate. It's somewhere between 12 and 15.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Okay. So you said you had flown into Dutch pretty
21 consistently in the 340.

22 A. Right.

23 Q. How about once you transitioned to the 2000? What did that
24 experience with Dutch look like?

25 A. As in?

1 Q. Were you still flying a regular Dutch Harbor route after you
2 transitioned to the 2000?

3 A. Yes. Yes. And you talking as far as comfort of operation
4 for a pilot? Is that what you're asking?

5 Q. Yeah. I'm just trying to get a feel for your experience with
6 Dutch Harbor --

7 A. Well, I've flown in and out of Dutch Harbor in a Grumman
8 Goose quite regularly; Piper 1040, Piper Navajo, Metroliner, Saab
9 340, and a Saab 2000. And the Saab 2000 is -- as far as a pilot
10 is concerned, I think is hands down the most comfortable just
11 because of the performance of the aircraft.

12 A lot of times these aircraft, they're advertised -- the
13 performance says certain performance on one motor type of thing.
14 If you lose a motor after V1 on takeoff, this airplane is a very
15 good-performing airplane. As far as, you know, the trip from
16 Anchorage down there, most of these other airplanes you sit at
17 16,000 to 20,000 feet. This thing can run up to 30,000 feet. And
18 when you make that step, you get out of 85 to 90 percent of the
19 weather that you're usually sitting in, icing, and -- so as far as
20 passenger safety, passenger comfort, pilot comfort, if you're --
21 was to lose a motor on departure, the airplane will do what it
22 says it will do. It's -- yeah. I enjoy it the most out of all of
23 them.

24 Q. How about the landing performance of this aircraft compared
25 to the others you've flown?

1 A. I think you guys have -- it lands just fine. I mean, I don't
2 feel, don't feel any different than any other airplane I've ever
3 flown in and out of there with. You call ahead, figure out the --
4 get the weather, figure out which runway you're going to land, and
5 get it pointed in the wind, and it does a fine job.

6 Q. Okay. Have you flown the accident aircraft before?

7 A. I think you guys know that. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. When was the last time you flew that aircraft?

9 A. I turned it over to Paul Wells after I flew it down there on
10 the trip earlier, came back, and turned it over to Paul.

11 Q. Can you just run through from what you recall of that flight
12 from leaving Anchorage to Dutch Harbor and back?

13 A. Normal flight. It was a pretty day down there. There was no
14 -- limited visibility, fairly high ceiling, and just an average,
15 far as I was concerned, little above average day. You're not
16 fighting low ceilings and low weather. And just a pretty decent
17 flight.

18 Q. Do you recall what the winds were doing at Dutch Harbor when
19 you came in?

20 A. When I was down there, they was blowing about swinging from,
21 oh, 270 around to 300. Yeah. They'll swing like that, they'll
22 swing like that depending on the wind -- yeah, when you get a --
23 there is a bit of a frontal change going on. It was swinging
24 around from the southwest to the northwest in the process but --

25 Q. Are those winds and the variable winds typical for Dutch

1 Harbor in your experience?

2 A. When you get in a frontal -- when you get in a system change,
3 a frontal passage or something, you'll get -- the winds will just,
4 they'll start swinging. What makes them variable is how they blow
5 down through the passes. But the wind from the southwest all the
6 way around the northwest is pretty stable. You don't get much,
7 you know, they don't -- that direction you don't get much of a
8 swing. Southeast -- the wind blows two directions basically in
9 Dutch Harbor, southeast or northwest. If it's blowing from the
10 southwest or blowing from the northeast, it's not going to last
11 long.

12 Q. Okay. Got it. How was the landing at Dutch Harbor?

13 A. Good.

14 Q. Do you recall what runway you used?

15 A. Runway 3-1.

16 Q. On the way back, who was pilot flying?

17 A. I do -- I was the pilot flying.

18 Q. Okay. And that's for Dutch Harbor to Anchorage flight?

19 A. I landed and took -- I landed Dutch Harbor, and I also took
20 off Dutch Harbor.

21 Q. You took off -- okay. Did you do the landing in Anchorage as
22 well?

23 A. I don't think I did. I don't. Because that's the first --
24 usually first officer wants a landing, and I usually do all the
25 landings in Dutch Harbor and all the takeoffs.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And so, yeah, I give the first officer -- I couldn't bet my
3 life on it, but I think there's a record of it some place who
4 landed that particular day.

5 Q. Yeah. But if you don't recall that's fine.

6 A. Yeah, I don't. I'm pretty -- I would have to say the first
7 officer, but I can't sit here and say that for sure.

8 Q. Okay. Do you recall anything about that landing in terms of
9 how? Okay.

10 A. No.

11 Q. Do you -- as PIC, do you walk around the aircraft? Is that
12 part of your normal responsibilities?

13 A. We do it together, first officer. Depends who is -- I do it
14 quite a bit of the time. And when you do a walk-around you're
15 just -- you're looking for -- these aircraft are so tight, tightly
16 cowled, you're just looking for oil leaks, and you're checking
17 props and tires. Wintertime -- well, that wasn't wintertime then,
18 but this time right now you want to keep an eye on, you know --
19 because, yeah, someone might blame you for dinging a prop, and
20 props are expensive and you might get in trouble for it. So,
21 yeah, you eyeball tires and props really close.

22 Q. What are you looking for when you're inspecting the tires?

23 A. Like, this time of year, with ice and rocks, salt and sand,
24 put rocks and sand on these runways and stuff. You might be
25 looking for -- you just keep an eye on them for slashes, just

1 general well-being of your tire. That's what keeps you on the,
2 that's what keeps you on the runway when you're landing. So you
3 keep an eye on them.

4 Q. So when would you typically do a walk-around?

5 A. Well, in the morning you do a preflight.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And then -- and after we turn the airplane over to somebody
8 if we're done with it, turn it -- probably turn it over to another
9 pilot, we'll do a walk-around just to make sure everything is
10 kosher, no oil. So if there's something leaking out of the cowl,
11 I need to pass that along to -- leak, if something is wrong with a
12 tire, something's wrong with a prop, something's wrong with, you
13 know, you need to pass that along. Either squawk it myself and
14 have it fixed or --

15 Q. Right.

16 A. -- talk to the next pilot about it.

17 Q. Okay. Do you recall talking to Paul when you handed the
18 aircraft over?

19 A. Just other than the normal small talk, good airplane, you
20 know, good airplane. It's all yours.

21 Q. Okay. Do you recall doing a walk-around for that --

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. -- in that exchange?

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Were there any anomalies?

- 1 A. Not that I know.
- 2 Q. Okay. So you started here 2017. Can you talk about --
- 3 A. 2017 I what?
- 4 Q. Is that what you said? You started with the Saab in 2017?
- 5 A. Oh, yeah, yeah.
- 6 Q. About.
- 7 A. Yeah.
- 8 Q. Okay. So do you recall when you got airport qualified for
- 9 Dutch Harbor?
- 10 A. I don't. As in -- you talking about how much --
- 11 Q. Did you get any formal training on flying into the special
- 12 airports?
- 13 A. You got formal -- for a guy like myself, that's been -- I'd
- 14 like to give you a number how many landings I got in Dutch Harbor
- 15 but --
- 16 Q. Well, it's just what you remember again.
- 17 A. Right. I mean, no, I'm --
- 18 Q. What you recall.
- 19 A. -- talking the -- if you've flown down there as a captain in
- 20 a Metro, in a Saab 340, you've got your Dutch Harbor training.
- 21 Now it's just getting comfortable in the aircraft.
- 22 Q. Okay.
- 23 A. And they do have a 300-hour requirement, I think. Well,
- 24 yeah, they had.
- 25 Q. Did you have to -- do you recall if you were -- you had made

1 that 300-hour requirement or was that requirement there?

2 A. That wasn't for, that wasn't for just everybody.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. But I'm thinking I had 300 hours before I went in there.

5 Q. Is that 300 hours in the aircraft?

6 A. In the aircraft, in type. I'm thinking I did. That 300
7 hours is just to get comfortable in the equipment. And if you
8 show proficiency, you know, yeah.

9 Q. Do you recall if there was any paperwork stating that you
10 were qualified to go into Dutch Harbor?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you recall -- what do you recall about that paperwork?

13 A. Just a, just a check ride form.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. There's a form. There is --

16 Q. Did you have to sign it?

17 A. No. That particular form is not signed by -- it's not your
18 normal -- that's all on your, like your -- it's a little more of
19 an informal form unlike a check ride.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Check ride -- like, you'll see with a PenAir check ride their
22 PenAir header on it.

23 Q. Okay. Have you ever flown with --

24 A. That's back to --

25 Q. Go ahead.

1 A. Back to that whole check ride and signing off, I know they
2 make a note of it. I don't know. I can't sit here and tell you
3 that there's a form. I know that the pilot doesn't sign anything.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. But they keep records of everything around here. I don't
6 want to lead someone down the wrong trail.

7 Q. Okay. Have you ever flown with Justin Lunn?

8 A. I have, um-hmm.

9 Q. Do you recall those flights?

10 A. Yeah. Justin is relatively new around here. One thing about
11 Justin, my opinion, is eager to learn. It's kind of his second
12 career. He spent some time in the military. I don't know how
13 many years, but it was just more than one stint, I think. Enough,
14 like, I want to say it was -- I don't know. I can't quite recall,
15 but it was like 7 to, 7 to 9 years or something. It was an odd
16 number I thought, because if you're going to do 10, you might as
17 well do 20 and get a retirement.

18 But anyway, he got out of that deal or he got out of that,
19 and he's got a couple kids -- couple young kids at home, and he
20 was pretty darn happy to be here because he's been living on rice
21 and beans the last 4 or 5 years trying to get his pilot's license
22 and get all his credentials. And then once he got here, he was
23 very eager -- very glad to be here, and very eager to learn.

24 Q. How was his CRM when you flew with him?

25 A. Real good. Yeah.

1 Q. What would you say his strengths were as a pilot?

2 A. What really helps is when someone shows up and they're eager
3 to learn just the little idiosyncrasies about the job and not just
4 going through the motions. He seemed like a person to me that was
5 -- that you might get some time out of, that might just not be
6 here for a short time. Maybe -- a lot of these guys show up, and
7 you spend three or four trips with them, and it's like, this guy,
8 you can tell he's here just for a short time.

9 Q. If there is anything that he could improve on based on your
10 experience with him what would those be?

11 A. Again, I've only flew with him four or five times, but there
12 was -- yeah, I mean, he -- you'll get in -- you'll get that with a
13 lot of new guys or young -- especially older fellows, number one,
14 they're older. They have a lot of respect for authority. Number
15 two, I think, his military career, I could see that, and I felt
16 like combination between -- he's a little older so he's going to
17 be a little more reserved. And that his military career, that
18 respect for chain of command.

19 And one thing you need to be when you're in -- you need to be
20 outspoken if you see something that you don't like. See something
21 you don't like, you're uncomfortable with, you need to speak it
22 up. But also, the captain needs to recognize these things, and
23 the captain needs to make an environment, too, that everybody --
24 if you've got somebody that you think is a little more reserved,
25 you've got to bring it out of them a little bit.

1 Q. When you were flying with him, what made you feel like he was
2 more reserved compared to the others you've flown with?

3 A. Well, I'm not saying he was any more -- for as much as he was
4 paying attention and as much as he was making himself part of the
5 checklist and part of the crew, he just -- you know, you could
6 tell he -- and, I guess, why I say that is you get that with an
7 older person. Tend to -- an older person, older in age will do
8 that. They'll be a little more mature. They might just hold back
9 a little bit. And I felt it was, I guess, his military career
10 too. He could --

11 Q. Is there any in particular examples you can provide?

12 A. No. Just my opinion.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Do you remember the last time was that you flew with Justin
16 about?

17 A. I don't.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I mean, there's records of it some place around here, but no,
20 I don't.

21 Q. You said you flew with him about four, four or five times.

22 A. Yes, and --

23 Q. That you can remember.

24 A. -- guessing, yeah, four or five times. That's just -- three
25 to five, I mean.

1 Q. Any of those into Dutch Harbor?

2 A. I go to Dutch Harbor, like, a lot. So if I was with Justin,
3 he was probably with me a time or two in Dutch Harbor too.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I can't specifically say that -- remember a day that he and I
6 -- just by default, I go to -- that's what I do. 99 percent of my
7 flying used to be to Dutch Harbor.

8 DR. SILVA: Okay. I'm going to pause here, hand it over to
9 Marvin. Are you okay? Do you need --

10 MR. HEHL: Sure.

11 DR. SILVA: -- a break or anything?

12 MR. HEHL: Press on.

13 DR. SILVA: All right.

14 BY MR. FRANTZ:

15 Q. Okay, good. Thanks, Adam. Just follow-up sort of to stuff
16 you were talking about, about Justin, and I'm not sure I
17 understand it right. Is he more or less likely than the average
18 junior FO to speak up to a captain if he has some safety concern
19 or sees something wrong? How would you characterize him in that
20 realm? And based on the limited times you've flown with him.

21 A. I think I would have to say he was probably more apt to speak
22 up. Some of these FOs, I guess, I mentioned maturity. Maturity
23 also can keep you to hold back a little bit, but also maturity,
24 it's like wait a minute here, this ain't good. But you get some
25 first officers, especially with a guy like myself, they find out

1 you've got 31 years of seniority here, and it's just like, it's
2 like, hey, easy guys, you know, I'm -- I can hurt -- yeah, you've
3 got to watch me just like you've got to watch anybody else. So --

4 Q. Okay. Yeah. Okay.

5 A. No. I feel as though he would.

6 Q. In your previous time -- you were with PenAir since?

7 A. 1989.

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. June 10th.

10 Q. Yeah. Besides -- and you did a lot of flying into Dutch
11 Harbor. Did you fly to Saint Georges or Sand Point or Kodiak also
12 regularly back in those -- during that period?

13 A. When I flew into Bush, I lived in Kodiak.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. And worked out of that hub.

16 Q. For PenAir?

17 A. For PenAir.

18 Q. Yeah. Okay. We know about the approaches at Dutch Harbor.
19 What's the point in a flight when you, as a captain, when you're
20 ready to decide which approach you're going to do, which runway
21 you're going to take? Where does that happen? Where does that
22 conversation start in the flight?

23 A. When I'm driving out here on a Wednesday afternoon heading
24 home, and I look at the forecast for the next day, I've got a
25 really good idea what runway I'm going to land on Thursday. On my

1 -- before my shower when I'm starting coffee, checking the
2 forecast. Yeah, okay, probably good pretty much to go with that
3 runway. On your way to work, run it through your mind again. And
4 get briefed. Look at the weather. Get an idea. Fly down there.
5 100 miles out, get the weather.

6 Got a pretty good idea, but nothing -- it's always subject to
7 change. You never lead yourself down a one-way path. You get
8 down there, and you see something, you never -- we can change our
9 mind turning base to final; you know what, this ain't the right
10 one today. You get them winds out of the northeast sometimes.
11 You got different quadrants in that wind chart, for instance, and
12 they fall in this quadrant. Well, that quadrant is 30 degrees
13 wide. If it's blowing on this end of the quadrant, like, say, the
14 east side of the quadrant, you get down there and you might see
15 something, it's like you know what, we've got to do 1-3 today.
16 That's that northeast stuff.

17 Q. Okay. So at Dutch Harbor, taking winds direction out of the
18 equation, and considering -- assuming it's VFR, is there a
19 preferred runway there?

20 A. No. According to the wind.

21 Q. Okay. Okay. Is the -- so the approach to either runway is
22 equally difficult or easy or however you want to characterize it,
23 but both -- would most pilots say, yeah, it doesn't matter whether
24 I'm turning --

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. -- right or 3-1, or left for 1-3, it's --

2 A. Yeah. The only time --

3 Q. -- the wind is favorable?

4 A. -- that you're going to -- you might get a preference from
5 one pilot to the next. Like, if they're going to land 3-1, yeah,
6 I like going in the backdoor. I like going in over --

7 Q. Okay. So the final decision -- like, allowing as you said
8 it's subject to change, but the final decision and where you're
9 going to proceed, does that come 100 miles out you said, 20
10 minutes roughly?

11 A. No, not the final decision. That's just when you pick up
12 your weather. Final decision you might be on final and --

13 Q. For planning purposes, when do you decide we're going for 3-1
14 versus 1-3? At what point?

15 A. When you pick up the weather.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. 100 miles out. 100 miles out, top of descent.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. You brief the approach. You plan, you -- and you brief an
20 approach and, yeah.

21 Q. And so now you're 10 miles out, and you talk to Dutch
22 weather, and you find out there's been a significant change in the
23 winds, and you determine, I think the other runway would be
24 better. How difficult a procedure is it, assuming VFR, for you to
25 -- say you're 10 miles out, to switch around, and now plan for the

1 other runway than you had planned for?

2 A. It's no big deal.

3 Q. What about if you miss or you attempt one runway, and it
4 doesn't work for whatever reason, and then you're aware -- become
5 aware that the winds are now more favorable to the other runway?
6 So you've gone missed on 1-3 --

7 A. You go missed --

8 Q. -- how hard is it to turn around and come back on 3-1?

9 A. You mean you aborted a landing and you went around?

10 Q. Yeah. Based on terrain and all the other features there.
11 It's --

12 A. You just go out the backdoor and -- if you're lined up for
13 1-3, you'd go out the back door, turn around. Rebrief it, you
14 know, and reconfigure it, run through some checklists to get ready
15 for landing.

16 Q. Have you ever landed at Dutch with a tailwind?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Have you ever seen any problems or experienced any problems
19 with the anti-skid system on the 2000? Have you written up any
20 tires or maintenance during something discovered during a
21 preflight?

22 A. No. They're real good about -- I mean, they won't let them
23 out of the hangar. They've got to have a day's use left in before
24 they'll let them out. If they ain't got a day's use left in,
25 they're not going to let them out of the hangar.

1 Q. Before the 2000, what were you doing with PenAir before you
2 transferred into 2000? You were flying the 340?

3 A. 340.

4 Q. Okay. When you were flying the 340, did you use the airport
5 analysis charts as well to determine your landing capabilities and
6 which runway you could use, and just like you do with the 2000?

7 A. You choose what runway you're going to use by the wind
8 direction.

9 Q. Right. No, I mean as far as --

10 A. But as far as landing --

11 Q. -- you said the weight-wise.

12 A. Yeah, right.

13 Q. That was the same in the --

14 A. Right.

15 Q. -- as it is --

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Is that something you get -- well, it doesn't matter. When
18 you fly with new FOs -- I don't know how often you've done that,
19 but I'm sure you've had some experience in the last couple years
20 in the 2000 -- do you feel like they have a good -- the new FOs
21 just fresh out of training, fresh out of the sim training, do you
22 feel like they have a good feel for how to use the airport
23 analysis information, the charts, and how to determine what the
24 limits are, and which runway they can and can't use, or what the
25 weights --

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. -- is that --

3 A. Pretty good training department, and them guys are -- got
4 brains like a sponge. They pick that stuff up. I've had pretty
5 good luck, I guess, is what you're saying.

6 Q. And you did your 2000 type rating in 2017? Is that what you
7 said?

8 A. (No audible response.)

9 Q. It doesn't matter. Doesn't matter.

10 A. Yeah. I was trying to think. We got -- last year was 2018.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. 2017 is when, yeah.

13 Q. At SIMCOM?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. In Orlando. What did you think of that training, the sim
16 training itself?

17 A. Good. I thought it was a first-class outfit. As far as the
18 instructors, you mean?

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. The instructors.

21 Q. And the quality of instruction. Did you learn what you
22 needed to know?

23 A. Sure. Yeah.

24 Q. Did you --

25 A. Yeah, I -- yeah.

1 Q. Did they give you any opportunity, or was it built in any of
2 the sim sessions, to actually use the landing performance
3 information, the airport analysis stuff during a landing to
4 determine, you know, you're --

5 A. Oh, yeah. You do what they call a LOFT at the end of
6 everything. You spend a whole 2 hours.

7 Q. You did that during the LOFT. How about during your
8 day-to-day sim sessions? Was that --

9 A. Oh, yeah. Every morning they'd hand you a mockup, dispatch
10 release. Not every morning, but a lot of them.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Because you're setting up the aircraft for weights and, yeah.

13 Q. Okay.

14 MR. FRANTZ: That's all I have for now. Thank you.

15 DR. SILVA: Dujuan.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right.

17 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

18 Q. So how do you communicate safety concerns within -- what's
19 the process?

20 A. Protocol is go through chain of command. Start out with
21 chief pilot.

22 Q. And have you ever had to communicate a safety concern?

23 A. Don't know if I had to, but I, I guess I could say I did it.
24 There are some things that -- couple things later on here that
25 started to concern me. So, I guess, I -- yeah. I mean, I've -- a

1 safety concern before.

2 Q. You're saying there's a couple things that concerned you.
3 What were those things that concerned you?

4 A. Some decisions that a pilot or two made, and the -- what
5 would you call it? They got grilled about it a little bit. And
6 it kind of got my attention a little bit because I wouldn't have
7 made the same choice but -- same choice that person did. But,
8 again, sometimes there's a little more to it. Might be a little
9 personality, little personality in there or something, and maybe,
10 yeah.

11 Q. What decisions were those?

12 A. Oh, what decision? Well, for instance, the weather was legal
13 for dispatch, and the person didn't go, and if it's legal for
14 dispatch, they wanted her to go -- for the person to go, and which
15 that's not unreasonable. But, again, every day you need to know
16 your limitations as a pilot, and your limitations will change from
17 day to day.

18 You know what, got a sick kid at home; wife might be pissed
19 off about something. You know how it is; life is life, man. And
20 so you might not be on your A game today, so you might not want to
21 go. And as a professional, you've got to be a little careful of
22 that because we are -- that's what we do. We fly airplanes. And
23 you deal with all that stuff, and -- but, yeah.

24 Q. You talked about the dispatch and then the pilot having to
25 make a decision to go --

1 A. Well, there's three people involved, and all three's got to
2 agree. Two out of the three or all three's basically got to
3 agree. Yeah, dispatch and the pilot and then SOC.

4 Q. And has there ever been a situation where people have not
5 agreed that -- to your knowledge?

6 A. Not to a point that that's -- not to a point that it's a
7 problem. You get, like I say, personality shit going on there
8 with these younger group. But I -- on this side of the house, I
9 don't know of any time where, you know, you might have to, you
10 know, they might question you and ask you what you're thinking.

11 And some changes just started. Around the first of August we
12 just -- we started seeing more change, more influence from the
13 Ravn side, and on just how we do things. And June and July was
14 real busy. Everybody's -- we're busy doing the Bristol Bay
15 hauling. And when things slow down is when change starts to
16 happen. It's good to be busy because management leaves you alone.
17 Things slow down, they --

18 Q. You mentioned that August date there. What --

19 A. I just threw a number out there.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. It was just, yeah.

22 Q. Have there been any safety concerns that you are aware of for
23 pilots flying into Dutch Harbor?

24 A. They start -- yeah. I mean, they start talking about doing
25 away with certain amount of training for these special airports.

1 Every airport has a little different -- every, you know --there's
2 a list of special airports, and they're all a little different.
3 They've all got their own thing. And that kind of concerned me.

4 Q. What specifically concerned you about them doing away with
5 that?

6 A. Well, just the limited time. You can have a dozen pilots in
7 a room, and eight or nine of them will be -- eight of them, nine
8 of them would be perfectly comfortable getting to the missed
9 approach point and flying 4 miles visually in reduced visibility
10 underneath a low ceiling. And the other four, they're just not
11 wired for it, and they'll be perfectly safe and perfectly fine for
12 their whole career if, when they get to the missed approach point,
13 the runway is right over the nose. And we -- not everybody gets
14 checked out for Dutch Harbor. Not everybody gets checked out for
15 Dutch Harbor. It's a -- just like -- the industry has changed in
16 the last 2 or 3, 4 years with the turnover and everything. It --
17 yeah.

18 Q. So Dutch Harbor is one of the special airports.

19 A. One of them. I think there's 12 of them in the state.

20 Q. Kodiak and some other. Does Dutch Harbor seem to be one of
21 those airports that stands out versus the other ones?

22 A. No. Dutch Harbor -- for instance, at Dutch Harbor, any one
23 of those runways, you can come in there and put the rubber on the
24 asphalt and go around. For instance, Kodiak, you can't do that.
25 Every one of those got its particulars. It depends what runway

1 you're landing in Kodiak. If you're landing Runway 2-6 right into
2 the -- you know, every runway has got its little different,
3 different things.

4 But Dutch Harbor, the thing about Dutch Harbor is the
5 approach into the runway is 4, 4 to 4½ miles from the missed
6 approach point. So you got 4 miles to fly, and you can't --
7 you've got to have the airport in sight at the missed approach
8 point. If you have the airport in sight, you proceed in. If you
9 have the weathermen amongst you. You can have the airport in
10 sight, and if the ceiling tapers down and you can't maintain your
11 legal, you're out of there. That's just the difference Dutch
12 Harbor.

13 Not everybody is comfortable to drive 4 miles underneath a
14 lower ceiling with reduced visibility. And there's just a bit of
15 training that goes with that. Exposure, just being there in the
16 right seat or the left seat with a check airman, whatever.

17 Q. So as captain, if you -- do you feel empowered here at the
18 company that, if there is a safety concern, that you can speak up
19 and that your decision is valued?

20 A. Yes. Yeah. But you take a person, a younger captain might
21 not feel that way. We're all -- everybody is at a different point
22 in their life, professionally, financially. Look at me, 53 years
23 old, new sheriff in town. God, I like my seniority number. I do.
24 I like my schedule. I mean, well, I wish we had more captains; I
25 wouldn't have to work so much. But so it's like, man, I don't

1 want to screw this up.

2 You got a new group in town. You don't know -- I mean, all
3 these rumors going around. Gets right down to it, if I have an
4 issue with not wanting to go, I don't go. And they've never --
5 and then you take another lower time person. It's like, god dang,
6 I only got 400 more hours to go to get my 1500 hours, and I can go
7 get a Delta or Alaska Airlines job. Everybody has got a
8 different, a different goal. It's like, man, I'll just hang it
9 out with you for a little bit more. They're just hanging with it
10 a little bit more.

11 And so maybe I won't go in with a safety concern because I
12 don't want the fallout. You just, you know, I -- you hear about
13 who the people are in power over there. This Deke Abbott
14 character, he showed up. He spent -- I don't even know anything
15 -- I don't know much about his background. He spent a lot of time
16 with the FAA. He shows up. He's the -- and he's, he had a lot of
17 influence over here. And that's where the chief pilot gets their
18 -- the chief pilot -- between him and the chief pilot, that's who
19 -- they started implementing these different things that was like,
20 ain't going to work. Like, say, with the training and stuff.

21 Q. When you say the training, what are you referring to?

22 A. Referring to there was -- stuff I was hearing. They wanted
23 to reduce the amount of time spent with somebody in Dutch Harbor
24 on exposure to the training.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all I have for right now. Thank you.

1 DR. SILVA: Brandon.

2 MR. WILSON: I have no questions.

3 BY DR. SILVA:

4 Q. So following up on Dujuan's question here. As far as you
5 know, were they successful? Did they reduce the qualification
6 time required to go in there?

7 A. I don't know. I'm not a check airman. I'm going through the
8 process now. I'm not real politically correct, so that's why I've
9 stayed away from it for so many years.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And but I got to the point where this new -- last winter I
12 started, well, I'd better -- if I'm going to stay here, I'd better
13 get involved. Because we lost a lot of people. We lost a lot of
14 our check airmen. When I say that, they moved on. With the
15 merger and the whole change of things, we lost a lot of
16 experience. It's like, son of a bitch, now I've got to do it
17 basically. That's kind of --

18 Q. Okay. And you mentioned that there was more influence from
19 the Ravn side later in the summer. Aside from the qualification
20 concern, were there any other operational things that you noticed
21 that brought concern?

22 A. You're going to get change with a new owner. New owner has
23 got a new plan. We weren't merged yet, but you could see they
24 were starting to bring in -- the influence we've seen over here
25 was Paul Wells and Crystal, the chief pilot, and then Deke would

1 spend a lot of time over here. And he was, I don't know what the
2 hell is it, Manager of -- yeah -- Flight Ops or Vice President of
3 Flight Ops or some damn thing. So anyway, it's -- we were
4 starting to hear just stuff that was coming down the pike, and to
5 my knowledge I didn't get in -- I didn't -- no. Far as to my
6 knowledge, no, we did not change, we did not change any
7 procedures. But that's not to say we followed the normal
8 procedures either. I don't know.

9 Q. Okay. You mentioned a case where a pilot got grilled on
10 their decision to not take a flight. Did you voice your concerns
11 about that?

12 A. I checked into it. Because these younger people come to us
13 senior guys, and it was a little odd to me, and the newer
14 management maybe didn't understand the weather like we understood
15 it. And I really didn't -- it was just strange how it went down.
16 There's a few more particulars to it, but it was just strange how
17 it went down. And we were getting at that point where it's like,
18 got to get involved in this, and something's -- see what's going
19 on. So I did voice my opinion.

20 Q. How did the company respond to your concern?

21 A. Well, it was the chief pilot.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And she -- I made the comment about wanting to have a chat.
24 Maybe you need to have a sit-down with Deke and talk to him about
25 the culture and where we're going, what's going on here, just to

1 get an idea so I know. And she made it real clear that I'd better
2 get my facts straight before I go talking to Deke.

3 Q. I see. Did you feel like your concerns were heard after that
4 conversation with the chief pilot?

5 A. Yeah, but -- heard, yeah, but whether she's going to do
6 anything with them at all.

7 Q. Did you get the impression that she would?

8 A. No. It was kind of up to me at that time. It's kind of
9 like, well, I was just waiting for the time to maybe set up a
10 meeting with Deke and find out just where we're going here. And
11 because you start hearing about the subtle changes and stuff. And
12 as a senior pilot, these guys come to you. I'm training their
13 first officers. I've got to kind of know what -- I mean, I'm not
14 -- again, I'm not a check airman. But any PIC is influencing the
15 young -- any PIC is influencing how these young pilots are flying.
16 All the bad habits come from the left side.

17 Q. All right. So coming around to the safety culture. How
18 would you rate the safety culture here?

19 A. It started to concern me after -- I keep using that first of
20 August type of thing. Bristol Bay shuts off just like water
21 coming out of the spigot. It just stops. Then all of a sudden
22 it's normal. You'll see when we're slowed down, okay, now we've
23 got all this work we have to do, all this stuff we have to put
24 into place to make these changes and stuff. And it kind of
25 started to concern me.

1 And it did, I guess, just with -- not whether the changes
2 were being made, but what we're hearing. You hear different
3 things in conversation. Or they had a few meetings, town hall
4 meetings they call them, in the hangar. They have them at
5 frickin' 1 o'clock in the afternoon when most anybody that's --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- is out flying. But there's a handful -- well, there's
8 fair bit of people show up there. But just stuff I'd hear from
9 the meetings. They're concerning us a little bit, comments that
10 were made, and --

11 Q. Can you elaborate on those comments?

12 A. Well, I take the Alaska peninsula kind of personally. I
13 could go fly jets or whatever like everybody else is doing, but I
14 enjoy what I do. It's interesting to me. I've got a lot of
15 friends that live up and down the peninsula, and you're doing them
16 a service. And there's a disciplined, and there's a right and a
17 wrong way to do it. And when we -- you can't -- you get somebody
18 new, a new management, they don't know this. They don't. And
19 they weren't really asking. They weren't asking. The few of us
20 that were left, they weren't asking. It was just making -- going
21 to make these changes, and, yeah.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I did get asked one time. I was told -- I was, in passing,
24 kind of informal asked my opinion about something with Dutch
25 Harbor, and I got accused of being cynical because -- and I just

1 chalked that up. I says, well, it's too many bad experiences down
2 there and some lessons learned that -- you know, I guess you call
3 it what you want. I call it experience. You call it cynical.

4 Q. What was --

5 A. Oh, just --

6 Q. Do you remember the nature of that conversation?

7 A. Just quizzing about the whole, how much time does a person
8 need -- came up, how much time does a person need for training? I
9 keep saying Dutch Harbor. I mean, don't get me wrong. There's
10 other special airports. It just so happens this is the topic
11 here. But how much time does he need? They want to put a number
12 in a book.

13 You train to proficiency. Some people might take longer than
14 others. Not everybody is equal. You can't put a number in a
15 book, and just because we hit the number in the book, okay, he's
16 ready to go. He might not be ready to go. A question was brought
17 up in a meeting one time, and how many landings does it take to
18 get competent in Dutch Harbor? Four, five? I says 200, 300. You
19 can't get competent in five landings. Yeah, proficiency.

20 Q. Okay. When you transitioned to captain, did you go through
21 any kind of captain leadership training or anything along those
22 lines?

23 A. You go through captain leadership training sitting in the
24 right seat.

25 Q. Anything formal that was provided by the company in terms of

1 training?

2 A. That was 20 years ago.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. When I say you go through that in the right seat, anybody
5 that this upper echelon that we checked out and trained for Dutch
6 Harbor, that person goes in there, and he's paying attention, and
7 he's not going to screw up because he don't want to be -- he don't
8 want to disrespect the guys that checked him out in there.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. You don't need any captain -- you get your captain training
11 in the right seat from the guys that are pushing the
12 professionalism. And one of the -- you flip the latch in the
13 door, look back down that aisle way at 40 -- 40 little faces look
14 forward at you when that cockpit door opens up. That's training
15 number one. All those people are putting -- you're responsible
16 for those people. You don't learn that out of a book.

17 Q. Okay. Is there any time in your time here at PenAir where
18 you would transfer -- do a partial transfer of controls in flight?

19 A. There's no such thing as a partial transfer of controls.
20 You're either driving or you're not.

21 Q. Okay. So --

22 A. I mean, you might transfer the controls for a short time.
23 Like if Brandon and I are flying together, and I'm going to -- I'm
24 the flying pilot, and I'm going to brief the approach, I'll
25 transfer the controls, not all the time. If you're at 30,000 feet

1 with the autopilot on, 9 times out of 10 I'll transfer the
2 controls. We might change -- we might be on our descent already.
3 We might be changing our program because we're going to change
4 runways down there, and I'd ask Brandon to take the controls, and
5 he would fly the aircraft while I would brief the approach, and
6 then we'd transfer the controls back.

7 Q. Will there ever be a case where, let's say, you would only --
8 you would have the first officer take the throttles only for
9 example?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. You might -- when you get on a runway, no, no.

13 Q. But nothing like --

14 A. No. There's no time when you let the -- you've got --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. No.

17 Q. And have you had any interaction with Paul?

18 A. Yeah. I mean, I knew --

19 Q. What are those --

20 A. -- just --

21 Q. -- interactions like?

22 A. -- in passing.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. We never had any sit-down, formal -- I never spent 3 days in
25 ground school with him or something like that. He was a new guy,

1 a new face around here. And he, like anybody, when you go -- he
2 was one of the three, one of the three influences we had from the
3 Ravn side and full of good idea -- all these new ideas and stuff.
4 And he was one that was talking about them all the time and stuff.
5 So, I mean, yeah.

6 Q. Were you aware of -- from what we understand, you do airport
7 analysis with the charts in order to determine whether you have
8 enough runway to land, right?

9 A. Right.

10 Q. Is there another way of doing those calculations that --

11 A. You mean assessing your risk? You're talking the risk
12 assessment form we do?

13 Q. Not the risk assessment. The actual performance
14 calculations.

15 A. Oh, okay.

16 Q. Is there -- is the charts the -- are the charts the only way
17 that that's done --

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. -- within the company? As far as you're aware, is there
20 anything in development that is some kind of computerized way of
21 --

22 A. There is some stuff in development, but it's not approved
23 yet.

24 Q. Have you used that?

25 A. No. I've seen it.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Never used it. It's been shown to me. And that was Paul's
3 -- that was one of Paul's projects far as I know.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. He was pushing it hard over here as far as what's up and
6 coming. And, I mean, it was getting real close as far as I know,
7 but then again that was, was about the only interaction I had with
8 Paul. I'm not much for -- them iPads are a wonderful tool, but
9 this job's real simple. Be careful. Pay attention. Point her
10 into the wind, and go do it.

11 Q. So when you said you were shown the app, was that with Paul?
12 Paul showed you the app or was there someone else?

13 A. Yeah. Again, it was his brain child. I call it his brain
14 child. He was the one pushing it over here as far as what's --
15 showing us what's coming, what's coming up.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Again, the way ours is set up right now, what is it, Brandon,
18 every 1,000 pounds or every 2,000 pounds? It goes 41, 39, 41.
19 It's every 2,000 pounds. We break it down in 2,000 pounds.
20 That's how you figure your performance. You're looking at not
21 even knot difference -- one knot difference sometimes in these
22 speeds that we -- so I was not really into it because, I mean,
23 there's not going to be much change. It's just the only
24 difference we're going to look at a different app than the -- a
25 different book in the iPad. I don't get too cranked up about all

1 that technology.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I mean, it's great stuff, but what we have is -- works.

4 DR. SILVA: Okay. Marvin.

5 BY MR. FRANTZ:

6 Q. Couple times you talked about August, and, like, I think you
7 mentioned it was a point of demarcation. There was a big change
8 or changes before and after. We talking about August 2019 or 2018
9 or what year?

10 A. 2019.

11 Q. This year.

12 A. This year.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. These guys took over -- what, December 26th last year,
15 full-fledged owning the place.

16 Q. Okay. The mass exodus you mentioned, and --

17 A. Started a year --

18 (Simultaneous comments.)

19 Q. -- talk about --

20 A. Started August 2018. We had a lot of guys after the auction
21 was final, before they just, they're going to move on. They're
22 going to do other stuff.

23 Q. After -- okay, after the auction was -- after it was known
24 that PenAir --

25 A. Right. The auction was over.

1 Q. -- PenAir was going to continue but with new --

2 A. Ownership.

3 Q. Okay. So what's the word? What is your impression of the --
4 what was the driver or drivers of this mass exodus that happened
5 at that point? What was behind that? Why would so many people
6 leave in a short period like that?

7 A. We worked for a family-owned outfit. The last couple years
8 got a little crazy because of financial stuff. Lot of changing
9 going. I say the last couple years. The last couple years of
10 PenAir. Bringing on -- we're putting airplanes down the lower 48.
11 We're bringing on Saab 2000s. It was using war mode. So it was
12 a little crazy around here.

13 But before that, I mean, it was a family-owned business. A
14 big family-owned business. And these guys, they didn't want to
15 work for Wall Street. They didn't -- wasn't comfortable, and they
16 was at a point in their life -- I don't if I would sit here and
17 say anything -- it had nothing to do with Ravn specific. Just
18 that if we're going to work for Wall Street, they're going to be
19 sitting in a jet. If they're going to work for -- I can't sit
20 here and say that it was -- it was just --

21 Q. Okay. Yeah. I understand.

22 A. Does that make sense?

23 Q. Yes. So currently there's a -- get signed off to be PIC
24 going into Dutch Harbor and couple other special airports, there's
25 the 300-hour PIC time requirement, waivable to 100 if you get a

1 check airman recommendation. And then either way, I guess,
2 whether you got 300 or you're waiving at 100, you got to get a
3 check airman training to the special airport. Is that right?

4 A. Right. That 300, okay, that 300 hours is just an airplane
5 thing.

6 Q. Right.

7 A. It has nothing to do with the -- you might be comfortable in
8 the airplane, but you might come walking into this company with
9 300 hours of Saab 340 time. Well, you meet the requirement. Now
10 we need to train you on Dutch Harbor. That's where I was getting
11 --

12 Q. Right.

13 A. -- they wanted to lump it all together, and it's like, no.
14 You can come in here with 2,000 hours of Saab 2000 time. The 300
15 hours is to come proficient in the airplane. You've got a point,
16 a touch down spot in Dutch Harbor. You guys all know it's a
17 little shorter runway. You're coming in landing at 12,000 feet,
18 your touch down spot is like that. Well, Dutch Harbor, the
19 airplane fits in there, but your touch down spot is right there.
20 You need -- it's a little smaller.

21 Q. So is the current requirement for just an unspecified amount
22 of training by a check airman, a sign-off, is that sufficient, in
23 your view, to be able to act as captain into Dutch Harbor? The
24 current requirements that PenAir has for PIC --

25 A. Right, right.

1 Q. -- to fly to a special airport, in your view, is that
2 sufficient?

3 A. If the group of people -- right now we're -- yeah. If you --
4 we have a group of people. I say a group. The group has thinned
5 down a little bit because, again, we've lost a lot of our
6 experience, but there's four or five of us -- four of us up there.
7 I'm getting drug into that. I'm becoming a check airman. I've
8 been -- since the accident, I've been a little -- getting involved
9 in -- yeah. So we're going to try it. What we're doing is, yeah,
10 you've got to get -- go through these check airmen, and when they
11 sign you off, you're ready. When they give you the nod.

12 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. That's -- I think that's all I have.
13 Thanks, Adam.

14 DR. SILVA: Dujuan.

15 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

16 Q. To your knowledge, does the FAA get a chance to review the
17 300-hour, 100 requirement? To your knowledge do you know?

18 A. I don't understand. Do they get a chance to?

19 Q. To review that requirement for flying into -- use the special
20 airports.

21 A. As in do they sign off on it? Are they involved in it?

22 Q. Are they involved with it, yes.

23 A. To my knowledge, I don't know.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I think they're signing off. When we put something in

1 writing in our training manual, they've got to sign off on it,
2 yeah. I mean, any time we put something in a manual, there's
3 somebody signing off on it. If we put something in our specific
4 -- your CFM --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- your GOM, yeah. I mean, that would -- I would think
7 they're involved in it too, yeah, to a degree.

8 Q. And so is there a safety committee here at the airline that
9 you know of?

10 A. Used to be, but it all went away in the last couple years.
11 So --

12 Q. What drove that to go away?

13 A. Well, just because of the whole selling of the company. Just
14 like we're talking a year from, like, September 2018 to the whole
15 -- there's a -- quite a bit -- people moved on with the whole sale
16 thing. That's what drove it.

17 Q. And with that process, were there any concerns with the
18 safety committee going away? And what was going to replace that?

19 A. A smaller safety committee. I mean, I'm not being sarcastic.
20 If I came across like that, I'm sorry.

21 Q. No. I'm just -- I guess, my thought process if you had a
22 safety committee and --

23 A. We -- no, we -- I -- again, I can't -- I don't know.

24 Q. And so Sathya brought up earlier about the safety culture.

25 So if you could categorize the safety culture here from 1 to 10,

1 where would you rate -- with 10 being the really, really good,
2 where would you rate?

3 A. Before or after the accident?

4 Q. Before the accident and after the accident.

5 A. It's kind of hard because things were -- it happened such a
6 short time from -- like I say, I keep using the first of August.
7 When we're busy, all hands on deck. Management's busy.
8 Everybody's busy. And once it slows down, then you have time for
9 submitting these changes and pushing these changes through.
10 Things started happening. I was not impressed at all with the
11 safety culture from what I was hearing. No.

12 Before the accident, you know, it was a couple months where
13 we started, you know, he -- things I started seeing, I was getting
14 a little concerned with talk, like I say, with shortening up this
15 training stuff. So before the accident, yeah, if I had to give a
16 number, scale of 1 to 10, a 3. After the accident, I mean,
17 there's a group of us now that are put in charge of revamping and
18 tightening up this, and getting back to what we were -- getting
19 back to the old requirements.

20 Q. And --

21 A. Nothing's -- I don't even think -- again, I'm not involved in
22 it enough. I'm getting involved in it now, going through the
23 process of being a check airman. But I'm not -- you asked me the
24 safety culture before and after the accident, three before, and I
25 really couldn't give you a number after because the -- yeah.

1 They're listening -- you know, they're getting us involved and
2 listening to us now. Hell, we don't go any place. I run to
3 Fairbanks and back.

4 DR. SILVA: I'm going to interrupt you for just a second.

5 MR. HEHL: Sure.

6 DR. SILVA: It's 1:33. Are you good for a few more minutes?

7 MR. HEHL: It's okay. Yeah.

8 DR. SILVA: Okay.

9 MR. HEHL: Thanks. Thank you.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all I had.

11 DR. SILVA: Brandon.

12 MR. WILSON: I don't have anything.

13 BY DR. SILVA:

14 Q. So you've gone through the interview now. Do you have
15 anything you want to add that we didn't necessarily ask you but
16 should have?

17 A. Nothing, no.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Not really.

20 Q. And is there anyone else you think that we should talk to
21 given the kind of questions that you got here today you think
22 might be helpful for us?

23 A. I think you've talked to quite a bit of people. I mean, the
24 higher guys.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Is Steve on the list?

2 Q. Steve?

3 A. Hakala.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Is he on the list or?

6 Q. We got him, hopefully.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. Good luck. He -- that's been his motto for 25 years, is all
10 his bosses, they drive him -- he drives them crazy because he'll
11 be here today, and they'll lose him for 3 days, and then he shows
12 back up.

13 Q. Okay. We will anticipate that then.

14 A. Been doing that for 30 years.

15 Q. Cool. Okay. Is there anyone else you think might be
16 helpful?

17 A. Yeah. Ian Thompson.

18 Q. Yes, we do.

19 A. These newer guys, they don't --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. There's been a lot of people here only since 4 or 5 months
22 and ain't been here long enough to know the culture or something
23 but --

24 DR. SILVA: Okay. Well, we appreciate the insight, and we
25 really appreciate your time. And if you do think of anything you

1 want to relay, you have our information. You're also welcome to
2 go through Brandon if you're more comfortable with that. So thank
3 you so much.

4 (Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Adam Hehl


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 2, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Katherine Motley
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/10/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: GREGORY PFEIFER

Captain, PenAir

PenAir Offices
Anchorage, Alaska

Friday,
October 25, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

ROGER YOUNG, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

DENNIS FISHER, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Pfeifer)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Gregory Pfeifer:		
By Dr. Silva		6
By Mr. Frantz		19
By Dr. Sevillian		29
By Mr. Young		33
By Mr. Fisher		38
By Dr. Silva		43
By Mr. Frantz		56
By Dr. Sevillian		58
By Mr. Young		59
By Mr. Fisher		61
By Mr. Frantz		61

I N T E R V I E W

(11:30 a.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: We're on the record at 11:30. So thank you for
4 agreeing to talk to us. I'm Sathya Silva. I'm a human
5 performance investigator with the NTSB.

6 We've got a few people around the table here, so what you're
7 seeing is a product of our party system. So while we at the NTSB
8 have expertise in investigations and investigating, we rely on
9 other people to provide expertise into the company, into the
10 aircraft, and also with the FAA. And it sounds like you know
11 Roger already, but he'll run through not the enforcement side; 100
12 percent safety. He essentially works for us for the
13 investigation.

14 So let's go around the room so you know who you're talking
15 to, and then I'll keep going with our spiel. Marvin.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Hi, I'm Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational
17 factors investigator with the NTSB.

18 DR. SILVA: Dajuan.

19 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan Sevillian. I'm a human performance
20 investigator for the NTSB.

21 DR. SILVA: Roger.

22 MR. YOUNG: You know me, Roger, with the FAA. Like they
23 said, I'm not here in any kind of regulatory capacity, it's
24 strictly to assist with the questioning, so --

25 DR. SILVA: Okay.

1 MR. FISHER: Dennis Fisher, line pilot, check airman, PenAir.

2 DR. SILVA: Great.

3 MR. PFEIFER: Nice to meet you.

4 DR. SILVA: So we're here for safety. What we want to do is
5 essentially find the reasons for the accident and, ultimately, our
6 kind of power arm is really through safety recommendations. So
7 that's our goal. We're not here to assign blame, liability, any
8 of that sort of thing.

9 What will happen is this recording will get sent out for
10 transcription, and then a copy of that transcript will eventually
11 become part of our public docket when the factual information
12 comes out. That could be 6 months to a year from now depending.

13 You are the expert. We're here to learn from you. There are
14 no right and wrong answers. If you have any questions, you don't
15 understand a question, you don't know the answer, "I don't know"
16 is a perfectly good answer. If you need a break, just holler. It
17 should -- it's pretty informal.

18 So you are entitled to have a representative sit with you.
19 Would you like someone to sit with you today?

20 MR. PFEIFER: Mr. Campbell.

21 DR. SILVA: Okay. Great. The format we'll run through here
22 is I'll start out with a handful of questions, and then we will go
23 around our table here, usually twice, to make sure everyone has a
24 chance, and then we'll turn it over to you and see if you have
25 anything else you want to add.

1 MR. PFEIFER: Okay.

2 DR. SILVA: Any questions before we start?

3 MR. PFEIFER: No questions.

4 DR. SILVA: Okay.

5 INTERVIEW OF GREGORY PFEIFER

6 BY DR. SILVA:

7 Q. Can you state and spell your name for us, please?

8 A. Gregory Pfeifer, G-r-e-g-o-r-y, Pfeifer, P-f-e-i-f-e-r.

9 Q. Perfect. And what's your title here?

10 A. I'm a captain in the Saab 2000.

11 Q. Can you run through a brief history of your aviation
12 experience from when you started flying to what brought you to
13 where you are today?

14 A. Yeah. So 16, I soloed, which was almost 10 years ago -- or,
15 no, 3 -- 7 years ago, sorry.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Sixteen I soloed; 17, I got my pilot license. I learned to
18 fly off of Lake Hood there just right down the road. Just kind of
19 prior to that, I worked for an air taxi for 3 years in which I
20 flew around the entire state of Alaska in various airplanes. So
21 it was an easy transition into getting my license at 17. Eighteen
22 I acquired my -- 18 or 19 I acquired my instrument commercial,
23 multi-engine, and then as well as my commercial, single-engine
24 sea, multi-engine sea. And then 19, I started working for
25 Clearwater Air; we flew Commanders up on the slope. I was SIC in

1 that.

2 And then that fall, kind of that winter, I applied at PenAir,
3 did my interview in December, and I got hired January 6, 2016, to
4 be a first officer in the Saab 340 freighter program because they
5 had the 135 back then. And then I did that until I turned 21. So
6 I guess it was just kind of under or over a year depending on how
7 you look at it, you know, with the training on either end. So
8 then I turned 21, there was a Saab 2000 class. I was old enough
9 to be a 121 co-pilot, and then I became a co-pilot in a Saab 2000
10 for 2 years. And then 23, which was this year, I became a
11 captain. I've been a captain for almost 6 months, I'd say. And
12 that's it.

13 Q. Cool. Which air taxi did you work with?

14 A. Alaska Air Taxi.

15 Q. Alaska Air Taxi. What did you do for them?

16 A. I was just a ramp. But, you know, I got to -- it was mostly
17 freight, so I got to ride around in a Skyvan and Otter. So I got
18 to fly a lot, I guess, going out to the villages because there was
19 already a right seat open.

20 Q. Cool. How many hours do you have about?

21 A. I'd say close to 4,000 --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- 3,500 -- 3,500 to 4,000 would be a safe, safe bet.

24 Q. Do you know how much in the Saab 2000s?

25 A. I think I just hit 2,000 hours.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. What about since you became captain?

4 A. Right around 360.

5 Q. Okay. Cool. Have you flown into Dutch Harbor?

6 A. I have.

7 Q. Okay. How often would you say you fly to Dutch Harbor?

8 A. Since I've become captain, I would say it's slowed down just

9 because it's a senior line. Maybe -- I don't know, five times a

10 month, I'd say.

11 Q. Okay. That's after you became captain?

12 A. That's correct, yeah.

13 Q. So that's the slow -- this is less time?

14 A. Right, right.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. When I initially started in the freighter program, that was

17 the run I did every single day at 5:00 a.m. --

18 Q. I see.

19 A. -- was Cold Bay-Dutch Harbor every day.

20 Q. Okay. Are you based here, Anchorage?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Is everyone based in Anchorage, is that why?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. It's a weird question. Okay. Do you remember the last time

25 you flew into Dutch Harbor?

1 A. I don't. I don't recall.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah. Maybe a couple weeks ago, something like that.

4 Q. What's your understanding of the weather? So let's say
5 you're teaching someone or explaining to someone how to come into
6 Dutch Harbor, how would you describe the local environment at the
7 airport?

8 A. Probably the first thing I would teach someone was how to
9 read the water.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. We get our weather about 120 miles out, so it's still 12 to
12 15 minutes from when we're actually at the runway, and so a lot of
13 things can change between the time when you get the weather and
14 the time you're at the runway. So it's very important when you're
15 approaching the runway that you're looking at those -- the water,
16 the cue, to see what's really going on.

17 There's three windsocks. You can see one of the windsocks
18 from about 3 miles away. But I'd say the water's a good
19 indication of a starting point just to kind of look and see what
20 the wind's doing, you know, velocity, where it's hitting hard out
21 on Rocky Point before and past it, because you can tell what your
22 -- how your approach path is going to be based on what you're
23 seeing on the water, because you'll fly through that air
24 obviously.

25 Q. What are you looking for on the water?

1 A. The direction, number one. And the velocity, and also the
2 mechanical turbulence, it'll give you a good cue for mechanical
3 turbulence. So if it -- for instance, there's -- I'm sure you
4 guys are aware of Hog Island, right?

5 Q. Okay. Um-hmm.

6 A. Based on how the water is around that will give you a good
7 indication of how your ride's going to be to the runway. So, and
8 the same thing, there's -- kind of on the other end there's Rocky
9 Point, which is a little bigger, but as you're coming in the back
10 door -- you're looking at the water the entire way coming in the
11 back door, and that'll give you -- that'll prepare you for when
12 you're on final to know what you're going to -- because you can't
13 really see the runway coming in the back door. You can but, you
14 know, it's on the side of a mountain. So as you turn final, if
15 you're looking at the water the entire way coming in, it won't be
16 -- you won't be hit by a surprise, I guess.

17 Q. Is there a preferred runway coming into Dutch Harbor?

18 A. No. Into the wind.

19 Q. Okay. Okay. And then stepping back, say, on a flight, how
20 do you typically run performance numbers, both for speeds and also
21 landing distance, anything in terms of performance?

22 A. We use this airport analysis guide.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And that's what we dispatch with. And so that chart will
25 tell you -- it'll give your destination and an alternate on that

1 chart. The destination will be 60 percent available stopping
2 distance planned, and 80 percent if it's your alternate. That's
3 what we dispatch with.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And it is in the remarks in the release what they plan you
6 for.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. When you get there, if it's different or you alter your
9 flight plan, I'll say, or how you're going to operate the
10 airplane, it's your responsibility as a PIC to ensure that you can
11 land with the different -- landing a different runway, different
12 wind, different configuration of the aircraft.

13 Q. So how would you run through that calculation or do -- well,
14 let me start with, who does that calculation?

15 A. Typically it might be the FO, but obviously it's the PIC's
16 job to ensure that it's safe, you know, to -- you know, he has
17 ultimate say-so. As a captain, I like to look over what he's done
18 to ensure that it's correct.

19 Q. Can you kind of walk me through that, how would you verify
20 the numbers are right?

21 A. So you can look right at the APG.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And then, and then he'll come up with -- on the TOLD card
24 he'll write down like, okay, flaps 35, landing distance available,
25 max landing weight, he'll write that down.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And then I'll verify in the APG the max landing weight. And
3 I'd have to reference the number, but it's pretty standard for
4 going to Dutch Harbor what our max is. And so then I'll make sure
5 that the number he comes up with is the same number, and we're on
6 the same page.

7 Q. Is there a standard in terms of communicating that
8 information or is that something you do kind of personally?

9 A. I don't -- I wouldn't say there's a standard, no.

10 Q. Okay. How do you decide what flap settings to use?

11 A. It depends on the weather.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Yeah. It depends on, it depends on the weather.

14 Q. So when you're doing these calculations, is this something --
15 do you do the calculations after you get the initial weather
16 call --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- a typical? Okay.

19 A. Typically you'll plan -- because you'll have your weather and
20 you'll plan for a certain setting, certain runway, because you
21 kind of have an idea as you start the flight.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And then you'll get the weather and just make sure it's not
24 something out of the ordinary.

25 Q. Yeah. What about coming into Dutch Harbor? Do you typically

1 use 35 or, again, does that vary based on the winds?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. Do you recall -- I'm trying to get a feel for how
4 often you would use 35 versus 20 in your experience at Dutch
5 Harbor?

6 A. It varies.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. I couldn't give you a good number.

9 Q. So it's not like a flaps 35 every landing kind of situation?

10 A. Not necessarily.

11 Q. Okay. Have you ever landed with a tailwind on that runway?

12 A. You know, I don't think so. Maybe, I guess, yes. In a
13 certain instance in Dutch Harbor you'll have a certain wind, and
14 it will be a headwind on one way and then maybe, like, one on the
15 other way or something. It'll be, it'll be kind of a varying
16 wind, I guess, and in that case I may have.

17 Q. Okay. I understand that it's a special airport, like, for
18 the company. What does that mean from your perspective?

19 A. Just my opinion on a special airport or FAA-designated
20 special?

21 Q. Yeah, yeah, so your -- no, no, not FAA --

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. -- just like from your perspective, what does that mean?

24 A. It's a short runway.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. You have limited alternate options. The wind can -- you
2 know, from certain directions can be challenging. You know you've
3 got to do a visual -- we've got to do a visual takeoff, so there's
4 no instrument. There's a procedure, but you have to remain visual
5 for quite some time, where a lot of the other airports you can
6 just take off right into the clouds.

7 Q. Do you have to have a certain amount of time before you can
8 fly into the airport?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you know what that is?

11 A. As the captain?

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. There's 300 hours -- there's a 300-hour benchmark, and
14 there's also a 100-hour benchmark.

15 Q. Do you know what the differences are?

16 A. I believe the 300 hours -- excuse me -- the 100 hours you're
17 required to have a check airman sign-off, a chief pilot letter,
18 and maybe a letter from that check airman; I'm not 100 percent on
19 that, but you are able to bypass the 300 with some provisions.
20 I'm not exactly 100 percent on those.

21 Q. Okay. So those numbers, are they time in the Saab or is it
22 time in the company; do you know what that is?

23 A. I want to say it was time in seat.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Left seat or right seat.

1 Q. Yeah.

2 A. But I'm not 100 percent on that.

3 Q. Okay. Did you do through any special training to fly into
4 Dutch?

5 A. As far as?

6 Q. Just any specific training particular to the aircraft --
7 airport? Sorry.

8 A. I'm not sure.

9 Q. Okay. So after you transitioned to captain, did you
10 immediately start running lines to Dutch Harbor? Was there any
11 time in between?

12 A. No. I want to say I had around 200 hours before I started.
13 It wasn't immediate.

14 Q. I see.

15 A. I wasn't immediately going to Dutch Harbor. They --

16 Q. Yeah, okay. Was there a milestone in there or did they at
17 some point just decide that you were good to -- did they just
18 start assigning you flights over there?

19 A. Well, I had to get the sign-off.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I'm not sure where that sign-off took place, but I believe I
22 made the 100-hour benchmark.

23 Q. Okay. So you had to get the sign-off. Do you know what you
24 -- do you remember what you had to do for the sign-off?

25 A. You have to -- it's on the sheet. You have to demonstrate

1 competency operating in and out of the airport, have local
2 knowledge, have local, you know, awareness of, like, your
3 alternates or what you're going to use for your alternate; just
4 basically have a good understanding and competently operate the
5 airplane in and out of Dutch Harbor.

6 Q. Okay. So is that sign-off just from a check airman?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Okay. Understand. So have you ever flown with Justin Lunn
9 as a -- being captain?

10 A. I have.

11 Q. Okay. Do you remember the last time you flew with him?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When was that?

14 A. I don't remember the date.

15 Q. That's okay.

16 A. I remember the flight, I guess.

17 Q. Okay. Can you describe the flight?

18 A. It was nothing out of the ordinary. It was a windy day at
19 Sand Point and Cold Bay was windy, real windy, so we were going to
20 go to Cold Bay initially, and we elected to go to Sand Point
21 because Cold Bay was windy. And we went to Sand Point, and it was
22 windy at Sand Point.

23 Q. Okay. Do you remember who was the pilot flying?

24 A. I was.

25 Q. Okay. Was that for both legs? Did you go and come back?

1 A. I did the takeoff and the landing in Sand Point.

2 Q. Okay. At any point was Justin pilot flying during the
3 flight?

4 A. At some point at cruise on the way back to Anchorage we
5 transferred controls.

6 Q. On the way back? Okay.

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. He did the landing in Anchorage?

9 A. He did, yes.

10 Q. Okay. How is it flying with him?

11 A. He's a pleasant guy to fly with. He does a good job. He
12 does a fair job.

13 Q. What would you say are his greatest strengths, flying with
14 him?

15 A. He wants to, he wants to do better. Like he's always -- he's
16 wanting to do a good job, I guess, and I appreciate that. It
17 makes it nice to fly with him.

18 Q. If there was anything you'd say that he could improve on,
19 what would those be?

20 A. Based on the few times that I've flew (verbatim) with him, I
21 can't recall something that -- you know, I don't want to say the
22 flights were flawless. I just -- I can't -- there might have been
23 little things here or there, but nothing that stuck out to me.

24 Q. On this last flight, do you know if it was in the last week,
25 2 weeks? I don't need a day, per se, but just like a --

1 A. Last week, I think it was.

2 Q. Okay. Have an idea of how many times overall that you've
3 flown with him?

4 A. Roughly, I want to say three.

5 Q. Three.

6 A. But I'm not 100 percent.

7 Q. Okay. Do you feel like he would have brought up concerns
8 with you if he had them?

9 A. I'm not sure.

10 Q. Okay. Okay. That's a perfectly good answer. Do you think
11 that he was open to your input, suggestions to things?

12 A. Very much so.

13 Q. Okay. Did you have to do a performance calculation going
14 into those airports?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. From what you remember, can you describe that process
17 and interaction with Justin on that?

18 A. I can't.

19 Q. Okay. Do you socialize with him outside of work at all?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Just professional, okay.

22 DR. SILVA: Let's see. Okay. I'm going to pause for now.

23 Do you need a break? How are you doing?

24 MR. PFEIFER: Sure.

25 DR. SILVA: We can take a break. All right, let's take a few

1 minutes. We'll pause this guy.

2 (Off the record.)

3 (On the record.)

4 BY MR. FRANTZ:

5 Q. Do you prefer Gregory or Greg?

6 A. Greg, please.

7 Q. Greg. Okay, Greg. So one of the younger captains we've come
8 across recently. Did you get your ATP and your Saab type rating
9 at the same time?

10 A. In the 340, yes.

11 Q. In the 340?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. And what year was that?

14 A. '17. I want to say 2017.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Two years ago. Or -- excuse me -- no, that would have been
17 -- yeah, 2 years ago. And actually, I take that back; I got it in
18 the Saab 2000. I apologize.

19 Q. Okay. And that was just 6 months ago?

20 A. So I was on a waiver because I was 21, and so I guess I had a
21 restricted ATP. And then as soon as I turned 23, the restriction
22 could come off.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. But me upgrading and the check ride had nothing to do with
25 the ATP; the ATP was actually acquired when I was 21. Our POI

1 told me, you know, as soon as I turned 23 it was just a matter of
2 paperwork because I've already taken the ATP check ride.

3 Q. So your Saab 2000 training was just a type rating?

4 A. That's correct; it was a PIC type rating.

5 Q. Okay. So when you started flying into Dutch Harbor as a
6 captain, once you became captain on the Saab 2000, you were able
7 to do that with the 100-hour waiver?

8 A. I was under that provision. I'm not sure how many hours I
9 had. It was -- I believe it was less than 300 in the left seat.

10 Q. And that's 300 hours -- I think with Sathya we decided it was
11 300 hours with the company, as PIC with the company, not in the
12 particular aircraft, that 300-hour requirement. Do you know?

13 A. I'm not sure.

14 Q. Okay. That's fine. Can you tell me -- can you walk me
15 through if you were the FO -- when you were FO or if you were the
16 FO, what -- and you're going into Dutch Harbor, say, what are the,
17 what are the steps you're taking, what books, what manuals are you
18 looking at to determine your performance capabilities to make sure
19 you're okay to land there based on what you know of the wind and
20 everything there?

21 As you're -- if this is post-dispatch, you're already
22 airborne, you're en route, now you're approaching top of descent,
23 getting ready for your approach briefing or whatever, so how do
24 you verify -- what are the steps you're taking to verify that your
25 performance is going to work for Dutch Harbor?

1 A. Using the APG.

2 Q. What's that?

3 A. Sorry. Airport analysis guide.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And if it's outside of that -- it's a very limited chart. If
6 it's outside of that, then we'll use that and unfactored landing
7 distance in the performance plan there.

8 Q. Does the -- you said APG?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Does that tell you -- does that give you a distance of either
11 how much runway you need or how much margin, how -- does that --
12 what's the final product of looking at that table? What is it you
13 get out of that?

14 A. It will tell you -- it's for dispatch, so it's the most -- it
15 will tell you destination for dispatch; you will land in 60
16 percent of the runway. It will -- the numbers work out to be to
17 land within 60 percent of the runway.

18 Q. Okay. Is that the same thing you're going to look at though
19 once you're en route after you've been dispatched? Are you
20 looking again to verify that you can --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And then, you know.

24 Q. So have you ever been to Dutch Harbor or any other airports
25 you've flown to with PenAir where you've had to do any

1 modifications or changes because you've looked -- you've run the
2 performance numbers and you've had -- something's come up that
3 indicates, oh, there's going to be a problem here?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So what are some solutions if that happens? What do you --
6 what can you do?

7 A. You can go to the unfactored landing distance and that will,
8 that will -- if there is -- if there are variables that were not
9 planned at the point of dispatch, you can use the unfactored
10 landing distance table in the performance binder.

11 Q. Okay. We hear of the -- well, we've seen this Medallion wind
12 chart. It's like a compass rose around the airport. Tell me what
13 you do with that, what it means to you, how you use it for a
14 typical flight?

15 A. It determines whether -- I'll use it for every runway if it's
16 -- basically wherever I'm going, you know, if the wind's above a
17 certain number, say, 5 knots. If it's anywhere in that margin,
18 I'll want to look at it to make sure that, to make sure that we --
19 like, I will land there.

20 Q. Is it mandatory that you use it per PenAir guidance or any
21 other guidance? Do you have to use it, and do you have to follow
22 it, you know, if it shows the wind and the sector you're coming in
23 is greater than what's on the chart? If you heard it's greater
24 than what's on the chart, is that a restriction on you or is it
25 advisory in nature; how do you use that?

1 A. In my experience at PenAir, what the captains have done and
2 what I do as a captain, is if it's over, say, that number, then a
3 phone call is required to be made to either -- to dispatch, and
4 then they'll in turn talk to the chief pilot, and you'll either
5 get approval or you won't get approval to land.

6 Q. Has that ever happened in your experience?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. Did you get approval?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Tailwind limitations, does the airplane itself have a
11 tailwind limitation?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What is that?

14 A. Fifteen knots.

15 Q. Okay. Does PenAir as an operator, or the special airports
16 that PenAir designates, are there tailwind limitations other than
17 the Saab, 15-knot tailwind limitation that you know of?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is there -- do you know if there's a tailwind limitation for
20 landing at Dutch Harbor?

21 A. Can you repeat the question?

22 Q. Is there a tailwind -- because Dutch Harbor is designated a
23 special airport, is there any tailwind limitation, other than the
24 one in the Saab manual that just says 15-knot tailwind limitation,
25 but is there any more restrictive limitation for Dutch Harbor or

1 any other special airport that you know of?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you know what it is, what the tailwind limitation is for
4 Dutch Harbor?

5 A. I'm not sure of the limitation for Dutch Harbor, and I'm not
6 sure that we have a printed limitation for Dutch Harbor. I know
7 Kodiak -- we started going to Kodiak special airport, there is a
8 printed limitation; however, as far as a tailwind for Dutch
9 Harbor, other than, you know, looking up and seeing what the
10 airplane can do, I'm not sure past that.

11 I guess in the APG, the airport analysis guide, or the
12 performance binder, past, you know, those numbers, I don't think
13 -- I'm not sure if we have a printed Dutch tailwind. I'm not
14 seeing that term.

15 Q. Okay. Are you -- in your training, do you -- were you
16 trained to -- what response were you trained to have when you
17 would get a GPWS warning when you're on final approach at an
18 airport, and you get a sink rate call, what response is expected
19 from you as the flying pilot?

20 A. Okay. So you get a sink rate call, I guess, is that --

21 Q. Yeah, from the GPWS gives you a sink rate, and you're inside
22 the final approach fix on an approach.

23 A. Can you repeat the question, please?

24 Q. Would you -- you have a GPWS, and it has different warnings
25 it'll offer you, and one of them is --

1 A. Right.

2 Q. -- a sink rate.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. In your training, do you remember what you were taught to do
5 if you get that warning? Just forget about where you're at on an
6 approach. Do you remember what you're supposed to do when your
7 GPWS starts yelling at you, "sink rate, sink rate"?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Have you ever gone around -- in your experience, have you
10 ever gone around because of a GPWS warning when you're getting
11 ready to land or close to an airport?

12 A. I have, yes.

13 Q. Okay. So, flying into Dutch Harbor, are there any -- is
14 there any tribal knowledge at PenAir or, you know, informal rules
15 of thumb that people know -- that everyone knows, oh, yeah, at
16 PenAir you always do this, or you never do that? Is there
17 anything special that you know about PenAir that's just this is
18 the way it is, you know, tips and helpful hints, outside of all
19 the regulatory stuff you have, how to fly those positions --

20 A. Right.

21 Q. -- general pilot stuff that you're aware of?

22 A. I guess the biggest thing would just be, like, to look at the
23 water.

24 Q. Okay. So tell me about your training at SIMCOM. How long
25 were you -- how long did that take your sim training in the 2000?

1 A. I believe it's 13 days. I'm not 100 percent on that.

2 Q. Okay. Do you remember how many hours you got in the sim?

3 A. I don't.

4 Q. Okay. What did you think of the instruction?

5 A. Topnotch instruction. I thought it was very well done.

6 Q. How about the instructors themselves; how many instructors
7 did you have at SIMCOM?

8 A. There is three instructors at SIMCOM.

9 Q. Did you get exposure to all three of them when you went
10 through?

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. Okay. All right.

13 A. I think, for my captain, I think I only had two, but
14 definitely from my initial I had all three.

15 Q. Your initial in the --

16 A. Or -- excuse me. I take that back. I did have all three
17 when I went for captain upgrade.

18 Q. You did?

19 A. I did, yes.

20 Q. Okay. When you went for captain upgrade you had -- did you
21 already have a 2000 type rating?

22 A. I did. It had a circling restriction.

23 Q. Right, right. So the captain upgrade, how long was that?
24 Was that 13 days?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. All right. So, anyway, generically no comments or
2 anything -- any complaints or anything about the training itself
3 down at SIMCOM?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. How about your ATP or your type rating ride for the
6 2000, how was that?

7 A. Good.

8 Q. Have you ever failed a check ride?

9 A. I have.

10 Q. What did you fail?

11 A. Multi-engine land.

12 Q. Okay. Did you -- how long before you retook the test?

13 A. I think I took it the next day or the day after.

14 Q. Do you remember what the event was you failed?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. What was it?

17 A. Single-engine hand-flown ILS.

18 Q. It's always the one that will get you. How's the Saab to fly
19 single-engine ILS hand-flown?

20 A. It's very easy.

21 Q. Is it? Okay.

22 A. It's no different than a two-engine really.

23 Q. Okay. So you've been with PenAir since -- was it 2016?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Okay. So have you seen any changes in either, you know,

1 policies, procedures, just general climate since the merger has
2 started happening, you know, within the last year? I mean, what
3 kind of changes have you seen at PenAir since Ravn has come in and
4 acquired it, and then they're trying to merge?

5 A. Can you repeat the question?

6 Q. Have you noticed any -- yeah, is there any difference in just
7 the day-to-day way you do things or the way that the people you
8 fly with, their attitudes or, you know, just general atmosphere of
9 the company since the merger has started occurring versus 2 years
10 ago when it was just, you know, PenAir --

11 A. Right.

12 Q. -- as a standalone company so to speak?

13 A. Right. I guess, it might be a little different for me
14 because I came in at a transition point to PIC. So being exposed
15 to more things, I'm not sure if it was just because I, you know,
16 made captain and that's part of what captains deal with, or this
17 is a transition phase that we're going through.

18 Q. Okay. Have you ever had to go around at Dutch Harbor?

19 A. Not that I can think of.

20 Q. Okay. What's the most challenging thing about flying into
21 Dutch Harbor from your point of view?

22 A. The weather.

23 Q. Okay. Where does Dutch Harbor rank among all the other
24 airports that PenAir flies to as far as challenge, degree of
25 difficulty, you know, things like that? Where do you rank Dutch

1 Harbor compared to everybody else?

2 A. The most difficult.

3 Q. The most difficult airport you fly into? Okay.

4 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, good. Let me see, I think I'm out. Yeah,
5 I'm going to take a break and pass it to somebody else. Thanks,
6 Greg.

7 DR. SILVA: Dujuan.

8 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

9 Q. Yes, Greg, I have some questions. One of the first questions
10 I had is, so as far as Dutch Harbor is concerned, is that -- do
11 you fly to Dutch Harbor as a scenario in a simulator?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And is there any type of simulated environment where you get
14 the weather? How do you get the weather or how was that simulated
15 in the simulator?

16 A. It will just be -- you know, I can't remember.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. I can't remember.

19 Q. So in the actual aircraft flying into Dutch Harbor, how do
20 you get the weather? What's the process of getting the weather
21 when you're coming into Dutch Harbor?

22 A. 40 miles out of MORDI, which is about 80 miles out of Dutch
23 Harbor, you can talk to Dutch weather. We have -- or there is a
24 weather observer there on the ground. And you'll call up on the
25 frequency, call Dutch weather, and then whoever is working that

1 day will read you the weather.

2 Q. Okay. Is there any other alternate way of getting the
3 weather other than Dutch weather service?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. What is that method?

6 A. There's -- I believe there's an ASOS or AWOS frequency.

7 Q. And as captain, are you involved in any way in the merger,
8 any merger aspects of the companies?

9 A. I was asked to look over, I guess, one revision that was
10 being made.

11 Q. And what revision was that?

12 A. It was a revision of the CFM as far as callouts, I guess.

13 Q. And were those callouts during the -- what phase of the
14 flight?

15 A. It was -- the scenario was -- we have a procedure in the CFM
16 for an engine failure at V1. And if you had a fire after you're
17 flying the airplane, after you got done making the calls, if you
18 have a fire, that would require a memorandum. And it would -- and
19 so you would complete the memorandum.

20 Now, since the merger, they wanted -- I'm not sure who,
21 wanted to implement a script to include the engine fire
22 memorandums instead of it just being, I guess, a given that you
23 would accomplish the memorandums or it's -- I mean, it's written
24 into the CFM that, at that point, you would accomplish
25 memorandums. They wanted to have it built into a script for an

1 engine fire. And that was very recent. I'm not -- it's not --
2 I'm not sure if it's published or approved quite yet.

3 Q. Okay. Are there any risk assessments that you do prior to
4 takeoff or anything?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And what risk assessments are those?

7 A. Can you repeat -- are there any risk assessments? Can you
8 repeat that question?

9 Q. Yes. Are there any risk assessments that you do as captain
10 prior to takeoff? Anything that you, you know, have a
11 conversation, is anything documented, things like that?

12 A. So me personally, or does the company have a risk assessment?

13 Q. You personally.

14 A. Okay. Yeah, for sure.

15 Q. And what risk assessments -- what types of risk assessments
16 do you do? Is it airport specific? Is it flight operation
17 specific?

18 A. I do a personal risk assessment, you know, I guess with
19 myself or with, you know, sometimes bring in the co-pilot, hey,
20 what do you think, before -- but really before we go anywhere, you
21 know, it's -- I mean, I personally think about where I'm going,
22 what the weather is doing. You know, obviously I want to complete
23 a safe flight. So, yeah, I'll first, you know, look at my
24 alternates, look who I'm flying with, you know, take everything
25 into consideration to complete a safe flight.

1 Q. And have there ever been any times where, you know, due to,
2 say, winds or weather at Dutch Harbor that you have had to
3 rethink, from a risk assessment standpoint, in flying into Dutch
4 Harbor?

5 A. Since I've been captain, no.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I've been lucky with good weather in Dutch Harbor.

8 Q. Okay. So can you describe the overall corporate culture here
9 at the airline -- and what I mean by that is safety culture, from
10 your perspective?

11 A. Can you repeat the question, please?

12 Q. Yeah. Could you describe sort of the safety culture here at
13 the airline, you know, as far as when you see something come up,
14 how is that communication done as far as situations that may come
15 up while flying, but just the overall culture of the company?

16 A. I haven't personally had any issues with being asked to do
17 something that was unsafe.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. So, in that case, I would say it's safe.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. The culture's safe.

22 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. That's all I have for right now.

23 Thank you, Greg.

24 DR. SILVA: Do you need a break?

25 MR. PFEIFER: Sure.

1 DR. SILVA: Okay. Let's pause here.

2 (Off the record.)

3 (On the record.)

4 DR. SILVA: All right. Go ahead, Roger.

5 BY MR. YOUNG:

6 Q. Okay. I've just got a few questions. We've been through a
7 lot of stuff on it so far. Just to follow up on your experience.
8 Did you have an approximate number of hours you had in the 340
9 PenAir?

10 A. Around 800, I'd say.

11 Q. And was that SIC or PIC?

12 A. SIC.

13 Q. Okay. And obviously ballpark, how many times do you think
14 you went into Dutch in a 340 as an SIC? Yeah, I know.

15 A. Every day for a year. I don't know, 200. That number could
16 be way off, but that's all I did in the 340.

17 Q. Okay.

18 MR. FISHER: He went a lot.

19 MR. YOUNG: Yeah, okay.

20 BY MR. YOUNG:

21 Q. So your Saab time, you said right seat was about 2,000 hours
22 in the 2000?

23 A. Yep.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Maybe 1,700, because I have 2,000 total.

1 Q. Ballpark.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay. How about flights into Dutch in the 2000 SIC? I know
4 there's not going to be an exact number.

5 A. 200 maybe. I mean, I went -- that was -- I did that run as
6 well in the right seat.

7 Q. Okay. And I didn't write it down. Did you have -- about
8 five times a month as a captain once you got the 2,000, ballpark?

9 A. Yeah. So on a count of hands probably 10 times as a captain,
10 I guess I'd say, since I've -- not quite five times a month, but
11 -- I'd say around 10 times I've been there.

12 Q. Okay. All right. So you're trying to describe your checkout
13 for Dutch. Is there a different checkout between the 340 and the
14 2000, is there -- with that, do they do anything different on the
15 checkout? I mean, now you were SIC in the 340, so --

16 A. Right. Right.

17 Q. But is there -- I guess it's not a great question that way.
18 Maybe you could describe a little bit more in detail your checkout
19 for Dutch Harbor in the 2000, I guess, is more what I'm looking
20 for with that.

21 A. I guess, just, you know, competently operating in and out of
22 the runway obviously, knowledge of the winds and the weather, and
23 having a good understanding of your alternate options, and I think
24 under that -- like under those factors combined, then the check
25 airman will make a decision to either sign you off that you're

1 competent to come in and out of Dutch Harbor.

2 Q. Okay. Do you think that your time before changed -- it was a
3 factor in your sign-off for Dutch Harbor?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Previous experience?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Okay. So speaking about the winds and stuff at Dutch Harbor,
8 you mentioned that you read the water. Can you tell us -- you
9 told us a little bit about that. Why is it such a big deal for
10 Dutch Harbor? What gives -- is there an advantage to it?

11 A. Dutch Harbor has -- is surrounded by terrain; it's on the
12 side of a mountain. So seeing how the water is, you know, acting
13 right around the runway will give you a good indication of how
14 your ride's going to be. You know, you can look at it outside the
15 bay and get the direction -- general direction, and then you know,
16 okay, once you go in there, that direction, I'm going to have this
17 over Rocky or this over Hog. But then, like, when you're in
18 there, going in to land, you're looking to see what's going on
19 around, you know, just the big picture.

20 Q. How does that work in -- with the -- on your approach going
21 in once you're past your final coming in to land --

22 A. Right.

23 Q. -- how does that work with your -- combined with the Dutch
24 weather? Is that something you guys --

25 A. Yeah, kind of.

1 Q. -- do you guys continue to talk to them or just -- is it just
2 before MORDI, do you talk to them more?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. How does that read into your approach coming in?

5 A. Kind of in conjunction, I guess, with Dutch weather. So you
6 get the report out there and then, you know, you're coming in, but
7 it's so -- it can change, right. So a change -- a lot of times,
8 Dutch Harbor will, you know, advise you of the change. They'll be
9 like, winds now something something, you know. They'll keep you
10 updated.

11 And I guess on that, you know, on that kind of final stretch
12 going into the runway, you might not be -- you know, maybe they'll
13 give a wind check, you know, or they'll give winds coming in, but
14 your biggest cue, your kind of last-second cue before you're going
15 to go touchdown, is looking at the water. Because the weather
16 person might not be right on the thumb, you know, telling you
17 every half second what -- how the wind's -- what the wind's doing,
18 I guess, if that makes sense.

19 Q. Yeah, yeah. And so where's your background for that, for
20 being able to read the water? Is that something part of the
21 checkout? Is it --

22 A. I guess reading, I guess -- like you mentioned, like,
23 culture, you know, flying in there with very senior people that
24 they -- that's one of the things they're always talking about or
25 always -- and really I use it anywhere now. Like anywhere I'm

1 going, I'll use the water as, like, an indicator of what's going
2 on. You know, the checkout doesn't specify, can he read the
3 water? But I think it's part of a general, you know, area -- goes
4 with that area of knowledge group that, like, he is looking at the
5 water, you know, he can -- you know.

6 Because in certain winds, on a short final, if you're looking
7 at the water, you'll see it's going to be mechanical turbulence,
8 you know. So like, are you flying slow, super slow, or, like,
9 what is he -- I guess it would go into that general knowledge
10 category for the checkout. But, no, they do not specifically ask
11 you, do you know how to read the water?

12 Q. Okay. As far as before your departure out of Anchorage, do
13 you guys -- and I might have missed it on this, so -- does PenAir
14 have a risk assessment form?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And how often does that get filled out?

17 A. Every time going to a special airport it's required, and then
18 I would have to reference the GOM, but when winds or visibility
19 are at a certain point, any airport they're required to be filled
20 out. Also, when you're a high minimums captain, you're required
21 to fill one out every flight.

22 Q. Okay. So they're not for every airport. So like Dillingham?

23 A. If the winds, the winds and the weather are at a certain
24 point -- like I said, I had to reference the GOM, but at one time
25 or another you might fill one out for Dillingham.

1 MR. YOUNG: Okay. All right. I don't have any more
2 questions.

3 MR. PFEIFER: Okay.

4 DR. SILVA: All right. Dennis.

5 BY MR. FISHER:

6 Q. Okay. I just have a few. Thinking back to your experience
7 going in and out of Dutch Harbor co-pilot, captain, different
8 types of aircraft, what is a typical alternate for Dutch Harbor?

9 A. Cold Bay.

10 Q. What's a backup for that?

11 A. Can you repeat the question?

12 Q. If you can't get to Cold Bay, but you want to go to Dutch,
13 what would you use as an --

14 A. Sand Point, Sand Point.

15 Q. All right. Let's say that's out of the way.

16 A. Bristol Bay, King Salmon, Dillingham.

17 Q. Okay. And with your experience, King Salmon or Dillingham,
18 was one preferred over the other?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Which and why?

21 A. King Salmon because it has ILS.

22 Q. Okay. So Dillingham, what would that do to your, what would
23 that do to your picture planning if you had to use that as an
24 alternate?

25 A. I'd really -- I don't like it. You know, if you're down to

1 Dillingham, you're basically looking at a VOR non-precision
2 approach. It's not -- it would make a big difference. It would,
3 as far as fuel planning and everything, because it -- it's not my
4 favorite alternate, I guess. Everything about it, you know,
5 between them, how they report the weather, which is frequently
6 off, you know.

7 So you could go to Dutch Harbor with a legal Dillingham
8 alternate, but how they report the weather in Dillingham, you
9 could get -- you could kind of get hung out to dry, and then
10 you're relying on a VOR approach. I say you're relying on a VOR
11 approach; that's the best approach that we can use to get in
12 there.

13 Q. Would you feel additional strain and stress on your decision
14 making if you had Dillingham as an alternate?

15 A. It would add to the -- it would add to my decision making for
16 sure.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. You know, one of the factors is, like, if Dutch is marginal,
19 I might not, I might not even descend. I might just go to
20 Dillingham because using Dillingham as an alternate, you're not
21 great on fuel typically either. So I'd really like the Dutch
22 weather to be good if I was going to use Dillingham as an option.

23 Q. Okay. Your limited experience with Justin, you mentioned he
24 was a solid co-pilot?

25 A. Yes. New.

1 Q. New, solid guy. Okay.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. How would you compare him to the other guys that are new?

4 A. Above average.

5 Q. Okay. In abilities or knowledge or combination?

6 A. You know, I didn't fly with him that much. I really don't
7 have much to base off of. As far as following the CFM and
8 procedure, he did that very -- he did a fine job at that. As far
9 as flying, I really didn't fly with him enough to know that.

10 Q. Sure. That's understandable. With that experience with
11 Justin, can you recall, was he a note taker; did he write things
12 down?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Did he -- what did he do with his takeoff performance
15 numbers? What did he do with his landing performance numbers?
16 Did he -- what did -- how did he --

17 A. He'd write them on the TOLD card, and then they'd go on the
18 center pedestal.

19 Q. Okay. So typically he would fill out that --

20 A. The TOLD card.

21 Q. -- card that we use, okay.

22 A. To write the numbers down, yeah.

23 Q. Have you seen -- ever seen him have a flight where he didn't
24 write that stuff down?

25 A. I couldn't tell you. I only flew with him three times, I

1 think, so --

2 Q. No, that's understandable.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. It's been mentioned the wind chart is referenced, the one
5 that we use. Is it limiting in any way for you?

6 A. No. For me personally?

7 Q. For you, yeah.

8 A. Yes, absolutely. I go by the wind chart.

9 Q. Okay. Everywhere or airport specific?

10 A. I want to say for the most part it's pretty, pretty much
11 everywhere. I try and go by that wind chart. It's pretty
12 accurate.

13 Q. Okay. That's fair. And personal limits, every pilot has
14 personal limits. Do you have any personal limits in Dutch Harbor?

15 A. As far as? Can you --

16 Q. Personal limits, what you won't do if you go there --

17 A. Oh.

18 Q. -- or what you won't get yourself into or --

19 A. Right, right. Yeah, absolutely I do.

20 Q. Okay. Can you maybe elaborate a little bit on it?

21 A. You know, if it's near the wind chart -- this is really
22 different for me obviously, Dennis, because I don't have that much
23 exposure to Dutch Harbor in the left seat, so -- and, like I said,
24 it's been fairly nice going there. But definitely I start with
25 the wind chart and then, you know, go from there for backing off

1 the wind chart.

2 Q. Okay. But you have limits?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. Do you see any limits on the wind chart being more than your
5 limits?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Which direction?

8 A. I guess I'd have to think about that.

9 Q. Okay, that's understandable. And my last question is around
10 the safety culture. You mentioned you didn't have any direct
11 issues.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Are you aware of any direct or indirect issues or anything
14 that you feel could be affecting people making decisions the way
15 they make decisions or --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And where do you see this coming from?

18 A. Can you repeat the question?

19 Q. Where do you see the issues coming from? Are they coming
20 from other pilots, other parts of the company?

21 A. Other parts of the company.

22 Q. Dispatch, management?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. To both?

25 A. No, I would say management.

1 Q. In what way?

2 A. As I said before, I've never -- I haven't quite been directly
3 affected by it, but I've heard or seen of an instance, and it
4 didn't just -- and I don't want to speak on this instance because
5 I wasn't there.

6 Q. Sure.

7 A. But what happened and the plot of what happened set -- kind
8 of somewhat set a tone for operating that before was not there, I
9 guess, if that makes sense.

10 Q. Before what?

11 A. Before the merger.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I didn't notice it before. Like I said, being a new captain,
14 maybe that's just part of, you know, being in the left seat and
15 something you deal with, however --

16 MR. FISHER: Okay. That's all I have.

17 BY DR. SILVA:

18 Q. Going back to that wind chart, and you mentioned that there
19 was a time where you had to request approval for going beyond
20 those numbers?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can you describe that time?

23 A. It was 1 knot over the wind chart going into Sand Point.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And me personally, as a captain, I did. As a co-pilot, I've

1 seen it done before.

2 Q. Okay. What did that conversation look like?

3 A. It was a call to dispatch, and they said we've already talked
4 to management; if you feel comfortable, just go.

5 Q. Was that a headwind component or do you remember?

6 A. Crosswind.

7 Q. Crosswind, okay.

8 A. I guess not a crosswind component, a -- it was a crosswind
9 but in that direction. I guess there's a certain -- I think it
10 was 25 knots, and so it was just 1 knot over that.

11 Q. Okay, got it. How does the airplane handle in crosswinds?

12 A. Very nicely. Yeah.

13 Q. Have you -- do you remember in your training, whether at sim
14 or OE, whether you've gotten any specific tailwind training or
15 landed in tailwinds, anything along those lines?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Okay. How about in operation, how often would you say you
18 end up landing in a tailwind?

19 A. How -- can you repeat the question, please?

20 Q. Yeah. Just when you're -- in your operation, you've had a
21 lot of time here.

22 A. Right.

23 Q. How often would you say that you encounter a tailwind on
24 landing?

25 A. Ten percent of the time maybe.

1 Q. Is that when you're pilot flying, monitoring, both?

2 A. Yeah. I guess -- I mean, 1 knot could be a tailwind, right?

3 Q. Uh-huh.

4 A. So, I guess, like -- you know, King Salmon's an 8,400 foot
5 runway. Our ramp's at the other end. We might operationally
6 consider a few knots to land downwind so that it's operationally
7 more appropriate. Not necessarily appropriate, I don't want to
8 use that, but --

9 Q. Efficient?

10 A. -- so you don't back-taxi rather.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Obviously we would need to make sure, with APG and the
13 performance, that it's doable. But as far as landing with a
14 tailwind, that's really one of the only instances I can think of
15 -- you know, Dillingham you wouldn't land with a tailwind. Dutch,
16 Sand Point, Kodiak, you'd never -- you really don't think about
17 even landing with a tailwind just because the runways --
18 Anchorage, you know, they always pretty much land you into the
19 wind or crosswind or some little amount of tailwind. But probably
20 Anchorage and King Salmon would be where are you operationally,
21 okay, you know, it might be -- you might do it, yes.

22 Q. Yeah. Okay.

23 A. But it's not a, it's not a practice. We're not taught.
24 There's no training to, like, hey -- you know, best-case scenario,
25 you always land an airplane into the wind.

1 Q. Right. Can you walk us through how you would conduct a short
2 field landing, let's say from 500 feet on down?

3 A. Well, at 500 feet I would definitely be stabilized. It would
4 be about ref plus 10, depending on, you know, what's going on
5 obviously. Ref plus 10, and then coming down, you know, just
6 flying it to the runway and just basically just losing your 10
7 knots, so right when you get to the runway, you're not going any
8 -- you're not going forward at all really. You're just -- you
9 know, maybe a split second just to, just to round out your descent
10 rate, but you don't want any lag on the touchdown really. And if
11 you start at 10 -- in my experience, if you start at 10 and you're
12 rolling it back from about, say, 300 feet, 500 feet, somewhere in
13 there, you just -- you really want to be touching down and not,
14 like I said, floating, I guess, anyways, you know.

15 Q. Are you shooting for a point on the runway to touchdown?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What is that?

18 A. I couldn't tell you.

19 Q. Okay. So with the short fields and the touchdown zone -- for
20 example, let's say at Dutch, you've got a shorter runway, but
21 you've got threshold markings -- you've got 1,000 foot markings.
22 Just kind of putting yourself there for a minute. What kind of --
23 not aim point, but if you were looking to touchdown there, what
24 would you go for?

25 A. No further than 1,000.

1 Q. No further than 1,000. Okay.

2 A. Yeah. That's just kind of my rule is no further than 1,000.
3 Anything after the 1,000, I wouldn't be excited about it. I guess
4 I should say I'd get excited about it if you're past the 1,000.

5 Q. Okay, fair. All right. So you touchdown at some point below
6 -- before the 1,000 foot markers, then what? What are you doing?

7 A. First thing is getting the nose on the ground, going into
8 reverse and you're braking.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And you're just -- you have to brake.

11 Q. Are you doing max brakes --

12 A. No.

13 Q. -- out there or how does that work?

14 A. No, and I should add, so -- so touchdown, nose wheel on the
15 ground, reverse, and then I brief it with the short -- with the
16 shorter runways, I'll go to the tiller.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And I'll tell the co-pilot that as we're -- as we are, you
19 know, briefing approach and landing, I'll say, hey, I'm going to
20 go to the tiller right away; be by the yoke so that whatever wind
21 correction or however -- you know, I don't want to just let the
22 yoke go and let the ailerons and the elevator do its thing. Like,
23 I want -- and then I'll go on the tiller pretty quick, yep.

24 Q. Okay. So you'd only make that transition where the co-pilot
25 would take the yoke, is that -- did you say on shorter runways?

1 A. Right, yeah.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. A bigger runway, no. I'd just wait till 80 knots. Unless
4 it's a crosswind -- you know, if you get a -- if you got a 40-knot
5 crosswind or something, you might go to the tiller before, because
6 you'll lose authority.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. In my experience.

9 Q. Okay. So then -- so would you typically do that transition
10 at 80 knots to --

11 A. On a normal?

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. Just normal runway?

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. So the co-pilot, at some point in the rollout, will
17 always get the yoke?

18 A. That's correct. That's correct.

19 Q. I mean, after any landing, right?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Okay. Just so I understand. Got it. Okay. When you're
22 doing your walk-around on the aircraft, can you run us through
23 what you're looking for when you're looking at the wheel
24 assemblies and tires?

25 A. You have to -- I want to make sure you've got -- they call

1 them wear pins, I believe there's four. And they're just an
2 indication of where your brakes are basically.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. They've got a little spring on them and they stick out like a
5 lollipop stem, I guess.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. That's what they look like. And you want to make sure that
8 it's not flush with the brake covering.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. They say, you know, like, that you only have, like -- you
11 only have to have the littlest amount or something, but if there's
12 ever any question, I just go get a mechanic and -- it's like, why
13 not just ask if you ever have any question?

14 Q. Right. Anything else you look for when you're doing that?

15 A. You know, general condition of the tire, make sure there's --
16 the strut's in place, the brake, the wear pins, the rollers on the
17 -- for the up locks, got to make sure that's free. Make sure
18 there's no leak in brake fluid; anything coming down from the
19 engine will protrude on the -- to the main gear. Just stuff like
20 that, I guess.

21 Q. Have you ever had a safety issue that you've reported to the
22 company?

23 A. No.

24 Q. No, okay. How would you do that if you did have a concern?

25 A. We have an internal safety reporting program, and you can

1 fill it out on your iPad.

2 Q. Is that anonymous?

3 A. I believe so.

4 Q. Okay. But you've never had to do it?

5 A. No. Yeah, I don't know if it's anonymous.

6 Q. Okay. That's okay.

7 A. I think the safety people know who it is but --

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. -- and then it's anonymous to everyone else, but I'm not 100
10 percent.

11 Q. Okay. Have you ever had a maintenance issue come up when
12 you're pre-flighting the aircraft?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. How was that handled? Can you give us an example what
15 you found and how it was handled?

16 A. APU won't start.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Call dispatch, dispatch will hand you over to maintenance
19 control, or they'll just put you right to the lead, and you say,
20 hey, this is the issue, can you patch me through to maintenance?

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And then they hand you down to maintenance, and then
23 maintenance will be like, okay, I'll come out, or I'll head down
24 to the gate. And then you call dispatch back, let them know,
25 like, hey, we've got a maintenance issue. Because sometimes it

1 might be a quick fix; they might be able to tell you something
2 like, oh, hey, check this or check that, and then it's fixed.

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. So then you don't need it. But if not, you need to call
5 dispatch back and say, like, hey, we're really broke --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- they're coming down to fix us. The captain will write it
8 up -- write the maintenance issue up in the discrepancy portion,
9 and then once maintenance has fixed it, they'll write a corrective
10 action. They'll draw a line under the write-up and the corrective
11 action, and now you have a legal, safe airplane again.

12 Q. Okay. Have you ever received any kind of pressure to fly
13 when you've felt like it was not safe?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Okay. In general, when it comes to the company culture -- I
16 mean, you're kind of in the midst with all the other pilots. How
17 would you say the, how would you say the overall culture is in
18 terms of pressure to fly or any kind of --

19 A. Can you repeat the question, please?

20 Q. So regarding your impression of the overall culture in the
21 company, you've mentioned that you haven't had any issues directly
22 yourself.

23 A. Right.

24 Q. But given you're in the midst of the company --

25 A. Right.

1 Q. -- and flying, what's your overall impression about the
2 safety culture and how others perceive the safety culture?

3 A. You know, I've been -- since this event that happened a while
4 ago, I guess that I told you kind of changed the culture, I guess.
5 I never really got a -- I never really asked, but I never really
6 got a good understanding, I guess, of, like, where do we stand
7 from this event, and I don't want to -- I wasn't there with this,
8 with this person when this happened a couple weeks ago. But it
9 seemed what came of that was if it's legal to go, then we should
10 be going.

11 Q. I see. So you mentioned this example when we were talking
12 about that transition from Pen to Ravn -- PenAir to Ravn.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Was there anything else that you've noticed in terms of the
15 transition, because you mentioned you didn't know whether it was
16 just --

17 A. Right.

18 Q. -- captain or whether it was transition, but --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. What are the other things, given that -- just, let's say
21 timeframe wise?

22 A. Right.

23 Q. Not necessarily reason wise.

24 A. Can you repeat the question?

25 Q. So you mentioned that you've noticed some differences about

1 the time that you transitioned to captain, which was about this
2 transition time between from PenAir to Ravn.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. And you said you noticed some changes. Aside from this event
5 that we've talked about already, were there any other changes or
6 differences you've noticed in the company?

7 A. Yeah. And I just want to clarify. The event that I'm
8 talking about was, like, 2 weeks ago.

9 Q. Oh, okay.

10 A. Not what we're here today about.

11 Q. Okay. I understand.

12 A. Okay. Just to make that clear. Like, this was 2 or 3 weeks
13 ago; I can't remember. That's what I'm talking about that changed
14 the kind of outlook culture.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. When Dennis asked me the question.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. But I was not -- I should say I was not talking about this
19 event that happened last week.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. That was a different thing. And that set the tone in my
22 opinion. One thing -- and like I said, I don't know if this is
23 transition or if this is just part of being a PIC -- the winds
24 were -- I was supposed to go to Sand Point/Cold Bay one day. I
25 went upstairs, you know, I check the weather in the morning before

1 I got to work. Went up. I'm like, man, it's windy. And went
2 upstairs -- management -- there was a management person up there
3 for some other reason, I'm not sure what -- upstairs to dispatch
4 to get a weather briefing.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And I was asked, because, like, Cold Bay/Sand Point, today
7 like, huh, Greg? And I was like, yeah. And it's like, then I was
8 asked, well, how's it looking?

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. I was like, it's pretty windy. And then the next question
11 that I was asked was, but it's legal, right? And that kind of,
12 that kind of like -- I don't know if it was just because, you
13 know, a PIC, am I -- is that -- you know, is it windy; do we just
14 go? I don't know because I'm a new captain.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. Or I don't know if it's the transition, you know. And I just
17 feel like there -- why wasn't there a discussion? You know, why
18 didn't we -- hey, how do you feel -- like, what are you thinking
19 about? Like and -- also, it's not just the fact that it's, you
20 know, the wind charts, and we're bubbling on the wind charts
21 upstairs talking about them. It's the flight that you're going to
22 take from Sand Point to Cold Bay, you know, it's that, too. It's
23 not just the destinations and the landing; it's you're crossing a
24 group of mountains and it's windy. So that -- when you're asking
25 that question, that kind of -- I guess, I saw was kind of

1 different.

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. But I don't know if that was, you know, just because I'm a
4 new PIC and we -- you know, that's how it is or the change. I
5 don't know.

6 Q. Did you feel -- let's work with that scenario. Did you feel
7 like you had a choice?

8 A. Absolutely, 100 percent.

9 Q. So what happened?

10 A. That was the day I ended up going to Sand Point and then did
11 not go to Cold Bay.

12 Q. And when you say management, are these people in your chain
13 of command that you're speaking with?

14 A. Yeah, yeah.

15 Q. Okay. Okay.

16 A. But I want to say, I 100 percent had decision to go or not
17 go.

18 Q. Right.

19 A. And I felt it was safe, so I decided to go.

20 Q. Okay. Understand. Switching completely, did you ever, did
21 you ever fly into Dutch Harbor in the simulator?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you recall what the circumstances of that scenario were?

24 A. I believe it was to practice an NDB approach.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I'm not 100 percent.

2 DR. SILVA: Okay. Okay. I am going to pause here. Do you
3 need a break? We're going to go around one more time, should be
4 quick. I think we've got -- I know you have a couple of
5 questions, but it's not going to be as intensive as the last time.

6 MR. PFEIFER: Okay.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Like a lightning round sort of.

8 DR. SILVA: Yeah.

9 MR. PFEIFER: All right.

10 BY MR. FRANTZ:

11 Q. I'm still confused about this wind chart. Is it mandatory
12 that you look at it, and if you see the winds are greater than the
13 block for that sector, you are required to call back to dispatch?
14 Is that correct?

15 A. I can't speak on that. I don't --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. I do. Every captain I've flown with, if it is, we have.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But I don't know if it's a written procedure.

20 Q. Okay. Have you ever written up or have seen anybody write up
21 or on any of your flights written up tires -- any issues with
22 tires at all that you can remember --

23 A. No.

24 Q. -- during pre-flights or write-ups?

25 A. No.

1 Q. In the sim do you remember a tire failure scenario on takeoff
2 or landing?

3 A. No.

4 Q. No. Okay.

5 A. Not that I recall.

6 Q. Okay. What does the term black water mean?

7 A. It's just -- it's either when you've got a wind coming over
8 land -- a piece of land, and you'll see it really, like, rippled
9 up, or you'll have, like, really gusty winds from kind of
10 different directions, but that's what will create that black
11 water.

12 Q. Okay. Is that a common terminology for Dutch Harbor?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is it for other places as well, or is it unique to Dutch
15 Harbor?

16 A. I've never seen it anywhere else, but Dutch Harbor's got
17 water around it. Not really.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Maybe Kodiak, but I haven't flown to Kodiak enough to know if
20 they report that.

21 Q. Where do you see yourself in 5 years?

22 A. I mean, I'd like to go to Alaska Airlines. I don't know if
23 that --

24 Q. Do you have any interest in being a check airman here or at
25 some other airline in the future?

1 A. I did, yeah.

2 Q. Are you a flight instructor?

3 A. No.

4 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Okay. Done. Thank you.

5 MR. PFEIFER: Thanks.

6 DR. SILVA: All right, Dajuan.

7 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

8 Q. Okay. Has there ever been any discussion with other crew
9 members about the use of that wind chart, how to use it, when to
10 use it, that sort of thing?

11 A. How to -- I guess it's in collaboration with the dispatch,
12 you're always kind of regarding it. How to use it, it tells you.
13 It says in the front of the book how to use it if you don't know
14 how, and then dispatch has a very good understanding of how to use
15 it as well.

16 Q. Has anybody ever questioned how to use the wind chart or came
17 to any discrepancy of how to use quadrants, what it means and
18 how's it applied to that specific airport?

19 A. Can you repeat the question?

20 Q. Yeah. Has anyone ever discussed any issues with using that
21 chart -- the wind chart -- Medallion wind chart, or understanding
22 what the quadrants mean as far as the wind is concerned, anything
23 like that?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Okay. Do you know how often that wind chart is updated or if

1 it's even updated?

2 A. I want to -- you know, I'm not 100 percent. I want to say
3 I've seen 2013 on one of the pages, but I couldn't tell you, I
4 couldn't tell you 100 percent answer.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right. That's all the questions I
6 have. Thanks, Greg.

7 MR. PFEIFER: Thank you.

8 DR. SILVA: Okay. Roger.

9 BY MR. YOUNG:

10 Q. I have just a few questions, airplane stuff. Going into
11 Dutch you said you want to be on 1,000 foot markers for that. How
12 do you determine your angle going in at Dutch?

13 A. By the VASI.

14 Q. Do they have VASIs on both ends?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. And you said you're on the brakes and reverse right
17 away. Are there -- is there more than one level of reverse? Is
18 it just reverse or is there a deep reverse? I mean, what's the
19 procedure on your short field for use of reverse initially?

20 A. The nose needs to be on the ground.

21 Q. Okay. And is there more than one level or --

22 A. I wouldn't know. I don't --

23 Q. So you just -- can you kind of describe -- do you get the
24 nose on the ground, you go into reverse? It's not how far you go
25 in reverse -- is it -- do you have to stop? Is it --

1 A. It's real -- yeah, yeah, to a stop.

2 Q. Oh, okay, okay.

3 A. Yeah. It's a real short area, and then it springs. So --

4 Q. Okay, all right. And just an explanation of the advantage of
5 going to the tiller before the 80 knots; what's the advantage of
6 being on the tiller at that speed still?

7 A. I guess I feel I have more controllability when I'm braking,
8 so that's why I do it.

9 Q. Okay, okay. You talked about going and talking to the folks
10 upstairs about the weather and stuff. Is it dispatch that's
11 upstairs?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Okay. You've been here for a few years flying. What do you
14 see for an experience level in dispatch?

15 A. Not -- new, I should say.

16 Q. Yeah. So less time than you've been around?

17 A. Yeah, there's -- I mean, I think they're all new since I've
18 been here with the exception of maybe one.

19 Q. So you got a little more experience with the weather in
20 different places, Dutch and stuff like that; is that what you're
21 saying?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Okay. All right.

24 A. Yeah.

25 MR. YOUNG: I don't have any more questions.

1 DR. SILVA: Dennis.

2 MR. FISHER: I just have one.

3 BY MR. FISHER:

4 Q. What does legal wind mean to you?

5 A. Inside the wind chart.

6 MR. FISHER: All right. Thanks.

7 DR. SILVA: Okay. Oh, yes?

8 BY MR. FRANTZ:

9 Q. Have you ever gone and missed at Dutch?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And how many times that might have happened? Both as, you
12 know, SIC or PIC with different airplanes?

13 A. Yeah. Maybe 10 times.

14 Q. Yeah. And how about going around versus missing approaches
15 and go around?

16 A. Maybe one go-around. I don't -- that I could remember.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks.

18 DR. SILVA: Okay. Anything we didn't ask you that we should
19 have?

20 MR. PFEIFER: No. No.

21 DR. SILVA: Okay.

22 MR. PFEIFER: I'm good.

23 DR. SILVA: All right. Well, if there's anything you do want
24 to add or change, feel free to reach out. You have our
25 information; you can contact us directly.

1 We really appreciate your time. We'll go off the record at
2 1:16.

3 (Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
 DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
 OCTOBER 17, 2019
 Interview of Gregory Pfeifer

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: October 25, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Cheryl Farner Donovan
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/15/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: STEVE HAKALA
Line Captain, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Thursday,
December 5, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot, Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Hakala)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Steve Hakala:		
By Mr. Frantz		6
By Dr. Silva		20
By Dr. Sevillian		32
By Mr. Fischer		35
By Mr. Wilson		38
By Mr. Frantz		39
By Dr. Silva		43
By Dr. Sevillian		47
By Mr. Wilson		49
By Mr. Frantz		51

I N T E R V I E W

(10:58 a.m.)

1
2
3 MR. FRANTZ: Marvin Frantz, operational factors investigator.
4 We'll go around the room in a minute and everybody can tell you
5 who they are. They'll tell you a little bit about what we're
6 doing today. You know, we're here as part of the investigation of
7 the PenAir and Dutch Harbor accident. And have you ever been
8 involved in an NTSB investigation before?

9 MR. HAKALA: I have not.

10 MR. FRANTZ: So I'll give you a quick rundown, very high-
11 level overview of how it works. For major investigations, and
12 that's what this is because it's 121 and it has a fatality, so
13 it'd be considered a major, we typically form groups for different
14 specialty areas, such as powerplants, systems. There might be an
15 airport group if that was considered a factor. Weather might be a
16 group if that was considered a factor. And we are the operational
17 factors/human performance group. We're kind of a combined group.
18 So we look at anything in those areas that we consider could be a
19 factor in this accident.

20 And so that's what this group is. And a group is not just
21 NTSB personnel because we don't have that wide-ranging expertise.
22 We don't know anything about Saab 2000s or Dutch Harbor or PenAir
23 manuals. So we get people that know stuff that we don't. And in
24 this case, our representative from PenAir is Brandon, because he
25 knows the Saab and he knows Dutch Harbor and he knows PenAir

1 operations. So he's our group rep to tell us about those things.

2 And then we have Tony, who -- we'll introduce him in a
3 minute, but he's from the FAA, and we always have an FAA
4 representative on the group. It's just default. But it's not
5 someone from the enforcement/certificate management side of the
6 FAA. He's representing the accident investigation side of the
7 FAA. And they're strictly here, basically, to work with us and
8 for safety issues that could be identified here that they need to
9 take back, but they're not here to -- he's not, he's not here --
10 the FAA is not part of our investigation for what most people
11 think the FAA does as far as interacting with pilots.

12 So what we do is we'll typically go around the table, and
13 everybody will have a couple questions for you. And we might go
14 around twice just for follow-ups, in case somebody has something
15 that's prompted by another previous question or something. We
16 like to tell you that you're entitled to have a representative.
17 Don't have to have one, but you're entitled to have a
18 representative, someone of your choosing, to sit with you during
19 the interview. And so just for the record, can you tell us who'd
20 you like to have as your representative?

21 MR. HAKALA: Mr. Campbell.

22 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, very good. Let's go around and we'll do
23 quick introductions, and then we'll get started on the
24 questioning.

25 MR. HAKALA: Very good.

1 MR. FRANTZ: So you know who I am.

2 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance
3 investigator with the NTSB.

4 MR. HAKALA: Nice to meet you.

5 DR. SILVA: Nice to meet you too.

6 MR. WILSON: Good morning, Steve. Brandon Wilson with
7 PenAir, check airman.

8 MR. HAKALA: Good morning, Brandon.

9 MR. FISCHER: And I'm Tony Fischer, aviation safety inspector
10 with the Denali CMO.

11 MR. HAKALA: How're you doing?

12 MR. FISCHER: Hey.

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: I'm Dujuan Sevillian, human performance
14 investigator, NTSB.

15 MR. HAKALA: Excellent. Nice to meet you.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks.

17 MR. FRANTZ: So Steve, before we get started, do you have any
18 questions of us or what the process, what we're doing today?

19 MR. HAKALA: I don't think so.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. If you need to take a break, you know, at
21 any time, just speak up and we can stop and we can take a break --

22 MR. HAKALA: Okay.

23 MR. FRANTZ: -- if you'd, if you'd like to. Okay.

24 INTERVIEW OF STEVE HAKALA

25 BY MR. FRANTZ:

1 Q. So can we start by just giving us your name with any
2 spellings we might need?

3 A. Steve Robert Hakala. H-A-K-A-L-A for the last name. Junior.

4 Q. And what's your current position at PenAir?

5 A. I am a line captain in the Saab 2000.

6 Q. Okay. How long have you been a captain in the 2000?

7 A. I was part of the initial cadre, so I think I was type rated
8 in the spring of 2016.

9 Q. Okay. Before your move to the -- or in the 2000, were you at
10 PenAir prior to that?

11 A. Yes, I've been here a little over 28 years and flown all of
12 their equipment, everything from Cherokee Sixes, 180s, Navajos,
13 Caravans, Saabs 340s, Metroliners, Conquests, Islanders, Grumman
14 Goose.

15 Q. Wow. So when you came to the 2000, did you come in as a
16 captain?

17 A. I did. I came from the left seat of the Saab 340 to the left
18 seat of the Saab 2000.

19 Q. Okay. How many hours, roughly, do you have in total?

20 A. Total time? Just over 30,000 hours.

21 Q. And how many do you think you have in the 2000?

22 A. In the last 3 years, a couple thousand.

23 Q. Bear with me while I find my question list.

24 A. No problem.

25 Q. Were you -- have you ever had any other positions at PenAir

1 besides captain? FO?

2 A. I've been an FO, captain. I was check airman.

3 Q. And when -- line check airman?

4 A. Line check airman.

5 Q. And when were you -- when'd you do that?

6 A. I did that up until August of this year.

7 Q. And why are you not a line check airman now?

8 A. There was three of us prior. Two other senior guys left to
9 Alaska Airlines. I was the only check airman, and so I was busy
10 doing OE a lot. And I was getting worn out and burnt out, and
11 there was some policy changes that I just wasn't -- I didn't agree
12 with, so I opted to back out.

13 Q. Were these changes -- did they come about as part of the
14 merger or acquisition by Ravn?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. So can you give us, like, an example of something you
17 didn't agree with that you thought --

18 A. Well, PenAir always had a, had a policy of, you know, taking
19 -- there was no pressure to these special airports, to -- not that
20 I felt pressure afterwards, but just the policy changes and
21 getting rid of our -- you know, the proficiency stuff. I just
22 didn't like the way things were going and didn't want to be a part
23 of that. So they were trying to implement the getting rid of the
24 -- what we thought was adequate time and proficiency in the
25 aircraft before signing off certain people to these special

1 airports, and I didn't agree with that.

2 Q. Are you talking about the 300-hour PIC rule?

3 A. 300, 100 hour. Yeah. You know, now that's not necessarily a
4 bad thing. In today's world, it is -- when I was check airman
5 many years ago -- not even that many years ago. 4 or 5 years ago,
6 I flew with a copilot for 2 or 3 years, and we would go in and out
7 of Dutch Harbor hundreds of times. As a check airman, I can let
8 them, if I choose, to land in Dutch Harbor. So as I get to know
9 these first officers and their skill level, I can start letting
10 them land there so that, by the time they do become a captain,
11 they've already landed there a hundred times. And so that makes
12 my job as a check airman when they get to the left seat a much
13 quicker process. So there's no -- so that 100 hours thing, I do
14 agree with that in certain circumstances. I would sign people off
15 prior to that. But I had known them prior for a couple of years
16 and knew how they could fly and their skill level.

17 Q. Did you ever -- how long were you a check airman? Sorry, I
18 might have missed that. How many --

19 A. Oh, I've been a check airman for 20 years.

20 Q. Okay. So have you ever -- so I assume you've signed off
21 people, you qualified PICs for special airports?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. For Dutch Harbor?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Have you ever done it for anyone that was sub-300 PIC in type

1 --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- or in the airplane?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Have you done that here?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In the 2000?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. How many people have you -- would you say you've done that
10 here?

11 A. One.

12 Q. Okay. And who was that?

13 A. That was -- I believe I was the one that signed -- yes, I
14 was. Greg Pfeiffer.

15 Q. Okay. So he had less -- did he utilize the prescribed waiver
16 process to --

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. -- be signed off?

19 A. Correct. There's a form that I sign that basically I vouch
20 for him to say that I think his skill level is up to par to be
21 qualified at that special airport.

22 Q. And did he have previous time in the, in the right seat of
23 the 2000 --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- that led you to have confidence in --

1 A. Yes. And the 340 as well.

2 Q. And the 340. So you qualified him for special airport.

3 A. I did.

4 Q. Let's stick to Dutch Harbor. Was it Dutch Harbor?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Yeah, okay. You did the flight with him. And do you know
7 how many hours he had PIC in the 2000 when he --

8 A. I couldn't tell you. He was not high mins anymore, so
9 meaning he probably had over 100 hours. Oh, he had to have had
10 over 100 hours. Yeah.

11 Q. Is that something you would have checked? Is that a check
12 airman responsibility to verify that the person has the hours?

13 A. I can vouch for myself that I would verify that they had over
14 the 100 hours. Yeah.

15 Q. Is that a requirement, though? Do you know if that's a
16 company procedure that's --

17 A. It was.

18 Q. -- up to you, or are you just signing saying I flew with him
19 to this airport and he's okay? And I don't --

20 A. I don't believe there's a form that says, you know, I have
21 checked that he's got over 100 hours in the left seat. I don't
22 believe that. Not that I'm aware of.

23 Q. Okay. But in this case, you --

24 A. I personally would check SkedFlex and his total times and
25 verify.

1 Q. And so -- and that was the only case that you signed someone
2 and --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Were you ever asked to sign somebody off sub-300 prior to the
5 -- or any other time?

6 A. Sure. Sure.

7 Q. And who asked? Was it management that was --

8 A. Management asked if I would -- when I would come back from
9 Dutch Harbor after a trip, are you going to sign he or she off?
10 And I would say no. Or yes.

11 Q. Were these sub-300-hour PICs --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- that they would ask about?

14 A. Yes. Only in one circumstance that I can recall?

15 Q. Okay. And do you know who that was?

16 A. The pilot or the --

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. John White was his name. He's not with us anymore. I flew
19 to Dutch Harbor with him two or three times and didn't sign him
20 off. I wasn't, I wasn't comfortable with it.

21 Q. Did you know if -- had you been informed as a check airman
22 that he was in the special airport qualification process and they
23 wanted you to fly, to fly the qualification flight and sign him
24 off?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. But he had less than 300 as far as -- is that your
2 recollection?

3 A. Not sure of that.

4 Q. Okay, okay. Did you ever fly with Paul Wells?

5 A. I did one flight with Paul from King Salmon to Anchorage. I
6 was his copilot for his observed ride with the FAA. I flew with
7 another captain out to King Salmon. They swapped seats and flew
8 with Paul Wells back to Anchorage.

9 Q. Okay. They flew back with him.

10 A. I'm sorry?

11 Q. Which seat -- you were --

12 A. I was the copilot.

13 Q. The observed ride was going or coming back?

14 A. With Paul, was coming back from King Salmon to Anchorage.

15 Q. King Salmon. Okay. Okay. So you were the, you were the
16 check airman/FO on that flight --

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. -- with Paul. Okay.

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. How'd the observed flight go?

21 A. It was a nonevent. I don't recall anything out of the
22 ordinary. You know, it's a, it's a 53-minute flight. We don't
23 have much time to -- he did everything up to par and to training
24 that I could tell.

25 Q. Was that his final OE flight?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did you sign off his OE --

3 A. No.

4 Q. -- paperwork?

5 A. No, no. I signed off his check ride form for his observed
6 ride.

7 Q. Okay. Have you ever felt -- when you were a check airman,
8 was there ever any pressure to try to get people qualified for
9 special airports earlier than 300 or as soon as possible or --

10 A. I don't know that it would be pressure. You know, I was
11 asked, are you going to sign him off? You know, there was no
12 pressure, you know, you need to sign him off after this trip. You
13 know, they would, they would meet me at the door after a flight
14 and say, are you going to sign him off? And I would say no. So I
15 would say that it wouldn't necessarily classify as pressure. But
16 there was obviously a need for us to get more pilots qualified for
17 special airports because of the current hiring situation in the
18 airline industry, as you guys are aware of.

19 Q. So somebody's meeting you at the door after a flight and
20 saying -- as soon as you walk in from the ramp and they're saying,
21 did you sign him off? It sounds like there's a level of interest
22 --

23 A. Sure. I would say --

24 Q. -- higher up in the company about let's get -- so besides
25 that, did you ever -- anybody ever talk to you, or any indications

1 that, you know, we got to get this moving, you got to -- we got to
2 get more people signed off?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Let's get this going?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Nothing like that?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. So tell me about Dutch Harbor. What's special about
9 it? What are some -- what are the top four or five considerations
10 you would tell me if I was a new FO flying in there with you.
11 What should I be aware of?

12 A. I would say short runway. The approach, you have to proceed
13 visually from 3 miles out, so knowing the terrain is very
14 important. You get a lot of wind and a lot of mechanical
15 turbulence. As my father said, it's the birthplace of the winds
16 out there. So that is -- experience out there is very important.
17 Knowing how to read water makes a big factor in your ability to go
18 in and out of Dutch Harbor safely on a day-to-day basis.

19 Q. Okay. Is there a preferred approach of the two runways?
20 Assuming wind is not a factor, would you choose one over the
21 other?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Both equally easy or difficult in VFR conditions, would you
24 say?

25 A. Correct. Yeah.

1 Q. Yeah, okay. How about -- how would you characterize the
2 difficulty of this scenario? You go in on 1-3, you miss -- not
3 miss. You go around. You're VFR, visual conditions. You go
4 around 1-3, and now you determine you'd probably better land on 3-
5 1. So how -- what's the best way you would do that, and how hard
6 is that going to be to come back for 3-1?

7 A. I've done it. It's not difficult. You have several options.
8 You're looking at the weather when you're coming in there, so you
9 always have more than one way out. So when you're going in the
10 front door to 1-3, as you're talking about, you're looking at the
11 back door to make sure that that is one way to egress out.
12 Another way is right turn, over town and back out. So you want to
13 have multiple ways. You never commit yourself with no multiple --
14 more than one way to get out. And you would simply -- depending
15 on winds, you would go down the runway, out the back door, proceed
16 back in from the north to the back door, if you were going to
17 switch runways as you said.

18 Q. Okay. And you've done that.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. More than once --

21 A. Oh, yeah.

22 Q. -- I'm sure. Okay. And not a high challenge or high
23 workload or difficult procedure if you're VFR?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Yeah, okay. Even in the -- how is it in the -- doing that in

1 the 2000 versus in, say, the 340?

2 A. As I mentioned before, I've flown probably over the last
3 almost 30 years, probably about 13, 14 different types of
4 aircraft. And the Saab 2000 is by far the nicest plane that I've
5 gone in and out of Dutch Harbor in as far as power to weight,
6 braking. It's a great airplane. In my opinion.

7 Q. Okay, so is it equally well-suited to the special environment
8 of Dutch Harbor as the 340?

9 A. I would say yes. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Once you get some experience in it.

12 Q. Right. Yeah. On a typical flight now, as just a -- or as
13 your captain duties now, when you come into Dutch Harbor, can you
14 describe your process for briefing and for determining, you know,
15 getting the weather and determining if you're going to be okay for
16 landing performance when you, when you head in? What's the
17 process that accomplishes all that as you're heading in?

18 A. The process is I've -- in the morning when I get up, I flight
19 plan it before I even come to work. When I go to see -- talk to
20 dispatch, I do that so that if they say something, that might
21 throw a red flag to me that I can already know what's going on.
22 They have a release for us that has planned and max takeoff and
23 landing weights that we use based on whatever in the bottom says:
24 flaps 35, zero wind. And so when we're -- I can get Dutch Weather
25 at 30,000 feet. I've gotten them as far as 90 miles north of

1 MORDI. And we can get the weather and make sure that that -- from
2 the time you leave here to the time you get to Dutch Harbor, the
3 weather could change five times. And the forecast means nothing.

4 So we will just plan. If it's still the same, we'll stick
5 with plan A, flaps 35, and brief the approach, everything that we
6 might encounter on the approach. We are also double-checking that
7 the numbers are correct, the weights are correct, the CG is
8 correct through the APG numbers.

9 Q. Your plan, the information you have on your dispatch,
10 planner's paperwork --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- I understand is -- gives you information assuming you're
13 going to do a flaps 35; is that correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. So what would cause you to say, maybe I want to do 20 today?

16 A. For me personally would be the northeast through easterly
17 winds that we can get down in Dutch Harbor. North through east.
18 About 350 to about 090. Creates a lot of mechanical turbulence
19 over the airport. And I have found in my experience that flaps
20 35, in those conditions, makes it more challenging. You have
21 these big flaps hanging out, and the mechanical turbulence jostles
22 the airplane around more. But you would only do that if you
23 had -- if the APG had said you could. You look in the 20 flap alt
24 CG 1 or 2 or not or normal category, and you would see if you're
25 required -- if your landing weight was going to be below that

1 number.

2 Q. And what if it's not?

3 A. Well, then you can't do it.

4 Q. Are you talking about the airport analysis charts? That's
5 what you're looking at, and looking at the max landing weight for
6 a particular flap setting.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And so if your landing weight is not below what that number
9 is for flaps 20, you wouldn't plan on doing a flaps 20.

10 A. No. Yeah, so you have your -- you can take your headwind
11 component in there and you can raise that number up a little bit
12 for a 20 flap configuration.

13 Q. Okay. So there's the 300-hour PIC. Has that been in place
14 for special airports as far as you can remember at PenAir? Do you
15 know when that actually came in?

16 A. I don't recall that. It never really was a factor. It was
17 just, a lot of it was we were taking very experienced people from
18 the left seat of the 340 and going to the left seat of the 2000,
19 or from the right seat of the 340 to the left seat of the 340. So
20 you didn't really have the time and type, the 300 hours and type.
21 The 100-hour PIC time, it seems like we had so many other routes
22 that they -- at that time, we didn't -- we had a lot more routes
23 and they would go get their -- they'd have over 100 hours doing
24 other things before they came to us for a special airport
25 checkout. We had plenty of senior pilots doing the special

1 airport, so there was never a need.

2 Q. When you've done the special airport checkouts as a check
3 airman, what's -- let's talk about just Dutch Harbor. What's the
4 average number of flights typically required before you sign -- to
5 Dutch Harbor before you sign somebody off and say, yeah, they're
6 proficient and they're safe at this airport?

7 A. I don't think I could come up with a number. It would be to
8 proficiency in my book. You would, you know, you would want to
9 see a 1-3 landing each direction and over town, different things.
10 It was never -- it was usually a -- I don't want to say -- I won't
11 really have a date, but you know, a week or two of flying with
12 someone to Dutch -- this is somebody that was qualified to Dutch
13 Harbor. Yeah.

14 Q. Before you would sign them off as special airport.

15 A. Yes. And not only that, we had multiple check airmen, and we
16 were getting -- multiple people were flying -- at least two were
17 flying with that person. It wasn't just one. And if we did do
18 one, then we always had another set of eyes at the end fly with
19 that person, he or she.

20 Q. Okay.

21 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Steve. I'm going to take a break
22 and see if anyone else has any questions. So I'll give it to
23 Sathya next.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay.

25 BY DR. SILVA:

1 Q. Going back to that mechanical turbulence coming into Dutch
2 Harbor, what were the wind directions that you mentioned?

3 A. About 350 to about 090. Basically it's Ballyhoo Mountain,
4 and the winds come over the top of that 1600-foot mountain there.
5 It just creates a lot of turbulence, but that runway is tucked
6 right up next to it.

7 Q. Okay. We're going to jump around here just a little bit --

8 A. Sure.

9 Q. -- to follow up. But that time where you had people meeting
10 you at the door with questions about whether you would -- someone
11 was ready to get signed off, what -- when was that?

12 A. That would have been in the end of July, early August of this
13 year. Yeah.

14 Q. Had that kind of condition ever occurred before?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay. Who was, who was asking?

17 A. Our chief pilot.

18 Q. And from your understanding, what was -- why was there the
19 interest in getting them signed off?

20 A. To have more crews available to go to all of our
21 destinations.

22 Q. Okay. So you mentioned a pilot shortage. Do you feel like
23 that was part of the reason to get people qualified?

24 A. I would hate to speculate on a pilot shortage, but I would
25 say that the lack of qualified people to our special airports,

1 there was a need to get more people qualified.

2 Q. Okay. So you mentioned that there was discussion about
3 changing the qualifications for special airports. When was that
4 discussion happening?

5 A. Early summer. Late May, early June.

6 Q. Okay. So what was your understanding of that, the proposed
7 change?

8 A. My understanding was where they wanted to get rid of the
9 PenAir -- the way we used to do it, and they have implemented
10 their own way of -- basically 100 hours, if a check airman will
11 vouch for them, kind of a deal to sign them off.

12 Q. Okay. So essentially reducing that 300 hours to 100 hours?

13 A. Correct. Correct.

14 Q. And what were your thoughts on that?

15 A. I resigned as check airman.

16 Q. What concerns did you have with the change? Oppose the
17 change?

18 A. My concerns were that we -- that pilots weren't going to get
19 the training that they needed to go to those airports, and that I
20 didn't want to be any part of that.

21 Q. So in terms of the requirements as they, as they are in terms
22 of PenAir, do you wait until the 300 hours to begin the training
23 and do the signoff?

24 A. You know -- before? You're saying before?

25 Q. Yeah. Before.

1 A. It was 300 hours, yes. And more if needed. So we like that
2 300 hours as check airmen because first officers are our best
3 friends, because we hear, he or she, really good; you should check
4 them out in Dutch Harbor. Or we're having -- you know, I'm having
5 some issues with so-and-so, flying with them. And not just from
6 one person. You know, you take it all in. And then we might
7 elect to have them fly another 100 hours until maybe we start
8 hearing the chatter that now they've -- they're good. So it was
9 not only for the person in the, in the left seat, but it was also
10 for us to make a decision whether we even wanted to start training
11 with them or not. It wasn't necessarily me, but through us and
12 through management. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. So in your experience, had you ever seen someone start
14 training for special airports during IOE?

15 A. Had I -- prior or -- could you, could you --

16 Q. Yeah, prior, prior. Let's say before the change in
17 management here.

18 A. I don't believe so, but I could be wrong. You know, as
19 initial cadre, I go back to -- we came out. We had -- we're like,
20 we're the first people. So there was a half a dozen of us, so I
21 guess I would say, yes, I have seen it, but not since the initial
22 cadre.

23 Q. Okay. So to rephrase it -- again, just so I'm understanding,
24 they're -- it's not, it's not typical for a special airport to be
25 part of a pilot's IOE.

1 A. Not typically, but also you have to realize the Saab 2000 was
2 primarily used for Dutch Harbor. So that's a good tool for
3 training, with the check airman in the right seat doing IOE. It's
4 not the ideal circumstance. We'd like to go do some King Salmons
5 and some Dillinghams prior to going to Dutch Harbor. But we did
6 do Dutch Harbors with me in the right seat during OE. Yes, we
7 did.

8 Q. Okay. Had you ever written a letter of recommendation for
9 someone to get that qualification prior to 300 hours or get the --
10 yeah, go ahead.

11 A. Yes, once. And that was Greg Pfeiffer.

12 Q. And that was Greg. So you -- what did that letter look like?

13 A. I believe it's just a form that we have. And it was --
14 there's a signature spot at the bottom that we submit -- sign it
15 and give it to the chief pilot.

16 Q. So from your understanding, that form -- that signature on
17 the form is your letter of recommendation.

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Okay. Okay. So you mentioned that you had concerns about
20 changing the qualifications for Dutch Harbor. Did you voice those
21 concerns?

22 A. To management?

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. No.

25 Q. Was there a reason you didn't?

1 A. I would say the reason was -- you know, the tone was a little
2 bit settled, but just around -- like, almost like I was a threat.
3 Not meaning me. The senior crews were a little bit of a threat.
4 Nothing was said. It was just a tone that no one came to me and
5 said, hey, what should we do? Help us with this transition. No
6 one came -- almost like I was kind of being shunned away. So I
7 kind of -- I didn't fear for my job, but I just didn't want to
8 make any waves.

9 Q. How did you hear about the potential change in requirements?

10 A. There was no meeting. There was -- it was just -- I guess it
11 would be on the line. No one, no one sat down with me and said,
12 here's what we're thinking; what are your thoughts? This -- yeah.

13 Q. How was it working with Crystal?

14 A. Again, I'll go back to -- just felt like I might have been a
15 threat to her. And so I didn't really have a relationship with
16 her, which I regret.

17 Q. Do you feel like she was approachable as a chief pilot?

18 A. No. On her defense, she was a very busy person, but I did
19 not think she was very approachable.

20 Q. When you say she was busy, do you know what she was busy
21 with?

22 A. No idea.

23 Q. So what gave you the impression that she was busy?

24 A. Not really making time for us.

25 Q. What would you have expected?

1 A. I would have expected -- I can only give what I would have
2 done.

3 Q. Sure.

4 A. If I was the new chief pilot at an, at an airline that had
5 been operating for 60 years, 70 years, I would have walked in and
6 got all the senior people, lined them all up, put them in one
7 room, and said, help. What are my immediate threats? What do I
8 need to watch out for? How can we make this transition smoother?

9 Q. Were you here when Ben started as chief pilot?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. How was his style compared to Crystal's?

12 A. You know, I've known Ben for so many years, it seemed like it
13 was an easy transition to him being chief pilot. I don't have
14 anything notable to say as far as, gee whiz, he did awesome stuff
15 and then he was easy to get along with and was approachable. And
16 if I had a problem, I didn't have any problem going into his
17 office and talking to him about it.

18 Q. Did you talk to anybody about not feeling comfortable going
19 to Crystal?

20 A. No. My wife, maybe. Yeah.

21 Q. Did you feel like there was a method to do that? Like, was
22 there a fix for that?

23 A. Well, no. And I can only say that one of -- I got to back
24 up. Another reason why I felt -- and it was when I resigned from
25 check airman. She wasn't very happy with that decision. And so

1 that kind of really shut me back.

2 Q. What was her response?

3 A. Her response was, what if I say no? I'm going to make you
4 work a lot. It's going to be a pay cut. And so on my drive home,
5 I told my wife I almost got fired.

6 Q. Okay. Because that was my next question. Did you interpret
7 that as a threat?

8 A. I did. I personally interpreted it as a threat. Yeah.

9 Q. Do you have any interaction with Deke Abbott?

10 A. I've never met him.

11 Q. Okay. Do you have an idea of what his presence was here?

12 A. I hate to speculate. I don't. I don't.

13 Q. Have you -- okay, we were talking about going back to the go-
14 arounds at Dutch Harbor. Have you done a go-around and
15 essentially come back around visually for an approach on the same
16 runway?

17 A. No. Not to my -- I mean, in 28 years I've been flying down
18 there. Not to my knowledge.

19 Q. Not. Okay.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Any idea why that just hasn't come up?

22 A. I'll take that back. Thinking back, I have done an approach
23 to the same runway and gone around -- and landed on the same
24 runway. Yeah.

25 Q. Visually?

1 A. Visually.

2 Q. Do you remember how you conducted that go-around and return?

3 A. Yeah. That was a landing on Runway 3-1 with those northeast
4 winds that I was talking about. Just a lot of -- and you got to
5 understand, those winds come in gusts. So it's all about timing
6 down there. If you time it wrong, it's not very pleasant. So
7 you're constantly listening to Dutch Weather. They're giving you
8 updates as they're seeing the changes. So I've done it. You just
9 visually proceed back around out to the north, reenter the traffic
10 pattern for the back door for -- I keep saying 3-0 because that's
11 the old runway.

12 Q. Magnetic deviation.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Yeah. Okay. So okay. So you go back up to the north.

15 A. I've also done missed approaches and gone home. Yeah.

16 Q. So on the, on the go-around, though, and this traffic pattern
17 or departure to the north and reentry, how long would you say that
18 process takes from the go-around to coming back to land? In the
19 Saab 2000.

20 A. 5 minutes? You need to go out. You need to get
21 reconfigured. You need to regroup, rebrief on any potential
22 changes. So I would say 5 minutes. It's not just --

23 Q. It's not --

24 A. -- hot lap back around and back in on the runway. For me,
25 anyway.

1 Q. Would you say that that's about the same amount of time you
2 would -- it would take to do a runway switch visually?

3 A. Yes. If you're visually, yes.

4 Q. Yeah. Is there any, is there any training that you got or
5 even gave regarding doing go-around in a traffic pattern to come
6 back and land?

7 A. Only if it happened. You know, we brief it. So it would
8 only be -- I don't recall, when I was a check airman, of ever --
9 we've missed approach, IFR. But I don't recall ever going in
10 there visually and going around as a check airman, mainly because
11 we would have never left Anchorage if the conditions were going to
12 be that bad with an OE or a, or a special airport candidate in the
13 left seat.

14 Q. Okay. What about on other runways, not limited to Dutch
15 Harbor?

16 A. Go-arounds?

17 Q. Yeah, a go-around with a --

18 A. With a --

19 Q. -- with a lap around the pattern.

20 A. With an, with an OE?

21 Q. Anyone. Like, what kind of exposure would somebody get?

22 A. The only exposure we would get would be what happened to us
23 on the line. You know, in sim, we train for all of that in the
24 simulator. You know, you're doing missed approaches and balked
25 landings and things like that. As far as actually doing a go-

1 around, we're trained for it. We brief for it. Hopefully it
2 doesn't happen.

3 Q. Right. So you mentioned that you do, you do balked landings
4 in the sim. And how do those end, those scenarios end?

5 A. Typically by a go-around and back to IFR, missed approach
6 into another approach.

7 Q. Okay. So would you ever see a scenario where you would go
8 around and do a visual VFR traffic pattern back in?

9 A. Only if you were on an approach that was visual from -- like,
10 the Dutch Harbor approaches are visual from a DME. You know, on
11 any of the other approaches, you have to execute the published
12 missed approach, so you would never reenter a traffic pattern. So
13 only on a visual approach or a potential VFR-to-VFR approach.

14 Q. Okay, how --

15 A. IFR-to-VFR approach. Excuse me.

16 Q. Right. So what I'm hearing is it's not terribly common to be
17 experiencing that kind of scenario.

18 A. I would say it's not uncommon, but it doesn't happen very
19 often.

20 Q. Okay, I'm just trying to get a feel for -- you know, there's
21 some solid performance on the Saab 2000 in doing a visual traffic
22 pattern. I'm just trying to get a feel for what kind of
23 experience you would get coming back, doing a visual traffic
24 pattern and coming back to land. Because that seems like it would
25 happen very fast.

1 A. Yeah. You're not talking about a training scenario. You're
2 just talking about in general.

3 Q. Well, in -- either in training also.

4 A. I can only speak for myself. I typically don't get myself
5 into those situations. So over the last 28 years, I bet you I've
6 made -- I'll speculate 10 go-arounds VFR over the runway. I've
7 done IFR missed approaches many times down there, but getting in
8 there, bad wind conditions, over the 28 years, let's just say 10,
9 12 times that I've had to go around for some reason or the other.
10 I've had vehicles on the runway. I've had rocks on the runway
11 from the big swells that push the rocks up on the runway,
12 turbulence, things like that.

13 Q. Okay. What's the fatigue policy here?

14 A. If I were just -- we adhere to 117 rules through our
15 SkedFlex, and they seem to schedule us within those parameters. I
16 have not heard -- I've heard of people calling out fatigued, and I
17 never heard of any backlash on it at all.

18 Q. Have you ever called out fatigue?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Do you know what happens if you do call out fatigue? Do you
21 have to make those hours up? Do you have to make the time up?

22 A. We do not have to make the hours up. We just have to fill
23 out a fatigue report, which helps them to figure out why. Yeah.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all I had.

25 MR. HAKALA: Thanks.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Sathya. Dujuan? Any questions?

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes. Yes.

3 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

4 Q. Steve, so the -- you'd mentioned John White earlier.

5 A. I did.

6 Q. You weren't comfortable with signing him off --

7 A. No.

8 Q. -- at the time? Why was that?

9 A. I just had -- as I said earlier, that I like to train to
10 proficiency, and I will not sign anybody off that is not
11 proficient and that I feel comfortable to have my signature on
12 that form. And I also will say that John was not comfortable
13 either. Neither one of us were comfortable with the signoff.

14 Q. So is the process that -- just considering the airport
15 qualification, the check airman has to feel confident.

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And the pilot has to also feel confident.

18 A. Of course.

19 Q. And is that stated anywhere in the airport qualification
20 requirement?

21 A. Not that I'm aware of.

22 Q. Okay. And with the signoff, so from a check airman's
23 standpoint, is it a structured process? What I mean by that is,
24 is there a checklist that check airmen use to evaluate each
25 potential --

1 A. On the back of our OE form, there's a checklist that we go
2 down, and we discuss and talk about and do all of those items. So
3 we have to have all of those items checked off before -- for sure
4 before we would ever sign them off, as well as he or she and
5 myself being comfortable with them at the special airport.

6 Q. Okay. And you also mentioned that there was -- the chief
7 pilot, you would meet the chief pilot and talk with her. This is
8 Crystal?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. About, you know, if you sign someone off or not for the
11 airport qualification. Was that just a discussion? Was it
12 inside? Is it in an office? Was it just outside?

13 A. Whether I was going to sign he or she off? I was met at the
14 door of the pilot -- which is across from her office. There's
15 that pilot room downstairs. And when we would walk in the hangar
16 door and into that pilot office, she would meet us there and ask
17 us if I was going to sign he or she off.

18 Q. Did you ever at any time feel rushed about making a decision
19 to sign pilots off?

20 A. I was asked if I would sign them -- if I was going to sign
21 them off, not that I should sign them off. So I would say no.

22 Q. Okay. As far as the -- as pilots reporting safety concerns
23 here at PenAir, what's that process look at, if a pilot has a
24 safety concern?

25 A. Well, a WBAT, we would certainly get on the computer and fill

1 out that. That would be your electronic filing, getting something
2 on the, on the file. And then I would go to the chief pilot if I
3 had a safety concern.

4 Q. Have you ever had any safety concerns?

5 A. Other than what we've just talked about and resigning from
6 check airman, no. No.

7 Q. And then when you had that safety concern, did you talk to
8 the chief pilot?

9 A. On?

10 Q. On that concern that you had?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Okay. Are there any other pilots that you know of that
13 submit safety reports?

14 A. You know, it's kind of an anonymous type thing. I know
15 people do. I couldn't tell you -- I don't know. But yes, they
16 do.

17 Q. And is that, is that sort of an open policy where a pilot can
18 go in and submit a report and then -- or go to the chief pilot and
19 talk? Did you feel that you could do that as line check airman?

20 A. With the new chief pilot? I did not. After my conversation
21 with her about resigning from check airman. Prior to that, I
22 didn't have a problem. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. Are you in any way involved in the merger between
24 PenAir and Ravn Air?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Okay.

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, that's all the questions I have.

3 Thanks.

4 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Dajuan.

5 Tony?

6 BY MR. FISCHER:

7 Q. Yeah, I got a few things you can clear up for me, Steve.

8 A. Sure.

9 Q. And I got the mic on. There we go.

10 So the braking action report out of Dutch Harbor. And you
11 know, it's the RCAM system now?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Has it been reliable?

14 A. I can tell you that Dutch Harbor is, in my experience, one of
15 the best stations we go to as far as runway reports and braking
16 action. They keep that runway clean. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay, so it's usually consistently --

18 A. Good.

19 Q. Good?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Gives a 5 rating?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Yeah. You know, obviously it's well-known that the weather
24 changes there a lot. But the runway condition, does the runway
25 condition change quite a bit, like, say, go from a 5 to a 3 or a

1 dry to --

2 A. I would say because of its climate down there, that it's less
3 than -- it changes less than the other runways we go to up north
4 because of the mild temperatures down there. You know, Dillingham
5 is by far worse. Yeah.

6 Q. Yeah. No, I would agree.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. Shifting gears a little bit, you're doing an approach
9 to 1-3, okay? Visual approach to 1-3. Normally, where do you
10 touch down at?

11 A. Prior to the 1,000-foot marker.

12 Q. Prior to the 1,000 --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Well prior to the 1,000-foot marker?

15 A. Not well prior.

16 Q. Not well prior?

17 A. Yeah. Just on glide slope, you know, on down.

18 Q. All right. All right, shifting gears again, the -- you're
19 maneuvering for a visual approach to 1-3, and you do a -- you're
20 approaching the approach hand, and you decide it's not working
21 out. And you said this doesn't happen very much to you, or it
22 hasn't happened. Would you be more inclined to circle Ballyhoo,
23 or make a right turn and right traffic again? Or not right
24 traffic, but a right turn.

25 A. So you're going into 1-3?

1 Q. Yeah.

2 A. And make a right turn -- no, I prefer to have the back door
3 open --

4 Q. At the back --

5 A. -- and proceed out the back door. That's a, that's a tight
6 turn in there.

7 Q. Okay. But then you'd have to circle Ballyhoo to come back
8 in.

9 A. Correct. Correct. And it gives you more time. You're in
10 those confined spaces in there. It's nice to go out to the north.
11 You have an egress, and you have more time to regroup. Yeah.

12 Q. All right.

13 A. And back to that landing thing, I give myself a 1-1,000, 2-
14 1,000 for a smooth landing and then that's it. Yeah.

15 Q. You don't, you don't float at all.

16 A. Don't mess around.

17 Q. Okay. How about crew pairings? You know, you have a captain
18 just signed off for a special airport, no matter what his hours
19 are. Is there any consideration given to crew pairings here at
20 PenAir?

21 A. There had been. There has been. I don't see the crew
22 pairing thing very often because I'm a senior guy. I fly with
23 senior FOs typically, unless I'm doing training. But in my
24 history with PenAir, there has always been consideration on
25 pairing.

1 Q. Okay. The situation as I understand it, you know, both
2 pilots had under 150 hours in the airplane. That would be
3 uncommon, wouldn't it?

4 A. Very.

5 Q. Okay. That's unusual.

6 A. Very unusual.

7 Q. Okay.

8 MR. FISCHER: Okay, well, that's all I got.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Tony. Brandon, you have any questions?

10 BY MR. WILSON:

11 Q. I just kind of am curious. When you were telling us about
12 Crystal meeting you and asking you to sign someone off, was that
13 Pfeiffer, or was that somebody else?

14 A. That was John White.

15 Q. That was John White?

16 A. Yeah. And it -- I think I -- I would have to look at
17 SkedFlex, but I believe I did two or three flights to Dutch Harbor
18 with him. And on each occasion, I was met and asked if I was
19 going to sign him off. Not implying that she was trying to make
20 me, but was asking, I think, if I was going to sign him off so
21 that she could go to SOC and approve another line pilot for
22 special airport Dutch Harbor. I didn't feel pressured. She was
23 simply meeting me at the door to ask if I was going to sign him
24 off.

25 Q. Was that for the 340 or the 2000?

1 A. That was for the 2000.

2 Q. Okay.

3 MR. WILSON: That's all I got.

4 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Brandon. So we'll go around one
5 more time, see if anybody has any follow-ups. We talked about
6 when you told her -- are you doing okay? Do you want to take a
7 break?

8 MR. HAKALA: No, I'm good.

9 MR. FRANTZ: You want some ice water?

10 MR. HAKALA: I'm good.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Because we don't have any ice water. It's a
12 good thing you don't want any.

13 BY MR. FRANTZ:

14 Q. Did you -- when you, when you were going to resign or when
15 you did resign as check airman -- and I'm going to characterize it
16 as an overt threat. You may not, but she -- Crystal talked to you
17 about you're going to take less money, you're going to get more
18 flying.

19 A. That was the words. And then immediately after that, she
20 became really nice. I think she realized what she had said and
21 changed her tone. So I will add that.

22 Q. Did you get any feeling of any similar pressure from anybody
23 else other than Crystal when you --

24 A. Never.

25 Q. -- said, I'm going to -- I'm out of here as far as check

1 airman goes?

2 A. No. No. I just had some people voice their concerns because
3 they wanted me to stay because of my experience level.

4 Q. Sure. Okay. What did you think of the -- you know, you've
5 been through lots of different training programs, even in 121 and
6 simulators. What did you think of the SIMCOM Saab 2000 program,
7 training program?

8 A. We had our own ground training, but the sim training, I found
9 it satisfactory. I mean, I was there for 45 days or something for
10 that initial cadre. And so it was pretty good. And recurrent is
11 very -- you know, it's a, it's a 441. I mean, it's a check ride.
12 I found it adequate down there.

13 Q. Okay. Do you feel like the instructors down there have good
14 knowledge or adequate knowledge of the kind of conditions that you
15 fly in up here, including special airports?

16 A. When I was down there initially, I would say no, because they
17 had not been up. But I know all three of those guys personally,
18 and they've been up here multiple times and have flown with us and
19 have seen it. I wouldn't say they're experienced, but they know
20 what we're doing.

21 Q. Okay. In sim training, did you ever go to special airports
22 in the simulator?

23 A. Yes. Went to, went to Dutch Harbor.

24 Q. You did?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Okay. Was that one time or was it frequent, a frequent
2 destination?

3 A. I only recall going to Dutch Harbor one time. Because we're
4 going to train in the aircraft. Yeah.

5 Q. Okay. Do you know Sarah Boots?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. Have you ever flown with her?

8 A. I did her OE.

9 Q. Did you sign off her OE?

10 A. I couldn't tell you. I couldn't -- yeah. I did a lot of
11 flying with her during her OE, though.

12 Q. How would you rate her piloting skills?

13 A. Above average.

14 Q. How about her judgement, aviation decision-making, judgment
15 skills?

16 A. Above average.

17 Q. Did you have anything to do with her -- do check airmen, did
18 check airmen ever have any role in recommending people to be
19 upgraded to captain?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. Were you involved?

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. Did anybody ask you should --

24 A. Absolutely.

25 Q. -- she be a captain?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And what did you say?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. Have you ever had any experience with her that would cause
5 you to question her judgement or abilities?

6 A. Never. Prior to her becoming a captain, I think I flew with
7 her for a couple of years as my first officer off and on. So
8 probably several hundred hours at least, and I found her to do an
9 amazing job. I would have never recommended her if not. Back
10 during that time, there was three of us check airmen, senior guys,
11 and we would all get together with the chief pilot and recommend
12 people for upgrade.

13 Q. Okay. So since the Ravn acquisition has been happening,
14 they've -- would you, would you characterize it as there's been a
15 shortage or a worry about the supply of captains? A concern about
16 do we have enough captains --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- for the flying we want to do?

19 A. Yes. And it was that prior to Ravn as well. You know,
20 PenAir, when we were doing our own thing and had our own
21 management, we were, we were seeing that as well. Yeah.

22 Q. And so were there any steps taken to -- by the airline, by
23 management, to try to address that that you disagreed with?

24 A. No.

25 Q. To get -- to bring -- get more people qualified, get new --

1 more new captains?

2 A. No. No. No.

3 Q. Okay.

4 MR. FRANTZ: All right. Thanks, Steve. I think that's all I
5 got. See if anybody else has any follow-ups. Sathya?

6 BY DR. SILVA:

7 Q. You said you flew OE with Sarah. Was that for the upgrade?

8 A. That was after her type rating. That was for her upgrade,
9 yes. That was -- I might have even done her first officer OE. I
10 don't recall. But I did her, I'm fairly certain, most of her or a
11 good portion of her OE for her captain upgrade.

12 Q. Have you ever declined a flight for weather that was above
13 weather minimums?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you give me an example?

16 A. Usually there's another factor involved. Runway condition.
17 Wind. It was legal to do, but there's no way you would ever do
18 it. Also weather trends. When I -- when we're heading out,
19 especially out in the Aleutians, I'm going to -- if the weather
20 has been down and it's forecast to be down but it miraculously
21 goes above minimums, I personally want to see a trend of good
22 weather before I'm going to commit myself to go down there. We
23 just don't have a lot of options out there, places to go. There's
24 not a runway every 80 miles, you know.

25 Q. Have you ever gotten any questions or feedback for declining

1 a flight that was above weather minimums?

2 A. You know, that's one thing that I don't get because I'm
3 senior guy. I never -- you know, if I say I don't want to go, no
4 one says anything. So I haven't experienced it.

5 Q. Do you feel like some of the less senior pilots get that kind
6 of feedback?

7 A. The only one I recall is the lady you're talking about, Sarah
8 Boots. There was some weather out in -- I believe it was
9 Dillingham that was right at or above minimums but had been prior
10 low. And she was met with some resistance on her decision not to
11 go. I can only give you an example. When I finished her OE, I
12 said welcome aboard, and I said, just remember, if you're not
13 comfortable, you won't have to go; no one's going to say a word.
14 Because it is dispatch and PIC agreement. Either one of those
15 come out of the equation, the flight's canceled, period.

16 Q. Did she talk to you about the event that she got feedback
17 for?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What was your impression?

20 A. My impression was that it was handled incorrectly.

21 Q. How would you have expected it to be handled?

22 A. I wouldn't -- there shouldn't even have been an issue.

23 Q. Have you -- yeah, you're a senior person, so I'm wondering if
24 -- have you ever had any run-ins with dispatch on --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- declining a flight?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. Have you ever landed in a tailwind at Dutch Harbor?

4 A. I've touched down on the runway with a tailwind before.

5 Q. Okay. Can you explain the experience?

6 A. With that, again, back to the -- well, it doesn't even have
7 to be that northeast through easterly wind, but sometimes the
8 winds crosswind coming out of the southwest, even. And it varies
9 back and forth, and you can -- you'll make your whole plans and
10 you'll come in there and you'll drive all the way in there, and
11 you go, you know what? I'm constantly watching my airspeed and my
12 ground speed. And you look down and you got a 7-knot tailwind.
13 You just -- around you go and you come back in the other
14 direction. It's very -- it's not rocket science.

15 Q. You mentioned that there used to be considerations for crew
16 pairing. Do you recall what those were?

17 A. You know, they -- I wouldn't say -- I would say that they
18 just never would put two inexperienced people together, especially
19 on a special airport. The problem is, prior to about 2 years ago,
20 we didn't have an inexperience problem. We were taking all of
21 these experienced people and just running through. And as all
22 these majors started hiring, we started losing all of our
23 experience. And so this stuff is all new to me as well, this low
24 pairing. I don't have an answer.

25 Q. Do you have an idea of what -- you mentioned that these were

1 two inexperienced pilots. What is enough experience, would you
2 say?

3 A. Well, I shouldn't say -- they weren't -- I don't know
4 anything about -- you're talking about the --

5 Q. Well, okay. Forget the preface of the question. Let's just
6 say, what is enough experience to be considered as an experienced
7 pilot to be paired with an inexperienced pilot, if that makes
8 sense?

9 A. For a special airport? 500 hours before you even consider
10 throwing someone -- and that's 500 hours in type in the left seat.

11 Q. In type. Left seat type.

12 A. Yeah. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. Can you walk me through your decision on resigning as
14 check airman?

15 A. Well, I had been considering it for several months, but I was
16 the only check airman and I felt like I couldn't resign from that
17 position until they had trained up more people. I believe it was
18 the end of July that I -- we had had maybe the first -- no, it was
19 the end of July, because they had already built the August
20 schedule with me doing OE through the month of August. But we had
21 had -- I believe two more check airmen were finally approved and
22 on the line. And so that's when I made my decision to finally
23 back out, and I said that I -- also when I talked to Crystal, that
24 I said I would stay on through the month of August since they had
25 me scheduled through August so that I didn't wreck the whole

1 schedule. So I believe I did some OE in August as well. And that
2 was the conversation I had with her.

3 Q. Okay. So in terms of the decision-making, it sounds like you
4 were considering it for a while. And this policy change for
5 special airports, how did that factor in in terms of the decision?

6 A. It was a big factor for me. I just didn't want to fly down
7 there with inexperienced people and them getting checked off
8 sooner than I thought that they -- and they wouldn't have. I
9 mean, I wouldn't let them, personally. I saw the -- the policy
10 change, I didn't like it. So I resigned.

11 Q. Okay.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay, that's all I had. Thanks.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Sathya. Dujan?

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

15 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

16 Q. So you talked about Greg Pfeiffer earlier, and that that was
17 one of the pilots that you had the waiver process and signed off.
18 So did you work with Crystal after that to let her know that this
19 pilot was ready to --

20 A. I filled out the paperwork and put it in pilot records box,
21 who would have given it to Crystal.

22 Q. So pilot records would work with Crystal.

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. And then how would it get into SkedFlex?

25 A. Crystal would assign the paperwork. I'm assuming she would

1 check everything that was -- pilot records and Crystal would make
2 the decision that all the paperwork, the Is were dotted, the Ts
3 were crossed. Stamp of approval for the special airport. Then
4 they would go to SOC and let them know that Greg Pfeiffer is
5 qualified to go to Dutch Harbor.

6 Q. Do you know if she would physically go to SOC, or she would
7 send an email?

8 A. I couldn't tell you that.

9 Q. Okay. Overall, what is your perspective on management
10 communication here at PenAir on changes in policies, procedures,
11 things like that?

12 A. Now?

13 Q. Now.

14 A. It's very good.

15 Q. Compared to some time ago, what has changed?

16 A. There was a management change downstairs, and I think that
17 opened things back up, the line of communication. Open door.

18 Q. And when you say management change, what --

19 A. Chief pilot.

20 Q. Chief pilot.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Okay.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all the questions I had. Thank you.

24 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Tony, do you have any follow-ups?

25 MR. FISCHER: I have nothing.

1 MR. FRANTZ: No? Okay.

2 Brandon?

3 MR. WILSON: You know, I kind of do.

4 BY MR. WILSON:

5 Q. Just out of your opinion, I'm looking at all these numbers
6 for unfactored landing distance, and I'm just kind of running
7 through various scenarios. Do you think the numbers in here are
8 accurate, or is the airplane better or worse than the numbers
9 show?

10 A. I think the airplane is better --

11 Q. Better?

12 A. -- then the numbers that we operate on.

13 Q. Okay. So how short do you think you can land, then?

14 A. Oh, I don't know how --

15 Q. Don't know?

16 A. I couldn't give you a number. I don't feel -- I can land it
17 in half the distance in Dutch Harbor. Three-quarters without even
18 touching the brakes.

19 Q. Yeah. Is that flaps 20?

20 A. 35.

21 Q. Flaps 35? Headwind, calm wind?

22 A. Headwinds. Calm winds, you got to go 35 and you're going to
23 do some braking. But it's never -- you're doing -- at 46114,
24 you're at about 119 knots. It's not that big of a deal.

25 Q. Okay. And do you remember if Crystal asked you for any kind

1 of, like, counsel or guidance on handling the Sarah Boots
2 incident?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Or was that just all her?

5 A. The only person I -- the only reason I heard about it was
6 because Sarah called me.

7 Q. Sarah called you?

8 A. Yeah. And told me I lied.

9 Q. Okay.

10 MR. WILSON: No, that's all I got.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Brandon. I got -- you got one
12 more thing? Okay, go ahead.

13 DR. SILVA: Go first?

14 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah.

15 DR. SILVA: I just wanted to clarify Dujuan's question on
16 which change of management are you referring to where things got
17 better.

18 MR. HAKALA: We just have a familiar face downstairs, so
19 meaning that Dennis Fisher is now our interim chief pilot. And
20 I've known Dennis a long time and I have no questions or no doubts
21 about his abilities. And he's a very open door, and I can talk to
22 him about anything.

23 DR. SILVA: Okay. So the switch was between Crystal and
24 Dennis. That was your --

25 MR. HAKALA: Yes.

1 DR. SILVA: -- improvement that you're --

2 MR. HAKALA: For me, yes.

3 DR. SILVA: -- mentioning. Okay. Okay, that was my
4 clarification.

5 BY MR. FRANTZ:

6 Q. So do you have any sense -- is there any sense among the
7 pilot group or have you ever experienced a sense of contention
8 between dispatch and pilots when it comes to talking about weather
9 or marginal flights?

10 A. No. I would say that, you know, there's no, there's -- not
11 about go or no go. You know, we all have our disagreements about
12 what we think the weather is going to do. But not -- I've never
13 felt or seen or heard of anything about dispatch trying to make a
14 decision for the, for the captain.

15 Q. If I was a new captain, though, and so I've got a flight and
16 I'm looking at and it just doesn't meet my level of comfort, and I
17 call up the dispatch guy and express my concerns, would I expect
18 any pushback at all from him, any trying to convince me? If I was
19 a new captain, would I --

20 A. See --

21 Q. Would that be common?

22 A. -- again, I'm not privy to that because I'm a senior guy.
23 But I haven't heard of any of that. Yeah, sorry, I don't have an
24 answer.

25 Q. So what about the concept of, like, personal minimums? Is

1 that -- are you familiar with that expression, personal minimums?

2 A. Sure. Sure, we all have our own envelope. Yeah.

3 Q. Is that -- you've got a lot of 121 time. Is that a concept
4 you've experienced or used or come across commonly in 121
5 operations, pilots talking about my personal minimums?

6 A. I would say with not necessarily approach minimums, but
7 special airport minimums. You know, Alaska is so unique with the
8 warming and the thawing and the freezing runways and braking
9 action and crosswinds and that. You know, my level of going into
10 Dillingham and someone else's might be two different things even
11 though it's VFR. So I guess to -- I don't have anything to say
12 either way. I don't know of people saying that, I'm not
13 comfortable, they're trying to make me go, other than one isolated
14 incident with Sarah.

15 Q. Is it a valid concept to -- in your opinion, is the personal
16 minimums, not necessarily just approach minimums, but just
17 personal minimums, is that a valid concept to have in place in an
18 operation --

19 A. Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely.

20 Q. -- like PenAir?

21 A. Absolutely. Yeah. Personal minimums. I mean, if you're not
22 comfortable -- it's the same -- it's just like the statement I
23 gave Sarah when she was done. If you're not comfortable, do not
24 go, period.

25 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. That's all I got. Thanks, Steve.

1 MR. HAKALA: Thank you.

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: I just have one more thing.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Looks like we got one more. There's always a
4 straggler.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: When you're talking about Dennis Fisher, when
6 Dennis came in as chief pilot, did he meet with the pilot
7 community here at PenAir?

8 MR. HAKALA: Yeah, we all got together. Dennis, he's called
9 -- he calls us -- he's talked to all of us, all of us senior guys
10 and even probably all of the captains, I'm sure, and first
11 officers. Yeah.

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: Did he give any highlights on what his
13 approach was going to be as chief pilot?

14 MR. HAKALA: Not to me, but I know -- I've known him for 25
15 years. I know his goal, his motive, his direction. It's just to
16 make things better, but he's awfully busy right now. Yeah.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, that's all I have. Thanks.

18 MR. HAKALA: Great, thank you.

19 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. We can go off the record.

20 COURT REPORTER: Sure. Off the record 12:06.

21 (Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
 DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
 OCTOBER 17, 2019
 Interview of Steve Hakala

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 5, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Eileen Gonzalez
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: DENNIS FISHER
Chief Pilot, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Tuesday,
December 3, 2019

APPEARANCES:

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Fisher)

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Dennis Fisher:	
By Mr. Frantz	5
By Dr. Silva	15
By Dr. Sevillian	25
By Mr. Fischer	26
By Mr. Wilson	29
By Mr. Frantz	30
By Dr. Silva	35
By Dr. Sevillian	38
By Mr. Fischer	40
By Mr. Frantz	41
By Dr. Silva	41
By Mr. Frantz	43
By Dr. Sevillian	44
By Mr. Frantz	44

I N T E R V I E W

(3:07 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Welcome, Dennis. Thanks for talking with
4 us. I'm going to do a little briefing that you heard a few times
5 when you were on the -- I'll run through it anyway. We are
6 looking at the investigation -- you know the role of the NTSB, how
7 we form groups, and this is the operational factors/human
8 performance group. And we've interviewed lots of people, and part
9 of the interview process is now we wanted to talk to the check
10 airman who did the accident pilot's OE --

11 MR. FISHER: Okay.

12 MR. FRANTZ: -- and other training, and so that turned out to
13 be you. So you get to switch roles here, now you get to be
14 interviewee. So we will -- it's not sworn testimony but, you
15 know, just to the best of your recollection, and it's an informal
16 interview, but if you don't know or don't recall, that answer is
17 fine. If later on you think of something you need to add or you
18 didn't say and you wanted to, you can contact any of us and tell
19 us that information.

20 You know Brandon. He has replaced you on the group, so he's
21 now the PenAir rep on the group. And you are entitled, as with
22 all our interviews, to have a representative with you during the
23 interview. Do you have someone you would like to have?

24 MR. FISHER: Yes, Morgan Campbell.

25 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, Morgan. And let's see, do you know Tony?

1 MR. FISHER: Yes.

2 MR. FRANTZ: So you know everyone here, so we don't need to
3 do introductions.

4 MR. FISHER: Okay.

5 MR. FRANTZ: So that's fine. So before we start, do you have
6 any questions of us?

7 MR. FISHER: No.

8 MR. FRANTZ: No.

9 MR. FISHER: Are you enjoying the snow?

10 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah.

11 (Laughter)

12 INTERVIEW OF DENNIS FISHER

13 BY MR. FRANTZ:

14 Q. So when did you -- what's your current role, Dennis? Well,
15 first of all, you state your name and the spelling for the record.

16 A. My name is Dennis Fisher, and my name is spelled D-e-n-n-i-s,
17 F-i-s-h-e-r, and I am the chief pilot at PenAir.

18 Q. And how long have you had that position?

19 A. Since November 1st of this year.

20 Q. Okay. And is that a permanent position or an interim or how
21 is -- is there any definition of that?

22 A. I see it as interim.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yes, until the merger is complete.

25 Q. Okay, so before you were -- became the interim or the chief

1 pilot, what was your -- what jobs have you had at PenAir?

2 A. Jobs?

3 Q. Positions.

4 A. I started in 1996 as a first officer in the Metro. I flew
5 for several years in the Metro and upgraded into the Saab 340,
6 started off as a first officer and then upgraded into the captain
7 position, I believe, around 2000. I was a captain until mid-2000,
8 I can't recall the year, but about 2008, 2009 maybe, where I
9 became an instructor for cockpit procedures, and then I moved into
10 a position as a simulator instructor. And then from that position
11 until 2016, where I moved into the Saab 2000, and I was a captain
12 in the Saab 2000 since summer of 2016. And then became a check
13 airman in the Saab 2000, spring of 2019.

14 Q. Okay. Any time in the right seat of the 2000?

15 A. As a -- yes, but as a captain or as a helping captain. So
16 when we first started with the Saab 2000s, we didn't have very
17 many pilots, so we were switching roles back and forth.

18 Q. Okay. And so how many hours do you have in the 2000,
19 roughly?

20 A. 2,500 or so. I'd have to look at my logbook.

21 Q. All of that's with PenAir?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. And how much total time?

24 A. Total time is roughly 21,000 hours, I think, but I'd have to
25 look at my logbooks for --

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. -- details.

3 Q. That's fine, rough numbers are good. Okay, did you, did you
4 perform any portion of the OE for Paul Wells?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Do you recall roughly how many hours you did --

7 A. I can't remember hours; I remember we did several flights.

8 Q. Okay. Do you know what other check airmen flew with him for
9 his OE besides you?

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. Okay. How did the OE go? Were there any issues or concerns
12 that you had early on or later during the OE that you know?

13 A. The OE went rather smooth with Paul.

14 Q. What's the minimum required hours for OE?

15 A. I believe it's 20.

16 Q. Okay. In your experience, do most pilots that you've
17 performed OE with on the 2000 get signed off at that point?

18 A. With his experience it's not uncommon.

19 Q. Okay. And how many hours -- do you know how many hours he
20 completed OE before he was signed off?

21 A. I don't know the number offhand.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. But it was right around the required number.

24 Q. Okay. What's the PenAir requirement for qualification -- PIC
25 qualification for special airports?

1 A. PIC qualifications, around 300 hours. PIC.

2 Q. And then anything beyond that before they can go to a special
3 airport? Any other requirements?

4 A. Well, they have to get a sign-off with the check airman.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. There are some other qualifying factors, waivers and such,
7 but we've -- since my tenure we've removed those, so --

8 Q. Okay. Before then, what was the qualification -- what was
9 the waiver option?

10 A. A hundred hours with a check airman who's flown with the
11 candidate approval and approval of the chief pilot.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Or not an approval, a recommendation.

14 Q. And then is there any requirement to fly with a check airman
15 to the special airport?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Any time or number of landing requirements --

18 A. No.

19 Q. -- associated with that? Okay.

20 A. No. Other than the 121 rule, 445 requirements.

21 Q. Okay. So did you sign off Paul Wells for Dutch Harbor?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. When you signed it, you were -- what was your understanding
24 of -- you were verifying what when you signed the form for him?

25 A. When I signed him off he was, in my opinion, a competent

1 pilot. I viewed his experience level similar to a pilot that came
2 over from the Saab 340. He had a lot of experience going in and
3 out of special airports, Valdez, Kodiak. I saw him in Dutch
4 Harbor prior to him working for PenAir, with Ravn. So I based a
5 lot of our evaluation on his experience level and how he performed
6 and how he handled himself.

7 Q. So when you signed the form saying that -- well, the special
8 airport form, you were just saying that you had accomplished the
9 required checkout or flight with him to the special airport and
10 you were satisfied that he met the requirements?

11 A. Yes. And we had done several flights into Dutch Harbor
12 during OE, so it wasn't the only time we've gone in there during
13 the special airport sign-off.

14 Q. Did you sign the form -- the sign-off for the special
15 airport, during his OE -- while you were flying with him for OE?

16 A. I believe it was after.

17 Q. You believe it was after you completed -- after he completed
18 OE?

19 A. Yeah, he got his OE, if I remember correctly, and then he was
20 signed off for Dutch Harbor.

21 Q. But you signed it, you signed off the check airman part of
22 that form saying, I flew with him to Dutch Harbor?

23 A. To Dutch Harbor, yes, yes.

24 Q. And was that based on a flight that you took with him after
25 he completed OE to Dutch Harbor or was it --

1 A. Yeah, I believe it was after, yeah.

2 Q. After he completed OE?

3 A. Yeah, yeah.

4 Q. Did you have any awareness or did you know of his total PIC
5 hours?

6 A. Yes. Well, I know of his total time; he had 14,000 hours in
7 turbo props and such.

8 Q. Okay. To do the special airport training at PenAir, does a
9 pilot have to meet those minimum hour requirements first with the
10 100 or 300?

11 A. It's in our -- yeah, they should under normal circumstances,
12 yes.

13 Q. Okay. So when you signed him off for the special airport,
14 did you know -- did you think or did you know how many hours he
15 had as PIC in PenAir airplanes?

16 A. Well, I knew he didn't have a hundred hours, yes, and I --
17 but I was instructed that we were going to be getting rid of these
18 policies and that we were in the process of changing these
19 requirements that weren't -- I wouldn't say they were required by
20 -- or not required, but I wouldn't say that Ravn was -- they were
21 talking about removing these qualifications, so I was under the
22 impression that this was stuff that was going on behind the
23 scenes.

24 Q. Yeah. So talk a little bit more about how you got that
25 impression or who -- where did you get the instruction that this

1 was going to change and so -- and was it that, that led you to be
2 comfortable signing the form, even though you knew he didn't have
3 the hundred hours?

4 A. I felt comfortable signing off Paul because of how he
5 performed.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I understood he didn't meet the hours, but it was also under
8 the understanding that those hours were in the process of being --
9 those procedures were being rewritten -- amended. I'm not really
10 sure; I wasn't part of that process.

11 Q. Where did that understanding come from?

12 A. The chief pilot at the time.

13 Q. Crystal?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. And did she -- was that an instruction, a direction to
16 you, or was it a conversation between the two of you and she said
17 -- or did she say sign the form, Dennis, because this is all going
18 to change anyway or --

19 A. I don't recall exactly the wording, but there was discussion
20 about not needing sign-offs or removing or changing the
21 qualifications. There was a push to get people who were
22 experienced to be signed off for Dutch Harbor.

23 Paul was the only pilot that met those qualifications, in my
24 mind, as a pilot who was experienced. He came from Ravn flying
25 30-seat turbo props in and out of special airports. No different

1 than a pilot that we've had in the past coming out of the Saab 340
2 that was signed off. I came out of the Saab 340 and went into the
3 Saab 2000. Our early group of Saab 2000 pilots were all signed
4 off without those qualifications, so --

5 Q. From your understanding, did he have significant experience
6 -- you said special airports, but did he have significant
7 experience at Dutch Harbor in the -- when he was flying for Ravn?

8 A. As far as I know, he had adequate experience, yes.

9 Q. And when you flew to Dutch Harbor with him, not just on the
10 flight that you -- where you said he was now -- when you signed
11 off that he was certified or he met your qualification standards
12 for the airport, but during OE, any concerns at all going in and
13 out of Dutch Harbor with him, anything that he needed --

14 A. No.

15 Q. -- extra coaching through or talking through or -- from your
16 point of view?

17 A. No, he was a pretty solid pilot. I didn't really see,
18 sometimes -- and I haven't done a lot of Dutch Harbor sign-offs,
19 mainly because we haven't had qualified applicants and -- but no,
20 he did not give me any reservations about his competence and his
21 abilities.

22 Q. Okay. So tell me again why -- what's your understanding of
23 why they were trying to get Paul signed off and maybe they would
24 change requirements so we -- we, as in PenAir -- wasn't too
25 concerned about the hundred hours? What's your understanding of

1 why that was -- didn't put forward for in this case, why were
2 they --

3 A. I can't speak for management on why they want to do stuff. I
4 can say that we're a little short on experienced pilots who can go
5 into special airports, and when we have one that is working for
6 us, it is an asset or a perceived asset that they want to put to
7 work.

8 Q. How long has that -- do you know how long that requirement --
9 you've been at PenAir a long time. How long has that policy of
10 300 with 100 waiver, how long has that been on the books at
11 PenAir, do you know?

12 A. I can't recall. What I do know is that PenAir has never had
13 to rely on that hundred hour. I don't recall anybody ever needing
14 it. We've never had people that were in that position coming to
15 us with that kind of experience.

16 Q. Is Paul the first person, that you're aware of, that was --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- pulling for that sub-300 qual?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And then maybe --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- no method because that might change, you were told,
23 that --

24 A. Yeah, the typical applicant for Dutch Harbor or special
25 airports is somebody's that sat in the right seat for 4 or 5

1 years.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. With the company. So hiring somebody off the street with
4 that kind of experience is something that I saw as a pilot that
5 was moving within the ranks of the company from another smaller
6 airplane, like a Saab 340.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So it didn't raise flags with me in that sense. I didn't
9 agree that we were going against it with this stuff, but it didn't
10 raise, like, safety flags.

11 Q. Okay. You had a conversation or you had an understanding or
12 Crystal explained to you that, you know, this might change; we
13 might drop this requirement. What was the beginning of that --
14 why were you talking to her in the first place about that, about
15 -- what prompted you to talk -- or her to talk to you or you to
16 talk to her about this particular -- about Paul and the hours? I
17 mean, what was the driving -- is there any particular thing that
18 made that conversation --

19 A. I don't recall. I do remember the conversation came up
20 several times, and I don't recall if it was in reference to anyone
21 in specific, but it was about changing the policy.

22 Q. So do you recall if Crystal ever spoke to you or talked to
23 you specifically about Paul and having Paul signed off even though
24 he doesn't have a hundred hours PIC, he doesn't meet the --

25 A. I don't recall.

1 Q. You don't recall that?

2 A. I don't recall that discussion, no.

3 Q. So when you signed the, when you signed the special airport
4 qual form for Paul, you understood that he didn't have a hundred
5 PIC?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But you also understood that, that was okay with PenAir, with
8 PenAir management?

9 A. With PenAir management, yes.

10 Q. Is that correct?

11 A. Yeah.

12 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, I think that's all I have. Thanks.

13 Sathya, do you have any questions?

14 BY DR. SILVA

15 Q. How many airport qualifications have you done prior to Paul's
16 into Dutch Harbor?

17 A. Special airports?

18 Q. Special airport qualifications.

19 A. Probably that was the first one.

20 Q. Okay. Were you given any instructions when you became a
21 check airman in terms of how to do a special airport
22 qualification?

23 A. No, our special airport checkout is very subjective.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And like I said, I've said it several times, that our

1 applicant -- typical applicant getting signed off for special
2 airport had ample experience for maybe 5 years sitting in the
3 right seat going in and out of these special airports. So Paul
4 was the first that I'm aware of.

5 Q. How many OEs had you done prior to Paul's?

6 A. I don't know offhand how many.

7 Q. Okay. But you said you started as a check airman in the
8 spring?

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. Do you remember what month?

11 A. I'd have to go back. I think around -- it might've been May.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I'd have to go check.

14 Q. But you had done an OE prior to doing Paul's?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay. Okay. So I'm going to bring up the form that we were
17 provided here.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. Okay. Do you recall signing this form?

20 A. I don't recall signing it, but that is my signature.

21 Q. Okay. Have you been asked after the accident to sign
22 anything or backdate anything?

23 A. I don't recall being asked to backdate anything, no.

24 Q. So when you would fill this -- have you filled these out
25 since, or is this the only one?

1 A. No, that's the only one I've ever signed off on.

2 Q. That's the only one, okay. Do you know where this date comes
3 from?

4 A. No, I don't.

5 Q. Do you recognize that at all? Would that have been something
6 you put in?

7 A. That's not my handwriting; I don't cross my sevens.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. No. So I don't know, I don't know how that was -- I don't
10 recall that, to be quite honest.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I'd have to go look at my logbook, when -- I signed it when
13 we flew together, so --

14 Q. Okay. So you don't recall the form, but these are your
15 signatures or this is your signature on --

16 A. Yes, that's my signature there. And then my name's crossed
17 off here, and I don't recall why that was crossed off. Paul Wells
18 was put in here, so that -- I might've filled it out wrong.

19 Q. Okay. Do you physically hand over this paperwork to Kirk to
20 sign, or how does that transaction happen?

21 A. I honestly can't remember when that's -- if I did that up in
22 the training records or -- I probably did that up in the training
23 record.

24 Q. Okay. Would Paul's signature come after yours? Like, when
25 you fill this out, are you the first one to fill it out?

1 A. I can't recall. I can't recall Watson signing it either,
2 so --

3 Q. You can't recall Paul signing it?

4 A. No, I can't.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I'm not saying it didn't happen or did happen, but I can't
7 remember it, so --

8 Q. Okay. I'm just trying to get a timeline for how this was
9 filled out, in what order.

10 A. No, I understand. And I am looking at these dates, and I
11 don't -- I can't recall why there's a difference in the dates.

12 Q. So, from what I'm understanding, your signature -- and again,
13 correct me if I'm wrong. Your signature on here means that you
14 found him to be competent, competently --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- able to fly into Dutch Harbor?

17 A. Yeah, yeah. My presumption is here that this is the date
18 that we did the flight, that I would call the checkout flight, and
19 then this was the date that I signed this stating that, that was
20 true.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Or accurate, I suppose, to be more --

23 Q. So when you signed this, do you remember if a date was in
24 there already?

25 A. I can't remember.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But that's not my handwriting.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So I didn't write -- I don't write sevens that way, so --

5 Q. Okay. Okay, so you took a number of flights with Paul into
6 Dutch Harbor.

7 A. Right.

8 Q. Is there one in particular you would've called a checkout
9 flight compared to any others?

10 A. It would be the last flight that we flew in there.

11 Q. It would've been the last one?

12 A. Yeah. Yeah, it would be the last one.

13 Q. Okay. So have you ever written a letter of recommendation
14 for a pilot to do a special airports training?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay. Were you asked to ever --

17 A. No, I wasn't asked for one.

18 Q. Okay. Okay. Do you know where the recommendation came in
19 for having him do the special airports training early on?

20 A. I don't know who would've written that letter. As far as I
21 know, the GOM requires a check airman to write a letter of
22 recommendation, and I don't know if anybody did.

23 Q. Okay. Okay. So you mentioned that Crystal had told you that
24 the rules were changing. Do you remember if this was prior to
25 starting Paul's OE? After?

1 A. I can't place it, whether it was before or after. I just
2 know that during the summer --

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. -- there was a lot of discussion about it amongst the pilot
5 group, things and -- things that I would hear from pilots that are
6 -- from the flight line they're hearing this and they're hearing
7 that. I can't say that it was an itinerary for change. I wasn't
8 in any meetings or discussions with anybody saying we're going to
9 change these policies and these dates, that sort of thing.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. But in general conversation, things have come up about
12 removing and changing policies regarding special airports.

13 Q. Okay. So when you were, when you were flying in with him to
14 Dutch Harbor, were you under the impression that this is a sign-
15 off, this is an evaluation? Or was that something that came to
16 you later and said, oh, you've flown to Dutch Harbor with Paul
17 eight times, and then you sign him off?

18 A. I can't recall, but I would presume when I signed him off, I
19 was under the intent of signing him off.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. So he was being evaluated as a special airport pilot.

22 Q. Okay. Okay. And I just wanted to clear some, clear some
23 stuff up with your OE. So this form for the -- for OE, how does
24 this get filled out? What's the process?

25 A. The pilot applicant will carry these with us -- with him, and

1 then we'll just fill these out per leg.

2 Q. Um-hmm, okay. So you would do each one --

3 A. Yeah, yeah.

4 Q. -- as it goes?

5 A. Right.

6 Q. Okay. So each of these signatures, each day it happened you
7 signed on a different day --

8 A. Yeah, yeah.

9 Q. -- is what I'm understanding? Okay. Is there any reason why
10 there would be flights that you conducted but wasn't documented
11 here?

12 A. What do you mean by that?

13 Q. So would every single flight done prior to the line check be
14 documented in OE, in this form?

15 A. Every flight -- I'm not really sure I understand the
16 question. Every flight that I did with him should be on that
17 form.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. If it's not, then I may be in error if it was me.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. But it should be on that form.

22 Q. Okay, so when do you -- do you fill this out at the end of
23 each day?

24 A. Yeah. Or at the end of each leg, usually.

25 Q. Usually at the end of each --

1 A. Yeah, it depends on the applicant, whether it's a leg-by-leg
2 or day-by-day thing, so --

3 Q. Okay. So if you flew with him for a full day, would that
4 happen at the end of the day, would you say?

5 A. It might; it all depends.

6 Q. Okay. What are you referring to when you're filling this
7 out?

8 A. What am I referring to?

9 Q. Is there documentation that you're using?

10 A. Flight numbers?

11 Q. Yeah, flight numbers, flight times or --

12 A. Oh, just what we get out of the logbook.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. So you're referring to the aircraft logs --

16 A. Yeah, yeah.

17 Q. -- which is -- okay, so you'd have access to those when
18 you're filling these out?

19 A. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Yeah. In fact, I should be the one filling them out, so
22 these times should be the same as the logbook, yeah.

23 Q. Okay. I'm contaminating you here, but --

24 A. That's okay.

25 Q. -- since I know, there were a few -- comparing his --

1 comparing Paul's log, SkedFlex, flight times to the aircraft
2 logs --

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. -- there were a few -- so actually, no, comparing them to
5 this list, there were a few missing.

6 A. Oh, there were? Okay.

7 Q. Yeah. So I'm just curious what would've led to that, because
8 this is one of them; this was actually the second day you flew.

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. And the last two are documented, but it doesn't look like the
11 first two are documented.

12 A. I don't know, I could've -- it could be an oversight on my
13 part.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Dutch, Kodiak. What was the date on this? Sixteen. So this
16 was the -- for the 16th.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. And these are Kodiak 1293. Yeah, that is 58, 2 hours and 1
19 hour and 50 minutes or so. Yeah, that's basically over here. Oh,
20 okay, so I see what you're saying. So these flights are these 2
21 days, so I must've got the conversion wrong because the times
22 match, 2:20, 2:27; these are these first three legs or for flights
23 like that. So this should be -- these are 94 and 95, those are
24 the flight numbers for them.

25 Q. You actually have a record for these and then print it out.

1 A. Oh, do I? Okay.

2 Q. And they happened to be the exact same times.

3 A. Oh, really?

4 Q. Yeah. Yeah, that's kind of crazy, but --

5 A. Well, yeah, I don't know. I can't explain that, but I -- I
6 didn't -- so I did put them in then.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. And then the other one, again, I'll just show it to you. I
10 know you don't necessarily recall, but there was another one, a
11 flight before -- what's the date on this, 7/22. I think this was
12 the day before the last flight you had with him but was omitted
13 from this piece of paper.

14 A. Okay. What was the date on this one, 22?

15 Q. Yeah. So I think it's on the second page.

16 A. Oh, okay. Here's another one, okay. And so this one is not
17 on this one?

18 Q. Yeah, I'm just going to see if you had -- and then there's a
19 reasonable explanation.

20 A. Yeah, I can't explain why it's not there.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I mean, the pilots have it. He may have not had it that day
23 and it just may have got overlooked. But generally, I mean, I
24 can't explain why a flight wouldn't be on there, other than maybe
25 he didn't bring the form in, and I didn't find it, and I didn't

1 get back with him about filling it out.

2 Q. Okay. Okay, I just wanted to clear that up on the record,
3 yeah. Okay.

4 A. Okay. No, it's my responsibility to make sure that, that
5 thing's filled out correctly and --

6 Q. Okay, but there's no systematic reason why you would omit
7 something from this?

8 A. No, no, no.

9 Q. Okay, it's not like --

10 A. That hurts my cause.

11 Q. Okay. Right, right.

12 A. I don't want to hurt my cause.

13 Q. Yeah. Okay, I just wanted to make that clear on the record.

14 A. Okay.

15 DR. SILVA: Okay, those are all the questions I had.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Dujuan, questions?

17 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

18 Q. Yeah, have you had a chance to -- so to speak with Crystal as
19 -- now in your new role as chief pilot?

20 MR. CAMPBELL: I'm sorry, you have to say yes or no for the
21 benefit of the reporter.

22 MR. FISHER: Oh. No, I have not. I'm sorry.

23 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

24 Q. And as check airman at the time, how empowered did you feel
25 speaking up to management about any issues that you might have at

1 the company?

2 A. My concerns were raised, but I didn't feel I had any
3 empowerment. I couldn't change policy or --

4 Q. What concerns did you have?

5 A. Removing limitations, changing policies that have worked for
6 a long time, that sort of stuff.

7 Q. And what chain of the management structure did you try to --
8 or did you feel that you couldn't go to and discuss these things?

9 A. It wasn't that I didn't feel I could go -- couldn't go to
10 people. It was that I didn't get the impression anyone had any
11 interest in what we had to say. When I say we, myself and other
12 check airmen.

13 Q. And why is that?

14 A. I don't know. I don't know why that there was a resistance
15 to the senior people here.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay, that's all the questions I have for
17 right now.

18 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, that's fine. Tony?

19 BY MR. FISCHER:

20 Q. Yeah, I -- now, Paul came over from Ravn, and were you
21 involved in his sim training down in --

22 A. No.

23 Q. So he was sent down there to get a type rating and come back
24 and flying his OE. Internally, what is the normal -- how do you
25 -- you know, has anybody else come over from Ravn to fly for

1 PenAir?

2 A. Well, who was flying -- we've had several co-pilots that have
3 come over.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. But I don't know if they were flying the Dash-8 or if they
6 were over on the Hageland side.

7 Q. Okay. Now, this is more your opinion: Was there such a need
8 to get -- to hire a captain off the street, and -- because this is
9 essentially what you did, is you hired a candidate off the street,
10 whereas normally, I think you upgrade your co-pilots.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And, you know, we talked to a very strong co-pilot the first
13 day, Britt Goudey, who seems to have 22,000 hours, 800 hours, 800
14 hours in the airplane.

15 A. Um-hmm.

16 Q. What is the selection process for doing that or is that --
17 you know, what is the selection process for doing that?

18 A. The selection process, to my knowledge, is Britt was hired as
19 a first officer, or I believe he might've been hired as a street
20 captain with an evaluation period attached to his employment to
21 see if he works out.

22 Paul, I don't know, I don't know how that worked as far as
23 why he was hired the way he was and put in that position. I know
24 he was hired as director -- I believe it was director of training
25 or something in the administrative side of things.

1 Q. So, you know, in some companies there's a management
2 exclusion that, if you get hired into management, you know,
3 they'll give you the line. Is that something that happens at
4 PenAir or --

5 A. I honestly can't tell you what they were planning to do in
6 that sense. Normally, from my experience from prior to Paul
7 coming online, I don't recall that ever happening.

8 Q. So it's kind of an anomaly?

9 A. Yeah, I don't recall it happening. Yeah.

10 Q. And during OE, did you guys have -- did you -- can you recall
11 any adverse weather as you were flying to Dutch that would've
12 demonstrated his judgment?

13 A. No. We had pretty nice weather. It was summer; it was all
14 nice. We might've had a few days with some light winds or
15 something, but from what I can recall, I mean, I don't recall any
16 weather being worrisome.

17 Q. And who else did Paul fly with?

18 A. For OE?

19 Q. For OE.

20 A. I think I did 99 percent of it, and then I think Steve Hakala
21 or somebody signed him off.

22 Q. Steve Hakala signed him off for his OE?

23 A. I believe Steve was the last guy that flew with him.

24 Q. Okay. And then you just signed the special airport?

25 A. I believe so, yeah.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Yeah. At least that's the way I remember it. It could be --
3 I mean, to be quite honest, I don't remember all the --

4 Q. Uh-huh.

5 A. -- turn of events through OE with him, so --

6 MR. FISCHER: All right, that's all I have for now.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Brandon?

8 BY MR. WILSON:

9 Q. I do have a couple questions. With Crystal telling you
10 to -- like, the policy's changing and you can sign him off now,
11 were you comfortable that he was proficient going to Dutch Harbor?

12 A. Yeah, I didn't have any problems with Paul's performance and
13 the way he flew the airplane.

14 Q. Did you guys go to any other special airports where he was
15 able to show proficiency?

16 A. Kodiak.

17 Q. You did take him to Kodiak?

18 A. Yeah, yeah.

19 Q. Was he proficient there, too?

20 A. Yeah, he flew fine there. He has a lot of experience in and
21 out of Kodiak, from my understanding, so --

22 Q. Do you know if he had Kodiak sign-off?

23 A. Not that I'm aware of, no.

24 Q. And then, per the AFM, can this airplane land with a 15-knot
25 tailwind, flaps 20?

1 A. Can it land? I think, yeah, if you get the performance
2 numbers out, you can run the -- run factor -- I mean, yeah, it'll
3 be close, but you can do it 35-, 3,600 feet at Dutch Harbor.

4 Q. And what assumptions would that -- you know, is it
5 single-engine, two engines?

6 A. Yeah, there's the unfactored landing distances that Saab
7 comes up with; they have predetermined conditions, 50 feet over
8 threshold, single-engine operation, touchdown, landing in the
9 touchdown and applying maximum brake and maximum reverse thrust on
10 the operating engine, so --

11 MR. WILSON: Okay, I think that's it for now.

12 BY MR. FRANTZ:

13 Q. Okay, we'll do another quick round. I just have a few.

14 We've heard other people tell about a meeting that happened
15 sometime during the transition or the merger with Ravn concerning
16 the special airport requirement and maybe changing or eliminating
17 it or modifying it. Do you have an awareness of that meeting or a
18 pilot meeting or a meeting with check airmen and pilots or -- it's
19 unclear exactly who was there, but it was a company meeting where
20 that was discussed. Do you, I mean --

21 A. Yeah, the company has had several mandatory meetings over the
22 past -- well, since the bankruptcy ended in a new management
23 merger, things started. I haven't been able to go to any of them
24 just because of my flying schedule.

25 Q. Do you have an awareness or do you know about one where this,

1 the idea of eliminating or modifying the special airport
2 requirements, was brought up?

3 A. There was one meeting this past summer, and I can't recall
4 when it took place, but after the meeting there was a lot of
5 discussion about somebody -- and I don't recall who, but made an
6 announcement or proclamation or something that had to do with
7 reducing or removing qualifications for special airports.

8 Q. Do you know what the -- what was your reaction to that?
9 What's your opinion on that proposal of changing the
10 qualifications for special airports?

11 A. I felt that was somebody that didn't have any idea of what
12 they were getting themselves into, to be quite honest.

13 Q. If somebody came and said we're going to eliminate this
14 300-hour PIC requirement for special airports, would you be
15 opposed to that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Was there anything, any discussion, announcement,
18 anything from PenAir, from management, after that meeting about
19 the requirements, they were going to change, they weren't going to
20 change? Was there any -- that you're aware of?

21 A. In official capacity, no, I don't recall hearing anything.

22 Q. Do you have a sense of what the pilot group, and I guess
23 maybe specifically the check airmen, thought about that idea of
24 eliminating their --

25 A. Yeah, they --

1 Q. What did they think about it?

2 A. They weren't in favor of it.

3 Q. Okay. Do you know Deke Abbott?

4 A. I know him, yes.

5 Q. Has he ever had any position at PenAir?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Has he ever talked to you specifically about special airport
8 qualifications or getting -- or anything to do with the
9 qualification of Paul Wells?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Has he ever talked to you about any other aspects of your job
12 as a -- when you were a check airman or special airports, signing
13 people off? Nothing?

14 A. Not as a check airman, no.

15 Q. Has he ever talked to you at all?

16 A. Oh, yeah, I've spoken with him several times.

17 Q. Okay, about any operational or regulatory or --

18 A. Just operational stuff.

19 Q. -- procedural stuff?

20 A. Nothing regulatory. I think I might've had some questions I
21 asked him at one point about something that came up, but it wasn't
22 special airport.

23 Q. Okay, but has he ever directed you to take any specific
24 action in any, any element that you had accomplished as a check
25 airman?

1 A. No, not as a check airman.

2 Q. Have you talked to him since you've become chief pilot?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Was it anything about Paul Wells or was there any discussion
5 about Paul Wells?

6 A. No.

7 Q. So what's your understanding of his role or his -- yeah, his
8 position at PenAir? I mean, he doesn't have a position at PenAir,
9 if I understand right, but yet he has -- well, what's his -- does
10 he have a role in the merger?

11 Is he looked at as in some authority position by the people -
12 - by the current managerial folks at PenAir? Is he just a Ravn
13 employee who is involved in the merger but he's -- is he trying to
14 exercise any authority or control over anything at PenAir that
15 you're aware of?

16 A. At this time, no. Not that I'm aware of.

17 Q. Was he in the past that you know of or you were aware of?

18 A. I can't say he had any influence. It seemed like there was
19 some guidance coming from somewhere other than PenAir, but I can't
20 say for sure who and what capacity. I wasn't in those circles,
21 but it did seem as if somebody else was making calls and shots.

22 Q. In your opinion, has there been a bright line between PenAir
23 and Ravn during this merger process, as far as how you do things,
24 what rules, what manuals you follow? You know, PenAir versus
25 Ravn. Or is it -- other than just a very distinct policy that,

1 you know, we're still PenAir and we have -- we're the certificate
2 holder and we follow these lines, or is there kind of a blending
3 that is occurring? I don't want to say unofficially, but you
4 know --

5 A. I would say that, by and large, the people I work with -- one
6 of the check airmen, one of them right now, the thought process is
7 that PenAir is a separate certificate, and we operate under its
8 certificate rules and regulations. And in the past, it did seem
9 like there were some subjects where there was a muddling of two
10 companies trying to merge things together.

11 Again, I wasn't in that circle, so I don't know to what depth
12 any of that happened, but it did seem like there was some thought
13 going into merging some of the operational stuff.

14 Q. And when you say in the past, what time frame were you
15 talking about?

16 A. Prior to me being chief pilot.

17 Q. Okay. So there's talk, there's talk now or there's a process
18 in place now of merging manuals or standardizing manuals and so --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- eventually I think that, correct me if I'm wrong, the goal
21 is for PenAir manuals to eventually go away, and they'll all be
22 Ravn policies, manuals, procedures. But that's a process in -- is
23 that correct?

24 A. No, I don't think that's correct. What I think the aim here
25 is, is that there -- it won't be -- I've been told several times

1 since I started as chief pilot that it won't be Ravn's way, it
2 will be the safest way. And so it's my impression that the
3 manuals will not just be Ravn policy, they'll be a merger of
4 PenAir policy and Ravn policy to become one new policy.

5 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, okay. Okay, thank you, Dennis. That's
6 all I have.

7 Sathya, any follow-ups?

8 BY DR. SILVA

9 Q. So when you said that you felt like there were shots being
10 called, it sounds weird now that I say that out loud, shots being
11 called by -- from somewhere else, what kind of shots are we
12 talking about?

13 A. It's more of a generalization.

14 Q. Um-hmm.

15 A. Not necessarily specifics. I can't say that so-and-so wanted
16 to change such-and-such. I don't think that -- (a) I wasn't
17 involved in any of that process, but just a general feeling that
18 there was outside influence being directed.

19 And the reason I say that is because the former chief pilot
20 seemed to not invite the experienced pilots for open conversation,
21 or there was a lot of discussion about -- well, she just, you
22 know, called me a road block, or I'm a trouble-maker, or I'm a
23 mud-stirrer or these things that were being put out there that I
24 was, you know, hearing from other pilots.

25 So here's a new chief pilot that is not working with the rank

1 and file in PenAir, at least the pilot level. I don't know what's
2 going on outside of the pilot level, but it's coming from
3 somewhere, and she's getting input and advice from somewhere.

4 Q. Um-hmm.

5 A. And that somewhere presumably is coming from Ravn.

6 Q. Um-hmm.

7 A. It's a presumption.

8 Q. So was it in relation to the special airports qualification
9 change that she wasn't really heeding feedback, or was there other
10 -- were there other issues that were brought up to her attention?

11 A. I would presume that it's coming from outside of the pilot
12 group here because none of us were in favor of changing the
13 policies.

14 Q. Yeah. So was that the only policy change that was of
15 concern?

16 A. There's been other policy changes that went against the grain
17 as far as the pilot group goes, scheduling policies, bidding
18 policies, you know, the normal stuff that gets pilots worked up.

19 Q. Um-hmm.

20 A. But other policies I can't -- I'm not coming -- nothing's
21 coming to mind at this time, so --

22 Q. The conversation you had with Crystal regarding Paul, the
23 changes in the qualifications so that Paul could get the sign-off,
24 was that a verbal conversation you had with her? Was that through
25 email? Do you recall?

1 A. It's probably verbal.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah, we don't talk much through email.

4 Q. Um-hmm. What's your understanding of why Crystal is no
5 longer in the chief pilot position?

6 A. I have no idea why she was -- I mean, I could guess; I can
7 come up with -- you know, but I don't think -- I think she was
8 removed because of what happened.

9 Q. Yeah. So in your position now as chief pilot, what's your
10 interaction with Deke Abbott?

11 A. Very little.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Very little. One of the things that I put out as a qualifier
14 to take the job was that if I felt I was being influenced by the
15 other side, operationally, that I was -- I didn't want to do this.

16 Q. Um-hmm.

17 A. That I didn't think it was fair to put us in that position.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. If they want to run the show, then they can run the show, but
20 I don't want to run it through them.

21 Q. Um-hmm. Who were you discussing that with?

22 A. That was Dave Pflieger.

23 Q. Pflieger, okay.

24 A. Yeah.

25 DR. SILVA: Great, that's all the questions I have.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Dujuan, any follow-ups?

2 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

3 Q. So just a few questions. So as chief pilot, you were talking
4 about that this position, you feel, is interim until the merger's
5 complete.

6 A. Um-hmm.

7 Q. Is that just your feeling or is that just something that
8 someone told you?

9 A. That was my condition to take the job, that I would help out
10 the best I could, but I didn't want to go beyond the merger.

11 Q. And what source of documentation, if any, did the company
12 give you as far as your internal role, responsibilities, those
13 type of things?

14 A. Other than how it's spelled out in the CAM manual, I wasn't
15 given the responsibilities of -- like, to sign or anything.

16 Q. And when you were check airman for the role, were you aware
17 of any policies that the chief pilot had as far as communicating
18 with check airmen or communicating anything?

19 A. I was aware of some of it, but I wasn't well versed in it.
20 I'd have to refer to the manuals quite a bit and add it to memory.

21 Q. Was the communication at the time by the book, by the
22 procedure? What I mean by that is, when you were having
23 conversations with Crystal and when -- you know, maybe you didn't
24 feel empowered to talk.

25 A. Um-hmm.

1 Q. Did you feel that, that was spelled out clearly in roles and
2 responsibilities, that you are -- that you could be empowered to
3 go to the chief pilot and talk about your thoughts?

4 A. I don't feel that it was in a manual, that sort of thing. I
5 felt I could speak my thoughts, but I also felt that they would
6 not be listened to, so --

7 Q. At the time, if you can remember, what would you rate the
8 safety culture when you were check airman?

9 A. I think the safety culture was not much different than it was
10 prior to me being a check airman. The safety culture that we had
11 built in place regarding special airports was built around having
12 a level of experience to start with. That level of experience
13 fell off drastically before bankruptcy; we lost a tremendous
14 amount of experience on all levels, all positions, and the policy
15 and procedures never kept up with that because it was happening so
16 quickly.

17 So the culture was there. The check airmen attitudes, the
18 discussions about people, potential candidates, all of this stuff
19 was there. But I don't think that the -- I don't see it as the
20 safety culture was drastically reduced, you know, from one day to
21 the next, if that -- does that answer your question?

22 Q. Yeah. Do you feel like you have a stake in this process with
23 the merger between PenAir and Ravn? And what I mean by that is
24 your experience, your knowledge, how does it contribute to, you
25 know, things that are changing between the companies? Do you feel

1 that, you know, as chief pilot, you're chief pilot, that what
2 you're going to do to provide your experience level, that some
3 good -- some changes are going to be made?

4 A. Prior to being the chief pilot, I would've said no, I didn't
5 feel I would have much influence. I don't think very many people
6 would feel the same -- I mean, that they would feel that they
7 would have much influence as well. Now that I'm chief pilot, I
8 feel I might have more influence because I feel more people are
9 listening to what I have to say which, in essence, is what the
10 pilot group has to say.

11 We want this company to survive; we want this company to be a
12 good company. There's a core group of guys here that want this to
13 be, you know, the best, safest company it can be. And I think now
14 PenAir will be able to have the ability to contribute some of
15 that. I'm hoping. At least that's my hope for this.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Dennis, that's all I have.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Tony?

18 BY MR. FISCHER:

19 Q. I just have one more. Who does the hiring, Dennis? Who does
20 the hiring for pilots? Is that something still retained?

21 A. I've sat in on a few interview processes, panels, I have --
22 you know, I have discussed candidates with the chief pilot from
23 Ravn because we interview together, and I have, you know, given my
24 opinion about whether this is a candidate we want to hire or not,
25 and that's as far as I've been involved with it. I don't know

1 who's making the final call on that. I haven't been involved with
2 a lot of it since November 1st, so --

3 Q. Is Dick involved with it?

4 A. I don't know. I don't believe he is involved with it much.

5 MR. FISCHER: Okay.

6 MR. FRANTZ: Brandon?

7 MR. WILSON: No questions.

8 BY MR. FRANTZ:

9 Q. I got one more, and I think Sathya has one more. You just
10 mentioned you've given feedback about some pilots that you
11 interviewed for -- has your feedback been heeded, disregarded, or
12 do you know, about the pilots?

13 A. From the few people that I've been involved with, we've had
14 one or two good candidates, and my opinion seemed to mesh really
15 well with the chief pilot of Ravn's, and then we've had one or
16 two, I think, that were not so good and the same thing.

17 Q. So no one has been hired, as far as you know, that you didn't
18 recommend?

19 A. Not that I can recall.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

21 Okay, Sathya, follow-ups?

22 BY DR. SILVA

23 Q. So when they're being hired, are they being hired for PenAir
24 or Ravn, these ones that you've been involved with?

25 A. The way they're hiring is they're trying to get the more

1 experienced people to kind of lean towards going into the PenAir
2 side and the less experienced guys to go in towards the Ravn side.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So there's a preconceived idea of where these people are
5 going to go before the interview starts and -- but I don't think
6 any of that's finalized until -- at least I don't -- I presume
7 when somebody's being interviewed for the Saab 2000, they're going
8 to be hired for the Saab 2000, so --

9 Q. Um-hmm. Okay. So you mentioned that -- you discussed your
10 interaction with Crystal as chief pilot. How was your interaction
11 with Ben, before Crystal?

12 A. With Ben? Ben was our chief pilot; I was just a line pilot.

13 Q. Um-hmm.

14 A. He's just -- I mean, I knew him; I've known him for years.

15 Q. Did you feel like you could bring up concerns and they would
16 be heard with him?

17 A. Yeah, I didn't have any problems talking to Ben.

18 Q. Um-hmm. And you mentioned that you put -- you stated clearly
19 that one of the conditions for you to take the chief pilot job was
20 that -- I'm putting words in your mouth, but that you wouldn't
21 tolerate pressure from Ravn -- or call it influence?

22 A. Right.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Why did you feel that you had to put that condition on --

1 A. Because I wanted to make it clear to the chain of command and
2 I had someone to answer to, and that's the director of ops and
3 then my boss, which is Brian Whilden.

4 Q. Um-hmm. So Brian's your boss?

5 A. He is ultimately the boss, yeah.

6 Q. Okay. Through the DO?

7 A. Through the DO, yeah, so --

8 Q. Okay. Okay. Did you feel like that line got blurred before
9 you took the position?

10 A. I just wanted to find the line. I don't know about how much
11 influence was going on. I just wanted them to be aware that I
12 didn't do this job to begin with, and I didn't want to do it as a
13 puppet.

14 Q. As a puppet, okay.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. All right, I understand.

17 A. Okay.

18 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

19 BY MR. FRANTZ:

20 Q. I've got another one. Were you a line check airman in the
21 340?

22 A. I was a simulator check airman.

23 Q. Okay. And how long did you do that?

24 A. Several years. I can't recall exactly.

25 Q. I'm looking for an org chart that I thought I had here, but

1 you said your boss is -- you work immediately right below the
2 director of operations?

3 A. I'm under the director, yeah. He controls --

4 Q. You're under, I'm sorry, who?

5 A. Under Dick Harding, the director of operations.

6 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Okay, I'll find it later. I thought you
7 guys brought this. I thought on the org chart you had the same
8 level, but okay. You're under the director of operations, okay.
9 All right, anything that we didn't -- oh, Dujuan.

10 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

11 Q. I just got one more. You mentioned the term puppet, and I
12 just wanted to ask, is that -- does that mean -- is that something
13 to do with the culture of the organization from the standpoint of,
14 if I say something is so, then it is so?

15 A. No, no, that's just my -- sometimes I'm not very articulate,
16 but that's just my way of expressing that, to -- under the
17 conditions of the job, I want to be, you know, the chief pilot
18 here. I don't want to be directed by somebody else. You know,
19 they're giving me instructions to do things outside of what our
20 policies are and stuff.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. No, I wasn't implying that at all.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

24 BY MR. FRANTZ:

25 Q. So I found this. For the record, I'm going to look at the

1 executive organization chart from the PenAir Corporate
2 Administrative Manual, Revision 2-1 of April of this year, April
3 19th. This has you on the same level as the DO, but is this
4 basically correct now? Has it been changed as far as you know
5 or --

6 A. Yeah, it's my understanding that I'm under the director of
7 ops, so --

8 Q. Okay. So you're down here somewhere.

9 A. I believe so, yeah.

10 Q. As the chief pilot, you're down here.

11 A. That might not be the -- that might be the executive -- like,
12 I don't know, the corporate way of it being organized.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I see Dick Harding as my overseer.

15 Q. Okay. Do you know if that's the latest revision?

16 A. I'd have to go bring it up and see.

17 Q. Twelve.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay, we can find that, too.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Okay. Anything we didn't ask you about that you think we
22 should have asked?

23 A. No, I can't think of any questions.

24 Q. Anybody else that you think we should talk to that we haven't
25 already talked to about this investigation?

1 A. I don't know. Who have you talked to? A lot of people, I'm
2 sure.

3 Q. It's more like who haven't we talked to.

4 A. Yeah. Have you talked to all the check airmen?

5 Q. All except the one on jury duty.

6 A. Oh, yeah, Iain. Okay.

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. No, I can't recall. Have you talked to Kirk Watson?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. I think he's -- he is one I'd recommend, but you already
13 spoke with him. And Dave Fiacco, did you speak with Dave Fiacco?

14 Q. No, who's he?

15 A. He's just the guy that does our manuals and stuff.

16 MR. WILSON: No, we talked to Dave Fiacco. He was here this
17 afternoon.

18 MR. FISHER: Dave Fiacco.

19 DR. SILVA: Oh, yeah. Sorry.

20 MR. FISHER: Our manual guy.

21 DR. SILVA: No, you're right. Yes, we have.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We won't tell him what a strong
23 impression he made.

24 (Laughter)

25 DR. SILVA: No, I didn't write -- the way I'm saying his name

1 in my head is different from how it's pronounced.

2 MR. FRANTZ: What's his position?

3 DR. SILVA: He was manager of flight -- flight safety?

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Flight standards or --

5 MR. FISHER: No, I don't know what his position is now. He
6 gets --

7 MR. FRANTZ: Is he on our list --

8 DR. SILVA: Yeah.

9 MR. FRANTZ: -- from yesterday? Oh.

10 DR. SILVA: The manager of flight safety.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Oh, I thought -- I was hearing a different name.
12 Yes. Okay.

13 MR. FISHER: No, I can't remember -- or I can't recommend
14 anybody else. I think you've talked -- you've spoken to all of
15 the big wheels.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. All right. Thank you, Dennis.

17 We'll go off the record.

18 (Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the interview concluded.)

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Dennis Fisher


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 3, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to
the recording accomplished at the hearing.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


David Martini
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/21/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: BRANDON WILSON
Line Pilot/Check Airman, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Monday,
December 2, 2019

APPEARANCES:

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Wilson)

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Brandon Wilson:	
By Dr. Silva	6
By Mr. Frantz	16
By Dr. Sevillian	27
By Dr. Silva	28
By Mr. Frantz	45
By Dr. Sevillian	52
By Dr. Silva	54
By Dr. Sevillian	60

I N T E R V I E W

(8:14 a.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: Thank you for speaking with us today. So I'm
4 going to run through a quick background of what we'll be doing and
5 what our expectations are of you.

6 You see a number of people in this room typically; right now
7 you only see NTSB. But we typically have representatives from the
8 operator and the FAA to help us with collecting the information,
9 because we're experts in investigation so we need the expertise
10 elsewhere of everything else too. So that's typically why we have
11 such a -- we normally have more people in the room. But you're
12 going to be the representative for our next interviews and then
13 maybe the FAA will get back to us.

14 So we'll run through -- again, I'm Sathya Silva. I'm a human
15 performance investigator with the NTSB.

16 Marvin, do you want to introduce yourself?

17 MR. FRANTZ: Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational factors
18 investigator with the NTSB.

19 DR. SILVA: Okay. And Dujuan.

20 DR. SEVILLIAN: I'm Dujuan Sevillian, human performance
21 investigator, NTSB.

22 DR. SILVA: Perfect. So we're here for safety. We're not
23 here to assign blame, liability, any of those sorts. Essentially
24 what will happen -- this is a little more formal than what we
25 normally do, but this recording will be sent, or this court

1 reporting will be transcribed, and it's essentially going to
2 become part of our public docket whenever the interviews --
3 whenever the factual information gets released, typically a year,
4 6 months to a year from now.

5 You're the expert. We want to learn from you. There are no
6 right or wrong answers. If you don't understand a question, feel
7 free to ask for clarification. If you need a break, just let us
8 know; everything's informal there.

9 You are entitled to a representative of your choice. Would
10 you like representation?

11 MR. WILSON: I've got Morgan here, yeah, thanks.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. So I'll start out with a handful of
13 questions, and then we'll go around our virtual -- or not our
14 virtual table, our actual table here, usually twice before
15 everyone gets a chance to answer everything else, everything they
16 have. And then we'll turn it over to you to see if you have
17 anything else you want to add that we didn't necessarily ask or
18 anything you wanted to clarify.

19 MR. WILSON: Sounds good.

20 DR. SILVA: Okay. Any questions before we start?

21 MR. WILSON: Did you want to brief me? I remember you
22 talking about briefing me, or is that next?

23 DR. SILVA: We'll do that afterwards.

24 MR. WILSON: Okay.

25 DR. SILVA: Yeah. Right now you are an interviewee. That is

1 your role.

2 MR. WILSON: Sounds good.

3 DR. SILVA: Great.

4 INTERVIEW OF BRANDON WILSON

5 BY DR. SILVA:

6 Q. Can you state your full name for the record, please?

7 A. Brandon Wilson.

8 Q. Okay. And what is your position here at PenAir?

9 A. Line pilot and check airman.

10 Q. And can you run through a CliffsNotes version of your
11 aviation experience from when you started flying to what got you
12 here?

13 A. I brought you a resume.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I'll just summarize really quick.

16 Q. Sure.

17 A. I started at PenAir in 2004 -- 2003, as a ramper, and I
18 worked my way up. I started in the Caravan as a first officer for
19 about a week and a half. They pulled me back into town for
20 another ground school. Went to Dutch Harbor for a year and a half
21 in the 1040, a turbine Navajo; did that for a year and a half. We
22 sold that airplane. Went back to the Caravan for a couple months,
23 and then I went to the Saab 340 for about 4 years.

24 Then I moved over to Everts Air Cargo, flew the DC-9 for a
25 year. And then I went to Security Aviation, flew a Conquest and a

1 Navajo for 2 years. PenAir called me up, asked me to come back,
2 and here I am. So I've been doing this for almost 2 years now in
3 the Saab 2000. And before all that, I went to the University of
4 Alaska and did my 4-year program, Bachelor of Science in Aviation.

5 Q. So what was -- do you remember your date of hire for this
6 recent stint at PenAir?

7 A. April of 2018.

8 Q. 2018?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. Do you have an idea of how many hours you have?

11 A. About 9,100.

12 Q. 9,100. What about in the Saab 2000?

13 A. I'll tell you exactly what I have.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I think it's about 1,400, but I will look. Just shy of
16 1,400.

17 Q. Okay. So who do you report to in your position here?

18 A. Today, Dennis Fisher.

19 Q. Okay. What about at the time of the accident?

20 A. Crystal Branchaud was my chief pilot.

21 Q. Have you flown with either of the accident pilots?

22 A. I did not fly with Paul Wells at all, ever. I flew with
23 Justin I think once or twice.

24 Q. Do you recall when that was?

25 A. Not off the top of my head, no. Maybe a month or two prior

1 to the accident.

2 Q. Okay. Do you remember where you went?

3 A. Dutch Harbor.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I believe it was Dutch Harbor.

6 Q. I know it's been a while, but can you go through what you
7 remember from that flight, what it was like flying with him?

8 A. He was pretty new. I kind of got his background, a little
9 bit about his life. I remember -- usually with new people, I have
10 three sheets of paper in my box downstairs, in there a topo map of
11 Dutch Harbor and a map of all the waypoints around Dutch Harbor,
12 and I try to give that to all the brand new co-pilots.

13 So I remember talking about that with him, like these are
14 important waypoints you need to memorize and visual conditions, so
15 when it is bad you can point them out and see them. So we talked
16 about that. Generally it was a pretty noneventful flight. You
17 know, it was a nice day, nice weather. We didn't have to work
18 very hard to get to Dutch Harbor back to Anchorage.

19 Q. How many times have you been into Dutch Harbor?

20 A. It's a pretty town, where I learned to fly. So I've been in
21 there a lot. So most of my career has been going to Dutch Harbor.
22 I couldn't tell you how many times off the top of my head.

23 Q. Yeah. Is it pretty consistent since you've been at PenAir in
24 the Saab 2000s, too?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. How would you describe the weather out there if you were to,
2 let's say, teach it to somebody?

3 A. It can be a challenge.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. You know, summertime, you get the summertime fog. The north
6 wind blows the fog right in, and it'll sit there for a week and
7 you won't go. Falltime you get squalls, wintertime squalls.
8 Springtime is hit or miss in between squalls or fog. So it's
9 just, it's hit or miss.

10 Q. When you're coming into the airport, is there any advice that
11 you tend to give pilots?

12 A. I try to teach them about the landmarks because that's
13 important. When I was a student pilot, one of my instructors
14 taught me, and it stuck with me ever since, is when it's bad
15 weather always try to have three points of reference so you know
16 exactly where you're at.

17 Q. Uh-huh.

18 A. And I try to do that with them. So I teach them, you know,
19 if you're doing the 3-1 approach, your missed approach point right
20 out the left window is Split Top, straight off to the left forward
21 is Summer's Bay, and off to the right you'll have Bayou and Split,
22 or the Spit; three points, know exactly where you're at before you
23 go in. So I try to teach things like that.

24 I try to teach them how to read the wind. What I do is I
25 have an idea what the wind's doing when I take off. I have an

1 idea of what's the wind doing while I'm en route because I can get
2 an update. And then, when I call in to get the weather, I compare
3 that with what I already have in my mind, and then I look at my
4 wind indicator, and then I -- the last thing I do to make sure
5 everything works is I look out the window and look at the water.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. So I try to do four different ways to figure out what the
8 weather's doing before I --

9 Q. What are you looking for in the water?

10 A. Well, if there's whitecaps. If there's whitecaps, I know
11 it's pretty windy. You look for a swell direction, and you can
12 look for direction of the wind from the swells to get a better
13 idea of what it's doing.

14 Q. Okay. And --

15 A. A small lake, you know, there's a small lake kind of by --
16 the missed approach point for 3-1 approach, there's a small lake.
17 And, you know, a small body of water, 12 knots of wind will start
18 forming whitecaps. So if there's no whitecaps, well, I know it's
19 not very windy.

20 Q. Um-hmm. When you call in for weather, what's the difference
21 between the en route phase of checking weather and calling in for
22 weather?

23 A. So the en route phase, you can call Dillingham radio or Cold
24 Bay radio. And that's a person sitting at that airport, and
25 they'll pull up the weather for that station, and you can get it

1 from them.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. They're at a desk hundreds of miles away. I call Dutch
4 weather, they're sitting up there -- and I don't know if you went
5 down there, but they've got a window overlooking everything, and
6 they have binoculars so they can see the wind at the end of the
7 runway, and you have wind sensors at the other two points, and
8 they know exactly what it's doing.

9 Q. Uh-huh.

10 A. They can tell you, oh, yeah, there's black water over the
11 Spit or, you know, over town it's clear. They're your eyes and
12 ears at the airport.

13 Q. Do you ever tune in to the AWOS? Is that part of procedure
14 at all?

15 A. No. I'd rather have someone with eyes looking at it. And
16 they're reading me what it says anyway.

17 Q. Okay. Are there -- have you noticed any inconsistencies in
18 the AWOS that lead you away from that, or is just you prefer --

19 A. I just, you know, I never use it. I remember using it a long
20 time ago when I was a co-pilot out there, and it was more accurate
21 to get the person to tell you what it was doing.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. It just had more reliability. They can see the things that
24 the weather machine can't.

25 Q. Um-hmm. So when captains essentially get qualified for these

1 special airports, can you describe what that training looks like?

2 A. I've only done less than a year of being a check airman at
3 PenAir, and I haven't signed anybody off for Dutch Harbor. Maybe
4 -- well, I can't remember, but it's generally something I don't --
5 haven't done, just because I haven't had the opportunity.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. But in order to do that, you know, they're -- in the GOM we
8 have guidelines of what you do. And it kind of states, you know,
9 you have 300 hours in the airplane. If you have less than that,
10 then you need to have 100 hours and recommendations from a check
11 airman, have in your file. And then you go on a flight to a
12 special, and we have a form that we fill out, and it just kind of
13 runs you down, you know, have the person talk about the runway
14 environment, normal procedures, abnormal procedures, things like
15 that.

16 Q. Have you done any special airport qualifications?

17 A. I did Crystal's for Kodiak.

18 Q. Kodiak.

19 A. And I think, I think I did Zach Thiel (ph.) for Sand Point.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I think those are the only two I've done.

22 Q. Okay. What's the documentation like once you've gone on
23 those flights?

24 A. I can show you if we can do that. But basically it's that
25 right there.

1 Q. Okay. So when do you fill this form out?

2 A. After the flight, if they satisfied --

3 Q. Is it immediately after the flight or do you have any --

4 A. I usually keep something like that in my flight bag, so it is
5 after flight, yeah. Or if I know I'm going to be doing a checkout
6 and I don't have it, I grab one. And that way I have it for
7 reference too.

8 Q. Yeah.

9 DR. SILVA: I'll get you an exhibit for this one.

10 BY DR. SILVA:

11 Q. Okay. How would you classify Justin as a co-pilot?

12 A. He was pretty new. Radio work was pretty good; he did that
13 well. You know, I know he pushed a wrong button on the
14 after-landing checklist, and that's kind of typical for new pilots
15 until they get things figured out. But he was right where I
16 expected him to be.

17 Q. How was CRM?

18 A. He was good. You know, he asked questions. I was more of --
19 I teach -- I like to teach them Dutch Harbor waypoints and how to
20 get in there, and it was more of that. But I didn't have any
21 complaints.

22 Q. So this flight that you did with him was as in your role as a
23 line pilot captain, not a check airman?

24 A. Um-hmm. It was -- yeah, right. I was just being a line
25 pilot.

1 Q. Okay. Can you describe your landing performance
2 calculations, essentially how you determine whether you have a
3 suitable amount of runway for landing?

4 A. So we have an airport analysis binder in our iPads. And on
5 our dispatch releases, our dispatchers calculate, okay, you're
6 going to land Dutch Harbor runway; they'll plan out which runway
7 you land. And it will say, you know, Dutch Harbor runway 1-3,
8 flaps 35, zero wind.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And it's up to you to go back and maybe add 10 knots of
11 headwind. And usually, you know, flaps 35, max brakes, runway --
12 usually the number is 46,114, and that's our max landing weight.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. So I reference what they tell me they're planning, and then I
15 look at it really quick, say oh, yeah, that's exactly what it is.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. So if I'm under this weight, then I can land there.

18 Q. Okay. So is there -- do you write down -- in your practice,
19 do you write down the flap settings and speeds that you would
20 expect to fly or is that kind of memorized?

21 A. We do. We have TOLD cards, and the FOs will go through,
22 okay, Dutch Harbor it's 21 feet, it's 4 degrees Celsius.

23 Q. Uh-huh.

24 A. And they write it all down, and then we'll lend flaps 35 and
25 it will show -- I don't know the speeds off the top of my head,

1 but they write them in there, and then usually it goes right on
2 the center console for quick reference. But we don't look at that
3 for our speeds. We program them into the airplane.

4 Q. Okay. What about flap settings?

5 A. We put it right here.

6 Q. It's on there?

7 A. Yeah, it's on there. Yeah.

8 Q. So you would know flaps. Okay. How often would you say you
9 land flaps 35?

10 A. Quite a bit lately.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Is that airport-specific or conditions?

14 A. Yeah. Dillingham, I try to do all flaps 35 now. King
15 Salmon, if I land in 1-2, I'll do flaps 35. And I try to mimic a
16 short field landing in King Salmon. Even though it's 8,500 foot a
17 runway, I still try to practice my short field technique when I
18 land 1-2 in King Salmon. Dillingham, it's not short by any means,
19 but it's a good place to practice it, too.

20 Q. So in Dutch Harbor, would you say that that's almost always a
21 flap 35, or how does that --

22 A. It depends on the conditions. If it's a really turbulent,
23 swirly day --

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. -- depending on where the wind's coming from. If it's a

1 headwind, flaps 35, and no problem. But if I'm getting quite a
2 bit of turbulence, I might do flaps 20.

3 Q. Okay. How often would you say that happens?

4 A. I can't give you a number. It just always depends on the
5 conditions.

6 Q. When did you say you started as a check airman here?

7 A. Sometime last spring. I went to sim in March, and then
8 ground school, observed flight by a company check airman, and then
9 an observed flight from the FAA. So it was sometime in March that
10 I went to sim, and then I want to say maybe April or May when I
11 actually started the duties of a check airman.

12 Q. And that was 2018 or 2019?

13 A. 2019.

14 Q. 2019. Okay.

15 DR. SILVA: Okay. I'm going to pause here and switch it over
16 to Marvin.

17 MR. WILSON: Okay.

18 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks.

19 BY MR. FRANTZ:

20 Q. When did you -- you've been at PenAir twice, this being your
21 second time?

22 A. Um-hmm.

23 Q. What was the time period for your first employment here?

24 A. As a pilot --

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. -- 2008 through 2014.

2 Q. Okay. Why'd you leave in 2014?

3 A. A different job.

4 Q. A better job? Like --

5 A. It was a jet.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Yeah. I mean, it was shorter flights. You did load and
8 unload the airplanes, but --

9 Q. So when you left PenAir back then, did you have any issues
10 with the company itself?

11 A. No.

12 Q. With PenAir?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. So you talked about this landing performance
15 information appears on your dispatch paperwork.

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. Do they actually --

18 MR. CAMPBELL: I'm sorry. You have to say yes or --

19 MR. WILSON: Oh; yes.

20 BY MR. FRANTZ:

21 Q. Is there a -- is the table or the information from the
22 airport analysis, is that also duplicated in the dispatch
23 paperwork or no?

24 A. No. We can look it up on the iPad.

25 Q. Okay. Does the dispatch paperwork indicate, at the time of

1 dispatch, what runway you'll probably use and what flap setting
2 you'll probably use and what CG you'll base your information on?

3 A. It doesn't give you the CG information, but on our
4 performance charts we use Alt CG-1 and Alt CG-2, and it will give
5 you your flaps; it'll give you the runway.

6 Q. On the --

7 A. On the dispatch release, yes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. But it doesn't give you what your CG is because we don't know
10 that yet.

11 Q. But you know it's -- tell me, what is this Alt CG-1 and 2;
12 what is that based on? Who makes a determination if the aircraft
13 is loaded to Alt CG-1 or Alt CG-2 and therefore you can use
14 numbers for those loadings? How does that work?

15 A. Our ops department down at the terminal, they are in charge
16 of doing our manifests of the weight and balance. And that's
17 where we -- that's how it's loaded, and they -- they have it all
18 down there. So I'm not quite sure what the question is. Who
19 determines if we're Alt CG, Alt CG-2?

20 Q. Right. What determines that you can use -- let me back up.
21 Does the captain, before every flight, does he spin a wheel to
22 determine CG for the flight once it's final load and everything?

23 A. You don't have to spin the wheel, but you can make sure it's
24 correct from the paperwork versus the whiz wheel. If it says
25 we're at this weight, this is our index, so you look down at your

1 index lines like, okay, we're Alt CG-1 or we're Alt CG-2.

2 Q. Is that information on the whiz wheel, the CG --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Alt CG-1 -- so are those ranges of CGs? If you're this range
5 you're Alt CG-1, if you're in this range you're Alt CG-2; is
6 that --

7 A. Yeah. It's on the whiz wheel.

8 Q. Okay. And that's based on, I guess, primarily loading of
9 cargo?

10 A. Um-hmm.

11 Q. Okay. Not -- would passenger loading also affect it?

12 A. It would, yeah. It would. So if you had everybody in the
13 back and the cargo in the back, will be more aft CG, which would
14 be Alt CG-2.

15 Q. How often is a flight not Alt CG-1 or Alt CG-2 loaded? Is
16 it --

17 A. From what I've seen, it's pretty rare.

18 Q. Okay. So when you leave at the point of dispatch, you know
19 your loading, you know your CG, you can look at the table, the
20 airport analysis. The only thing you don't really know is the
21 weather at your arrival, you don't know what your winds are; is
22 that right?

23 A. You have a pretty good idea.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. You pretty much have a pretty good idea of what you're going

1 to be doing as long as there isn't a big change.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. On days where it's calm, you might have a little bit of wind,
4 and those are days where it might vary.

5 Q. So when is the decision made, say, when to use -- what flap
6 setting to use?

7 A. It depends on the conditions. You know, if I'm looking at --
8 I generally try to plan that top of descent. If I'm listening to
9 the weather, okay, it's straight down the runway, we'll land flaps
10 35. Or if I've got a really bumpy, turbulent crosswind, okay,
11 maybe we'll do flaps 20 today.

12 Q. But around top of descent would be that point where --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. -- the captain would decide?

15 A. And sometimes I'll change it as I'm looking at it. I'm
16 looking at it and I might say, oh, you know what, let's do flaps
17 35 or let's do flaps 20; it's worse than I thought or better than
18 I thought.

19 Q. And so if you decide, say, to do flaps 20, which would
20 further restrict your landing weight, how do you know that you can
21 still land with flaps 20?

22 A. If I'm unsure of the conditions, I will have both reference
23 piece -- I check for both.

24 Q. No, I mean, how do you know that your performance is good
25 enough and your weight is okay to land at flaps 20 versus flaps --

1 A. Because I've already checked. I'll check for both flaps 20
2 and flaps 35. If I don't think I know which one I'm going to do
3 by the time I get there, I'll check for both conditions.

4 Q. Okay. And by checking, does that mean you look at the
5 airport analysis chart --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and determine if you're under whatever the limit weight is
8 there for what you want to do, flaps 35 or flaps 20?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. And the wind, whatever the wind is there?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. So you talked about the airport, the special
13 qualifications. Does PenAir call it a special qualification or
14 special airport qualification, or what is it officially called
15 when you -- PIC has to meet the requirements of 300 hours, a check
16 airman flight and everything? Is that called a special airport;
17 is that what it's --

18 A. Special airport qualification.

19 Q. Okay. So you filled out this form?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. All I see on here is just a signature, a name, and a
22 check airman's name. So is there any record made anywhere that
23 stays part of a record as far as notes for the flight, how the
24 pilot performed or any comments about his performance during a
25 flight when you're trying to qualify him for a special airport?

1 A. We don't have anything that I've been taught for doing that.
2 It's more probably a verbal brief after the flight.

3 Q. And what are you -- is there any -- do you have any -- as a
4 check airman, do you have -- what guidance do you have on how to
5 conduct a special airport qualification?

6 A. Can I see that form? Right here.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So this is -- it talks lesson elements, you know, a briefing,
9 preflight planning, normal takeoff, en route, and landing
10 procedures, abnormal considerations, and a debrief.

11 Q. Okay. So more detailed than this, though, there's nothing in
12 writing, like what abnormal considerations. So that's just based
13 on your experience as a check airman or your knowledge of that
14 airport. You're taught you're supposed to cover those items; is
15 that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. So there's nothing more detailed than this right
18 here --

19 A. Not that I know of.

20 Q. -- qualifying someone? Okay. How many -- let's see, you've
21 done -- how many total special airport qualifications with PenAir
22 have you done?

23 A. I believe it's just two.

24 Q. Okay. Is it typically -- and from your experience and from
25 what you know of other check airmen or other people qualifying, is

1 it typically just one flight that gets -- can get a PIC, or
2 usually gets a PIC, qualified and signed off for an airport?

3 A. It's kind of whatever is necessary. You know, sometimes you
4 can't always go. So they might be scheduled for a flight and you
5 don't go.

6 Q. Right. But once you complete a flight there and back, is
7 that usually satisfy -- from what you know, is that when --
8 typically it's one flight there and back that gets the person --
9 will be able to sign them off; is that --

10 A. Generally I would say that's safe to assume. Keep in mind,
11 you know, a lot of the people that have worked at PenAir and doing
12 these special checkouts have been here a long time and know the
13 area.

14 Q. Sure. What is a wind chart?

15 A. It's something they produced a long time ago. I believe it
16 was Medallion Foundation. And it just breaks down the runway
17 environment, and you have quadrants, and from this quadrant you
18 can take this much wind and --

19 Q. So, yeah, how do you use that -- as a pilot, how do you or
20 what do you -- where does the wind chart come into your planning
21 or preparation or guidance for flying the flight or not?

22 A. I look at -- it's only a guideline, but I look at it as
23 regulatory in my personal belief. If I take out a taxi light, and
24 the FAA comes and says, hey, your wind chart says 20 knots but it
25 was 25 when you landed, I look at that as something, my personal

1 self, like I'm not going to go outside that chart because I want
2 to protect myself, the company, and the passengers.

3 Q. Okay. Do you know if it's a PenAir regulation, rule or
4 requirement that you strictly adhere to those limits on the chart,
5 or --

6 A. We stick to them.

7 Q. -- is it just guidance?

8 A. No, we stick to them. If it's outside the wind charts,
9 dispatch doesn't even want us to go.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. So we stick to them.

12 Q. Have you ever landed at Dutch Harbor with a tailwind?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Have you ever had to change your planned approach or your
15 planned runway because, as you got closer, you learned that there
16 was a wind shift, and now you deviate to the other runway to avoid
17 a tailwind?

18 A. I have, yes.

19 Q. How common is that?

20 A. It's pretty rare.

21 Q. It's pretty rare?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. Assuming it's VFR at Dutch Harbor, how much more
24 difficult is the 3-1 approach than the 1-3 approach? Just like on
25 a -- whatever scale you want, how much -- why would you prefer one

1 or the other, and how hard is it to change from one to the other?

2 A. On a VFR day, no winds, either one of them works for me. I
3 don't have a preference for runways.

4 Q. Okay. Is there, do you know, at PenAir, or just informally
5 or formally, is there a preferred approach -- given all other
6 things being equal, is there a preferred approach at Dutch?

7 A. Whichever one the wind's favoring.

8 Q. Okay. So we've heard people talk about the turn to final
9 coming in on 3-1 is a little more difficult; you see things later
10 or you line up later. Is that -- what do they mean by that, do
11 you know?

12 A. For me, I don't have an issue with it. I try to do the same
13 thing every single time. I stay on the upwind side of the
14 mountains. I hit the city dump at 500 feet; I hit Rocky Point at
15 300 feet, nice stabilized approach. I don't have an issue with
16 it. I see how some people could if they're not familiar with the
17 area, but I don't see it any more difficult than the other side.

18 Q. Okay. When you were an FO, and now that you're overseeing an
19 FO, what does the FO supposed to be looking for when he looks for
20 tire -- looks at the tires on a pre-flight inspection?

21 A. Make sure there's not chunks missing out of them, flat spots,
22 cords missing, looking at the wear pins, general condition of the
23 tire.

24 Q. Okay. Have you ever had -- as an FO or as a captain, have
25 you had an FO bring an item, an issue to your attention about a

1 tire? Let's limit it to the Saab, the 340 or the 2000.

2 A. Not that I can think of, no.

3 Q. No?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any -- since you've been back at
6 PenAir, has there been any tire failures that you're aware of on
7 takeoff or landing?

8 A. Not that I'm aware of, no.

9 Q. Have you ever gotten any kind of warning -- or I'm not sure
10 what Saab calls it, it might be a master caution or caution, but
11 any indication of malfunctioning anti-skid system?

12 A. No.

13 Q. On any Saab?

14 A. No. I've never had any brake issues or tire issues.

15 Q. Back to the qualification for special airport. When you were
16 at PenAir, your first run here, was Dutch Harbor a special airport
17 then?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you remember, were the qualifications the same or the
20 criteria the same to fly there as they are now?

21 A. No, that was a long time. I don't quite remember, but I
22 remember some of the new captains that upgraded, I think they
23 needed to wait until they had 300 hours to do a qualification
24 ride.

25 Q. Okay. You've done -- did you say you've done two special

1 airport qualifications since you've been here?

2 A. I think it was -- I think it's been two.

3 Q. Do you know if -- were both or either of those based on the
4 waiver of if the person had less than 300 hours PIC with PenAir
5 but they had the -- and they met the 100-hour waiver condition,
6 was either of them in that category?

7 A. I can't remember.

8 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Okay. Thanks, Brandon. That's all I
9 have for now.

10 DR. SILVA: Do you need a break at all?

11 MR. WILSON: No, I'm okay.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. Dujuan?

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. I have a couple.

14 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

15 Q. So have there been any pilots to your knowledge that have not
16 been qualified to fly into Dutch Harbor due to their flying
17 performance?

18 A. No. I don't think so.

19 Q. Okay. And beyond the Medallion wind chart, is there anything
20 that PenAir specifies as far as a wind limitation flying into
21 Dutch Harbor?

22 A. We stick pretty religiously to the wind charts.

23 Q. Okay. You talked about the Medallion Foundation chart, you
24 called it a guideline, and then you said, well, it's regulatory
25 from your perspective. Is that typically -- is that common

1 culture to sometimes look at things as regulatory from personal
2 perspective in some of the guidelines?

3 A. What you're asking is, you know, if I -- if there's only a
4 guideline out there, do I take that as regulatory?

5 Q. Right.

6 A. I do.

7 Q. Is that common amongst most pilots, you think?

8 A. I think most people I've ran into aren't going to exceed the
9 wind charts. There's no reason for it. If your -- they're there
10 for a reason, and that's to keep us safe.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right, that's all I had. Thank
12 you.

13 DR. SILVA: So I just wanted to follow up on some of the
14 questions Marvin had.

15 BY DR. SILVA:

16 Q. Did you have to do airport qualification for Dutch Harbor?

17 A. I did, yes.

18 Q. What did that look like?

19 A. The people that checked me out, I -- they were my mentors
20 when I was a co-pilot when I was in Dutch Harbor. They knew I
21 knew the area. They knew that I knew the terrain and everything.
22 So a majority of it was when I was on OE, I went to Dutch Harbor
23 every single day with a check airman when I was on OE. And then
24 they had me sit for 300 hours, and then I did my checkout.

25 Q. Okay. So you had to wait till you got 300 hours to do the

1 checkout?

2 A. Yeah. They wanted -- they did want me to get signed off
3 early, but they're like, no, we're just going to wait till 300.

4 Q. Okay. And that was 300 hours in the aircraft?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. When was that?

7 A. Well, I started OE in June, and I want to say I got my
8 sign-off somewhere in maybe September of 2018.

9 Q. Okay. So I'm understanding correctly, this piece of paper
10 wasn't signed off until you had 300 hours?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Did you do --

13 A. And I did do a flight with a check airman.

14 Q. So you did a flight after the 300 hours?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. With a check airman?

17 A. Um-hmm.

18 Q. Okay. So what was the purpose of the OE flight, would you
19 say?

20 A. The purpose?

21 Q. Right. So you said you flew to Dutch Harbor consistently
22 during your OE?

23 A. Um-hmm. And that's just -- to do the OE, that's required by
24 the FAA. I went to Dutch Harbor, but I also went to other places.
25 I was just flying a regular schedule on the line with a check

1 airman.

2 Q. Do you remember how -- from your first flight without a check
3 airman to Dutch Harbor, do you recall how much time had passed
4 between your check-out and that flight?

5 A. I think it was pretty quick.

6 Q. Okay. Do you keep track of your hours?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So these qualification numbers, how does the company -- from
9 your understanding, how does the company keep track of those
10 milestones?

11 A. We have a program called SkedFlex.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And it keeps track of all our hours.

14 Q. Do you know if those are kind of like an automatic thing,
15 where there's --

16 A. I don't think it's an automatic trigger, like, oh, so-and-so
17 has 100, so-and-so has 300.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I think they can just go in there and look.

20 Q. Okay. Were you ever assigned to fly into any special
21 airports without getting a qualification ride?

22 A. No. When I was on OE with a check airman, the weather was
23 bad in Dutch and we did divert to Sand Point, which is another
24 special airport. But I was with a check airman, and that's okay
25 to do.

1 Q. Okay. So when you -- let's say you do have to divert to an
2 airport that is qualified as a special airport, are you able to do
3 that? Let's say you don't have the airport qualification for that
4 diversion airport; are you able to do that as a pilot, to take
5 that liberty?

6 A. It is in our -- I believe it is on that sheet, that if I'm
7 signed off for Dutch Harbor, I have the qualification sign-off, I
8 go to Dutch, my alternate's Sand Point; I divert, I can go to Sand
9 Point.

10 Q. You can go into Sand Point?

11 A. Yeah. But that is extremely rare.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I don't think it would even happen. If you get a sign-off,
14 we'll probably get you all your sign-offs right away.

15 Q. Okay. As far as you know, does scheduling have that
16 information of what airports you're qualified to go into?

17 A. They do have it, yeah.

18 Q. Okay. Do they -- it doesn't sound like they put -- in terms
19 of alternates, they don't necessarily include that into their --

20 A. That's something to ask them. That's a program I'm not too
21 familiar with, other than getting my schedule.

22 Q. Okay. So when you sign that piece of paper as a pilot, did
23 you do this after that 300-hour flight, checkout flight?

24 A. For myself?

25 Q. For yourself.

1 A. Yes. We did do one of those, yes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Well, the check airman did. I didn't do it.

4 Q. You didn't?

5 A. He did.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. He did it.

8 Q. Did you have to sign it?

9 A. I believe I did sign it.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yep, there it is.

12 Q. Okay. And do you sign it before the chief pilot signs it?

13 A. I do, yeah.

14 Q. Okay. And do you get any record of this, this documentation?

15 A. It goes in the pilot records.

16 Q. Okay. Do you see it at all?

17 A. After I sign it? No.

18 Q. Yeah. Okay. How often have you done a go-around in the Saab

19 2000?

20 A. I've done many, many missed approaches.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Go-arounds? I think I did one last summer when the tower

23 here in Anchorage told me to go around due to traffic.

24 Q. Okay. What does training look like when it comes to actual

25 go-arounds?

1 A. They take care of that down in sim.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. It's pretty common for them to have you come in and land and
4 say, oh, firetruck on the runway or airplane on the runway, and
5 you go around. Or they'll put a plane on the runway, and you have
6 to decide to go around.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So they cover it down there.

9 Q. Um-hmm. As far as you can remember, are there any situations
10 that require more decision making in terms of assessing the winds
11 or the weather when deciding whether to go around, or is something
12 more clear like an incursion?

13 A. I've never had a go-around due to weather.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. It's mostly been brought on by air traffic control telling me
16 to go around.

17 Q. I see. Okay. And follow-up on the tire conversation from
18 earlier, do you often do walk-arounds as a captain?

19 A. End of the day, I'll generally do a post-flight walk-around.
20 And I do -- I walk around in front of the airplane, and I do
21 walk-arounds, even though usually it's an FO duty, I do them.
22 Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. So when you are doing those, what are you looking for
24 in the tire assemblies?

25 A. Like what we talked about before: no chunks missing, no

1 tears, no cords showing, no flat spots, general condition of the
2 wear pins, make sure you have enough wear pins showing, make sure
3 all the hydraulic hoses are there and not leaking. And you can do
4 that pretty quick. Sometimes I'll go kick the tires just as a
5 habit.

6 Q. Okay. So let's say there was a flat spot, what does that
7 mean for you?

8 A. To me it means someone might have locked up for a second.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. We're not going to have -- get tires like that put on, so
11 something happened on line.

12 Q. Is that something that you would request maintenance for, or
13 is there a certain amount that you would go?

14 A. I would. I'd call maintenance.

15 Q. Okay. Did you say, have you seen flat spots before?

16 A. No, I have not.

17 Q. Okay. So, let's say, based on again your knowledge of the
18 aircraft, if you were to have an issue with the anti-skid, is
19 there anything you would necessarily see on the tires, again from
20 your understanding of the system?

21 A. As I'm flying and land, or --

22 Q. Or just in terms of inspection of the tires and things like
23 that, what --

24 A. If the anti-skid wasn't working on the plane?

25 Q. Yeah, let's say something was failed there.

1 A. I just never had it happen, so --

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. You know, if the anti-skid's not working and you locked a
4 tire up, you'll probably get a flat spot.

5 Q. Um-hmm. Would that be on multiple tires or just one tire,
6 from your --

7 A. It depends. I've never had it happen, so --

8 Q. Okay. And going back to when you're doing your airport
9 analysis. What weather information are you using to do the
10 airport analysis?

11 A. I'll use the weather that was given to me from the weather
12 observer in Dutch Harbor.

13 Q. Okay. So you use those winds?

14 A. It's the most current, yeah.

15 Q. Okay. How far out from the airport would that be?

16 A. It's about 80 miles out; 20 minutes or so.

17 Q. Okay, 20 minutes. Is there any reason or procedure that
18 would have you wanting to do that earlier in the flight?

19 A. You can't necessarily call too early due to the radio
20 reception.

21 Q. Okay. Because you won't get it?

22 A. Right. You won't get it, yeah.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. But you can call Cold Bay Radio, and they can give you
25 weather if you need it.

1 Q. Okay. And they're just using the AWOS?

2 A. Yes. Well, they use the weather that is put out as the
3 METAR.

4 Q. Right. Okay. Got it. And when you did your OE, did you fly
5 with one check airman the whole time or did you --

6 A. We had three, and I flew with all three. Majority of it was
7 with one check airman, but I did fly with all three before I was
8 signed off.

9 Q. Okay. And when -- I'm going to switch to your role here as a
10 check airman. So when you're doing the paperwork for OE and
11 you're noting the flights that were taken for OE, is that filled
12 out by all of the check airman that flew with the pilot, or is it
13 mainly the one that did the majority?

14 A. Whoever flies with that person fills out that section for the
15 day. So we have a form, you know, date, flight, routing, and how
16 many lands that person did.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And so that person carries that form around with them, and
19 for every check airman they fly with, they fill it out after the
20 flight with the hours and landings.

21 Q. And that's been consistent since you've been a check airman
22 here?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. So it's not something that's filled out at the very
25 end?

1 A. No. You do it at the end of the flight.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. So every flight that a pilot flies for OE should be
5 documented on that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. On that sheet of paper. Okay. After you get the initial
8 weather check from Dutch Weather, say, like 80 miles out, how --
9 do you solicit more information coming into the airport? How does
10 that look?

11 A. It depends on the day. You know, if I'm fighting poor
12 visibility, I'll try and get as many updates on visibility as I
13 can. If I go missed, I call Jen and say, hey, what's it doing?
14 It's not what you reported it as.

15 Or maybe -- what can happen is, you know, it might be worse
16 out to the north and inside the Bay it's better, and so you might
17 not be able to see it. For them it's good, but for you, the
18 pilot, it's not.

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. So I'll try and get another weather briefing once I'm in the
21 hold at the missed, and to see if I should continue holding or go
22 over to Cold Bay.

23 Q. Okay. This is backing up a little bit, but can you describe
24 your roles and responsibilities as a check airman here?

25 A. Make sure everybody's doing what they're supposed to do,

1 following the CFM. I do training for the new co-pilots, new
2 captains, line checks.

3 Q. Okay. Ground training for the new, or --

4 A. I don't do ground, no.

5 Q. You do flight training?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Okay. Only for the new FOs?

8 A. And captains.

9 Q. And captains. How much of your time would you say is split
10 between the check airman role and the line pilot role?

11 A. The majority of what I've been doing is line pilot. You
12 know, I started check airman duties in the spring. We had a
13 couple FOs come through, nothing throughout the summer, and then I
14 just started doing more check airman stuff 2 to 3 weeks ago as we
15 got more applicants.

16 Q. Okay. How many check airmen does the company have?

17 A. Today, two; myself and Iain.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Dennis is busy doing check -- or chief pilot duties. And we
20 have two that are coming through the pipeline, Adam and Zach
21 Thiel.

22 Q. Do you recall, did that change in the last month or 2 months,
23 whenever the accident occurred? Did you have those three?

24 A. There was the three of us. There was myself, Iain, and
25 Dennis.

- 1 Q. Got it. Okay.
- 2 A. Steve Hakala was doing it but is not anymore.
- 3 Q. Okay. Do you know why he --
- 4 A. His house was destroyed in the earthquake, so he's trying to
5 build a new house.
- 6 Q. Okay. So he took time.
- 7 A. Yeah.
- 8 Q. Okay. So you were hired on as a captain?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. For the Saab, okay. Has the company had any changes -- made
11 any changes since the accident that you're aware of?
- 12 A. We don't go to Dutch Harbor anymore.
- 13 Q. Okay. Any other -- anything else?
- 14 A. We are -- we had three applicants who were going to upgrade.
15 They didn't have 500 type -- or 500 in the airplane, and so we
16 bumped them back to the right seat till they have 500 in the
17 airplane to go back to the left seat.
- 18 Q. Okay.
- 19 A. That's all I can think of right off the top of my head.
- 20 Q. That's been new?
- 21 A. Yeah.
- 22 Q. Is there a requirement for 500, for captain upgrade?
- 23 A. It is going to be now.
- 24 Q. Okay. And that's only who are upgrading from FO to captain?
- 25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. So when you hire in --

2 A. I don't know what their policies are. I mean, they're
3 working them out right now.

4 Q. Okay. Okay. From your perspective, both from a line pilot
5 perspective and a check airman perspective, how have things
6 changed between before the merger to after the merger in terms of
7 operations?

8 A. From a pilot perspective?

9 Q. From your perspective in the company.

10 A. From my perspective? You know, the pay scale's changed.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. It's gone up. I generally just kind of do my job and fly,
13 and I haven't had too many changes affecting me.

14 Q. Was there a management change with that, with the merger?

15 A. We did get a new chief pilot because our old chief pilot
16 moved on to another company. Crystal came in from the Ravn side.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. There's been, in the safety department, I think there's more
19 Ravn pilots than PenAir people in there. A lot of faces I don't
20 recognize.

21 Q. Okay. So have -- in terms of any changes there, you haven't
22 noticed any changes in operations from that perspective?

23 A. No, not -- I mean, we've changed our terminal location.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Nothing I can think of right now on top of my head; no.

1 Q. Uh-huh. How would you describe the safety culture here?

2 A. I think it's changed a little bit. I know over the summer
3 there was a pilot meeting, and we had Deke, Sarah Fraher, and
4 Crystal Branchaud in it, and they were talking about getting rid
5 of the qualification needs for Dutch Harbor. And I wasn't too
6 happy about it, and I closed the door with the three of them in
7 Crystal's office and said, hey, I don't think this is a good idea;
8 I don't think you should do it. So --

9 Q. What was -- do you recall what their reasoning was for that?

10 A. No.

11 Q. So they had a meeting -- is it with all the pilots?

12 A. Whoever could attend.

13 Q. Whoever could attend, on getting rid of those qualifications?

14 A. It wasn't -- that wasn't what the purpose of the meeting.
15 The purpose was general, this is what the company's going through,
16 these are the things that are changing.

17 Q. Got it.

18 A. It was just a general pilot meeting.

19 Q. Okay. Do you know what the result of that was?

20 A. Of the meeting?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. It was more information for the pilots.

23 Q. So when you -- when it came to discussing getting rid of the
24 qualifications for Dutch Harbor, do you know if that actually got
25 enacted?

1 A. Well, it did. I mean, Paul didn't meet 300 hours in the
2 airplane.

3 Q. So in terms of the qualification, from the form as it is
4 today, you have the 300-hour requirement or 100 hours plus
5 sign-off.

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. So did that 100-hour option not exist before?

8 A. It did, because it was on the form here. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay. So when you say he didn't meet the 300 hours, did he
10 meet the other qualification for 100 hours?

11 A. I don't know his flight time.

12 Q. Okay. So from your understanding, do you know of other
13 pilots -- I guess in your experience here -- I'm assuming here as
14 a check airman, how often would you go from -- would pilots not
15 classify -- not qualify from the 300 hours but may qualify from
16 the 100-hour requirement?

17 A. I don't know the hours of the pilots here.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I could look, but I -- it's not something I do.

20 Q. So when you're doing a qualification, airport qualification,
21 is that any -- do you get any feedback on that, their hours with
22 the company?

23 A. I -- you know, I've only done two. And no one says, okay,
24 this person has this many hours. It's generally, okay, this is --
25 you're scheduled to do a sign-off today with this person.

1 Q. Okay. So you don't get any feedback on that?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. But when you went through it, it sounds like you had
4 to wait until 300 hours?

5 A. I did, yeah. The check airman wanted me to do it sooner, but
6 somewhere in the company said, no, just have him wait until 300.

7 Q. Okay. Did you know that there was that other alternative
8 when you were going through the airport qual?

9 A. No. I wasn't concerned about it.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I was happy doing what I was doing.

12 Q. Got it. So going back to the culture -- I appreciate the
13 example. When you say it's changed, what did it go from to what
14 did it go to?

15 A. As far as the culture?

16 Q. Um-hmm, safety culture.

17 A. Well, I mean, they still want to run the safe airline. But
18 as far as the Dutch Harbor requirements, you know, there was a lot
19 of -- I didn't want it to change. I wanted people to have time in
20 the airplane.

21 Q. Have you ever gotten pressure to fly from the company?

22 A. No. No, I don't generally tolerate that from any manager. I
23 just walk away, you know, I'm not doing that.

24 Q. Have you ever been approached with anything like that here?

25 A. No.

1 Q. And in your interaction really with other pilots, has anyone
2 voiced any concerns about that?

3 A. Of being pressured to go?

4 Q. Uh-huh.

5 A. No, not that I can think of.

6 Q. How do you like working here?

7 A. I enjoy it.

8 Q. What's your favorite thing about the job?

9 A. I get to fly with people I know.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. It's just -- they're not a number. When you go to major and
12 you sit next to someone for a week, and it might be the only time
13 you ever see them in your life.

14 Q. How many pilots do you have? Do you know?

15 A. It changes all the time. I don't even keep track anymore. I
16 know we have a lot of co-pilots and not as many captains.

17 Q. Yeah. If you could change anything about your job, what
18 would it be?

19 A. Well, of course more money.

20 Q. Okay. Anything else?

21 A. I want to go back to Dutch Harbor. That was a good route.

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. Generally now what we do is just up, down. Dutch Harbor you
24 do get time en route to kind of talk to the other person, and I
25 used that time for OE to do more scenario-based training. I gave

1 them a scenario and was like, what would you do?

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I don't have a lot of time to do that in the shorter flights.

4 Q. Okay. How would you characterize morale amongst the pilot
5 group?

6 A. I came to the company, again, when the merger or the
7 bankruptcy was going on; a lot of people were leaving. We lost a
8 lot of talent. We lost a lot of mechanics. Ravn gave the rampers
9 an ultimatum, okay, you're going to take a pay cut or you're going
10 to leave. So it's gone down quite a bit.

11 Q. Okay.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. We're going to go around one more time.

13 Marvin.

14 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks.

15 BY MR. FRANTZ:

16 Q. You came in back, your second time here, in the middle of
17 when the merger was sort of in progress, would you say?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And why -- what's your understanding of why they were -- so
20 many pilots were leaving at that point?

21 A. Uncertainty, I think, of what was going to happen. And there
22 is a pilot shortage, the majors are hiring like crazy, and they're
23 very qualified people, and --

24 Q. Uncertainty though, in that they didn't even know if the
25 airline would continue or how it would continue, would they be

1 able to be working there in the future; is that what you mean by
2 uncertainty?

3 A. You know, I came into it with a lot of people already gone.
4 And I wasn't here, so I don't know why they left. But with any
5 bankruptcy I think there's uncertainty, and I think they're just
6 looking out for their bottom end.

7 Q. Sure. Okay.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Looking out for their bottom end, I
9 like that.

10 MR. WILSON: Bills have got to be paid.

11 BY MR. FRANTZ:

12 Q. Can you tell me -- can you briefly describe how the use of
13 the airport analysis chart and how just generically landing
14 performance, how that's taught and trained to a new hire FO? How
15 does he -- or a new hire captain, if you're brought in as a
16 captain.

17 A. Well, they go through it in ground school, landing
18 performance day, where they go over performance. And then in the
19 airplane what I've been doing is, for every single landing, we
20 pull it out, and I have them go through it or I go through it.
21 And we verify that yes, indeed, we are landing below the weight
22 that the APG binder says we are.

23 Q. Do you know if that, that you just described, is a formal
24 part of PenAir requirements, flows, part of a checklist or
25 anything like that?

1 A. Well, it's not a flow, but if you look in the CFM, you know,
2 the en route phase, it talks about going over these things.

3 Q. Okay. When you were -- I apologize -- I didn't write it
4 down. When did you leave PenAir the first time?

5 A. 2014.

6 Q. Were you a captain?

7 A. FO.

8 Q. Okay. Did you have any captain experience in any aircraft at
9 PenAir previously?

10 A. No.

11 Q. No? Okay. Let's go back to the 300 and 100 requirement.

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. That 300/100, it says, 300 hours PIC experience in PenAir
14 aircraft. So if when a captain is getting -- or 100 with the
15 waiver. When a captain is getting OE, do you know if -- and you
16 may not know the answer -- does PenAir count his OE time towards
17 the 100 hours of PIC in PenAir aircraft, or 300, to meet the
18 special airport requirements?

19 A. I don't know off the top of my head, but I think it's off of
20 OE. You know, I'm not sure.

21 Q. Sure. Yeah, that's something we can ask somebody who deals
22 with that directly. Describe your -- give me your overall
23 impression of your simulator training in the 2000.

24 A. I've done quite a bit of simulator training through various
25 121 companies. I think it's pretty on par of everything I've

1 done. It's pretty standard, you know, the week and a half of
2 training, check ride, and then LOFT. Pretty standard.

3 Q. Was it -- what about just the quality?

4 A. I thought it was good.

5 Q. How does that compare to other 121 and 135 training you've
6 gone through?

7 A. I thought it was good.

8 Q. During the simulator training, is there any element of that
9 that involves using the performance charts or the airport analysis
10 charts, or is that a routine part of a simulator session, you
11 would consider an airport analysis chart during a simulator
12 flight?

13 A. For the LOFT portion.

14 Q. For the LOFT?

15 A. Um-hmm.

16 Q. Okay. Is there any of the performance analysis and airport
17 analysis elements that we talked about, any of that actually
18 taught down in Florida?

19 A. We do it before they leave.

20 Q. It's done here in ground school?

21 A. Um-hmm.

22 Q. Okay. You talked about this meeting, talked about the
23 meeting -- I guess it was -- was it summer of 2018, where you went
24 in and said, I don't think you should eliminate this requirement?
25 Was that 2018, summer?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And the discussion was they were considering eliminating the
3 Dutch Harbor as a special airport, eliminating that 300/100
4 requirement; is that --

5 A. Not eliminating Dutch Harbor as special. It's always going
6 to be a special.

7 Q. Eliminating --

8 A. But the requirement.

9 Q. -- the 300 -- at that time, do you know, was it still 300/100
10 with a waiver?

11 A. I believe it was.

12 Q. And the discussion was, we want to just maybe get rid of that
13 requirement?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And then out of that, though, no changes were made as far as
16 you know; is that right, to this requirement?

17 A. From my recommendation?

18 Q. Yeah. Or no, just out of that -- yeah, from your
19 recommendation or -- the company didn't change anything after
20 that?

21 A. I don't remember.

22 Q. Okay. But we know that right now this is still in place.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And just to clarify, when you got special airport qualified
2 you had 300, but some people were saying -- like the check airman
3 you flew with said you should go ahead and do it now with 100
4 hours, right, and then the decision --

5 A. I don't remember the, I don't remember the hours I had when
6 they said that, but because I had gone there so many times and I
7 learned to fly there.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. But --

10 Q. Was he advocating that you get qualified under the 100-hour
11 waiver, though? You had less than 300 but you had more than 100;
12 was he advocating --

13 A. I don't know why he was justifying it, but he just said, I
14 wish we could just sign you off now.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But we waited till I had 300.

17 Q. And was that a company decision or was it -- who, I mean --

18 A. I don't know whose decision it was.

19 Q. Yeah, okay. And was -- when you had this discussion summer
20 of 2018 about Dutch Harbor and special -- or the requirement, was
21 Dutch Harbor the only airport that was discussed as maybe
22 eliminating this -- of the other special airports, was Dutch
23 Harbor the only one that was talked about getting rid of the
24 300/100?

25 A. Well, at that time I think we were only doing Dutch and Sand

1 Point. I don't know if we were doing Kodiak yet.

2 Q. Okay. Do you know if Sand Point was a part of them --
3 eliminating the requirement for Sand Point as well? Or do you
4 know?

5 A. I don't know what their plan was.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I just told them I don't think it's a good idea.

8 Q. Okay. Okay, let me just make sure. I think I've got
9 everything. Oh, the -- so what's your understanding -- as a check
10 airman, what's your understanding in the sequence of events to get
11 a PIC qualified? Does he have to have -- the 300/100 with a check
12 airman sign-off, does he have to have that first before he gets
13 the special airport training, you know, the one flight or whatever
14 with the check airman, or can he have that check airman training
15 flight before he reaches 100/300?

16 A. That I don't know.

17 Q. You don't know. Okay. In your case, did you say -- or was
18 it -- in your case you didn't have the 300 hours, but you got
19 signed off?

20 A. No, I did.

21 Q. Oh, you didn't get --

22 A. I did have the 300.

23 Q. Yeah. Right, right, right. Okay. And did you -- and then
24 after you reached -- after you hit 300, did you then go on a
25 flight with a check airman to sign you off --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- for Dutch?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. After you hit the 300 hours with PenAir PIC?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. Who was the check airman?

7 A. I believe it was Brent Kennedy. I can't remember off the top
8 of my head, but I believe it was Brent Kennedy.

9 Q. And when was that? This year?

10 A. I'm guessing September of 2018.

11 Q. Of 2018. Okay.

12 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think that's all I have. Thanks,
13 Brandon.

14 Dajuan.

15 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

16 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

17 Q. Do you know if PenAir has a safety management system?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And what is generally covered, you know, in the safety
20 management system, high level?

21 A. As far as what's taught in ground school?

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. I can't remember. I did that almost 2 years ago.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I know I have it on my iPad, so if I need to reference

1 something, I can pull it up.

2 Q. Okay. And what's the process of reporting safety hazards at
3 PenAir? I'm looking at -- is it an electronic process, paper
4 process, and then --

5 A. Both.

6 Q. And then how -- everyone has access to complete a report?

7 A. Computer reports, yes.

8 Q. And can you describe how that would work if you had a hazard
9 that you needed to report through the system?

10 A. Well, there's always the paper copy of the captain's report
11 which anybody can fill out. And there's, you know, a checklist of
12 things that might have happened, and then you can give a narrative
13 of what it was.

14 We have an old system of WBAT which is our -- which was our
15 safety system. We've converted over to another system, Vistair, I
16 think -- I believe it is. And it's on your iPad, and you can fill
17 it out in flight, at home, anywhere you want, and it'll submit
18 itself to the safety department.

19 Q. And who's in charge of the safety management system?

20 A. I can't remember off the top of my head.

21 Q. Okay. Do you know of any changes that are upcoming to that
22 system with the merger?

23 A. We switched a new reporting system, and that's the only
24 change I'm aware of right now.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right, that's all I had. Thank

1 you.

2 BY DR. SILVA:

3 Q. This new reporting system, what changed about it?

4 A. I haven't filled one out yet. It's on my list of things to
5 do.

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. Just a different format, I think. Or a different company in
8 charge of it.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. You know, it was WBAT before, now I think it's Vistair, I
11 believe is what the name of it is now.

12 Q. Okay. Did you get a new training on that, or how was that
13 conveyed to you?

14 A. We got emails and I just spent an afternoon with Tiffany and
15 Brian logging in to the new system.

16 Q. Was that with all the pilots, as far as you know?

17 A. Everybody got the email. And everybody has it on their iPad.

18 Q. Okay. Did everyone sit down --

19 A. No, it's just -- I'm special.

20 Q. It's just you, okay. Have you reported any safety concerns
21 with the company?

22 A. On the new system, no.

23 Q. What about on the old system?

24 A. I had an RA resolution, almost a midair, that I've used it
25 for. I did a couple of them, but I don't think the iPad

1 transmitted it. So I just went straight to Tiffany Lease and told
2 her what it was, and she filled it out for me.

3 Q. And who is Tiffany? Who was Tiffany, I guess?

4 A. She's still here.

5 Q. Oh, she is?

6 A. I can't remember the name of her title.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. But she's in the safety department.

9 Q. Okay. So you went straight to the safety department?

10 A. Um-hmm.

11 Q. Okay. Did you get any resolution on those safety concerns?

12 A. As far as feedback, like an email?

13 Q. Or anything really. Can you give an example of the RA that
14 you got?

15 A. I've seen them in the past where I've gone, logged into the
16 program, and there was feedback in the program. But not lately,
17 no. But I haven't filled out anything and had it go all the way
18 through that. Just in person.

19 Q. So what concerns did you bring to Tiffany?

20 A. I believe it was the ramp. You know, you've got your taxi
21 line, and then there's a line off to the side, and then there's
22 carts. In the wintertime, those lanes aren't there if they're not
23 brushed. So we used to have a motorized brush that would sweep
24 all these lines really quick. It broke, and I don't think it's
25 been fixed yet. So I think if I keep submitting those things that

1 they'll fix it.

2 Q. Okay. So it hasn't been fixed yet?

3 A. Well, we --

4 Q. As of now?

5 A. It just snowed. We haven't had a lot of snow this winter,
6 so --

7 Q. Yeah. When did you report that?

8 A. I don't remember.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Maybe 2 months ago.

11 Q. Okay. So outside of an email or the system, do you get any
12 feedback on what's being done about a concern or --

13 A. They publish safety bulletins I think about once a week, once
14 a month. When they have, they bring up issues in that.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But as far as direct feedback on what I wrote, I haven't
17 received anything just because I haven't submitted anything.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And they do publish emails of -- so actually, I take that
20 back now that I remember. If I submit something, it goes into the
21 system, and then emails are published, and everything people have
22 written in there, what they wrote is in there and then what the
23 company is doing to resolve it. So there are emails.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And those go to everybody. Not just me.

1 Q. Okay. Going back to this pilot meeting, you mentioned that
2 was in the summer of 2018 or 2019?

3 A. It might have been '19.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Now that I'm thinking -- yeah.

6 Q. Do you remember who you -- when you said you talked to
7 management after that, do you remember who you talked to?

8 A. Deke, Sarah, and Crystal.

9 Q. Okay. So Deke, Sarah, and Crystal; okay. Okay. I know
10 we're going back to this airport qualification quite a bit. This
11 100-hour requirement also says it has to come with a letter of
12 recommendation from a check airman and the chief pilot. Have you
13 ever written a letter of recommendation?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Okay. Have you had -- how are maintenance issues handled
16 from your perspective?

17 A. As far as if I find something wrong in my process that I go
18 through?

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. Depending on where I'm at, I will probably most likely call
21 dispatch, say, hey, I have a maintenance issue. They transfer me
22 over to the maintenance department, and then I talk with them
23 directly.

24 Q. Okay. Have you ever had any pressure to defer something that
25 you didn't necessarily think should be deferred or anything along

1 those lines?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. I'm jumping around a little bit so bear with me here.
4 On this flight that you had with Justin about a month before the
5 accident, do you --

6 A. A month or two. I can't remember exactly. I could look on
7 SkedFlex, but --

8 Q. That's fine. Just, again, from your recollection -- I know
9 you've had a lot of flights since then. So is the first -- do you
10 remember, you were the pilot flying, I'm assuming?

11 A. Going into Dutch Harbor?

12 Q. Going into Dutch Harbor.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. All right. So was it the first officer's responsibility to
15 do the airport analysis? Do you recall --

16 A. I do it a lot myself though.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Just because I like to look at the numbers myself.

19 Q. Okay. So would you take that responsibility from him or
20 would you have him do --

21 A. He'll also do it, but I also look at it.

22 Q. Okay. Do you recall what happened for that flight?

23 A. No, I don't. I do know it was a nice sunny day, so --

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. That's the only thing I remember.

1 Q. Okay. Does the company use EFBs?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. Are those used at all in any kind of function for
4 performance calculations?

5 A. That's where our performance binders are located, yes.

6 Q. Okay. In terms of documenting speeds or flap settings or
7 anything, is there anything in the EFB that would enable you to
8 put those speeds in --

9 A. No.

10 Q. -- and output something?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Or is it just --

13 A. It's all charts.

14 Q. It's all charts.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay. Did you have CRM training?

17 A. In ground school.

18 Q. Ground school?

19 A. They cover it in ground school.

20 Q. And that was the initial --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- 2 years ago?

23 A. Yes. And they'll -- I don't know what their schedule is, but
24 during recurring, you know, they touch on certain topics.

25 Q. Okay. How often is recurrent training?

1 A. Once a year.

2 Q. And do you recall what your training looked like for you?

3 A. I've had so many of them, I don't.

4 Q. Okay. In that training or either separate training, did you
5 have anything related to captain's leadership training?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Does that sound familiar?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Okay.

10 DR. SILVA: Okay. All right, did you guys have anything
11 else?

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: I have one more thing.

13 DR. SILVA: Yes.

14 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

15 Q. You were talking about safety bulletins earlier. After the
16 accident, were there any safety bulletins published at PenAir?

17 A. All the time.

18 Q. Well, after the accident, for the accident flight, was there
19 any safety bulletins?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. No.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Thank you. That's all.

24 DR. SILVA: Right. Related to --

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Related to the accident?

1 MR. WILSON: Related, no.

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

3 DR. SILVA: Okay. Got it.

4 MR. WILSON: And the safety bulletins can be anything from
5 flight crew perspective all the way down to how you walk on ice.
6 That's the kind of safety bulletins they post.

7 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

8 DR. SILVA: Okay. Got it. Do you have anything you want to
9 add that we didn't ask you?

10 MR. WILSON: Not that I can think of, no.

11 DR. SILVA: Okay. Well, you're going to know how to reach us
12 very soon, so --

13 So we'll go off the record now.

14 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 2, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Tamara Candeloro
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/13/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: CRYSTAL BRANCHAUD
Chief Pilot, PenAir

PenAir Offices
Anchorage, Alaska

Friday,
October 25, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

ROGER YOUNG, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

DENNIS FISHER, Line Pilot, Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Ms. Branchaud)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Crystal Branchaud:		
By Mr. Frantz		7
By Dr. Silva		22
By Mr. Fisher		35
By Mr. Young		37
By Dr. Sevillian		41
By Mr. Frantz		46
By Dr. Silva		51
By Mr. Fisher		54
By Mr. Young		56
By Mr. Fisher		57

I N T E R V I E W

(9:41 a.m.)

1 DR. SILVA: On the record at 9:41.

2
3 MR. FRANTZ: Have you ever been involved in an NTSB
4 investigation before?
5

6 MS. BRANCHAUD: No.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. So I'll give you a brief overview of how
8 it works.

9 MS. BRANCHAUD: Okay.

10 MR. FRANTZ: We use what's called a party system because we
11 don't have all the experts we need at the NTSB; it's a fairly
12 small organization. So when we're investigating an accident we
13 form groups based on different topics. Like there's a power
14 plants group, a structures airframe group, a systems group. There
15 could be an airports group if that was an issue, weather if that
16 was an issue. Operational factors and human performance, if those
17 are factors in the accident, that's a group. So that's what this
18 group is: we've combined -- sometimes operational factors is
19 separate from human performance, sometimes they combine because
20 they have so many overlapping areas.

21 And then the NTSB forms the group and they are -- the NTSB
22 representatives are the chairpeople of the group, and then we
23 bring in outside experts because we don't have that expertise. So
24 we bring in somebody that knows the operator and the airplane. In
25 this case, it's, you know, check airman -- you have Dennis. And

1 then we bring in the FAA; they're always a party to every
2 investigation because they bring their level -- but it's not FAA
3 from the enforcement or regulatory side. And we'll -- everybody
4 will introduce themselves and explain that. But it's the FAA from
5 the accident investigation and prevention side of the FAA. So
6 they're just here to assist us. They work -- he works for us --
7 Roger works for us in this investigation.

8 And the purpose of -- so we form that group and then we go
9 out and do the activities. A big part of those activities are our
10 interviews with people that were involved in whatever we're
11 investigating.

12 We typically -- the end product of today's interview will be
13 a transcript, and that written transcript, once we get the
14 recording transcribed, that'll become part of the permanent record
15 of this accident investigation. And eventually, down the road
16 when we're completely done, that'll become part of what they call
17 the docket, which is just a collection of all the documents that
18 the NTSB produced for this investigation, and that becomes public.
19 So we can't offer you any privacy, confidentiality, or immunity or
20 anything like that based on what we talk about today.

21 With that said, we're just looking for the facts. We're not
22 trying to find blame or apportion blame. We're looking for facts
23 which will lead us to an analysis, which will give us a probable
24 cause. That's our final product, is the probable cause of an
25 accident.

1 And it's not just this group, it's all the other groups are
2 putting everything together at the end. And then when somebody --
3 groups determine what the probable cause is, and then from that
4 potentially safety recommendations are issued by the NTSB to the
5 FAA, to the operator, to the manufacturer, to -- anything that we
6 think could help prevent something like this in the future.

7 You have a right to have someone with you during the
8 interview, and if you would like a representative, could you just
9 state who it is just for the record so we have it on record who
10 your representative is?

11 MS. BRANCHAUD: Morgan Campbell.

12 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks.

13 I know I left something out; what did I miss for our intro?

14 DR. SILVA: Introductions.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah, okay. We've done that before -- missed
16 them that is. So I'm an operational factors investigator with the
17 NTSB. Operational factors means anything to do with the company,
18 the training, company manuals and procedures, pilot, pilot
19 backgrounds, anything on the operational side. So that's my
20 position. I have some 121, 135 background as well.

21 And then we'll just go around and everybody else can tell you
22 who they are.

23 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva. I'm human performance with the
24 NTSB.

25 MR. FISHER: Dennis Fisher, line pilot, check airman, PenAir.

1 MR. YOUNG: Roger Young with the FAA. Just a little
2 background, I did fly for PenAir for 17 years. So I flew the
3 Goose out of Dutch for 5, and then down in -- then flew the Saabs,
4 a 340, for the next 12 years as a check airman, so -- but, like
5 they said before, I'm here to help with the questioning. I'm not
6 here in any regulatory capacity.

7 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan Sevillian. I'm a human performance
8 investigator with the NTSB.

9 MS. BRANCHAUD: Thank you.

10 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Before we get started, do you have any
11 questions of us?

12 MS. BRANCHAUD: No.

13 MR. FRANTZ: How we're going to do it is, I'll probably start
14 off asking some questions that I have, and then we'll just take
15 our turn, go around the table, and see if anybody else has any
16 questions. Often we'll do a second round in case anybody has any
17 follow-up questions on something that was -- you know, came up
18 during other folks' questioning, so we'll rerun that. And then at
19 the end, we'll ask you if have anything else to add or anything we
20 didn't talk about.

21 So, so let's start with the easy stuff.

22 INTERVIEW OF CRYSTAL BRANCHAUD

23 BY MR. FRANTZ:

24 Q. Could you give us your name and any particular spellings you
25 think we might need?

1 A. Okay. It's Crystal, C-r-y-s-t-a-l, Jacobs Branchaud,
2 B-r-a-n-c-h-a-u-d.

3 Q. And how do you pronounce that?

4 A. Branchaud.

5 Q. Branchaud, okay. And, Crystal, what is your current
6 position?

7 A. Chief pilot, PenAir.

8 Q. And how long have you had that position?

9 A. Since February of this year.

10 Q. Okay. What are your -- how old are you?

11 A. Fifty-seven.

12 Q. What are your primary duties and responsibilities as a chief
13 pilot?

14 A. Overseeing the daily operation of the pilots and helping with
15 the merger program, overseeing safety.

16 Q. Can you give us a quick sketch of your aviation background up
17 to when you joined PenAir?

18 A. Certainly. I received my private pilot rating in '93. I
19 worked for Ketchum Air Service flying floatplanes from '95 -- I'm
20 sorry -- '96 to '99. In 1999, I went to Northern Air Cargo, and I
21 was -- I started as a flight engineer on the DC-6. I became first
22 officer on the 727, captain on the 727, then captain on the 737.
23 In 2009, I went to Shared Services, and I was captain on the 737
24 there. And in 2015, I went to Ravn.

25 Q. In 2009, what was the company you went to?

1 A. Shared Services.

2 Q. How do you spell that?

3 A. Shared, S-h-a-r-e-d.

4 Q. Oh, Shared Services.

5 A. Shared Services.

6 Q. Is that an Alaska operator?

7 A. It's ConocoPhillips, ConocoPhillips in BP.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. In 2015, they had a reduction in force, and I was laid off,
10 so I went to Ravn.

11 Q. Do you know Noreen --

12 A. I do.

13 Q. -- Price?

14 A. Um-hmm. I do.

15 Q. Okay. So you started flying in '93. Did you have any
16 aviation positions, anything before that?

17 A. No, I got my private pilot in '93.

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. No.

20 Q. Before that, what were you doing before you got your private
21 pilot's license?

22 A. I was a financial analyst for a company.

23 Q. Did you do your private training in Alaska?

24 A. No. I did it -- my private training in California and all my
25 other training in Alaska.

1 Q. Approximately how many hours do you have?

2 A. 10,000. Over 10,000.

3 Q. And can you run down your -- what type ratings you have on
4 your certificate?

5 A. I have Boeing 727, Boeing 737-8, and Saab 2000. I also have
6 a glider rating -- commercial glider.

7 Q. Okay. And you were hired by PenAir directly as the chief
8 pilot; is that correct?

9 A. I was asked to become chief pilot by management in Ravn after
10 Ravn was bought -- after Ravn bought PenAir.

11 Q. Okay. Yeah, I guess I'm confused. You joined PenAir -- what
12 year did you come to PenAir?

13 A. February of this year.

14 Q. Of this year. Prior to that you were at?

15 A. Ravn.

16 Q. At Ravn, okay. And you were flying the -- what were you
17 flying there?

18 A. Dash-8.

19 Q. Yeah, okay. How many hours roughly do you think you have in
20 the Saab?

21 A. 140.

22 Q. Okay. Do you fly -- how many hours a month would you say
23 you've flown since February? Or when did you get your type rating
24 in the Saab?

25 A. I had got my type rating in April.

1 Q. Okay. So how many hours a month would you say you fly the
2 line?

3 A. It varies. May and June -- let's see -- May, June, July, I
4 flew fairly frequently, and after that I did not fly so much.

5 Q. Okay. How many times do you think you've been into Dutch
6 Harbor in the Saab?

7 A. Three.

8 Q. Okay. How about in other aircraft flying with Ravn
9 previously?

10 A. Three.

11 Q. Just three times?

12 A. In the Dash-8, and then three times in the Saab.

13 Q. Okay. Is that -- would that be your total experience into
14 Dutch Harbor?

15 A. More or less.

16 Q. Okay. So PenAir has some airports designated as special
17 airports. Can you tell me what they are -- what airports they
18 are?

19 A. Dutch Harbor, Sand Point, and Kodiak.

20 Q. And what characteristics of an airport make it a special
21 airport, require it to have that designation?

22 A. Mountainous terrain.

23 Q. Okay. And are there restrictions or any other special
24 requirements for PenAir to operate into special airports?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What are they?

2 A. They have to be signed off by a check airman; they have to
3 have either 300 hours or 100 hours with a waiver and a
4 recommendation letter from the chief pilot and check airman.

5 Q. 100 hours if they have a waiver. Who's giving the waiver?
6 Who's issuing the waiver?

7 A. The waiver, you sign a -- the check airman will check out,
8 and then they'll sign that he has checked out for Dutch Harbor,
9 and then there should be also a recommendation letter and a chief
10 pilot letter.

11 Q. Otherwise they have to have 300 hours. And is that 300 hours
12 in type or 300 hours --

13 A. Not in type.

14 Q. What is that 300-hour requirement -- hours of --

15 A. It is in PenAir aircraft.

16 Q. In PenAir aircraft. And what aircraft does PenAir operate
17 other than the Saab?

18 A. They also operated a Saab 340 and a Saab 2000.

19 Q. Okay. So in PenAir aircraft period, 300 or 100 with a
20 waiver. Okay. Is that requirement for captain only or captain
21 and FO?

22 A. Captain only.

23 Q. Okay. Any other special things about special airports, other
24 than the requirement -- the 300, 100 requirement, any other
25 procedural or operational requirements when operating into special

1 airports?

2 A. Other than a checkout by the check airman, no.

3 Q. Can the FO land at a special airport?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. Can you give me a quick rundown of the training and/or
6 checking that the captain would have to get to be signed off for a
7 special airport?

8 A. You would have to fly into a special airport with a check
9 airman and the check airman would have to be confident that the
10 captain could do the special airport operation.

11 Q. Is there any hour or landings requirements number associated
12 with that?

13 A. Not that I'm aware of.

14 Q. But just so I'm clear, if a captain has 300 or more hours at
15 PenAir, in a PenAir aircraft, he's good to go for special
16 airports?

17 A. That's my understanding.

18 Q. Does not require any special training for the special airport
19 if he's got 300 or more hours?

20 A. He still has to be signed off.

21 Q. By?

22 A. A check airman.

23 Q. Okay. So he still has to fly with a check airman to the
24 airport and be signed off?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do you have -- what is your method of -- as chief pilot, what
2 do you -- what techniques or what method do you use to monitor
3 pilot performance and keep aware of concerns or issues or just
4 general levels of performance by the pilots?

5 A. I talk to other pilots that the pilots have flown with,
6 making sure there's no difficulties or any concerns. If someone
7 has concerns, I will follow up and discuss it with other pilots;
8 I'll fly with that person.

9 Q. Are you a check airman with PenAir?

10 A. I am not.

11 Q. Okay. Can you tell me about the type of performance
12 calculations or validations, or I'm not sure what wording PenAir
13 would use, that a crew has to go through as they're approaching an
14 airport to verify that the conditions and everything are such that
15 they are able to land at that airport? What do they need to do
16 post-dispatch to make sure that the airport is --

17 A. They need to get the ATIS, the weather information, and check
18 the temperature and the winds. Then they need to go to the
19 unfactored landing distance table and check that, based on the
20 winds, they have enough runway. And then they need to go to the
21 page before that, and if there's contamination on the runway,
22 rain, slush, or snow, they need to factor that into their
23 calculations.

24 Q. Both -- so there's two pages you described. Are they -- and
25 what's the document that they are in or what's that --

1 A. The Saab performance binder, I believe is what it's called.

2 Q. Okay.

3 DR. SILVA: Feel free to use this if you need.

4 BY MR. FRANTZ:

5 Q. So they're -- they have to -- do they -- are they asked --
6 are they trained to actually calculate their landing distance and
7 to compare that to the distance of the runway they're going to; is
8 that what you said?

9 A. They are trained that in ground school, yes.

10 Q. And that's -- so that's a routine calculation they'd be
11 making every flight before they come into -- during the approach
12 or even prior to approach period?

13 A. Maybe not every flight, maybe not in Anchorage because, you
14 know, you have a 10,000 foot runway and -- I'm not sure I've seen
15 it made coming into Anchorage. But certainly going into Dutch,
16 they absolutely -- or Kodiak.

17 Q. What are the other airports -- special airports that PenAir
18 flies to?

19 A. Dutch, Sand Point.

20 Q. Sand Point, okay. And was there a third? Is there a third
21 one?

22 A. Kodiak.

23 Q. Yeah. So, if we look at any captain's training record, we
24 would find some marking or some indication that this captain was
25 approved for special airports, either from a waiver or the fact he

1 has 300 plus hours and he has a sign-off from a check airman. Is
2 that something which is annotated in training records?

3 A. That's -- that should be so. I cannot speak to every captain
4 prior to my getting here that was already signed off for Dutch. I
5 have not looked at every captain's records, but I believe that to
6 be true, yes.

7 Q. The training you talked about or -- sorry -- the performance
8 calculations and checking you talked about that occurs in flight,
9 is that something that's trained here in PenAir ground school?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Is it -- do you know if it's also part of the training that
12 the pilots will do in the sim when they go for sim training? Are
13 they using PenAir manuals and procedures when they're flying
14 their --

15 A. In the sim?

16 Q. -- their sim training sessions?

17 A. I'm trying to remember my last sim training session. Maybe
18 not. I'm not certain.

19 Q. Would you know if there's any other training -- sorry --
20 performance calculations or manuals that they might be using at
21 this sim operator when they're training there versus what you guys
22 train here in ground school?

23 A. No. They're using the same manuals.

24 Q. Was it a -- who was it that gave you your type rating in the
25 Saab? I don't need a name, but where or who was -- what was the

1 position, what was the title of the person that --

2 A. We did our sim training at SIMCOM, and he's a contract sim
3 trainer employed by SIMCOM.

4 Q. And he has authority to issue the type rating?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. And so, as part of that typing rating, was there an
7 oral?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did that oral include calculation or performance calculations
10 -- performing performance calculations?

11 A. It did, yes.

12 Q. Okay. Do you recall if when you did that oral you used, you
13 know, PenAir documents, PenAir manuals or --

14 A. We used our iPads, which would only be PenAir documents.

15 Q. Okay. How does a pilot determine what the approach speed
16 should be at a particular airport? A ref speed, V-ref, how would
17 you find a V-ref?

18 A. For landing?

19 Q. Uh-huh.

20 A. It's in our Saab performance binder.

21 Q. And is that the speed that the pilot is trained to fly during
22 the approach or is there an additive or --

23 A. There's an additive, ref plus 10, and then coming over the
24 fence they should be at V-ref.

25 Q. And is ref plus 10 a default additive, it's always you

1 just --

2 A. No.

3 Q. -- routinely add ref or at 10 knots?

4 A. No.

5 Q. No.

6 A. It varies according to the wind.

7 Q. Okay. Can you describe how it varies according to the wind?

8 A. If it's very windy, very gusty, you may add an additive of
9 plus 15. If there's reports of wind shear, you may add an
10 additive, or you may add an additive for icing.

11 Q. Are those additives specified in your GOM or performance
12 manual, or where would you -- where would a pilot find those
13 specific numbers?

14 A. In the -- well, for V-ref plus ice would be in the APG or the
15 performance binder, and the CFM as well.

16 Q. And what's this CFM?

17 A. Company Flight Manual.

18 Q. Company Flight Manual. Does the Saab 2000 have a tailwind
19 restriction, tailwind limit?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What is that?

22 A. Fifteen knots.

23 Q. Do you have tailwind -- does PenAir impose any tailwind
24 limitations for special airports?

25 A. They do for Kodiak at night and Sand Point at night. So yes.

1 Q. Are there any tailwind limitations for Dutch Harbor?

2 A. Not specifically, but you are limited in -- you take a weight
3 hit certainly if you land with a large tailwind.

4 Q. Is that something that would be calculated as part of those
5 performance calculations you were talking about a minute ago?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Does PenAir have a generic tailwind limit for a landing?

8 A. Fifteen knots.

9 Q. So the same as the manufacture's limitation?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Fifteen knots, okay. What's the definition of a stabilized
12 approach for PenAir?

13 A. No banking -- or sorry -- there is no definition on the bank
14 angle. It's descent rate less than 1,000 and airspeed plus 5
15 knots.

16 Q. Descent rate, did you say less than 1,000 feet a minute?

17 A. Yes, less than a 1,000 feet per minute.

18 Q. Okay. And airspeed plus 5 knots, meaning 5 knots beyond what
19 you want to be flying?

20 A. Exactly.

21 Q. Okay. So if you were trying to fly ref plus 10 and you got
22 to ref plus 15, that would be -- you'd be considered unstable?

23 A. You would be considered stable because you're within 5 knots
24 of where --

25 Q. Oh, I see.

1 A. -- you want it to be.

2 Q. Okay, okay. And so then, is there some point on approach
3 where PenAir pilots are told, if the approach becomes unstable
4 based on those criteria, for example, they should execute a
5 go-around? Is there a point where they're told that or is it --
6 what's their guidance on what to do if they become unstabilized
7 during approach?

8 A. The guidance is to go around if you become unstabilized on
9 the approach.

10 Q. At any point in the approach? Because --

11 A. Well, below -- so it's 1,000 feet and then 500 feet; 1,000
12 feet if you're on an IFR, 500 feet if you're on VFR.

13 Q. Okay. Okay. Well, I think this is -- what are pilots --
14 what do they -- sorry. Does the definition of stabilized
15 approach, does that include not receiving any GPWS warnings? If
16 you receive a GPWS warning, is that -- are you to consider that
17 approach now unstabilized and you should go around, or what's the
18 guidance?

19 A. I don't know that that's specifically addressed in our
20 stabilized approach policy.

21 Q. Okay. Is there any guidance that says how a pilot in PenAir,
22 policies and procedures, how a pilot should respond to a GPWS,
23 say, inside the outer marker on approach -- or inside the final
24 approach fix?

25 A. You're supposed to respond to the GPWS accordingly.

1 Q. So not necessarily go around, but correct the condition that
2 was --

3 A. Exactly.

4 Q. Okay. But no -- we got no specific go around, okay. Do you
5 -- have you been -- let's see -- you've been there. So you
6 haven't done a recurrent ground school yet in this Saab; is that
7 correct?

8 A. I have not.

9 Q. Okay. And you got your type rating in April, did you say?

10 A. I believe so, yes.

11 Q. So have you been back to the sim since your type rating?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Are you due to go back?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. When you go back on your -- after, you know, on your 6
16 months, what's the training? What are the elements of the
17 captain's 6-month sim visit? What is it -- what happens there?

18 A. So, I have not done it, but I assume it's as any 6-month
19 check, would be a check ride, V1 cuts, stalls, steep turns,
20 circle; same thing as what was on the initial check ride.

21 Q. Do you get -- is it a proficiency check then you would get or
22 would it be like a LOFT or deficiency training or do you know
23 specifically?

24 A. So specifically I'm not certain, but I understand it's a
25 check ride. The first -- so you go down with your partner and

1 there's 2 days, and the first day is the first partner's check
2 ride and the second day is the second one's check ride.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. The ride is quite long.

5 Q. And is all of that -- all of that's done currently by SIMCOM
6 instructors, correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. And I guess they're checked -- designated as check
9 airmen, sim check airmen for PenAir?

10 A. Yes.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. All right, thank you. I'm going to take
12 a quick break and pass it on to Sathya and see if she has any
13 questions.

14 MS. BRANCHAUD: May I take a quick break too?

15 DR. SILVA: Yes, of course.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Oh, yeah, of course.

17 MS. BRANCHAUD: Thank you.

18 DR. SILVA: We will pause. Take your time.

19 We're off the record at 10:09.

20 (Off the record at 10:09 a.m.)

21 (On the record 10:12 a.m.)

22 DR. SILVA: We're back on the record at 10:12. Just let us
23 know any time you need a break.

24 MS. BRANCHAUD: Okay.

25 BY DR. SILVA:

1 Q. So I just wanted to clarify, the 300 hour/100 hour minimum
2 for the special airports, is that listed and do you know where
3 it's listed in your manuals?

4 A. It's listed in the GOM.

5 Q. In the GOM. Okay. Are there -- is there any circumstance
6 where a captain would fly -- is it just the captain or the first
7 officer also?

8 A. Captain.

9 Q. Only the captain. So is there any circumstance where the
10 captain would be able to fly a revenue flight into a special
11 airport with less than 100 hours?

12 A. With a check airman, yes.

13 Q. Okay. As long as you're with a check airman, okay. So how
14 is the -- how are the flight assignments made? Does dispatch know
15 the limitations that pilots -- that captains have into those
16 aircraft?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is that just automatically through a --

19 A. Through SkedFlex.

20 Q. Okay. Can you run through your daily routine? What do you
21 do when you come into work every day?

22 A. 8:00 a.m. I have a meeting; 9:00 a.m. I have a meeting; 10:30
23 usually I'm -- no, 11:00, a meeting.

24 Q. Who are you meeting with?

25 A. At 8 o'clock we have a companywide meeting by telephone and

1 everybody checks in, the various departments.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And at 9 o'clock I have a meeting with Deke Abbott, just once
4 again checking in and discussing various daily issues. Wednesdays
5 at 11 o'clock it's a meeting with CAVOK; they are doing our merger
6 of the manuals.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So that's also an update and where we are. We have deadlines
9 for those manuals, and it's an update on that, and then that can
10 sometimes be followed by a meeting with the FAA because they're
11 closely involved with the merging of the manuals. It's mainly
12 meetings, working on manuals, and then the day-to-day operation of
13 pilots.

14 Q. Do you have oversight over the training process as well?

15 A. Not so much, no.

16 Q. Who is it you report to?

17 A. I report to Dick Harding.

18 Q. Who is that? What position is he?

19 A. Director of operations.

20 Q. At PenAir?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. Can you tell us more about your transition between
23 Ravn and PenAir? I know you said you were asked to take on the
24 role. How was that set up? How did you get approached by that --
25 for that?

1 A. Sarah Fraher, the chief pilot at Ravn, asked if I would be
2 interested, and I was interested. And we just talked about it,
3 what the duties would entail, and then I said I would do it.

4 Q. From your understanding, why was the position open at PenAir?

5 A. Ben Nygren, the chief pilot, was going to Alaska Airlines.

6 Q. Okay. So that's just a natural progression thing. So what
7 does your interface normally look like with Ravn compared to your
8 job here at PenAir? You mentioned you spoke -- you speak with
9 Deke every day?

10 A. No, not every day.

11 Q. Oh, okay.

12 A. I interface with Deke to discuss issues that I may or may not
13 be having. I also listen to what the other chief pilots are
14 dealing with so I can learn from that, and that's about it. I
15 interface with Aaron Rocereta on the manuals.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Working closely with him on integrating the manuals.

18 Q. Are you in charge of pilot hiring as well?

19 A. I am involved, yes, in pilot hiring, yes.

20 Q. Okay. What does that look like in your perspective?

21 A. Mary Ingebritson is the pilot recruiter, and she prescreens
22 all of the applicants. And then she sets up appointments for
23 interviews, and then usually Mary, myself, Sarah, maybe someone
24 else from the recruiting department or HR sits in on an interview.

25 Q. Okay. What do you look for in pilots when you're hiring?

1 A. We look for qualifications, of course; we look for attitude;
2 we look for other recommendations. If he's being recommended by
3 someone who already works in the company, that counts for a lot.
4 We look for why they want to come work for Ravn.

5 Q. Okay. What kind of qualifications do they have to meet?

6 A. The qualification of 1,500 hours.

7 Q. That's the 121 --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- basic qualifications? Okay.

10 A. And we look at their background of course.

11 Q. Okay. From where you're situated in the company, have -- do
12 you know of any safety reports or safety concerns going into Dutch
13 Harbor that have been brought up at all?

14 A. Not that I know of, no.

15 Q. And based on your experience and your training into Dutch
16 Harbor, what's your understanding of the local environment there?

17 A. Very dynamic, always changing.

18 Q. Can you elaborate on that? Let's say if you were going to
19 teach somebody else what to look for, what would you say?

20 A. Always have an out. The winds are constantly changing. If
21 the pilot made it in front of you 5 minutes before you, you may
22 still not make it in because the clouds and visibility are always
23 changing very fast; always have a Plan B.

24 Q. Do you recall what your special airport training was for
25 Dutch Harbor? What does that look like?

1 A. I am not signed off for Dutch Harbor.

2 Q. Oh, you're not. Okay. So what were the circumstances of you
3 flying in there with PenAir?

4 A. I was flying in with the check airman just for training.

5 Q. Just for training. So how did that training look?

6 A. Oh, it's very good. We would come in and they would point
7 out the different points, Eider Point and Hog Island and all. I
8 can't remember all the other points off the top of my head, but I
9 was told there's the dump and there's the hotel, and they were
10 giving me visual points so that you can determine if you can
11 continue on or if you should, you know, get out now.

12 And it was good regarding wind shifting, and even though the
13 wind is coming from one direction at one part of the runway, it
14 may be coming from the exact opposite direction on the other side
15 of the runway, so be prepared for anything and everything.

16 Q. Is there a preferred runway going into Dutch?

17 A. Depending on the winds, 1-3 is the easier approach.

18 Q. And why is that, is it easier?

19 A. Because it's straight in pretty much from the approach.

20 Q. Do you recall during your training whether you got landing
21 experience with a tailwind?

22 A. In Dutch or anytime?

23 Q. No, in general.

24 A. I do not recall landing with a tailwind, but maybe in
25 Anchorage there may have been a time when the wind was slightly

1 tailwind.

2 Q. Okay. And that would be the experience that you have with
3 landing in tailwinds?

4 A. With the Saab.

5 Q. With the Saab, okay. Do you recall any short field training,
6 landing into short fields?

7 A. Other -- I mean, our training consisted of landing in Dutch,
8 which is a short field.

9 Q. In the simulator?

10 A. Oh, in the simulator? Is that what you're asking me?

11 Q. Yeah. Well, either way. I'm trying to get a feel for
12 experience wise.

13 A. We did do Dutch training in the simulator, yes. But other
14 than that, I mean, we didn't have -- I'm not sure what you're
15 referring to, what would be -- what would that look like?

16 Q. Well, I'm just trying to get a feel for -- I'm not looking
17 for anything in particular.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. I'm just trying to understand what kind of exposure pilots
20 would have gotten to short field operations, whether it's in the
21 sim or whether it's in flight.

22 A. Yeah, we did both.

23 Q. You did both, okay. So SIMCOM has the database and
24 everything for Dutch Harbor?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. Let's see here. How do you decide what flap settings
2 to use?

3 A. I -- flaps 20 is the normal flap setting. I would use flaps
4 35 if I had a tailwind or a short field. Every time I've been
5 into Dutch I've used flaps 35, but it hasn't been that gusty or
6 windy.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. If it were gusty, I would use flaps 20, no question.

9 Q. Okay. Why is it you would reduce the flaps for gusting
10 winds?

11 A. It's easier to control the aircraft with flaps 20.

12 Q. How does the aircraft handle on the ground with winds?

13 A. Good.

14 Q. So specifically going into Dutch, the pilot flying would be
15 the captain, right? Is there any exchange of controls on the
16 ground once you land?

17 A. Once we land? No, because you say 80 knots tops and bottoms,
18 so that just means he goes to the steering -- the nose wheel
19 steering, but it's not really an exchange of controls. So I guess
20 it is kind of, the co-pilot will take the yoke --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- when they say tops --

23 Q. Got it.

24 A. -- and the captain goes to the nose wheel steering.

25 Q. So the -- this is just so I'm understanding. The first

1 officer would take the yoke?

2 A. Um-hmm.

3 Q. So pitch in --

4 A. Push it in the wind.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Yeah, point it into the wind.

7 Q. And then the captain has control of brakes and power? Or --

8 A. Nose wheel steering.

9 Q. And nose wheel steering.

10 A. Yeah. Captains always have the brakes and the power always.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. The only thing -- the co-pilot takes the yoke and just puts
13 it down.

14 Q. Okay. Got it. When does that transition typically happen?

15 A. Eighty knots.

16 Q. Eighty, okay. You mentioned that you don't fly that often
17 anymore. How often a month would you say?

18 A. Two or three times.

19 Q. Two or three times, okay. But you got the brunt of your
20 hours in the first couple of months it sounds like?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. We understand that there is a wind chart -- I believe that's
23 what it's called -- from the Medallion Foundation that's used for
24 these airports. What is that from your perspective?

25 A. It's a wind chart for Dutch, or for other airports, too, that

1 gives you a compass rose; if the wind's coming from this
2 direction, it should not be any stronger than this speed for you
3 to go, or it's the guidelines. If it's stronger and you choose to
4 go, you probably -- I don't know if anybody does that.

5 Q. Okay. Do you know what those guidelines are based off of?

6 A. I do not. The Medallion Foundation put it together. I don't
7 know how they did that.

8 Q. Does that have to do with anything regarding aircraft
9 performance or --

10 A. No.

11 Q. It's just a guideline for blanket winds coming in?

12 A. It's a generic guideline that any company can use.

13 Q. Okay. Did you know either of the accident pilots?

14 A. I knew Paul Wells better than I knew Justin Lunn --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- but I had said hello to Justin Lunn; I knew who he was.

17 Q. How many pilots do you have in the company?

18 A. About 35.

19 Q. Okay. Is that split 50/50?

20 A. No.

21 Q. How is that split?

22 A. I'm not entirely certain. We have three captains upgrading
23 now, so it may be 16, 19.

24 Q. Okay, 16 captains?

25 A. Including the three upgrading.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Maybe 15, 20.

3 Q. Got it. Okay. Is that enough?

4 A. For our operations, yes.

5 Q. Okay. So you feel like there's plenty of pilots to support
6 the flights that you have in the operation?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. So what was your interaction with Paul Wells?

9 A. I'm not sure what kind of answer -- friendly or what kind of
10 answer --

11 Q. Okay. Yeah.

12 A. -- are you looking for?

13 Q. I mean, what are you -- how do you interact? What do you --
14 is it something you worked with him here or --

15 A. I work with him. We talk about he's to get -- he was in
16 charge of getting together a training module for SOC, the merger.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. The plan was to have the Gen Subs class for both the Dash and
19 the Saab be together and then split for the systems.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. So he was working on combining that.

22 Q. Do you have a timeline in terms of what the goal -- what the
23 deadlines are for to meet these deliverables that you're
24 developing for the company?

25 A. For the merger?

1 Q. For the merger.

2 A. The timeline for the manuals was, I believe, the end of
3 February.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. But --

6 Q. Next year?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. Do you think that's doable?

11 A. Well, it depends on a lot of things. It's hard to tell,
12 especially now how things have changed quite a bit, so I don't
13 know. I don't know the answer to that.

14 Q. What are the challenges you'd be facing?

15 A. In the merger?

16 Q. Yeah.

17 A. Combining GOMs is a challenge because there are some
18 differences, so the pilots -- both pilot groups have to be trained
19 on the differences. I imagine any challenge that two companies
20 face when they're combining into one.

21 Q. Have you ever flown with either Justin or Paul?

22 A. I flew with Paul Wells in the Dash-8.

23 Q. Oh, okay.

24 Q. I've never flown with Paul -- Justin.

25 Q. Okay. How was it flying with Paul in the Dash-8?

1 A. Great. He's an excellent pilot.

2 Q. Were you captain, first officer?

3 A. I believe I was first officer.

4 Q. Okay. Do you recall when you've flown with him or had there
5 been any abnormal situations or emergencies, anything like that?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Routine?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What would you say his greatest strengths are as a pilot?

10 A. He's very standard. He's very safety oriented. He's very
11 knowledgeable.

12 Q. How is your CRM?

13 A. Excellent.

14 Q. How do pilots report safety concerns in the company?

15 A. Through Vistair.

16 Q. Vistair?

17 A. Or through captain irregularity reports.

18 Q. Okay. Are you involved with that process at all? Safety
19 management, do you --

20 A. I am involved in that I see the safety reports that come
21 across, yes.

22 Q. Okay. Who manages that program?

23 A. Tony Santiago and Tiffany Lease.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay. I'm going to pause, thank you.

25 MS. BRANCHAUD: Okay.

1 DR. SILVA: Do you need a break? How is your --

2 MS. BRANCHAUD: I'll take a break.

3 DR. SILVA: Yes. All right.

4 MS. BRANCHAUD: Thank you.

5 DR. SILVA: Pause.

6 (Off the record.)

7 (On the record.)

8 DR. SILVA: Turn it over to you.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Sathya, I'll hand it over to see
10 if Dennis has any questions now.

11 MR. FISHER: I have a few. You've already asked a lot of my
12 questions.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

14 BY MR. FISHER:

15 Q. Crystal, would you -- coming from Ravn, what would you say
16 the culture is at PenAir regarding FOs if they see something in a
17 cockpit they don't like, to speak up to not speak up?

18 A. Yes, to speak up.

19 Q. Okay. And since you know Paul, would you -- how would you
20 view he would receive that speaking up?

21 A. Very well.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Absolutely.

24 Q. Okay. You mentioned that SkedFlex does a lot of the grunt
25 work for crew pairings?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is there any other oversight that's kind of double checking?

3 A. Iain -- well, the scheduler, who's ever scheduling will
4 verify if there's some question.

5 Q. Okay. And have they -- in your tenure as chief pilot, have
6 they come in and asked you regarding concerns? Have you noticed
7 or seen anything like that?

8 A. I have not.

9 Q. Okay. So would you say the system works?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. You flew some pretty fast airplanes in the past and
12 some pretty slow airplanes in the past. In your experience, what
13 -- how would you compare where the Saab sits?

14 A. Faster than the Dash, slower than the 737.

15 Q. Okay. And performance wise as far as landings and --

16 A. The Dash will land shorter.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And is much slower; it's like a Super Cub in many respects.
19 The Saab is a little bit faster.

20 Q. Okay. Would you say Dutch Harbor is unsuitable for the Saab?

21 A. No.

22 Q. And then you also, you mentioned flaps 20 gusting conditions.
23 How would you -- what would you do to verify that, that's
24 acceptable?

25 A. Go into the performance, the performance binder to make sure

1 you have enough runway to land flaps 20 based on your weight and
2 the winds.

3 MR. FISHER: What I have here -- yeah, I think that's pretty
4 much what I have here. Yeah, that's -- I think that's pretty much
5 what I have. Thanks.

6 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Dennis.

7 Roger.

8 BY MR. YOUNG:

9 Q. Forgive me. I'll be bouncing around a little bit, so I
10 apologize for that up front.

11 You said you're part of the merger program for it, and what
12 part of that are you -- you're involved in it, I guess?

13 A. I'm involved in the manuals --

14 Q. Yeah.

15 A. -- portion of it, yes.

16 Q. The manuals portion. Okay. All right. You talked about the
17 GOM requirements for the special airports, the 300 hours or 100
18 hours with the waiver. How involved are you in the sign-off
19 process for that stuff?

20 A. I rely on the check airman.

21 Q. Okay. Do you -- who writes the letter for that?

22 A. The check airman is supposed to write a letter, yes.

23 Q. Check airman. Okay. All right.

24 A. And the chief pilot.

25 Q. Oh, so you -- you're also part of the letter then?

1 A. There's supposed to be a recommendation by the chief pilot,
2 but I would rely on the check airman for that recommendation.

3 Q. Okay. All right. You talked a little bit about the tailwind
4 limitations and Kodiak and Sand Point at night and a lot of the
5 stuff being a weight deal for Dutch Harbor. How involved is
6 dispatch in that? Is dispatch -- is it -- do they do anything on
7 their stuff before they launch the flight? As far as the -- for
8 landing weights, or do they have any part in any of that stuff?

9 A. There is a dispatch planning that they do and that they note
10 on the bottom of the release, how they figured their weights.

11 Q. Okay. So do they have a landing weight -- an estimated
12 landing weight for the crews, or do they -- I'm just not familiar
13 with the -- what the release is, so --

14 A. For dispatch --

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. -- or for all of them?

17 Q. For dispatch and then for the --

18 A. For Dutch, I mean?

19 Q. Yeah. For all of them really. I mean, Dutch maybe is the --
20 are the -- is there a special loading or deal for Dutch Harbor
21 that's different than -- or a special use airport than the other
22 airports?

23 A. Not that I'm aware of, no.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Dutch is allowed to be -- yeah, planning -- Dutch and Sand

1 Point are allowed to use alt CG2 for planning purposes only --

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. -- by dispatch.

4 Q. And what is that?

5 A. That is in the CFM, and it is a way that Saab allows the
6 aircraft to be dispatched at a higher weight, but it is up to the
7 crews to determine at what weight they are actually at and at what
8 -- how much runway length they have and what kind of flaps they
9 can use.

10 Q. Okay. Do you know if that was used for that flight or if
11 it's -- is that a standard procedure for the special use airports
12 or --

13 A. For Dutch --

14 Q. For Dutch.

15 A. -- and Sand Point only.

16 Q. Okay. All right. And as far as dispatch goes in their
17 monitoring process or how they do their stuff, is there -- do they
18 -- for a trip that's fairly lengthy, are they in contact with the
19 crew on the way down for changing weather or anything like that?
20 Do they --

21 A. Yes, if something unusual occurs.

22 Q. Okay. And how do they get ahold of the crews for that stuff?

23 A. By a sat phone.

24 Q. Sat phone. Okay. All right. Do you know -- let's see --
25 yeah, they actually kind of covered that part of it. Moving on to

1 that -- to the wind charts and Dutch Harbor specifically. You
2 mentioned that -- or does PenAir use them as a limitation? Is it
3 -- how do -- does PenAir use the wind charts for these places?

4 A. Dispatch uses them as guidelines. It is not a limitation.

5 Q. So they could dispatch a flight to Dutch Harbor if they're
6 beyond the wind chart?

7 A. With PIC concurrence.

8 Q. Okay, okay. All right. All right. And you mentioned the,
9 that the -- you use SkedFlex for keeping track of who can go where
10 kind of a thing.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So who has the oversight? Are you monitoring that the
13 correct stuff is getting put in for the folks? Who makes sure
14 that low time or not checked out folks are not entered into
15 SkedFlex erroneously or whatever?

16 A. So Pilot Records --

17 Q. Pilot Records.

18 A. -- would be in charge of making sure that the correct people
19 are qualified, and Iain Connelly is in charge of SkedFlex as well,
20 scheduling. So it's a combination.

21 Q. Okay, okay. Does SkedFlex or does PenAir have any pairing
22 requirements on captain/co-pilot?

23 A. Just the standard FAA requirements.

24 MR. YOUNG: Okay. All right. Yeah, I have no other
25 questions. Thanks.

1 MS. BRANCHAUD: Thank you.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Roger.

3 Dujan.

4 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

5 Q. All right. I just have some questions here, some of them may
6 have already been answered to an extent. But is there a risk
7 assessment that's conducted for each flight for PenAir?

8 A. Not for every flight, no.

9 Q. What would -- what's the determination that's made on whether
10 it should be done?

11 A. Special airports or high minimums.

12 Q. Okay. So is it safe to say then that Dutch airport you would
13 have to have a risk assessment done for that --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- due to this -- due to it being a special airport and high
16 minimums? Okay. So you mentioned earlier that the pilot wishing
17 to fly into a special airport would have to be approved by a check
18 airman. Part of that process -- or do they have to get sim
19 training first for those special airports, those three that you
20 mentioned?

21 A. No.

22 Q. So they don't get any sim training for special airport use?

23 A. Well, we get sim training for Dutch.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. But we don't get sim training for Sand Point. That would be

1 on-the-job training with a check airman.

2 Q. Okay. All right. And you mentioned that you were involved
3 with the merger program. What are the manuals that are being
4 updated?

5 A. All of them.

6 Q. All of them. Okay, okay. So the GOM is being updated --

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. -- is one of them, and that -- in general, are you seeing any
9 major updates between the two companies as far as flight-related
10 information?

11 A. Major, I'm not sure.

12 Q. So, between the two companies, did this seem like a heavy
13 workload to update these manuals or not so much?

14 A. Well, so, for example, we're going to be changing -- for
15 PenAir, we'll be changing the way the chimes are done. So is that
16 a major update? It's a change, and the flight attendants have to
17 learn it and the pilots have to learn, but it's not a -- would you
18 qualify that as a major change? I'm not sure.

19 But there are changes in the way we -- PenAir will operate
20 and the way Ravn operates so that we are operating very similarly.
21 The flight attendants will be on both planes, so it's important
22 that the pilots are standard when they interact with the flight
23 attendants. So there will be changes.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I don't know if you'd call that major.

1 Q. No, it was more just trying to understand what's the workload
2 involved with updating all this?

3 A. Well, the workload involved with updating them is
4 significant. It takes a lot of time. I have to get with my
5 counterpart at Ravn, and we discuss every section that we're
6 working on and how best to integrate it.

7 Q. Okay. All right. And the question is -- next question is:
8 Explain the process of getting the weather on initial approach
9 into Dutch Harbor?

10 A. Prior to top of descent you would make contact with the
11 weather observer.

12 Q. Is there any other method that you would use other than the
13 weather observer?

14 A. There is an AWOS on the field. My experience the few times
15 I've been in there, I've relied on the weather observer.

16 Q. And why is that?

17 A. Because she's giving me up-to-date, far more accurate weather
18 than the AWOS.

19 Q. Has there ever been a situation where the weather information
20 has been delayed -- Dutch weather has delayed the information that
21 you were asking for it, and it seemed like you had to wait to get
22 the weather update?

23 A. From the weather observer?

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

1 Q. Okay. So describe the corporate culture in general at the
2 airline.

3 A. Safety oriented.

4 Q. Safety oriented, okay.

5 A. Very open.

6 Q. And I think earlier you were talking about that the FO cannot
7 land the aircraft if they don't -- if they're not approved for a
8 special airport --

9 A. No.

10 Q. -- is that true?

11 A. No. The FO is never allowed to land in Dutch Harbor.

12 Q. In Dutch Harbor. Okay. Would there be any situation that
13 would change that requirement?

14 A. I guess if the captain was incapacitated the FO would have to
15 land.

16 Q. Okay. All right.

17 A. But I'm not even sure that's true. They'd probably miss and
18 go to somewhere else.

19 Q. Okay. And to your knowledge have you ever heard of any
20 system anomalies on the Saab 2000?

21 A. System anomalies?

22 Q. Anything that in general would be, you know, a case where
23 you've seen a lot of system failures, issues with the systems on
24 the Saab?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Okay. So you talked about the captain irregularity report
2 earlier. What is included in that report?

3 A. Anything the captain wants to write about. Here at PenAir,
4 if a captain goes missed, I believe a captain irregularity report
5 is to be filed, which I think will change once we integrate
6 because a missed approach is really a normal flight maneuver if
7 required. So I've received missed approach, I've received divert
8 captain irregularity reports, and I've received other things.

9 Q. And is that communication -- do you get back with the captain
10 and then talk about, kind of have a conversation about the issue?

11 A. If need be.

12 Q. If needed, okay.

13 A. If it's a standard missed, no; if it's a standard divert, no;
14 if something weird happened, yes, I would follow up.

15 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. That's all I had. Thank you.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Dajuan.

17 So we're going to -- we'll do a quick one more round.

18 Typically it goes a little quicker than the first. But before we
19 do, do you want to take a break?

20 MS. BRANCHAUD: Yes. Thank you.

21 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

22 (Off the record.)

23 (On the record.)

24 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Crystal, so we'll go around one more time
25 to see if anybody has any follow-up questions.

1 BY MR. FRANTZ:

2 Q. I just wanted to first of all clarify, when you flew with
3 Paul, you said you flew with them in the Dash. That was at Ravn?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Was that also at that time called Corvus Airlines?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. But the plane said Ravn, and you guys knew it as this
8 is Ravn?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. And how long ago was that? When was the last time you
11 flew with him?

12 A. I don't know. I really don't know.

13 Q. All right.

14 A. Maybe a year ago.

15 Q. And was that just a standard crew pairing?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. But you were a captain then?

18 A. I don't remember. I believe I flew right seat with him, but
19 I don't know if I was checked out as captain at that time.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I'm not certain.

22 Q. Okay. So the Medallion wind charts that we're talking about,
23 and you described dispatch uses them as kind of guidance or -- and
24 if the winds are higher on the chart, it's still okay -- higher
25 than what the chart says for any particular sector, it's okay to

1 go with as long as the PIC says, yeah, I'm good with that; is that
2 correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. Do those charts have any use once the flight's
5 airborne? Would it be typical for a crew to pull them out once
6 they're en route, look at it and say --

7 A. Yes. Yes.

8 Q. Does it impose any limitation on the crew once they're
9 airborne, the values on the chart?

10 A. It's not limiting. It's guidance.

11 Q. Okay. Would you expect that a crew is routinely pulling out
12 that chart as they're approaching an airport to look at the winds
13 and compare them to what the chart says and -- or is that -- is it
14 a routine thing, or is it as needed? How is --

15 A. As needed.

16 Q. How would they use that in flight?

17 A. If the winds had changed significantly from what they were
18 expecting, yes, I would expect them to look at the wind chart.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. If there was no change or not much change --

21 Q. Are there any -- you've only been into Dutch a few times, but
22 from your time as a chief pilot talking to other pilots, are you
23 aware of any rules of thumb for flying into Dutch, any tips or
24 tricks or people say, yeah, we never do this or it's always like
25 this or -- anything specific you know about Dutch along those

1 lines?

2 A. I'm sure there are those things, but I don't know them.

3 Q. Okay. Tell me about -- can you give me, like, a description
4 of your SIMCOM training, what it consisted of, you know, kind of
5 quantity, type or training, and your impressions of the training?

6 A. We got there, and the first or second day we took the oral,
7 which was unusual for me, but I like that, taking the oral first,
8 and then you start the training. The training was excellent. The
9 instructors were excellent; they knew the plane. They put us
10 through our paces. Everything was on time as expected. I have no
11 -- nothing negative to say about the training at all. I found it
12 to be quite good.

13 Q. How many sim sessions did you get?

14 A. I believe I was there for 2 weeks, so it would have been at
15 least 10.

16 Q. And does that include the check ride at the end or 10 and a
17 check ride?

18 A. I'm not certain.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I'd have to look at my schedule.

21 Q. How many different instructors did you fly with?

22 A. One. Only one instructor and then a different one for the
23 check ride.

24 Q. Okay. Any comments on them, instructors?

25 A. They were excellent.

1 Q. Since you've been at PenAir and during this merger process --
2 by the way, is it still called PenAir or is it Peninsula Aviation
3 Services now? What's the --

4 A. I think it's d/b/a PenAir.

5 Q. Doing business as PenAir?

6 A. I believe.

7 Q. So keeping the name, but PenAir as a company is non -- does
8 it still exist or --

9 A. Yes. It still exists until we are fully merged.

10 Q. Okay. So since you've been here at PenAir, Peninsula
11 Aviation, have there been any changes in (a) special airport,
12 special airport procedures, or (b) any other procedures from
13 changes? As in from the way PenAir did it when they were PenAir
14 versus the way it's now being done during the merger? Anything
15 that you're aware of, changes?

16 A. No.

17 Q. No. Okay. Who teaches CRM for your pilots?

18 A. It would either be Kirk Watson or I think maybe Britt Goudey
19 might be certified to teach it as well.

20 Q. Is it part of the ground school before the pilot goes to the
21 sim?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you know how much time --

24 A. I don't know.

25 Q. -- the CRM block is?

1 A. Whatever is required in the module.

2 Q. You mentioned high mins. What's the restriction -- what are
3 high min -- does that only apply to captains, that term high min?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And what are -- do you know what those restrictions are?

6 A. Anything less than 100 hours, you add 100 feet to the ceiling
7 and half mile to the vis.

8 Q. And is it 100 hours in what or doing what?

9 A. In the aircraft.

10 Q. In the type?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. Not -- okay. 100 hours in type, you have to add --
13 they're a high mins captain?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Okay. How long does OE last at PenAir?

16 A. A minimum of -- what, 25. And if they need more OE, they
17 will get more OE.

18 Q. Is there a norm or a standard or an average?

19 A. Right around 25 or a little more, not much more.

20 Q. How many line check airmen do you have?

21 A. Four.

22 Q. Four.

23 A. Oh, and -- four, four line check airmen.

24 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think that's it for me. Thanks.

25 Sathya.

1 BY DR. SILVA:

2 Q. Yeah. So again, scenario flying into Dutch, which crew
3 member does the performance calculations or you would expect to do
4 the performance calculations?

5 A. The co-pilot.

6 Q. Co-pilot would do them, okay. How is that calculation
7 communicated between the crew members? Is there a briefing done?

8 A. Usually a briefing, yes.

9 Q. So what information would be in the briefing?

10 A. Your speeds, the approach you're doing, the type of approach
11 you're doing, the minimum descent altitude, if you plan to circle,
12 what kind of flaps you're using, anything else pertinent to the
13 flight.

14 Q. Okay. Who typically decides the flaps setting? Would that
15 be pilot flying or --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Do you know if that's discussed prior to the
18 performance calculations or is that part of the briefing after?

19 A. I'm not certain. It could be either way, I suppose. I
20 imagine people would usually assume flaps 20, so they would do
21 performance calculations for flaps 20. And if they were planning
22 on flaps 35, that would be discussed and they would do performance
23 calculations for flaps 35.

24 Q. Okay. And these tops, bottoms transition, is that normal
25 from your experience, that kind of procedure on landing?

1 A. On different airplanes?

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. I don't think they did that on the jet. I don't think they
4 do that on the Dash-8, so --

5 Q. Okay. So you've only seen that here?

6 A. I think so.

7 Q. Okay. Do crews get training specific to reading that wind
8 chart that we discussed before?

9 A. It's discussed in ground school.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I'm not sure much training is required on reading the wind
12 chart, but they've certainly seen it.

13 Q. Is that something that would typically be referenced during
14 training?

15 A. We would discuss it, sure.

16 Q. Okay. What about in a sims, like, scenario based?

17 A. No, not in the sim.

18 Q. No.

19 A. We wouldn't reference that wind chart.

20 Q. It would just be ground training on it?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. Okay. And regarding a preflight walk-around, can you talk us
23 through, when you're looking at the -- let's just say the wheel
24 assemblies, what are you looking for?

25 A. Leaks, wear and tear on the tires, brake pins, lines,

1 hydraulic lines, making sure there's no wear and tear on that,
2 making sure there's no slush or dirt or contamination mucked up in
3 there.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. General condition.

6 Q. When it comes to wear and tear on the tires, what are you
7 looking for?

8 A. There's -- well, so if there's no tread, I would get a
9 mechanic to come look at that. If you could see cord, I would
10 definitely get a mechanic to come look at that. Other than that,
11 flat spots maybe. I've not seen that.

12 Q. You haven't seen flat spots?

13 A. No.

14 Q. In your experience?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. But I would look for it.

18 Q. And then can you walk us through a short field landing as
19 pilot flying, let's say from 500 feet down?

20 A. I would remain on VASIs, remain on speed. I would expect
21 callouts of speed variation and sink rate, and I would expect to
22 touch down in the touchdown zone, and for short field I would use
23 -- I would rip it into reverse as quickly as possible and
24 (indiscernible) brake.

25 Q. When would you put it in reverse? Are you waiting for

1 certain conditions?

2 A. (Indiscernible).

3 Q. (Indiscernible)?

4 A. Well, so when I land, the nose gear comes down maybe a half
5 second after the main. So by the time I get it into reverse the
6 nose gear is down.

7 Q. Got it.

8 A. But the nose gear needs to be down.

9 Q. Okay. And when you say touchdown zone, what's your
10 definition of a touchdown zone?

11 A. At Dutch?

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. 1,000 feet. It's marked; it's clearly marked on the runway.

14 DR. SILVA: Okay. Good, that's all I have. Thank you.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Sathya.

16 Dennis, any follow-ups?

17 MR. FISHER: Just some small ones.

18 BY MR. FISHER:

19 Q. Is there any wind differences for lower time captains?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. Do you remember offhand what they are?

22 A. I believe there's a note on that chart that says if you have
23 less than a certain amount of time you subtract 10 knots from the
24 wind.

25 Q. And we're trying to remember back to training, you -- did you

1 do a Dutch scenario incident?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you remember, did that stand out in any way to you or did
4 it -- was there anything in there you're like, this is awesome or
5 this is really bad?

6 A. No.

7 Q. No?

8 A. There was nothing that stood out.

9 Q. And how would you, how would you kind of -- you've been into
10 Dutch; you've been in the sim. How would you compare the two?

11 A. Dutch is much more difficult than the sim.

12 Q. Okay. All right.

13 A. I don't know that the sim can be programmed to have squirrely
14 winds like Dutch. Maybe it can, but they didn't the day we
15 practiced.

16 Q. So it's more of just a field condition exercise?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. Now going back to the performance stuff, the FO is expected
19 to come up with all the numbers for the flight, for the landing.
20 How would he convey that to the crew member? How would he --
21 would he write it down or would he put it in the computer or how
22 is that?

23 A. I believe it's supposed to be written down on the TOLD card,
24 but he could have verbally conveyed it to the captain as well. I
25 don't know that there's a spot. I can't remember exactly what the

1 TOLD card looks like, but is there a spot to write down length of
2 runway required? I'm not certain.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. Okay. Then it's supposed to be written down.

5 Q. And how was that trained in the sim?

6 A. Yeah, they would look it up in the sim then and do it, they
7 would write it down.

8 MR. FISHER: Okay. That's all I have.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Dennis.

10 Roger.

11 BY MR. YOUNG:

12 Q. You mentioned there's no first officer landings at Dutch
13 Harbor. Is that the same for the other special airports?

14 A. I believe so, but I'm not 100 percent certain.

15 Q. Okay. And with the merger going on, as far as crew that have
16 come over from Ravn to Pen, is there a certain number of captains,
17 co-pilots? Is there -- do you see what was at Pen, what did you
18 guys have to add to it to get your crew complements for
19 everything?

20 A. Well, only -- let's see. We had two come over from Ravn and
21 myself, so three total from Ravn.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And that was it.

24 Q. That was it. All right. So who was -- I guess it would be
25 you and Paul and the third one?

1 A. And Levi Fox came; he came from Hageland.

2 Q. Also a captain here at Pen?

3 A. No. He's a co-pilot.

4 Q. Co-pilot. Okay. All right. All right. You mentioned that
5 on the preflight, if you found something, you would call a
6 mechanic over. At what point do you write that up?

7 A. Well, if the mechanic would say that it's good, I wouldn't
8 write it up. And if he would say, nope, that's not good enough, I
9 would write it up right then and there.

10 MR. YOUNG: Okay. All right. I've got no other questions.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Roger.

12 Dujuan, follow-ups?

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: I don't have any follow-ups.

14 MR. FISHER: Okay. I have a follow-up to a follow-up. It
15 should be quick.

16 BY MR. FISHER:

17 Q. Before the merger --and you may not know the answer to this.
18 Before the merger, were the special airport requirements the same
19 when it was just -- when PenAir was PenAir or --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Special airport requirements as in, you know, 300 hours or
22 100 with a waiver. Did that -- was that in place at PenAir before
23 Ravn?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. It was?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think we're finished. So we asked you
4 a lot of questions. Is there anything we didn't ask you that you
5 think we should have?

6 MS. BRANCHAUD: No.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Anything you want to add to?

8 MS. BRANCHAUD: No.

9 MR. FRANTZ: You have our contact information, so if you
10 think of anything down the road, it's perfectly fine to go back
11 and correct or add on to anything you said here, because this is
12 not sworn testimony; it's just an informal interview. So we can
13 continue to talk afterwards if you have anything else you want to
14 tell us.

15 Okay. Well, with that we'll go off, and say thank you very
16 much for coming in this morning.

17 DR. SILVA: Off the record at 11:11.

18 (Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Crystal Branchaud

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: October 25, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Wade Donovan
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/21/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: CRYSTAL BRANCHAUD
Former Chief Pilot, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Wednesday,
December 4, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

ROGER YOUNG, Accident Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

TONY FISCHER, Principal Operations Inspector
FAA

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot, Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Ms. Branchaud)

I N D E X

ITEM	PAGE
Interview of Crystal Branchaud:	
By Dr. Silva	5
By Mr. Frantz	17
By Dr. Sevillian	26
By Mr. Wilson	29
By Dr. Silva	29
By Mr. Frantz	32
By Dr. Sevillian	35
By Dr. Silva	36
By Dr. Sevillian	36
By Mr. Frantz	37

I N T E R V I E W

(1:41 p.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: For our introduction again, just so we're
4 familiar and we get everything there on the record -- you know
5 everyone in this room, I think, except for Tony. Tony is
6 representing the FAA for this set of interviews. Our previous FAA
7 person had a conflict. So, again, his role is safety, no
8 enforcement action or anything along those lines.

9 Again, we're here for safety. We're not here to assign
10 blame, liability, but really just to prevent this from happening
11 again. What will happen, again, with this transcript, too, is
12 that we'll get the transcript from our transcription service, and
13 it'll eventually become part of our public docket when the
14 accident information goes public.

15 You're the expert, no right or wrong answers. Answer to the
16 best of your ability. Again, like last time, if you need a break,
17 just let us know.

18 You are entitled to a representative. Would you like to have
19 a representative?

20 MS. BRANCHAUD: Mr. Campbell.

21 DR. SILVA: Okay. And again, like last time, I'll start off
22 with a handful of questions, and we'll go around our room twice to
23 -- typically to make sure that we've caught everything.

24 Any questions before we start?

25 MS. BRANCHAUD: No.

1 DR. SILVA: Okay.

2 INTERVIEW OF CRYSTAL BRANCHAUD

3 BY DR. SILVA:

4 Q. What is your current role?

5 A. I am flying the line for Ravn.

6 Q. Okay. In what position?

7 A. Line captain.

8 Q. In the Dash-8?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. Can you talk to me about that transition, why you left
11 PenAir?

12 A. I was removed from my position.

13 Q. Do you have insight into why?

14 A. I was given no explanation.

15 Q. Where did that notice come from?

16 A. Brian Whilden.

17 Q. Was there anyone else involved with the decision, as far as
18 you know?

19 A. I only received the letter from him, so I wouldn't know.

20 Q. Was it just a letter? Did you get --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did you have a face-to-face interaction?

23 A. Yes. He gave the letter to me, to my face.

24 Q. Okay. So I wanted to follow up on the airport qualifications
25 again. When you started your position here, you said February --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- I believe, what was your understanding of PenAir's policy
3 for airport qualification?

4 A. I had a incomplete understanding of it at the time. I
5 believed you needed 300 hours, but that could be waived.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And the waiver, I had an incomplete understanding of.

8 Q. Can you explain that in more detail? What part of it did you
9 not understand?

10 A. I thought I could just waive the 300 hours. I didn't realize
11 you had to have 100 hours PIC in PenAir aircraft before it could
12 be waived. It was an error on my part.

13 Q. Okay. How did how did you learn that you had to have that
14 300 -- or the hours?

15 A. After the accident, I learned that.

16 Q. Okay. Was there any effort while you were here, before the
17 accident, to change those qualifications?

18 A. No. There was only talk of it. There was no -- we were not
19 moving to change those qualifications in the GOM.

20 Q. What was the talk?

21 A. Maybe they could be waived.

22 Q. Is there a reason that there were -- the discussions were
23 brought up to waiving those?

24 A. No reason. Not that I can -- like, for example?

25 Q. Were there any circumstances that required maybe further --

1 more captains signed off for Dutch Harbor or any of the special
2 airports?

3 A. No, no.

4 Q. Okay. So why -- when it comes to the waiving of the 300
5 hours, why would -- was that applied in Paul's case?

6 A. He had 1,000 hours of turboprop Alaska time. I had flown
7 with him in a Dash-8. I had been a student of his in his class.
8 I was confident he could go into Dutch safely. I had no concerns
9 with waiving the 300-hour requirement for Paul Wells.

10 Q. Okay. Were there other pilots that you were considering
11 waiving 300-hour requirement for?

12 A. Greg Pfeiffer, that requirement was waived for him as well.

13 Q. Were there any others that were considered, any other pilots
14 or anything?

15 A. Well, Ross Meyers and Sarah Boots were close to 300 hours,
16 but I wasn't considering waiving the 300 hours for them. Both of
17 them -- well, Ross, maybe. Sarah expressed that she did not want
18 the 300 hours waived, and I said, okay, that's fine. Ross said
19 maybe he was willing to waive it, but we never got around to it.
20 He was still flying with the check airmen and it was never
21 seriously discussed.

22 Q. So, from what I'm hearing there, there was no consideration
23 or discussion of lowering the requirements going into special
24 airports?

25 A. There was discussion of it, but nothing was done.

1 Q. Who was who was involved with those discussions?

2 A. Me, Deke, Sarah, Aaron.

3 Q. Okay, and Sarah's -- what's her last name?

4 A. Sarah Fraher.

5 Q. From Ravn?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. Was that potential brought up to the pilot group at
8 all?

9 A. I believe it was during a pilot meeting; Deke discussed
10 waiving it.

11 Q. How was that response?

12 A. How was that response?

13 Q. Yeah. What kind of feedback did you get from the group?

14 A. I had Zach come in my office and express concern that it
15 shouldn't be waived. And I said, we're not changing the GOM, but
16 I wanted to keep the -- it wouldn't be eliminated. The 300 hours
17 wouldn't be eliminated, but I wanted to keep the ability to waive
18 it. And he said, okay. And that was the only one that I recall
19 expressing concern over changing it. Maybe Adam Hehl expressed
20 concern over changing it as well, but I don't recall exactly what
21 he said.

22 Q. So why was it not changed?

23 A. It just wasn't. I don't know. It's not -- there was no
24 specific reason why it wasn't changed. Maybe, with time, we would
25 have changed it, but we hadn't changed it.

1 Q. So, Paul reported to you, correct, the director of training?

2 A. He didn't really start that position. He was getting
3 experience on the line and flying. He didn't actually start that
4 position, as far as I know.

5 Q. Did he have any projects he was working on?

6 A. He talked about projects, but once again, I don't have
7 firsthand knowledge of what exactly he was doing other than flying
8 the line.

9 Q. Okay, so any of the projects that he was working on, do you
10 know who he would have been working on those with?

11 A. Jeff Arnold, perhaps.

12 Q. Who is Jeff?

13 A. Jeff Arnold is the director of training at Ravn because he
14 was tasked with integrating the two training programs.

15 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any of the projects that Paul was
16 working on?

17 A. There was one project to put the weight and balance on the
18 iPad. He was working on that.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. But it never -- it didn't happen. He was just working on it.

21 Q. So the weight and balance calculations?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. On the iPad?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. What about performance calculations?

1 A. That, yes. All of those.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I'm very -- I'm not familiar with the program, so he just
4 mentioned that he was doing it and that it would be a great help
5 to the pilots.

6 Q. Do you know how he was testing it?

7 A. I imagine he was testing it, I imagine, on the plane, and
8 then also running the standard way of calculating weight and
9 balance and then comparing the two.

10 Q. But it was not something that you had assigned or had
11 oversight of?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. Okay. Have you ever written a letter of recommendation for
14 someone to receive special airports training?

15 A. I did for Paul -- for Greg Pfeiffer after the accident, when
16 I realized I needed to do that.

17 Q. Okay. Oh, there was something else at the tip of my tongue.
18 Let's see. What's your typical interaction with Deke Abbott -- or
19 would have been, obviously? At the time that you were chief pilot
20 here, what was your typical interaction with him?

21 A. We had meetings every night -- every morning at 9:00 a.m. to
22 discuss what's going on in the company. He was very helpful. He
23 always asked if I needed anything. They were positive --
24 generally positive interactions.

25 Q. Okay, so daily interactions?

1 A. For the most part, yes. But sometimes I couldn't make it
2 because I had another meeting that I had to attend to or something
3 else.

4 Q. What kind of -- did Deke have input into the operation here?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. How so? Can you give us an example?

7 A. He gave me advice.

8 Q. Okay. Can you give me an example of the kinds of input you
9 would get from Deke?

10 A. If I was having a question regarding a pilot, I would ask him
11 for advice. Day-to-day operations. I'm not sure.

12 Q. What, in terms of day-to-day operations, might you have
13 interacted on?

14 A. One time I had a pilot call me from the gate. He had a FDR
15 in-op, and the MEL was a little bit unclear whether or not he
16 could be dispatched. So I called Deke, and I read to him the MEL,
17 and I asked for his opinion, his advice. That would be something
18 that he helped me with.

19 Q. What was the result of that? Do you remember?

20 A. The result was that we said he could not MEL it. And he did
21 not go, but upon further discussion with Nick Aderman and
22 maintenance, we determined that he could have MEL'd it.

23 Q. Did -- does Deke sit in on pilot hiring or interviewing at
24 PenAir?

25 A. I don't believe he has.

1 Q. What's your -- what was your interaction with the director of
2 operations here when you were chief pilot?

3 A. I would -- we would work together to make sure things were
4 taken care of regarding the SOC, the manuals. I would also ask
5 him for advice occasionally, that sort of thing.

6 Q. Was there a difference in the type of advice you would ask
7 between the DO versus Deke Abbott?

8 A. Deke Abbott was around more than the DO, so Deke Abbott was
9 more available for me to ask advice. So, for that reason, I would
10 say I talked to Deke more often.

11 Q. How often did you see Dick Harding?

12 A. Some every day when he was here.

13 Q. When was he not here? Did he --

14 A. He had 2 weeks on, a week off. His schedule was --

15 Q. Okay, it was on his schedule. I see. What is the process
16 for manual changes -- aircraft manual -- but not aircraft
17 operating manual changes?

18 A. During SOC? It would all go through the company that was
19 hired to handle manual changes.

20 Q. So if -- in terms of merging those manuals and changes that
21 needed to be implemented, what was the process in terms of coming
22 up with the ideas of how to change it? Was there any testing?
23 Was it evaluated? How -- when does it get into the manual?

24 A. We were given a list of things by the company that they
25 hired. I can't remember the name of the company. And you had

1 different phases: 1, 2, 3 and 4. And in Phase 1, there was a
2 certain number of things that were changed. And Aaron Rocereta
3 and I got together, and we looked at the Ravn manual and the
4 PenAir manual, and we determined how best to change the Phase 1
5 portion that we were tasked with changing.

6 Q. Okay. How would you evaluate the effects of that change?

7 A. We were required to put it into a safety net, and then it
8 would go out to all the different departments that might be
9 affected by the change. And they were required to look at that
10 and determine whether or not the change would work.

11 Q. Okay. So, in the discussion about changing the airport
12 qualifications with that, would you expect that to be the same
13 process that --

14 A. We never did that, so yes, that would be the same process if
15 we had done it.

16 Q. Okay. As chief pilot, have you ever been in a situation
17 where you've disagreed with the pilot in terms of their decision
18 to accept or decline a flight?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can you describe the situation?

21 A. We had a young, brand new captain who declined to take a
22 flight and after 6 hours, decided she wanted to go home. And I
23 talked to her, that she, in the future, needed to stay for her
24 duty period, her duty day. And that was it, was a counseling
25 session.

1 Q. What was your understanding of the situation that she was
2 faced with?

3 A. She felt that she had been at the airport for several hours,
4 and the weather at her destination was above minimums, and it was
5 forecasted to be above minimums, but she felt that wasn't good
6 enough, and she didn't want to wait there anymore. And she'd only
7 been there 6 hours, and I think she had 12-hour duty day that day.
8 And I kind of felt like she threw up her hands and said, send in
9 the reserve crew, I'm going home.

10 And so when she got back to the office, I talked to her, and
11 I said, you know, you don't get to walk off the job. If you're
12 fatigued, you can file a fatigue report and we'll discuss that,
13 but she didn't do that. So we just -- it was more of a mentoring,
14 in my opinion, a mentoring session with a very young captain.

15 Q. Did she have concerns about fatigue?

16 A. She felt her crew was tired, but nobody filed the fatigue
17 report. They had been waiting at the airport for 6 hours, so my
18 opinion was they kind of shrugged their shoulders and wanted to go
19 home.

20 Q. Was anyone else involved with this situation when you were
21 speaking with this pilot?

22 A. Deke Abbott came and also spoke with her as well.

23 Q. What was his input on that?

24 A. It was a similar input. If you -- you know, if she was
25 tired, she knew to file a fatigue report, and she didn't do that.

1 There were no concerns about safety. She felt the weather, you
2 know, the weather wasn't good enough for her to go at that time,
3 then she needed to wait and see the weather improved. She had 6
4 more hours for her duty day.

5 Or she could have asked for more fuel. We counseled her on
6 that. We could have taken off the load and she could have asked
7 for more fuel. She had a lot of options other than throwing up
8 her hands and saying, I'm going home. And we wanted to point out
9 those options to her.

10 Q. Was there any follow up to that conversation?

11 A. I did. I called her later. I asked her if she thought about
12 things and if she had anything she wanted to add, and she said no.

13 Q. Okay. It sounds like there was some questioning of decision
14 making. Did you feel like she was capable of doing her job?

15 A. I know she's capable of doing her job. Otherwise, I would
16 remove her from her job if I didn't feel she was capable.

17 Q. Did you feel like after this incident -- was there any
18 questioning of whether she was going to stay on as a line pilot?

19 A. No, but to her? Did I talk to her about staying on as a
20 pilot?

21 Q. Right.

22 A. No. Never.

23 Q. Was there discussions behind the scene?

24 A. No. I felt strongly she was a young, inexperienced line
25 captain. I put -- and this was a counseling, mentoring session --

1 I put nothing in her file. There was no discussion of removing
2 her from the line, no.

3 Q. Okay. Have there been any other cases of flights that -- the
4 outcome of flights that you were -- or canceling or declining of
5 flights that didn't necessarily -- that you didn't necessarily
6 agree with?

7 A. I had Adam Hehl call me once that he said it was really windy
8 and he didn't want to go to Dutch. And I said, well, don't go.
9 And he said, but Iain Thompson went, so I have to reassess whether
10 or not I should go.

11 And I said, well, Iain Thompson left a while ago, and things
12 have changed. If you're not comfortable with going, don't go.
13 And he didn't go. And there was no recriminations or anything
14 like that from that discussion at all -- not that I can recall.
15 I've always agreed, if a line captain had valid safety concerns,
16 don't go.

17 Q. I'm just trying to understand the differences in the
18 scenarios that you were faced with in terms of valid safety
19 concerns versus invalid. How do you make that determination?

20 A. Well, there was no invalid safety concerns. Are you talking
21 about Sarah's declining?

22 Q. Right.

23 A. So, her concern was that she was tired, and she didn't want
24 to stay. That's what came across. And she refused -- she didn't
25 want to fill out a fatigue report. The weather was fine, and she

1 couldn't give us a good reason why she didn't want to go -- or
2 wouldn't stay and stay for the rest of her shift.

3 She had a 12-hour or 14-hour duty day. I don't really
4 remember exactly. And she left after 6 hours. I felt she was
5 young and inexperienced, and she needed to be counseled, mentored,
6 that you don't just get to throw up your hands and go home unless
7 you have a good reason.

8 Q. Do you recall what the weather was on that day?

9 A. I believe it was 2 miles and 600 over, and I think you needed
10 a mile and a quarter to get into Dillingham. And I think the
11 forecast was for 3 miles.

12 Q. Okay, so in your perspective, that was an acceptable -- it
13 was an acceptable weather condition for departing?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. It's right at the tip of my tongue. Okay, how was --
16 what was Sarah's response? How did she respond to the --

17 A. Later on, after all the counseling, she agreed with me that
18 she should have gone. And she could have asked for more fuel.
19 She could have waited for another hour if she wanted to. She had
20 options, and she agreed.

21 Q. Okay.

22 DR. SILVA: All right. I'm going to pause here. I'm going
23 to let -- Marvin, do you have any questions?

24 MR. FRANTZ: Sure.

25 BY MR. FRANTZ:

1 Q. You said you didn't -- you weren't aware of the 300/100-hour
2 requirement. Is that correct? Either one of those for special
3 airports?

4 A. I was aware of the 300-hour requirement. I made a mistake
5 thinking that I could waive it.

6 Q. So as to -- to no required number, just to waive the 300 --

7 A. Right.

8 Q. -- period? Okay. Were you aware of the other requirements
9 for a special airport besides the hours, as in the check airman
10 letter or chief pilot?

11 A. Not until after the accident.

12 Q. How soon after the accident did you learn that? Do you
13 recall?

14 A. Shortly after.

15 Q. So you said you don't know why there was talk of eliminating
16 that requirement. You don't know what the reason was for that.
17 Were you surprised that somebody was talking about changing the
18 manual or changing PenAir policies for no reason?

19 A. Well, so this was many months ago, and I believe at the pilot
20 meeting, Deke mentioned that as long as you had proper training
21 and you were qualified, you could go into an airport. And he used
22 the example of Aspen, that pilots were trained and they would go
23 in with a check airman and they would watch videos and they would
24 learn about the airport. And he didn't see that Dutch Harbor was
25 much different, and that with proper training, you could go into

1 Dutch Harbor and not have a -- necessarily have a hour
2 requirement.

3 Q. Deke Abbott?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And what did you think of that idea?

6 A. I didn't disagree.

7 Q. What was the general reception among the pilot group when
8 they --

9 A. I think they disagreed, and we didn't change it.

10 Q. So did you sign a form or check a box, something to make a
11 record that Paul Wells was qualified for Dutch Harbor?

12 A. I did not. Dennis Fisher and Kirk Watson did.

13 Q. Did you know what they did to --

14 A. They signed a form, the qualification form.

15 Q. Okay. Were you aware that they signed that form?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did you see that form?

18 A. I did not, not until after the accident.

19 Q. And once someone's qualified for a special airport, how does
20 that information make it to crew scheduling so they know that this
21 pilot is okay to go to this airport? Do you know?

22 A. Someone tells them. Maybe it might have been me.

23 Q. So do you think that both Kirk and, Kirk and Dennis were not
24 aware of the 300/100-hour requirement for special airports?

25 A. I think -- I'm not sure. We all made the mistake. I think

1 if they had known about -- if any of us had known about the
2 100-hour requirement, we would not have signed any document. They
3 would not have signed any document if they had known. I know that
4 they wouldn't have.

5 Q. Does the document that they signed say that they
6 certified or verified that this person has met the 300/100
7 requirement and had special airport training? Or do you know
8 what, specifically, they signed --

9 A. I have no --

10 Q. What they were saying when they signed?

11 A. I have not looked at that document carefully.

12 Q. Not familiar with that form?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. You use the term shrugged their shoulders a minute
15 ago. Was that talking about Sarah, when you were talking to her
16 about the --

17 A. It was a -- I don't know that she did that. It was only -- I
18 know that after 6 hours, she decided she didn't want to do the
19 flight and came back to the office. I don't know that she
20 shrugged her shoulders, literally.

21 Q. Do you know if she -- or if she had any communication with
22 the operations, with the dispatch or what --

23 A. I believe there was some communication.

24 Q. I mean, once she decided she wasn't going to go, did dispatch
25 -- or, yeah, dispatch say, okay, we have something else we'd like

1 you to do, or you -- would you stand by because we might need you
2 later? Or do you know if there is any communication along those
3 lines?

4 A. I do not know if there was any communication, but I believe
5 that Sarah did not ask if she could be released. I understand she
6 did not ask to be released.

7 Q. And you said she refused to file a fatigue report?

8 A. No, she didn't refuse. I know one was not filed.

9 Q. And did you ask her why -- if she was too fatigued to do the
10 flight or she was -- thought she was, did you ask her why she
11 didn't or wouldn't file a fatigue report?

12 A. I did not ask her. I know we talked about, in the future, if
13 you need to file a fatigue report, you need to file a fatigue
14 report. And she said she was okay with that. She understood
15 that.

16 Q. When you had the counseling session with her, was Deke Abbott
17 present for that session?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is that a normal course of events to have a senior vice
20 president present when a new captain is counseled for something
21 like this?

22 A. So that's the first counseling session I ever did. And
23 that's why I wanted him there, because I was new at it as well,
24 and I wanted to make sure that I didn't blow it. So I wanted him
25 to be -- I called him and asked him to come over.

1 Q. Do you feel like he gave you -- so who conducted the
2 counseling session?

3 A. I would say both of us.

4 Q. You or Deke? Both of you? Do you feel like -- did she --
5 was at all intimidated by that kind of firepower coming at her,
6 for --

7 A. She may have been, by Deke. But she was young and
8 inexperienced, so that doesn't surprise me, I suppose, if she was
9 intimidated.

10 Q. Do you feel it was a valuable experience for her?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you feel like she came out of it with a better feeling
13 about safety reporting and her decision making?

14 A. I feel like she came out of it with a better feel that she
15 has options. If the weather is at minimums and -- or above
16 minimums and forecasted to be even better, that she can get more
17 fuel. If she still doesn't want to go, she can wait another hour
18 for more -- or see what the trend is doing. She had options. And
19 that if she went and she missed, she goes to her alternate.

20 Q. Was she called unprofessional during that counseling session?

21 A. Oh, wow. I do not recall that.

22 Q. Were her skills or judgment questioned during that counseling
23 session?

24 A. Her judgment was questioned because she refused a flight for
25 a reason that she couldn't really articulate. But once again, I

1 put it down to her being young and inexperienced, a young and
2 inexperienced captain, and this was a counseling session.

3 Q. And that was the first counseling session that you had
4 conducted?

5 A. First and only, I believe, was that.

6 Q. In your entire career in flying?

7 A. Yes. Yes, as a chief pilot, yes.

8 Q. Before you had that, did you confer with Deke? Had you
9 talked about and explained the situation and told him what was
10 going to happen or what -- why you were talking to her, and he was
11 up -- I mean, was he -- did he come into it fully knowledgeable
12 about what happened or what the situation was?

13 A. As much as I was knowledgeable, yes.

14 Q. Did he give you any guidance on the best approach to counsel
15 or correct Sarah?

16 A. No.

17 Q. No? Who did most of the talking?

18 A. It was probably 60/40 him.

19 Q. Was the FO for that flight also counseled?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was it with Deke and you as well?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Was it -- how was it different or how was it the same as the
24 counseling you had with Sarah?

25 A. It was different because the FO stated that she was fatigued,

1 and she had been up all night with a sick child. And both Deke
2 and I were very clear that she should have filed a fatigue report
3 even before she came into work, that she should not have come in
4 for that flight. She should have filed the fatigue report. And
5 in the future, if she is up all night with a sick child, she needs
6 to file a fatigue report and not come in.

7 Q. And do you think she left that counseling session
8 understanding that and likely to adhere to that policy in the
9 future?

10 A. I talked to her about it afterwards, and she said she would.

11 Q. The FO?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. And going back again with Sarah, you felt Sarah came
14 away with -- she benefited from that session. She learned, and
15 you think in the future she would maybe behave differently in that
16 same situation? Was that your feeling at the end of the
17 counseling session?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But did you say you don't know -- you didn't find out the end
20 or you don't know now if the OCC had no specific flights for her
21 after she refused the one flight? You don't know if that's what
22 they wanted to do or not, but do you know that they didn't -- they
23 did not release her? Did you know that -- or do you know that?

24 A. I believe my record -- best of my recollection was there was
25 a bit of -- that's right, Bill -- was it Billy? There was some

1 differing opinions as to whether or not she was released. That's
2 what it was. According to Sarah, Billy hung up on her, so she
3 believes she was released by the hang up, but she never received a
4 verbal confirmation from anyone that she was released.

5 Q. Okay. After the fact, looking back on the Paul Wells
6 qualification concern, were you surprised that no one brought to
7 your attention that he didn't have this requirement? He had this
8 requirement but didn't have the hours, and therefore, he shouldn't
9 be qualified? Did that -- were you surprised that no one
10 mentioned that to you?

11 A. I was -- yes. I think they didn't know, so how could they
12 mention it to me?

13 Q. How did you learn about -- like when you initially came to
14 PenAir, how did you learn about special airport qualification?
15 Was it -- how did you -- you knew that there had to be training or
16 a checkout with a check airman.

17 A. Yes, from the check airman.

18 Q. How did you -- how'd you learn that? From the check airman?

19 A. Um-hmm.

20 Q. Okay, great. So it was -- you didn't read the manual or go
21 through the manual and read about special airports or anything
22 like that?

23 A. I did go through the manual, but obviously I didn't --

24 Q. There was a lot to go through.

25 A. -- take the care that I needed to.

1 Q. Okay.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks. That's all I have for now.

3 DR. SILVA: Dajuan?

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, yes, thanks.

5 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

6 Q. Crystal, you used the term young and inexperienced to
7 describe Sarah Boots. What does that mean?

8 A. She's a young captain. She has experience in the aircraft,
9 but she is a young captain regarding making decisions for her crew
10 and herself. And that requires time and experience.

11 Q. Okay. So the term inexperienced, does that have any
12 relationship with her training?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. All right. Okay, how would a pilot -- if a pilot had
15 a concern, a safety concern, what's the process by which the pilot
16 would communicate to you the safety concern?

17 A. So there are several processes. They can communicate
18 directly with me, which I have had that happen, and I had Terri
19 Ann Rabe come to me. She's a brand new co-pilot, and she had
20 concerns regarding icing in Bethel. And she said she felt like
21 they weren't doing a good job and they had to redo it. And I
22 said, did you write this up in a safety report? And she said, no.
23 And I said, this is a perfect thing that needs to be written up in
24 a safety report. It needs to be tracked. And if we need to do
25 retraining, we will only know about it if you write it up, and she

1 said she would -- and she did.

2 Sarah Boots was the captain of that flight. And I talked to
3 her about it later, and I said, if it happens again, please write
4 it up because we need to track these things. And if retraining
5 needs to occur, we need to determine that sooner rather than
6 later. And she said she would, so -- and in the pilot meeting, we
7 had Tiffany Lease come in and show the pilots how easy it was to
8 file a safety report from their iPhone. And I did my best to make
9 it clear that we wanted safety reports. You can do it by iPhone.
10 You can do it by paper.

11 Iain Thompson came to me, or had a -- he didn't come to me.
12 He had a rejected takeoff in Anchorage. And I called him, and I
13 said, you need to report that to dispatch prior to another
14 takeoff, and you need to write it up. He said, I don't want to
15 write it up. And I asked him why, and he said, because in the
16 past, there've been problems if you write it up. And I said,
17 well, it's anonymous. And he said, no, they know. They always
18 know. And I said, well, I'm going to write it up for you. And he
19 said, okay. So there are lots of ways they could report safety
20 problems. And I always encouraged safety problems to be reported.

21 Q. So, when Iain said that, oh, well, if I write up, they'll
22 know, what feeling did you get when he said that?

23 A. It made me sad because he was referring to the previous
24 management. And it was -- I wanted to overcome that way of
25 thinking. And when I said, I'll write it up for you, and he said,

1 okay, it was like, okay.

2 And there was no recrimination for him after it was written
3 up. There never were retribution or recriminations if somebody
4 wrote something up. So there were several ways for someone to
5 approach.

6 Q. Right. So Tiffany Lease, safety manager -- safety -- so do
7 you speak with her on a monthly basis to discuss safety issues
8 that come up that have been put through the system?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And are there any sorts of situations where you would say,
11 hey, I think we need to discuss this issue here at a meeting
12 because this seems to be a common issue from a safety report?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. If you're in a meeting with, you know, safety
15 individuals and -- do you feel that they feel they're empowered to
16 come and talk to you about safety issues?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. All right, has there ever been anyone that you felt,
19 you know, concerns about that will not come up to you and talk to
20 you about it?

21 A. I think there are old school PenAir pilots here that might be
22 reluctant to. I tried to make it clear, I tried, that it was
23 safe. It was safe for them to come up and address safety
24 concerns.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay, that's all the questions I have for now.

1 DR. SILVA: Okay. Tony?

2 MR. FISCHER: Nothing for me.

3 DR. SILVA: Brandon?

4 MR. WILSON: I just have one about the Sarah incident.

5 BY MR. WILSON:

6 Q. If she would've just called in fatigued, would that have been
7 the end of the story?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So, it would have been --

10 A. Absolutely.

11 Q. -- better to call in fatigued?

12 A. Yes, absolutely.

13 Q. Okay. Is there any disciplinary actions for someone that
14 calls in fatigued?

15 A. No. And that was another thing that -- Zach Thiel was
16 another one who had concerns. He asked me about -- well, he was
17 concerned about being asked to extend his duty day. And I said,
18 they can ask you, but you -- if you don't want to, you say no, and
19 you cite fatigue. And if they make you fill out a fatigue report,
20 fill one out. There will be no retribution. I told him that, to
21 his face, there would have been no recriminations.

22 MR. WILSON: Okay, that's all I got.

23 BY DR. SILVA:

24 Q. From your understanding of the requirement, as when you
25 started the airport -- special airport qualification, was that

1 300-hour minimum to begin training for the special airports? Or
2 was that to begin operation at the special airports?

3 A. I clearly did not have a thorough understanding of that
4 regulation. So --

5 Q. Okay. What was your understanding at the time? What did you
6 assume?

7 A. At the time, my understanding was 300 hours and then you
8 could get signed off for the Dutch Harbor, but I had the ability
9 to waive that 300 hours.

10 Q. Okay. So, once you've flown 300 hours PIC, is that when you
11 do the checkout? Or can you do the checkout before you hit 300?

12 A. Well, you would fly with -- you could fly with check airmen
13 during that 300 hours, which is what I encouraged new captains to
14 do, so it would be concurrent, I suppose.

15 Q. So can you do the qualification before you hit the 300 hours?
16 Can you get that signed off?

17 A. I believed you could.

18 Q. Okay. Do you no longer believe that?

19 A. That is not correct.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I was wrong.

22 Q. So what is your understanding of it now?

23 A. You need at least 100 hours PIC before you can qualify for
24 the company sign-off.

25 Q. When pilots brought those concerns to your attention

1 regarding reducing requirements, what did they have to say?

2 A. They said they didn't think it was a good idea.

3 Q. Why was that?

4 A. I didn't ask them why. I just assumed it was because they
5 thought Dutch Harbor was an airport -- a special airport.

6 Q. A special airport in what way? The designation or --

7 A. Regarding winds and weather.

8 Q. Okay. You mentioned Billy. Who's Billy?

9 A. He works up in OCC.

10 Q. OCC, okay. Do you know what his position is?

11 A. I don't know exactly. Scheduling slash --

12 Q. So his interaction with the pilots is through scheduling?

13 A. I'm not certain.

14 Q. Okay. When Dennis was flying with Paul and doing that
15 training with Paul, did he ever bring up any question about
16 whether Paul met the criteria --

17 A. No.

18 Q. -- to start training?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Okay. When Kirk was given that piece of paper to sign, did
21 he ever bring up a question of whether Paul met that criteria?

22 A. No.

23 Q. So under -- was there any point in time that you conveyed to
24 anybody that there was a requirement that was going to be waived
25 in his case?

1 A. Well, the 300-hour requirement.

2 Q. Okay, so were those conveyed to Dennis and Kirk Watson as
3 well?

4 A. Well, they knew that.

5 Q. That they were waiving the 300 required?

6 A. Yes, I believe so.

7 Q. How do you know that they knew that?

8 A. Well, they knew he didn't have 300 hours.

9 Q. Had anyone told them that, that was being waived?

10 A. I can't speak to that. I don't recall.

11 Q. Okay.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay, we'll go around one more time, quick
13 around. Marvin?

14 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks.

15 BY MR. FRANTZ:

16 Q. How many weather turndowns did you see when you were chief
17 pilot here?

18 A. How many weather?

19 Q. Weather turndowns?

20 A. Oh, quite a few. I wouldn't even be notified for most of
21 them. You mean if a pilot turned down a flight for weather and
22 OCC thought they should go?

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. Only one.

25 Q. So the other ones, would you call it a turndown if both the

1 pilot and the OCC decided it wasn't good?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. That would still be a turndown?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Who's turning it down?

6 A. It's a mutual decision.

7 Q. Okay. Only -- so you only saw the one. Was it your decision

8 to -- did you feel like you had to -- you needed to counsel Sarah

9 because of the weather turndown?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So would -- if I went and asked 10 PenAir pilots, when you
12 were chief pilot, would they say, yes, if we do a weather turndown
13 then we have to go explain it to the chief pilot?

14 A. No.

15 Q. They wouldn't say that? They wouldn't worry about being
16 counseled, necessarily?

17 A. I can't speak to what other pilots would say, but I would
18 not --

19 Q. Did you --

20 A. I would not counsel.

21 Q. But you counseled Sarah.

22 A. I counseled Sarah because she was new, a brand new captain.

23 Q. And what did she need counseling on? For a judgment on
24 weather?

25 A. Her judgment on going home because she didn't want to do the

1 flight.

2 Q. Is that what she said? Or did -- I mean, why did she tell
3 you she --

4 A. She came back to the building. I mean, if she -- why would
5 she come back to the building if -- you wouldn't wait out weather
6 -- you'd wait out for weather at the airport. My understanding
7 from OCC was that she was going home. She wasn't going to take
8 the flight.

9 Q. And when you counseled her, did she tell you that, too, that
10 she -- when she -- did she tell you that, when she decided she
11 wasn't going to do it, she was going home? Is that what she told
12 you when you counseled her?

13 A. There was a bit of a disagreement with her and, once again,
14 Billy because she was under the impression that he hung up on her.
15 Therefore, she was released.

16 Q. Okay. Did Deke Abbott tell you to counsel her or direct you
17 to counsel her?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Did he suggest that you counsel her?

20 A. No. I called him saying, I think we need to talk to her.

21 Q. Okay. And if a pilot files a fatigue report, is that ever --
22 in your experience, was that ever -- is a pilot ever asked why
23 were you fatigued or what's the deal here? Why did you file a
24 fatigue, because you knew you had to come on duty? Why are you --
25 I mean, does that ever --

1 A. I have never done that.

2 Q. Okay.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks. That's all I have.

4 DR. SILVA: Dujuan?

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

6 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

7 Q. Do pilots get trained in any fatigue risk management?

8 A. Yes, there's --

9 Q. That you know of?

10 A. Yes, there's the fatigue training, FEAT (ph.) training.

11 Q. And how often is that done here at the -- is it for new hires
12 only?

13 A. No, I think it's done once a year, but I'm not certain, but I
14 think it's done yearly.

15 Q. Okay. All right, so some time ago, the NTSB put out an
16 investigative update to the accident. Have you had a chance to
17 review that?

18 A. Not carefully, but I did see it.

19 Q. Okay.

20 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, that's all the questions that I
21 have for now.

22 DR. SILVA: Thank you. Tony?

23 MR. FISCHER: Nothing.

24 DR. SILVA: Brandon?

25 MR. WILSON: Nothing.

1 BY DR. SILVA:

2 Q. I just wanted to clarify one thing. You mentioned that there
3 was only one instance where OCC thought that a flight should go
4 and a pilot refused?

5 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.

6 Q. Was that the case with Sarah?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. And how did you find out about that?

9 A. I believe Billy came down here and said, Sarah's coming back;
10 she's not taking the flight.

11 Q. Okay.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay, anything else?

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: Just one more thing.

14 DR. SILVA: Yeah, go ahead.

15 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

16 Q. Sarah not taking the flight, is there anything in a process,
17 in a manual, that tells pilots that, if they feel they cannot go
18 out on a flight because they're, let's say, fatigued or they feel
19 that they don't want to go out due to the weather circumstances,
20 that they go through a process or a flow to -- and it comes back
21 to you, as far as decisions that need to be made?

22 A. That was one thing that we counseled Sarah on, is that she
23 should have called me prior to things escalating between her and
24 OCC. And I counseled her. I said, please call me next time so
25 that this can be avoided. And I don't know that there's a

1 specific thing written in the manual.

2 Q. Okay. The reason why I'm asking is that this is -- are all
3 employees knowledgeable of, that they can go through the process
4 so that, you know, if they have concerns, that they have that
5 available to them to reach out? Because you stated that she
6 should have called you, so I was wondering if it was a process out
7 there that she should have followed.

8 A. I don't think that there is -- it would be difficult to make
9 a process for every eventuality. Off the top of my head, I do not
10 know of such a process.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay, thanks.

12 MR. FRANTZ: I got more.

13 DR. SILVA: Okay.

14 MR. FRANTZ: Sorry, you just brought it up here.

15 BY MR. FRANTZ:

16 Q. You just used the term, things escalating between her and
17 OCC. Did you see that as an adversarial relationship in that
18 case, that OCC was saying, you should go, and she was saying, no,
19 I don't want to, and they were arguing; there was a conflict?

20 A. I do not have firsthand knowledge of that. I know that there
21 was a difference of opinion in how things went down with that.

22 Q. Is that how, is that how you perceive that the dispatch/pilot
23 relationship should be, is that they should argue it out or --

24 A. I do not think that's typical. No.

25 Q. -- battle and decide, find a winner? Or I mean, is it --

1 A. No.

2 Q. Or is it one person says, no, it's done, or what should be
3 the guidance for that kind of thing?

4 A. It should be a mutual decision. There should be some back
5 and forth.

6 Q. So, okay, so if one person says no, the other person doesn't
7 have to just defer. The other person could try to convince the
8 no-sayer, well, here's why you should go? Or I mean, is that your
9 view of how it should work between the two of them?

10 A. I am not sure -- if they're saying no, what would have to be
11 the reason? I mean, if she just said, no, I'm not going, then she
12 would have to give some kind of a reason. Now, no, I'm fatigued;
13 I'm not going. Well, then there's a process for that. No, I
14 don't like the weather; I'm not going. There's a process for
15 that. If the weather is not good at the time, but it's forecasted
16 to be better, she can sit there and wait for another hour or wait
17 for another hour. There's not a process for her to say, no, I'm
18 going home, when she has 6 more hours of duty in front of her.

19 Q. What is the process for, I don't like the weather, or I'm not
20 comfortable with it? What is that process that she didn't follow
21 that she should have?

22 A. She should have called me and said, this is what the weather
23 is. This is what I'm thinking. Now, if she was fatigued, she
24 should have filed the fatigue report and gone home, and that would
25 have been the end of it.

1 Q. So you would prefer that she call you, and you would have had
2 the weather discussion with her?

3 A. Yes, I could have had a weather discussion with her. She's a
4 young, inexperienced captain. Yes, I would have had a weather
5 discussion with her. I wouldn't have not necessarily said, you
6 have to go. I may have said, wait another hour, see what the
7 weather's going to do. Take more fuel.

8 Q. And she didn't do that and that's -- is that why she got
9 counseled, because she didn't --

10 A. She didn't do that.

11 Q. -- seek out another -- your advice or your counsel on her
12 decision not to go?

13 A. She didn't do that.

14 Q. If it had been a 10,000-hour captain, you would -- would you
15 have also expected them to call you and say, I'm not taking this
16 flight because weather, and here's why?

17 A. A 10,000-hour captain probably wouldn't have made that same
18 decision. The weather was good at the time. It was above
19 minimums -- well above minimums. It's 2 hour -- 2 miles and
20 something else forecasted to go to 3 miles.

21 Q. So why do you feel like she turned it down?

22 A. She turned it down because she was tired and wanted to go
23 home.

24 Q. And you would have preferred that she take the flight even if
25 she was tired and wanted to go home?

1 A. I would have preferred, if she was tired, she would have -- I
2 would've preferred her to file a fatigue report and go home.

3 Q. Okay. And that was the -- was that the big -- one of the big
4 takeaways from the counseling session, was that you should have --
5 if you would've just filed this.

6 A. Absolutely. We certainly said that.

7 Q. Okay.

8 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

9 DR. SILVA: Do you have anything else you want to add --

10 MS. BRANCHAUD: No.

11 DR. SILVA: -- before we go? All right. We will conclude
12 here. Thank you again for coming down. And off the record.

13 Okay, off the record, 3:24.

14 (Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
 DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
 OCTOBER 17, 2019
 Interview of Crystal Branchaud


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 4, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Kimberlee Kondrat
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/13/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: KIRK WATSON
Director of Training, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Tuesday,
December 3, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Watson)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Kirk Watson:		
By Dr. Silva		6
By Mr. Frantz		24
By Dr. Sevillian		40
By Mr. Wilson		42
By Dr. Silva		42
By Mr. Frantz		57
By Mr. Fischer		65
By Mr. Wilson		66
By Dr. Silva		66

I N T E R V I E W

(8:10 a.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: All right, Kirk, thank you very much for agreeing
4 to speak with us today.

5 MR. WATSON: All right.

6 DR. SILVA: We have a few people around the table. Three of
7 us are NTSB, but what you're seeing is a reflection of our party
8 system at the NTSB.

9 Have you worked with us on anything else in terms of accident
10 investigation?

11 MR. WATSON: No, this is the first time.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. So our party system essentially is there
13 to make sure that we've got a comprehensive report and a
14 comprehensive understanding of what happened. So while we, as the
15 NTSB, have expertise in investigations, we rely on the rest of the
16 industry, both the FAA and the operator, sometimes the
17 manufacturer, to make sure that we have the appropriate
18 information from their side. So that's why we have everyone
19 around the table now.

20 So I will run through and we'll go around the table for
21 introductions and I'll start. Sathya Silva. I'm a human
22 performance investigator with the NTSB.

23 Marvin.

24 MR. FRANTZ: I'm Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational factors
25 investigator with the NTSB.

1 MR. WATSON: Okay.

2 DR. SILVA: Dajuan.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan Sevillian, human performance
4 investigator with the NTSB.

5 MR. WATSON: Okay.

6 DR. SILVA: Tony.

7 MR. FISCHER: Tony Fischer. I'm an aviation safety inspector
8 with Denali CMO.

9 MR. WATSON: We met. Thanks.

10 DR. SILVA: And Brandon.

11 MR. WILSON: And he knows me. Brandon, check airman, PenAir.

12 DR. SILVA: So we've got FAA representation. And FAA's role
13 here is purely safety. He has no leg into enforcement. So
14 everything here, again, is going to support the investigation.

15 The purpose of why we are here is safety. We are not here to
16 assign any blame, liability, any of those sorts. What will happen
17 is we put this recording out for transcription. We'll get a copy
18 of that transcript, and that transcript will become part of our
19 public docket once our factual information is released, typically
20 6 months to a year from now.

21 So you're the expert here. We want to learn from you. There
22 are no right or wrong answers. If you don't understand a
23 question, feel free to ask for a clarification. If you don't know
24 the answer, that's a perfectly acceptable answer as well. Also if
25 you need a break, feel free to speak up. It gets a little hot in

1 here.

2 You are entitled to a have representative with you today.

3 Would you like to have a representative sit with you?

4 MR. WATSON: Yes.

5 DR. SILVA: Who is that?

6 MR. WATSON: Morgan.

7 DR. SILVA: Okay. So I will start out by asking a handful of
8 questions, and then we will go around the room usually twice to
9 make sure that everyone's had a chance to ask the questions that
10 they need. Then I'll turn it over to you and see if there's
11 anything else you wanted to add based on what we have asked you
12 already.

13 MR. WATSON: All right.

14 DR. SILVA: All right. Any questions before we start?

15 MR. WATSON: Not yet.

16 DR. SILVA: Okay. Sounds good.

17 INTERVIEW OF KIRK WATSON

18 BY DR. SILVA:

19 Q. Can you state and spell your full name for us please?

20 A. Kirk Watson, K-i-r-k, W-a-t-s-o-n.

21 Q. Can you run through a CliffsNotes version of your aviation
22 background from when you started flying to where you are now
23 within the company?

24 A. Like private pilot --

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. -- or how far back?

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. All right. I'm old. 1980 I got my private pilot license.
4 19- -- let's see -- finished college. At 23, I did my commercial
5 multi-instrument. Then I worked various jobs in California, then
6 I got my CFI, went to work in LA in '89, '91, '92, and did flight
7 instructions for about 2½ years. And then I came up to Alaska
8 1993, worked for a small operator out in Naknek, Alaska, for about
9 8 months. I was applying at PenAir the whole time I was up here.
10 I had by then about 2,200 hours. It was real hard to get an
11 aviation job back then.

12 So after 8 months, PenAir called me. I got hired -- not
13 hired here, but I went through their ground school. What they did
14 was, they'd do their indoc and then over the year they'd call you
15 back. So there were a lot of senior guys in that class, so of
16 course, they took all them. So I continued to work for another 8
17 months for Yute Air, and then PenAir called me, and I started here
18 in February 1995. And that's in the right seat of a Metroliner as
19 a co-pilot, and right seat in a medevac plane of a Cessna 441.

20 And then we -- I worked my way up the chain after about 8
21 months doing that. I was ready for -- they allowed you to -- we
22 had a bush operation, so I went out there and started flying
23 Cherokees, Caravans, Navajos for about a year and a half. They
24 called me back in for a captain on the Metro. So I went to
25 school, did that, upgraded, became the captain on the Metro by --

1 let's see -- I started in '95. By '97, I was a captain on the
2 Metro. And then when the Saab 340 came, I went right into that
3 immediately. That was around 1999.

4 And so I became -- straight into a captain on a Saab 340
5 and flew on that till the Saab 2000 showed up here, which was
6 2016. Is that right? Something like that. Anyway, during the
7 time I was in that Saab 340, I was a sim check airman, line check
8 airman, every rating you could do. I was an APD for about 4 years
9 towards the end of that, prior to '16. I worked with the FAA and
10 do type rides in the Saab 340. And when the 2000 came along, we
11 didn't have any of that set up, so I just became captain in the
12 Saab 2000 in '16, '17, '18 -- yeah, it must have been '16, like
13 May '16, June. And I flew 1,300 hours as captain in that.

14 Then I got a medical'd out in 2018, June 2018. I quit
15 flying. I stayed with the company, took about 7 months off, and
16 then I came back this year, January 2019, and they gave me the
17 manager of flight OPS -- or flight standards, manager of flight
18 standards. And then all the upper PenAir -- Ravn was taking over,
19 and the upper PenAir people were all leaving. So we got a new
20 chief pilot, a new DO.

21 I was new to the flight manager job, and I inherited all of
22 the training also. So I just went by the manuals, what were in
23 the manuals. I just would say: What do you need to be a pilot?
24 What do you need to be a check airman? What do you -- you know,
25 call the simulator, get the pilot scheduled, all that stuff, all

1 training stuff. And so I've been doing this since January,
2 February of this year just on the ground. And then they switched
3 my job November 1st to director of training, the title. I'm still
4 doing the exact same thing, it seems like.

5 Q. Okay, director of training. Do you still hold the other hats
6 that you mentioned earlier?

7 A. I am going down to do -- become a simulator check airman
8 again now.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Since January, they changed the contract on that. We had a
11 guy already to go, John White. As soon as I got him certified, he
12 quit. So that left us kind of hanging, and so I got one of our
13 other check airmen to fly the simulator, and I'll be the second
14 one. And we have three check airmen down there, but they work for
15 SIMCOM, and sometimes their scheduling is hard to deal with. But
16 if they have a lot of advance notice, they can handle it for pilot
17 training and stuff.

18 Q. So you said you took about 7 months off before coming back?

19 A. Uh-huh.

20 Q. So when did you leave?

21 A. June.

22 Q. June 2018?

23 A. '18, yeah.

24 Q. Okay. Which is when you said you were medical'd out?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Okay. What did you do in that gap?

2 A. Chemotherapy.

3 Q. Okay. So, when you came back in January, you were given the
4 manager of flight standards position. Did you hold any other
5 titles at that point?

6 A. No. I was just like a -- not furloughed, but I was on leave
7 basically. I had enough vacation and seniority and sick leave
8 to -- somehow I gapped that 7 months.

9 Q. Oh, okay.

10 A. I don't know how it happened exactly, but --

11 Q. Have you ever held the manager of flight safety position?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Okay. What about director of training before this November
14 1st change?

15 A. No. We didn't have one for years because, you know, we
16 dwindled down to about less than 20 pilots. So the manager of
17 flight standards could do both jobs with 20, but as it built --
18 now we're building back up to, like, 35. And it's something Ravn
19 just put on me. I don't know why they changed the title, but --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I was the -- you know, I've have been a pilot since '95 here,
22 so I know more of the flying part of it than this book part of it
23 and that type of stuff. But I've learned a lot here since then.

24 Q. Okay. From my understanding, Paul Wells was director of
25 training at the time of the accident?

- 1 A. That's true. He hadn't really started the job yet because he
2 was still in training. He was doing some stuff in the background,
3 but just before the accident was the first time he ever had time
4 to come in the office, and we were starting to coordinate stuff.
5 So he had done, like, no training -- director of training things.
- 6 Q. Okay. So were you handling those responsibilities as well?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Okay. Do you know who was director of training before?
- 9 A. I don't remember us ever having one. Well, in the last year.
- 10 Q. Okay.
- 11 A. And then who was responsible for that, I assume the manager
12 of flight standards was doing everything.
- 13 Q. Okay. Who was the manager of flight standards before; do you
14 remember?
- 15 A. What's his name? Gary Schlabach (ph.). There you go.
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. Yeah. And so I had like -- he suddenly left as I was kind of
18 limping in, and he's like, here's a folder for the ground school
19 starting tomorrow. I'm like, but I have so many questions.
- 20 Q. Uh-huh.
- 21 A. And so I just dove right in and started teaching ground
22 school.
- 23 Q. Okay.
- 24 A. And then our chief pilot left and --
- 25 Q. Who was chief pilot at the time?

1 A. Ben Nygren.

2 Q. Okay. And then who replaced Ben?

3 A. Crystal.

4 Q. Okay. So I'm just -- make sure I have an idea of all of the
5 hats that you have here. But I want to understand each of those
6 roles also. So, in your manager of flight standards position, can
7 you run through what your responsibilities are?

8 A. Oh, in the book it says you should be accountable to the DO
9 and basically you're in charge of check airmen.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. So that's what the role's title really is.

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. The director of training would be the person who would teach
14 all the ground schools, schedule all the training. So I'm doing
15 both of those. So it's, it's not too hard to do, but -- one
16 person can do it; it's okay.

17 Q. How do you split your time between the two?

18 A. I just do whatever is necessary, whatever is coming up. You
19 know, if it's simulator riding -- you know, a lot of check airmen
20 have to ride once a year, twice a year. Or every 2 years. New
21 hires have to be observed, things like that. I have to coordinate
22 with our scheduling -- pilot scheduling, make sure everybody is on
23 the same timeline.

24 Q. Okay. Do you feel like you have the time and the resources
25 to get everything you need done?

1 A. Yes and no. The yes, I'm keeping up with it. I could make
2 it better though, you know, if I had a little more time.

3 Q. Okay. Can you give me an example?

4 A. More like our ground school, just how everything is in change
5 all the time. It's aviation, you know, you're always changing
6 something and updating. So that's all -- that's fallen behind a
7 little bit.

8 When I got here in January, they'd just redone our FOTM
9 luckily, so there was a whole new set of guidelines to follow. So
10 luckily I didn't have to deal with that at all. And that gets
11 updated every 4 years.

12 Q. And that was done by Gary before he left?

13 A. Oh, probably the chief pilot, the DO, Gary maybe a little
14 bit. Katie Doherty was here. She's like an outside contractor,
15 former chief pilot of us. She's been all over in aviation in
16 Alaska. She's over at Naknek now.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. But I still call her asking her what -- so for advice on
19 things if I can't find them in the manual.

20 Q. Okay. Can you walk me through this special airports
21 qualification and the training required for that?

22 A. In the general operating manual, there's a section that says
23 to be special airport qual'd you have to be 300 hours, right, as a
24 captain. You have to have gone into the airport at least once
25 with a check airman, and then you have to be recommended. There

1 was a waiver for people prior to 2015, so if you were already
2 flying in there in any of our planes, you were qual'd.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So there's only a handful of us left that fell under that. A
5 new person would have to meet the 300, and then if they wanted to
6 waive it -- looking through that and looking back at Paul's
7 record, I know he didn't even have 100. He didn't have any of
8 those quals. Like the minimum would be to have 100 in the
9 airplane. You would have to -- if you wanted to waive it, you
10 needed two letters or recommendation. It could be an alternate,
11 which we never use at Dutch. So that was pretty much out. You
12 could fly with a check airman in there. There's like four things
13 there.

14 But, yeah, he was off the scale on all those, and they were
15 -- the reason he got there was they were changing that reg we had
16 in our GOM. At that time they were sending it through the
17 process. So that's -- it kind of fell to the side, I think, in
18 monitoring it.

19 Q. Do you recall what the change was for that?

20 A. They wanted to do -- they -- Crystal, Deke Abbott -- wanted
21 to do away with that 300-hour thing because Paul had so much time
22 in the plane -- not in the plane, but flying in Alaska and had
23 flown to Dutch quite often. They were going to change it to just
24 be qualified by a check airman to go in there basically without
25 the 300-hour rule.

1 Q. Would that also negate that 100-hour rule?

2 A. I think so. They were just going to take it out.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So that was started and then it never got documented.

5 Q. Do you know where in the stage it was? Had it gotten to the
6 FAA?

7 A. I don't know. They were doing the manuals back then, so I
8 didn't have time to really look into what exactly they were doing.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. I just heard they wanted to do that.

11 Q. Okay. And you mentioned letters of recommendation. What
12 does that look like? Is that an actual, physical letter?

13 A. No. It could be an email, just say I recommend Paul fly into
14 Dutch Harbor.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Email it to us. Goes in his file.

17 Q. So would a signature on this -- on the qualification form
18 count as a recommendation, or is that purely that you'd done that
19 checkout?

20 A. I don't think it's intended to be like that.

21 Q. Okay. Okay. So if we're still operating on the old rules,
22 which was the 300 and 100 with a recommendation, when would you go
23 through that training or do the qualification ride?

24 A. Well, traditionally we'd do it after 100 hours, start that
25 whole process.

1 Q. You would start the process after 100 hours?

2 A. Yeah. It shouldn't even start prior to 100.

3 Q. Okay. So when you say start the process, would that mean
4 initial flights into the special airport?

5 A. Yeah. Like, then they'd start -- I mean, they could go in
6 there with a check airman anytime --

7 Q. Right.

8 A. -- you know, prior. It just happens on the schedule.

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. But the intent of it, I think, was after 100, and they were
11 highly experienced, you let them go in there with a check airman.
12 They'd make, you know, an approach and a landing, and depending on
13 the check airman, if he liked it or didn't like it, they'd say no,
14 let's go again, you know, something came up. And then you just
15 repeat that until the check airman agrees like, okay, you can go.

16 Q. Okay. I think I understand. So, based on the intent of the
17 policy, it wouldn't necessarily be training sign-off with, let's
18 say, 10 or 15 hours, wait till you get 100 hours, and then start
19 flying into the special airport?

20 A. What do you mean?

21 Q. So are you able to do -- you mentioned that you can do -- you
22 can go in with a check airman before you reach the 100 hours.

23 A. Yeah. It was pretty common actually.

24 Q. Can you get signed off for the airport before you have that
25 100 hours?

1 A. Well, he did, I know. So no, that shouldn't have been
2 possible. So --

3 Q. For the sign-off?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Okay. Okay. So is there a way of verifying the times and
6 the minimums?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. How is that process -- what does that process look like?

9 A. It's SkedFlex they use for tracking times. And what they'll
10 do is they'll just put a tag in and say he's sub-300 usually is
11 what it is. And if that sub-300 tag enters Dutch, Sand Point,
12 George, Kodiak, on their schedule, it flags them and says they
13 can't fly there unless they are paired with a check airman or
14 something.

15 Q. Okay. Do you know what that would look like if they didn't
16 have the 300 but had the 100 hours?

17 A. Same thing. It's the same thing, yeah.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And it's up to -- I mean, I work closely with pilot records
20 upstairs. So it was kind of in our realm to avoid -- you know, to
21 keep him out of there. But the chief pilot and them were just
22 like, no, we got to get him going in there. We got to get this
23 going today. They were in a rush to get that guy going.

24 Q. Was that rush specifically for Paul?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Do you know why?

2 A. Oh, maybe we were low on captains that could go there because
3 of all the people that quit. So there were only four or five guys
4 qualified.

5 Q. So it sounds like they were aware that he didn't meet the
6 qualifications as they stood?

7 A. Yeah. They were very aware of it.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I think that's why they wanted to change it, too. So in
10 between trying to change it and him going there, we just lost
11 track of it. And somehow it -- we said okay in, what was it,
12 August when he did his OE?

13 Q. Yeah. July.

14 A. Yeah, they okayed him in SkedFlex, and then, you know, the
15 schedulers will just -- you know, they don't think anything of it
16 anymore.

17 Q. Okay. Are you aware -- have you, you guys as a company
18 looked into whether this -- I'm not going to call it an oversight,
19 but the situation occurred with any other captains that are
20 special airport qualified?

21 A. What situation?

22 Q. Having -- flying in there with less than 100 or 300 hours?

23 A. Yeah. We just -- we did qual a guy that had been flying in
24 there for -- since he's been hired here, under 300.

25 Q. Okay. Under 300.

1 A. He was like 2-something, 2½.

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. But he had all the -- he had two letters. He had all the
4 quals for it. But then after this, they took him off, just --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- you know, until -- but now he's, like, past 300, so it's
7 fine.

8 Q. Do you recall when he went through that process --

9 A. Who?

10 Q. -- to get qualified? This other pilot that you mentioned.

11 A. Not off the top of my head, but it's fairly -- it's in the
12 last 6 months.

13 Q. Okay. So same time frame?

14 A. Yeah, yeah.

15 Q. And you mentioned that you had gone through the -- gone
16 through Paul's flight logs and saw that he didn't have 100 hours.
17 Can you explain what you were looking at?

18 A. I kind of went and did this post-crash, so -- yeah, it just
19 wasn't on my radar for some reason.

20 Q. Yeah, but when you're looking at it and making that
21 determination, can you kind of walk me through what pieces of
22 information you're looking at to make that determination?

23 A. Well, we find out their flight time. Then usually a chief
24 pilot or DO will say, let's get them spooled up for Dutch or
25 whatever, Sand Point. And then I'll schedule a check airman to

1 fly in there and start the process. So if they're past 300, all
2 they got to do is get a sign-off on that form from the FOTM. It's
3 airport specific to the special airports we have.

4 Q. So even if they have 300 hours, they still have to do the
5 checkout?

6 A. Oh, yeah.

7 Q. Okay. So yeah, going back to when you looked at the records
8 after the accident flight, what documentation were you assessing
9 to determine whether the -- Paul had less than 100 hours?

10 A. I was just informed by the chief pilot, Crystal, and she
11 said, we're signing him off down there, and then she took the ball
12 and ran with it. And I got a sign-off sheet back from one of the
13 check airmen, and I was looking over it, and I realized he was
14 basically signed off on OE.

15 So right then I probably should have just raised my hand and
16 said stop, you know. I probably -- I should have. But, you know,
17 I had so much stuff going on, and they seemed to, like, want to
18 take this guy and run and then eliminate that 100-hour rule, to
19 me. And so I just, I just let them go with it.

20 I wasn't sure where the process was because Paul wasn't -- he
21 was flying or doing other stuff, and he just wasn't in my office
22 that much, so I couldn't talk to him a lot to get the information
23 needed for his flight time. They just kind of came as a pair,
24 Crystal and Paul.

25 And then he was kind of starting his own thing. I don't know

1 if it was director of training stuff, but he mentioned to me like,
2 hey, I'm doing APG; it's going to be in the thing. I'm like,
3 okay, great. I didn't know if he was flying with it, I didn't
4 know -- you know, it wasn't turned on for the pilots, so -- all we
5 do is -- for landing is APG performance.

6 Q. So this situation where you got the form for Paul's airport
7 qualification, that was all -- this situation was prior to the
8 accident?

9 A. It just went in the file. And then it went in SkedFlex he's
10 signed off.

11 Q. Okay. Because you do have to sign those forms?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Did you sign that form?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So the date that is reflected on the form, would you say is
16 the date that you signed that form?

17 A. Was it August? You guys have it.

18 Q. Yeah. Yeah, August.

19 A. Yeah, that one.

20 Q. August 1st.

21 A. Yeah. So it came back to me without this date on it, 7/20.

22 Q. Okay. Yep.

23 A. So I looked back in SkedFlex to see when he landed there, and
24 that was the last time he was there with a check airman, so I just
25 put this date in.

1 Q. So you filled that out and then --

2 A. No. Just this date.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And then -- because that was blank. And then Dennis Fisher

5 was down there, and this is just the day we signed it. So this

6 doesn't matter. But that's the day -- it was his last day of OE

7 they signed him off.

8 Q. Okay. 7/20.

9 A. Yeah. I don't even know how many entries he made in there.

10 Q. Into Dutch Harbor?

11 A. Dutch Harbor prior, you know, on OE.

12 Q. Could he --

13 A. And I don't know how many he did as a Ravn pilot either.

14 Q. Right. Is it reasonable to get the sign-off before

15 completing OE?

16 A. Not usually. I've never seen it. But I've only been here

17 this year, so --

18 Q. Okay. But you wouldn't --

19 A. And these are all new forms, so -- but they're similar.

20 Q. When you say new forms, do you know when they were changed?

21 A. January 1st, the whole manual was updated.

22 Q. Okay. The whole thing was changed?

23 A. Yeah. That's in the --

24 Q. Oh, right, because this was the flight -- okay.

25 A. FOTM form, yeah.

1 Q. Right. Okay. So you got this the beginning of August, and
2 you looked through the schedule and saw that this was the last --

3 A. That's how I got that date, yeah. Normally the check airman
4 should put that date in there.

5 Q. So who fills this out?

6 A. Check airman should. They should put the person's name, let
7 them sign it. Here's the check airman's signature -- I mean,
8 check airman's name, signature, date he signed it.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. So see, and then -- they have it, and then it comes up to me,
11 you know, within a day or two.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. So the time I -- the last time I looked at this was probably
14 8/5.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. So on 8/5, I looked back in SkedFlex. And he hadn't been
17 flying much, I realized. So I just went day by day, and the last
18 time he flew there, I checked who he was flying with, and it was
19 like -- it was Dennis.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. And I guess that's the day they wanted him signed off.

22 Q. Okay. So given this letter and completing OE, was Paul good
23 -- according to management and their intention, was he good to fly
24 into Dutch Harbor?

25 A. That's what I assumed.

1 Q. Okay. I understand.

2 DR. SILVA: I'm going to pause here.

3 MR. WATSON: Good.

4 DR. SILVA: Do you need a break? How are you doing?

5 MR. WATSON: No, I'm fine.

6 DR. SILVA: All right. Marvin.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you.

8 BY MR. FRANTZ:

9 Q. So I got to pursue this qualification a little further for
10 Dutch Harbor. The way the form -- the way it's written, the
11 100/300 is a prerequisite to receiving special airport training.
12 It says, before you can receive the special airport training, you
13 got to have 300 PIC, or waivable to 100 with a check airman letter
14 and sign-off by -- is that your understanding?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So, if a pilot receives a check airman sign-off for Dutch
17 Harbor training like Paul may have, while he's on OE, if he makes
18 multiple trips to Dutch Harbor with the check airman, and the
19 check airman says, I know he doesn't have the 100 hours yet that
20 is required, but he does have -- the check airman says, I have
21 given him Dutch Harbor training, or I have flown with him and he's
22 okay, I'm going to sign this, is that invalid for that check
23 airman to sign it at that point if he knows that the guy doesn't
24 have 100 hours?

25 A. I don't think they realize it. I don't think they -- they're

1 not --

2 Q. He wouldn't be aware?

3 A. Yeah. He wouldn't be aware -- I mean, he's aware he's on OE
4 with him, but -- and it should strike him as odd and maybe ask
5 somebody about it, but --

6 Q. Is it your opinion that -- or is it the company's view or
7 your view that that's legitimate, for a check airman to sign off
8 special airport training if he's flown with a person to that
9 airport? Even if it was during OE, and he's satisfied with the
10 person's performance, is it legitimate for him to then say he has
11 special airport training accomplished?

12 A. Yeah. But it would have to have been requested by somebody.

13 Q. For him to?

14 A. To do that sign-off.

15 Q. Sign it off?

16 A. Yeah. They have to be looking for that. So the chief pilot
17 probably said something.

18 Q. To the 300/100 hour, and it seems like they were looking for
19 the 100-hour waiver for Captain Wells?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Does that -- does his time spent flying during OE with the
22 check airman, does that count towards that 100 hours' company PIC
23 time?

24 A. Sure.

25 Q. So I heard you say that you determined that Paul Wells had

1 flown into the airport as PIC before he had the 100-hour minimum;
2 is that what you said? And how did you determine that?

3 A. I just look on SkedFlex. I mean, I wasn't, you know, paying
4 attention to him a lot after he got signed off and they said we
5 are going to do this, so I wasn't really watching his schedule.

6 Q. Okay. Did you see -- have you ever seen or did you see the
7 -- for the 100-hour waiver you have to have a recommendation from
8 a check airman, and the chief pilot has to also have a letter.
9 Have you seen either one of those documents for Paul?

10 A No. She came up -- Crystal came up to her office and
11 mentioned she was -- she wanted Dawn, our pilot records person, to
12 put an email together, send it to her, and then she'd send it
13 back. But something happened that day that it didn't get back in
14 there.

15 But that's just one, the chief pilot recommendation. So
16 technically you would have to have two. And so there wasn't even
17 one documented. There was a verbal of it, but it just never got
18 sent or something.

19 Q. And was that -- you just mentioned about Crystal was asking
20 someone to put together a letter that --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. -- would be the one from her signing or saying Paul was --

23 A. Right, right. Just kind of --

24 Q. Do you know when that happened? Was that after the accident?

25 A. It was probably -- no, probably in August.

1 Q. It was in August?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. But as far as you -- but then it didn't go forward, the
4 letter was never actually provided --

5 A. I don't know where --

6 Q. She never signed one or it never went in as final?

7 A. The email, yeah, the email never happened somehow. I
8 remember them talking about it, but I never saw the paper or the
9 email.

10 Q. In your view though -- and I may have asked this before, so I
11 apologize. But is it -- if the pilot doesn't have the 100 hours,
12 he's working towards that, but he doesn't have it yet, is it
13 legitimate for a check airman who is flying with that pilot on OE
14 to Dutch Harbor to say, I certify he has had special airport
15 training?

16 My job is to certify him for this special airport, and I just
17 did three legs of OE with him to the airport or three trips to the
18 airport, and so I certify him. Is that valid for that check
19 airman to sign off at that point saying, yeah, he's had Dutch
20 Harbor training, so I'm satisfied he can fly there, whether or not
21 he meets the 100 hours or not? Is that -- I mean --

22 A. I don't think that's the intent of that. It's, like I said,
23 it's supposed to start after 100, you know. And then -- or after
24 300, just to start the sign-off. But you'll randomly end up down
25 there, since we had three to four flights a day down there, so it

1 was one of the main legs for anybody flying.

2 Q. But you wouldn't -- he shouldn't be calling that special
3 airport training even though he's going there on OE with the
4 person; is that your view?

5 A. Yeah. I mean, it is and it isn't. If you're with a check
6 airman, you're watching the guy the whole time anyway.

7 Q. Okay. Is that 300/100 policy still in place; do you know?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So there still is -- options available still do 100 hours --

10 A. It's just like you have it printed there.

11 Q. No changes since the accident? Okay.

12 A. So you have to talk to Crystal or, I don't know, Aaron
13 Rocereta, maybe. They were working on that. I wasn't -- I didn't
14 get many FOTM changes because of the -- the FOTM was so new. You
15 know, it was, like, no reason to change it.

16 Q. Has that 100/300 rule -- 100 waiver, 300 rule, has that been
17 in place for -- how long, to your knowledge, how long has that
18 been in place at PenAir for special airports?

19 A. Probably since 2015.

20 Q. 2015?

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. Okay. What was behind bringing that into -- it's not an FAA
23 requirement. It's in your manual, so it's FAA approved, but -- I
24 mean, it's a GOM item. It's a company item.

25 A. Right.

1 Q. What was the intent, to your understanding, why did that --
2 why is that rule there?

3 A. I don't know. I mean, now we know, but whoever was writing
4 the manuals back then probably wanted to -- they want experienced
5 people flying into these more technical airports, so they put it
6 in there. I don't know how or why they came up with those
7 numbers.

8 Q. Okay. In your time here, do you have any -- how often have
9 you seen that rule -- or the 300 rule waived down to the 100? Is
10 that common, uncommon? Have you ever -- how often have you seen
11 somebody that got signed off that only had the 100 numbers?

12 A. Only twice. Yeah, only twice this year.

13 Q. You said twice?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. This year?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. How about in prior years, any recollection?

18 A. I wasn't in that office, so I wouldn't know. I wouldn't be
19 watching stuff like that. I was more of a sim and line pilot.

20 Q. Okay. So twice this year, and one of those was Paul Wells?

21 A. Paul and, yeah, Greg Pfeiffer.

22 Q. Okay. And as far as you know, did Greg complete 100 hours
23 and get to sign off before he flew into --

24 A. Yeah. He was beyond 2, and he had already been flying as a
25 co-pilot in the plane for at least a year, I know. So he probably

1 had over 1,000 hours in the plane, and he -- his first job here
2 was flying to Dutch every day with our most senior guy, so he
3 learned it well.

4 Q. Okay. Do you know, are there -- is there a plan right now
5 that you're aware of to change that rule, the 300/100 rule?

6 A. Yeah. We have a draft to change it right now.

7 Q. Okay. And do you know what the change is going to be?

8 A. It's going to be 300, and then there's no 100 waivers. But
9 to even be a captain, we're bringing it up to 5. So now, any new
10 captain before they even start in the left seat is going to have
11 500 in the airplane. So we're going to avoid all that in the
12 future.

13 Q. So director of training is your title right now, but that
14 started November 1st, did you say?

15 A. Yeah. November 1st.

16 Q. Prior to that you were manager of flight standards?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. And prior to that, Paul held the director of training title.
19 And about how long when he assumed that position?

20 A. Since he was hired in August or July, whenever it was.

21 Q. Okay. So he came to the company as director of training? I
22 mean, that was his starting position?

23 A. Yes. But we had no interaction with him. Training-wise he
24 wasn't doing anything.

25 Q. Who was doing the training?

1 A. I was doing everything.

2 Q. That was the flight standards manager?

3 A. Yeah, I was doing both. We normally didn't have a director
4 of training around the flight ops. The flight standards manager
5 did everything.

6 Q. So director of training, so who is your boss?

7 A. Dick Harding and Dennis Fisher.

8 Q. Are both -- so the chief pilot --

9 A. And then Brian Whilden, you know.

10 Q. -- and the director of operations are both over the director
11 of training?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. And were they -- were the same two people over your previous
14 position of manager of flight standards?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. The chief pilot and the DO?

17 A. Yeah, it's almost the same job here because it's so small.

18 Q. Okay. New topic. How are pilots trained to verify landing
19 performance or verify that, before they reach an airport or choose
20 a runway and a flap setting and everything for a landing, that
21 it's going to be okay, the runway is going to be sufficient for
22 that landing? What's the procedure that a pilot should use?

23 A. There's a 1-day training course in our initial new hire
24 modules to go over all the APG, landing, takeoff, performance.

25 Q. APG, is that synonymous with --

1 A. Airport analysis, yeah.

2 Q. -- airport analysis binder, it's called?

3 A. Yes. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. So they are taught how to use the airport analysis or
5 how to read the tables and the information in the binder?

6 A. Right. And this plane is odd because it has these Alt CG 1
7 and 2s. So to normally go into Dutch with a load of people,
8 they're going to load the plane aft CG so they can gain a couple
9 thousand more pounds for landing. And if you're light, it doesn't
10 really matter too much, but if you want to go in there at, you
11 know, max weight, you have to be in that Alt CG 2. So that has to
12 start with the ops person loading the plane correctly.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And it was a real normal operation. It was nothing odd about
15 it.

16 Q. As a crew or an airplane is approaching an airport, though,
17 and they have their latest weather now from the airport, is there
18 any process or policy that PenAir has that they need to perform
19 certain actions, look up certain numbers or validate certain
20 things to make sure that, that airport and that runway now is
21 still okay, now that they have the latest weather there, that it's
22 still sufficient for their landing? Do they have to look up any
23 tables, plotting charts, look up and validate --

24 A. Not really. If you fly down there -- you left here gross
25 weight, you're going to burn 4,000 pounds of fuel, you're going to

1 end up down there at 47,000 numbers, flaps 35, Alt CG 2. So it's
2 printed in your release; you can see it. This plane's a computer.
3 It runs perfectly. You can see your weight. It just shines in
4 front of you as you get closer to Dutch, the fuel's burning out.
5 You look at that. That's going to be your weight for landing.
6 They've already pre-calc'd it before you even took off.

7 So what's happening on the runway, like the only thing that
8 would change is if the runway went below a 5 -- 5, 4, 3s, right?
9 So is it wet? That's the only thing really we have in the APG for
10 Dutch Harbor. Is it wet at 15 percent? Normally you can't land.
11 With no wind, right?

12 But this never happens because we don't -- you don't go there
13 if there's something like that. You don't go there if there's
14 some contamination. You wait for them to clear it a lot of times.
15 So if you're waiting to clear it, you're only going to get
16 lighter, and your performance will get better. And then you just
17 look at the numbers; it's black and white. You just go headwind,
18 tail -- we don't ever land with a tailwind usually. I mean, just
19 slight, because of the -- you guys will probably beat this to
20 death but, you know, it flows around the mountain sometimes, and
21 these can be tailwinds at both ends, but the center is a
22 crosswind. But it handles that fine.

23 The only thing is you got to adhere to what you took off
24 with. You know, that's your plan, and you should probably stick
25 to it. And if you want to change it, it should only change for

1 wind. Because I'm not going to land with a tailwind. I'm not
2 going to land with a contaminated runway there. So those aren't
3 even things I'd ever heard of before from any pilot that flew
4 here.

5 Q. So is it a fair statement to say that, as long as you don't
6 land with a tailwind or pilot landing with a tailwind, your
7 performance numbers should be fine when you get there?

8 A. For zero wind.

9 Q. Because the performance numbers you left with are based on?

10 A. Landing.

11 Q. But, I mean, what kind of wind were they based on?

12 A. They base them on zero wind.

13 Q. Zero wind?

14 A. Yeah. So if you have -- there's usually some headwind there
15 component. There are a few clear, calm days, but most of the time
16 you have some type of wind to deal with. And that only should
17 help your landing.

18 Q. Have you flown to Dutch Harbor in the 2000?

19 A. Yes. Hundreds of times.

20 Q. Okay. You ever landed there with a tailwind?

21 A. Not to my recollection. Besides that gusty thing -- you
22 know, you might get some gusts when it's up near the edge of the
23 wind chart.

24 Q. Okay. Let me give you a quick hypothetical. You're coming
25 into Dutch Harbor. It's visual. You decide to go around for

1 whatever, let's say wind, wind shear, wind shift.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. You go around, and on the go-around you're now determining
4 that maybe the opposite direction would be better because of new
5 wind information.

6 A. Sure.

7 Q. How difficult a procedure is it to now do a course reversal
8 to come back and land on the opposite runway that you just missed?

9 A. Piece of cake. Just go around the mountain and come back.

10 Q. Does it matter -- well, is it either way equally the same
11 ease of difficulty, whether it's 1-3 or 3-1 that you're reversing
12 for, they're both --

13 A. Well, 3-1 is probably a little more technical because of the
14 short final. You have to turn that short final.

15 Q. Is it a -- I don't know how to rate it. Is it a complex
16 maneuver or is it a maneuver that most any pilot qualified for
17 Dutch Harbor should be comfortable doing?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. A course reversal off the end of 3-1 to come back for 3-1,
20 that should be not a highly difficult or complex or challenging
21 maneuver; is that fair?

22 A. It's fair.

23 Q. Fair. Have you ever done that?

24 A. I've never done one low to the ground, but I have come by due
25 to the winds and landing configuration, and it's usually good

1 weather when this happens. I'll be talking to the weather lady
2 and she'll be like, it's favoring this runway, it's favoring that
3 runway, it's favoring this one. So I'll just fly by at, like,
4 pattern altitude and just look down there at the water. There's
5 three windsocks. Then I'll assess it, and then I'll make my
6 decision to --

7 One of my big -- one of my personal rules for flying in there
8 was base turn into the wind. So whatever the wind was, if it
9 dictated coming in over town, I'd go over town to make my ground
10 speed slower so I had more time and I could use a lower bank angle
11 to turn final on 3-1. It's 3-1 that's the problem. And that
12 always worked out great for me. I never had -- I never hit the
13 ground there and gone around. I mean, in 20 years flying there.
14 I've come over and looked and decided to like, oops, let's go to
15 the other side, you know. But it totally depends on the wind down
16 there.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. And it's visible all the time at all sorts of sources, you
19 know, waves, wind patterns, you know, downdrafts, you can see them
20 on the water. So it's like you have got an endless windsock
21 circling the airport. You can always see it.

22 Q. So how does a new pilot learn that all those things you're
23 talking about, the sources of the winds and --

24 A. Well, we hope that they need to get experience with a check
25 airman going down there.

1 Q. Can that be done in one flight?

2 A. If they have been in there before. Which he had -- I didn't
3 look at his resume and his logbook and see how many logged
4 flights. That's not my responsibility. I'm thinking in the
5 future, you know, there might be some validation to that, but I
6 think just by us raising it to 500 it's going to get rid of a lot
7 of this.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. It's new pilots. We hadn't -- the company has been going to
10 Dutch for so long that we haven't -- this is the first year we've
11 encountered this basically. So many senior people left, they're
12 hiring people with 1,500 hours, which is crazy almost, you know.
13 Back when I got hired, I couldn't even fly a Cherokee for 2,200
14 hours, you know.

15 Q. You said you are -- PenAir is attempting to qualify some of
16 your pilots as sim check airmen?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. So they can conduct --

19 A. Check rides.

20 Q. -- proficiency checks?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. You got -- are you intending to qualify any of them as APDs?

23 A. Yeah. That's -- I'm going to do that probably within the
24 next year.

25 Q. Okay. So is that so you won't have to rely on the SIMCOM

1 schedule and their APD schedules?

2 A. Right. It frees me up, easier to schedule.

3 Q. Okay. And why is that? I mean, I understand their schedule,
4 but it's worked up until this point. Why now have you determined
5 -- PenAir determined --

6 A. Well, the first -- until the beginning of the year, the
7 contract from SIMCOM didn't allow non-SIMCOM people to run their
8 sim.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. So once Ravn took over, they rewrote it and they put a clause
11 in there where we could have our own instructors. So --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Iain is the first one. He just got qualified to do it. And
14 I'm leaving tonight actually to go start that process.

15 Q. To become?

16 A. A PC check airman first, and then --

17 Q. Okay. And then an APD?

18 A. APD, yeah, down the line.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And probably Iain will do that too.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Thompson.

23 Q. What do you think of the SIMCOM training and instructors that
24 have been in place up to this point? What's your impression of
25 the quality, process --

1 A. I like it.

2 Q. -- procedure?

3 A. It's professional. It's by the book. It doesn't lack
4 anything. I mean, we wrote their system for them. We just --
5 like, here's your plan of attack. It's 12 lessons. And every day
6 it's written out exactly what to do, and they just follow that.

7 Q. And you said some of their instructors are designated as
8 check airmen for PenAir but they are SIMCOM instructors; is
9 that --

10 A. Yeah, they are PC check airmen for PenAir contract.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. They call them TCEs.

13 Q. They are not line check?

14 A. No.

15 Q. It's PenAir -- because you have to be a PenAir pilot to be a
16 line check?

17 A. Yeah. None of them fly. So they just run the sim.

18 Q. Okay. So what about those instructors, do they -- are you
19 satisfied with their level of performance?

20 A. Yeah. We've had the same three since they got into the 2000.

21 Q. No concerns? Any pilots ever come to you or anyone that you
22 know of with concerns about sim training or instructors of SIMCOM
23 or the equipment or anything?

24 A. Just recently I have been encouraging the pilots to tell me
25 anything they didn't like about it or things, and the only

1 feedback I get is like, hey, they could keep me a little more
2 honest on the radio. They're real minor things, you know, maybe
3 some callouts, you know, that they are not -- they're like, you
4 know, wait -- because you know what a sim is like; you don't want
5 to stop what's going on a lot of times, so they might not
6 interrupt. But I'd like to see them maybe, you know, post-brief
7 them about these few items. They're pretty minor.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. And then I talk to the sim -- the instructors down there and
10 they're like, oh, yeah, yeah, we'll clean that up.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thank you, Kirk. I think that's all I
12 have for now.

13 DR. SILVA: All right. Dujuan.

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya.

15 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

16 Q. Kirk, I have a question for you. In your opinion, do you
17 feel that Paul Wells needed more training to fly into Dutch
18 Harbor?

19 A. I don't know. I'm not line flying right now, so I'd be a bad
20 one to ask.

21 Q. Okay. And could you talk to me a little bit more about the
22 500-hour rule? You described it earlier. Could you just go over
23 it one more time?

24 A. So we are trying to upgrade our co-pilots. They'll have
25 2,500 hours total time and 500 in the airplane. So in the Saab

1 2000, we want them to sit as a co-pilot for 500 hours so they're
2 cemented in nice. And then go over to -- we just pulled three
3 captain upgrades off of -- because of this right now. So I just
4 had them at sim. They were going to go be captains, but they
5 barely have 350 hours in the plane.

6 And so we're going to avoid becoming a captain now until 500
7 hours. And then they will start their OE 20 hours and then, you
8 know, they will already have all the recommendations that you guys
9 are talking about today.

10 Q. And who has the authority to sign off the pilots for the
11 special airport with the newer upcoming role; is it still the
12 check airmen?

13 A. Yeah. It'll be a check airman. The sign-off will be the
14 same. That rule will be there, the 300-hour, but the 500 is going
15 to pass everybody so it's almost going to be obsolete.

16 Q. And how will this be communicated throughout the company?

17 A. It'll be in the GOM and the FOTM. And we told the pilots
18 themselves.

19 Q. And this will be the same when the merger between PenAir and
20 Ravn; this won't change?

21 A. It more lines up with Ravn's, what Ravn has now, anyway.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. It should be easy transition.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. That's all I have. Thanks, Kirk.

25 DR. SILVA: Tony?

1 MR. FISCHER: Oh, I don't have anything.

2 DR. SILVA: Okay. Brandon.

3 MR. WILSON: Just a couple.

4 BY MR. WILSON:

5 Q. How would you rate this airplane -- the Saab 2000 versus a
6 340 as far as stopping at Dutch Harbor? Better, worse, the same?

7 A. I think it's better.

8 Q. Have you ever had any problems stopping in Dutch Harbor?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Any anti-skid problems?

11 A. I don't think any of our planes have ever flown with
12 anti-skid deferred. I can't remember off the top of my head, but
13 it takes such a hit that maintenance just fixes it. There's -- I
14 have never seen one --

15 Q. Have you ever had any problems with the tires on that plane?

16 A. 340, nothing with the 2000.

17 MR. WILSON: Okay. That's all I have.

18 DR. SILVA: Okay. How are you doing? Do you need a break?

19 MR. WATSON: I'm fine, thank you.

20 BY DR. SILVA:

21 Q. Okay. So I have some follow-ups here. Going back to just
22 flying into Dutch Harbor. How do pilots get weather information?

23 A. You get a weather packet when you leave, the current METAR
24 and TAF. You get about 80 miles out, you talk to the weather
25 person there looking out the window on the ground and you can ask

1 them anything you want. They give you a standard METAR basically
2 if, you know, the weather's kind of okay and you can call it good.
3 And then you shoot your approach pretty much in that last 20
4 minutes, and if you have any questions, they're just a click away.

5 Just -- you can ask them anything. Which runway is it
6 favoring is a common thing when it's a crosswind. So, like, I go
7 -- you know, when I'm, like, 3 miles out and I either got to go
8 right or left, I'll be like, okay, what's it favoring right now?
9 And she'll go, okay, it's favoring 3-1. I'm like, here I come,
10 poof. So, you know, within the last -- you know, you can get a --
11 you can talk to them as much as you want. You're the only one on
12 the radio anyway. It's not busy at all.

13 Q. Do you guys ever use the AWOS frequency -- turn to the AWOS
14 frequency?

15 A. No. It's only on when -- at night I think. So we never fly
16 in there at night.

17 Q. Okay. It's not broadcasting during the day?

18 A. I don't -- no, it doesn't. We never listen to it.

19 Q. Okay. Is there a reason why Dutch weather is preferred over
20 AWOS?

21 A. Yeah, because of the unique topography around there.

22 Q. So what does Dutch weather give you that the AWOS couldn't?

23 A. You know, the approaching winds. They'll say -- they'll give
24 you a PIREP from somebody, maybe, that just went in there. Those
25 are really valuable. They'll say there's a squall coming,

1 probably be here in 5 minutes, you know. And you can look at your
2 time and see, well, I'll be at the airport in 3; I'm going to make
3 it.

4 Q. Uh-huh.

5 A. There's a lot of good things like that, or they'll say
6 there's birds somewhere. There's all sorts of good information
7 they can give you. They'll go, we just had a peak wind of blah,
8 blah, blah, you know. I'm like, oh, well, how long did it last?
9 That might change your mind.

10 Q. At any point had you noticed any differences or concerns with
11 what the AWOS is reporting compared to what Dutch weather has?

12 A. They're basically reading the AWOS to you.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. But they bias the wind, I think.

15 Q. What do you mean by that?

16 A. Because that's only the midfield wind basically that AWOS.
17 So they have anemometers at both ends, and we can get a -- you
18 know, they can average it out.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. I mean, I've been in their office. I don't know if any of
21 you guys went in there, but there's a runway over a compass rose
22 and, you know, it tells you exactly which way it's favoring. They
23 can tell you in an instant. Or, if there's some weird gust, you
24 actually see them on the water too, which -- or it's turbulent,
25 you know, super turbulent.

1 Q. So is the use of Dutch weather included in training for Dutch
2 Harbor?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is that -- are there PowerPoints or ground training for
5 special airports?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. What kind of information is in that ground training?

8 A. It's all FAA-supplied stuff. We go over the wind charts.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. What else is in there? Foreflight and then, you know,
11 experience, everybody tell a story about watch this, watch that,
12 maybe.

13 Q. Okay. So those -- is that dependent on the person who is
14 teaching the class?

15 A. Probably.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. But the main bulk of the information, everything they need to
18 know is laid out quite clearly.

19 Q. Okay. We've touched on this in different ways, but what are
20 the challenges or concerns about having people fly into special
21 airports like Dutch Harbor with less experience as PIC in the
22 aircraft?

23 A. Challenges and concerns?

24 Q. So what do you gain by having more experience before you
25 start that training or get the sign-off?

1 A. You get to see different weather patterns. You know, every
2 day -- like all summer, it was gorgeous down there, but now we're
3 in the winter and it's -- can be terrible some days you can go in
4 there.

5 Q. Uh-huh.

6 A. But, yeah, the more experience you have, the more times
7 you've seen it, the better you're going to get.

8 Q. So would you get that experience prior to training?

9 A. There is no way. You have to go there in the airplane.

10 Q. Okay. So does -- that experience prior to the training in
11 the special airport, how does that alleviate any concerns about
12 flying into special airports?

13 A. Well, you're always concerned when they're going down there.
14 It's just, you know, we go over that risk assessment form, too, as
15 a safety thing, and you can -- it can raise concerns that you
16 might not have been thinking of, you know, before you left type of
17 thing.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I'm sure you guys have looked at that risk assessment, but
20 for Dutch Harbor, you know, you got to stay honest with that
21 stuff.

22 Q. Uh-huh.

23 A. I don't know what -- I haven't seen what Paul did that day
24 before he left or -- I know the wind was in question when he got
25 there, which way to go, but I don't see why he wouldn't talk to

1 the weather and say, which runway is it favoring? Or if there was
2 some obscuration, and he didn't want to go in the other runway or
3 -- I have no idea.

4 Q. Okay. So --

5 A. I mean, we show them pictures. We show them videos. We show
6 them low weather. We show them squalls. We do everything we can
7 prior to going there. It's just up to the check airman then to
8 decide, yeah, he can land there. I mean, I know I checked out
9 lots of people there when I was check airman for the 340.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And the lower the weather got, the more you could tell what
12 the pilot was going to do, which is -- so the day you go there,
13 you know, if it's a clear, easy day and the wind is down the
14 runway, it's like, hey, did I really learn anything here? They
15 learn the ground track, you know, fly and stuff like that, but
16 until the clouds drop and you can't see the tops -- you got to
17 recognize the bases of the mountains and be cognizant of that.

18 Q. Uh-huh.

19 A. And when I'd fly in there with people, I'd say, hey, you got
20 to have this check point, that check point, that check point. If
21 she says she can see that, you'll be able to see that. You know,
22 they're like 3-mile gaps you got to get across, because you always
23 miss at 4 miles. So basically, at 4 miles you got to be able to
24 see at least 3, 4 miles to get in there.

25 Q. When you were doing these airport qualifications in the 340,

1 were the requirements and documentation the same as they are now?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So you filled out these qualification forms as a check airman
4 as well?

5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Okay. When did you find out that there were plans or ideas
7 of changing the airport requirements? Before.

8 A. When they wanted Paul to go in there.

9 Q. When they wanted Paul to go in?

10 A. Yeah, it was right at that time.

11 Q. That's when you found out?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Did you have concerns about that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What were those concerns?

16 A. See, I didn't know the reason why they'd set that rule up.
17 So we were just like, God, it's already so low -- to me it's so
18 low sounding as is, I go, I don't know why you'd want to change
19 that. And then they had all the check airmen in a meeting there,
20 and the comment was made, an airport is an airport. And we were
21 like, no, it's not. But this one is special, you know, it's the
22 top of the specials probably for 121.

23 Q. Who was pushing that idea?

24 A. Deke Abbott and Crystal. We were like, true, a runway is a
25 runway, too, but if you only have 3,900 feet of runway, you better

1 hit the end of it.

2 Q. So --

3 A. It's more the approach in Dutch, I think, that fouls people
4 up.

5 Q. Did you voice the concerns that you had?

6 A. We did a little bit. I remember a couple check airmen said
7 something about that. And once they talked to Adam Hehl, he was
8 very concerned about it.

9 Q. Uh-huh. How did they respond? How did Crystal and Deke
10 respond to that?

11 A. I don't remember. We kind of were, you know, mad inside,
12 angry probably, but probably didn't voice it correctly.

13 Q. Okay. So they essentially continued with the plan?

14 A. Yeah. They continued on their plan.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I was surprised to hear Deke say that, because he was, like,
17 ex-FAA, you know, safety everything. But now that I've learned
18 more of what he -- his history, I was just like, that's
19 unbelievable that he even said that.

20 Q. You mentioned the 500-hour rule that's coming up.

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. And so 500 hours as an FO in the aircraft before upgrading to
23 captain, is that -- does that also include new hires, new hire for
24 captains?

25 A. This is the first year we have had new hire captains. So

1 this is why this came up.

2 Q. I see.

3 A. It's -- no, we just want it to be safer somehow, whatever we
4 can do.

5 Q. Was Paul the only new hire captain that you had?

6 A. This year.

7 MR. WATSON: Did you come on this year?

8 No, it was last year. Yeah, he got hired straight into
9 captain.

10 BY DR. SILVA:

11 Q. Brandon?

12 A. Brandon, yeah.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. That was before my time almost.

15 Q. Okay. So it's rare, from what I'm understanding?

16 A. It is rare. You normally don't like to do that, but if you
17 hire only 1,500-hour pilots, you're going to be up against a wall
18 fast.

19 Q. So is there a plan for -- you've got the 500-hour rule for
20 upgrading first officers. Is there a plan for managing that risk
21 for new hire captains?

22 A. What do you mean?

23 Q. So I understand the first officer to captain upgrade. But if
24 you're hiring straight -- I'm going to say off the street for
25 captains, is there any sort of requirement change or --

1 A. Yeah. They all have to be over 2,500 hours and 500 in the
2 plane.

3 Q. Okay. So if you were to hire a captain straight out with no
4 aircraft experience --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- they would have to sit right seat?

7 A. Right for at least 6, 7 months.

8 Q. Okay. Got it. I see. Do you have any input into procedural
9 changes for the company?

10 A. Sure.

11 Q. What are you typically involved with when it comes to
12 procedures?

13 A. All training things. So if they want to do more training on
14 any specific item, I can cause that to happen easily.

15 Q. What's your interaction like with the FAA?

16 A. I'm talking to them, like, three times a week probably.

17 Q. How is that relationship?

18 A. It's great.

19 Q. Okay. Jumping around a little bit here but -- so your title
20 is director of training now, and you're doing both jobs of flight
21 standards and training. Did they hire a new flight standards
22 person?

23 A No. I think in the Ravn Corporation that's coming up; they
24 have a director of training and a flight ops manager at Ravn
25 already.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. So once they're going to merge, they won't need one. So it
3 kind of works that I just do it for PenAir right now.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. They gave -- I think Dave Pflieger talked to David Fiacco to
6 help me out a little bit. So once we decided we were going to
7 change these flight times, you know, raise it to 5/2,500, Dave has
8 been, like, doing the technical writing part of it.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Did you interview him already?

11 Q. No.

12 A. David Fiacco?

13 Q. Fiacco. Let me write that down.

14 A. I think he's today, actually, later.

15 Q. I'll have to double check that. That's one of our later
16 questions is who you think we should talk to.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. So tell me about the CRM training here. When is it
19 done? What's --

20 A. We do an initial and a little bit in systems. But we
21 actually have almost a complete day of that. We go over the FOTM,
22 whatever is in the manual. Then we have a PowerPoint about it,
23 regular CRM airline stuff, how to talk, you know, what to avoid,
24 who to contact, you know, encourage them to use all your resources
25 and don't hold back.

1 Q. Okay. Is there any scenario-based training in that or is
2 it --

3 A. Just -- you know, it's always in the background of the sim,
4 is about the first time we'd see it and see how a new captain or
5 an FO would ask questions or interact. It's an ideal, you know,
6 thing to have, but not always attainable immediately.

7 Q. Is there captain leadership training for upgrades?

8 A. There's supposed to be. They're developing it right now.
9 Ravn is on top of that. That was Deke Abbott's specialty.

10 Q. Okay. So that's -- that wasn't part of PenAir's --

11 A. Not really. Ours was all by experience and, you know,
12 observations.

13 Q. Okay. Uh-huh.

14 A. But now we're going through pilots so fast it -- the time
15 isn't there anymore.

16 Q. To get that experience?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. So when did that initiative for captain leadership training
19 start?

20 A. Right away. When I got here in January, it was -- they
21 formed a little group over there at Ravn, and I went to the first
22 class of it, and they were just trying to decide how big and how
23 wide to make it, how long in the curriculum. They're probably
24 close now.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Sarah would know more about it or -- Sarah Fraher, the chief
2 pilot at Ravn.

3 Q. Okay. Got it. How would you describe the safety culture
4 here?

5 A. Describe the safety culture. It's excellent I think. From
6 the time they implemented the whole SMS system, it really smoothed
7 the whole operation out safety wise. People were calling more for
8 information. People were reporting, you know, things you usually
9 don't hear about more, pilots. And usually any -- you know, it's
10 PIC rules, so if they said they didn't want to go that day, no
11 matter what the reason, they're just, okay, we won't go. Or they
12 get another pilot and see if they want to go.

13 Q. Okay. Have you noticed any changes in the safety culture
14 since the merger?

15 A. No.

16 Q. So when Crystal was your supervisor -- correct, she was? How
17 was your relationship with her?

18 A. It was good. We talked every day probably three times a day
19 at least. Every morning and -- come in, what's up? What's going
20 on? It was pretty good in the loop there.

21 Q. Did you feel like any concerns or input you had were heard?

22 A. Yeah. But I just didn't stop her on this. I just -- like
23 the way, you know, Paul was sold was, he's a wonder pilot, been up
24 here forever, he's got 25 years' experience. I've been to Dutch
25 Harbor 100 times. What am I supposed to think?

1 Q. And that was the information she was giving you about that?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay. Got it. You mentioned that Paul was working on an APG
4 application, I believe.

5 A. Yeah. It was basically our landing numbers, something to
6 plug in winds, I guess. I don't know. I never saw it. I never
7 saw the program operating.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. But he had it on his iPad somehow. But they have already
10 cancelled it.

11 Q. Oh, they cancelled it?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Do you know when that happened?

14 A. Right after the crash. Well, he was the only one working on
15 it, so nobody knew any details of it.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. So we decided the system that's in place has been working
18 forever, why change it?

19 Q. Do you know what his role was in terms of that testing?

20 A. Not really.

21 Q. Okay. Did -- clarification on the forms, because I know
22 Marvin has mentioned it before too. The airport qualification
23 form, is that form stating that you are -- go for training, or is
24 that form stating you have completed training?

25 A. Should be have completed it.

1 Q. Okay. So when you -- when we're talking about letters of
2 recommendation, is that you should -- this is the go for training
3 information?

4 A. Yeah. You get two letters of recommendation. That's if
5 you're sub-3, though. That was sub-3. Two letters, the 100, and
6 then you'd start flying is what the intent is, I think.

7 Q. Okay. So let's say you hit 300; who would initiate that
8 training?

9 A. Usually the chief pilot probably say, let's gets them
10 schooled up on Dutch.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. The check airmen would start flying down there with them.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. But they might have been going there during that 300 hours.
15 You know, anytime they're with a check airman, we try and keep
16 that going the whole time so you're not like, hey, I got 300, now
17 my next landing is going to be Dutch Harbor.

18 Q. Okay. And then again, just to make sure that I'm clear, that
19 letter of recommendation, is that, like, an okay for training, or
20 is that an okay for a sign-off letter of recommendation?

21 A. Okay for training.

22 Q. Okay. And, after the accident, were you ever asked to sign
23 or back date any documentation?

24 A No.

25 DR. SILVA: All right. That's all I have.

1 Marvin.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

3 BY MR. FRANTZ:

4 Q. A minute ago you were talking with Sathya about -- just a
5 second -- there was a check airman meeting, there was feedback,
6 and something was decided not to be done. Was that -- what was
7 under discussion then? Was that the eliminating the 300/100
8 requirement for special airport, and then that was -- what, caused
9 some feedback from check airmen? Or what was that discussion
10 about that you were talking about?

11 A. I can't remember if they wanted to eliminate the 300 or just
12 lower the sign-off threshold due to experience. If the person had
13 experience down there, they could just sign them off anytime they
14 wanted, I think is what they were going for.

15 Q. Okay. That was the proposal sort of by, would you say Deke
16 and Crystal --

17 A. Deke and Crystal, yeah.

18 Q. But it wasn't implemented as far as you know?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Is that correct? Okay. I heard 2,500 mentioned a minute ago
21 along with 500. What's the 2,500?

22 A. That's if somebody came off the street or is trying to
23 upgrade. So if we hire somebody at 15, they're going to have to
24 sit right seat until 25, and then they'll be able to go left seat.
25 So we won't have any captain with less than 2,500. And when I got

1 hired, it was 5,000, then it dropped to 4,000, which is where it
2 was now. And now we're dropping it to 2,500.

3 Q. So 2,500 is just minimum as -- for hiring as an FO?

4 A. To become a captain. No, a FO could come in at -- you know,
5 ATP, whatever, you know, you can come in from 1,000 to 1,500 and
6 there's a big gap in there.

7 Q. So I still don't understand what the 2,500 requirement is for
8 or who it applies to. Hiring new people --

9 A. If a new person wanted to come here, a street captain, they'd
10 have to be --

11 Q. A captain?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. Coming in as a captain, 2,500.

14 A. Yeah, you'd have to have above 2,500 and then sit right seat
15 for 5.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And then they would move left seat --

18 Q. Right.

19 A. -- after we do a whole sim session, like an initial new hire
20 sim session. So they'd be in the left seat for 36 hours of
21 simulator.

22 Q. Okay. Not in place yet, those requirements?

23 A. I think it's written; it's not been submitted because of
24 their annual --

25 Q. Have you ever flown with Paul Wells?

1 A. Huh-uh.

2 Q. Have you ever had any feedback or heard of any feedback on
3 his decision making, command presence, or aircraft handling
4 skills?

5 A No. I assumed he was doing fine.

6 Q. You mentioned a minute ago about someone refusing a flight
7 for weather, and have you ever seen that happen?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Do you have any knowledge of that happening?

10 A. It's pretty common. Usually you're in communication with a
11 dispatcher and you just decide, you know, is this normal?

12 Q. And so the pilot decides they don't want to make that flight;
13 are there any -- is that pilot required to make an explanation to
14 the chief pilot, or are there any consequences of turning down a
15 flight for weather?

16 A. There shouldn't be, but I heard of one our young, new
17 captains got interviewed by Deke and another chief pilot about
18 refusing a flight due to weather.

19 Q. Do you know if there were any adverse consequences for that
20 pilot other than just the interview?

21 A. Feelings got hurt. I don't know.

22 Q. And then you mentioned that -- I thought I heard you say they
23 might check and see if another pilot would take it.

24 A. Right.

25 Q. So is that a practice, that if somebody says, I don't want to

1 go, I don't like the weather, they -- okay, now we'll go ask
2 another pilot?

3 A. No, usually you've been waiting so long that you're getting
4 near the edge of your duty and time limits and then, you know,
5 they'll -- and then weather is probably changing. You know,
6 they'll -- it's like, okay, go home and give up, and we'll get the
7 next guy in. Just so they can have somebody at the airport ready
8 to go.

9 Q. So if a pilot --

10 A. It's not, like, a management thing, I think, where they're
11 like, okay, you're not going to go, let's call the next guy. We
12 don't have that many pilots around anyway.

13 Q. So if a pilot refuses -- looks at the weather, calls dispatch
14 and says, no, I don't want to take this flight --

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. -- once that got up to another level, the company wouldn't
17 say, okay, well, let's call in a reserve pilot and see if he'll
18 take it? That wouldn't happen?

19 A. No. No. Not like that.

20 Q. Okay. What's a wind chart?

21 A. Any guys have a copy of it here?

22 Q. Let me make it more specific. How is it used? How are
23 pilots trained to use the wind chart? When do they use it, and
24 what do they do with it?

25 A. You can do it pre-departure, you know, for your forecast

1 winds, and then if they're 1 knot over that, you can refuse to go,
2 you know, and probably shouldn't be in there. So when those go
3 past those limits, it's a good safe time to say, no, thank you and
4 hold, wait. I don't know.

5 Q. Would a --

6 A. Whatever option, yeah.

7 Q. Would a pilot use that chart once he was in flight and got
8 weather, say, at his destination?

9 A. Yeah, they could. You'll hear a number that's like, you
10 know, oh, that direction? What is that direction? And then we
11 just -- it's on the iPad; you just look it up. You're like, oh,
12 that is a bit over. So and then you have a discussion, you know,
13 how long has it been there, how many gusts have you got over that?
14 And you make up your mind. At that moment it might not be over,
15 but just in the last 10 minutes we had it over. So those need to
16 give you heightened awareness.

17 Q. Okay. So you mentioned that you are the manager of flight
18 standards, and Paul came in, and Paul was the director of
19 training. But did you --

20 A. He was in training pretty much, though, for 2 months.

21 Q. Okay. So was he executing any of the actual responsibilities
22 of director of training while he was -- held that title, if he did
23 officially hold it?

24 A. No. He went and taught ground school at Ravn about a month
25 -- I think that month prior --

1 Q. For?

2 A. For their company.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. It wasn't the systems. It was their indoc.

5 Q. Indoc, okay. So did you say you were essentially executing
6 the director of training responsibilities, the job, even though
7 Paul held the title?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. After he came on --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- you were still doing the same thing you had been doing
12 before he came on; is that correct?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. When the merger is complete, is your job going away? The
15 director of training at PenAir --

16 A. Probably.

17 Q. -- is that going to be absorbed into the bigger organization?

18 A. Probably. But there'll be a position for the Saab 2000
19 training. So whatever they call it, I'll just do that.

20 Q. So when check airmen are conducting Dutch Harbor -- special
21 airport training, what guidance -- what written guidance or
22 informal guidance, what sort of guidance do they have on what they
23 should be training when they're doing a special airport
24 qualification?

25 A. It's pretty minimal written. It's one entry and exit. But

1 normally it ends up being more. So why they wrote it so low is
2 normally we -- like, me or any of our former pilots mostly were,
3 you know, in the 340 for 10 years going down there. And we're
4 like, okay, we'll just switch the planes. Let's -- okay, you made
5 it in there on one try, you know. And they're like, okay, you can
6 go in there. So even I was checked out again by a check airman in
7 the 2000 to go back in there.

8 Q. So is one flight with a check airman, in your view, is that
9 sufficient to sign somebody off for special airport?

10 A. Not now. I mean, we'll have to look at their history closer,
11 like -- you know, so if somebody like this comes up again, they
12 just -- well, how many times have you been to Dutch Harbor, you
13 know? How many times was the weather below, you know, 1,000 feet?
14 How many times was the wind over 20 miles an hour? They'll have
15 to give a more -- but now they are rewriting Dutch checkout. It's
16 going to be -- did you see it, Brandon? Three entries, three or
17 four now, minimum.

18 Q. Okay. Why would a pilot select a flaps 20 versus a flaps 35
19 landing in the 2000?

20 A. Depending on the Alt 2 or not, and the weight and the wind,
21 headwind component.

22 Q. You said -- did you say earlier that the planning, that
23 guaranteed before they left that they could make it there was
24 based on a flaps 35 landing?

25 A. Uh-huh. With no wind.

1 Q. So if a pilot -- why would a pilot then decide as -- well,
2 you just mentioned some factors. If he decides as he approaches
3 that he wants to do a flaps 20, does he have -- is there any
4 requirement, written/unwritten, that he should go back and verify
5 that flaps 20, he's okay?

6 A. No, you just open the APG and you look at flaps 20 and you
7 look at your weight and then you add a wind, if there's a wind
8 component. And he can -- the weight is printed right there. If
9 you're over that weight, you shouldn't do it. Pretty much if
10 you're Alt 2 here, at gross weight, you're going to have to do a
11 35.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And just recently, over the last year, I hear people are --
14 there's some word on the street that they don't like doing flaps
15 35, and that was the first I heard of it recently. And I was
16 like, that's surprising because everybody I went to Dutch with, I
17 always made them land flaps 35 no matter what.

18 And the plane handles fine. Even if it's gusting or windy,
19 this plane has no problem flaps 35, flaps 20. Its problem is
20 slowing down. So that's what I tell the new guys. I'm like, just
21 go around flaps 35. Once you push those throttles up, that thing
22 is going to the sky. You know, it's crazy. Even if you didn't
23 clean up anything, it'd probably climb 2,000 feet a minute at
24 flaps 35.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. So I like -- always training still to, like, don't be afraid
2 of this, just do it. It gives you another 10 knots almost of
3 wiggle room.

4 Q. Okay. Do most people that get special airport qualifications
5 get it with just one flight in with a check airman?

6 A. I can't say.

7 Q. Do you have any knowledge or awareness of people that require
8 -- not require -- have more than one trip there with a check
9 airman to get signed off for a special airport?

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. Have you seen that happen?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay.

14 MR. FRANTZ: That's all I have, Kirk. Thank you.

15 MR. WATSON: You're welcome.

16 DR. SILVA: Dujuan?

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: I don't have any further questions, thanks.

18 DR. SILVA: Tony?

19 BY MR. FISCHER:

20 Q. I had one, Kirk. Does PenAir go into any other special
21 airports?

22 A. Yes. We go to Sand Point and Kodiak right now.

23 Q. And is that 300/100 requirement the same for those airports?

24 A. Correct. Yeah.

25 MR. FISCHER: That's all I have.

1 DR. SILVA: Thank you. Brandon.

2 BY MR. WILSON:

3 Q. You were just talking about the performance of the airplane.
4 In our performance binder in the unfactored, it gives us a number.
5 Do you think that airplane -- or those numbers are pretty
6 accurate?

7 A. Yes.

8 MR. WILSON: That's all I got.

9 DR. SILVA: Okay. I just have a few follow-ups.

10 MR. WATSON: They were long, if anything.

11 BY DR. SILVA:

12 Q. This meeting where there was this discussion about changing
13 the qualifications, was that a pilot meeting?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. Do you know the pilots who couldn't be at that
16 meeting, is there a way that the company disseminates information
17 that was discussed or presented?

18 A. You know, you tell one pilot of the airline, they all know.

19 Q. Okay. So to your knowledge --

20 A. All the check airmen were there. So, you know, as soon as
21 they are on one flight, everybody knows.

22 Q. Okay. So there's no minutes or anything?

23 A. We informed the people that it impacted right away.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. So, you know, that's -- we kind of stopped the training in

1 its tracks. And the rest are FOs, so they're not even close.

2 Q. So who would it have impacted, this waiver?

3 A. Klein.

4 Q. Klein, okay.

5 A. Deremere, and Zach Bowman.

6 Q. What was the second one you said?

7 A. Deremere, D-e-r-e-m-e-r-e.

8 Q. Okay.

9 MR. WATSON: Is that how you say it? What's her first name?

10 MR. WILSON: Heather.

11 MR. WATSON: Heather. Sorry.

12 BY DR. SILVA:

13 Q. So they were all new captains?

14 A No. They were FOs the beginning of this year, and on the
15 seniority in flight time, they were next for captains. And they
16 wanted three more captains, so sent them to sim, and then this
17 happened, and they are on standby basically until they get their
18 500. They were sub-500 in the plane.

19 Q. So in the potential policy change to get rid of the airport
20 qualification requirements that Paul went through, did that affect
21 any other pilots, or was that just Paul?

22 A. They took Greg's away right then. He had already been flying
23 in there sub-300 as a captain.

24 Q. So, after the accident, they took his away?

25 A. Yeah. But now he's over 300.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But he's probably got 2,000 in the right seat already, so his
3 knowledge of the plane is good.

4 Q. What's your understanding of why Crystal is no longer a chief
5 pilot here?

6 A. I just heard she resigned. And I haven't talked to her.
7 Nobody called me. So that's all I know.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I don't know the why of it.

10 Q. Uh-huh. What's your understanding of why Paul is no longer
11 director of training?

12 A. Well, he's got to be on standby after this is figured out.

13 Q. Is he still employed with the company to your knowledge?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. You mentioned a name Aaron Rocereta; is that right?

16 A. Yeah, Rocereta.

17 Q. Rocereta.

18 A. A.R. Just call Ravn and ask for A.R.; they'll know who
19 you're talking about.

20 Q. So who is that?

21 A. He's the director of ops over there.

22 Q. Okay. You mentioned that there's some pilots you heard
23 through the grapevine that didn't like flying at flaps 35. Where
24 is that information coming from?

25 A. Just pilots that stop by my office and tell me that. Casual

1 conversation.

2 Q. Were any of them concerned about flying at flaps 35, or is
3 that hearsay from them seeing others be uncomfortable flying?

4 A. I don't know. Maybe they're just not practicing it enough.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I think there's something with the wind. This is extremely
7 controllable at that lower speed even.

8 Q. Okay. Who is it you work with directly at the FAA?

9 A. Chuck Fitzpatrick mostly, and then, now that it's changed, it
10 recently became Pat Sullivan. But our main simulator guy is John
11 Posey.

12 Q. Posey.

13 A. So those are the three guys I usually interact with the most.
14 Ted Cruz recently is doing some observation flights.

15 Q. Okay. But you said Posey was for simulator?

16 A. Yeah, what's he called? What's his title? It's P -- CPM,
17 right, crew program manager.

18 Q. Crew program manager.

19 A. He's typed in the plane.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. He lives in Florida, so it's easier for him to get to the sim
22 and stuff.

23 Q. Got it. Okay. Have you read the investigative update that
24 we put out on the accident?

25 A. Yeah. Last -- you only put out, like, two, right?

1 Q. I think there's only -- yeah.

2 A. The one, the tire picture?

3 Q. I think it's that one. They gave you -- it would be, like, a
4 5-page thing.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Did you read it?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. Anyone else you think that we should talk to given
9 what you can tell from the questions that we were asking?

10 A. What specifically?

11 Q. In terms of anyone you think that may have more information
12 regarding the lines of questioning, might be helpful?

13 A. I think you're already interviewing everybody. I don't know
14 everybody you're interviewing, but --

15 Q. Well, based on who you --

16 A. -- all the captains maybe and all the FOs that flew with him.
17 I don't know if those are on there. Since he only had been in
18 there barely 100 hours, it can't be that long of a list.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. But no pilot came to me ever and said, hey, he's weird this
21 way, he's doing this that way. I never -- and I'll usually hear
22 those right away if something goofy is going on.

23 Q. Okay. Do you have anything else you want to add that we
24 didn't ask you about?

25 A. Not at this time.

1 DR. SILVA: Well, you have our information.

2 MR. WATSON: Uh-huh.

3 DR. SILVA: Feel free to reach out any time. You're also
4 welcome to go through Brandon if you're more comfortable with
5 that. And I thank you for your time.

6 MR. WATSON: Thank you.

7 DR. SILVA: Off the record.

8 (Whereupon, at 10:01 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Kirk Watson


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 2, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Letha J. Wheeler
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 5/29/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: RICHARD HARDING
Director of Operations, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Wednesday,
December 4, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Harding)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Richard Harding:		
By Mr. Frantz		9
By Dr. Silva		23
By Dr. Sevillian		35
By Mr. Frantz		37
By Dr. Silva		42
By Mr. Fischer		44
By Mr. Frantz		46
By Dr. Silva		47

I N T E R V I E W

(12:36 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Good afternoon. Thanks for coming in.
4 I'm Marvin Frantz and everybody -- I'll have everybody else
5 introduce themselves in a moment. But, before we do, I'll give
6 you a little briefing of what's going on. Have you ever been
7 involved or part of an NTSB investigation before?

8 MR. HARDING: No.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. So, when we investigate accidents, the
10 NTSB forms specialty groups to look at certain areas, for example,
11 power plants group, systems group. This group is a group -- it's
12 two groups in one, so it's combined. It's a hybrid. It's called
13 operational factors and human performance. So some of us -- I'm
14 operational factors, and we have human performance specialists
15 with the group.

16 Also in the group, because the NTSB doesn't have, you know,
17 all the expertise we need for investigations, we bring in outside
18 people to be part of the group, part of the investigation. We
19 always bring in the FAA, but it's the accident investigation
20 branch of the FAA, not the enforcement or certificate branch. But
21 the accident investigation, they always provide us a
22 representative on the group.

23 And then we get -- we try to get a -- well, we don't try. We
24 get a representative from the operator. In this case, we have
25 Brandon, because he's an expert on the Saab and on PenAir

1 operations and training and being a check airman. So he's our
2 authority for that realm. So he's part of our group, and he's
3 working with us for this investigation.

4 And what the group -- primary group activity is conducting
5 interviews. You know, we conducted several interviews when we
6 were up here right after the accident, and then we came back this
7 week to do another round of interviews. There may be other
8 activities down the road the group gets together for, but we stay
9 as a group until the final factual -- what we call the factual
10 report is written. And then everyone in the group looks at that
11 report and agrees that, yep, I agree that this is what we've
12 learned, and these are the things we discovered during our
13 investigation.

14 MR. HARDING: How soon does the factual report come out?

15 MR. FRANTZ: That can be anywhere between -- the factual
16 report, we've tried -- the goal for the whole investigation is
17 typically a year. But the factual report's only partway through.
18 After the factual report, then there's analysis that takes place
19 where we look at the factual reports from all the different
20 groups, and there's analysis of all those to figure out what's the
21 ultimate probable cause of this accident.

22 And then the final product the NTSB always shoots for is what
23 safety recommendations could be put out to preclude this kind of
24 thing from happening in the future. The goal for a typical
25 investigation is a year to complete the whole thing. Sometimes

1 it's longer. Sometimes it's shorter. Depends on our workload and
2 the complexity of the investigation.

3 MR. HARDING: Does the FAA run a parallel investigation of
4 the accident, or is the NTSB just the only --

5 MR. FRANTZ: The -- well, the NTSB is tasked with the primary
6 investigation of the accident, determining the probable cause of
7 the accident.

8 MR. HARDING: The reason I ask is I've seen a thing that they
9 want to do interviews of a lot of people and I was curious.

10 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah. They -- the certificate management
11 office, I mean, I don't know if it's an accident investigation,
12 but they have elements of the accident that they will look at and
13 they may -- I have to let Tony speak to the FAA's part of their --

14 MR. FISCHER: Sure.

15 MR. FRANTZ: -- and any separate investigation that they
16 conduct on the accident.

17 MR. FISCHER: Dick, the -- I'm not part of it, because I'm
18 sitting at the safety table.

19 MR. HARDING: Right.

20 MR. FISCHER: And the NTSB, they just want to know how it
21 happened --

22 MR. HARDING: Right.

23 MR. FISCHER: -- why it happened, and they go from there.

24 The FAA just determines the nine responsibilities: Did the
25 government do its job? Did -- is it ATC's fault? Was it pilot

1 training? Was it weather? Was it aviation medical? And there's
2 actually nine of those, and those are what the CMO is checking
3 off. And, say, in this particular accident, they -- your
4 certificate-management team, I imagine, is coming back to you with
5 some questions on, how do you do this?

6 MR. HARDING: Right.

7 MR. FISCHER: Why'd you do that? And that can have punitive
8 effects, but not this. Okay?

9 MR. HARDING: Thanks, Tony.

10 MR. FISCHER: Okay.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Tony.

12 So this -- again, this will be part of the public record and
13 the public docket eventually. It -- that's why we're recording.
14 We ask you to answer to the best of your ability the -- or the
15 answer of I don't know or I can't recall is fine, if that's true.
16 That's a good answer. And, after the fact, if there's other
17 things you want to add, you'll have a chance at the end to add or
18 talk about anything else that we didn't touch on during our
19 interview.

20 So, before we get started, let me just go around the table
21 and have everybody introduce themselves. I'm operational factors
22 investigator Marvin Frantz with the NTSB.

23 DR. SILVA: All right. Sathya Silva, human performance
24 investigator with the NTSB.

25 MR. HARDING: And I know this guy.

1 MR. WILSON: You know me. Brandon Wilson, one of the check
2 airmen.

3 MR. HARDING: And I met her at the front door. Tony, I
4 don't.

5 MR. FISCHER: Yeah. I'm aviation safety inspector, and I'm
6 assigned to Lynden Air Cargo at this time. Okay?

7 MR. HARDING: Okay.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan Sevillian, human performance --

9 MR. HARDING: How do you spell your first name?

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: How do I say it?

11 MR. HARDING: How do you pronounce your first name?

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan.

13 MR. HARDING: Dajuan?

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

15 MR. HARDING: Okay. Thanks.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah. Human performance investigator, NTSB.

17 MR. HARDING: Okay.

18 MR. FRANTZ: And we also have to let you know that everybody
19 we interview is entitled to have a representative, someone of
20 their own choosing. And could you just state for the record who
21 your representative is?

22 MR. HARDING: Yeah. I elected Morgan Campbell.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Very good. Before we get started, do you have
24 any questions about the -- oh, well, typically, we'll just -- one
25 at a time, we'll just kind of go around the room. People will ask

1 questions, and then we'll go to the next person, and we might have
2 to do it in two rounds because sometimes people have follow-up
3 questions spurned by something that someone else asked. So we
4 might do that. So that's how it'll -- we'll kind of operate. And
5 we'll just kind of take turns.

6 Do you have any questions of us before we get started?

7 MR. HARDING: No. I think I've asked them.

8 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Great.

9 INTERVIEW OF RICHARD HARDING

10 BY MR. FRANTZ:

11 Q. So can we start by just -- can you state and spell your name
12 for the record for us?

13 A. I think so. Do you want me to do it?

14 Q. Would you, please?

15 A. Yeah. Richard Harding. R-i-c-h-a-r-d, Harding,
16 H-a-r-d-i-n-g. Richard. I spelled that already.

17 Q. Okay. And what's your current position?

18 A. Director of operations.

19 Q. Okay. For PenAir?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And how long have you had that position?

22 A. Well, with the new PenAir, I've been here since February.
23 The old one, I've got about 20 years.

24 Q. February of 20 --

25 A. 2019.

1 Q. Okay. Before February of 2019, what were you doing?

2 A. I retired.

3 Q. Okay. And you said, "the old PenAir." Were you director of
4 operations?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And what time period were you director of operations for that
7 organization?

8 A. I retired in 2008, in April, and back 20 years,
9 approximately. I'm not -- I don't remember the exact date. It's
10 on my resume, but I don't --

11 Q. Okay. So you were with PenAir through 2008?

12 A. Yes. I started with PenAir in 1970.

13 Q. Okay. And how long were you DO at PenAir?

14 A. About 20 years.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Approximately.

17 Q. And then -- until 2008. You retired and then came back to
18 PenAir as it's -- during the merger process, correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. How did you end up coming back? Did someone contact
21 you and ask you to come --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. Who was that?

24 A. Brian.

25 Q. Ryan?

1 A. Brian.

2 Q. Oh, Brian.

3 A. Brian Whilden.

4 Q. Brian Whilden? Okay.

5 A. He's the president.

6 Q. Okay. Did you know Brian from the previous time at PenAir?

7 A. He used to work for me.

8 Q. Can you give me a quick sketch of your aviation background?

9 You said you started with PenAir back in the '70s?

10 A. Yeah. I started with PenAir. I guess I will start there. I
11 came on with ATP and fly the 402 and smaller aircraft. Lived down
12 in King Salmon with my family, and I worked as a line pilot in the
13 bush for about 4 years. And then I left and went back to work in
14 the family business, and it took me 4 years to get the hell out of
15 there. Never want to go to work for friends and family. It
16 didn't work very well.

17 I only came back to PenAir as the director of training.
18 They'd had a couple of accidents and needed some help in that
19 area. So I did that, and I was director of training for several
20 years.

21 And one of the things that I did while I was working as the
22 director of training, we had a -- I was president of the Air
23 Carriers Association, and they had a committee that was made up of
24 all of the major groups, like the NTSB. I think it was before
25 Clint Johnson came in with that position. I can't remember who it

1 was. And we had Pat Pole (ph.), or some -- and there was somebody
2 before him. But we all belonged to this, and somebody from the
3 DoD, and we had three airlines that were included in it. And we'd
4 sit around the table, and we'd talk about the things that we could
5 do to improve safety.

6 And one of them came from the -- came up with the idea of the
7 Medallion Foundation that could operate independently of the FAA
8 and work with companies. And companies would have trust in them,
9 because we wouldn't share our -- any of our audits or anything
10 with the FAA.

11 And we did a couple other things. We got Senator Stevens
12 involved, and Marion Blakey was the administrator of the FAA and
13 worked with them in Washington. And we got all of the runways in
14 Alaska -- Alaska has, like, 400 and some runways that they're
15 responsible for -- and we got most of them extended to 3,300 feet,
16 and we changed the signage to about the halfway marks on all of
17 the shorter runways, which was very important for small airplanes,
18 as you get out in the bush and you're taking off and were
19 wondering where the halfway point is so that you could abort if
20 you're not 70 percent of your speed. Anyway, we did that and had
21 a couple of other things.

22 We started the Capstone Project in harmony with the FAA and
23 ADS-B aircraft, and it started in Bethel. And it took a while to
24 get that going because people don't trust the FAA. They put their
25 -- they would have -- on a computer, they would be able to follow

1 them and see where they're going. It took a few years to get
2 everybody involved but I think, now, most of the airplanes in
3 Bethel are equipped with ADS-B equipment, which is of huge, huge
4 importance.

5 Anyway, the Medallion Foundation was started in 2000.
6 Actually, I had the idea for Medallion Foundation in the late '70s
7 in a flight with Johnny Cash. I don't know if you remember that
8 story but, anyway, I was supposed to fly him out to the Painter
9 Creek Camp, and he was coming in, in his Gulfstream, whatever, and
10 he had two buddies with him. Anyway, they get off the plane, and
11 the guide from Painter Creek had sent up a 180 to pick them up.
12 It was a brand new airplane, and so they hopped in the airplane,
13 and off they went. And I got his two buddies and all of their LL
14 Bean crap, loaded it up, and we took off about a half hour later.
15 And Painter Creek's about 45 minutes to an hour.

16 And it was bad weather. I mean, it was raining and a
17 500-foot ceiling or something like that. But it was, you know,
18 just what we fly in every day out there. And so we flew over to
19 Painter Creek, and we got there, and Johnny Cash wasn't there.
20 And so we unloaded the airplane and went back. When I got back to
21 King Salmon, I found out they couldn't find Painter Creek, and
22 they ended up in Port Heiden.

23 And apparently, this pilot that they had, had never -- he
24 rode out to the camp with somebody else, and that was his first
25 trip to King Salmon. And he's picking them up. And I thought,

1 jeez, the -- you know, a person should have some way of knowing
2 that this is a Part 91 operation, and you get a chance to get in
3 an airplane that's -- operates at a higher standard.

4 Anyway, that was in about maybe 1975 or so. And years later,
5 in the late '90s, we came up with this Medallion Foundation. We
6 based it on a five-star program, which is kind of like the TOPS
7 program. So all of the stars were based on programs that the
8 Peninsula Airways had come up with. We were -- every year we'd
9 have to go over to Europe and work with insurance underwriters to
10 get a better insurance rate. And it was terrible at that time.
11 And we came up with a lot of programs, like a risk assessment
12 program. I stole that from the Department of Defense and changed
13 it around a little bit. We took small arms fire at the end of the
14 runway. Took that off the form. We didn't.

15 But the one thing that they had on our -- their form that we
16 didn't have on ours was importance of the mission. And we took
17 that off, because that wasn't something that we would consider.
18 It was either you have either the availability to go, we've
19 met all the requirements and we can go, or we don't go. We
20 don't -- if somebody's dying and have to have an airplane, that's
21 not part of that process.

22 So anyway, we took most of those programs, and we put them
23 into the Medallion Foundation. And then we got to work with
24 Marion Blakey at the -- she was a regional administrator at the
25 time. And Nick Sabatini was their second in command. And

1 Ted Stevens was our money guy. He put appropriations on all of
2 the different places. The FAA -- I think the FAA was --

3 Q. Was this all while you were at PenAir?

4 A. Yes. Yes.

5 Q. So you were at PenAir, but these were other safety-related
6 things you all were involved in?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I belonged to several different committees and --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- different things like that. And then, eventually, I
12 became chief pilot and, from there, just a short time in that
13 position, and I became the director of operations.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. And I was there until I retired, and then I -- after I
16 retired, I became a consultant and worked with Richmond and Quinn
17 doing expert witness work. And we had a consulting business with
18 a partner that lived out in Wasilla.

19 And anyway, we got a contract with the state to -- like I
20 said, 400 airports or so. And so we did these 5010 inspections.
21 And so I thought that would be kind of fun to get into a little
22 airplane and go all around the state, and I did that for 3 years.
23 And I -- I'm too old to do this shit, climbing in and out of that
24 airplane and stuff. So I quit doing that, and I still work for
25 Richmond and Quinn.

1 Brian called me and said they were desperate for a director
2 of operations until a merger was complete, at least. And so I
3 told him I would be willing to do that if I could come up and go
4 back and forth and get a --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- week at home once in a while.

7 Q. Okay. Are you -- so, prior to this -- prior to you coming to
8 this -- the new PenAir, we'll call it, have -- do you ever -- have
9 you ever worked with Ravn or done anything with Ravn or the Ravn
10 Group of any of those airlines --

11 A. No.

12 Q. -- prior to --

13 A. No. Other than working on committees with Bob Hajdukovich
14 and others.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But I've never had anything to do with Ravn or Ryanair or any
17 of those.

18 Q. Okay. So one of the things we're looking at is the PenAir
19 special airport qualification procedures for PICs. So can you
20 explain to me what the policy and the procedure is for a captain
21 at PenAir today to be qualified for special airports?

22 A. We were in the process of changing that, but it was you had
23 to have 300 hours to fly into special airports and be signed off
24 by a check airman and so on and so forth. And we've changed that
25 a little bit. They had a -- an exemption for that. If they were

1 at over 100 hours, they could be signed off by the chief pilot if
2 they'd had an inspection or had a check ride and been approved by
3 a check airman.

4 Q. Is --

5 A. And that was one thing that, when I came here, that was on
6 the books already and --

7 Q. Okay. Was that -- how does that compare to when you were
8 director of operations, before you left the old PenAir? What --
9 was there a similar policy for special airports?

10 A. We had a policy, but there was no exemptions for it. And I
11 don't remember what it was exactly, but it was probably 300 hours.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And type one, as captain.

14 Q. And then when you came -- recently, when you came back to
15 PenAir, that policy was 300 hours, but there was a 100-hour
16 exception that was already in place when you --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- became DO this time?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. Do you know why the 100-hour waiver -- why that was
21 there?

22 A. I have to assume that it was there because we went from 340s
23 to the Saab 2000, and we had pilots that had landed in these
24 special airports hundreds and hundreds of times in a similar
25 aircraft. And so I think they thought that, to qualify in the

1 2000, they would have an exception for it, which would kind of
2 make sense but --

3 Q. How many times have -- since you've been DO this time, how
4 many times have you seen that exception utilized?

5 A. I don't know. I know the only one I can think of is the one
6 that had the accident. Other than that, I don't think anyone has.
7 But I may be wrong on that.

8 Q. I assume, when you were DO in the old PenAir, were you also
9 flying when you were the DO?

10 A. Yes. Yes.

11 Q. So I'm probably taking a wild guess, but I think I'm safe.
12 You probably have a lot of experience with Dutch Harbor?

13 A. Yes. A lot.

14 Q. Is Dutch Harbor a challenging airport?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And what are some things that make it difficult, a challenge?

17 A. High winds, mountainous terrain, water on both ends of the
18 runway, short runway. Weather, mostly.

19 Q. Do you feel like -- the airport requirement is 300 hours now.
20 And did you say you had a -- like, when you were the DO, there was
21 a similar requirement previously, but you just don't remember what
22 it was firsthand?

23 A. I don't remember.

24 Q. Was there a -- do you remember if there was special -- other
25 than flight-hour time, was there special training required for

1 special airports?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And is there training required now --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- once a pilot reaches -- if he has the 300 hours in PIC --

6 A. Yes. Yes.

7 Q. -- he also has to get -

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What's involved in that training, do you know, for special
10 airports?

11 A. You'd have to talk to the training director, but they have --
12 you know, show them all of the -- I think they have a slide
13 program and they also have a computer-based -- computer --
14 whatever you call it.

15 Q. How about flight training?

16 A. Flight training, yes. They go down with a training airman or
17 a check airman on several flights there, and they learn some of
18 the idiosyncrasies of that particular airport. One of the
19 advantages we have there is we have both approaches from both ends
20 of the runway are over the water, so we get a good reading of the
21 wind. You have to teach people that.

22 Q. PenAir uses the Medallion wind chart for --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Is that for -- do you use that for all airports or just
25 special airports, or all airports you've already talked about?

1 A. All airports.

2 Q. So what's the policy? What's the guidance a pilot gets on
3 how to use that wind chart?

4 A. Well, first of all, a dispatcher looks at the thing and, if
5 the wind is above -- from a certain direction, is above that
6 required amount, the gust factor's above that, then they don't
7 dispatch the flight. And then the pilots look at it again, and
8 they have a risk assessment form that they fill out, and it talks
9 about the wind.

10 And so it -- as you, I'm sure, are aware of, very few
11 accidents happen because of one thing: It's usually because of an
12 accumulation of a lot of different contributing factors. And the
13 risk assessment form is an opportunity for them to put a number --
14 numerical value on each one of those things. And wind -- the wind
15 direction and velocity is, of course, one of them.

16 Q. Are pilots told that, that is a controlling document, the
17 wind chart, that, if the winds are above the limits set on that
18 chart, they cannot land at that airport?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you know Deke Abbott?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Was he part of your return to PenAir? Was he involved in
23 your coming back to be DO? Did you interview with him or speak
24 with him before you came back to be DO there?

25 A. I did not. No. I met him after I got back here.

1 Q. Okay. What's your -- what's the nature of your relationship
2 with Deke Abbott now, now that you're the DO?

3 A. Well, we work together on different issues and have worked on
4 several committees with him, and he's a very competent person and
5 a good choice for -- he's the vice -- I think senior vice
6 president of flight operations for both Corvus and PenAir. And I
7 think he's a good choice for that. He used to work at the FAA, I
8 think, in Fairbanks.

9 MR. HARDING: Tony, is that right?

10 MR. FISCHER: No. It was in Anchorage.

11 MR. HARDING: It was in Anchorage. Okay. He was there after
12 I left.

13 BY MR. FRANTZ:

14 Q. Is he involved in the merger to PenAir, the PenAir
15 certificate and the Ravn certificates?

16 A. I expect so. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Do you have a daily working relationship with him?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. I mean, do you -- are you in touch with him daily about items
20 or issues or --

21 A. We have a safety meeting every morning, 7 days a week,
22 at 8:00 in the morning. And he is in on that call, and all of
23 the departments report in, and I talk to him then. But if
24 there's -- some issue comes up, we get -- he comes over here, and
25 we get together and talk about it.

1 I remember one time one of our pilots had -- he was a young
2 pilot, and he got in trouble with putting stuff on Facebook. And
3 so we had an interview with him, and Deke had me sit in on the
4 interview with him. Stuff like that.

5 Q. Does he exercise any authority or control over PenAir
6 operations?

7 A. I don't know the answer to that. He's the senior vice
8 president of flight operations. So I suppose he does, if --

9 Q. Is the -- if I ask the FAA, what would they say about his
10 position regarding PenAir operations?

11 A. I don't know.

12 Q. When that incident -- not incident -- that thing you just
13 mentioned about where he was counseling or talking to a pilot who
14 had -- was in trouble or had some trouble because of something,
15 was that a PenAir pilot?

16 A. Yes. He was a young guy that had -- was scheduled to be
17 upgraded to captain, and the talk was about his immature putting
18 something on Facebook. And I don't remember what it was, but I
19 think that he had made some comment. Crystal had just become the
20 chief pilot. I think it was some comment about her, but I don't
21 know what it was or --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And it's -- I'm just --

24 Q. Was this shortly after you became the DO --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- again?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Came back as the DO?

4 A. Yes.

5 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I'm going to pause for a second here, and
6 I'm going to give somebody else a chance to ask questions.

7 Thanks, Dick.

8 Sathya?

9 BY DR. SILVA:

10 Q. In that situation with the pilot who had put something on
11 Facebook, what was the outcome?

12 A. We just sat in a room and talked to him. And Deke did most
13 of the talking. He likes to talk. And he told him that, you
14 know, that -- let the pilot give his reason for doing it and so on
15 and so forth. And Deke told him, you know, it was very immature
16 and he says -- and he impressed on him the importance of decision
17 making and how an immature, quick decision can make and lead to
18 disaster.

19 And I think I told him a story. We had a guy on -- coming
20 down on Maui, a young guy, and he was following somebody and the -
21 - a woman had pulled out in front of him. It was really slippery,
22 and she's sliding all over the road. And anyway, got it under
23 control, and then he went in front of her and decided to give her
24 a brake check. So he got right in front of her and hit on brakes,
25 and she went swerving off and hit a tree or a pole and her

1 daughter was killed in the accident. And it was an example of
2 somebody making a quick decision that was based on immaturity.

3 Anyway, Deke advised him that, you know, if you, you know,
4 you have any situations that you're not sure, just don't be making
5 quick, irrational decisions. And one of the things that impressed
6 me is, about 2 weeks ago, we had -- Nick Sabatini came up here and
7 was doing interviews with the pilot, and he was interviewing that
8 same pilot, and he was doing it in my office. And one of the
9 things the pilot said was, when I'm going in to do an approach,
10 for example, at Sand Point, and the wind is such-and-such, he
11 says, I always ask the co-pilot if he's comfortable with the
12 approach.

13 And it reminded me of the meeting that we had months before
14 that -- with Deke Abbott when Deke had put that in his mind. And
15 he's still -- he was still using those as part of his preflight --
16 or pre-landing briefing. And I thought that was important.

17 Q. So were there any ramifications to this person's upgrade
18 because of that?

19 A. We decided that -- after we talked to him, we decided that he
20 was capable of being upgraded, and he was upgraded to captain.
21 And we've never had any problems with him since.

22 Q. Do you know of any scenarios or situations of PenAir pilots
23 getting feedback from management for declining a flight?

24 A. I'm not aware of any.

25 Q. I'm just trying not to jump around here too much.

1 A. I get calls from dispatch and they've -- if a pilot has
2 agreed to a flight, then they'll ask me what I think of it. But
3 he's already agreed to it, so I may or may not. But any one of us
4 has the opportunity to stop a flight at any time. If a pilot
5 won't take a flight because they're uncomfortable with it, that's
6 fine.

7 Q. Have there been any cases where you've heard of something --
8 of a pilot declining a flight and there's pushback or fallback for
9 that decision?

10 A. I haven't heard of anything that would -- that caused
11 fallback. I do remember one incident where a chief pilot said
12 that the -- prior to her meeting with the pilot, she said that a
13 certain pilot had declined a flight because she didn't feel
14 comfortable doing it. And that was the end of our conversation.

15 She talked to the pilot, and I don't know what the outcome
16 was, if the pilot took the flight or not. But I don't think --
17 I'm sure she didn't put any pressure on the pilot, because it is a
18 policy in this company, if you don't feel comfortable, whether
19 there's anything wrong with the flight, you're perfectly
20 legitimate to cancel that flight.

21 Q. Would you get involved with any of those types of situations
22 as DO?

23 A. I get involved if the dispatch calls me and asks me if it's
24 something -- like, we had -- a north/south runway was closed for a
25 long time.

1 MR. HARDING: What was it, 6 months, Brandon?

2 And, while it was closed, we had -- we only had the other
3 runway to land on, and we had some very strong crosswinds coming
4 in on it. And I would get a call from dispatch, and they'd ask me
5 what my thoughts were. But I'd never pressure a pilot to do
6 something they didn't feel comfortable with. If they didn't feel
7 comfortable taking off, it was up to them.

8 BY DR. SILVA:

9 Q. Okay. What can you tell me about Dutch weather?

10 A. It's shitty. When they have nice weather down there, it's
11 really nice. But it's not very often. And it's -- they have a
12 lot of wind conditions down there. And, if you looked at our wind
13 chart, you can see little segments. Where most charts have maybe
14 four different segments, it has segments from all these different
15 directions. They have a lot of squalls down there.

16 One important thing is, when you're getting a weather report,
17 and they're reporting there are snow squalls, is to ask the
18 weather reporter to time them, because I've been in there where
19 there will be a squall over the airport and, I mean, it would be
20 terrible visibility, and I'd be out in the bay with -- the sun
21 wasn't shining, but it would be perfectly clear, and I'd circle
22 around for 10 or 15 minutes, the squall would go by, and I'd go
23 ahead and land. So it's important to get, you know, reporting
24 timing of the squalls.

25 The squalls are a big thing. Quite often, when a wind is

1 from -- directioned from behind Ballyhoo, you'll end up with a
2 tailwind at both ends of the runway. And they have three
3 windsocks down there and, you know, they're -- they work so-so.
4 That's -- it's all, you know, shielded by the mountain, Ballyhoo
5 Mountain. And so that's -- the windsocks aren't as effective as
6 you'd like them to be, so we have to --

7 And the water is probably our biggest indicator, and there
8 are some times that the wind shifts a great deal. Like, for
9 example, in that accident that happened, it was one of those days
10 the wind was going back and forth like that. And, when the snow
11 squalls come through, you can -- they don't follow the wind
12 direction. They follow the winds aloft. If the winds aloft, at
13 4,000, are coming from this direction, and the wind is blowing
14 this direction, a squall will be going that direction. So there's
15 a lot of just little dumb things like that, that --

16 Q. Sounds like a complex environment.

17 A. It is complex. It's not like landing at Anchorage.

18 Q. So, based on that -- your experience and your understanding
19 of these factors coming into that airport, what are your thoughts
20 on airport qualification in order to land at the airport?

21 A. I think after, you know, a good lot of experience in the
22 airplane, and you've been down there with the check airmen on
23 different flights -- I think the new one, we've got a requirement
24 for them to land at least twice on both 3-1 and 1-3 and have a
25 couple landings down there and been down there with a check airman

1 or an instructor and get very familiar with the airport and all of
2 those little things, like I just told you. And, once you get
3 familiar with it, it's a safe operation.

4 Q. Prior to the accident, were there any discussions,
5 internally, about changing those requirements?

6 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Could have been, but I would think that I would have been
9 involved in them, if there were, and I don't remember any.

10 Q. Are you typically involved with procedure changes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What's your role in that?

13 A. Well, director of operations -- I'm responsible for
14 them -- all the different manuals, and it's my responsibility.

15 Q. So would a change originate below you and then get sent to
16 you to do the change, or how does that process work?

17 A. Yes. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. What are the differences in the company, given that
19 you were DO for the old PenAir, and you're now DO for the new
20 PenAir?

21 A. Well, there's a lot of differences. It's acronyms.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. We'll double, triple the amount of acronyms now for all this
24 stuff. But I would say that PenAir -- the old PenAir had a very
25 safe operation. And I think that the new PenAir has probably a

1 safer operation. I mean, it's -- we have more people involved in
2 the safety department, and there's more emphasis on that. The old
3 PenAir, Danny Seybert was the president, and there was no
4 communication with anybody in the company. He was the king, and
5 he had it all.

6 In this company, we have meetings which are kind of a pain in
7 the ass, but we have great communication here. Everybody knows
8 what everybody else is doing, and we meet every morning at 8:00,
9 and it's about a half hour of talking with all the different
10 departments. And we have safety meetings, and we have meeting
11 after meeting. But the communication, I think, is the biggest
12 difference in the two companies. I mean, we would have open
13 communications with everybody.

14 The offices downstairs are set up with -- my office is the
15 first one on the left, and the chief pilot is the next one, and
16 flight attendant is the third office, and the door's always open.
17 And when people have to walk by our office to get to the pilots'
18 station there -- and so they can -- they're welcome to come in and
19 talk anytime. Open door.

20 Where back at the original -- or the old PenAir, we'll call
21 it, my office was -- I'm on the end of the hall here, and that was
22 that whole end of the building. So, if the pilots wanted to see
23 me, they had to come upstairs and go through my secretary and see
24 me there. But now, my door's open, and they have to walk right by
25 me. And most of them stop in at least to say hello if they have

1 any problems.

2 And many times, I've had pilots come in, and they have an
3 issue, and they'd stop and talk to me or, you know, stop and talk
4 to the chief pilot if they want. So I think communication is the
5 biggest thing, and I think the safety -- emphasis on safety is
6 stronger here than it was at the old PenAir. We have a good
7 safety culture.

8 Q. So can you describe what a typical day looks like for you?

9 A. Yeah. I get up at 5:00 in the morning, brush my teeth, make
10 breakfast and -- anyway, I come in here at -- I'm here by around
11 7:00, somewhere between 7:00 and 7:30. And then I go up to OCC
12 and I get briefed and all that. And, in the morning, when I first
13 get up, and I'm having breakfast, I look at the SkedFlex and see
14 what the schedule is doing. And then I go through my emails and
15 see what's happening.

16 And when I get to work, I -- the first thing I do is up to
17 OCC on the third floor there, and I talk to Iain first and have a
18 briefing on everything that's going on. And then I cross --
19 across from him is the -- is Robert, and he's in charge of the
20 maintenance and that department. And then I go over and talk to
21 the -- whoever's doing the weather and dispatch and go have a
22 briefing before I -- by 7:30 I have that.

23 And then, by different days -- like, on Mondays at 8:30, we
24 have a -- or 9 o'clock -- I don't remember what it is; it changes.
25 But we have a meeting of just people here in the building. And

1 after that, I have several other meetings that I go to at
2 different times of the day. And in between that, I get to do my
3 job. And I do, you know, op spec changes and different things
4 that come up.

5 Q. Yeah. That's actually a great lead-in to my next question,
6 which is what are your responsibilities here?

7 A. I'm responsible for the flight operations and chief pilot and
8 records and all the manuals. So --

9 Q. What's your interaction in terms of the day-to-day operations
10 would you say?

11 A. I guess I don't understand the question exactly.

12 Q. What is your -- in terms of your insight into what's
13 happening on the line?

14 A. First is my interaction with the OCC, and then I cover things
15 that happen during the day that -- on my schedule.

16 Q. What kind of things are those?

17 A. A lot of them are meetings I have to go to. And, of course,
18 manual revisions and things like that are -- Alliyah (ph.) is our
19 tech pubs person, and she's about as good a person as you'll
20 possibly find for that job. I mean, she gets stuff coming from
21 every direction, and I have to watch what's coming in from
22 different people, what changes and training.

23 I usually meet with Kirk Watson sometime in the morning and
24 talk to him about what's going on in that training department. I
25 think you've already talked to him here, haven't you? I think

1 he's down at the sim today. So --

2 Q. So what percentage of your job, would you say, is split
3 between overseeing the operation versus aspects connected to the
4 merger?

5 A. Ninety percent is oversight of the operation, and 10 percent
6 or less is the merger. I mean, we've got people that are over
7 there working with KVOK (ph.) or whatever they're calling
8 themselves. And I have a lot of people that are in charge of
9 each manual. For example, flight attendants and in-flight
10 service, Kathy Duffy (ph.), she does -- she works with them on
11 her -- getting her manuals and her training all up to speed and
12 all of the different things.

13 But I don't spend a lot of time with that. And, once the
14 merger is complete, Aaron Rocereta will be the director of
15 operations. So he's doing most of the work that -- as far as
16 merging.

17 Q. In terms of the airport qualification, is it your
18 understanding that you need that minimum qualification, so 300
19 hours, before you start training or before you do the checkout for
20 the special airports?

21 A. Before you start -- actually, yes -- training.

22 Q. So flying into there -- okay. What is your source for
23 weather information going into Dutch Harbor?

24 A. Well, they have an AWOS down there, and then they have an
25 actual weather observer down there that's been there for many

1 years. And that's probably the biggest source. And, of course,
2 all of the National Weather Service data is available to the
3 dispatchers and --

4 Q. Do you --

5 A. -- probably the most important part would be the weather
6 observer down there that's on the job.

7 Q. Uh-huh. Do you use the AWOS information at all?

8 A. Sort of. Yeah.

9 Q. In what way?

10 A. Well, pilots use it when they come in and see what the latest
11 weather is. And then they get an update from the weather
12 observer. It's just kind of a basic --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. I'm going to hang this up.

15 Q. So you mentioned that the biggest source is probably the
16 weather -- or the -- it's Dutch weather?

17 A. The person that --

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. The person that's on -- that's the weather observer there
20 that's on call is the most important, I would say.

21 Q. So what benefit do they bring on top of having AWOS?

22 A. Experience.

23 Q. What kind of information would you get from them that's
24 different?

25 A. Weather patterns. For example, we talked about squalls.

1 They would --

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. They have all that information.

4 Q. Had you -- have you ever had any concerns about the integrity
5 or the accuracy of the weather from the AWOS?

6 A. Not at -- no.

7 Q. Okay. It's just --

8 A. It's pretty accurate. Well, it's -- like I said, it's
9 shielded from the wind. If the wind is coming from behind
10 Ballyhoo, I would question it.

11 Q. Okay. So, under certain conditions, it may not --

12 A. Certain conditions.

13 Q. -- capture?

14 A. It may not be as -- and that's why we have a weather observer
15 down there because of their conditions that you can't -- didn't
16 feel comfortable with just AWOS information.

17 Q. All the times that you've flown down to Dutch Harbor, have --
18 has that weather observer been there?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. That was established -- it's been an established operation
21 for a while?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. We had -- yeah -- anyway, they -- long-time people, and they
25 live down there and understand -- they understand what's going on.

1 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all the questions I had. Thank
2 you.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Sathya.

4 Dujuan, any questions?

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

6 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

7 Q. How do you interface with the safety department? Do you have
8 any interface, as director of operations, with the safety
9 department?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And what does that look like? What's the -- what's your
12 interface with them?

13 A. I work with them on a daily basis.

14 Q. You do?

15 A. Any ASAP reports or anything like that comes through, I --

16 Q. Is it just ASAP reports, or is it also any safety reporting
17 within the company?

18 A. Everything in safety.

19 Q. And do you get a chance to look at any of the reports,
20 disposition them, have any insight on how that works?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. And what's the process that you -- you know, when you
23 look at them?

24 A. The safety department handles a thing, and then they run it
25 by me, and I have to sign off on what their mitigation is for the

1 issue. And then we have a long-term meeting afterwards to see if
2 it's reoccurred. And anyway, I deal with them on an everyday
3 basis.

4 Q. And is there a matrix or anything that the safety department
5 uses for categorizing different safety-related issues?

6 A. I'm sure there is. Yes.

7 Q. And is there -- when you look at these reports, are you just
8 looking at a certain aspect of them when you sign off on it, or
9 are you looking at the entire report?

10 A. I look at the entire report.

11 Q. Okay. Is there any communication with any other employees
12 when -- after you've signed off the report on -- when you say, "we
13 look at the mitigation," do you communicate that any way other
14 than your signature?

15 A. I work with Tony and, of course, Tiffany. And, if there's a
16 specific person that has done the ASAP, and I have a question,
17 I'll talk to them.

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. No further questions right now.
19 Thanks, Martin.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you, Dujuan.

21 Brandon, questions?

22 MR. WILSON: No, not now.

23 MR. FRANTZ: No? Okay.

24 Tony?

25 MR. FISCHER: I don't have anything at this time.

1 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I've got a few follow-ups, so we'll go
2 around one more time and see if anybody else has anything.

3 BY MR. FRANTZ:

4 Q. Since you've been the DO at PenAir this time, are you aware
5 of any pilots declining flights for any safety-related reason?
6 Has that happened since you've been DO this time?

7 A. Usually, the flight is declined before it gets to me. Like,
8 they have to -- the dispatch has canceled it, or the risk
9 assessment program has gotten that they're not going to take it
10 for whatever reason. And it doesn't even get to me. But --

11 Q. Is there -- sorry.

12 A. Go ahead.

13 Q. Is there a procedure that you would eventually become aware
14 of any flights that were declined by pilots though?

15 A. No.

16 Q. So you may not even know about -- if a pilot declined a
17 flight, and the flight was canceled, it might not ever even reach
18 your -- there's no formal process to brief you on or for you to
19 become aware of it?

20 A. No. There is -- and the way I do -- I get a delayed report
21 or a flight-canceled report. Every time a flight is canceled, I
22 get a report from dispatch that a flight has been canceled.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. That's about it. This comes in, I look at it, delete; next
25 one, delete --

1 Q. Would that have a reason why the flight was canceled?

2 A. Usually, yeah. It would say, weather, maintenance, whatever,
3 pilot declined.

4 Q. But you -- have you ever seen a pilot-declined --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- since you've been here this time?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. How many have you seen?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Okay. Is there ever any repercussions or consequences of a
11 pilot declining a flight?

12 A. Never.

13 Q. If I were to ask random PenAir pilots, would they say they're
14 100 percent comfortable with saying no to a flight and not worry
15 about their future with PenAir?

16 A. Ask away.

17 MR. HARDING: Brandon?

18 BY MR. FRANTZ:

19 Q. All right. With the -- is that any different than it was
20 when you were DO at the old PenAir?

21 A. No.

22 Q. When you're -- who's your boss right now at the new PenAir?

23 A. At new PenAir it's Brian Wilson -- or Brian Whilden.

24 Q. Okay. And who was your boss when -- at the old PenAir?

25 A. Danny Seybert.

1 Q. Who is the owner? Is he the owner, or is that the owner's
2 son?

3 A. Well, he was -- at the end, he was the owner. It's a kind
4 of --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Warren Seybert was the owner when I started, and he was owner
7 for many years. But anyway, it's a long, involved story there,
8 but I don't want to get into it. But anyway, it got transferred
9 to Danny, and Danny was then the owner. He was also the COO and
10 president.

11 Q. Okay. And you said you knew Brian at old PenAir?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. What was the nature of your relationship then?

14 A. I think he was the -- you know, I don't remember. But he
15 started on the line -- as a ramper on the line, and he worked his
16 way up, went through all of the different departments, and he
17 would have -- when they did the merger, they chose him to be
18 the president. And I don't think they could have possibly
19 picked anyone that was any better.

20 I'm glad they didn't use Danny Seybert, because I think Brian
21 is very competent and knowledgeable. And he's been around this
22 business for many years. He's been in all the different positions
23 and really understands it. And now I think he's just been
24 promoted to senior vice president of safety or some formal Corvus
25 group, which is a good choice.

1 Q. Okay. I want to talk about that counseling session you
2 talked about that involved Deke. Was it a -- was it at all
3 surprising to you that someone at Deke Abbott's level, senior
4 vice president, was involved in a basic -- or a generic counseling
5 of a line pilot who was maybe going to move up? I mean, is
6 that something that you would expect from that high a level to
7 be -- come down and become involved in that sort of issue?

8 A. I didn't have any expectance -- expectations one way or the
9 other. I was just starting in that position. Crystal was a chief
10 pilot just starting that position. So I guess I wasn't surprised
11 that somebody had got to his level and came down.

12 Q. It is --

13 A. He's a hands-on guy.

14 Q. Does he provide you now, in your position as DO -- does he
15 provide you with any guidance or direction on day-to-day, DO-type
16 responsibilities?

17 A. Day-to-day, no.

18 Q. Has Deke Abbott or Crystal or anyone associated with Ravn
19 that's now becoming part of PenAir, anyone ever talked about
20 reducing that -- changing or reducing that 300-hour minimum for
21 special airports?

22 A. Not that I know of, no.

23 Q. Has anybody talked about reducing or eliminating the 100-hour
24 waiver for that -- for special airports?

25 A. After the accident, we decided to --

1 Q. After the accident?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Is that in place now?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. That is gone?

6 A. We're not going to Dutch Harbor, but yes, it's in place.

7 Q. Well --

8 A. We've got a temporary revision for it.

9 Q. Okay. But, prior to the accident, no discussion about that
10 qualification requirement, 300/100? That was not under review or
11 discussion as far as you know, before?

12 A. Not to my knowledge, no. I would think that I would have
13 been involved if it were, and I was not involved and never heard
14 of it.

15 Q. Okay. At the old PenAir, you never worked for Brian? Did he
16 always work for you when you were a DO?

17 A. He worked for me. Now, I work for him.

18 Q. Right. Switched around.

19 A. Yeah, and I have no complaints.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think that's all I have for now, Dick.
21 We'll just make one more round and see if anybody has any
22 follow-ups.

23 DR. SILVA: Okay.

24 MR. FRANTZ: Sathya?

25 DR. SILVA: Just a few.

1 BY DR. SILVA:

2 Q. Who was the DO before you came back as DO?

3 A. Oh, they've been through several of them. There was a Matt
4 somebody. And then, when I came back, there was a temporary -- I
5 can't think of his name. Can I ask him?

6 MR. HARDING: What was his name?

7 DR. SILVA: It's okay. You can answer.

8 MR. WILSON: Was it Larry Bond?

9 MR. HARDING: No. He was -- Larry Bond was in there, but
10 I've never -- I didn't -- I never knew Larry Bond. And then,
11 after him, we had a pilot, Ben Nygren. That was the name I was
12 trying to think of.

13 DR. SILVA: Okay.

14 MR. HARDING: Ben was a temporary guy.

15 BY DR. SILVA:

16 Q. As DO?

17 A. As DO, yeah, until I took over.

18 Q. Got it.

19 A. I never knew Bond.

20 Q. Okay. Do you know why Bond left?

21 A. No idea.

22 Q. Okay. Have you ever heard any concerns about Deke Abbott's
23 involvement with PenAir?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Any concerns brought to you or even through the grapevine?

1 Have you heard anything about Crystal?

2 A. When I worked with her, I worked closely with her. And she
3 is very competent in what she did, and I depended a lot on her.
4 And I never heard any complaints from the pilots about her until
5 after she had been removed from that, and then I'd only heard that
6 she was -- can't think of the word -- abrupt. I can't -- I don't
7 know. Just terse. I don't know. But, anyway, I never heard
8 anything until after she'd left, and they said, well, she was
9 maybe a little rough on the pilots.

10 Q. What do you mean by "rough on pilots"? What was the
11 impression you got?

12 A. I don't know why. Just people come in and, after she had
13 gone, she was -- yeah, she's kind of -- but, you know, when you
14 take somebody out of a position and put them in a management
15 position, quite often they feel like they need to be the boss and
16 take kind of a straw boss attitude, I guess.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And that's the feeling that I got from the people that
19 complained. And nobody complained about her. Just had mentioned
20 that, yeah, she's a little --

21 Q. Were these from pilots?

22 A. Yeah. But nothing before that, and I don't think she -- I
23 don't think most of them were -- I mean, they were maybe being
24 very picky.

25 Q. Before she left, was there any avenue for pilots to voice any

1 concerns?

2 A. Yes. My door was open all the time.

3 Q. Okay. And, at least at the old pilots, I knew most of them
4 from before I left. And I don't think anybody ever had any
5 trouble coming into my office. Brandon was a new pilot from the
6 time I left, and he had no problem. He'd walk in whenever he had
7 a -- something he wanted to talk about.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. And I feel the same. There are some of them I still don't
10 even know their names, and they come in and talk and mostly just

11 B.S.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all my questions.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Sathya.

14 Dujuan, follow-up?

15 DR. SEVILLIAN: I don't have any follow-up questions at this
16 time.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Brandon?

18 MR. WILSON: No.

19 MR. FRANTZ: No?

20 Tony?

21 MR. FISCHER: Yeah. I got one -- one or two.

22 BY MR. FISCHER:

23 Q. Dick, were you involved in the hiring of Paul Wells?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Okay. Now, Paul Wells was hired as a captain, you know,

1 straight into the Saab captain is my understanding.

2 A. Okay. I guess so. Sounds like it.

3 Q. Did that happen before your tenure here or --

4 A. Right about the same time. I'm not sure of the timing. I'm
5 not sure when.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I remember the first time I met him. I met him, and he was
8 in ground school, and I had a talk with him.

9 Q. I see. Is it unusual to hire a captain right off the -- what
10 would be considered right off the street into --

11 A. Unusual? Probably not.

12 Q. No?

13 A. No. Not put him in the left seat. I mean, they would hire
14 him as a -- and put him in the right seat and do all the training
15 and everything. But, you know, if you've got -- find a highly
16 experienced captain -- and I understand Wells had, like, 20,000
17 hours and 14,000 -- over 14,000 in the Dash-8 or whatever it is.
18 So he is a very experienced guy and I think he would have -- good
19 choice for hiring, but he went through ground school. That's
20 where I met him. I don't know how much time he spent in the right
21 seat. I just -- I'm not sure. You probably know more about it
22 than I do, I'm sure.

23 MR. FISCHER: That's all I have.

24 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you, Tony.

25 MR. FISCHER: Uh-huh.

1 BY MR. FRANTZ:

2 Q. Who was the chief pilot when you came on as DO?

3 A. They were just -- Crystal was brought on about the same time
4 that I was, and I think Dennis Fisher was acting chief pilot at
5 that time. Is that right?

6 Q. I may have asked you this before, but did you know Crystal
7 previously?

8 A. No, I did not.

9 Q. All right. And were you involved in her hiring at all?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Were you involved in her departure?

12 A. I didn't sit in on the meeting where they decided that, but
13 I'd say no.

14 Q. Was she asked to resign?

15 A. I don't know. You'd have to ask Brian. I assume so, but --

16 Q. Did anyone consult you about whether she should remain or
17 not --

18 A. No.

19 Q. -- when she left?

20 A. No.

21 Q. If they had, what would you have said?

22 A. I'd have said she'd have to go.

23 Q. Do you know who made the decision to ask for her resignation
24 or --

25 A. No.

1 Q. You don't know who made that decision?

2 A. I assume Brian did, but I don't know.

3 Q. Do you know if there was anyone from -- well, okay.

4 MR. FRANTZ: I think that's all I have.

5 MR. HARDING: There was no one. No one at all.

6 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah. I think Sathya had one --

7 DR. SILVA: Yeah. I had one more.

8 MR. FRANTZ: -- more follow-up.

9 BY DR. SILVA:

10 Q. You mentioned that you would have recommended that she leave
11 if you were asked. Why is that?

12 A. Well, for regulatory reasons, she didn't fill out a, she
13 didn't fill out a paper. He didn't have the qualification at that
14 time when she recommended him. She went directly to our records
15 administrator and told her that, if he was not qualified, to put
16 him on the SkedFlex but didn't have the paperwork to go with it.

17 He didn't have the -- she apparently didn't research to see
18 that he had his 100 hours, and he did have the hundred hours when
19 he had the accident, but he didn't have it when she signed the
20 paper. So I think that was just -- can't do stuff like that.

21 Q. From your understanding, was that an oversight, or do you
22 think that, that was intentional?

23 A. Oversight. I'm sure she wouldn't have done it if she'd have
24 realized. And that's -- and I don't know what her experience was
25 at Ravn, but I assume that she was -- she knew Paul before coming

1 over, and that probably -- I'm just making an assumption. You
2 know, they probably had some of her little -- some input into her
3 decision to, you know, to sign him off. She knew that was -- he
4 was a highly-experienced pilot. But I -- you know, I'm just
5 supposing there. So --

6 Q. What's your --

7 A. But she definitely did not do it intentionally.

8 Q. Okay. What's your interaction with the FAA?

9 A. My interaction?

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. I get along with them.

12 Q. Okay. Who are -- who do you work with?

13 A. Pardon me?

14 Q. Who do you work with primarily?

15 A. Pat.

16 Q. Okay. Did you have a change in POI?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Who was it before Pat?

19 A. It was a Fitzpatrick.

20 Q. Okay. Has there been any changes in terms of how that
21 interaction is between the two?

22 A. Not really, no.

23 Q. Do you feel like Pat has a good grasp of PenAir operations?

24 A. He seems to. Yes.

25 Q. How often would you say you interact with him?

1 A. Every other day.

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. Three, four times a week.

4 DR. SILVA: That's really it, now.

5 MR. HARDING: That's really it. Put a lid on that one.

6 DR. SILVA: Unless someone else wants to pipe up here.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Dick. Anything we didn't ask you

8 about that you think we should have about this investigation of

9 this accident?

10 MR. HARDING: No. You're very thorough.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Is there anything/anyone that you think we
12 should talk to? I mean, we have done lots of interviews, and I
13 know you don't know who we've interviewed, but are there any names
14 that you think would be important for us to speak with?

15 MR. HARDING: The people that I know that you've interviewed
16 have all been people I would have recommended.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Anything to add?

18 MR. HARDING: No. No addition. No.

19 MR. FRANTZ: No? Okay. I think we're finished. We can go
20 off the record.

21 (Whereupon, at 1:41 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Richard Harding

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 4, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Betty Caudle
Official Reporter



Traci Leeper
Transcriber



Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/16/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: DAVID FIACCO
Manager of Flight Safety, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Tuesday,
December 3, 2019

APPEARANCES:

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Fiacco)

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of David Fiacco:	
By Dr. Silva	6
By Mr. Frantz	19
By Dr. Sevillian	28
By Mr. Wilson	31
By Dr. Silva	31
By Mr. Frantz	36
By Mr. Fischer	38
By Dr. Silva	39
By Mr. Frantz	40
By Dr. Silva	41

I N T E R V I E W

(12:35 p.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: Thank you for agreeing to talk to us. As I
4 mentioned, I'm Sathya Silva; I'm a human performance investigator
5 with the NTSB. Got a few people in the room today, and we're
6 going to go around and do introductions so you'll know who you're
7 talking to, but essentially what you're seeing is a result of our
8 party system at the NTSB.

9 So while we at the NTSB are experts in investigating, we rely
10 on the rest of the industry and the other parties involved in
11 order to bring the industry expertise, so that's usually why we
12 have an operator representative and an FAA representative,
13 sometimes the manufacturer, things like that. So -- oh, let's go
14 around the room now so you can get a feel for names to faces.

15 Marvin.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Marvin Frantz, I'm an operational factors
17 investigator with the NTSB.

18 DR. SILVA: Dajuan.

19 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan Sevillian, human performance
20 investigator, NTSB.

21 DR. SILVA: Tony.

22 MR. FISCHER: David, Tony Fischer, aviation safety
23 inspector --

24 DR. SILVA: And Brandon.

25 MR. WILSON: Good morning, Dave. Brandon, check airman.

1 DR. SILVA: And I will mention the FAA's role here is purely
2 safety. When they are part of our investigations, they cannot use
3 any of this information for enforcement action; it's a hundred
4 percent safety. That said, our goal here is safety, so we're not
5 here to assign blame, liability, any of those sorts. We really
6 just want to prevent this from happening again.

7 What will happen with this recording is it will get
8 transcribed, and a copy of that transcript will become part of our
9 public docket usually a year to -- sorry, yes, it's almost a year
10 from now, once we release the factual information.

11 You are the expert here; we want to learn from you, so there
12 are no right or wrong answers. Try and answer to the best of your
13 recollection. If you don't understand a question, feel free to
14 ask for clarification. I don't know, again, is a perfectly good
15 answer. Let us know if you have any -- if you need any breaks,
16 too.

17 MR. FIACCO: Okay.

18 DR. SILVA: Okay. You are entitled to a representative
19 today. Would you like to have someone sit with you?

20 MR. FIACCO: Mr. Campbell.

21 DR. SILVA: All right. So I will start out with a handful of
22 questions, and then we'll go around our table, usually twice to
23 make sure everyone's got their questions asked, and then I'll turn
24 it over to you to see if you have anything else you want to add.
25 Sound good?

1 MR. FIACCO: Sounds good.

2 DR. SILVA: Any questions before we start?

3 MR. FIACCO: Not yet.

4 INTERVIEW OF DAVID FIACCO

5 BY DR. SILVA:

6 Q. All right, can you state and spell your full name for us,
7 please?

8 A. David Fiacco, D-a-v-i-d, F-i-a-c-c-o.

9 Q. All right. Can you run through CliffsNotes version of your
10 aviation history from when you started flying to where you -- your
11 position now?

12 A. Sure. I started flying when I was 18, and I had all of my
13 commercial instruments, CFI, at age 21. At that point, I changed
14 interests and I kind of flew, like, once or twice a month rented
15 airplanes for a while. And when I moved up here, I thought I
16 might want to do some flight instructing so that I could see the
17 state for free.

18 Q. Um-hmm.

19 A. And when I was flight instructing, I happened to lose my job,
20 and one of my students was a flight attendant here, said I should
21 apply, and I thought I'd give it a shot.

22 Q. When did you start at PenAir?

23 A. 2006.

24 Q. Okay. What different roles have you held within the company
25 since then?

1 A. Well, I started as a first officer, and in 2011, I started
2 working as the manager of flight safety when the internal
3 evaluation program started.

4 Q. That was in 2011?

5 A. That was 2011.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And then in late 2013, I was assistant director of operations
8 and then, in 2017, I went part-time to my current title of manager
9 of flight safety.

10 Q. Um-hmm. So you're part-time currently?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you hold any other roles within the company --

13 A. No.

14 Q. -- currently?

15 A. No.

16 Q. You're not flying?

17 A. No.

18 Q. What aircraft are you rated in?

19 A. I have a type rating in the Saab 340 and Lear jet.

20 Q. Do you have any time in the Saab 2000?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Um-hmm. About how many hours do you have total?

23 A. 7,500 or so.

24 Q. Um-hmm. So you mentioned that you're part-time in your
25 current position here as manager of flight safety. Is there

1 anyone -- is that a part-time responsibility as a job, or is
2 someone else sharing those responsibilities with you?

3 A. So, well, I think the merger kind of mixed it.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. So there is a manager of flight safety at Ravn, and there was
6 before, so he has his duties, and primarily, I'm just doing flight
7 auditing.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I just do audits of the flight operations department.

10 Q. Currently?

11 A. Yeah. And then special projects. If I have time, they'll
12 assign me things.

13 Q. Okay. So you're starting with this, so we'll just continue
14 the question which is, describe your roles and responsibilities as
15 manager of flight safety.

16 A. For the most part, auditing of any, any division of flight
17 operations, so I do audit flights, flight operations. I audit
18 pilot records, crew scheduling, dispatch, operational control.

19 Q. Um-hmm.

20 A. And that's primarily my responsibilities.

21 Q. What kind of special projects come up that you've been
22 involved with?

23 A. Well, with the recent accidents, we are redoing some things
24 for the manuals, writing the manuals, rewriting portions of the
25 manuals, that sort of thing. About a year and a half ago we were

1 introducing a pay module through SkedFlex, and so I worked with
2 developers at SkedFlex to get the pay module working the way that
3 we wanted it to.

4 Q. Um-hmm. You mentioned manual changes since the accident.
5 What kind of changes are in the -- in process?

6 A. I think we are removing, removing an exception to the
7 qualification, we're adding some -- creating, like, a pilot
8 airport guide. There's some -- maybe some missing information in
9 the aircraft performance section. Can't really remember what
10 else. And then also trying to merge that with the RC3 manuals --

11 Q. Um-hmm.

12 A. -- for Ravn and where it will fit in and how it will fit in.

13 Q. All right. You mentioned that the aircraft performance
14 section might be missing a few things. What's the --

15 A. So missing a few things is probably the wrong terminology as
16 much as -- so there's a performance binder which has all the
17 information in it, and there's just something that was in the 340
18 manual that had a few steps in it that wasn't in the 2000 manual.
19 The 2000 manual just referred you somewhere and it didn't have the
20 actual steps.

21 Q. What are the steps? They're just steps on how to read the
22 chart?

23 A. Yeah, basically.

24 Q. Okay. Okay, so you're putting that into their performance
25 manual?

1 A. Possibly. I mean, it's currently -- yeah, editing.

2 Q. You're evaluating that --

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. -- on it. What is this pilot airport guide?

5 A. So when I first started here, there was a -- this little
6 booklet on Dutch Harbor, and it had all kinds of different -- all
7 the different landmarks that Dutch Harbor -- that is necessary for
8 flying down in Dutch Harbor. It named them all, told you how far,
9 you know, so if a -- so if the weather observer in Dutch Harbor
10 said they could see Split Top, it told you how far Split Top was
11 from the airport, and it had all those different landmarks with
12 mileage.

13 It would tell you where you would get sinkers and floaters
14 depending on the wind direction, and it would kind of give you a
15 profile for what altitude you should be at depending on where you
16 were, you know, in relationship to the airport and in base leg,
17 down range, that sort of thing. And that was -- that information
18 kind of, with the pilots -- every pilot used to have it and carry
19 it with them. It's kind of like a, kind of like a work aid, job
20 aid, but it wasn't ever an official document.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And so it kind of -- because it wasn't an official document,
23 once we started going to having everything official, it kind of
24 just went by the wayside, sort of, and so we'd like to kind of
25 make it an official document --

1 Q. Um-hmm.

2 A. -- you know, that can be used and edited, if necessary, and
3 controlled by the company.

4 Q. Um-hmm. When was it that things started to become official,
5 that, that -- what year-ish time frame are we looking at?

6 A. Oh, so in 2013, we rewrote the manuals and when -- at that
7 point, the 135 portion of the business went away for passenger
8 carrying, so it had cargo for a few more years.

9 Q. Okay. And you mentioned you're evaluating removing an
10 exception to the airport -- the special airports qualification, is
11 that correct?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. What exception is that?

14 A. The section for the hundred hours.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. For having less than the 300 hours.

17 Q. Um-hmm. So how does that process work? How do things get
18 onto your desk?

19 A. Somebody just asks me.

20 Q. Who usually asks you? Where does that come from?

21 A. It could be Kirk Watson, it could be Dennis Fisher,
22 Brian Whilden.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Tony Santiago.

25 Q. Okay. Have you evaluated a potential change to the -- other

1 potential changes to that airport qualification sheet?

2 A. We have thought about other changes, yeah, we're
3 contemplating several.

4 Q. Can you describe what those are?

5 A. Well, I believe that Ravn has a certain qualification for 300
6 and 300, so either seat could have 300 hours and they can go to
7 special airports. Also, I kind of want to say it isn't
8 necessarily just special airports, I mean, our -- the
9 qualifications for PenAir was for what the company considered to
10 be special airports, not just what the FAA considers to be a
11 special airport, so it was a Southwest company designated airport
12 qualification and it included St. George, which we no longer go
13 to, but that is no longer an actual special airport for the FAA.

14 Q. Um-hmm.

15 A. So it wasn't just for FAA-designated special airports; it was
16 a company qualification and it just so happened that Dutch Harbor
17 and Sand Point are FAA special airports. So we're contemplating
18 the change possibly to the Ravn way, possibly adding some --
19 something other than a minimum hour of qualification, those sorts
20 of things.

21 Q. So prior to the accident, were there any changes in the works
22 for airport qualification?

23 A. So I believe that in discussions for merging the manuals,
24 that they -- that Ravn did want to do 300 -- go with their
25 300-hour for either seat.

1 Q. Okay. Have you done any kind of evaluation on that change or
2 do you know where that was in the process?

3 A. I don't think there was like a -- I don't necessarily believe
4 there's an evaluation of it.

5 Q. Okay. Would there be an evaluation -- is that something you
6 would expect, an evaluation --

7 A. Well, I mean, I guess to say no evaluation is kind of just --
8 I mean, I think the -- that they're looking at two manual systems
9 and saying we're going to keep the Ravn system.

10 Q. Okay. And that -- so --

11 A. And so the evaluation was that the Ravn is good enough if you
12 want to do that system.

13 Q. So how does the Ravn system differ from the PenAir system?

14 A. So it's 300 hours in either seat, so that would mean a --
15 that a PIC -- a captain with only 50 hours as a PIC could fly to
16 those airports if -- as long as the first officer had over 300
17 hours --

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. -- in that seat --

20 Q. I see.

21 A. -- in that airplane. Whereas PenAir, it's the PIC. There
22 isn't any SIC qualification. The PIC has to have the 300 hours.

23 Q. Um-hmm. Is there an exception for that 300 hours?

24 A. The hundred hours, having 100 hours and a letter from the
25 chief pilot and check airman, I believe.

1 Q. So in your auditing role, have you ever done an audit on
2 airport qualification and documentation?

3 A. Yeah, I mean, that's part of a normal audit.

4 Q. All right. What do you look for when you're evaluating that?

5 A. Well, I would look for to make sure that person was
6 qualified, you know, if I'm going through somebody's -- it would
7 be during the pilot records audit, and if I saw -- for the most
8 part, I go through, I look in their file; if they have the
9 qualification, I would make sure that they had the prerequisites
10 before they were given the qualification.

11 Q. Um-hmm.

12 A. I would try to make sure that the date on the form is matched
13 on the date in SkedFlex for giving -- being given the
14 qualification.

15 Q. Okay. When do you typically do those kinds of audits? Is
16 that on a schedule?

17 A. Pilot records is every 6 months.

18 Q. Every 6 months. When was the last time you had one?

19 A. Over the summer.

20 Q. Do you recall when in the summer?

21 A. Either --

22 Q. Late, early?

23 A. Let's see, 6 is, 6 is June, so June or August.

24 Q. June, okay. June or August?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Early or late, okay. So from your understanding of the
2 airport qualification, when is it that special airports training
3 should start with respect to pilot experience?

4 A. When should -- I'm not sure what you're --

5 Q. When should the special airport training begin?

6 A. Begin? I mean, the special airport training should begin in
7 ground school, I believe.

8 Q. Okay. Is there, in terms of qualification -- you mentioned
9 the 300 hours. Is the procedure to start training after 300 hours
10 in that special airport? Is that 300 hours really, like, a
11 milestone for pilots?

12 A. So I think that -- oh, so one of the other changes that we're
13 making is through the upgrade qualification where the person would
14 need 500 hours in the -- as SIC in the plane before --

15 Q. Right.

16 A. -- before they upgraded, and that was, that was a
17 qualification prior to 2015. And so I think the idea is that a
18 person who flies here starts out as an SIC, they're going to be
19 going to those special airports on a fairly regular basis, so
20 their training starts as first officers --

21 Q. Um-hmm.

22 A. -- and they're flying with an experienced captain who is
23 basically teaching them all the different things. For example,
24 the pilot guide or airport guide that I had mentioned, you know,
25 that would be something that a captain would be talking to a first

1 officer about, you know, constantly. Okay, so you broke out,
2 that's Priest Rock, that's second Priest Rock, that's Captain's
3 Bay.

4 So teaching would start -- you know, not a formal mentoring
5 program, but certainly, certainly an expected mentoring program,
6 you know, and then when the SIC, you know, has enough experience
7 and his time is up and upgrades, then he would have seen both of
8 those airports, or all three of those airports when we had St.
9 George. You know, a lot of hours, you know, prior to being
10 upgraded to captain.

11 And then, once they're upgraded to captain, the 300 hours is
12 just to, you know, get them used to doing the things that they
13 have to do as responsible captains. You know, we don't want to go
14 sending them to a higher-risk airport while they're still getting
15 used to their duties as a PIC, so -- just because they're
16 high-risk airports, and so you don't want them -- you don't want
17 to have to be thinking about it necessarily.

18 Q. So you mentioned the transition between first officer flying
19 into the special airports --

20 A. Um-hmm.

21 Q. -- and transitioning into the seat. What about street
22 captains that are hired?

23 A. So I don't know of any. So the only group of street captains
24 that I believe we've hired were for our Boston base several years
25 ago.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Oh, and Brandon.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. But I believe Brandon was -- he was here prior and then came
5 back.

6 Q. Um-hmm. Okay, so --

7 A. And we don't -- I think -- so we do have a path for a captain
8 to come in off the street and be trained, but it's not necessarily
9 -- that's one of the other things we're writing, is to make sure
10 that people have 500 hours as an SIC.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And so if they're hired as a street captain, they still have
13 to fly 500 hours as an SIC, you know, prior to moving over to the
14 left seat.

15 Q. Right, but at the time of the accident, you didn't have that
16 policy, correct?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Okay. So I just want to make sure I'm clear on the
19 requirement itself. The check that's done for the special
20 airport --

21 A. Um-hmm.

22 Q. -- does that have to happen after the 100 hours or the
23 300-hour requirement?

24 A. Yes. I mean, it is supposed to.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I mean, that's a prerequisite, you know.

2 Q. Um-hmm.

3 A. In the FOTM, it calls it a prerequisite, and then I don't
4 know the exact verbiage in the GOM, but it certainly says that,
5 once qualified, they will then go on a ride, so a person isn't
6 supposed to get checked out until they've met the qualification.

7 Q. Um-hmm. Have you seen documentation for anyone who has flown
8 with that waiver, the hundred-hour waiver?

9 A. I haven't seen any documentation of somebody who's flown with
10 the waiver.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. You're talking like the letters and --

13 Q. Or just anyone, just anyone who would fall into that
14 category.

15 A. I mean, Paul didn't fall into the category --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- but he got the qualification.

18 Q. So why do you think that happened with Paul?

19 A. Well, I think -- honestly, I don't know.

20 Q. Would that be something that, in your position, you would
21 have caught or been ready to catch?

22 A. So as part of the pilot records audit, we do not audit every
23 single file --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- you know, so if I happen to pull Paul's file when I was

1 doing an audit, then I would probably catch it.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. So we basically -- I mean, I'd have to look at the audit
4 checklist, but when doing an audit, we pick a certain percentage
5 of total files, you know, and then -- from the regular pilot
6 group, then we pick a couple of check airmen, and so it's not, not
7 in every single file folder.

8 Q. Okay. So along those lines, have you ever seen a letter of
9 recommendation within the pilot files on --

10 A. I have never seen a letter of recommendation.

11 Q. Um-hmm. So from your understanding, was Paul the only pilot
12 that -- or the only captain that got qualified with less than 300
13 hours?

14 A. So I don't know. As far as I know, he would be the only one.

15 Q. Okay. All right, I'm going to pause here. Dave, do you need
16 a break?

17 A. No.

18 DR. SILVA: Okay, Marvin?

19 BY MR. FRANTZ:

20 Q. Okay, thanks. David, you said you're part-time flight --
21 manager of flight safety now.

22 A. Um-hmm.

23 Q. Was there a time when you were full-time manager of flight
24 safety?

25 A. When I first started in 2011 until 2013.

1 Q. Okay. And then 2013, you were assistant DO?

2 A. Um-hmm.

3 Q. And then 2017 is when you came back to manager of flight
4 safety. Did you come back as part-time even back in 2017?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And so that was prior to the Ravn/PenAir bankruptcy, right?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. So why were you -- why was it a part-time position in 2017?

9 A. I had some disagreements with the flight operations
10 management team.

11 Q. So that's what -- that's why -- was it your choice to come as
12 part-time?

13 A. I had originally planned to go back to the flight line here,
14 but I had some other personal things going on, so I had decided to
15 take another flying job where I wouldn't have to fly as much as I
16 would've flown here.

17 When I was planning on going back to the flight line, Brian
18 Whilden asked if I was willing to give him 40 hours a month in the
19 safety department as a flight auditor and helping out with special
20 projects, and so when I had decided to leave the company to fly
21 elsewhere, you know, I asked him, hey, do you still want me --
22 still want 40 hours a months from -- out of me, you know, as a
23 part-time employee, and he accepted, and so --

24 Q. Okay. So has PenAir -- that position of manager of flight
25 safety has only been filled part-time since 2017 and that's by

1 you?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Okay. No one else was doing whatever the manager of -- the
4 duties of manager of flight safety, no one else was doing those?

5 A. So I'm not sure what it says in there for duties. I think it
6 has some things in there that probably I was actually not
7 responsible for.

8 Q. Okay. So you said you've only seen one person use that
9 100-hour waiver and that's Paul?

10 A. Well, I mean --

11 Q. To the best of your knowledge is --

12 A. -- he didn't use the waiver. I mean, he didn't -- I mean,
13 there was none -- there wasn't even a waiver.

14 Q. Meaning there was no --

15 A. He didn't meet any of the qualifications.

16 Q. By any of them, you mean of the -- he didn't meet the 100/300
17 or --

18 A. Right. He didn't meet either one of the prerequisites.

19 Q. Did he get the training? Did he have the checkout or the
20 qualification --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- flight with a check airman?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did the check airman sign something saying he's good to go
25 for Dutch Harbor?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. Did the check airman -- would the check airman have
3 had any visibility into how many hours Paul had as PIC when he
4 signed that?

5 A. I don't know.

6 Q. Okay. Have you audited Paul's flight records since the
7 accident?

8 A. I have -- yeah, I reviewed the qualification when it was
9 entered into SkedFlex, the day it was signed.

10 Q. And so how did you determine that he didn't meet the 100-hour
11 requirement?

12 A. Because the form was signed prior to his completion of OE.

13 Q. By -- the form that says special --

14 A. The airport qualification form.

15 Q. Was signed prior to his completion of OE?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And who signed that form?

18 A. That I don't -- can't remember.

19 Q. Okay. Do you know if he -- did he make any actual flights
20 into Dutch Harbor as PIC before he had a hundred hours as PIC with
21 the company?

22 A. I don't believe he had a hundred hours prior to the day of
23 the incident, and I believe he'd been to Dutch Harbor prior to
24 that, though, as PIC, but I'm not -- I would have to look.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. It would be easy to find. I can look it up if you want.

2 Q. This 300/100 has been in place at PenAir for how long, as far
3 as you know?

4 A. So the 300-hour was informal up until 2015; 2015 was the
5 first time that it was put into the manual system.

6 Q. The 300?

7 A. The 300. And then, at the time, the exceptions were written
8 because of the -- we were going to have a whole brand new cadre of
9 Saab 2000 pilots who needed to be able to go to Dutch Harbor, and
10 so that's where the exceptions came in, so --

11 Q. By exceptions, you mean the hundred-hour waiver option or --

12 A. Not the hundred-hour waiver option, but the -- you know,
13 prior to May, whatever, 2015, anybody who would make a couple of
14 landings, so that basically qualified all of our captains that
15 were transitioning from a Saab 340 to the Saab 2000. As far as
16 the 100-hour, I'm not sure where that came from; I don't actually
17 recall.

18 Q. Or you don't know when -- you don't recall when it became --

19 A. It went into the manual at the same time, May of 2015.

20 Q. And what was going on in May of 2015 that necessitated the
21 earlier transition?

22 A. The transition to the 2000.

23 Q. The transition to the 2000?

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Okay. How did that happen, the transition? Did you bring on

1 all five planes at once? Was it one plane a month?

2 A. No, I don't recall how many planes it was.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. It wasn't all five.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. It was maybe one or two, but I don't recall exactly.

7 Q. Yeah, okay. So as far as, you know, the -- what was -- can
8 you just outline for me the discrepancies in the qualification --
9 the special airport qualification process for Paul, what, what
10 didn't get done or what was wrong with the process in his case,
11 from your point of view?

12 A. That they were making -- Ravn was making an argument that
13 they should have the 300/300, that, that wasn't even adhered to,
14 and they were making an argument that he's going to be the
15 commander of flight standards, that he has a ton of hours, that
16 he's been there in the past for Ravn in the Dash-8 and that, that
17 person should be qualified -- that a person like that should be
18 qualified.

19 Q. Was the argument made that, that should happen even before
20 they reached the hundred-hour number?

21 A. Oh, yeah. Yes.

22 Q. So would you say it was an intentional decision on the part
23 of someone, somewhere, some group at PenAir to allow Paul to fly
24 to Dutch Harbor as PIC in violation of that particular
25 qualification standard?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Where do you think that decision came from?

3 A. Well, from talking with Crystal, she basically said she was
4 getting told by Deke Abbott to -- you know, to not hold those
5 restrictions, that a pilot with those qualifications should be
6 able to go.

7 Q. Did you ever talk with Paul about that at all? Did you ever
8 have a conversation with him about qualification for special
9 airport?

10 A. Never about the qualifications.

11 Q. Okay. Let me switch over to Dutch Harbor a little bit. You
12 flew the 340 here for quite a while, so do you have --

13 A. Yeah, about 5,500 hours.

14 Q. Do you have lots of time or lots of trips to Dutch Harbor?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay. What are the threats or dangers or concerns about
17 Dutch Harbor that you think make it an airport that you need
18 special qualifications for?

19 A. Short runway, mountainous terrain, windy, changing -- rapidly
20 changing weather, especially in the wintertime. Tricky winds. I
21 think a common indicator on weather is black water all quadrants,
22 williwaws, shifting winds rapidly. My very first day of the OE, I
23 believe it was 35 gusting 45 out of the northwest when we left
24 here, and when we got there, it was 35 gusting 45 out of the
25 southwest -- southeast, so it turned 180 degrees within our 2

1 hours and 50 minute trip down.

2 Q. When you were flying, did you use Dutch weather as your
3 primary source of weather?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. The station operator there at Dutch weather?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. What do you think about that, the product they provide, the
8 weather service --

9 A. Oh, I think they're amazingly knowledgeable, and they work
10 with the pilots directly for the most part. I think one of the
11 relationships that a PIC has to cultivate is a relationship with
12 that weather observer, and I believe that's one of the things
13 that, you know, the SIC kind of learns from the PICs, that is
14 cultivating that relationship with the weather observer just to
15 know -- you know, because they all have their kind of
16 idiosyncrasies, differences in the way that they -- where they
17 look. I mean, generally the same but, you know, whether it's best
18 to come over town or, you know, what's happening where.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. So that's definitely a relationship that's cultivated.

21 Q. Okay. Is there a preferred runway at Dutch Harbor, slash
22 approach?

23 A. Whichever one of the runways the weather is -- the winds are
24 favoring.

25 Q. Winds are calm, is there a preferred runway?

1 A. So I'm not as qualified as some; it's been a very long time
2 since I've flown on a regular basis so, I mean, if the winds are
3 really calm, you know, it really depends on what the winds are
4 doing outside because of where the -- whether the wind observer is
5 at the bottom base of the mountain, so it could be calm at the
6 airport and could be howling outside, you know --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- but there's probably a couple of check airmen who could
9 give some really good detailed --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- information on that.

12 Q. Did you ever land at Dutch Harbor with a tailwind?

13 A. I don't recall ever landing there with a tailwind.

14 Q. Did you ever miss an approach at Dutch Harbor?

15 A. Sure. Um-hmm.

16 Q. Did you ever do a -- have a go-around when you were visual?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you recall what that was for?

19 A. Eagles.

20 Q. Okay. And so if you do a go-around, what's the general
21 pattern you're going to fly if you want to just -- if you go
22 around but you want to return for the same runway?

23 A. Up to the PIC. I don't think there is a standard. I mean,
24 the traffic pattern is around the mountain.

25 Q. Okay. What about if you do a go-around, and then you decide

1 you want to return for the opposite runway? Is there any standard
2 pattern or specific guidance a PIC would have and how to get
3 turned around to come back -- assuming it's visual, to come back
4 to the opposite runway, or is it just maneuvering as he needs to?

5 A. Yeah, I think it would be maneuvering as he needs to, but --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- I mean, that would be something that, you know, a PIC
8 would brief.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah. Okay, I'm going to take a break for now,
10 thanks.

11 DR. SILVA: Dujuan.

12 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

13 Q. Thanks, Sathya. How do you manage risks, hazards, with
14 respect to flight, flight safety?

15 A. So as the manager of flight safety?

16 Q. As the -- um-hmm.

17 A. So I'm not -- that would not actually be part of my job
18 description, I mean, that's -- so I kind of audit with flight ops
19 department their policies and procedures that they've put in
20 place.

21 Q. Um-hmm.

22 A. So they're the ones that are kind of in charge of the risk
23 assessment and risk analysis, so they would be in charge of that,
24 and then I would just kind of check it, you know, to see if it's
25 -- their controls are working properly.

1 Q. All right. When you audit, you check for controls and make
2 sure everything is operating properly. Have you ever noticed any
3 issues with procedures, policies, anything like that, as you go
4 through your audit?

5 A. Yeah, I mean, sure.

6 Q. And what were those issues related to?

7 A. I would have to look at some past audits, you know, I mean,
8 it's varied. You know, pilot records, we've had some, you know,
9 missing, missing sign-offs, wrong dates, not matching SkedFlex to
10 the paperwork. You know, it's -- yeah, I would have to look at
11 some past audits to really get a good feel.

12 Q. And when you see those, what's the communication chain when
13 you locate it, you know, you're going through your sample and you
14 find this?

15 A. Sure. So basically, we -- the audit process starts with, we
16 have to give them 2 weeks' notice, so we send an audit letter
17 saying hey, we're going to be auditing this division, you know, on
18 -- within these dates. This is the scope of the audit; this is
19 what we're going to be looking at.

20 And then, then I would do the audit, and then we have a
21 couple of forms. I would do an audit write-up with any findings
22 and also any observations if there is something that wasn't
23 necessarily a policy or a regulatory -- something that I just kind
24 of noticed, I would try -- that would be an observation. And that
25 would go to the responsible party along with the corrective action

1 plan that they needed to fill out, the corrective action plan,
2 within a certain timeframe.

3 Q. Right. And for the information that you notice that's
4 regulatory --

5 A. Um-hmm.

6 Q. -- is there a -- do you look at that and you say, well, this
7 particular regulation is being violated by the -- by inputted
8 information, for example, sign-offs, et cetera. Do you talk about
9 that as it relates to the FAA?

10 A. So I believe if we had something that I found that was
11 regulatory, there would most likely be a VDRP included with it.
12 Or that would be up -- it would be up to the DO whether or not he
13 wanted to do a VDRP on that, and he normally would since we've
14 been involved in that program.

15 Q. And the VDRP is a voluntary disclosure reporting process?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Okay, so that, that's consistent with the director of
18 operations has the authority to, to go through that process.

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. And does he or she receive input from you as far as your
21 thoughts on disclosing information?

22 A. On whether or not he should disclose it?

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. No, I mean, it wouldn't be up to me.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I mean, the director of safety, sure.

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right, that's all the questions I
3 have for now.

4 MR. FIACCO: Sure.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks.

6 DR. SILVA: Tony?

7 MR. FISCHER: I don't have anything.

8 DR. SILVA: Brandon?

9 BY MR. WILSON:

10 Q. I just missed something he said. When was that hundred hour
11 waiver added to the manuals?

12 A. May of 2015.

13 MR. WILSON: Okay. That's all I have.

14 BY DR. SILVA:

15 Q. Just wanted to follow up on a few, few things you mentioned.
16 You said that you spoke with Crystal about the lowering of
17 qualifications.

18 A. Um-hmm.

19 Q. And she was getting input from Deke. What was your
20 impression of how Crystal felt about that?

21 A. I think that, I mean, she felt that it was okay.

22 Q. Um-hmm. Who do you report to?

23 A. Tony Santiago.

24 Q. You report to Tony, okay. How is that relationship?

25 A. Good. I've been working with Tony since we created the IAP

1 back in 2011.

2 Q. How would you describe the safety culture here?

3 A. Now, before?

4 Q. At the time of the accident, so just prior to the accident.

5 A. Just prior. I think that other people would have a better
6 answer, the people that are flying on a daily basis. I'm not
7 really involved in the daily operation as much as I was, so I
8 would only be giving you secondhand.

9 Q. Okay. Well, based on your interactions with other people in
10 the company, how would you classify morale about that same time?

11 A. I think morale at that time was, what's going on with the
12 merger --

13 Q. Um-hmm.

14 A. -- you know, and I think that most people thought the safety
15 had gone down for some of those reasons. And I guess I would have
16 to check, but you mentioned if anybody else had gotten the waiver,
17 I think possibly Crystal.

18 Q. Oh, okay.

19 A. So, because I know she was flying down there. I'm not sure
20 if she actually ever got it, so --

21 Q. I see.

22 A. Not positive.

23 Q. Um-hmm. You mentioned that -- sorry. Okay, you mentioned
24 that, when you came on part-time, you had some disagreements with
25 the flight ops management team. Can you elaborate on that?

1 A. I only have 2 hours. So before I worked in aviation, I
2 managed places, and I just felt that there was things that I
3 wanted to do that, you know, I was the only person that wanted to
4 do them, and I just don't -- you know, I don't understand the
5 airline system --

6 Q. Um-hmm.

7 A. -- airline management structure, I guess, because their idea
8 of management was different than mine.

9 Q. What kind of stuff did you want to do that wasn't necessarily
10 being heard by the company?

11 A. I just wanted the people in charge to have knowledge of
12 things.

13 Q. I'm sorry, say that again?

14 A. To know how to do things.

15 Q. Oh, okay.

16 A. To know how to do certain things.

17 Q. Okay. So it was management style differences or -- is that a
18 fair way of --

19 A. Sure. That would be a fair way of saying it.

20 Q. When you said with flight ops management, who would that
21 entail?

22 A. The DO and chief pilot.

23 Q. Okay. But you don't report to them from what I understand,
24 right? You don't report to them.

25 A. Not right now. I did as assistant DO.

1 Q. As assistant DO. Okay, I understand.

2 A. So I was flight ops management.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. And then --

5 Q. Okay. Okay, so that was part of why you left that position?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Okay, I understand now. Going back to your experience flying
8 into Dutch Harbor, how do you -- what source of information do you
9 use for weather going in?

10 A. The weather observer.

11 Q. Are there any circumstances where you would use the AWOS?

12 A. Not that I can recall, I mean, other than just to listen to
13 it, to hear what it says, you know, but I mean, as I recall -- I
14 haven't, I haven't been there in a while, so --

15 Q. Um-hmm.

16 A. -- I mean, as I recall, you couldn't even get it until really
17 close in, anyway. Couldn't see it.

18 Q. So -- okay. Was -- is there -- from your understanding, why
19 is there a preference to use Dutch weather over the automated
20 reporting?

21 A. Just because they're going to give you those types of -- the
22 information that you need to make a better decision.

23 Q. Um-hmm. Can you give me some examples of that, that type of
24 information?

25 A. Sure. So you have to make an approach to the back door,

1 sometimes the clouds will be in the back door --

2 Q. Um-hmm.

3 A. -- you know, but over town it's clear, so that's the kind of
4 information you're going to get, and that's one of the basic ones.

5 Q. Um-hmm.

6 A. They also give you squall movements and timing on squalls,
7 that sort of thing.

8 Q. Was there ever any concern about inaccurate information
9 coming from the AWOS?

10 A. From the AWOS?

11 Q. Right, automated versus human?

12 A. Oh, no, I don't think so. I think it just had to do with,
13 like I said, the range at which you could receive it --

14 Q. Um-hmm.

15 A. -- and then again, it's not going to have any details.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Which is not the -- sufficient details.

18 Q. Um-hmm. Do you know where the AWOS equipment is located at
19 the airport out there?

20 A. I'm not positive, but I'm pretty sure it's the base, kind of
21 midfield-ish.

22 Q. Midfield-ish, okay.

23 A. I think, I don't really know.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay. Just curious. Okay, I'm going to pause
25 here. So long, good?

1 MR. FIACCO: Yeah.

2 DR. SILVA: All right, Marvin.

3 BY MR. FRANTZ:

4 Q. You said you audited Paul Wells' flight logs or flight
5 schedules since the accident?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And so, were you specifically auditing to verify the
8 hundred-hour requirement or just --

9 A. Yeah, I was, I was curious.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And I -- as, you know, working with Tony, I kind of felt that
12 at some point they would taproot it. I've been involved in other
13 taproot investigations, so I just thought I would, you know, do
14 some background.

15 Q. Did anyone ask you or direct you to do that audit?

16 A. No.

17 Q. And do you recall a number, how many hours he did have as PIC
18 up to the accident point?

19 A. Yeah, it was --

20 Q. Basically, with PenAir.

21 A. Yeah, 95.

22 Q. On the day of the accident?

23 A. Well, yeah, so -- and then the 3 hours down there, so 98.

24 Q. So that was -- you got that from looking at the SkedFlex --

25 A. SkedFlex.

- 1 Q. -- records?
- 2 A. Yeah.
- 3 Q. Ninety-five plus the time to fly down there?
- 4 A. Correct. Around there. I mean, 95 --
- 5 Q. So it's just shy of the 100. Okay.
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Does Deke Abbott have any position at PenAir?
- 8 A. Not that I know of.
- 9 Q. Has he ever had a position at PenAir, do you --
- 10 A. Not that I know of.
- 11 Q. Did you have, have you had, or do you think people at PenAir
12 have a sense that he has some authority or some power -- that
13 might not be the right word -- exercises some influence over
14 PenAir operations even though he's not a PenAir employee?
- 15 A. Definitely.
- 16 Q. Is he a Ravn employee, is that your understanding?
- 17 A. I believe, that's my understanding.
- 18 Q. Okay. Prior to the Ravn acquisition, did you have any -- did
19 you know of him or was he involved --
- 20 A. No.
- 21 Q. -- anywhere at all at PenAir that you knew of?
- 22 A. Not that I know of.
- 23 Q. So you only heard his name after the Ravn acquisition came
24 about or was it --
- 25 A. Correct.

1 Q. How long was Crystal chief pilot?

2 A. I don't know.

3 Q. No, okay. Do you know why she left?

4 A. No idea.

5 Q. Do you know what happened to the -- do you know who the chief
6 pilot was before Crystal?

7 A. Ben Nygren.

8 Q. Okay. Do you know why he left?

9 A. Alaska Airlines job.

10 Q. Did you have a good working relationship with him, with Ben?

11 A. So I didn't work for Ben. He was chief -- became chief pilot
12 after I had left flight ops management, so yeah, I had --

13 Q. Did you have any interaction with him as the manager of
14 flight safety position?

15 A. Just with the audits and -- yeah, trying to get him up to
16 speed on some things.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, that's all I have. Thanks, Dave.

18 DR. SILVA: Dujuan?

19 DR. SEVILLIAN: I don't have any further questions, thanks.

20 DR. SILVA: Tony?

21 BY MR. FISCHER:

22 Q. Just one. David, you said you were the assistant DO.

23 A. Sure.

24 Q. Who was the DO?

25 A. Matt Macri and then Bill Batman.

1 MR. FISCHER: That's it, that's all I have. Kind of puts it
2 in a time frame.

3 DR. SILVA: Um-hmm. Brandon?

4 MR. WILSON: I've got nothing.

5 BY DR. SILVA:

6 Q. I just wanted -- I had one more follow-up. After you
7 reviewed Paul's -- you essentially audited Paul's records after
8 the accident, they didn't ask you to do that. Did they know that
9 you were doing that?

10 A. I then talked to Crystal about it.

11 Q. Okay. What was her response?

12 A. Her response was that he's, you know, all the kind of things
13 that we talked about: He's got 14,000 hours, been to Dutch Harbor
14 as a Dash-8 captain.

15 Q. Um-hmm.

16 A. This is why he's qualified, blah, blah. She just gave all
17 the reasons why she thought he was qualified.

18 Q. Justified the qualification. And this was after the
19 accident?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Okay. Did she voice any of those prior to the accident that
22 you are aware of?

23 A. I'm not sure what you mean.

24 Q. So had you ever talked with her or gotten any feedback from
25 her regarding Paul's qualifications for Dutch Harbor?

1 A. No, just the general, that -- you know, that they were --
2 that they wanted to go to Ravn --

3 Q. I see.

4 A. -- 300/300.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Instead of the PenAir 300 as PIC.

7 Q. Okay. So the information you got from Crystal was after,
8 okay. Do you know if anyone else had got information regarding
9 your review? It was just Crystal?

10 A. Oh, I mean, then when Dennis took over, talked to Dennis
11 about it. I've talked to Kirk about it.

12 Q. What were their responses?

13 A. I think most of the responses of all check airmen was yeah,
14 he should've never been in the airplane.

15 DR. SILVA: Um-hmm. Okay. I think that's it.

16 MR. FRANTZ: One more.

17 DR. SILVA: Okay.

18 BY MR. FRANTZ:

19 Q. When you were getting or hearing these things about why Paul
20 should've been qualified to go even though he didn't meet the
21 rule, and you said, well, one thing mentioned was 14,000 hours
22 Alaska flying, was one of those things mentioned extensive
23 experience at Dutch Harbor?

24 A. She did not say extensive; she says -- she said he had flown
25 there -- the Dash-8 there for -- and I said, you know, for Ravn

1 charters, and she said yes, you know, so a couple of times over
2 summers.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks.

4 BY DR. SILVA:

5 Q. Based on our lines of questioning, do you have any
6 suggestions for who else you think we should interview, who might
7 be able to help us?

8 A. Other than -- no, I think you've probably covered all the
9 check airmen and --

10 Q. So you would recommend talking to every single one? Let me
11 make sure I have the list. So we have Brandon.

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Dennis, who is no longer there, right?

14 A. No, Dennis is --

15 Q. Dennis is chief pilot now?

16 A. He's chief pilot.

17 Q. Okay. And then who else?

18 A. Adam --

19 Q. Adam.

20 A. -- was here yesterday.

21 MR. WILSON: He's not a check airman yet.

22 MR. FIACCO: Oh. He's --

23 DR. SILVA: Oh, he's working on it.

24 MR. WILSON: He's working on it.

25 MR. FIACCO: Yeah.

1 MR. WILSON: Or Iain.

2 DR. SILVA: Iain.

3 MR. FIACCO: Iain, yeah.

4 DR. SILVA: Iain is the one we didn't talk to yet. And then,
5 I know Steve --

6 MR. FIACCO: Hakala.

7 DR. SILVA: -- was, okay.

8 BY DR. SILVA:

9 Q. Is there anyone else who was a chief pilot in that summer
10 range that --

11 A. No.

12 Q. -- isn't anymore? Okay.

13 A. No.

14 Q. So those are -- that covers that.

15 A. Yeah, that's pretty much it.

16 Q. Okay. Anyone else?

17 A. I can't think of anybody.

18 Q. Do you have anything else you want to add that we didn't
19 necessarily ask you?

20 A. No.

21 DR. SILVA: Okay. Well, if you think of anything, you have
22 our contact information. If you're more comfortable to go through
23 Brandon, you're welcome to do that, that's fine.

24 MR. FIACCO: Okay.

25 DR. SILVA: We appreciate your time.

1 MR. FIACCO: Thank you.

2 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

3 (Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the interview concluded.)

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of David Fiacco


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 3, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to
the recording accomplished at the hearing.


Betty Caudie
Official Reporter


Karen D. Martini
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/21/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: TIFFANY LEASE
Manager of Safety, Ravn Air Group

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Tuesday,
December 3, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Ms. Lease)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Tiffany Lease:		
By Mr. Frantz		8
By Dr. Silva		22
By Dr. Sevillian		41
By Mr. Frantz		44
By Dr. Silva		47
By Dr. Sevillian		50
By Mr. Frantz		51

I N T E R V I E W

(10:14 a.m.)

1 MR. FRANTZ: Good morning, Tiffany.

2 MS. LEASE: Good morning.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks for coming in. My name is Marvin Frantz.
4 I'm an operational factors investigator for the NTSB. And we'll
5 go around the room in a second and introduce -- have the other
6 people introduce themselves.

7 But let me just give you a brief rundown of what we're doing
8 today and kind of how it works. Have you ever been involved in an
9 NTSB investigation before?

10 MS. LEASE: This will be the first.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. It's good educational experience. The
12 NTSB, when we investigate accidents, we form groups to look at
13 specific aspects of accidents. For example, we might form a power
14 plants group, and they will look specifically at the engines, see
15 if they had any involvement. We have systems groups that could
16 look at airplane systems. We have human factors, which looks at
17 human factors. And we have operational factors, self-explanatory.

18 In this case we have combined two of those groups, human
19 factors and operational factors, and so that's who we are, and
20 those are the things that we're looking at. Those are the aspects
21 of this accident that we are investigating. There is a power
22 plants group; it's looking at that. There's a system group,
23 runway or airport. There's other people that look at other
24
25

1 things. But we're looking at those factors.

2 So when we form those groups at the NTSB, it's not just NTSB
3 personnel, because we don't have all the expertise needed. So we
4 bring in other people as part of the groups. For example, if
5 there was a pilots' union, there would be a union representative
6 on our group from that pilots' union. We always have a
7 representative from the operator who is part of our group and is
8 now working on the investigation with us. And so, today that
9 representative is Brandon. He's representing PenAir, because he
10 has expertise at Saab and in PenAir operations.

11 MS. LEASE: Yes.

12 MR. FRANTZ: And in checking, because he's a check airman.
13 So he's part of our group.

14 And then Tony, who we will introduce everybody in a minute,
15 is from the FAA. We always have the FAA as party, part of our
16 groups, but it's not the FAA enforcement, regulatory side. It's
17 the -- FAA has a separate branch, accident investigation, and
18 their personnel or representatives from that office are always
19 part of an NTSB investigation, but only in the accident
20 investigation element, and they basically work for the NTSB during
21 the investigation. They are not people who are going to later on
22 violate pilots or write anything, you know, that you might -- that
23 typically people think of the FAA.

24 The NTSB doesn't look to apportion blame or assign
25 responsibility. We look just to find out what happened by

1 gathering as many facts as we can, doing some analysis, and
2 determining a probable cause.

3 MS. LEASE: Yes.

4 MR. FRANTZ: And then from that probable cause, the ultimate
5 end goal is we hope to get some safety recommendations out of
6 that, which are just recommendations we make. Nobody has a
7 requirement to implement them, but those can go to a company, they
8 can go to the FAA, they can go to an airplane manufacturer. But
9 that's the goal, of anything we think would help prevent something
10 like this in the future.

11 MS. LEASE: Uh-huh.

12 MR. FRANTZ: So those recommendations come out of our long
13 investigation. And it can be long. Typically an investigation of
14 a major accident like this can be a year or longer to complete
15 everything and get all -- everything done. So we are in the early
16 phases of this. Part of the early phase is interviews with all
17 kinds of people that, you know, have interest or touch parts of
18 the accident we are interested in, which is operational and human
19 factors.

20 So that said, this is an informal interview. It's not sworn
21 testimony, but you are expected to answer, you know, truthfully
22 and to the best of your knowledge. But if you don't know an
23 answer or if you don't recall, it's fine to say that. You can
24 always come back to any of us or go through Brandon, the PenAir
25 representative, if you have something after the interview that you

1 think, oh, you meant to add this, or you wanted to say this but
2 you forgot. But that's all right as well.

3 MS. LEASE: Okay.

4 MR. FRANTZ: The testimony that will ultimately become a
5 transcript, a written transcript, it will go in what we call the
6 docket, which is our file of all the information from the
7 accident. Our investigation will ultimately become public, so we
8 can't say that this is -- you know, you'll have anonymity or
9 anything in anything you say here. Eventually it will become part
10 of the publicly released information for the accident.

11 You are -- anybody we interview is allowed to have a
12 representative with them, someone of your choosing. It can be
13 anyone, but it has to be your choice to have or you don't have to
14 have anyone. But do you have someone you want to have as a
15 representative today?

16 MS. LEASE: I do.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Could you just for the record state --

18 MS. LEASE: Morgan Campbell.

19 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks. Okay. Let's -- we'll do a quick
20 round of introductions, and then we'll see if you have any
21 questions before we start.

22 MS. LEASE: Okay.

23 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva. I'm a human performance
24 investigator with the NTSB.

25 MS. LEASE: Nice to meet you.

1 DR. SILVA: Nice to meet you.

2 MR. WILSON: Brandon, check airman.

3 MS. LEASE: Good morning, Brandon.

4 MR. FISCHER: Hello, Tiffany. I'm Tony Fischer.

5 MS. LEASE: Yes.

6 MR. FISCHER: I think we've met before.

7 MS. LEASE: We have.

8 MR. FISCHER: Okay. Years ago.

9 MS. LEASE: Yes.

10 MR. FISCHER: I'm an aviation safety inspector with the FAA.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: And I'm Dujuan Sevillian, human performance
12 investigator, NTSB.

13 MS. LEASE: Nice to meet you.

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: Nice to meet you.

15 MS. LEASE: So my name is Tiffany Lease. I am the manager of
16 safety for the Ravn Air Group.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks. So after my briefing and before
18 we get started, do you any questions about today, the interview,
19 anything?

20 MS. LEASE: Not yet.

21 MR. FRANTZ: Very good.

22 INTERVIEW OF TIFFANY LEASE

23 BY MR. FRANTZ:

24 Q. Okay. Could we start just by stating your name and your
25 position?

1 A. My name is Tiffany Lease, and I am the manager of safety.

2 Q. And how long have you had that position?

3 A. I have had the position for roughly 3 years, I think.

4 However, I have been in the safety department for 7, PenAir safety
5 department.

6 Q. Okay. And so, you're the manager of safety for PenAir?

7 A. I was. But since the merger of the operations, I was
8 transferred from PenAir to Ravn approximately 2 months ago.

9 Q. Is that merger complete now?

10 A. No.

11 Q. So you're a Ravn employee now; is that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. But do you have any responsibilities for the PenAir
14 operations?

15 A. Yes. Yes.

16 Q. Are they the same responsibilities you had before you're --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- acquire changed from PenAir to Ravn?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Same thing.

21 A. Yep.

22 Q. So you have been the manager of safety at PenAir for 3?

23 A. Yeah, approximately.

24 Q. Okay. And before that you were in the safety department.

25 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. And what was your title or what did you do then?

2 A. So I started in the safety department in 2012, and I started
3 out as the safety specialist. And then I was the designated
4 employer representative for the drug and alcohol program. I was
5 the primary for about 2 years, and then I was an alternate for 3.
6 And in that time frame I went to security, so I was the manager of
7 security for less than a year, and then I switched back to safety,
8 and then I was the manager of safety. So 3 or 4 maybe. I'd have
9 to look back.

10 Q. Are you a pilot?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Before PenAir, did you have any aviation experience?

13 A. I was a ground handler. I was a ramper at Swissport.

14 Q. Okay. Is that a --

15 A. We're ground --

16 Q. -- an airline, Swissport?

17 A. No. It's ground support. Yeah. We ground-handled overseas
18 aircraft like TrenAir, EVA Air.

19 Q. Okay. Where was that at?

20 A. Here in Anchorage.

21 Q. Okay. So what are your duties and responsibilities as
22 manager of safety?

23 A. So when -- before we merged, I was the primary analyst for
24 our safety reporting system. I was and still am an instructor. I
25 do in-doc, I do recurrent, and I do a lot of safety promotion

1 within the entire operation. And I do reports -- monthly status
2 reports that go directly to the accountable executive and the
3 executive team.

4 I chaired safety committee meetings, put the agendas
5 together, distributed the minutes, and do a lot of traveling. I
6 go to the stations and hold what we call station safety visits. I
7 have a lot of interaction with everybody within the entire
8 operation as far as safety promotion.

9 Q. Who's your boss?

10 A. Tony Santiago is my supervisor.

11 Q. And is it director of safety?

12 A. Managing director now.

13 Q. Okay. Is he also now at PenAir -- I mean at Ravn or --

14 A. No. He's still PenAir. I believe he's still PenAir.

15 Q. And his title is managing director of safety?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. Okay. And have you worked for him ever since you have been
18 manager of safety?

19 A. No. So a few years back the org chart changed. So Brian
20 Whilden was the director of safety and the -- he was my direct
21 boss. And then when he -- his position changed, and then Tony's
22 position changed; then I started reporting to Tony.

23 Q. Okay. Which was how long ago?

24 A. Roughly 4 years. I can't give an exact date.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I would have to look at a calendar.

2 Q. So Tony has been your boss for that period?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Maybe 3 years.

6 Q. Okay. You mentioned you teach ground school initially.

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Is that the in-doc portion of ground school?

9 A. Yes. And for recurrent.

10 Q. And recurrent. So what topics do you teach?

11 A. SMS, ASAP, emergency response, HSE.

12 Q. HSE?

13 A. HSE.

14 Q. What does that stand for?

15 A. Health, Safety, and Environment.

16 Q. Okay. How long is your presentation typically, your classes

17 that you teach --

18 A. Two hours.

19 Q. -- ground school?

20 A. Two hours is the initial, and then the recurrent is about 30

21 to 60 minutes.

22 Q. Okay. How long has PenAir had an ASAP program; do you know?

23 A. I know it was here when I started.

24 Q. Okay. Tell me about -- can you just briefly describe the SMS

25 system --

1 A. Sure.

2 Q. -- at PenAir?

3 A. So we have the safety policy, which describes management's
4 commitment to providing all the necessary resources so the
5 employees can perform their jobs to the highest possible safety
6 standard. And the way that the employees achieve those resources
7 is through the safety report system. So if they identify a hazard
8 within the operation, that's how they voice their concerns to us,
9 and then we in the safety department, we're basically the liaison
10 between the submitter and the departments -- the affected
11 departments.

12 So we identify that information and we distribute it to the
13 employee groups, and we have feedback through the safety
14 department and the submitter. And we give them a thank you
15 message, we give them periodic updates, and we give them feedback
16 all the way to closure. And the safety reporting system is a
17 confidential reporting system, so all names are removed. And we
18 always have the philosophy of looking at processes and procedures
19 rather than looking at individuals that are involved.

20 And we keep the report open until we have a corrective action
21 or mitigation plan. Then we give the closure information to the
22 employees that way. It also describes our safety objectives. So
23 basically we look at key performance indicators from the year
24 prior, and we look at trends. And that's where we determine what
25 needs to be our focal points for the next year.

1 So we do that with each department, and we get the
2 departments involved. So we'll look at certain areas within
3 maintenance, flight ops, ground, or admin, and we'll look at areas
4 as far as where we need to improve. And then we'll build those
5 into our objectives for the next year, and we'll work on those
6 throughout the entire year.

7 And it also describes our just culture, non-punitive safety
8 reporting system for unintentional deviations and, of course,
9 there's -- if something happened intentional then, you know, they
10 would be up for reprimand, but the safety department is not
11 involved in that at all. Then that's where management and human
12 resources comes into play.

13 And we also -- the safety policy also talks about our
14 emergency response plan and how we are going to activate that plan
15 and also keep the operation running at the same time. So that's
16 just kind of a brief of the safety policy.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. So safety risk management is -- when we conduct safety risk
19 assessments, any time we are bringing on new equipment, starting a
20 new operation, changing processes or procedures, then we'll do a
21 safety risk assessment where we do an analysis, and we determine
22 hazards, risks, controls, risk factors, and responsible
23 individuals. And then we'll determine a plan as to how we are
24 going to implement those controls so that we have -- we really
25 have a control on what we are doing and try to proactively

1 determine any kind of hazards or risks that we see. And we also
2 do the safety reporting. That's another way that hazards are
3 reported to us.

4 And then we have safety assurance, which really is our
5 internal evaluation program. We have our internal auditors that
6 basically verify and look at our manuals and, you know, do the
7 audits and make sure we are doing what we are saying we are doing.
8 And there's also external audits as well that fall into safety
9 assurance. And that could even simply be a check ride, or it
10 could be an interview -- not interview but a review -- employee
11 review just to make sure that, you know, those performances are
12 being achieved and determining areas where we are strong or where
13 we are weak and where we need to improve upon.

14 So we also have safety promotion, which when we had --
15 previously, before we merged, within our safety reporting system,
16 when I chaired the safety committee meetings, we built the agenda
17 based off of all of the reports that came into the reporting
18 system. So we would identify the reports and lump all of the
19 reports into one report, and we would discuss all of the higher
20 level reports within the safety committee.

21 And all of that information would be documented, and we would
22 take note of the date and what kind of action that we have taken.
23 And that information would get distributed to all employees
24 through our promotion. We would give it to the employees directly
25 via e-mail, and we also have safety bulletin boards where we

1 require a board to be posted within every station or every
2 department wherever people congregate so that the information is
3 easily accessible. And we always keep the employees informed as
4 to what's happening within the operation and what we're doing
5 within the operation.

6 We also have other key items in safety promotion. We have
7 what we call a safety flash, and that basically is, anytime
8 something happens within the operation, we want to raise awareness
9 as to what happened, why it happened, and what we are doing to
10 prevent that event from happening again.

11 And then we do a safety bulletin, which always consists of
12 three articles which is SMS; Safety 24/7, so that it's at work or
13 at home; and then the last one is recent event. So we will talk
14 about an actual event that happened, again why it happened, and
15 something to prevent that event from happening again.

16 We do a lot of incentives for safety promotion, because we
17 really want to make it intriguing. We want to make it to where
18 people actually want to participate, and we want to give people
19 something for their participation. And it's also basically a
20 gratitude from the safety department saying thank you for
21 participating in our programs, because without the participation
22 of employees within the operation, there's no way we could improve
23 what we are doing if we didn't have that strong communication, and
24 we didn't build a trust with the employees.

25 So it's really important that they know that with promotion

1 and also training. Training is promotion. We -- the initial I
2 do, and then I do the recurrent as well. I maintain the content
3 for our computer-based training for general employees and advance
4 SMS as well. And as I mentioned before, I do a lot of station
5 safety visits where I go to the stations, and I hold meetings with
6 all of personnel, and I give out prizes. I have them answer
7 questions, and really the idea is to get them engaged and get them
8 participating so that they have a better grasp on the message that
9 we are trying to send as far as safety. That also gives me the
10 opportunity to have one-on-one time with individuals, because not
11 everybody likes to speak in a group setting.

12 So when the meeting is over then, you know, we'll talk to the
13 people and say, hey, have you ever submitted a safety report? And
14 if they say yes or no, then I'll say, you know, well, if you see a
15 hazard around here then, you know, we can take that, put the
16 information into the reporting system, and I'll sit down, and I'll
17 walk you through it. So it gives me the opportunity to sit down
18 with them, and it may be something as simple as, you know, I
19 notice that there's a hole in the rug right here and somebody
20 could trip. Nobody has tripped yet, but there's a potential.

21 So I'll explain to them that even if the hazard is that
22 small, nothing is ever too small to be reported. So I sit down
23 with them, and then I help them put the report in. And then at
24 that point, when I come back home, then it gives me the
25 opportunity to work with management, and then we will put a

1 corrective action in. And then now it shows the employee that,
2 because they put the report in, we did something.

3 And then that's where the trust is built with the employees
4 and actually to show them that, when they voice something, their
5 voice is being heard, and we are doing something about that. And
6 it really boosts morale, and it encourages a positive work
7 atmosphere, and it just kind of keeps it going to where, you know,
8 they know that, if they let us know something, and we put a
9 corrective action into place that, you know, something is getting
10 done.

11 Q. Okay. Very comprehensive rundown, thank you.

12 A. That's our SMS in a nutshell.

13 Q. So I'm looking back at -- I just want to go back to your
14 position for a moment, Ravn Air Group. Do you have responsibility
15 for any other operations other than PenAir under your new
16 position, the Ravn Air?

17 A. All three. Ravn Air Group is all three certificates.

18 Q. I mean -- so do you have responsibility for any safety or for
19 the same safety as for Ravn Air Alaska, and Ravn Air Connect as
20 well as PenAir?

21 A. Yes. Yes. All three now.

22 Q. So you do that job you just described for all three
23 certificates?

24 A. Uh-huh.

25 Q. Is there anybody -- is there anybody else?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Any other managers working --

3 A. No.

4 Q. So you're the top safety manager for the three Ravn
5 certificates?

6 A. Uh-huh. We have a senior analyst and then a systems analyst.

7 Q. So did your workload just triple when you went to Ravn Air
8 Group, because you were just doing this for PenAir --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- now you're doing that for three --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- three operations?

13 A. Yeah, but there -- but now our employee group in our safety
14 department actually grew too.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Our safety department got a lot bigger because --

17 Q. Okay. And -- no, go ahead, I'm sorry.

18 A. We -- I think it was roughly 6 months ago that the two safety
19 departments merged, and our staff level definitely got much
20 larger.

21 Q. Okay. And so, I'm sorry if I asked you this already or you
22 already said, but when did you officially become safety manager
23 for Ravn Air versus just PenAir; when did that happen?

24 A. Approximately 2 or 3 months ago.

25 Q. Okay. Okay. So what are the routes that an employee can

1 forward a safety concern to the department? What methods do they
2 have to do that --

3 A. So one of the ways --

4 Q. -- where they call?

5 A. One of the ways is through our safety reporting system, and
6 we just recently moved from WBAT to Vistair. So electronic
7 devices, computers, EFBS. We are working on getting apps for the
8 phones so that people can submit a report through the phone.

9 On the PenAir side, we have paper reporting. Ravn doesn't
10 have paper reporting. We have little drop boxes that have little
11 tiny locks on them. We have one located in the crew room, one
12 located in the maintenance area where the mechanics clock in, so
13 that if they were to fill out a paper report, they can easily drop
14 it in on there.

15 But whenever I do training for in-doc or recurrent, we let
16 them know that, if they forget their credentials for the safety
17 reporting system, they don't have access to the paper reports,
18 they can simply send us an e-mail, and we'll put the information
19 in for them. Really there's no way that we won't accept the
20 information. As long as the information comes to us, we'll take
21 it.

22 They can give us a call. We have a 24-hour safety and
23 security hotline that they can call us on. So there's really no
24 limit to where the information comes. They can even come and
25 voice their concerns to us vocally.

1 Q. So in your previous experience with just PenAir and talking
2 about just PenAir now --

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. -- how many reports do you take typically a month, would you
5 say?

6 A. Well, it really fluctuated over the last few years because,
7 obviously, the company went bankrupt, and we definitely saw a down
8 fall then, because our number of employees decreased. And I mean,
9 even prior to that the numbers increased, because there was a
10 point where we opened up multiple stations within the lower 48.
11 And then prior to that is when we were really steady in Alaska and
12 the East Coast.

13 So there was a real fluctuation within the intake of the
14 reports, so it really is based on a specific time. So which time
15 frame would you, would you think? Or I can just give you an
16 average for maybe each time frame.

17 Q. How about in the last year?

18 A. I'd say roughly -- a month you said?

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. So I'd say roughly 30 to 40.

21 Q. A month?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. In your analysis of the reporting, do you sort them
24 from sources? Like, how many from ground handlers, how many from
25 pilots, how many from customer service agents or whatever; do you

1 break that down?

2 A. We source them from the employee group and the risk factor.
3 So whether they were low, minor, moderate, or higher risk to the
4 operation.

5 Q. How many do you typically get a month from air crew, from
6 pilots?

7 A. Within this last year?

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. Within this last year the flight crew reporting definitely
10 went down after the company went bankrupt. And there was a point
11 where -- a few months where there wasn't any reports, and then
12 there were a few months, too, where there were less than 10, and I
13 wouldn't even go over 10 within this last year.

14 Q. Per month?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Okay.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you. I'm going to take a break and my
18 colleague here, Sathya -- and she can ask you questions.

19 MS. LEASE: Okay.

20 MR. FRANTZ: Thank you.

21 DR. SILVA: Let us know any time you need a break too. Do
22 you want a break?

23 MS. LEASE: No, not at all. Let's keep going.

24 DR. SILVA: All right.

25 BY DR. SILVA:

1 Q. So the reports that you get from pilots, not necessarily in
2 the last year, but throughout your stint here both -- really in
3 the safety department. Have you received any reports on flying
4 into Dutch Harbor from --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- from a crew perspective?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What were the safety concerns that were brought up?

9 A. I think for flights going in and out of Dutch they're -- one
10 of the high ones was alcohol reports from passengers. There's a
11 little bar in the terminal, and when they get past the CSAs, they
12 seem like they are fine, and then they get to the plane, and then
13 they have to be removed.

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. So that is definitely one of the high ones, because all our
16 other locations that we flew to, there's -- they don't have a
17 little bar. So that was one of the highest ones.

18 Diversions, turn backs, for weather.

19 Q. Okay. Were there any risk mitigations put in place for going
20 into or flying out of Dutch Harbor as a result of any of the
21 safety initiatives that you know of?

22 A. Honestly I'd have to pull up the reports to look.

23 Q. Have you received any concerns about flying into any of the
24 special airports where your flights fly into?

25 A. Not that I can think of right off the top of my mind.

1 Q. Any reports on air crew qualifications or performance, flight
2 crew performance?

3 A. Not that I can think of.

4 Q. How did you get into safety?

5 A. So, when I started here at PenAir, I started out in admin.
6 And that really was just me getting my foot into the door. When I
7 first had my experience in aviation, I fell in love with the
8 industry.

9 Q. Uh-huh.

10 A. And I -- when I came here, as I said before, I knew that, you
11 know, admin wasn't where I wanted to be. I wanted to get into a
12 position where I had the opportunity to work with the entire
13 operation, and I didn't want to just -- basically just be in a
14 cube and crunch numbers or just stay in one little area and do the
15 same thing over and over again. I wanted something to where I
16 knew that I could grow within the operation, and not just the
17 operation, but the industry.

18 So after being here for nearly a year, a lot of different
19 jobs opened, but I didn't want to move into something that I knew
20 I wouldn't want to move into. I wanted to move into an operation
21 -- I mean a portion of the operation where I knew that I would be
22 able to make a positive impact and, like I said, work with
23 everybody in the operation.

24 So there was a position that opened up in the safety
25 department, and I reviewed the job description at the time, and it

1 was very intriguing and very meaningful to me because, obviously,
2 safety is paramount. So I decided to take the position. And at
3 that point, I was basically the assistant to everybody within the
4 department, so it gave me an opportunity to really learn about
5 what everybody in the safety department did, and I had a lot of
6 involvement with everybody in the department.

7 And after my experience and knowledge base was built after
8 being in the safety department, I started really working with
9 everybody in the company, and I really liked the interaction of
10 working with everybody, promoting with everybody, and giving
11 everybody an understanding as to their contribution to safety
12 operations and how every single person within the entire company
13 has an effect on each other and the people that we serve.

14 And I really grew a passion for safety. And I did a few
15 different jobs in the safety department, as I mentioned in the
16 beginning of the interview, and I just -- I feel like that is
17 where my passion is.

18 Q. Uh-huh. Did you get any kind of formal training as you went
19 through that process --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- in safety?

22 A. Yes. I did SMS training.

23 Q. Uh-huh.

24 A. I did system safety and Taproot all through the Medallion
25 Foundation.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. I got my aviation safety management certificate from USC.
3 And I also did accident -- aircraft accident and incident
4 investigation training, SMS training with Embry-Riddle, and I'm
5 going back in the beginning of next year to do the OSHA training,
6 and then I'll get my certificate from them as well.

7 Q. Okay. Do you recall if you switched over to the Ravn side
8 before or after the accident?

9 A. I think it was before, but it was very close. I think it was
10 before. I can't -- I was so close to the time.

11 Q. Okay. So how does your role as manager of safety differ from
12 Tony's role as director of safety and the manager of flight
13 safety?

14 A. So the manager of flight safety, he is an evaluator --
15 internal evaluator. So he's the one that does audits within the
16 flight operations.

17 Q. Uh-huh.

18 A. And Tony, as the director, obviously that's the 119 position,
19 and he is responsible for the programs within the safety
20 department, and he is one of our risk acceptors for the higher
21 risks within the department, so -- because of the org chart.

22 So we have the low, minor, moderate, serious, or higher. So
23 I would be allowed to accept a lower or a minor risk in putting
24 controls into place as far as mitigations for those risks, and
25 then Tony would be moderate or a serious risk. And then if it was

1 a higher risk, then that would, obviously, be the vice president
2 or accountable executive.

3 Q. Uh-huh.

4 A. So he is also responsible for the content within our manuals.
5 So he is the one that says that, yes, you know, this change can go
6 into the manuals.

7 Q. Uh-huh.

8 A. The manuals that he owns. So he has ownership over our
9 manuals. And basically, if I want to make changes through our
10 programs or a manual switch or anything within our department,
11 then I would run through him. And he's the one that makes the
12 approval.

13 Q. Okay. Can you give me some examples of the different risk
14 categories; like, what might fall into a different risk category?

15 A. So a low would be something like, I was walking from my car
16 into the building, and I slipped and fell. And maybe I had a
17 minor bruise or, you know, it wasn't anything really bad. Then
18 that would be something that would be a low and depending -- so,
19 if we had another one of that same nature, then the likelihood
20 would go up.

21 So really the likelihood of the event occurring is what is
22 driving that risk factor to a higher level. So if we had
23 something frequent, and we had maybe two or three slips and falls
24 within the last week or two, then the likelihood is going to drive
25 that up, even if it was just a minor bruise or even no injury or

1 maybe just a scratch.

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. And then if it were something like a moderate then that would
4 be -- it could be a higher injury or a higher damage, whether it's
5 GSE facilities or something that touched the aircraft because, you
6 know, we don't allow anything to touch the aircraft. And then the
7 serious would be, again, if it, you know, it's happening
8 frequently, that's going to boost it up too. And then the high --
9 the last one would be, like, a fatality or substantial damage.

10 Q. So can you give me some examples that you have had that may
11 fall into the serious category?

12 A. So --

13 Q. In flight ops, if you can recall any?

14 A. We haven't really had any high or serious in flight ops
15 specifically.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. We -- in years past we always had a very strong safety
18 record, safety culture, and what we did in the safety
19 department -- our entire operation was extremely involved, and we
20 had a lot of safety reports that came in. And as I was mentioning
21 before, because we had our safety promotion and we had incentives
22 and we showed the employees that the safety reporting system
23 worked --

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 A. -- there was really a strong line of communication between

1 the employees and the safety department and the affected
2 departments. So we really didn't have very many serious or high
3 within flight ops in all of the years that I have been working at
4 PenAir.

5 Q. You mentioned that there's been a reduction in the reporting
6 from flight crews over the last year or so.

7 A. Yeah, year and a half. Whenever we went bankrupt.

8 Q. Okay. Why do you think that would be the case?

9 A. Well, you know, it was a really hard time when we went
10 bankrupt, because we were a family-owned operation, and everybody
11 that was at PenAir for years, everybody really had a good bond,
12 and we all felt like, you know, this is not -- it wasn't ever just
13 a job. Like, this was part of our lives, and this is like a
14 family.

15 And the family that owned the company and, you know, the
16 executive teams, every single department that was involved, we all
17 felt like -- you know, this was a family-ran operation, and it
18 was, you know, it was very difficult to lose that and to know that
19 the family that owned the operation and ran the operation, you
20 know, they were going to be leaving.

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. And our entire, you know, executive team, it completely
23 switched, and everybody was afraid that they weren't going to have
24 a job, and nobody knew what was going to happen with the company.
25 We -- you know, the company was put on auction, and we were, we

1 were getting sold. So it really was a grieving time because, you
2 know, a lot of us that came to PenAir saying that, you know, we
3 are going to work here. This is going to be our job. This is
4 going to provide income for us and our families. And to, you
5 know, have that really up in the air and not know where you're
6 going to be was really hard for all of us in the operation.

7 And not just that too, but because people were afraid of not
8 knowing what was on the other side, people started to leave. And
9 we had a lot of people, including crew members, who decided to go
10 to other carriers because, you know, maybe they felt like they had
11 more stability or there was, you know, something that was
12 concrete. And at that point it was a lot for us to go through.

13 Q. Uh-huh. Speaking of the bankruptcy and the merger, is the
14 safety department involved in terms of assessing risk of merger
15 activities?

16 A. Absolutely.

17 Q. Can you describe how you're involved?

18 A. So right now we have a third party entity that's involved
19 with us as far as doing the assessments on the manual sweeps for
20 both operations.

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. So we have -- and we also have subject matter experts with
23 any employee group that are helping us as well. So, for instance,
24 for flight. And we are taking the two GOMs, and we are doing a
25 safety risk assessment on every single change that we're making

1 within the operation. So we are looking at the best practices
2 from both sides, and we are taking the best practice from either
3 side of the operation, and that's a process that's going to go
4 forward.

5 Q. Uh-huh.

6 A. And once the merger is done, then we are going to retire one
7 of the manuals, and then keep one solid manual. Of course, we'll
8 have the aircraft specific items, but there's also general items
9 that we can follow as far as best practices also. So we are doing
10 that with every single employee group within the operation.

11 And the safety department is involved. So basically, we'll
12 help the employees, and we'll say that this is how you describe
13 the system, this is how you'll identify the hazard, this is how
14 you determine the risk, and this is how you give it a risk factor
15 based on the severity and the likelihood.

16 Who's going to be responsible for implementing this control,
17 how are you going to monitor this control once it's -- this is
18 implemented, and how are we going to determine that there are no
19 other additional hazards or risks that come on to this and,
20 basically, how is it going to be documented? So it's really from
21 the start of the change all the way to the end of the change and
22 then periodic reviews and continuous monitoring so that we can
23 keep reviewing the changes that are put into place.

24 Q. Uh-huh. Are you aware of a potential change -- so, these are
25 with potential changes to the manuals, correct? This process that

1 you described.

2 A. Actual.

3 Q. Actual changes.

4 A. Uh-huh.

5 Q. Okay. Did anything come through the pipes in terms of
6 changing the qualifications for special airports?

7 A. Not with -- I don't think it was with any of our revisions
8 cycles as far as the mergers. So I was really involved, and I
9 don't want to say that solidly, because I was really involved with
10 the safety risk assessments for assessing all of the processes
11 within the manuals and the first two, the first two periods and
12 revision cycles.

13 So we have four revision cycles that we're going through, and
14 I was heavily involved in the beginning, and then we had another
15 individual who was more so involved within the last month, 6
16 weeks. I can't, I can't put an exact date on it, but there was
17 that role transferred over to somebody else within the safety
18 department.

19 Q. Six weeks from now -- previous to now or previous to the
20 accident?

21 A. No. From now I think.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. It's just I can't pinpoint dates.

24 Q. Okay. Who is that person?

25 A. Adam McCarty. He was Corvus' director of safety.

1 Q. Okay. So from your recollection you don't recall seeing a
2 change come through to --

3 A. Not when I was working with the SOC for the manual -- the
4 SOC, system operating certificate -- or single operating
5 certificate, sorry.

6 Q. And you mentioned GOM ,and did you also mention the flight
7 crew training manual?

8 A. The CFM -- so it's every manual. So we have every single
9 manual, whether it's ground, flight ops, in flight, maintenance;
10 every single manual within the entire suite --

11 Q. Uh-huh.

12 A. -- is being reviewed side by side within each portion of the
13 operation.

14 Q. How many -- so you mentioned that your department grew.

15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. How many employees did you have in the safety department
17 before and after that merger?

18 A. So before we went bankrupt we had 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 --
19 roughly 8 to 10 maybe. Roughly 8 or 9 -- 8 to 10, I'd say,
20 roughly.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I'm just trying to count. I'm just trying to remember where
23 people were.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And then after the bankruptcy started to come into play and

1 as people started to leave, we lost a couple people. And after
2 the bankruptcy was all said and done, and people chose to leave on
3 their own or other people got transferred to another position,
4 then we had three.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. We had three when we merged. We had four, and then the one
7 person left, and then we had three.

8 Q. Uh-huh.

9 A. And we had three when we merged.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. PenAir -- and at that time I think Ravn had roughly 10 maybe.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. They definitely had a high amount, 9 or 10 I think, if I try
14 to count. So we had 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 -- yeah, somewhere
15 around there.

16 Q. So do all of these people now report to you?

17 A. No.

18 Q. How is that managed, the reporting structure?

19 A. So it goes our senior VP of safety, managing director, and
20 then there's our directors of safety, which Tony is our --
21 PenAir's director of safety also, but he's a managing director
22 over the department.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And then we have our director of safety for Ravn Connect, and
25 then we have our director of safety assurance, and then he has the

1 manager of internal evaluation, I think. I'm not sure exactly
2 what his title is, but he's the manager of IEP. And then there's
3 an auditor below him.

4 Q. Uh-huh.

5 A. And then, after Tony, then it comes to me as the manager of
6 safety, and then the senior system safety analyst, and then
7 there's the systems analyst below him.

8 Q. Okay. Okay. So you have two people --

9 A. Yes. And that just changed when I became a Ravn employee, so
10 that was very recent.

11 Q. Okay. But you switched to only having two?

12 A. No, the -- exactly, because before it -- the structure went
13 our VP and the director and then me.

14 Q. You mentioned that there are 2-hour modules for the training
15 that you do.

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. Is that per module, the 2 hours, or are you --

18 A. Initial.

19 Q. Okay. So it's a 2-hour -- so are you instructing for 2
20 hours --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- over all of the topics that you mentioned?

23 A. Yes. Yes.

24 Q. How much of a role do you have in recurrent?

25 A. So I am the recurrent instructor as well for safety.

1 Q. Is that also 2 hours?

2 A. No. Our flight ops person's training manual says that it's
3 30 minutes.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. But I usually go over the time, so it's about 45-ish.

6 Q. Uh-huh. You mentioned safety promotion that you did at the
7 different stations. Can you give us an example of what kind of
8 safety promotion there is for crew members?

9 A. So we have our safety bulletin that we put out that has a
10 question, and it's basically a trivial question.

11 Q. Uh-huh.

12 A. So if we write an article about SMS -- so if I -- say the
13 safety department takes every report submitted, and we bring it up
14 against our risk matrix to determine -- I wouldn't say risk
15 matrix. I'll say, the safety department determines the risk
16 factor measuring the event that occurred based on the likelihood
17 and severity; what tool do we use to determine this? And that's
18 really just a question that goes out to everybody, but crew
19 members also. And then they can come back to us and say that we
20 use a risk matrix --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- to determine the risk factor. Their name gets put into a
23 pot, and basically we'll have a drawing at the end of the week,
24 and we will give two employees, like, a jacket or a hat or a skirt
25 or scarves or, you know, whatever we are giving out based on the

1 time of the year.

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. And there's also an employee ID number that we put within the
4 bulletin so that employees can actually look in there to find
5 their employee number, and if they find it, they report it back to
6 the safety department. Then we'll say something like, what was
7 the recent event article about? And we'll engage a conversation
8 as far as information that we are putting out, making sure that
9 they are reading it, obtaining it.

10 Q. Uh-huh.

11 A. And we'll have a discussion on that. And then we will give
12 them a jacket for that. We also have -- had, on the PenAir
13 side --

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. -- so safety reports that were put in, general safety
16 reports, we offered incentives. So we had our monthly safety
17 committee meeting, and if a general hazard report was submitted to
18 us or any kind of general report, we would offer an incentive and
19 basically put their name in for a drawing, and we do a pot, then
20 do a drawing every month. And we would choose two numbers at that
21 time and then give those two employees promotional items.

22 We also have the spirit of safety award where it's really an
23 open nomination form to where anybody within the operation can
24 nominate anybody for a safety performance or a promotion. And
25 they would give us some kind of information, like, an example was:

1 One time we had a flight crew that was taxiing the aircraft back
2 over here from the ramp, and they saw a piece of FOD that was
3 going over the runway. And they called our mechanics and said,
4 hey, we see a piece of FOD over there. It looks like it's a clear
5 garbage bag, and we are stopping the aircraft. We basically
6 stopped the operation and said, we are holding the aircraft here
7 until somebody can remove that, because we don't want engine
8 ingestion. So they waited there, and then one of the mechanics
9 came, removed the FOD, and then they brought the plane back here.

10 Q. Uh-huh.

11 A. So somebody nominated them for that. So that was a part of
12 giving them a promotional item, giving them a certificate, a
13 letter of recognition, and basically recognition within -- in
14 front of the safety committee. And we actually post that
15 information on our company intranet so that it is really
16 distributed throughout the entire company, and people know that,
17 you know, this person did this, and this is what we gave him for
18 whatever he did.

19 And there's also an annual safety -- the annual safety
20 committee meeting that we would hold. So we do, like, large
21 prizes at the very end of the year. This is a one-time thing
22 where we would do separate pools for everybody that participated
23 within the safety bulletin. If they got the answer correctly,
24 then we have one pool for that. And for all the people that made
25 attempts, we'll have one pool for that.

1 And then we'll take a look at the safety reports, and we'll
2 determine who had the greatest impact on safety. And then we'll
3 give them prizes for that, or we'll look at -- we'll basically
4 just look at all different types of areas as to how we can give
5 employees reports, or we'll take all of the reports that were
6 submitted, and we'll just do random drawings for, you know, that
7 particular part of the year, and we will give away a bunch of
8 items that way as well.

9 Q. How does anonymous reporting work within the incentives for
10 reporting?

11 A. So that is the downfall with anonymous reporting. If you
12 submit a report to us anonymously, and we don't know who you are,
13 we can't give you a drawing, because we don't know who you are.
14 But we do -- we did, within PenAir, provided feedback to the
15 employees that made anonymous submissions. So earlier I had
16 mentioned that our agenda was built off of all the safety reports
17 that come in to the department.

18 Q. Uh-huh.

19 A. So basically we would put the narrative in there, and then we
20 would have the date of the safety committee meeting. And then we
21 would put the action items on that report. And I also mentioned
22 that those minutes were emailed to the employees directly and also
23 posted on our safety board. So there was two different ways that
24 the employees got feedback to their anonymous report.

25 Q. Okay. The last question I had was regarding, you mentioned

1 that if there was an intentional violation, that would get handed
2 off. How do you determine whether something was intentional?

3 A. So that would be determined either through the safety
4 department or the safety department and the effective departments.
5 So if we had somebody who was told by their managers that this is
6 what you need to do to get the job done, and they followed the
7 procedure -- or not the procedure, but the instruction that was
8 given to them by their management, then -- and maybe something
9 went wrong, but they were instructed to do so, then that would be
10 something that would be unintentional, because they were told to
11 do that way, and at that point it would be the company.

12 You know, we want to make sure that we are providing the
13 employees the tools, the equipment that we -- the procedures that
14 we are setting them up for success. Or if it was something that
15 we can determine that was a human error, then that would be
16 unintentional. But if it was something that was intentional, then
17 it would be that they have the knowledge, they were trained, they
18 know what the procedure is, but they decided to deviate from the
19 procedure. And that would be something that would be intentional.

20 Q. Okay. How often do you see intentional deviations?

21 A. Rare.

22 Q. Is that, like, once a year, once a month; what does that mean
23 to you?

24 A. Honestly it was so minimal because there was just -- and just
25 going back to the PenAir side, it was just the safety department

1 really had really strong relationships with everybody in the
2 entire operation. And understanding and -- you know, all the
3 employees were very aware that we, as the department, we're here
4 for a resource -- as a resource for the employees, and if they
5 needed anything, if they questioned anything, we were always
6 there. So it was just very rare.

7 Q. Okay.

8 DR. SILVA: All right. That's all I have. Thank you.

9 MS. LEASE: Thanks.

10 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Dujuan.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Marvin.

12 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

13 Q. So are you involved in any FAA audits by any chance?

14 A. Whenever we have the FAA come ,then if it was something
15 involved as to what my particular job duties entailed, then I
16 would be involved.

17 Q. And you were talking about the risk assessment levels.

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. So who developed those levels, the low, medium, serious,
20 high?

21 A. The safety department built the matrix several years ago. It
22 was already built prior to me coming here, and I'm not sure what
23 they were using before, but I know that the matrix was built when
24 SMS was a voluntary pilot project.

25 Q. And is that matrix in the GOM or --

1 A. SMS.

2 Q. SMS, okay. So, for serious and high risk, you mentioned that
3 Tony signed off on those or accepts those; is that who --

4 A. Moderate. I said the moderate --

5 Q. Just the moderate?

6 A. Moderate or serious, I think, is what it is now for your
7 director level. I'd have to double check. Our matrix was
8 recently updated as the two companies merged. So Ravn had a
9 separate one, and then we had a separate one, and we -- with the
10 merger of our manuals, we built a new matrix that would better fit
11 the operation, the entire operation as a whole.

12 Q. And who chairs the ASAP program?

13 A. Well, the Medallion Foundation, a third party -- we used to
14 have a third-party administrator, and that changed as of maybe the
15 last 2 months. Again, that's just an estimate. It's very recent
16 that the Medallion Foundation closed down.

17 So, at that point, the safety department -- well, not the
18 department, one individual within the department has taken over
19 the ASAP submission. So basically he's the only one that sees the
20 reports. The rest of us in the department are not allowed to look
21 at that information, because it's a confidential reporting system,
22 and he's the one that identifies the -- I think he identifies the
23 information. He identifies the information, gives the information
24 to the FAA, and then sets up a meeting between the FAA and a pilot
25 rep.

1 Q. And for safety measurement systems, I know you conducted the
2 training; is there any outside training that the safety employees
3 get?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. For safety management systems?

6 A. Yes. And our previous SMS manual that was only PenAir
7 specific, we were required to take at least one external training
8 for safety.

9 Q. What was that training?

10 A. It depends. It varies year by year. So, like, mine this
11 year was the Embry-Riddle SMS with the accident investigation and
12 then the OSHA.

13 Q. And as far as the IEP program, that's concerned, what's your
14 level of involvement with the IEP program?

15 A. So I don't conduct any audits. However, if I need any kind
16 of information as far as tracking and trending, or if I need data,
17 then I can get that from them, or they can get it from me as well.
18 And also, any kind of safety reports, if we need to put those
19 safety reports into monitoring phase, then we'll come to them and
20 say, this needs to be monitored; can you take a look at this
21 process within the next 2 weeks to, you know, measure how it has
22 been working?

23 Or if we need something to be monitored and not on a
24 temporary level, we want something to be looked at on more so of a
25 long-term level, we'll have them put the information -- add the

1 information to a checklist so that this is something that gets
2 monitored, whether employees are doing monthly audits or yearly or
3 self-audits. You know, we have employees that do the self-audits.
4 Or it could be something that they add to their checklists, and
5 whatever the frequency is of the audit, then this is something
6 that is being monitored.

7 Q. So a lot of the data that you see also helps you with your
8 SMS as far as stats are concerned?

9 A. Exactly. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. All right.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all I had. Thank you.

12 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Dajuan.

13 Brandon.

14 MR. WILSON: She answered all my questions already.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Wow.

16 MR. WILSON: I have nothing.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Tony?

18 MR. FISCHER: I have nothing.

19 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I just have a couple. We'll do one more
20 quick round. I only have a couple.

21 BY MR. FRANTZ:

22 Q. Do you ever -- does the safety department ever receive any
23 safety reporting regarding unsafe behavior of other employees?

24 A. I can't say that I recall any with unsafe behavior right now.

25 Q. So have you ever seen a report from one pilot submitting a

1 concern about another pilot's behavior or actions safety-wise in
2 your time in the department?

3 A. Maybe. I would have to look through the reports. I know
4 that there has been one -- I remember one that was not in the
5 flight ops group.

6 Q. Okay. Nothing you recall from the flight ops group?

7 A. Possibly. I'd have to pull up the reports in front of me to
8 give a better answer though.

9 Q. Okay. Is there -- do you know of any routes someone from the
10 flight ops group has, other than through the safety department, to
11 raise attention or concern about another person's -- another
12 pilot's behavior? Do they have other reporting routes?

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. What are those?

15 A. So they could reach out to one of the lead pilots, or they
16 could go to the chief pilot, or they could go to the director of
17 operations, or they could go to the managing -- well, I guess that
18 is the safety department, managing director of safety, or they
19 could go to a VP or even the accountable executive.

20 Q. Are you confident that flight ops personnel are aware of all
21 those options --

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. -- for raising concerns?

24 A. Absolutely.

25 Q. If somebody raised a concern -- a flight ops person raised a

1 concern like that through one of those routes, would it
2 necessarily ever come to the attention of the safety department,
3 per se?

4 A. If it affected the operations as far as safety or the
5 employees, or if there was any kind of effect on safety, yes.

6 Q. So you're not sure you have ever had specific reports through
7 the safety department about -- from a flight ops about another
8 person's behavior?

9 A. I think there may have, just off the top of my mind, but
10 again, I would have to look through the reporting system to give a
11 definite answer on that.

12 Q. Right. Okay. Are there any current, unresolved safety
13 reports regarding Dutch Harbor?

14 A. I don't believe so, no.

15 Q. Do you recall when you had the last safety report related to
16 Dutch Harbor?

17 A. No. But as we merged the operation, I am no longer the
18 primary analyst as far as our safety reporting system. So -- I'm
19 trying to think of what the last one was that I recall. It was --
20 I don't know. Maybe it was an alcohol passenger -- intoxicated
21 passenger. But again, I can't be a hundred percent certain on
22 that one. That's where I'd have to pull the reports up in front
23 of me.

24 Q. Okay.

25 MR. FRANTZ: All right, thank you. That's all I have right

1 now.

2 Sathya, do you have any follow-ups?

3 DR. SILVA: Just a clarification.

4 BY DR. SILVA:

5 Q. So how are flight crews educated about ways to report safety
6 issues?

7 A. Initial and recurrent, and it's also listed within the manual
8 suite, and there's basically directions to say that, if one of
9 these events occur, then this is how you submit a report. You can
10 do it via paper, electronic, or report it to flight ops
11 management. So everything is spelled out within the manual suite,
12 so they have the information with them at all times.

13 And we also go over it when we go and do initial. I will
14 actually open up the reporting system and say, this is where you
15 click, this is what you enter, this is how you submit, this is the
16 life of the report. And then I also show them the paper
17 alternative, which is the captain's report, and basically it's
18 just information -- same information on a submission form for our
19 electronic version, but that's just another way that they can give
20 the information to us. So that's actually gone over on an annual
21 recurrence.

22 Q. Okay. Are there any other promotion activities, like, for
23 example, you gave with going out to stations and communicating
24 with the employees? Has anything like that happened with the
25 pilot group?

1 A. Just the awards, the Spirit of Safety Award, the safety
2 bulletin, and then the general submission for hazard reports. And
3 then the annual report also.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I mean, not annual report, annual meeting.

6 Q. Right. Have you received any reports related to pilots being
7 pressured to fly or take a flight?

8 A. No. For PenAir, I can confidently say no.

9 Q. Okay. And we talked about Dutch Harbor specifically, but in
10 general for flight ops and reports coming from crew members,
11 what's the nature of the reports that you get in from crew
12 members?

13 A. Probably just as what I said before: intoxicated passengers,
14 weather diversions, and honestly, that's all that I could think of
15 really as far as crew members' flight reports.

16 Q. If there is a diversion for weather, can you walk me through
17 how that kind of report would be handled from the safety
18 department in terms of risk assessment and --

19 A. So if it were a weather diversion, then the flight crew would
20 submit the report. Then basically they would get a thank you
21 message, just basically a canned message that comes from one of
22 the analysts within the safety department. We give that
23 communication acknowledging that we received the report, and then
24 at that point, the report comes to us. And then we'll open it up.
25 We will measure the risk based on the severity and the likelihood.

1 And then we'll give it an assessment, and then we'll de-identify
2 it, and then we'll basically create a duplicate of that
3 information.

4 And then we'll distribute that information to flight ops
5 management. And they are going to be the ones that take a look at
6 it, because they are the subject matter experts within flight
7 operations. Then they are going to review it, and then if there's
8 nothing out of the ordinary, and it was -- you know, normal
9 procedures were followed, flight crew did everything that they
10 needed to do as far as following procedure, then there's no
11 further action required.

12 And then they give us the note that they've reviewed it and
13 no further action necessary because crew members did everything
14 that they needed to do. And then, at that point, we will have a
15 closure e-mail. Then we'll give that to the submitter saying that
16 flight ops management has reviewed your report, has determined
17 that no further action is necessary. And then we close the
18 report. And then we take that and keep it for tracking and
19 trending. And the reports that I distribute, too, that'll also go
20 into further reports that I give to our leadership or our coach or
21 partner.

22 Q. How often would you say, when it comes to weather diversions,
23 do you close it out versus have further action?

24 A. Pretty much close them out all the time.

25 Q. And when you say flight ops management, who is it that you're

1 working with over there?

2 A. The chief pilot, the director of operations, and before it
3 was our manager of flight standards, and our manager of fleet
4 safety because that position -- we don't have that position.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I'm pretty sure we don't have that position anymore. Just
7 our org charts have been changing a lot, titles have been
8 changing. We've just been going through a lot of change with our
9 personnel lately.

10 Q. Okay. So that was Kirk Watson that you had worked with
11 before? Is that right?

12 A. No. It was before him.

13 Q. Okay.

14 DR. SILVA: That's all I have. Thank you.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thanks, Sathya.

16 Dujuan, any follow-ups?

17 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

18 Q. Just one more. So you travel to the stations and conduct
19 meetings at the stations. Is there a manager of stations?

20 A. Uh-huh. Customer service manager.

21 Q. Okay. And then when you go there and you -- do they talk
22 about risks that they see at their particular stations --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And that's pretty open communication?

25 A. Absolutely.

1 Q. Do they ever use a matrix? Is there a different matrix that
2 they use --

3 A. No.

4 Q. Just the one matrix?

5 A. We use one across the entire operation.

6 Q. Okay.

7 DR. SEVILLIAN: That's all I have.

8 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks. Brandon?

9 MR. WILSON: I got nothing.

10 MR. FRANTZ: Tony?

11 MR. FISCHER: (No audible response.)

12 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. One more quick one.

13 BY MR. FRANTZ:

14 Q. You've talked about this a few times. Safety reports based
15 on, you said on flight ops; specifically, alcohol associated and
16 weather diversions. Why would a pilot make a safety report
17 because he diverted for weather? What's the safety concern? What
18 would a typical safety concern be for that?

19 A. Well, that was a requirement. So basically we have a list of
20 mandatory reports that the flight crew have to make to -- as far
21 as the safety report, and that was one of the items that was
22 listed in the GOM.

23 Q. As a mandatory report?

24 A. As a mandatory -- it's a required report.

25 Q. You said was listed; is it still listed in the GOM? Is that

1 going to change or --

2 A. I don't know. I know that there was some talk about it being
3 changed, but because -- I'm pretty sure that they don't -- it's
4 not a required report on the Ravn side, but as far as right now, I
5 think that it still is in the GOM as a required report.

6 Q. Okay. I think we are finished. Is there anything that we
7 didn't ask you about you think we should have regarding this
8 investigation?

9 A. Not that I can think of.

10 Q. Okay. Anything to add?

11 A. Huh-uh.

12 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. We are done then. Thank you. We can go
13 off record.

14 (Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Tiffany Lease

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 3, 2019


was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Betty Caudle
Official Reporter



Letha J. Wheeler
Transcriber



Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/16/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: TONY SANTIAGO
Director of Safety, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Thursday,
December 5, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Santiago)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Tony Santiago:		
By Dr. Sevillian		5
By Dr. Silva		15
By Mr. Frantz		24
By Dr. Sevillian		35
By Dr. Silva		38

I N T E R V I E W

(2:34 p.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Good afternoon, Tony. My name is Dajuan
4 Sevillian, and I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB.
5 Appreciate you coming out and interviewing with us today.

6 Around the room, we have NTSB investigators. But also, as a
7 result of our party system, we have members of our party here.
8 They provide us with information to help support our
9 investigation. Have you ever been on an NTSB investigation
10 before?

11 MR. SANTIAGO: Not prior to this one, no.

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. So FAA is here, but they're not here
13 for enforcement by any means. It's just for safety. And so
14 that's the FAA's role.

15 You're entitled to one representative. Who would you like to
16 represent you?

17 MR. SANTIAGO: Morgan Campbell.

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. So as this is being recorded, through
19 the transcription process, this will be in the public docket one
20 day in the future, just to let you know that.

21 What we'll do is we'll go around the room, introduce
22 ourselves, and then we'll go from there. So we'll start with
23 Marvin.

24 Go ahead, Marvin.

25 MR. FRANTZ: Marvin Frantz. I'm an operational factors

1 investigator with the NTSB.

2 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva, human performance investigator with
3 the NTSB.

4 MR. WILSON: Brandon Wilson, one of the check airmen at
5 PenAir.

6 MR. SANTIAGO: Hey.

7 MR. FISCHER: And I'm Tony Fischer with the Denali CMO.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: Any time when we have a, have a question and
9 you don't know it, just say you don't know. We'll move on from
10 there. For the record, yes and no is important, so just say yes
11 or no to the questions if -- instead of, instead of nodding. Is
12 there, is there anything else, any questions you have before we
13 get started?

14 MR. SANTIAGO: No, I think --

15 DR. SEVILLIAN: Very good. Okay.

16 INTERVIEW OF TONY SANTIAGO

17 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

18 Q. So, for the record, could you please state your full name
19 with spelling?

20 A. Tony -- middle name too?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Tony Orlando Santiago. It's T-o-n-y, O-r-l-a-n-d-o,
23 S-a-n-t-i-a-g-o.

24 Q. Okay. And what's your role here at PenAir?

25 A. I am a director of safety here at PenAir.

1 Q. Okay. Could you give us a brief scope of your work as
2 director of safety at PenAir?

3 A. Well, primarily I serve as the Part 119, a position required
4 by regulation. Essentially, boiling it all down, I'm responsible
5 for all the safety programs here at PenAir as far as how the SMS
6 is concerned and our Part 5 compliance with that reg. That's just
7 kind of summing it down, and summing -- there's quite a bit more
8 to it that I can go into, if you would like.

9 Q. Yes, please.

10 A. Okay. So that's dealing with our safety reporting systems,
11 how our IAP -- or QAP, as it's been retitled recently -- works.
12 Audit scheduling, processing of all our SRMs, safety risk
13 managements, or safety promotion programs, our -- essentially, our
14 day-to-day functions. I'm responsible for all the different
15 departments in the scope of safety. We include -- security is
16 also in that. And technical publications also falls underneath
17 safety. So those are all the different areas that fall under my
18 purview.

19 Q. Okay. Could you give us a brief sketch of your aviation
20 background?

21 A. Well, I've been at PenAir for the last 16 years. It'll be 17
22 years in January. Basically spent my entire aviation career here
23 at PenAir since I was 19. So that's -- pretty much all my
24 experience here is internal, but I did start primarily with a
25 ground background. I started on the ramp back in 2003 -- January

1 of '03. Worked the ramp for about a year or so. In 2004, I
2 became a lead, a supervisor, on the ramp. And funny enough, I
3 also trained Brandon when he started on the ramp. But in 2006, I
4 moved on into operation, which is primarily dealing with weight
5 and balance, and just kind of the loading of the aircraft and
6 working in that portion of the operation. I did that for about 2
7 years.

8 In 2008, I interviewed for safety and became the -- I don't
9 have the exact month, but in 2008, I became the -- called the
10 insurance manager, which is primarily dealing with the IAP
11 program. So I was basically running the audit schedule --
12 building the audit schedule, better said. Running the audits,
13 conducting those. Did that for -- in that time frame, the title
14 changed a few times, but in reality, the position was the same.

15 I moved to, you know, audit -- they retitled it to audit
16 coordinator, audit manager. Finally they settled on manager of
17 ground safety in 2010. So in 2010, that became my position. And
18 still an IAP focus, but it kind of geared more towards the ground
19 operations and how the stations were operating and fuel and deice
20 and that type of thing. Did that for -- check my notes. About 4
21 years.

22 In 2014, I became the IAP program director. So I was just
23 basically put in charge of the entire audit program for flight and
24 maintenance and ground and coordinating that side of the
25 operation. I did that until July of 2017. In July of 2017, I

1 became the 119 director of safety for PenAir, and I've been in
2 that role till now -- current. In addition to that, I was also
3 made the management director of safety for Ravn Air Group for all
4 three certificates in -- just a few months ago, in July. So I
5 also have that role that was added on just a few months ago.

6 I apologize. I'm trying to speak up, but --

7 DR. SILVA: I understand.

8 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

9 Q. And you mentioned safety programs here at PenAir. You are in
10 charge of that. So is that ASAP?

11 A. ASAP is a part of that, yes.

12 Q. Okay. For the internal evaluation program, what does that
13 include as far as auditing is concerned, that -- you know, which
14 areas are you looking into for internal review?

15 A. I would say everything. I don't think anything's outside of
16 our purview besides finance type items. We don't -- we're not
17 really heavy into the finance aspect of the auditing. We leave
18 that to the auditors if they hire for that type of thing for --
19 the banks require it.

20 But flight and -- apologies. Flight and ground are under us.
21 We audit -- at PenAir, we audited the CAS program specifically for
22 maintenance, and then maintenance ran the day-to-day audits that
23 require the maintenance program by regulation. So maintenance
24 would have handled the primary -- the required 21 tasks that they
25 have for auditing of maintenance, and then we would audit the CAS

1 program and maintenance the oversight over them to make sure they
2 were following the schedule as required and closing out their
3 findings or cards they would generate.

4 Q. Okay. And as far as -- so flight operations, part of IAP
5 review, have you ever done a review of the airport qualification
6 criteria for PenAir?

7 A. It is part of our scheduled audits. We require a minimum of
8 one audit per year for each discipline or department, so to say.
9 So crew scheduling and pilot records would be primarily where
10 those -- sorry -- where those types of operations would be
11 evaluated.

12 Q. And when was the last time flight ops was evaluated?

13 A. They get evaluated periodically throughout the year. It's
14 just broken out into -- I wouldn't say there's one big flight ops
15 audit. There is -- one month they'll do, you know, pilot records.
16 Another one they'll do actual flight ops and do flight op --
17 cockpit operations or cabin operations, or pilot records and crew
18 scheduling, for example.

19 Q. And what are you looking at in pilot records and crew
20 scheduling?

21 A. In pilot records, the actual pilot files are opened and
22 evaluated. They go -- they'll pick a sampling of files, and
23 they'll look and see, make sure they have their initial
24 qualifications, check whatever's required by -- per our FOTM. So,
25 you know, if qualifications were current, if check rides were

1 done, if they're done timely, if they meet the base grace
2 requirements.

3 Q. And as far as safety management systems is concerned, are all
4 pilots trained on safety management systems, to your knowledge?

5 A. Absolutely. At PenAir, we've taken a very active role in the
6 safety training aspect of operation. Either Tiffany -- Tiffany
7 has primarily taken that role. I think you've interviewed her
8 already. But she's been kind of my lead on doing all the pilot
9 training. But we made -- very early on, we decided that we wanted
10 to make sure that the safety department did the SMS training for
11 our pilot group.

12 Q. So with Tiffany's role, she's manager of safety.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. She handles the hazards -- the safety hazards and making sure
15 that -- what was the system that the hazards -- safety hazards
16 were put into?

17 A. Previously WBAT.

18 Q. WBAT. Okay.

19 A. We are currently using Vistair.

20 Q. Vistair. Okay.

21 A. We just moved over to Vistair in -- we did it staged, but we
22 -- the SRA portion of it was activated back in June. Safety
23 reporting, we activated in September.

24 Q. All right. So as director of safety, how do you get involved
25 with -- if a hazard comes through -- a safety hazard comes

1 through -- let's say, for instance, a pilot. How do you get
2 involved with review or disposition of that?

3 A. All of those come to me. I'm able to view -- for all three
4 certificates, for that matter. But I'm able to review all of
5 them. They come directly to my email. We have a daily phone call
6 that takes place. Any, you know, concerns that get brought up
7 that are pressing or elevated risk that I would see get brought up
8 on that call. 8 o'clock every morning. In addition to that, we
9 have our own meetings internal for our department. And that's
10 kind of, just kind of our process just on a day-to-day basis.

11 And then we have our -- also, in addition to that, all our
12 different SMS-mandated meetings that we have, like our safety
13 action group meetings that happen on a quarterly basis, our safety
14 review board meetings that take place on a quarterly basis, flight
15 standards review board meetings. There are just several meetings
16 that kind of -- Vistair, the inputs, like, from safety reporting,
17 all of that, feed into those meetings, and that's where they're
18 processed. And I take part in as many of them as I can, of
19 course.

20 Q. Do you work closely with the FAA principal operations
21 inspector at any time?

22 A. Yeah, we meet fairly often. I have a cell phone number we
23 call. It's been -- with the recent change in CMTs, we're still
24 getting to know each other a bit. I've been working with Chuck
25 Fitzpatrick for the last several years. And they changed our,

1 they changed our CMT to be the same as the Corvus CMT relatively
2 recently. Probably in July or so. Yeah. So we're still getting
3 to know each other.

4 Q. Do you interface with using the voluntary disclosure
5 reporting system? Is that --

6 A. VDRPs?

7 Q. Yeah, VDRPs.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Yeah. And how does that -- you know, how do you, how do you
10 interface with that whole process?

11 A. Well, VDRPs are -- we like to let the DOs or DMs -- DOMs file
12 those from an operations standpoint. Safety is a role, as
13 documented in our program. We're really more the surveillance
14 part of it. You know, they go through, I'll help them find the
15 root cause and implement their -- or document the corrective
16 actions in the system.

17 Safety's role at that point is to validate that they've
18 actually done those fixes and put them into the manual system with
19 our symbology that's to let us know. That's a control that we put
20 in place because we violated an FAR of some kind. So we want to
21 -- once we get those, we know those are kind of trigger points in
22 our IAP checklist that are added to make sure that we follow up on
23 those in the future.

24 Q. And what sort of safety promotion do you do with the
25 organization as far as bulletins? When you, when you see a

1 corrective action and you say -- you know, is there certain things
2 that you want to, you know, show the pilot community and say, hey,
3 we've learned this? How does that work?

4 A. We have -- for our most significant type issues, we have
5 what's called a safety flash. So our safety flash is we'll go --
6 on the safety flash, we'll put out -- we make sure to say, hey,
7 this -- we don't want to be ambiguous and just say, hey. We want
8 to make sure you guys are aware of something. We'll say, no, we
9 had something happen, and this is what happened, and this is what
10 we need to do to mitigate that, or this is our policy that was
11 violated.

12 And then we always include a second sheet that's, like, kind
13 of a briefing sheet for, you know, any supervisor that wants to
14 talk to their staff about it. They have talking points to say,
15 hey, these are the things we want you to talk to your staff about,
16 you know. And we usually include two or three questions on there,
17 just for the supervisor to talk to their employee about those
18 items, so to say.

19 On a more regularly scheduled basis, we have our safety
20 bulletins. Those go out every 2 weeks. And on those, we usually
21 have three things on there, three topics, one being safety
22 management systems, SMS; one being safety 24/7, you know, safety
23 outside the home -- outside of work, not just here at -- not just
24 here in the workplace, but outside your -- you know, at your home
25 or anywhere you're at; and then a recent event. So we'll always

1 highlight something that's happened recently in the company,
2 whether it comes to us via a safety report or something we
3 discovered in an audit or something like that, just to highlight
4 for the entire employee group, really, what's going on in the
5 organization.

6 Q. Have there been any -- a safety flash or a safety bulletin
7 since the PenAir accident?

8 A. Since the accident? There's been a few. There's been two or
9 three, but I'm trying to think if they were PenAir-specific or
10 not. There was one that came out that was PenAir-specific, yes.

11 Q. And what was the general focus of that one?

12 A. That one was specifically dealing with the air stairs. We
13 had, had incidents of air stairs being pulled away from the
14 aircraft too soon. And we have a requirement that, when you pull
15 the stairs up to the aircraft, you cannot remove them without
16 letting the flight attendant know, just because there's a
17 requirement for egress. So if she doesn't know the stairs are
18 away, the doors open, the stairs are inside the aircraft, they
19 have no way to get off the aircraft if an emergency happens.

20 So there's a requirement that she needs to know, so that if
21 she's still going to be on the airplane doing briefings or
22 anything with the passengers, that you need to put those internal
23 stairs, stairs down. So we had had a couple of incidences -- one
24 too many for my taste, but it happened repeatedly over about a 2-
25 week time frame, and it happened in stations where we had newer

1 employees turning the PenAir planes. So we wanted to make sure to
2 get that, get that out immediately. So we did a flash for that.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right, Tony, that's the questions
4 I have for right now.

5 Sathya?

6 BY DR. SILVA:

7 Q. Have there ever been any safety bulletins specific to either
8 special airports or Dutch in particular?

9 A. Safety flash. I know there's been several, but
10 operationally, the only one that really comes to my mind
11 immediately was probably a couple years ago where we had -- a
12 flash was put out after we had an incident in Dutch Harbor where
13 the prop tether was left on the airplane. And it actually --
14 engine almost started with that prop tether in place, and the prop
15 tether shot through the side of the airplane.

16 So we ended up doing the safety flash for that. There's been
17 others, but I don't want to get into specifics without being
18 certain. Yeah.

19 Q. Any bulletins or flashes related to operations in special
20 airports?

21 A. There have been, but as -- I just don't remember the exact
22 details. I know there's been flight ops bulletins that the flight
23 ops department internally does as well that are also based on
24 safety reports, things like that. And I mean, I can pull them up.
25 But I know there have been, there have been a few over the past

1 few years just related to Dutch and operations in there. Yeah.

2 Q. Do you have any flight time?

3 A. I'm not a pilot.

4 Q. No? You mentioned that the CMT changed a few months ago.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. How was it working with the prior CMT?

7 A. Really well. We had a really good relationship, I would say.

8 Q. So did you -- who did you primarily work with?

9 A. Chuck Fitzpatrick.

10 Q. How did things change in terms of FAA once the CMT switch
11 happened?

12 A. The new CMT just really wasn't that -- isn't -- I would say
13 still isn't that familiar with PenAir as a whole. They were just
14 handed, here's the certificate, and they had to -- in the middle
15 of doing this, you know, SOC process for merging certificates
16 together, all of a sudden they have all these Corvus manuals, and
17 they have an additional set of manuals for PenAir that they're
18 having to all of a sudden be tasked with knowing. And it's been a
19 bit of a process trying to --

20 Q. Can you elaborate on that? Yeah.

21 A. Well, just certain things where they'll come in, and they'll
22 kind of expect -- just something as simple as our technical
23 publication. At Corvus, they do -- they have a bulletin system
24 for quick manual changes that are outside of the manual revision
25 process. So it's like, we need to make a change to the manual.

1 They call it a bulletin, and they attach the bulletin to the front
2 of the manual. Well, at PenAir, we have a -- we call it our TR
3 process or temporary revision process. And we -- what we do is we
4 put it on a yellow page and insert that on the page facing the
5 manual.

6 So something as simple as getting them to get that we don't
7 do bulletins, or all the temporary, quick changes aren't in the
8 front of the manual. We actually put them in the page that's
9 appended. And something as simple as that, where they come in
10 talking, I want a bulletin, I need a bulletin now, where's the
11 bulletin? We don't have bulletins. We have TRs. It's different.
12 And just simple administrative things like that kind of get lost
13 in the, in the shuffle. So it's -- there's a lot of, wait a
14 minute, this is PenAir; this is not Ravn. We need to --

15 Q. Right.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. So how is that process going?

18 A. It's getting better. I would say it's getting better. I
19 think there was just kind of an initial feeling out period. They
20 didn't know us, we didn't know them, and we were all kind of just
21 -- we had -- you know, the previous CMT had been on our
22 certificate for several years at that point. So all of a sudden,
23 they were gone. We came to work on Friday, and they were gone.
24 We were told, this is your CMT now. There was no notice. It was
25 just a change now.

1 So it did take some initial feeling out just to kind of
2 figure out, okay, who are they? They tend to want different
3 things. So things that, you know, the previous CMT would say,
4 well, they liked the way it was, now they're like, well, we
5 wouldn't have approved that. So we're finding there's some
6 differences, kind of, in how they approach things. So we're
7 figuring it out. It's not -- I wouldn't say it's a bad
8 relationship, but we're still -- you know, just different ways of
9 doing things.

10 Q. Did you get the impression that there was any kind of, like,
11 handover from the previous CMT to the current CMT?

12 A. I mean --

13 Q. From your perspective?

14 A. -- I imagine it happened, but it didn't really -- if it did,
15 it didn't seem very thorough. Just my opinion.

16 Q. So you're not seeing the effects thereof.

17 A. I wouldn't -- no.

18 Q. Okay. The descriptions of the interaction, is there -- there
19 seemed to be some kind of adversary based on how they approach you
20 and things they expect, based on your descriptions. Is that a
21 fair assessment?

22 A. That it's adversarial?

23 Q. Adversarial.

24 A. I got to think about that one. I don't --

25 Q. It doesn't have to be that word if you have a better word.

1 A. I wouldn't say it's adversarial, but because of -- I would
2 say more they have a certain expectation of how things should be
3 done based on the way they've always done it. And when you didn't
4 necessarily fall in line with that, they're really quick to write
5 a letter, you know, instead of trying to talk it over.

6 And that was a significant difference in approaches from the
7 previous CMT. Whereas this one previous CMT, you had a problem,
8 you could call him and just work it out. And the new one will be
9 really, really fast to -- I've noticed -- you come to work and
10 there's a letter. Whether it's compliance action or LOI, whatever
11 terminology they want to use, but it seems to be -- they seem to
12 be a lot quicker to do that.

13 Q. Have you received a number of those since the switch?

14 A. Yeah. I haven't received them. They're going to Brian.
15 They're addressed to Brian.

16 Q. Okay. Addressed to Brian.

17 A. But I end up having to deal with them.

18 Q. It's your responsibility?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. So when did they start? Do you remember when that switch
21 happened?

22 A. Officially, in July or so.

23 Q. Okay, so July. It's November now.

24 A. I don't have the exact date.

25 Q. Okay. So it's been about 6 months, 5 or 6 months?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Can you give me an idea of quantity of the letters you're
3 getting compared to this 6 months versus the beginning of the
4 year?

5 A. I mean, I could tell you in the last month probably about 9
6 or 10, which was significantly more than I have ever received
7 before the CMT switch.

8 Q. What about before the accident? Were you still getting them?

9 A. Before the accident, we were still getting them, yeah. I
10 would say right when it switched over, we probably got four or
11 five immediately.

12 Q. How often would that happen with the previous CMT?

13 A. Not very. They happened, I mean, but I just really can't
14 remember a number offhand. But it wasn't frequent enough to be --

15 Q. Is that, like, one every couple of months or --

16 A. I don't know. Maybe one or two here and there. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay. Okay. Let's see. Were you aware of any initiatives
18 before the accident to change the airport qualifications for
19 pilots?

20 A. Can you repeat the question?

21 Q. Were you aware of any initiatives to change the airport
22 qualification requirements -- special airports qualification
23 requirements prior to the accident?

24 A. To change them, no. I'm trying to think. There was talks
25 about maybe getting a new piece of equipment in the airplane to

1 help the more junior pilots who are getting qualified, but not to
2 reduce the requirement beyond what it already was, the 300 or 100
3 with the waiver, that I'm aware of.

4 Q. What was this piece of equipment?

5 A. The Stratus 3.

6 Q. Okay. So was that given to the first officers as a test
7 basis? Was that what I'm understanding?

8 A. From my understanding, we were only in discussions with the
9 FAA to get it approved to put in the airplane. So anybody that
10 actually had one, it was a personal piece of equipment.

11 Q. I see. Okay. How would you describe the health of your
12 reporting system?

13 A. Could be better.

14 Q. In what ways?

15 A. From our ground crews, we get quite a few reports. From the
16 pilot side, we don't always get the reports that we necessarily
17 want. They seem to be more apt to go tell the chief pilot, and
18 then we get it from the chief pilot that, hey, they have a
19 concern.

20 So I would say I would like to see -- I always want to see
21 more reporting. Any time I hear about an issue from a supervisor
22 that I didn't get in a report through the system, I'm concerned
23 that we're not getting the inputs into the system.

24 Q. Do you have an idea of why that might be the case?

25 A. I know that -- or I won't say I know. My opinion here is

1 just that, especially in the recent year with the bankruptcy
2 process, that's when we noticed the most significant, kind of,
3 downward trend, during the bankruptcy. It got better once we kind
4 of exited, and then we've kind of seen -- it's kind of gone up and
5 down since then.

6 Q. Okay. So if a pilot had a concern -- a safety concern about
7 their supervisor, is there a mechanism for them to bring that to
8 safety -- to the safety department?

9 A. We have several outlets. We do have our Lighthouse
10 compliance and ethics line that is available --

11 Q. Okay. Compliance and ethics. Okay.

12 A. -- where they can call that. We also have a 24-hour line
13 that the safety department carries -- that there's always somebody
14 from our department that carries that line, that -- it rotates
15 among myself and the other managers, directors in the department,
16 that they're able to call. And then we also have open door
17 policy, so any time they want to talk about anything, they can
18 come to my office or Brian's office and come in.

19 Q. Tell me about this compliance and ethics line. What does
20 that provide a pilot that used it?

21 A. It just gives them an outlet. If they have a concern with,
22 you know, anything about compliance, they're not comfortable
23 coming to me or comfortable coming to anybody, it's a third-party
24 company we've hired called Lighthouse. They're able to give their
25 concern, and those concerns get sent directly to Dave Pflieger,

1 CEO; our human resources VP, Wendy Yow; and Brian Whilden, senior
2 VP -- or president of PenAir and senior VP of safety for the Ravn
3 Air Group. So those three get it, and then they work every single
4 one of those issues from that, from that front.

5 Q. Okay. How are pilots notified of this resource?

6 A. It's in our SMS manual. It's also -- we have -- the Ravn Air
7 Group gets safe go cards that have been passed out to all the
8 employees. So that number and the 24-hour hotline is on that
9 card.

10 Q. Okay. What is the fatigue --

11 DR. SILVA: Are you okay?

12 MR. SANTIAGO: Sorry.

13 DR. SILVA: We can pause and take a break any time.

14 MR. SANTIAGO: Can we take a break?

15 DR. SILVA: Absolutely.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah. We can take a break.

17 DR. SILVA: Absolutely.

18 COURT REPORTER: Okay. Off record 3:04.

19 (Off the record at 3:04 p.m.)

20 (On the record at 3:12 p.m.)

21 COURT REPORTER: We are back on record at 3:12.

22 BY DR. SILVA:

23 Q. So my last question was regarding fatigue policies.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. If a pilot calls out on fatigue, is -- what is the policy in

1 terms of making up any hours or pay or anything along those lines?

2 A. Making up pay?

3 Q. Yeah. So is there --

4 A. I don't think we have anything for that. I mean, we do
5 require that they submit a fatigue report if they're going to call
6 out fatigued, and those are analyzed in accordance with our
7 fatigue policy. But as far as the pay side of it, I'm not sure,
8 actually.

9 Q. Do they, do -- would they still get paid for a day or the
10 flight, or --

11 A. I'm not sure.

12 Q. You don't know? Okay.

13 A. I don't think so. But I'm not sure. I don't want to --

14 Q. That's okay. It's probably a good question for somebody
15 else.

16 A. Yeah.

17 DR. SILVA: Okay. All set there. Thank you.

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya.

19 Marvin?

20 BY MR. FRANTZ:

21 Q. Yeah. Tony, did you say you had a manager of safety
22 responsibility for Ravn Air Group?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you have a director of safety. Is that a 119 position?

25 A. Director of safety is 119.

1 Q. No, what about the manager for Ravn Air Group?

2 A. Not yet. The idea is that -- the long-term plan is, once the
3 PenAir certificate goes away, that I transition into the 7H
4 director of safety.

5 Q. 7H?

6 A. Corvus. Ravn.

7 Q. What's the difference between Corvus and Ravn?

8 A. Branding. It's Corvus Airlines d/b/a Ravn Air Alaska.

9 Q. And isn't there another certificate?

10 A. Had one. H6, or Ravn Air Connect.

11 Q. And so you're manager of safety for them, too, in your Ravn
12 manager of safety position?

13 A. I oversee the director, the director for that. So 7H
14 currently has their own director of safety, Adam Ricciardi, and
15 then H6 has a director of safety, Greg Hess. And they report to
16 me.

17 Q. So you have safety responsibilities for three certificates
18 now?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. How many airplanes is that? Any idea, roughly?

21 A. A little over 80, I think, is about right. Yeah.

22 Q. So who's your boss?

23 A. Brian Whilden.

24 Q. And then do you have another boss in your other position as
25 manager of safety for Ravn Air Group?

1 A. No. Brian is the accountable executive for PenAir, and I
2 report to him in that capacity for PenAir. And then he's a senior
3 VP of safety for Ravn Air Group, and I report to him in that --
4 for both.

5 Q. So who works for you here at PenAir? Who's underneath you?

6 A. On the PenAir certificate specifically? Tiffany and Dave
7 Fiacco.

8 Q. What's Dave's title?

9 A. Manager of flight safety.

10 Q. So this would be wrong if I see manager of flight safety
11 under the DO on this org chart?

12 A. Yes. Yes. Yeah.

13 Q. Manager of flight safety should be over here?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Along with the manager of safety?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Who's the manager of safety?

18 A. Tiffany Lease.

19 Q. There, it's fixed. Do you ever -- does the safety department
20 here have any involvement or ever touch the issue of special
21 airport qualifications for pilots, the process or the recording of
22 the qualifications for special airports?

23 A. As far as the auditing of it, yeah, but I mean --

24 Q. For auditing.

25 A. But the development of it was, like I said, done.

1 Q. Okay, so you audit.

2 A. Yeah. That they have the qualifications that they're --

3 Q. And what about fatigue reports? Do they come to the safety
4 department first?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. What do you -- and do they come to you, or do they
7 come to the manager of flight safety first?

8 A. We both get them. I get all of them.

9 Q. And what's your, what's your requirement? What are you
10 supposed to do with them when you get them?

11 A. We process them as if they were any other report. The same
12 as ASAP report -- well, ASAP is a little different, but a safety
13 report or a maintenance report that would come in. They get risk
14 assessed, they get sent to the appropriate supervisor, and they
15 get analyzed for a fatigue report.

16 They would get looked at for the schedule: Was the schedule
17 built properly -- or not properly. Was it built according to 117?
18 If there are any other factors. We'll talk to the pilot. You
19 know, did he have anything else? Did you have anything personal
20 going on that contributed to that, or was -- did we just build you
21 a bad schedule? Did we put you on a morning flight -- or
22 afternoon flight and then a morning flight the next day? You
23 know, just look at all the different factors that go into that.

24 Q. Do you know if there's ever any follow-up with the person or
25 the pilot who submitted the -- a fatigue report? Is he contacted

1 and ever asked more questions or anything? Any follow-up on the
2 fatigue report submitted by the pilot to the pilot?

3 A. We do. It's not always a phone call. We do have an online
4 reporting system, so we utilize the feedback system in -- within
5 WBAT and now Vistair. They'll get an email back with what was
6 done with the report. And that's the case for every single report
7 that we get. Online is the primary source. If we have follow-up
8 questions on something, we will call them and either say, hey, we
9 need some clarification on your report, or you didn't include this
10 data point, so we need some further clarification.

11 Q. Is that your job to do that, to do that follow-up?

12 A. I have done it, but the analyst or Tiffany are the primary
13 day-to-day drivers on it.

14 Q. Would someone necessarily call a pilot and say, why were you
15 fatigued? I see in your report you said you were fatigued coming
16 on duty; why were you fatigued? I mean, is that a typical
17 follow-up or --

18 A. Like, why were you fatigued?

19 Q. Why are you -- why were you fatigued? What was -- what's the
20 problem? Is that a --

21 A. Yeah, I mean --

22 Q. -- typical follow-up call?

23 A. Yeah. I would, I would say yeah. Yeah, I mean, just -- not
24 in a -- like it was a negative thing. Just, hey, what happened?
25 Was there something, like I said earlier, in your personal life,

1 or do you believe the schedule was built wrong, or did you just
2 not get enough sleep last night?

3 Q. In a fatigue report, is there any kind of narrative section
4 where a pilot can write why he was fatigued?

5 A. And that's what, that's what I was saying. I mean, it just
6 depends on what's -- how detailed they are. I've found, at least
7 in my experience, that when a pilot is fatigued, he's pretty
8 thorough in saying why. He's saying, hey -- just as an example,
9 you know, I can think of one where the pilot, you know, they said,
10 hey, I flew p.m. schedules, you know, was on shift 5 days this
11 week. All week I'm on p.m. schedules. On Friday, you decided to
12 put me on a 6:00 a.m. shuttle. I was tired. That didn't work for
13 me.

14 Q. Do you have a dispatch certificate?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Do you receive -- is there any kind of report, safety report,
17 required by a pilot if he doesn't take a flight because of weather
18 or other reasons other than just -- other than fatigue? If he
19 decides, I don't, I don't want to do this flight and because --

20 A. Like, once he shows up?

21 Q. Yes. Once he shows up, he's talking to dispatch, and he
22 decides he's not going to -- doesn't want to do it. Is there
23 anything he has to submit report-wise?

24 A. Yeah, we have a list of required reports in the SMS manual
25 saying, if you have these -- or GOM, actually; I'm sorry -- where

1 it says, if you have, you know, these type of events, you don't
2 take a flight for weather, you have mechanical interruption, you
3 divert somewhere, there's required reporting that's supposed to
4 take place.

5 Q. Okay. And are you the -- is the safety department the first
6 department to see that report -- a report like that?

7 A. Typically, yes.

8 Q. Okay. And then what --

9 A. If it's, if it's input into Vistair, we are the first ones to
10 see it.

11 Q. And that's --

12 A. We do, we do have a couple pilots that are -- who are
13 hesitant to use technology, so they use our old paper reporting
14 system. And if they use the paper report, they put it in the
15 chief pilot's box, and then he will bring them up to us.

16 Q. And then what do you do with it, a report of that nature that
17 we're talking about?

18 A. It gets entered into the system by us.

19 Q. And do you -- does the safety department follow up with the
20 pilot often, occasionally, never for more explanation about what's
21 going on here? Why did this --

22 A. I would say as required. I mean --

23 Q. What does that mean, "as required?" Who determines if it's
24 required or no?

25 A. I mean, us as the analysts, we'll look at it. Do we need

1 more detail? I mean, if we need more detail, we're going to
2 follow up every single time.

3 Q. Safety department --

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. -- is going to make that decision. So if the pilot has
6 technical reasons about weather or wind or runway conditions or
7 something, and he says he didn't want to do it, would it be the
8 safety department that determines what we need more information
9 about this?

10 A. Like, the risk? Well, we would go to -- I guess I'm missing
11 a step here. I'm sorry. Any report, like the flight-specific
12 like that, we're not just going to risk assess it and say, okay,
13 we know what this is; it's low risk. We're going to go to the
14 subject matter experts. We're going to go to flight ops and say,
15 hey, flight ops, this report came in. I mean, what do you think?

16 You know, and they're entering their information in the
17 system, into the investigation portion of the portal, so to say.
18 So there's more than just us looking at it. Other departments are
19 getting involved as far as, far as the SMS goes. Yeah.

20 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any pilots that turned down
21 flights for weather ever receiving any counseling or negative
22 consequences from the company?

23 A. I have heard of instances of -- rumor. I've heard co-pilots
24 come to me concerned about one particular incident where a pilot
25 turned down a flight and ended up getting called into the chief

1 pilot's office to question on their decision. It's only one
2 incident that I specifically have knowledge of.

3 Q. Who was that pilot?

4 A. Sarah Boots, I believe.

5 Q. Do you have any knowledge of what the outcome with that was
6 for her --

7 A. No.

8 Q. -- for any consequences other than visiting the chief pilot?
9 Do you know of anything else that happened?

10 A. No, not directly. No. That was something that came to me in
11 passing from another pilot with -- he came to me and just said,
12 hey, this happened; what do you know about it? I was like, I
13 don't know anything about it, but let me look into it. So I had a
14 conversation with Brian. It's like, hey, I had this feedback come
15 to me from a pilot. And Brian kind of took the baton from there.

16 Q. He did what?

17 A. He kind of took the baton, so to say, on that one.

18 Q. Do you know Deke Abbott?

19 A. I do know Deke Abbott.

20 Q. Is he in your chain of command, so to speak?

21 A. No.

22 Q. What's your relationship with him -- I mean, working
23 relationship with him? How do you interact with him? For what
24 reasons, or how, or --

25 A. We don't interact directly too often. He's the senior VP of

1 flight ops or operations for Ravn Air Group as a whole. Most of
2 my day-to-day interactions are more with Aaron Rocereta on the
3 Corvus certificate, their DO. And then our DO, Dick Harding, and
4 more the other 119s. I see him more in the corporate global
5 meetings that we have, like our weekly O&Ds. On Tuesdays, we meet
6 corporately as a -- all three -- well, the 121 certificates meet
7 on alternating weeks, and then the 135 the other week. So that's
8 where I see him most of the time.

9 Q. Okay. So you've been at PenAir a long time. Can you give me
10 a couple sentences summing up what you see as differences or
11 changes from before the bankruptcy to today? How is it -- how was
12 it 5 years ago, say, compared to today as far as safety culture
13 and overall safety operations in the airline?

14 A. I would say that overall I think the safety culture is still
15 good. Far as major changes, I would say, I have definitely
16 noticed among the pilot group, there's a little fear of the
17 unknown, so to say, from the Corvus side.

18 I've heard several comments -- you mentioned Deke. You know,
19 they're kind of afraid of him knowing things because -- just seems
20 to be a fear of, you know, him coming down, so to say. We didn't
21 have that before. There was more openness, definitely, with the
22 prior PenAir management, so to say. I definitely have heard a
23 couple comments here and there from the pilot groups coming to me
24 saying hey, you know, I'm not as comfortable anymore.

25 Q. When you say a fear of him knowing things, did you, did you

1 mean people might be more reluctant than they would have
2 previously to make a report because they're afraid that people
3 would find out and they --

4 A. Just to, just to speak to the incident we mentioned earlier,
5 you know, with Sarah, you know, that similar type of thing. You
6 know, saying something or making a decision and being questioned
7 on it.

8 Q. Do you think, in your opinion, since you've been doing safety
9 so long, would that -- could that have any negative impact on --

10 A. Reporting?

11 Q. -- the idea or the -- yeah, the freedom people feel to make
12 safety reports?

13 A. I think so. Yeah, I mean, it's probably a contributing
14 factor.

15 Q. So quantity-wise, have you seen a change in the number of
16 safety reports submitted from today versus 2 or 3 years ago?

17 A. Absolutely. It's gone down.

18 Q. It's gone down. Do you associate that at all with the
19 changeover or the acquisition by Ravn?

20 A. I believe that's part of it. Part of it is that. Part of it
21 is, like I mentioned earlier, the bankruptcy. There's a lot of
22 factors that go into that, I believe.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Yeah, thank you, Tony. That's all I have
24 for now.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Marvin.

1 Brandon?

2 MR. WILSON: I don't have any questions.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Tony?

4 MR. FISCHER: Nothing from me.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. We'll start our second round of
6 questions here. I'll start first.

7 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

8 Q. So a follow-up to what Marvin was saying about the
9 acquisition and change in safety reporting. Have you looked at
10 this as a high-risk, from director of safety, because people are
11 not reporting -- pilots are not reporting as you want, you know?

12 A. Um-hmm.

13 Q. You do believe it's a high risk?

14 A. Do I believe it's a high risk to the -- yeah, I think we're
15 not getting all the information that we should be.

16 Q. So how -- so you own that process. You own the safety
17 process. So how does that -- have you made any --

18 A. I've made various overtures to different departments. I've
19 reached out to the chief pilot saying, hey, look, I need your
20 help. I need you to talk to your groups. You know, there's been
21 different emails sent out to the group. We need reporting. I've
22 reported in our safety review board meetings, say, hey, our
23 numbers aren't healthy here; we need some renewed emphasis on
24 this. So there's definitely been communications regarding it.

25 Q. You said you reported to the chief pilot. Which chief pilot

1 are you referring to?

2 A. Both now.

3 Q. So Crystal and then --

4 A. Crystal Branchaud, and now Dennis.

5 Q. -- Dennis Fisher. Okay. So with Crystal, how was the
6 communication with Crystal? If you could describe when you, when
7 you communicated a need for a little bit more oversight on that,
8 how was that communication?

9 A. As far as --

10 Q. You being able to approach her and interact with her.

11 A. I didn't have any problems, personally. She tended to -- she
12 wasn't overly familiar with PenAir's system SMS, I would say.
13 Like, SRA completion, all that. She was in our office quite a bit
14 for help with doing safety risk assessments related to the SOC
15 process and all the different manual changes. So we worked with
16 her quite a bit in that regard.

17 Q. Okay. Now with the change, having Dennis Fisher in as chief
18 pilot, any changes that you've seen in the process or
19 interactions?

20 A. Well, I think it's been better, but a lot of that comes from,
21 I think, he's just -- he's been around PenAir a lot longer. He
22 was more familiar with our -- how we did things, how we do things.
23 He still needs a little -- like I said, he's never been involved
24 in, you know, the actual online system, so to say, and doing the
25 SRAs. But, you know, it's not hard. I mean, it's just a matter

1 of, kind of, guiding him in the right direction.

2 Q. So who actually does the audits -- the internal audits within
3 your group? Is it someone from the -- is it the manager of
4 safety, or who does it?

5 A. The audits themselves?

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. PenAir had -- we had our own audit team. We had a manager of
8 IAP and an auditor below him. As part of merging departments
9 together, we moved them all under the director of safety
10 assurance, Jason Patrick (ph.), for Corvus or Ravn Air Group. So
11 he now has the same -- the auditor that was doing the PenAir
12 audits and Dave Fiacco now are basically doing the audits under
13 him, so to say. So Brian Peterson is the auditor who primarily
14 does the PenAir station audits, so to say, and then Dave Fiacco
15 does the flight audits.

16 Q. When you conduct an audit, is it a checklist --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- or is it -- okay. And how long does the audit usually
19 last? Or is there a set time for the audit?

20 A. There is no set time. It just depends on the complexity of
21 what they're evaluating.

22 Q. And you're auditing --

23 A. I mean, a flight ops audit will take a few days because you
24 can't just go on one flight and say, I'm good. You got to do a
25 sampling. You got to do several flights in order to effectively

1 evaluate the process.

2 Q. And are you just auditing the records, or are you talking
3 with the employees and engaging? How is that interaction? Are
4 the, are the employees usually up to communicating?

5 A. Yeah, I haven't really seen any problems. The only thing,
6 for any audit, I mean, there's always going to be an initial
7 hesitation and fear of, okay, who's this person who's questioning
8 me on how to do my job? But I have not experienced, you know, any
9 really negative interactions regarding an audit.

10 Q. Okay.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, thanks. That's all the questions
12 I have for now.

13 Sathya?

14 DR. SILVA: I just had a few follow-ups.

15 BY DR. SILVA:

16 Q. So you mentioned that, between the event here at PenAir and
17 other pilots at Corvus, there's a sense of not wanting to speak up
18 in fear of getting ramifications from Deke, or -- is that a fair
19 statement?

20 A. I don't know if it's fear. But might be hesitation. Yeah.

21 Q. So from the safety side, how do you counter that? What's the
22 fix?

23 A. What's the fix? From our standpoint, I mean, any time we
24 have a chance, we hype up our, you know, SMS program, our just
25 culture policy. We say, look, this is our policy; this is how

1 we're going to -- this is how we treat -- if you have a violation,
2 you have an issue, if you, if you report something, the initial
3 reaction is not going to be, you know, you're fired. We're going
4 to look into it. We're going to investigate it.

5 And if this really is, you know, a human error or human
6 factor or something -- or management factor, better said -- that
7 goes into it, it wasn't necessarily just, you're a pilot, you
8 screwed up, shame on you. It's, well, maybe our policy wasn't
9 sufficiently detailed for that, or maybe there was something that
10 happens outside of your control that affected that incident.
11 We're not going to just immediately go after you.

12 Q. Would any part of that process include changing or attempting
13 to change management behavior? So if there's a fear -- or, sorry,
14 a hesitation, a concern about one specific person --

15 A. Have we ever reached out to Deke or anyone?

16 Q. Or would that be part of the process?

17 A. We have done that. I mean, like I said, since we're talking
18 about -- we have mentioned Deke several times now. I know that,
19 you know, after we had a couple reports of this from both
20 certificates -- you know, Corvus and PenAir -- and I reached out
21 to Brian about it. Said, hey, Brian, this is what's going on.

22 And he reached out to Deke and said, look, Deke, this is
23 what, this is what the pilots are saying. We got to make sure
24 we're maintaining our just culture here. We can't just -- for
25 initial action, cannot always be, you're a pilot, you screwed up,

1 you know, shame on you and a letter in your file. You know, so
2 those conversations were had. And we would -- I would have them
3 with -- or we would have them, myself or Brian, with anybody if we
4 felt that they were not necessarily abiding by what we would call
5 our just culture policy.

6 Q. Okay. So we touched on Sarah's situation there, and Marvin
7 asked you if you felt that, that -- her experience would have a
8 negative impact on reporting, and you said yes. Do you feel like
9 her experience would have a negative impact on safety? Or could
10 potentially have a negative impact on safety?

11 A. Could it have a negative impact on safety? I mean,
12 potentially. Potentially. I mean, any time -- you know, if we're
13 not getting the inputs into the systems, and we don't know about
14 things, you can't address them. So I mean, any time you have
15 individuals who see things that are happening and aren't reporting
16 them, there's a potential for degradation of safety.

17 Q. So in addition to the reporting side of things and getting --
18 I'm just going to, I'm going to say that -- let's say she got the
19 negative consequences for declining a flight. Does that have a
20 negative impact on safety, her experience itself, not just the
21 reporting side of things? Is there, is there consequence for
22 that?

23 A. Consequence to her, the organization?

24 Q. In general. In general. For the, for the organization,
25 specifically for her. Could that influence the way that she's

1 doing her job?

2 A. It could. I mean, I don't think I could fairly say no.
3 There's some, like I said, there's some impact. I mean, it could
4 -- the experience could cause someone to maybe hesitate, question
5 their own decision-making in the future. And that's -- I mean,
6 you don't need pilots in the air questioning their every move
7 because they're afraid of what a certain management official is
8 going to think. So could it? Yes.

9 Q. Have you ever gotten any reports -- let's start with PenAir
10 -- on the PenAir side -- about pilots being pressured to fly by
11 either management or dispatch?

12 A. Pressure to fly?

13 Q. Or consequences for declining a flight.

14 A. The only type of thing I ever heard of is kind of what I --
15 the specific incidence I've heard of on the PenAir certificate is
16 that one.

17 Q. Has there been any outside of the PenAir certificate?

18 A. Specifically pressure to fly, or just anything?

19 Q. What's your example of anything?

20 A. No, like I said, there's -- I can't think of any specific
21 incident on the other certificates where -- I guess I've heard
22 rumor of it. Most of it came to me by way of Tiffany when she
23 started -- when we started -- because I guess going to
24 differences, PenAir, the safety department always did all the
25 training. On the Corvus side, that wasn't the case. The pilot, a

1 management -- flight ops management did all the training, safety,
2 SMS, security, all of it. So when we came on and merged the
3 groups together, we said, well, we don't necessarily like that. I
4 want safety -- the pilots to have a face with safety.

5 So we started having Tiffany and someone from safety do those
6 classes as well. And kind of the immediate feedback we kind of
7 got was, well, you're talking about just culture, and my
8 experience was this. You know, I had this happen to me. That
9 doesn't seem to jive with what you're talking to me about. So
10 there was -- she got a lot of stories, and I can't remember the
11 specific details of them, but they were kind of similar in nature
12 to what -- the Sarah Boots incident that I mentioned. That's what
13 -- I'm trying to think of a specific story --

14 Q. That's okay.

15 A. -- so to say, but I just can't remember the exact details.
16 That's why I'm kind of hesitating to --

17 Q. Yeah. That's fine. So given that information that she got,
18 is that actionable at all from the safety department?

19 A. Yes. Like I said, that's what I mentioned -- you know,
20 that's why I took that in a different -- the Sarah Boots incident
21 and the other feedback I got from Corvus.

22 Q. Okay. So that's where that --

23 A. That's where I -- that's where that came from.

24 Q. That's where it came from. Okay, got it.

25 A. It wasn't just that one incident with Sarah. I mean, if you

1 hear it one time, you say, okay, well, that's just one pilot's
2 opinion. Maybe we need to monitor that; let's see. But we
3 started getting it from various sources. Oh, wait a minute, we
4 need to really look at this.

5 Q. Okay. In terms of fatigue, is there a risk of fatigue for
6 pilots being essentially on airport standby for an extended period
7 of time? Like, they show up early, ready to go, and delay, delay,
8 delay, delay. Is that -- does that pose a fatigue hazard in your
9 opinion?

10 A. Can, yeah. I guess it depends how long we're talking about.

11 Q. How long would you expect for that to become fatiguing, let's
12 say?

13 A. I got to think about that. I don't have a good answer at the
14 moment.

15 Q. Okay, that's fine.

16 DR. SILVA: Okay, I'll stop there. Thank you.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya.

18 Marvin?

19 MR. FRANTZ: Nothing.

20 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Anything here?

21 MR. WILSON: Nothing from me.

22 MR. FISCHER: Nothing from me.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: I just have one more question. So as a
24 member of management, do you feel empowered to stand by all of
25 your decisions that you make and feel comfortable that management

1 above you will stand by you?

2 MR. SANTIAGO: Yeah. Absolutely.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. All right. So that's all the
4 questions that I have. Is there anything that we should have
5 asked you that we didn't ask you?

6 MR. SANTIAGO: I can't think of anything right now, no.

7 DR. SEVILLIAN: Any suggestions of other people we should
8 talk to? I know you don't know everyone we've talked to, but --

9 MR. SANTIAGO: I don't know who you've talked to. It's a
10 whole --

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: -- is there anyone that you would suggest,
12 from your perspective?

13 MR. SANTIAGO: I don't know. Dave Fiacco is a good one.
14 He's pretty -- really familiar with the -- you asked me a lot of
15 targeted questions as far as auditing, so anything about auditing,
16 he would really -- from the flight ops perspective specifically,
17 he could give you a lot more detail. Yeah.

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Thank you so much for
19 interviewing with us.

20 MR. SANTIAGO: Oh, that's it?

21 DR. SILVA: Yeah, you're welcome.

22 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah, that was it. Okay.

23 COURT REPORTER: Off record 3:42.

24 (Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Tony Santiago


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 5, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Eileen Conners
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/22/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: BEN NYGREN
First Officer, Alaska Airlines

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Thursday,
December 5, 2019

APPEARANCES:

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

CRAIG HUFFMAN, Chief Pilot
Alaska Airlines
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Nygren)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Ben Nygren:		
By Dr. Silva		6
By Mr. Frantz		14
By Dr. Sevillian		30
By Mr. Fischer		34
By Mr. Wilson		35
By Dr. Silva		35
By Mr. Frantz		45
By Dr. Sevillian		48
By Mr. Wilson		50
By Dr. Silva		51
By Mr. Frantz		55

I N T E R V I E W

(9:02 a.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SILVA: All right. Ben, thank you so much for agreeing
4 to talk to us today.

5 MR. NYGREN: You bet.

6 DR. SILVA: I'll run through a brief background of what you
7 can expect today, and then just introductions, and see if, before
8 we start, whether you have any questions, if that works for you.

9 MR. NYGREN: Sure. Sounds good.

10 DR. SILVA: Okay. So we've got quite a few people around the
11 table today. Have you worked with an NTSB investigation before?

12 MR. NYGREN: Nothing formal like this.

13 DR. SILVA: Okay. So what you're seeing is a result of our
14 party system. So we as the NTSB have expertise in investigation
15 and investigating. We rely on the industry for subject-matter
16 expertise through the company, for example, as company policies,
17 aircraft, that sort of thing. The FAA is here as, again, from a
18 regulatory aspect -- regulatory information aspect. There is no
19 enforcement that they can do. This is purely safety, totally
20 separate from the enforcement side of the FAA. So that's why we
21 have multiple people assisting in our interviews and in our
22 investigation.

23 So let's go around the room for introductions so you know who
24 you're talking to. Again, I'm Sathya Silva; I'm a human
25 performance investigator with the NTSB.

1 MR. FRANTZ: And I'm Marvin Frantz. I'm the operational
2 factors investigator, NTSB.

3 DR. SILVA: Okay. Dujuan?

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dujuan Sevillian, human performance
5 investigator, NTSB.

6 MR. FISCHER: And I'm Tony Fischer from the Denali CMO.

7 MR. WILSON: Brandon Wilson, check airman, PenAir.

8 DR. SILVA: Perfect. So that's who you're talking to.

9 We're here for safety. We are not here to assign blame,
10 liability, any of those sorts. We're really just trying to
11 prevent this accident from happening again. So what will happen
12 with this recording is a transcript will be made, and eventually
13 that will become part of our public docket whenever the factual
14 information gets released, anywhere between 6 months to a year
15 from now typically.

16 For this interview, you are the expert. There are no right
17 or wrong answers. We want you to answer to the best of your
18 ability. If you don't know, if you don't know an answer, that's a
19 totally fine response. If you need clarification, feel free to
20 ask. Also if you need a break, just let us know. Okay?

21 You are entitled to have one person here to sit here with
22 you. Would you like to have a representative here?

23 MR. NYGREN: I brought my work associate, Craig Huffman.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay, great. So I'll start out with a handful of
25 questions, and we'll go around our room. Usually that's twice to

1 make sure that everyone has a chance to ask the questions that
2 they need to. Do you have any questions before we start?

3 MR. NYGREN: No.

4 DR. SILVA: Okay.

5 INTERVIEW OF BEN NYGREN

6 BY DR. SILVA:

7 Q. Can you state and spell your full name for the record please?

8 A. Sure. It's Benjamin, I go by Ben, Nygren. B-e-n,
9 N-y-g-r-e-n.

10 Q. Okay. And what is your current role or current position?

11 A. I'm a Boeing 737 first officer at Alaska Airlines.

12 Q. And when did you start that position?

13 A. I started in March of this year.

14 Q. Okay. Can you run through a CliffsNotes version of your
15 aviation history from when you started flying to where you are
16 now?

17 A. Sure. I did my first flying lesson in, I believe it was '94.
18 Completed training in '96. I worked as a fulltime flight
19 instructor '96 to '98. For 2 years, '98 to 2000, I flew 135
20 single-engine airplanes in Juno, Alaska. And then starting in
21 2000, I flew various airplanes, had various roles at PenAir until
22 I left this March to join Alaska.

23 Q. So you started at PenAir you said 2000?

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Okay. Can you run through the different positions you had

1 there?

2 A. Sure. I spent the summer of 2000 as a Metroliner first
3 officer. Then I spent approximately 7 years as a Dillingham-based
4 135 pilot flying Saratogas, Navahos and Caravans. Five of those
5 years as the night, on-call medevac pilot. And then in about '07
6 or '08 moved back to Anchorage, worked as a Saab 340 pilot, first
7 as a first officer for about a year, then as a captain.

8 And then, for approximately 3 years, taught ground schools,
9 taught systems instruction. And then, when PenAir brought on the
10 Saab 2000, I was one of the early groups of pilots to go get
11 trained in that thing. And I worked as the Saab 2000 systems
12 instructor until I stopped doing that in August of '17 to take the
13 chief pilot job, which I did until March of '19. So I think my
14 first official day of chief pilot was, like, September 1 of '17 I
15 believe.

16 Q. How many hours do you have approximately?

17 A. Approximately 14,000.

18 Q. Do you know how much of that is in the Saab 2000?

19 A. You know, the only number I know for sure because I remember
20 seeing it on the computer was I flew 350 hours last year in the
21 airplane. I'm going to estimate total time in the airplane maybe
22 1,500 to 2,500. Probably closer to -- I don't know, probably
23 1,500 to 2,000 is probably a fair guess.

24 Q. And did you start as captain in that airplane?

25 A. Um-hmm.

1 Q. Okay. What kind of experience do you have with Dutch Harbor?

2 A. Been going in there since, you know, a little bit in the
3 Metro, but that was a long time ago. Primarily starting in '07,
4 '08, you know, as the Saab 340, and then it was as a Saab 2000
5 guy, we went in there just all the time.

6 Q. Okay. Pretty consistently?

7 A. Yeah, you know, as the schedule'd kind of ebb and flow, maybe
8 some months you won't go in there a bunch. But over the years
9 quite a bit, you know, in the many of hundreds of times I've been
10 in and out of there.

11 Q. So you've been here for quite a while. Can you run through
12 your understanding of the airport qualification policy from even
13 before it may have been a policy? Like from the company's point
14 of view, what did the airport qualifications for Dutch Harbor look
15 like?

16 A. You know, in my experience, historically a new PIC will have
17 most likely been in there quite a bit as a first officer if they
18 become a new PIC. And it's changed a little bit over the years,
19 but in the 340 days, when we had lots of 340s operating, I think
20 it was pretty typical for a new PIC to maybe spend a summer or
21 more not going in there, you know, and getting experience until
22 they had the recommendations from the check airman and other
23 senior pilots, and then the company would perform some sort of
24 checkout. I wasn't in management exactly at that time to tell you
25 that exact checkout process.

1 And then, when I was in management, we -- or all of the
2 captains, when I started as a manager, were already checked out in
3 there, and they had all transitioned from the 340, so they had
4 extensive Dutch Harbor experience. When I was the chief pilot, we
5 brought on, I believe it was two or three new captains who were
6 new captains in the 2000.

7 And so the process for those guys, like I'll think of two
8 first officers who had not been 121 PICs before, our method with
9 them was to let them gain experience in the airplane, and then
10 follow our company procedures. You know, I'd have to reference
11 the manuals to tell you exactly the recommendations and letters
12 and whatnot. But once they're approved, they'd ride down there
13 with the check airman, and the paperwork would get filled out, and
14 they'd be qualed once the check airman recommended them for Dutch
15 Harbor.

16 Q. So you said there were two people -- was that two pilots that
17 were upgrading?

18 A. Yeah. So our first 2000 upgrades who didn't already have
19 extensive PIC experience, those are the two guys I'm talking
20 about.

21 Q. Okay. When was that?

22 A. That would have been sometime in 2018 there.

23 Q. I'm going to go back to that.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. So you said that they -- so when you hired them, what was the

1 policy for them getting experience in --

2 A. You know, like historically, people -- ideally, historically,
3 people have lots of right-seat experience going in there before
4 they were left-seat qualified. And so these two individuals had,
5 you know, thousands of hours right-seat PenAir, you know,
6 operating in and out of Dutch Harbor. And once they were
7 captains, they operated at other places until the check airmen and
8 others recommended them for the Dutch Harbor qual, and they had
9 the required amount of hours. You know, the typical hour minimum
10 was 300 PIC.

11 We had a policy written in there where we could go as low as
12 a hundred I believe, and I don't have the manual in front of me,
13 so don't quote me here. I believe it was a hundred with extra
14 recommendations, you know, extra chief pilot documentation and the
15 other documentation. And I wasn't in management, or I wasn't the
16 one who implemented that one, but I didn't have a problem with it.
17 I believe the intent was, you know, you get a highly qualified
18 individual, and as a special case by case, you know, okay, that
19 individual can get to sign off with as little as a hundred.

20 Q. Have you, in your time as chief pilot, do you know of anyone
21 who did get qualified with less than 300 hours?

22 A. I don't think -- well, on the 2000 side, I don't think so.
23 It's possible on the 340 side. We had a check airman from back
24 east who may have gotten in under 2000 -- or excuse me, under 300.
25 I don't recall exactly.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But, you know, just based on what I know of him and
3 everything, it wouldn't surprise me if I gave him the approval.

4 Q. So in terms of the intent of that policy, is the intent that
5 you gain the experience in the aircraft and then begin the
6 training or do the qual check? Or can you do that before you
7 reach that, let's say, 100 hour mark?

8 A. So the question is, can you get the Dutch Harbor training
9 before 100 hours?

10 Q. Yeah.

11 A. I think training is -- or we don't train in the aircraft. To
12 gain experience in the aircraft under 100 would be acceptable as
13 long as one was flying -- for a PIC, for a left-seater, as long as
14 they were flying with a check airman.

15 Q. So to continue with that, from your understanding, is it
16 acceptable to do the qualification check prior to gaining that
17 hundred hours and getting that sign-off?

18 A. You know, I'd have to reference the manuals. You know, I
19 didn't really memorize them. At any time a question that I wasn't
20 sure on would come up, I'd open up the manual and reference what
21 the policy was. But I don't think that comports with the manual.

22 Q. Okay. So in your experience here, had you ever written a
23 letter of recommendation for anyone to get a sign-off?

24 A. You know, we had such limited 2000 new captains while I was
25 there. We had the two first officers who didn't need that, and

1 then we had another very qualified new captain. I could have done
2 it for that new captain. That captain had a lot of experience at
3 PenAir and in Dutch Harbor prior to being a 2000 PIC. So
4 conceivably, but I don't remember if I did or not.

5 Q. So you mentioned that the FOs didn't need the requirement.
6 Can you elaborate on that?

7 A. All right. I guess I may have misspoken. The two new guys,
8 I believe we let them get up to the 300 hours before we initiated
9 the Dutch Harbor checkout is my recollection. The two FO to
10 captain, initial captain guys at PenAir.

11 Q. Okay. So that they could get the experience as captain?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay. Tell me about Dutch Harbor. If you were teaching
14 someone how to get in there, what kind of things would you
15 mention?

16 A. Let me just preface by saying I wasn't a check airman, so I
17 would certainly mentor people and talk to them about it, but
18 checking them out, per se, wasn't one of my official duties. It's
19 challenging. The runway's short. The IFR approach is different
20 than many. It requires maintaining basically VFR conditions for
21 the last about 3 miles. The wind can vary and greatly affect your
22 performance.

23 Q. In terms of the wind or weather, is there anything that was
24 typical out there that you might want to look out for?

25 A. Oh, yeah. I mean, a host of things.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. The terrain was such, like say you get a strong north wind,
3 you know, the wind can wrap around the hills -- or the hill there,
4 Ballyhoo, and do different things at different ends of the runway
5 for example. That's, you know, one thing. And you're watching
6 out for black water, which is where the terrain contours the wind
7 down and forces it onto the water, and that's a good indication of
8 strong wind shear and turbulence, so you look at the water to see
9 what that's doing.

10 Probably one of the most important things is to just ensure
11 visibility for maneuvering in there because the last bit has 3
12 miles required visibility and 500 foot required ceiling. You
13 can't get yourself boxed -- you can't put yourself into a corner
14 by proceeding inbound and not being able to maneuver
15 appropriately.

16 Q. Have you ever flown in with a tailwind to Dutch Harbor that
17 you can recall?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Can you describe the situation?

20 A. Sure. So the weather reporter gives us the weather -- the
21 wind as measured at midfield. Sometimes -- and they'll say north
22 wind conditions, you know, you will get the windsock on either end
23 of the field kind of pointing various direction. So it's possible
24 that the prevailing wind, like at midfield and at the far end
25 provides a headwind, but it's possible at the approach end to have

1 a bit of a tailwind. I mean, you just pick the prevailing wind
2 and -- you know, I would say anything more than, you know, just a
3 breath of tailwind, you know, a few knots is concerning. But,
4 yeah, it's not uncommon to have a bit of a tailwind on some of
5 those approaches.

6 Q. I'm going to pause here.

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 A. Yeah.

10 DR. SILVA: Marvin? Okay.

11 BY MR. FRANTZ:

12 Q. Okay. I need you to clarify a few things --

13 A. Sure.

14 Q. -- early on. You said you taught 340 and 2000 systems?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Here at PenAir?

17 A. Um-hmm.

18 Q. Okay. And then where was the flight training?

19 A. For the 2000, the flight training was done in the simulator
20 at SIMCOM in Orlando.

21 Q. Okay. But there was -- okay. But all the system stuff was
22 taught here by PenAir pilots?

23 A. Generally. My initial group was taught by the SIMCOM
24 instructors who remained qualified to teach the systems.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. But after the first two groups, the initial cadre of two
2 people and then the following group of which I was a part, I
3 believe all the systems were taught in house --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. -- in Anchorage.

6 Q. Where did you do your 340 type training?

7 A. I believe the type was conducted in St. Louis. We did bounce
8 around from cities.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. But let me think. I'm pretty sure it was St. Louis.

11 Q. And then the 2000 was in Orlando?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And what did you think -- or what was your overall impression
14 of the training from SIMCOM?

15 A. It was great. You know, those guys, while they didn't at
16 that time have any experience flying the plane, they are very
17 professional sim instructors. You know, I'm impressed at their
18 ability to kind of go between planes. I know some of them
19 instruct on the Dornier and some other aircraft, and they're --
20 well, you know, highly-professional folks there.

21 Q. So while you were here, even as a pilot or as the chief
22 pilot, did you ever see any deficiencies that you thought -- in
23 flight crews here that you thought were traceable back to some
24 lack in training?

25 A. No.

1 Q. In flight training or in sim?

2 A. No.

3 Q. No?

4 A. No. Yeah.

5 Q. So special airports, you were talking about FOs and you
6 didn't know if they got the time or not. Did you mean -- is there
7 any requirement for FOs to have any kind of airport training
8 before they can go there?

9 A. I don't believe so, no.

10 Q. Okay. So you talk about you don't know if they got the 300
11 hours or not. Did you mean when they were -- when they upgraded
12 to captain, you don't know if they got 300 hours before they --
13 what did you?

14 A. Sorry if I was unclear. Let me try and be clear.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I believe that those two FO upgrades had 300 hours as PIC in
17 the 2000 prior to their Dutch Harbor checkout, but I'm not
18 positive. But I believe that to be the case.

19 Q. Okay. And you said you never -- to your knowledge, that you
20 never saw anybody use that waiver to the 100 hours?

21 A. Not --

22 Q. Only a hundred PIC before they could do Dutch Harbor?

23 A. I don't believe so, no. But, you know, it wouldn't surprise
24 me, like I said, with that East Coast check airman, you know, if
25 somebody highly qualified like him who has --

1 Q. Was that in the 340?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. He was?

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. What's the difference in your impression, since you've flown
6 in both, in flying the 340 versus the 2000 into an airport like
7 Dutch Harbor?

8 A. The 340 is a little bit more forgiving. Our experience, when
9 we transitioned aircraft into the 2000, was the limitations that
10 we placed on the winds in Dutch Harbor that worked well in the 340
11 needed a little fine-tuning for the 2000.

12 Our wind charts, which are our recommended limits, were --
13 max winds were reduced as a result -- or based on our experience
14 operating the 2000. Now I wasn't the manager when that happened,
15 so there could have been some other factors, but I believe it to
16 be tied pretty well to the 2000 when we reduced those wind
17 numbers.

18 Q. When you were chief pilot, were you ever aware of any pilot
19 performance issues landing at Dutch Harbor or going into Dutch
20 Harbor? And anything rise to your level of attention as chief
21 pilot?

22 A. You know, we had a senior -- or an experienced 340 captain
23 who, in transitioning to the 2000, went through some of the
24 struggles that kind of all of us did when we transitioned, you
25 know. And when I heard he was struggling, I got him with a check

1 airman just to kind of, first of all, make sure he was relaxed and
2 understood this wasn't a jeopardy situation and that we all kind
3 of went through a little bit of a learning curve, you know,
4 getting dialed in on that aircraft. Just check airman counseling,
5 and that's --

6 Q. Now was that not specific to Dutch Harbor or --

7 A. It was probably -- Dutch Harbor is our most challenging place
8 there in that aircraft. Yeah, I think it was tied to Dutch
9 Harbor.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And I should add, I and my other coworkers did experience a
12 learning curve learning how to not treat the 2000 the same way as
13 the 340. You know, if we both had -- a few of us had some kind of
14 eye-opening moments where we learned to operate that plane in the
15 Dutch Harbor environment.

16 Q. Sure. So what were pilots taught? What was your
17 understanding of how to use that wind chart?

18 A. It is a recommended limit, a good anecdote from years ago.
19 Somebody was getting -- a friend of mine was getting taught the
20 wind chart in class, and he asked the chief pilot, "So if I go
21 outside these limits, and I damage an airplane, am I going to be
22 fired?" "Yes, you are." "Okay, well, I understand that's a
23 limit."

24 Now I wouldn't say that was exactly my policy, I would fire
25 somebody. But a pilot puts themselves out there, they're kind of

1 taking -- they're putting themselves at personal risk if they're
2 going outside that chart. They're kind of taking responsibility
3 for what they're doing is the way I looked at it.

4 Q. In your experience, would it be commonplace for a pilot to
5 pull out that chart each time they're approaching Dutch Harbor --
6 as soon as they got the latest winds there, would it be
7 commonplace to expect that they would pull out the wind chart and
8 just verify that --

9 A. Sure.

10 Q. -- they're still --

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. -- everything was okay --

13 A. Sure.

14 Q. -- per the chart to continue on?

15 A. Yeah, everybody in my experience was acutely aware of what
16 was on that chart and, you know?

17 Q. It wasn't just a dispatch item. It was used in flight --

18 A. Sure, absolutely.

19 Q. -- for pilots to see?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. What other manuals or charts would a pilot need to look at
22 once they had the latest weather that, you know, they know what
23 they're getting into as they're approaching Dutch Harbor? What
24 are they doing to prepare and make sure they're going to be okay
25 to continue on besides looking at the wind chart?

1 A. Yeah. In order to verify the landing performance, a pilot
2 had a couple of options. The easier option would be to refer to
3 the same landing charts that we use for the purposes of dispatch.
4 You know, they require -- they give an extra margin. So if in
5 flight I, as a pilot, could look at the landing chart and prove my
6 performance on there, then I knew I was good.

7 Because there's that extra margin in the landing charts that
8 isn't required in flight; if that didn't work, I could then get
9 out the un-factored performance, which were at the back of -- I
10 believe it was called our performance handbook, performance
11 manual. At the back of that chart were un-factored landing tables
12 for flaps 20 and flaps 35 that I had as a tool to verify my
13 landing performance.

14 Q. Okay. And what were some factors that would go into your
15 decision to choose flaps 20 versus 35 in the 2000?

16 A. Flaps 35 helped to slow you down a little better. In
17 squirrely, variable wind conditions, I think there was kind of a
18 general consensus that I shared that sometimes the elevator
19 control wasn't as crisp in those conditions as flaps 35. And as a
20 result a lot of us preferred 20 when the winds were squirrely.

21 Q. Okay. Squirrely, variable?

22 A. Yeah. Wind shears. You know, anytime you get any amount of
23 wind in that terrain in there, you know, it's going to lead to
24 possible shears.

25 Q. How much of a factor was the difference in approach speeds

1 typically between flaps 20 and flaps 35? Was it a process that a
2 pilot would think, well, because of the wind, maybe a tailwind or
3 whatever -- a slight tailwind or calm winds, but I want to be
4 slow, so I choose flaps 35 versus 20; I want to have a little
5 slower approach. Was that ever a factor in determining 30 versus
6 25?

7 A. Well, if I was --

8 Q. Or 35 versus 20?

9 A. If I was trying to make that decision, I'd take lots of
10 factors into account. Like if for some reason, you know,
11 hypothetically I wanted to take a tailwind, and it wasn't gusty,
12 you know, if it was just steady state, non-gusty, I wouldn't be
13 uncomfortable doing 35, but --

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. If that answers your question.

16 Q. Yeah. Have you ever land -- did you say you have landed at
17 Dutch Harbor with a tailwind?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you recall roughly the magnitude?

20 A. You know, and it was where one of the three windsocks
21 indicated a tailwind. So a scenario would be, you know, land on
22 13, a bit of a tailwind on the approach into 13 midfield and roll
23 out far end showing a headwind.

24 MR. HUFFMAN: So could I just interject something real quick
25 maybe to get to that? No? That was a question.

1 MR. NYGREN: Can --

2 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah. No, sorry.

3 MR. HUFFMAN: Okay. All right.

4 MR. FRANTZ: We didn't explain this, sorry. But you can
5 advise him not to answer a question if you want, or you can say
6 can we have a break and you can go --

7 MR. NYGREN: Oh.

8 MR. FRANTZ: -- you could confer with --

9 MR. HUFFMAN: Okay.

10 MR. NYGREN: Let's take a break.

11 MR. FRANTZ: -- if you want to

12 MR. HUFFMAN: Yeah.

13 MR. FRANTZ: -- but --

14 MR. HUFFMAN: Yeah.

15 DR. SILVA: We'll take a break.

16 MR. FRANTZ: But, yeah.

17 DR. SILVA: We'll go off the record.

18 MR. FRANTZ: Sorry, we didn't --

19 MR. HUFFMAN: Oh, no, that's fine.

20 MR. NYGREN: Yeah.

21 MR. FRANTZ: -- let you know your role.

22 MR. NYGREN: Yeah.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, yes.

24 MR. HUFFMAN: No problem.

25 (Off the record at 9:32 a.m.)

1 (On the record at 9:37 a.m.)

2 BY MR. FRANTZ:

3 Q. So how common, in your experience, was it to have to land
4 with a tailwind at Dutch Harbor?

5 A. So I would always land into the prevailing wind. You know,
6 the weather reporter calls the wind at midfield and the midfield
7 wind is the direction that I would land. You know, you do get a
8 little bit of variable, other stuff. But I would always land into
9 the prevailing wind.

10 Q. Did you ever hear of -- I mean, was there any tribal
11 knowledge or just general pilot group conversation about, you
12 know, if -- yeah, we head into a tailwind -- yeah, we landed with
13 a tailwind today? I mean, was it common at all? Was it rare that
14 people would talk about they had to do a tail? Or was it not
15 talked about there?

16 A. Well, it just wasn't a thing.

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. I mean, you'd land into the wind.

19 Q. Is there a preferred runway -- assuming neutral winds or calm
20 winds, is there a preferred runway at Dutch Harbor?

21 A. If it was calm, I guess it really would go to pilot
22 preference. I mean, you know, you could -- on the one hand,
23 landing 1-3 gives you a lot of room to maneuver onto final. On
24 the other hand, landing 1-3 gives you a little bit of a tighter
25 space to perform your go-around. So I mean, I wouldn't have any

1 qualms about just landing on either one into the wind. I'd
2 probably choose 1-3 just because I wouldn't have to back-taxi.

3 Q. Okay. Have you ever done a go-around at Dutch Harbor?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do you remember what runway you were going into?

6 A. I'm sure both of them.

7 Q. Okay. Have you ever done a go-around on one runway and then
8 decided you wanted to land the opposite direction?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Was it VFR, or do you remember?

11 A. Probably on a visual approach, yeah.

12 Q. Because we had some talk about that with some people, and
13 it's still a little unclear to us how that would be done, how you
14 would go around from one runway and then do a course reversal to
15 come back to the opposite runway. Is that a particularly
16 challenging maneuver -- assuming it's VFR --

17 A. No.

18 Q. -- is that a challenging maneuver to turn -- either end to go
19 off and then come back to that?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Either one would be particularly difficult?

22 A. No. The typical profile would be for them to go around, fly
23 out into the bay where there's lots of room to maneuver, and then
24 maneuver to approach again.

25 Q. Okay. Either way would be --

1 A. Yeah, no problem.

2 Q. -- relatively doable or not?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Absolutely.

6 Q. And what did you think of the Dutch Harbor weather reporting
7 that you got? Did you use the weather observer?

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. Yeah?

10 A. Yeah, they were --

11 Q. Was that the standard --

12 A. Great.

13 Q. -- to use them versus the AWOS?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. When you were chief pilot, did you ever have
16 experiences of people turning down flights because of weather?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. Were these flights that were offered by the OCC or SOC, but
19 the pilot looked at it and said, I'm not comfortable, or no? Or
20 was there ever a back and forth between the dispatch and the
21 pilot? Or was it they both just agreed, yeah, we can't do this
22 today?

23 A. I think everyone respected the PIC's decision when it came
24 to, if they don't want to go, you know, they're not going to go.
25 Now if -- or, yeah.

1 Q. So if a PIC turned down a flight for weather, was there some
2 process he was supposed to follow to notify management what he was
3 doing and why he was doing it, a formalized process to do that?

4 A. I believe it meets our published requirements for filling out
5 a safety report. I think that was supposed to happen. A WBAT
6 report, that's what we called those things.

7 Q. Okay. Have you ever counseled, or been directed by higher
8 management to counsel or talk to, a pilot who refused to go on a
9 flight for weather reasons?

10 A. Not a pilot, but one time the ownership took issue with the
11 operation just making a decision. We don't think, for a number of
12 factors, this plane should go down there, and one of them was just
13 maintenance. And the previous manager said, you know, if it's
14 legal to go, I want you to go. And I remember having a
15 conversation with him, if it's legal to go, you know, and safe to
16 go, and you want us to go, we'll go.

17 Q. This was -- okay, this was before the Ravn --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- acquisition?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. So you say that wasn't weather related, but it was
22 more the airplane?

23 A. I think it was just the operations department trying to make
24 a holistic decision; is it smart for us to go down there today?
25 We only have one plane operating today. If it breaks, it's going

1 to do this, that and the other thing to our whole schedule. And
2 so just looking at -- let's make an operation decision not to go.
3 It wasn't just the, you know, fighting with the weather. And --

4 Q. But you --

5 A. -- the owner said, I'd like to see it go, and --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- okay. If it's safe and legal, you know, we'll send it for
8 you.

9 Q. You do have recollections though of pilots saying no --

10 A. Absolutely.

11 Q. -- because of weather. And as far as you know, did they
12 suffer any repercussions at all from the --

13 A. No.

14 Q. -- you know, from higher level management?

15 A. No. I would counsel -- I remember specifically counseling
16 some of my two new 2000 PICs, I didn't expect them to be able to
17 get in there every time somebody else who's been doing it for a
18 decade or more does. You know, there's going to be some days
19 where their comfort level is such that they're not going to go,
20 and somebody else might still be comfortable. And that was my
21 expectation.

22 Q. Was it at all common or did you ever aware of contention
23 between ops and a dispatch person to say, it's legal, you should
24 go? You know, the weather's legal, and the pilot would say no,
25 and there would be any kind of back and forth? Or would it

1 escalate to some other level? Or between, you know, the two
2 people responsible for the flight, was there ever a point where
3 they didn't agree, and they had to bump it up to somebody else to
4 make a decision that you were aware of?

5 A. I got to -- it wouldn't surprise me, but let me try and think
6 if I can think of a specific example. I can't think of a specific
7 example of that.

8 Q. Okay. So you're familiar with the concept of personal
9 minimums, pilots have personal minimums. Is that a thing that
10 existed, could be used here at PenAir when you were here? Could a
11 pilot say, I'm not comfortable or that's below my personal
12 minimums? Is that something that was used --

13 A. Sure.

14 Q. -- or could be used?

15 A. Sure. So that's kind of the concept I just related when I
16 was talking to the new 2000 captains. You know, if you're not
17 comfortable, I don't want you going, and I expect you to possibly
18 have a different completion rate than somebody else. You know, I
19 expect you --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. -- if you're not comfortable to not go.

22 Q. Did you feel like you got support for that point of view from
23 higher management --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- while you were here?

1 A. Yes. If there was any -- sorry, I don't need to -- yes.

2 Q. So even though it could be legal to go as far as weather
3 goes, you wouldn't always expect somebody to go just because --

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. -- the weather --

6 A. I mean, the legality doesn't directly weigh in on the winds,
7 for example.

8 Q. Did you ever find that anybody -- any pilots kind of abusing
9 that process of saying, I'm not comfortable, I don't want to go,
10 but did you ever get a sense that --

11 A. When I would --

12 Q. -- that they had done that last month, or they had some other
13 reason they don't want to go, but they were throwing it on the
14 weather?

15 A. No, not when I was the manager.

16 Q. Okay. So what changes did you -- you left in March of this
17 year? So kind of in the middle of the acquisition, the changeover
18 between --

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. -- Ravn? Did you see any changes in what we were just
21 talking about, company, higher-level management attitudes about
22 this kind of thing, about personal minimums or uncomfortable? Was
23 there any changes coming down that, you know, that you felt that
24 they're not telling you, you know, if it's legal and you meet all
25 the requirements and you've checked out the airplane and blah,

1 blah, blah, then you're expected to go? Do you ever sense any of
2 that as the Ravn side kind of came in and started the merger?

3 A. No.

4 Q. No?

5 A. No. I felt supported in continuing to promote the safety
6 culture that, you know, we had maintained.

7 Q. Who -- okay. Do you know Deke Abbott?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you ever have any interactions with him regarding
10 dispatch or departures of specific flights or pilots who were
11 uncomfortable with the flight and --

12 A. No.

13 Q. -- he might be involved or intervene?

14 A. No.

15 Q. No? Okay. Thanks, Ben.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. That's all I have for now.

18 A. Okay. Yeah, you bet.

19 DR. SILVA: Dujuan?

20 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

21 Q. Yes, Ben, to follow up with what Marvin was saying about
22 personal minimums. Is the concept of pilot personal minimums, was
23 it documented anywhere?

24 A. So those weren't terms that we used, personal minimums. You
25 know, if somebody just came to me with a piece of paper and said,

1 all right, here's my personal minimums; they're different than the
2 airline's. That would seem a little off to me. But if somebody
3 said to me -- well, if somebody said to me, I'm not comfortable
4 with this wind or this forecast or what have you, you know, that
5 would be acceptable.

6 As far as being written down somewhere you can choose,
7 probably in general safety promotion there might be something to
8 that effect. I'm sure there is. You know, PICs has the ultimate
9 authority, responsibility for, you know, for the safety of the
10 flight. You know, probably wrap it up into some of that kind of
11 verbiage.

12 Q. Well, did you ever have any meetings or anything, safety
13 meetings about, you know, when we have the personal minimums, you
14 know, this is the process I want you to follow, you know, contact
15 me? Was there any process or anything?

16 A. No, but we're such a small group. I mean, I had pretty -- I
17 mean, all the captains and most of the FOs are in my phone still.
18 I mean, we kept pretty close tabs on one another and, you know,
19 there's a pretty collaborative environment at my years at PenAir
20 of, you know, kind of working together. Hey, this is what's
21 happening. You know, what do you think? You've been there more
22 than me, you know, help me make a good decision here.

23 Q. So would you say your team had a cohesive team --

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. -- that would feel free to call you any place and time?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. So if a pilot had a safety concern, what's the process by
3 which the pilot would communicate that safety concern to you?

4 A. Talk to me or, you know, in all cases it was recommended, you
5 know, our policy was to do a safety report. But if someone didn't
6 want to put something on paper, and they just wanted to give me a
7 call, I mean, they were certainly free to do so.

8 Q. What would be a reason why a pilot would not want to put
9 something on paper?

10 A. It's been a long day, they're tired, they just want to go
11 home. If I don't call you and get this out of the way, it's just
12 not going to happen.

13 Q. Was the safety reporting process, was that an anonymous
14 process, or did you have to put your name on the report?

15 A. It could be done either way.

16 Q. And did you -- many reports as chief pilot come into your
17 office?

18 A. Um-hmm.

19 Q. And were most of them anonymous, or did they have names on
20 them?

21 A. I believe most of them had names.

22 Q. Okay. Would you directly contact those pilots and talk to
23 them about the issues?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. And as far as any corrective action that needed to be

1 done based on, let's say, the narrative that was put together,
2 what was your role in, you know, going through the corrective
3 action and providing a disposition?

4 A. Oh, sure. So I worked a lot with a Tiffany Lease in our
5 safety department. You know, reports would come through, and then
6 she'd route them to the flight ops leadership. And if it was
7 something as simple as no pilot deviation, no action required, I'd
8 type that up and it would leave my desk, if you will. If I needed
9 to counsel someone or change a procedure, I'd do those things, and
10 I'd document them and, you know, return it to Tiffany's
11 department.

12 Q. Okay. And in your time as chief pilot, did you ever have
13 anyone come into your office and, you know, discuss safety culture
14 or, you know, provide, you know, some inputs about safety culture?

15 A. You know, like I said, we were pretty collaborative. We had
16 lots of discussions. I can't think of anyone coming in with a
17 concern saying, you know, I've got X, Y, or Z concern about our
18 safety culture. But I mean, I can think of examples where we
19 would just work together to, you know, not I want to say
20 indirectly promote it, we'd just talk about the situation at hand.
21 And, you know, I'm thinking of the new captains, you know, the
22 conversations I've alluded to. I'd tell them, I don't expect you
23 to, you know, go if you're not comfortable. Thank you, I'm glad;
24 I'm not going to.

25 Q. Thanks, Ben, that's all the questions I had for now.

1 A. Yeah. Yeah, you bet.

2 DR. SILVA: Tony?

3 BY MR. FISCHER:

4 Q. Ben?

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. Earlier you said you'd maneuver for the most favorable
7 runway.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. But as I understand it, the RNAV 1-3 or the RNAV 3-1 is not a
10 circling approaching? How do you --

11 A. That's correct. So that maneuvering for whatever runway
12 would be appropriate -- or it could be appropriate on a visual
13 approach.

14 Q. Okay. So how would you go about getting a visual?

15 A. Just follow the procedures in our ops specs and our GOM. If
16 you want me to, I can extemporaneously tell you, I think it was --
17 the manual read I think you had to be within 30 -- I can't
18 remember.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I'd get out the manual every time --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- you know? And I'd encourage my folks to do the same.
23 We'd have these discussions, when can you cancel IFR, when can you
24 do a visual approach? And we don't always have them memorized,
25 but what I did expect from my folks was to be able to open it up

1 and find the answer.

2 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you.

3 A. Yeah, you bet.

4 Q. Thank you, Ben.

5 A. Okay.

6 DR. SILVA: Brandon?

7 BY MR. WILSON:

8 Q. I might just have one or two. Talking about those two new
9 captains, and there was knowing that they might get on days where
10 other people would. What kind of conditions were those? Was it
11 visibility driven or wind driven?

12 A. I would expect potentially either. I would tend to think it
13 would probably be more wind.

14 Q. Was it Dutch Harbor, or was it other airports?

15 A. I'm thinking specifically of Dutch Harbor. There is just --
16 it's a lot hairier than the other airports, you know, with the
17 maneuvering VMC at the end and with the potential wind shear type
18 of wind.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. But it would certainly apply to any airport where they
21 weren't comfortable.

22 MR. WILSON: That's all I had.

23 MR. NYGREN: Okay.

24 BY DR. SILVA:

25 Q. Okay. Did you overlap with Crystal when she came in?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. For how long?

3 A. It was a number of weeks, possibly 4 or 6. But it wasn't --
4 you know, we tried to work together as much as we could. But a
5 fair bit of her time was taken up with training, so I couldn't
6 really, you know, be with her the whole overlap.

7 Q. Flight training?

8 A. I think she was in ground training for most -- a fair bit of
9 the time we overlapped.

10 Q. I see. Did you provide any training or anything for her for
11 her job? Was she a pilot?

12 A. Yeah. I kind of tried to fill up every minute we had
13 together with passing on whatever I could. Like, I remember
14 specifically doing a memo together, I remember specifically our
15 Skedflex guru was available, and scheduling I think we had about 2
16 hours together with him and some other folks, me and Crystal, and
17 just teaching about Skedflex operations. Now -- yeah.

18 Q. Okay. What was your impression of her when you were working
19 with her?

20 A. She seemed, you know, kind of eager to learn and figure out
21 the challenges of the whole new operation.

22 Q. You mentioned that you've still got pilots' phone numbers in
23 your phone.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Has anyone contacted you since you left regarding any safety

1 concerns, what they may have had about the company?

2 A. I have not gotten a lot of calls. I've heard one concern,
3 and I can't really remember. It wasn't, like, a direct, this
4 happened to me. It was more just a hearsay kind of thing.

5 Q. Okay. Did they ask for advice or anything from you?

6 A. No, it was just kind of a -- just kind of came up in a
7 routine conversation of this thing, you know, about, you know?
8 Again, it's coming to me, like, third hand.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. No, I've had pretty limited contact since I left, you know?

11 Q. How had the company changed from when you started as chief
12 pilot through the bankruptcy and the merger?

13 A. Well, you know, the dust was still just floating around in
14 the air. As far as my job and how flight ops ran, I didn't get
15 any interference. It was business as usual, you know, still just
16 keep running my -- managing my team, you know, the same way I had
17 been.

18 Q. Okay. Marvin mentioned Deke Abbott. What was your
19 interaction with Deke when you were here?

20 A. We -- let's see here -- discussed staffing. I advocated for
21 pay raises for pilots, you know, like probably -- same as I did
22 with the old ownership. Let me think here, was there? There was
23 a pay raise for the first officers and, yeah, between Deke and
24 Dave, you know, I just tried to advocate for more money for the
25 captains.

1 Q. Was that a difficult conversation?

2 A. Well, yeah, but it wasn't any different than with the
3 previous ownership.

4 Q. Okay. What was your impression of Deke's involvement with
5 PenAir?

6 A. My impression it would probably be more in the future. But
7 as far as when I -- like I said, I just didn't feel a lot of push
8 and pull from above with Ravn to tell me that, you know, change
9 the way business was being conducted.

10 Q. You mentioned you had received some safety reports. What
11 were the nature of those that came to you?

12 A. Oh, gosh. Oh, a lot of -- or several safety reports
13 overlapped with -- I'm drawing a blank for a second -- our
14 Medallion system, our Medallion -- what did we call that
15 reporting? Shoot, I forgot.

16 Q. Was it ASAP?

17 A. ASAP, yeah. Several overlapped, and so I'd get a safety
18 report, you know, company wide, and then as a management
19 representative for the ASAP, I'd go and continue to deal with it.
20 I mean, we had one where the crew left the gear pins in, you know?
21 We had -- I don't know, but there were lots. I think I try and
22 forget as soon as I'm done dealing with them.

23 Q. Had you ever received any information regarding a pilot who
24 was pressured to take a flight?

25 A. I don't think so.

1 Q. So along the lines of safety reporting, if someone had
2 concerns about -- safety concerns about the chief pilot, what is
3 the method for escalating those concerns?

4 A. If the person would -- I mean, if the person was not
5 comfortable communicating those directly to the chief pilot, I'd
6 say they'd just go to the director of operations, or maybe get
7 some advice from the safety department, you know, how should I
8 proceed?

9 Q. What was your interaction like with your director of
10 operations?

11 A. So I worked under three. I worked under Bill Batman, Larry
12 Bond, and Dick Harding.

13 Q. Okay. Let's start with Dick.

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. So what were your interactions like with Dick?

16 A. You know, I was trying to fill the role, or I was trying to
17 help bring him up to speed with PenAir changes, you know, since
18 he'd been gone. You know, we didn't have a ton of time together
19 but, you know, he's a consummate professional. You know, I
20 respect him a lot and -- positive interactions.

21 Q. So Larry was before that. Do you know when Larry left?

22 A. I believe it was prior to the ownership handoff. I want to
23 estimate December/January.

24 Q. Okay. What was your interaction like with Larry as DO?

25 A. We worked pretty well together. You know, he was always

1 supportive of, you know, me supporting the pilot team. Yeah, all
2 positive.

3 Q. Would you say he played an active role in his position in
4 terms of the operation and the oversight?

5 A. Yeah, I would say a challenge he had was being new to the
6 operation. And I would say that, you know, somebody like a Bill
7 Batman, who I worked with before who had a, you know, over a
8 decade of experience here with our policies and procedures, it was
9 easier for somebody like that to just be more intimately involved
10 with the minutia of operations. But Larry was always -- when you
11 needed to get something figured out, he was always willing to, you
12 know, figure it out and help make the best decision.

13 Q. How would Dick fall into that spectrum of --

14 A. You know, I just didn't get to -- I can't think of really any
15 issues that Dick and I had to address together in our, you know,
16 kind of short time working together.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Knowing Dick from before, you know, when I worked for him
19 previously, you know, he was intimately involved and, you know, a
20 great supporter of, you know, running a professional operation.

21 Q. Okay. Going back to airport qualifications. So there are
22 these requirements that are spelled out for airport qualification.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Where in the process is it verified that those requirements
25 are met? Who's responsible for that?

1 A. You know, I'd have -- it's probably specifically laid out.
2 I'd probably have to open the manual. But just off the top of my
3 head, I mean, if you're the person -- the manager or the check
4 airman signing the form, you know, you're signing that you're
5 agreeing that it's complied with.

6 Q. So when a check airman signs the form, do they have
7 information about total hours, for example, for a pilot?

8 A. I hope so. You know, I leaned pretty heavily on my pilot
9 records department to help me comply with some of this stuff, and
10 I think my understanding is, you know, the pilot records work
11 pretty closely with the check airmen as well to, you know, help
12 them with that.

13 Q. Okay. So a check airman's signature implied not only
14 competence or proficiency with the airport, it meant compliance
15 with the requirement as well?

16 A. I mean, that's how I feel when I put my signature on
17 something. And if I haven't done my due diligence, you know,
18 well, then I just trusted this other person to help me figure it
19 out. But if I signed it, I mean, I'm responsible for it.

20 Q. Okay. You mentioned that you had done a go-around at Dutch
21 Harbor. Did that involve just flying the traffic pattern back in?

22 A. I know I've done, you know, quite a few of them in there, and
23 maybe the most recent one, the one that stands out, yeah, I was
24 approaching 3-1 and the south wind, the wind shear was not
25 acceptable. You know, we kind of had an unacceptable wind shear,

1 so we went around.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And, you know, flew back out into the bay.

4 Q. And so you flew back out into the bay, and you did another
5 approach in?

6 A. We did. Yep, we did another approach.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. We landed to the other direction because it was just a direct
9 south crosswind, and in my experience in the 340, that wind was
10 acceptable. You know, either way it would have worked just fine.
11 But due to Rocky Point right there, the level of wind shear just
12 couldn't support a stable approach in the 2000. So landed from
13 the other direction, and it worked better. And compared notes
14 subsequently with people who have flown into the Dutch lots more
15 than me -- you know, I've been in there hundreds of times. I know
16 guys who are mentors who've been in there thousands of times, you
17 know, and compared notes with them, and they're like, "Well, yeah,
18 you silly, didn't you know you were going to get this wind off of
19 Rocky Point?" "Well, I do now."

20 Q. Right. Do you recall going around, and specifically in the
21 2000 at Dutch Harbor, and essentially doing a traffic pattern to
22 come back and land on the same runway?

23 A. So I recall heading out into the bay. So, you know, if you
24 want to call it a traffic pattern, it wasn't a conventional
25 traffic pattern.

1 Q. Okay. So it's not -- okay. So it wouldn't necessarily be --
2 okay.

3 A. There's more room to maneuver out in the bay than there is to
4 stay in the over-town side.

5 Q. Okay. Did you feel time pressure during that maneuver to
6 come back and land? How did that --

7 A. So fuel. So if I was -- you know, if there's any pressures,
8 it would be, you know, don't -- make sure there's proper fuel, you
9 know, which we, you know, we've ideally got figured out before we
10 even commence the approach. You know, we briefed, if we miss,
11 here's how much fuel we have; here's our plan.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Any other possible pressure might be if there was IFR traffic
14 behind you waiting. I mean, that could put some pressure on a
15 pilot.

16 Q. Okay. So if you were -- let's call it an unconventional
17 traffic pattern. If you did go around, and you were doing this
18 traffic pattern, what kind of work load would you expect in terms
19 of getting that airplane cleaned up and then set back up for
20 landing again?

21 A. It's potentially, you know, pretty fast paced activity. You
22 know, like probably any, you know, traffic pattern type of work in
23 a transport category aircraft.

24 Q. Are there any other -- and again, moving outside of Dutch
25 Harbor here in the Saab, would pilots experience that kind of

1 go-around traffic pattern come back around?

2 A. I mean, you don't experience it every day. I mean, I recall
3 having a day of multiple missed approaches in King Salmon with
4 kind of a green first officer, and I remember -- it looked like it
5 was a lot more work for him than it was for me.

6 Q. Okay. Were those missed approaches or --

7 A. Yeah. Yeah, a missed approach or -- excuse me -- they were
8 IFR missed approaches.

9 Q. Okay. Is there anything in training that actually goes
10 through going around and doing a VFR traffic pattern that you can
11 recall in the Saab?

12 A. I would say as part of the Dutch checkout, that would be an
13 appropriate discussion.

14 Q. But it's not like it would be part of -- or it's not like it
15 was part of the Saab training, per se? Was that a scenario that
16 would --

17 A. I don't think we had a specifically tailored scenario. But,
18 you know, I didn't develop or run the check airman side of things,
19 so there very well could have been.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I mean, I do know -- I do recall that, you know, we would do
22 Dutch Harbor work in the simulator.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. I'm not positive. I don't think that was a scenario, but I'm
25 not sure.

1 Q. Okay. Just kind of get a feel for how often someone would
2 fly a basic traffic pattern --

3 A. I think it's kind of --

4 Q. -- in the Saab 2000.

5 A. Oh.

6 Q. In operation even.

7 A. Well, you know, if it's appropriate, if you're able to, you
8 know, if it's safe and legal and operationally appropriate, not
9 that uncommon. You know, not an everyday thing, but not that
10 uncommon.

11 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all I had. We're going to go
12 around one more time.

13 MR. NYGREN: Okay.

14 DR. SILVA: If that's okay?

15 MR. NYGREN: Sure.

16 DR. SILVA: How are you doing? Do you need a break or
17 anything?

18 MR. NYGREN: I'm good. How you doing?

19 MR. HUFFMAN: Good.

20 DR. SILVA: Okay. All right. Marvin?

21 BY MR. FRANTZ:

22 Q. Okay. So at SIMCOM, presumably you did go-arounds?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Missed approaches?

25 A. Yeah, I'm still trying to stop saying the PenAir go-around

1 procedures at my new job.

2 Q. Yeah. So did you do go-arounds versus missed approaches in
3 the simulator that you recall?

4 A. Oh, did we do a visual go-around? Yeah, I'm sure we did.

5 Q. Okay. So the training -- or the requirement of PenAir we've
6 learned, and you've told us, is, you know, that to go to special
7 airports 300 hours PIC, may be waivable to 100 with the proper
8 recommendations. And then a checkout with a check airman. In
9 your view, and you have lots of experience at Dutch Harbor, is
10 that sufficient?

11 A. You know, I wouldn't say you should consider yourself an
12 expert once you've had the checkout. You know, I would reference
13 back to my discussions with my new captains. Yeah, you're checked
14 out, but I don't expect you to have everything figured out the way
15 this other person who's been going in here for 20 years has it
16 figured out.

17 Q. In your view as -- you're comfortable -- not that you were
18 making the scheduling, but you're comfortable with a pilot that
19 has, you know, 300 hours and has his check airman sign-off, you're
20 okay with them PIC to Dutch Harbor?

21 A. Yes. Yeah.

22 Q. Is it --

23 A. Yeah, the check airmen --

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. -- are super professional, take their job seriously.

1 Q. So it's sufficient. Is it necessary? Do you need 300 hours
2 PIC? Let's stipulate that the checkout's probably a good idea
3 with the check airman, but is that 300 PIC hour mark, is that
4 necessary before you should be able to qualified, just in your
5 opinion, to go into some place like Dutch Harbor?

6 A. I would just -- you know, if I was back running the airline,
7 I would just say it would be situational. You know, I'll
8 reference back to that East Coast PIC, a check airman, who I'm not
9 sure if I waived the 300 hours or not. You know, if I was running
10 the airline today, and he needed to go, and I had a discussion
11 with him and the check airman, I would be totally comfortable
12 signing him off, you know, under 300 right now.

13 Q. Okay. Do you know Sarah Boots?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Did you ever fly with her?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. What'd you think of her as a pilot?

18 A. Great.

19 Q. And aircraft handling skills?

20 A. You know, I don't have a, like, a real full, like, 10-point
21 critique on her built up, you know, of good at this, bad at this.
22 Just overall professional and, you know, does great. I cannot
23 think of any deficiencies with Sarah's performance or attitude.

24 Q. How about her -- that was my -- attitude/judgment as a --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- pilot?

2 A. I'd take --

3 Q. Any reason to --

4 A. I'd hire a hundred more pilots just like her.

5 Q. Yeah, okay. Do you have any -- roughly how long you guys
6 overlapped, how long you've been both here? Did she --

7 A. I --

8 Q. -- come on while you were chief pilot?

9 A. Yeah. I trained her. I taught her initial ground school,
10 and then I worked with her as a captain/co-pilot for a period, you
11 know, before I became her chief pilot.

12 Q. Okay. Has anybody from the PenAir or Ravn contacted you
13 since the accident?

14 A. Brian Whilden called me only to talk about this NTSB -- or
15 just to set this NTSB interview up. We didn't talk about anything
16 other than setting the interview up. And -- no.

17 Q. Deke Abbott?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Talk to him since the accident?

20 A. Have not.

21 Q. Okay. Thanks, Ben. I think that's all I have.

22 A. Yeah, you bet.

23 DR. SILVA: Dujuan?

24 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

25 Q. Yes, thanks, Ben.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. What sorts of leadership training did you receive at PenAir
3 as chief pilot?

4 A. Oh, good question. As far as formal training, I don't
5 recall.

6 Q. Okay. Was there informal sort of --

7 A. You know, I would just say mentoring for all my years here,
8 you know, how -- I'll give you some for examples. You know, I had
9 a death in the family, you know, when Dubby Jenson was my chief
10 pilot, and told him about it. He said, "All right, Ben, here's
11 what you're going to do, you know? You leave, tell me when you're
12 coming back to work." And, you know, I knew he had the support of
13 the people above him to run the airline that way. And so just
14 examples like that were, you know, how I knew I -- you know, the
15 leeway I had to run things the way I wanted to if that makes
16 sense.

17 Q. So in the transition period between when you were leaving as
18 chief pilot and then Crystal was coming in, did you provide her
19 with any guidance or any tips about the chief pilot role and how
20 to work in that position?

21 A. You know, we had, you know, many days together. You know,
22 I'm sure -- yeah. I can't really think of any specific -- you
23 know, here, let me unload my wisdom on you, Crystal. I can't
24 recall anything like that. But we had lots of time together just
25 talking about things.

1 Q. In the time that you, you know, spoke with her, did you feel
2 like she was a leader?

3 A. I felt like she, you know, was ready to learn to do the
4 position. You know, that was my first leadership role as well
5 when I took it on, and I didn't have any previous management
6 experience. I guess I kind of looked on her the same way as I
7 felt, you know? It's, you know, it's your job to go learn.

8 Q. All right. Thanks, Ben.

9 A. Yeah. Yeah, you bet.

10 DR. SILVA: Tony?

11 MR. FISCHER: I don't have any more questions.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. Brandon?

13 BY MR. WILSON:

14 Q. I just kind of want to clarify a couple things. If you were
15 in the VMC conditions and cleared for a visual approach coming
16 from Anchorage or King Salmon going to Dillingham, and the winds
17 were favoring runway one, how would you enter that traffic
18 pattern?

19 A. Overhead. That's for Dillingham coming in from the
20 Northeast? I'd go overhead and make a left traffic.

21 Q. So is it common for pilots at PenAir to fly visual patterns
22 at airports given VMC conditions?

23 A. Oh, yeah, sure. Yeah.

24 Q. So they do know how to do them? And --

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. You know, I guess I should apologize. You know, when we were
3 talking about this, I was thinking the discussion was leaning more
4 towards going around and flying a pattern. But, yeah, I'm glad
5 you clarified that. So, yeah, flying a --

6 Q. So the pilots do have experience flying visual patterns at
7 PenAir?

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. Okay. That's just what I wanted to clarify.

10 A. Yeah. Thanks.

11 DR. SILVA: Is that it?

12 MR. WILSON: Yep, that's it.

13 DR. SILVA: Okay.

14 BY DR. SILVA:

15 Q. Yeah, my question was regarding a go-around in the traffic
16 pattern.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. But in terms of cleaning up an airplane and setting back up,
19 but I appreciate the clarification. I just have a few follow-
20 ups --

21 A. Sure.

22 Q. -- that we just heard from some others. So you mentioned
23 that, given a pilot's experience, you may be comfortable signing
24 them off or comfortable with their proficiency going into a
25 special airport like Dutch Harbor. What would go into your

1 assessment in terms of their experience?

2 A. More times than not, I've flown with the individual, you
3 know, for years in most cases or many cases.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I would rely heavily on the check airman advice, or check
6 airman counsel, you know?

7 Q. So let's say that they've passed the proficiency check but
8 have 20 hours in the airplane.

9 A. The proficiency check for say --

10 Q. Sorry, the airport qualification check or --

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. -- evaluation.

13 A. We wouldn't give it to them with 20 hours.

14 Q. Okay. What kind of number would you give it to them then,
15 assuming the proficiency was --

16 A. Well, 300's the default.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. If there's reason -- you know, if there's a -- you know, I'll
19 call them a "rock star" in quotes.

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. If somebody walks in who has, you know, 10 years flying Saab
22 2000s or, you know, 10 years of flying in and out of Dutch Harbor
23 every day, that's somebody who I would think about, you know --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- they might not need -- they might be a candidate for the

1 100 hours.

2 Q. Okay. Yeah, I'm just trying to get a feel for, okay, like is
3 this -- are you looking for a certain amount of time in the
4 airport, in the airplane, of a candidate when you're looking at
5 that?

6 A. You know, mostly I just want to be able to feel good about,
7 you know, how we proceeded. You know, is this a safe choice? Do
8 I need to worry about this person? And if it doesn't feel safe or
9 if I'm going to need to worry about this person, then, you know,
10 we're going to let them get some more experience.

11 Q. Do you feel like 100 hours is sufficient for someone who has
12 not flown in there? So that's 100 hours total time in the
13 aircraft?

14 A. I would just look for -- you know, I would want to see a
15 reason. So I would want to say, oh, this person has extensive,
16 you know, Dutch Harbor type experience or extensive, you know,
17 experience in that airplane.

18 Q. Okay. One or the other?

19 A. That's where I'd start to look. You know, I mean, I'd take a
20 whole look at the person, but those are the kind of two big things
21 that I would be thinking about.

22 Q. Does PenAir, or did PenAir when you were -- give any captain
23 leadership training?

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. What did that look like?

1 A. Well, captain leadership? No, I -- actually, I take that
2 back. What we had was a -- we had a mentorship program for a
3 while. If people were close to upgrading and maybe they weren't
4 getting the recommendations to upgrade, we would assign them a
5 check airman and make sure they flew with that check airman at
6 least once a month. And kind of that check airman would sort of
7 be their shepherd, if you will, to, you know, develop them as a
8 captain candidate.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Oh, yeah, so I guess that is captain leadership training.

11 Q. So what kinds of -- what kind of aspect of skills -- or what
12 kind of skills would the check airman be cultivating?

13 A. I mean, the biggest one is just good decision making, you
14 know? I think for folks coming out of the right seat, they get
15 out of the habit of being in charge or making decisions. So
16 sometimes they just need a little cultivating to get being good at
17 making good decisions, you know?

18 Q. You mentioned that you used to have that program. Does it
19 still exist?

20 A. You know, we just had a couple candidates who we felt kind of
21 needed it, and so we did it for those candidates. I think it kind
22 of petered out after that probably because we just didn't have the
23 same kind of situation. You know, the situation was candidates
24 who seniority dictated they could upgrade, but we just wanted to
25 see their skills rise a little bit more.

1 Q. Okay. Was that written anywhere, or was that kind of an
2 informal system?

3 A. I don't think it was written. No. But, you know, I could
4 probably -- if full pieces of records exist everywhere, we did
5 have it on, like, our scheduling checklist. When we would write
6 the monthly schedule, we'd go through at the end and we'd check
7 the boxes, okay, have the mentorship, you know, candidates been
8 vetted to be flying? So it was on that checklist.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. But I don't believe in a manual.

11 Q. Okay.

12 DR. SILVA: Anyone have anything else? Okay.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah, just a couple.

14 BY MR. FRANTZ:

15 Q. Picturing Dutch Harbor, I've never flown in there, but it's
16 -- I mean, I've been there but not flown in. It seems like either
17 runway you use, if you go around the tip, and let's say it's VFR,
18 the typical pattern would be to circle Ballyhoo if you're coming
19 back to the same runway? Is that --

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. -- correct --

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. -- is you fly around the mountain?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And you hear of anybody, or any talk of anybody, ever going

1 the other way and circling or entering more of a conventional
2 traffic pattern over the city to come back for the same runway?

3 A. It was a thing to do your first approach, your first downwind
4 over the city sometimes. But no, that would be pretty
5 unconventional. Especially if you'd just gone around off of 1-3,
6 that would be a potentially uncomfortable right-hand turn there.

7 Q. Yeah, okay. Did Sarah Boots upgrade to captain while you
8 were here?

9 A. I think she was in the process. I don't believe so, no.

10 Q. Okay. Did you have any involvement in her upgrade or
11 anything leading up to her upgrade, like evaluation or anything
12 like that? Interviews?

13 A. You know, I may have identified her as an upgrade candidate.

14 Q. Okay. So from what you remember of her, you would have
15 supported her upgrade?

16 A. Yeah, 100 percent.

17 Q. Yeah?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay. That's all I got. Thank you, Ben.

20 A. Yeah, yeah, you bet.

21 DR. SILVA: All right. Is there anything that we didn't ask
22 you that you want to add?

23 MR. NYGREN: Can't think of anything.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay. Well, you have our information. If you
25 want to reach out --

1 MR. NYGREN: All right.

2 DR. SILVA: -- don't hesitate. And we appreciate your time.

3 MR. NYGREN: Yeah, you're welcome.

4 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

5 MR. NYGREN: Best wishes with everything. Yeah.

6 (Whereupon, at 10:23 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Ben Nygren

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 5, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Jami McNear
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/10/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: DEYUOS "DEKE" ABBOTT
Senior VP of Flight Operations, Ravn

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Wednesday,
December 4, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Abbott)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Deke Abbott:		
By Mr. Frantz		5
By Dr. Silva		14
By Dr. Sevillian		34
By Mr. Wilson		40
By Mr. Frantz		42
By Dr. Silva		53
By Dr. Sevillian		57

I N T E R V I E W

(3:42 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. FRANTZ: So the NTSB, we form groups when we're doing a
4 major investigation like this, and power plant systems. This is
5 the operational factors/human performance group. We're combined.
6 And I'm operational factors, and Sathya and Dujuan are human
7 factors.

8 And as you know, also, because we don't have the expertise,
9 we bring in other people to the group. FAA is always a group
10 member, as you know, and so today it's Tony. He'll introduce
11 himself in a minute, but he's representing the accident
12 investigation element of the FAA for this investigation.

13 And Brandon is our Saab/PenAir/Dutch Harbor expert that we
14 brought in, so he's part of the group. He replaced -- you
15 probably know, he replaced Dennis Fisher because Dennis moved up
16 to be chief pilot.

17 So this is our group, and we've been here this week doing
18 some follow-up interviews to the first group of interviews we did
19 when we were out here from the accident. We are going to do the
20 questioning by just kind of one at a time. We'll just go around
21 the group, and then after everyone's had a chance to ask
22 questions, if anybody has any follow-ups, we will probably go
23 around again.

24 You're authorized -- authorized is not a good word -- you're
25 allowed to have a representative with you for the interview. But

1 what you need to do is state who that is for our record.

2 MR. ABBOTT: Morgan Campbell, please.

3 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thank you. Let's do a quick round of
4 introductions. Marvin Frantz, operational factors investigator
5 with the NTSB.

6 DR. SILVA: Sathya Silva, human performance investigator with
7 the NTSB.

8 MR. WILSON: Brandon Wilson, check airman, PenAir.

9 MR. FISCHER: Tony Fischer. I'm the aviation safety
10 inspector with the Denali CMO.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: Dajuan Sevillian, human performance
12 investigator, NTSB.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

14 (Background noise)

15 DR. SILVA: It's a good thing there's not a mic on there.

16 (Laughter)

17 MR. FRANTZ: Deke, could you -- for the record, could you
18 state and give us the correct spelling of your name, please?

19 MR. ABBOTT: It's Deyuos, D-e-y-u-o-s, Charles,
20 C-h-a-r-l-e-s, Abbott, III.

21 MR. FRANTZ: And is Abbott --

22 MR. ABBOTT: Two Bs, two Ts.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Two Bs, two Ts, okay.

24 INTERVIEW OF DEYUOS "DEKE" ABBOTT

25 BY MR. FRANTZ:

1 Q. And what's your current position?

2 A. Senior vice president, flight operations, Ravn Air Group.

3 Q. Okay. How long have you had that position?

4 A. Seventeen months.

5 Q. Who's your boss?

6 A. Dave Pflieger.

7 Q. So, before you became -- and was that your first and only
8 position at Ravn?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Okay, before you became senior vice president for flight ops,
11 what were you doing?

12 A. So I worked for the FAA for 9, 9-ish years, approximately.
13 When I left the FAA, I was the acting deputy regional
14 administrator for the state of Alaska for the FAA. Prior to that
15 I was the CMO manager for the Polaris CMO here in Anchorage. And
16 before that, I was the acting deputy division manager for flight
17 standards for the state of Alaska. Should I keep going?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. Okay. Before that, I flew with Comair for almost 12 years.
20 When I left Comair, I was the base chief pilot, JFK. Had about
21 424 pilots, to be exact, at that base. We did over half of all of
22 Delta flying out of Kennedy, plus the flight attendants and all
23 that kind of stuff of running a base of that size.

24 Before I was the chief pilot at Kennedy, I was a system chief
25 pilot for Comair. We had -- I think there were four of us. There

1 were four system chiefs that worked in the SOCC and ran the
2 airline on a operational basis 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
3 Before that, I had my own flight school. Before that, I worked --
4 I was an operations manager for a large chemical distribution
5 company in the south side of Chicago.

6 Q. That's good. I'm just interested in the aviation part. So
7 when did you start flying? What year? Just --

8 A. 1981.

9 Q. Okay. And then you had a -- was your airline experience was
10 at Comair?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And how many years were you there?

13 A. Almost 12.

14 Q. How many hours, roughly, do you have?

15 A. So, like, about 8,000 total time. Typed in both jets and
16 turbo props. All three of my CFIs are current. I've got the
17 remote pilot certificate. Yeah, a ATP, commercial, single-engine
18 sea. I think that pretty well covers it.

19 Q. Okay. When did you leave the FAA? What year?

20 A. Well, that would have been last year, so '18.

21 Q. 2018?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yeah, the other aviation job, you know, we should probably
25 talk about that. After I left Comair, I was aviation safety

1 inspector -- a 121-inspector. Not a GA, a 121-inspector; AFS-220
2 in DC. And I was the lead inspector for all 121 flight operations
3 policy for the country. And then I was promoted to the AFS-220
4 manager, so I was a manager responsible for all 121 operating
5 policy.

6 Q. How did you find out about the job at Ravn?

7 A. How did I find out about that? That came up when Dave was
8 looking for folks. He said, hey, do you know anybody? And so I
9 reached out to some guys I knew in the industry: Anybody
10 interested in coming to Alaska? No. And then he said, all right.
11 Came back again. Do you know anybody? No. And I was thinking of
12 leaving the FAA anyways to -- actually, I was thinking of going
13 back to flying full time. And then I decided. I said, well, then
14 I'll apply. So I put my name in the hat.

15 Q. Have you known Dave for a long time?

16 A. No. Never -- just when he came to Alaska.

17 Q. Okay. So what's -- what are some of your primary jobs and
18 responsibilities as the senior vice president of flight ops at
19 Ravn?

20 A. So my responsibilities? It's very straightforward. I'm
21 responsible for the oversight and the running of the Hageland
22 certificate, the 135 certificate and the Corvus certificate, the
23 121 certificate, which is all about the -- it's pilot hiring,
24 training, procedures, standards, OCC, so dispatch for both
25 certificates, scheduling for both certificates. That is -- that's

1 my main function.

2 I was assigned cargo, which I don't know that much about, but
3 they needed somebody sort -- to keep an eye on cargo after the
4 senior vice president for airports and cargo left. So I kept an
5 eye on cargo in turn, until we found somebody who actually had
6 cargo -- solid cargo experience. That's a discipline in and of
7 itself.

8 Q. Are you involved in the -- I know you are -- what is your
9 role in the acquisition of PenAir by Ravn and the merger? What do
10 -- do you have specific responsibilities or a role in that --

11 A. I do.

12 Q. -- combination?

13 A. Yep. So I'm responsible for help bringing all these two
14 certificates together as far as the pieces and getting the manuals
15 to come together. It's a challenge, I can tell you that. It's a
16 huge challenge. So that's my main responsibility.

17 We work primarily with a contractor who does all the work.
18 And then my -- the way -- essentially, my essence as a senior
19 executive is to stand back and say, okay, where is this thing
20 getting stuck? Who needs to -- you know, how do we get it
21 unstuck? Do we need more money? Do we need more people? Is
22 there a misunderstanding of what's supposed to be done? That's
23 what I do there.

24 Q. What is your understanding of the special airport
25 qualification requirements for PenAir pilots?

1 A. Yeah, so the basic understanding, as I understand it, it's
2 300 hours, can be reduced to 100 hours. In the manual requirement
3 you've got three things. It needs a check airman recommendation,
4 it needs a chief pilot recommendation, might even be concurrence,
5 and then a check airman ride with a sign off.

6 Q. That -- is that requirement, the letter, concurrence, is that
7 just to get the waiver? Or is that for --

8 A. I wouldn't call it waiver.

9 Q. -- all pilots?

10 A. I wouldn't call that a waiver. It's not a waiver. I mean,
11 it's built into the manual system. It's a simple reduction. It'd
12 be no different than reductions of other training events that are
13 out there in the system. It's built into -- it's built in the
14 manual already, in the approved manual system.

15 Q. Do you know how long that's been in place, that requirement,
16 at PenAir?

17 A. I don't know the exact amount. I know it's approximately
18 2015 when that happened. I don't know. You'd have to -- we'd
19 have to look at that actual document.

20 Q. Do you think it's sufficient qualification criteria for a
21 pilot to fly to a special airport?

22 A. I do.

23 Q. Do you think it needs to be changed or modified?

24 A. Probably not. It's -- that is an unusual -- in my
25 experience, it's a very unusual thing to see in a manual.

1 Q. What, specifically, is unusual?

2 A. Requiring 300 hours in the seat to go somewhere like that.
3 Generally speaking, under 121, the only -- is you got -- you have
4 a couple there. You got the 100 and 120 days, consolidation.
5 You've got the high mins captain rule. But I've never seen a --
6 such a requirement to go in there. That is a uniquely Alaska type
7 concept.

8 Q. Is it unique to PenAir as far as you know? Or do other -- do
9 you know of --

10 A. It is not unique.

11 Q. -- have knowledge of other carriers up here using
12 requirements like that?

13 A. Corvus has a similar kind of language in the manual.

14 Q. Do you think it could be eliminated, the requirement?

15 A. Could it be eliminated? It could be made to look fairly
16 similar to all the other 121s in the United States.

17 Q. And which would mean what?

18 A. So, if you were to eliminate it entirely -- it could be
19 eliminated, I suppose. It could be. The argument has been made
20 that having 300 hours in the airplane helps add to the competency
21 of the captain.

22 Okay, that's an argument. And that argument, I've never
23 heard it applied anywhere else. If you look over at -- let's use
24 UPS or FedEx. You could have a guy sit right seat on an MD-11 for
25 15 years and upgrade to the left seat of the 7-4. He's going to

1 do his OE, and he's cut loose until he's off high mins, and he's a
2 regular, fully-qualified line captain. And he goes into special
3 airports using special airport procedures, whatever they would be.

4 Q. Did -- was there ever a discussion, since you've been senior
5 vice president for flight ops, of changing that requirement at
6 PenAir?

7 A. PenAir? I'm going to have to say yes, but see, the reason --
8 the only reason I say that is because we discussed this on the
9 Corvus side, and the chief pilot and the DO said, no, we should
10 leave it in. It's been working. Okay, it's working. Got it.
11 Let's -- we'll leave it be.

12 Could it be -- did we have a discussion? Honestly, I don't
13 know the answer to that. It probably has been discussed. Whether
14 or not we discussed it in detail or changing it -- but we discuss
15 a lot of things, whether we're going to change, look at it, not
16 change it, leave it alone. Does this make sense? Is this
17 industry standard? That's -- I mean, I look at those things
18 almost every day.

19 Q. Are you saying you don't recall ever having a discussion with
20 PenAir personnel -- management personnel and/or pilots about
21 possibly eliminating the 300/100 requirement?

22 A. Oh, I would say -- no, actually I would say, yeah. I would
23 say that conversation has been had. Looking at it? Sure, look at
24 it? Absolutely.

25 Q. Is it your view that eliminating that would not make the

1 operation any more or less safe if you eliminated the 300/100-hour
2 requirement for special airports?

3 A. I think you'd have to look at the basis of how that was put
4 in place. And then I think you'd have to say, okay, in the
5 totality, are we gaining or losing by doing this?

6 So it was put in place for whatever reason was put in place.
7 But when I look at a very small carrier, like Corvus is -- 10
8 airplanes -- or very -- even smaller carrier, like PenAir, five
9 airplanes, and nowhere else in the industry do I see this kind of
10 language, it says, why is -- what's so special about this?

11 I'm not convinced that it's necessary because it's not done
12 elsewhere. There are mountains around the country, around the
13 world. Air is air. Physics are physics. Why is this different?
14 But it wasn't changed and -- nor was the Corvus changed. It was
15 -- we left it alone.

16 Q. Do you have any day-to-day oversight or control
17 responsibilities specifically for the PenAir certificate?

18 A. I do not.

19 Q. Does anybody at PenAir report to you?

20 A. They do not. If you look at the org structure, everybody
21 reports up through Brian. Brian reports to Dave. I report to
22 Dave. Therefore, the organization structure is I'm a peer of the
23 president of PenAir.

24 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thank you. I'm going to pause for a second
25 and turn it over to Sathya.

1 MR. ABBOTT: Okay.

2 BY DR. SILVA:

3 Q. Along those lines, what is your involvement with PenAir?

4 A. At most, it's -- so when PenAir came -- was purchased, the
5 chief pilot, the DO left. Certificate cannot last and operate for
6 any length of time without those two 119 people. Nobody in PenAir
7 who would have met the 3 and 6 Rule stepped forward to become and
8 volunteer and take a leadership position. Therefore, had to go
9 outside the certificate, pretty unusual. Actually, it's very
10 unusual. I don't think I've ever seen that done, but the rule
11 doesn't disallow it.

12 So I had reached out to guys that I knew -- same guys I
13 called the first time. Both -- they all said, no, thank you. No,
14 don't want to move to Alaska. Brian came up with Dick Harding's
15 name. Dick Harding was a former DO here, and he was willing to do
16 it. So Dick did not require -- or did require a management
17 deviation under the 119 Rule because he did not -- because he'd
18 been retired for at least 10 years and, therefore, he didn't meet
19 the 3 and 6, so he went for the management deviation for Dick.

20 Needed a chief pilot, and since we did not have anybody
21 stepped forward from the pilot group to take that job, we started
22 looking at where else can we get someone. So we had -- Crystal
23 Branchaud applied, put her name in the hat and said she would like
24 to do it. She also did not meet the criteria because her time was
25 under 125. The law requires 121 -- 3 and 6. So she got a

1 management deviation.

2 When we put them in, both are brand new. Dick had -- Dick's
3 a highly experienced man. However, his currency is 10 years since
4 he'd been in the business. He'd been retired. Crystal had never
5 been a chief pilot. So the extent was, you know, can I keep an
6 eye on them, as that goes? That's all.

7 Q. What do you mean by keep an eye on them?

8 A. So Crystal is a little -- let's use Crystal as an example.
9 So Crystal's a brand spanking new chief pilot. She has nobody to
10 talk to and ask questions of and try to understand, okay, how do I
11 deal with this situation? Whereas, on the Corvus side, the chief
12 pilot there has one current chief pilot and three former chief
13 pilots, so she can sit down, say, okay, guys, this is a weird one.
14 What do I do with this one?

15 So Crystal would come over on a pretty regular basis, my 9
16 o'clock, and say, okay, here's the things I got. And what do you
17 think about this when you think about that? And so she had this
18 room, collective high level of experience to ask questions. What
19 do you think? Or what am I missing here?

20 Now, the way for me to keep an eye on that would be say, you
21 know, listen to what she's talking about. Is she getting in over
22 her head? So, as a chief pilot, you can get in over your head
23 couple ways. One is you can wade into water that's too deep, and
24 you can't swim, and you drown. Or you wade into shallow water
25 that's filled with sharks. One or the other. And if I saw her

1 wading into water, that would -- that could hurt her, we'd say,
2 okay, what does everybody think about what she's got here? What's
3 everybody's opinion on this? That's --

4 Q. Give some examples of your -- with the water analogy.

5 A. Okay. Yeah, sure. So let's use, let's use payroll.
6 Payroll's a -- is a potential shark infested water.

7 So if a pilot has a payroll problem -- so there's a couple
8 subjects when you are dealing with pilots. You had better never,
9 ever -- if you touch him, you better be very careful, and you
10 better get it right, and you'd better err on the side of the
11 pilot.

12 So if you touch their food, their sleep, their money, or
13 their family -- if any subject -- if you're touching one of those
14 four subjects, you are now wading into shark infested water
15 because if -- here we don't overnight, so we never have rest
16 issues. Therefore, since we don't have rest issues, we never get
17 into family things.

18 But if we're talking about money, because every now and then
19 payroll gets fouled up, you'd better fix this, and you'd better
20 fix it fast. Get over to payroll and get a manual check cut. If
21 this person truly is tight on money, get a manual check cut and
22 get that worked out, and then they can sort that out on the next
23 payroll cycle. That would be an example of shark infested waters.

24 Q. What about the alternative, wading in too deep?

25 A. All right. So wading in too deep is going to be you're over

1 your head in terms of your experience and knowledge of where you
2 stand, especially as a new chief pilot.

3 So if you have -- let's use -- well, let's use maintenance,
4 right. So you can have situations where you have a perfectly good
5 airplane that's carrying a ton of deferrals. And so a chief pilot
6 can walk into that and say, yeah, we have a perfectly valid
7 airplane. Let's go ahead and -- you know, this airplane is --
8 it's a legal airplane, so we're good here. There's time to say,
9 okay, no, I think we need to pull that airplane off the line.
10 Cancel this flight. Let's get these four items fixed. These
11 three can sit, but these need to get squared away.

12 And but your deed now -- but you're coming out of your area
13 of expertise. You're now moving in to deal with maintenance. And
14 unless you're super strong there, you need to be -- you're getting
15 into water. You can get in trouble because you don't know the
16 material. I'm not a maintenance guy. Don't pretend to be. That
17 would be an example.

18 Q. So you mentioned this 9:00 a.m. meeting. What is this
19 meeting for?

20 A. It is for the two DOs. Generally, it's for the two DOs and
21 the two chief pilots and myself to go over, what we do we got
22 going on at the moment? What are the issues or problems you've
23 got? What are we doing about whatever that subject is at the
24 moment?

25 We do -- on the 135 side, we move airplanes around the state

1 fairly often based on the need of the state, more so if we have a
2 large volume of mail, for example, needs to be moved, we will talk
3 about, can we move this 1900? Let's put it up there. Let's take
4 a 208 and stick it over there. Yeah, that'd be a good example of
5 what we talk about at the 9 o'clock.

6 Q. So it's the five of you in that meeting?

7 A. Generally, it's five. It can be others. Yeah, you know, so
8 for example, we are dealing -- you know, it's occasional to have a
9 maintenance guy. Not often. We occasionally have -- very
10 occasionally, we'll have a ground service guy. Okay, where are we
11 at with getting all this stuff fixed? You know, winter's coming.
12 Where are we at? Fill us in.

13 Who else shows up to that? Crystal would show up. I thought
14 that was very useful for her to see -- the term we use is how the
15 sausage gets made every day -- so she can have a philosophy on how
16 to think about things and how to make the certificate run.
17 Certificate doesn't just run by itself.

18 Q. Had you worked with Crystal before she took the chief pilot
19 job?

20 A. She was a line captain, so the answer would be, at best, you
21 know, I might have said hi to her. So she was a line captain who
22 applied for the job.

23 Q. Did she apply on her own, or was she requested? Did someone
24 approach her about applying?

25 A. I would say probably the answer to that would have been Sarah

1 said, hey, you know, there's going to be this opening. Do you
2 want to put your name in? Something like that. I don't know that
3 to be true, though. I don't know that's true.

4 Q. Okay. What are your interactions with PenAir pilots?

5 A. For the most part, pretty minimal. Yeah, I'd say pretty
6 minimal because I don't have, I don't have the day-to-day, hand-on
7 touching of the certificate. Unlike the Corvus guys, right? I
8 mean, the Corvus guys, I'll get grabbed in the maintenance hangar.
9 Hey, what's the story? What are we doing with this? Guys would
10 come to my office, literally, and plop down in my seat and -- I
11 want to talk to you about stuff. Tell me this deal. Tell me the
12 story on this. Tell me the story on that. Okay, I'll tell the
13 story. Very minimal on PenAir pilots.

14 Q. When you do interact with PenAir pilots, what are those
15 circumstances?

16 A. Well, there's been two that I can think of in this room. We
17 had two people who were upgrading, and there were concerns about
18 their personal maturity levels to be in the left seat of the
19 airplane for both of those people.

20 And multiple, multiple -- I'm going to -- let's just put it
21 as pilots -- multiple pilots had gone to Crystal and said, hey, I
22 am concerned about these people. And Crystal said, you know, what
23 do you think about this? I said, I think you got to hear them
24 out. You got to hear their story; see what they think. So I had
25 two different conversations with two different upgrade candidates

1 on that subject.

2 Flying in the left seat of a 121 airplane is not about flying
3 airplanes. That's a thinking seat. The right seat is a procedure
4 seat. And we have -- you can't -- someone may be technically
5 qualified to be in the left seat, but if they don't have the
6 emotional maturity to be in the left seat, then someone is going
7 to have to tell them, sorry, it's not going to work, or you're
8 going to have to work on yourself to get ready for this
9 assignment.

10 Q. What were the situations that made Crystal and you question
11 emotional maturity? Let's talk about one pilot at a time since
12 you mentioned those were two separate cases.

13 A. Okay. So one was a young guy. He was about -- I don't know,
14 young. He was, like, 23. There were reports that this guy, off
15 duty, had -- he was out and -- out over, over here at the float
16 pond where all these -- where all the pilots hang out, in --
17 either in uniform or wearing PenAir clothes, drinking, carrying
18 on, putting his hands on women.

19 And this, combined with the concerns of several pilots to
20 Crystal -- the first place you look for, for pilots, if they're
21 going to have bad behavior, is you look on their personal life.
22 So, if you look at their personal life, if they're undisciplined
23 there, it's possible they're going to bring that over to the
24 cockpit.

25 And so Crystal said, you know, what do you think? I said, I

1 think we should hear this guy out. He's a young guy. I was a
2 young guy. I was a young pilot. I understand this. Let's -- you
3 were a young woman. Let's talk to this guy. Let's see what he
4 has to say.

5 So we sat in his room and talked to him and said, hey, you
6 know, this doesn't work. You cannot -- people put your trust --
7 their trust in you, and when you're out acting, in town, like
8 this, that is not trustworthy behavior. What do you think about
9 that? And he said, I can see what you're saying. I said, right,
10 you're not Joe FO anymore. You wanted to be a captain. That is a
11 little more than just putting four stripes on your shoulder and
12 collecting double pay. There's a lot more to that. So we talked
13 to him about it, and he went out and he qualified. And from all
14 accounts, he totally took that to heart. There was some more
15 there. I think he was missing leadership, in general, not just
16 from the PenAir pilot group, because honestly, I believe the
17 PenAir pilot group should have done that -- should have been
18 talking to him like, hey, you got to knock that off. That doesn't
19 work for me. But that didn't happen. Or if it did, it certainly
20 didn't take. But Crystal had not ever had the experience of
21 having these kind of conversations. I've done it for years. I'm
22 like, you know, you got to have a conversation.

23 It's his choice. Is he going to step up and say, I get rid
24 of my childish ways or am I not? If I am, I'm going to become a
25 grown man and be taking a responsible job, then that's what I've

1 got to do. And he did, from all accounts.

2 Q. So he's still here with PenAir?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. What about the other situation?

5 A. Yes, the situation -- similar on maturity and concerns about
6 maturity. I didn't hear any specific examples of behavior, but
7 there were concerns about her ability to be a mature captain. And
8 so we had the same conversation with her and talked about, you
9 know, this is the job. This is more than just four stripes and
10 making more money and all that. And she seemed to hear that.

11 Q. What was the context of the -- again, the feeling of
12 immaturity? Where did that come from?

13 A. It came from other pilots to Crystal. They had gone to her
14 with their concerns. And then she called me and said, you know,
15 how do you deal with this? Can you come over and help me -- walk
16 me through working -- talking to her? Sure.

17 Q. Do you recall any examples of the concerns that they had?

18 A. I don't. I don't. I didn't ask that question. You know,
19 but there were multiple -- I do know -- I mean, I remember there
20 were multiple -- I don't want to call them complaints. There were
21 multiple concerns brought to Crystal about her also.

22 Q. Okay. Have you flown the Saab 2000?

23 A. No.

24 Q. What's your experience with Dutch Harbor?

25 A. I've flown in there once.

1 Q. When was that?

2 A. When was that? I don't know. A while ago.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Long before the accident, let's put it that way.

5 Q. Was it -- do you remember what aircraft you were flying?

6 A. It was on the Saab.

7 Q. The 340?

8 A. No, 2000.

9 Q. You flew in there --

10 A. I sat on the jump seat and rode in.

11 Q. You did jump seat? Okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Have you ever flown in there as PIC --

14 A. Never.

15 Q. -- or SIC?

16 A. Never.

17 Q. Okay. But it was in, like, the last year because you've been
18 working --

19 A. It was. I would say that's true.

20 Q. Okay. What did you notice about Dutch Harbor when you had
21 that experience? What was your impression?

22 A. It's a short runway. That's what I noticed. It's a short
23 runway. It's a tight fit.

24 Q. Aside from the length of the runway, were there any other
25 challenges that you noted about the airport?

1 A. It, to me, looked like any other semi-mountainous kind of
2 airport that I've operated into. I flew a CL-65 jet, I don't
3 know, 10 years, whatever, whatever it was. I actually went,
4 looked it up. I couldn't even put my jet in there; it's not even
5 allowed. So, when I saw the runway, I was like, that's a tight
6 little snug fit.

7 Q. What prompted you jump seating for that flight?

8 A. Just like any other station that, you know, I'm going to go
9 see what's out there, just like I go to North Slope. I go to
10 Barrow or Nome or Unalakleet or Dutch Harbor or, you know, fill in
11 the blank -- Valdez, Kodiak. Hadn't seen it. Why not?

12 I considered overnighting, but I've done enough overnight in
13 my life, I didn't need overnight. So I flew out, I think, on the
14 early flight and came out on a late flight.

15 Q. Did you jump seat on the way back too?

16 A. I don't think I did, actually. I think I sat in the back.

17 Q. You mentioned that the airport qualifications that PenAir had
18 were uniquely Alaska. When you say Alaska, are you describing the
19 state of Alaska or --

20 A. The state of Alaska.

21 Q. Okay. So, from what I'm understanding, those kinds of
22 restrictions you wouldn't expect to find in the continental U.S.?

23 A. I've never seen them anywhere else. I have seen tons of, you
24 know, special airports -- normal special airports that go on the
25 special airport list, and that is always brought -- you go in as a

1 qualified line captain using the pictorials that are part of the
2 normal airport, special airport qual event. So you're required to
3 read all those sometime before you get there.

4 Q. Have you ever been involved with any pilot meetings for
5 PenAir?

6 A. Yeah, we had a meeting down in the hangar where a bunch of
7 pilots were there. We've had a pilot meeting, post-accident, with
8 check airmen. I'm sure I have other meetings. I mean, I talked
9 to guys all the time, right? I mean, more than two people is a
10 meeting, so I'm sure I have.

11 Q. So that, the meeting that you recalled before the accident,
12 do you remember what was discussed?

13 A. Yes. That was very specific to -- as we were building what
14 we were going to do with, with the Dash-8 going into Dutch Harbor.
15 So we pulled the check airmen, not all of them, but some of the
16 check airmen, on the Saab 2000 in and said, hey, you know, tell us
17 what you think. What is a helpful -- is there something helpful
18 we need to look at as we send our guys down there?

19 And we had a couple of those meetings, actually. And that
20 was -- the whole point was to -- was there any information here
21 that was -- that would be helpful to put on the training for Dash-
22 8 pilots.

23 Q. What was the result?

24 A. Yeah, the end result was we've got -- so to go into -- we've
25 got a pretty lengthy GOM -- addition to the GOM on going into

1 Dutch. Talks about max winds. You have to have wind velocity by
2 the final approach fix or we don't go in. We put a prohibition
3 on, I think it was Cold Bay. Can't use Cold Bay. Might have been
4 Sand Point, but either way, one of those two airports, we weren't
5 going to use that as a destination alternate.

6 We put -- we had to have four approaches, two into runway 3-1
7 off the right base, one straight into 1-3, and then the fourth
8 would be at check airman discretion. They had to see one off the
9 instrument procedure. And we also made a training video to let
10 the pilots get a view of what that looks like going into Dutch
11 Harbor.

12 Q. So when did these initiatives take place? Was this before or
13 after the accident?

14 A. This was after the accident because the -- you know, it's
15 unknown why that airplane did not stop on the runway, right? We
16 don't know. Airplane touched down at 1,000 foot, 1,800 feet. We
17 have a huge skid mark off the left tire. Anti-skid clearly is not
18 working on this airplane. Something's broken with that airplane.

19 And we're now -- until that is totally resolved, we're now
20 going to put Dash-8s into an airport that we don't go that often.
21 And that's what we're doing now. And we're about -- well, we're
22 pretty darn close to finishing up getting those guys qualified on
23 that, so I have enough pilots to cover the schedule to go into
24 Dutch Harbor.

25 Q. So that was the topic of the meeting you had with pilots here

1 after the accident?

2 A. I'm going to say yes.

3 Q. Okay. You mentioned a meeting that happened prior to the
4 accident. Do you recall the subject?

5 A. Yeah, that was more like a pizza thing down in the hangar.
6 Everybody have a pizza, drink a coke, say hi. That kind of stuff.
7 It was not a business -- it was not -- there was no technical or
8 business component to that.

9 Q. Okay. Are you involved with hiring at PenAir?

10 A. We are involved with hiring. Yes. So the -- yeah, this is a
11 strange subject because when we bought PenAir, PenAir was severely
12 understaffed, and nothing was being done about that. And then, so
13 the chief pilot on the 7H side, the Corvus side, does all the
14 hiring for her certificate, but we had nobody doing it for PenAir.
15 So Crystal, being a new chief pilot, I said, okay, Crystal, you
16 work with Sarah. You two, together, interview all these pilots,
17 and you decide who's going where. Talk to these candidates. You
18 guys sort it out and we do it that way.

19 That actually is a -- it's a strange thing, because even
20 recently, when we've asked Dennis to participate in that, he
21 doesn't seem to be interested in that. And so we, to this day,
22 are still interviewing these new pilots to come in. I think
23 Dennis now is slowly engaging on that, but hiring pilots is a
24 critical thing. It's absolutely critical. You know, on -- we
25 look at a lot of candidates before we pick one up. The number's

1 large. It's like 7 to 1. That's because it's an important --
2 it's a very important selection. It's very important.

3 Q. Are you involved -- so it sounds like you're describing new
4 hires. Are you involved with captain upgrade?

5 A. No. The only two captain upgrade issues that I ever dealt
6 with were the ones we discussed with the two maturity problems
7 moving forward.

8 Q. Have you ever sat in on a captain upgrade interview?

9 A. No.

10 Q. You mentioned the 3 and 6 Rule. Can you explain what that
11 means?

12 A. Yeah. So the 3 and 6 Rule's just -- it says you have to have
13 3 years. You have to have -- yeah, 3 years in the last 6 years of
14 having operational control or managerial control. You have to see
15 how the rule reads. But that's what -- basically what -- it
16 forces, it forces the issue that someone's been in "the business"
17 for at least 6 years; of that, 3 years they've held some sort of
18 leadership position other -- some sort of leadership position.

19 And so, in other words, you couldn't have a -- and only
20 because -- I suppose you could have an FO apply to be a chief
21 pilot. But I don't think that would work because they wouldn't
22 have had any kind of supervisory experience. Yeah, it's the way
23 the rule reads.

24 Q. You mentioned earlier that there was a conversation about
25 changing the special airport requirements or reducing those

1 qualifications, changing them to better match what the continental
2 U.S. has. Was that ever -- change, or potential change, idea
3 ever discussed with PenAir pilots?

4 A. I don't know. I don't think so, but I don't know. Yeah,
5 that would be -- that subject would be like any other subject.
6 You're constantly looking at everything you do all the time. Does
7 this make sense at all, at all times? It doesn't matter what
8 subject you're on. Does this make sense? Do we have the right
9 number of pilots? Do we have the right number of flight
10 attendants? Are these really special airports? Because you can
11 take airports off the special airport list as easily as putting
12 them on.

13 Q. So as far as we know, the concept of reducing the
14 requirements for special airports at PenAir was not openly
15 discussed with the pilots?

16 A. I would say -- I know it would be -- have been discussed, for
17 sure. Do I remember exactly who was there? I do not. But that
18 would be no different than any other piece of business that you
19 look at from a normal course of business. Does this make sense?

20 Q. Would that be something that you would be involved with or
21 present for?

22 A. I could. Sure. Yeah, right. If it was -- if that was a
23 piece of business we were going to discuss at the time, yeah, I
24 could be involved in that. I could just as easily not be
25 involved. It would be the chief pilots, the DOs work through

1 this, talk it through. What do you think?

2 But we do that all the time with all sorts of subjects. So a
3 special airport conversation of, do we remove the special airports
4 or not, it's just sort of a normal thing. It's a normal question
5 to ask.

6 Q. So do you recall ever being part of a conversation with
7 PenAir pilots involved discussing that concept?

8 A. I'm going to have to say I don't recall specifically. I
9 mean, I'm not going to say it didn't happen. It's possible, but
10 that would be no different than any other conversation of subject
11 matter, and this is what we're looking at.

12 Q. Do you know if Crystal has had any concerns with pilots
13 declining a flight or declining flights?

14 A. I've not heard of her having a concern with the pilot
15 declining flights. In other words, you were -- did you say
16 refusing an assignment?

17 Q. Right, or canceling for weather?

18 A. No, I've not heard of --

19 Q. Did you ever hear of that?

20 A. -- her -- I've not heard of that conversation that we've ever
21 had where a pilot refused to operate and said, nope, I'm not going
22 to -- I'm declining; I'm not going to do it.

23 Q. Is that because that doesn't happen typically? Or it
24 wouldn't come up to her?

25 A. It doesn't happen very -- I -- it's a very rare thing to hear

1 that come up because a flight is dispatched out, and if you have a
2 weather problem, the airplane simply goes on a weather hold. It
3 just goes on a weather hold till you have the weather for release.
4 That's all.

5 Q. So, what's your opinion of -- yeah, you need a weather hold
6 because it's below minimums? What's your opinion on pilot
7 decision making? Let's say, the minimums rise above -- or, sorry
8 -- the weather rises just above minimums?

9 A. Okay, so you -- so -- well, let's be super clear what we're
10 talking about. It's either at or above, right? At or above; at
11 or below.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Okay. So for -- if we're going to say, if we have legal
14 weather for dispatch, we have -- so we have a legal airplane. We
15 have a legal crew, legal rest, legal training, legal release.

16 Now, what's -- why are -- why is there some reason we're not
17 going? You could easily sit there and say, well, we have a
18 weather hold because there's a line of thunderstorms laying
19 between A and B. Line of thunderstorms between A and B would not
20 be a prohibited event for release.

21 Now, you might want to hold and not penetrate the line, or
22 you look at the weather and say, yes. However, what's the trend?
23 Should we hold for the trend or not? Sometimes it would be, we're
24 not going to hold for the trend, but we're going to put extra gas
25 on the airplane, so we get down there, if it trends good, great.

1 If it trends bad, you got gas. You hold or you come home.

2 So, to answer your question, I have never heard -- I don't
3 think I've ever heard of a pilot refusing a trip here. I've had
4 pilots elsewhere refuse trips.

5 Q. So I'm just trying to -- I'm going to rephrase what you said
6 to make sure I understood.

7 A. What are you driving at here?

8 Q. Well, I'm just trying to understand your opinion. Is it --
9 if it's at or above minimums and there's -- everything's met
10 legally, there's an expectation that the pilot should take that
11 flight. Is that what I'm hearing?

12 A. I would say -- all right, so I'm going to rephrase your
13 question because an expectation has sort of a biased angle to it.
14 That's a standard. And the standard is that we have a standard,
15 and these are the standards. Can you operate to the standards?
16 We dispatch to visibility only. So can you -- are you able to
17 operate this airplane to the standards? Yes, I am. No, I'm not.

18 If you're not, that's a, that's a different problem. That
19 needs to come off the line. Figure that one out. Yeah, I can
20 operate to the standards. Okay, what are we waiting for? Why are
21 we waiting? Well, because there's a line of thunderstorms coming
22 through, or there's a tornado on top of the field.

23 Otherwise, if we have other standards, I don't know what
24 those would be, then we don't have standards. We have every -- we
25 have 40,000 airline captains' view of when they should go. And

1 that does not happen in the United States. Certainly, in the
2 lower 48, that doesn't happen. So the issue is, do you have a
3 legal release? Yeah, I got a legal release. If you're concerned
4 about it, I have taken many, many trips where, yeah, I'm going to
5 put some extra gas on; put an extra 5,000 pounds of gas on the
6 airplane. We'll get there. It doesn't work, I come home. I
7 hold. I divert.

8 But we don't have a situation where we start coming up with
9 personal standards. Personal standards are not professional
10 standards. This is a professional commercial operation. So if
11 every United pilot decided he'll only go -- he doesn't like to fly
12 at night. Okay, so he can't fly at night. And then this guy
13 doesn't like to fly in the snow. We don't have standards anymore.

14 Q. Is that synonymous with personal limits?

15 A. Personal limits is a -- in my opinion, a private pilot
16 concept.

17 Q. Can you explain that?

18 A. So a private pilot who gets their brand new instrument
19 rating, in theory, can go and take their airplane, their little
20 Cessna-150, and fly all over the place, and they can fly ILSs down
21 to minimums at night in heavy rain. Probably not a great idea.
22 Perfectly legal.

23 Now, we take that concept, and then we insert that into a 121
24 operation. We now no longer have 121 standards. We now have
25 every pilot's personal standards. What are those numbers? Nobody

1 knows. They're not published. They decide on a whim. So a pilot
2 has to decide, can they operate to the standards or they cannot.
3 And if they cannot do that, then they need to be taking themselves
4 off the line to fly.

5 If they don't -- if they feel that the weather is going to be
6 problematic, then they have to come up with options. I can hold
7 at the gate. I can taxi out and wait for it to get better. I can
8 put more gas on the airplane and we get down there -- oh, weather
9 went down on the way. It was forecasted good, so I had a good
10 legal release, but I get down there, sorry, can't fly the
11 approach. So I hold or I come back or I divert. But to apply a
12 private pilot concept to commercial flying, we would then have no
13 standards.

14 Q. Okay.

15 DR. SILVA: I think that's all the questions that I had.
16 Thank you.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, Dujuan, do you have any questions?

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

19 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

20 Q. Have you had any conversations with Crystal about a pilot
21 named Sarah Boots, by any chance?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And how did that conversation go?

24 A. So, Sarah Boots -- we've had multiple conversations on Sarah
25 Boots. Sarah Boots was one of the pilots who had -- people had

1 expressed concerns about Sarah Boots' personal maturity. She was
2 the one -- one of those two that we discussed earlier. I sat here
3 with Crystal, talked to Sarah about, here is the job. Here are
4 the things we've been hearing. What do you --how do you take
5 that? What do you -- do you believe me? Do you think that's all
6 nonsense? What's your opinion? Tell me what you think.

7 So that was a first conversation. After that conversation, I
8 also believe -- just like the other guy, Greg, I believe she
9 understood that this is a more serious job than just hopping in
10 the left seat. Now I'm, you know, Joe Captain.

11 The second one was when Sarah walked off the job. So we had
12 a Saab 2000, I think it was to Dillingham, trip. The weather was
13 below minimums. And so, she did -- she was on gate hold for a
14 long time. It was a long time, gate hold. She was on the gate
15 hold for, like, I don't know, 6 hours. And then she just decided
16 that she wasn't going to wait anymore, so she took herself, her
17 first officer, and a flight attendant, walked off the job and came
18 back here.

19 So Crystal calls me up and says, wow, what do you make of
20 this one? I'm like, what I make is a pilot just walked off the
21 job. You can look at that as an unavailable. You can look at
22 that as AWOL. You can look at that as abandoning her job. So she
23 said, can you come over here and talk to her with me? Sure. So
24 we sat down with Sarah Boots and, you know, what's going on,
25 Sarah? Well, I'm tired of, I'm tired of waiting. I'm just -- I

1 just don't want to wait anymore. Okay. And when did you start?
2 Well, I did a 6:00 a.m. report. Okay, so 6:00 a.m. report, you've
3 got many, many, many duty hours left on you here. Well, you know,
4 I'm just not going to wait anymore. Okay.

5 She then brought up well, you know, I'm not sure I really
6 like the Dillingham weather. Okay, so what's wrong with
7 Dillingham weather? Well, it's this or whatever it was. Okay,
8 that's -- I get that. She said, well, you know, I'm not -- I am
9 not comfortable.

10 And I guess this is where you're going with this.

11 She's like, you know, I'm not comfortable with those numbers.
12 Okay, those are, those are the approach minimums, so you're not
13 able to operate to approach minimums? I mean, you're a 121
14 captain who can't operate to approach minimums. What standard are
15 you able to -- I mean, do we have a new standard here? Because
16 now we have a 121 captain saying that she can't operate to
17 approach minimums.

18 So anyway, long story short, on that day where we ended up
19 with her was, why don't you just go home and think about this?
20 What is it -- what are you doing? So she went home. She got full
21 pay for the day. I don't even -- I doubt Crystal even put a
22 record of our conversation in her file.

23 That's not a completely unusual kind of discussion for a new
24 captain. This is a new captain sort of feeling it out. She's
25 feeling out her, she's feeling out her level of authority, and her

1 authority is, absolutely, she can hold on the gate all day long.
2 Pull in the gate. That's fine. Hold on the gate. But once the
3 weather comes up, now it's time to make the airplane operate.
4 It's time to go. What was interesting about that whole thing was,
5 even though she walked off the airplane, there wasn't much -- it
6 was during the conversation that the airport went to, like, basic
7 VFR. Had she just waited, like every other 121 pilot does, that
8 airplane would have left the gate and just gone down there.

9 So it's -- that was a new captain behavior. From my
10 experience, that's -- you know, you see that with -- people
11 upgrade, they start to think that they are the answer rather than
12 there's all these rules and standards and criteria that are out
13 there. They also seem to also forget, often, that a dispatcher
14 has equal signing authority on the release. Dispatcher's not
15 going to release unless it's a legal, safe release. And so we got
16 them throwing a gate hold. Okay, gate hold. It happens all day
17 long.

18 Look what happened just last few days up in the northeast,
19 right? Did all those pilots just pack their bags and go the hotel
20 because they don't like snow? Of course not. Of course not.
21 They sit at the airport, they drink coffee, and then they eat
22 chicken wings, and then they read the paper, and then they find
23 something else to do. And eventually, either you time out, you're
24 released, you're reassigned, or you push. She chose none of
25 those. She chose walking off the job.

1 Q. Did you feel that there was some confusion on her knowledge
2 of authority and what she is supposed to do as pilot in command in
3 a situation like we just discussed about leaving?

4 A. I think that she believed, based on the culture that I have
5 seen here, which is that she can just do anything she wants and
6 that being asked questions is somehow a -- I don't know,
7 uncomfortable thing, I guess. I don't know.

8 But for someone to say they can't be asked a question, then,
9 you know, then I might as well get up and walk out, right. I
10 mean, if you can't be asked questions, then that means -- what
11 does that mean? Because that is not a all-powerful position.
12 That's a job that requires you to comply with the rules.

13 Q. So you mentioned the culture that you've seen around here.
14 Are you referring to PenAir?

15 A. I am.

16 Q. What is it about the culture at PenAir that drives you to
17 that perspective about, that pilots could do what they want to do?

18 A. What I have seen is a general kind of -- it's kind of a, you
19 know, I contrast this against my time in New York, and I think
20 that the pilot group and the company, in general, is very -- has a
21 very narrow experience level.

22 It's very deep on its -- on narrow, but it's not broad-based.
23 And so it's a situation where people say, well, no one's going to
24 -- ever going to ask me questions. I can just -- you know, I'm
25 going to do what I got to do. And I can do it the way I want to

1 do it, and nobody's going to ever actually question me on that and
2 ask and, you know, say, okay, tell me the story.

3 Why are you here in this particular case, Sarah? Why are you
4 not at the airplane? Why are you not the airplane? Were you
5 released? No. Were you reassigned? No. And you certainly
6 haven't left. Why are you not at your airplane, ready to do your
7 job that you're getting paid to do?

8 Q. Do you think after that situation, Sarah, when you had your
9 conversations with Crystal -- do you think in order to mitigate
10 the circumstances, that it wouldn't happen again, do you feel like
11 a process should've been in place for the pilots to communicate --
12 to show how they would communicate with the chief pilot on these
13 types of situations?

14 A. Process? I mean, I'm not trying to be flip about this, but
15 they can call crew scheduling. They're very quick to call crew
16 scheduling when they need something else. If they need to come
17 off an assignment -- they are on an assignment -- if they want to
18 change their assignment, they have to call crew scheduling. Ask
19 crew scheduling a question. Hey, can I be released? Are we going
20 to go? No. Why not? Because you're assigned. You're on weather
21 hold, and you have plenty of duty left until we go. I'm calling
22 the chief pilot. Super. You've got her number. Call her up.

23 As far as a process that's a -- that is a normal -- that is
24 an incredibly normal chief pilot conversation. Pilots and chief
25 pilots talk constantly. Constantly. I mean, the chief pilot for

1 Corvus, she is on the phone -- well, all the chief pilots. My --
2 I was too -- constant. In fact, my boss complained on how many
3 minutes I used to chew up on my cell phone because guys were
4 constantly wanting to talk about subjects.

5 Q. So, the more I hear about how Crystal and you talked about
6 situations when she was coming over to the job, would you
7 categorize that relationship as mentorship? Mentoring her through
8 these processes?

9 A. I would. I would, sure. I would characterize that as a
10 mentoring a very, very new chief pilot who was by herself. Dick
11 had a commuting schedule, so his schedule -- he had a commuting
12 schedule, so that fluctuates. So here is a brand new chief on her
13 own who would reach out for, hey, help, give me some -- give me a
14 way to think about this. So that's mentoring. Frankly, I wish I
15 had, had someone mentor me so I could ask those kind of questions.

16 Q. So far as this, did she ever speak to you, Crystal, about how
17 to deal with safety concerns -- pilot safety concerns?

18 A. I don't remember any specific subjects on that. I don't
19 remember any specific subjects like that, no.

20 Q. Okay.

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. That's all I had. Thanks, Deke.

22 MR. ABBOTT: Okay.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Dajuan. Brandon?

24 BY MR. WILSON:

25 Q. You mentioned PenAir has been -- is extremely understaffed

1 when Ravn bought it. Have you had any difficulties with clashes
2 between our two cultures?

3 A. I would say the clash -- this is a weird clash, too -- I
4 would say there is a passive aggressive clash where, I mean, even
5 recently we are trying to get -- because you don't hire a pilot
6 that you need tomorrow morning. You are looking 3-plus months
7 downrange. You can't just be passive about this. You have to be
8 constantly looking at it. This is not a one-and-done deal. And
9 my sense has been a lack of interest in engaging on that subject
10 in general, so we -- yeah, I would say that's the clash on the
11 hiring piece of it.

12 To answer your question, I've seen that. It's a passive
13 aggressive rather than a active, hey, we are going to be in
14 trouble come springtime if we don't have enough. What can we do?
15 Can you help me? How do you do this? And that's -- I still see
16 that to this day, actually.

17 Q. And then with Sarah Boots, if she would have called in
18 fatigued, would you think you would have even find out about this?

19 A. Fatigue's a -- it's a game. You're done. Fatigue -- a pilot
20 fatigue call is done. We're done. There's nothing else to
21 discuss. The chief pilot later may ask the question, talk to me
22 about fatigue. What happened? Did you -- are you not getting
23 enough rest?

24 And most of the time, what you'll find there is they have --
25 it's either -- it's almost always they have little children in the

1 house, and they aren't sleeping well. And then you say, yeah, you
2 know what? Why don't you take the next couple of days off. Let
3 me know when you're ready. We'll see you when you come back.

4 But a fatigue call is -- it's an all stop. All stop.

5 Q. Is there any discipline action if a pilot calls in for
6 fatigue?

7 A. There is no discipline on fatigue.

8 MR. WILSON: That's all I had.

9 MR. FRANTZ: Tony?

10 MR. FISCHER: No, I don't anything.

11 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I've got a few follow-ups.

12 BY MR. FRANTZ:

13 Q. Do you have any knowledge of Paul Wells' certification for
14 special airports or his qualification, if he obtained it, how he
15 obtained it?

16 A. No, other than --

17 Q. Do you think he was qualified?

18 A. Well, other than, you know, after the accident. But, you
19 know, I don't keep track of guys' individual qualification.
20 That's not something I would ever spend time with.

21 Q. What do you know now about his qualification?

22 A. What do I know now? Okay, so the GOM had a requirement for
23 300, reducible to 100 based on three different things happening.
24 One was you had to have a check airman recommendation, had to have
25 a chief pilot recommendation. He had to have a -- essentially a

1 ride with a line check airman putting them into the airport. And
2 then that document -- and it gets signed off by a check airman.
3 And I think it's a director of standards, might be the director of
4 training, saying, yeah, okay, he's done what is needed to do.

5 Q. Yeah. You just told me the qualifications, but did -- what
6 do you know about his qualifications --

7 A. He was 14 down --

8 Q. -- special airport qualifications?

9 A. Yeah, I know -- what I know now is that he had the line check
10 airman sign-off into Dutch, and that he did not have the Crystal
11 sign-off, even though Crystal believes she did actually put it in
12 SkedFlex. When she went to look for it, it did not exist. So I
13 said, okay, so it doesn't exist. So we had a -- didn't have a
14 chief pilot sign-off, nor did -- was there a check airman
15 recommendation.

16 Q. So do you know where the breakdown occurred? Why those
17 things didn't happen?

18 A. I do not.

19 Q. Do you know if anyone is looking into that to figure out what
20 the -- why it didn't happen like it was supposed to for Paul
21 Wells?

22 A. So I believe that Dave and Brian Whilden are working and
23 making sure that is snugged up.

24 Q. Do you know why Crystal was dismissed from PenAir as chief
25 pilot?

1 A. Yeah, I mean, that was a big mistake. She -- it was a big
2 mistake on the qualification that, unfortunately for Crystal, it
3 was -- she had a very important job, and that was an important
4 sign-off, and she missed that. Now, anybody who has supervised
5 any size pilot group -- that mistake she made was a rookie chief
6 pilot error. Many mistakes get made like that. Most of the time
7 they're on payroll issues -- payroll or schedule. But, in this
8 particular case, that was a big mistake.

9 Q. Is it your view that Paul Wells could have safely operated at
10 PenAir without having the 300 in the, in the airplane?

11 A. Is it my opinion he could have operated? I would have said
12 if he completed the entire training program and was a qualified
13 left seat pilot, whatever restrictions that would have been placed
14 upon him, he could have operated fine.

15 Q. Were you involved in his hiring here at PenAir?

16 A. In terms of he came in as -- he wanted to -- yeah, let me
17 back that up a little bit. He'd been flying the Dash-8 for, like
18 -- I don't know, a long time. He was tired of it. He was sick of
19 the airplane, sick of going to Kenai, wanted something new to do
20 and was -- I think he had already -- was just -- had already left
21 and was going to say, I'm going to go do something else with my
22 life.

23 This -- there was a director of training that needed to be
24 filled. Paul is an excellent instructor. So are you interested
25 in that, Paul? I did not actually have that conversation with

1 him, but he was a good fit to be that. So you can't be a director
2 of training on an airplane you're not qualified on, so he goes to
3 Saab school to get typed and qualified on the airplane.

4 A. Was there any rush or pressure to get him qualified so he
5 could assume the director of training role more quickly?

6 A. No, he would have gone -- I don't remember the sequence, but
7 he just would have gone to the regular qual course. The qual
8 course runs of whatever speed it runs at. And when he pops out
9 the other end and does OE, then that's when he's done, whatever
10 that is.

11 Q. Was there any pressure to expedite his area of special
12 airport qualification process so he could fly to the special
13 airports?

14 A. I am not aware of that at all.

15 Q. Have you heard the term -- I'm sure you have -- safe versus
16 legal?

17 A. Of course.

18 Q. Do you agree that if something is legal, it's safe?

19 A. I think legal is the minimum standard for safe. Then you
20 have to look at all the other pieces. I'll go back to my
21 thunderstorm example. You could have a perfectly legal airport
22 that has a huge line of thunderstorms laying across the final.
23 And is that a legal approach? It is. Would we release into it?
24 We probably would. But we're going to have provisions to either
25 not penetrate the line or come around the other side of it, or

1 it's just not going to work. That's why we put extra gas on
2 airplanes, and then we bring the airplane home.

3 Q. You said the concept of personal minimums, in your view, is
4 something for the private pilot world?

5 A. In my opinion -- is that a question?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Yeah. So the answer is yes. Not -- let me be more specific.
8 Not just -- it could be a ATP rated guy. It could be a guy who's
9 got tons of hours, but he hasn't flown in a long time. He
10 retires. He says, you know what? I'm not flying IFR anymore.

11 Okay. So, I used to fly jets to Cat II. Maybe when I'm 75
12 years old, I'll say my new personal mins are VFR single-engine,
13 only during the day. Am I qualified to fly night multi-engine
14 jets? Sure, I am. Of course, I am. But I would change that.
15 Now, could I go to my boss and say, yeah, you hired me to fly your
16 jet, but I'm only going to fly day VFR? That -- we're now --now
17 we're not -- we're mixing apples and oranges there.

18 Q. So you had a lot of time as the chief pilot or supervisor of
19 pilots. Did you come across this idea of pilots talking about my
20 personal minimums in your 121 experience?

21 A. Never. I've never heard that.

22 Q. Are personal minimums, in your view, usually more safe or
23 less safe than legal minimums?

24 A. I have no experience in personal minimums. I fly the legal
25 minimums.

1 Q. So, if somebody says, my personal minimums are this, what
2 does that mean to you?

3 A. In the context of 121?

4 Q. Yes, in any context. A pilot says, yeah, that's below my
5 personal minimums. What does that mean?

6 A. Well, I think -- not to be rude. I think that's an
7 incomplete question. You can't do -- you must differentiate
8 between 121 flying and Part 91 GA flying. So if a Part 91 GA guy
9 says, my personal minimums are that, it's, okay, good for you. I
10 mean, those are your -- that's your choice, your airplane, your
11 life. You do what you want with it. On a 121 though, if we
12 start that conversation, that has to be, so you're going to have
13 to tell me more about that. Are you uncomfortable on the
14 airplane? Do you need more training? Have you scared yourself?
15 What's happening here? And I have never heard, ever, a 121 pilot
16 -- except one -- bring up, well, those are my personal minimums.

17 Q. Do you think Sarah's refusal to take the flight that day was
18 a safe decision?

19 A. Sarah did not refuse to take the flight. Sarah walked off
20 the job. It's very -- there's a very large distinction there.

21 Q. Why did she walk off the job from you -- what you know about
22 it?

23 A. She didn't want to wait any longer. It was inconvenient for
24 her personally.

25 Q. Did she state that?

1 A. She said that she was going to get done late.

2 Q. If a pilot at PenAir has a concern about weather, and they
3 talk with the dispatcher, and the dispatcher assures them that,
4 yep, the forecast current conditions are legal; this flight is
5 okay, and the pilot says, I'm not comfortable with that right now,
6 is there any procedure the pilot should go through to remain on
7 the ground at that point?

8 A. Of course.

9 Q. And can you -- and what's that procedure? What would you
10 expect him to do?

11 A. So that would be what I did when I was assistant chief pilot.
12 So, you know, we -- you get a guy. You say, okay, this is what it
13 looks like. I'm not comfortable with that. All right, walk me
14 through that. What's the issue? Okay, let's hold for an hour and
15 see how it looks. Let's put another 5,000 pounds, another 10,000
16 pounds of gas. Let's -- are there any other options we can look
17 at here? Sure. Yeah, we can do that.

18 Most of the time, high percentage of the time, once you
19 exercise one of those options, then the captain gets a comfort
20 level of how that would work. Most of the time that I have seen
21 has been spring and the summer flying, getting around large
22 convective activities. Guys are reluctant to penetrate,
23 especially cold fronts, that contain lines of thunderstorms.

24 And you have to say, okay, so let's let that dissipate, or
25 let's let it move, or let's change the route. But if we change

1 your route, we're now adding 2 hours to this leg. If that's what
2 you need, then I guess that's what, that's what we'll do. We'll
3 add a bunch of gas to the airplane, and there we go.

4 Q. In your experience -- long experience as a chief pilot in 121
5 operations, is there a percentage of pilots out there that take
6 this authority that they're given to say yes or no to a flight,
7 and they would abuse it for personal reasons? Such as, I'm going
8 to be late if I stick around any longer today, so I'm just going
9 to -- don't mean to -- do you have experience with that? Is this
10 --

11 A. I do, yeah.

12 Q. What percentage of the pilot force that you dealt with would
13 you say, roughly, would be somebody that might abuse that kind
14 of --

15 A. 3, 4, 5 percent -- pretty small. High percentage of pilots
16 are professionals who are looking to do the right thing the right
17 way. But these small percentage are -- they become selfish and
18 they do it for personal reasons: I want to go home early. My
19 girlfriend lives here. I want whatever it is. Those are the ones
20 we have to look at it and say, you're going to have to walk me
21 through that one. I don't understand that.

22 Q. By walk me through, you mean explain it to you, convince --
23 try to convince you of their -- is that what you mean by talk me
24 through it?

25 A. Well, ultimately, they don't have to convince me, right.

1 Ultimately, the pilot can say, I'm not going take the flight.

2 Okay.

3 Q. Suffer any repercussions for that?

4 A. It would depend on the circumstances. It would. So -- it
5 would. It would, right, because now you are in to a refusal to do
6 work.

7 Q. But if the pilot called in fatigued, no repercussions?

8 A. Fatigue is a show-stopper.

9 Q. Do you ever see that abused?

10 A. I have.

11 Q. In your experience, have you seen that abused?

12 A. I have, along with sick leave. I've seen sick leave and
13 fatigue abused.

14 Q. Is there anything you can do about that as a chief pilot?

15 A. The fatigue is a tough one. So, if you look at the 117 Rule,
16 if you really want to dig into it, you'll see what office wrote
17 117.

18 And so, when a pilot now certifies a dispatch release, he
19 certifies that he is good to go in all respects. And the way the
20 rule reads is that he has availed himself of the opportunity for
21 rest. So what ends up -- that way, if a guy's coming off of time
22 off, he had a rest opportunity. Once he reports for duty, he's on
23 a 4 or 5-day trip. That's company responsibility to ensure he
24 gets good rest opportunity.

25 Now, if he chooses to stay up all night and watch TV and call

1 his girlfriend and play video games or whatever, and then calls in
2 fatigued the next day, you have to ask the question, what happened
3 here? Was there something wrong with the hotel? I mean, did the
4 lady next door, you know, smash her purse against the door all
5 night? Were there kids screaming and running up and down the
6 hall? These are all, these are all things that actually happen.
7 I mean, they actually do.

8 You say, okay, that's a problem. I got to call the hotel and
9 say, you know, seriously? These crews are telling me that you've
10 got kids running up and down the hall. We specifically get these
11 rooms to avoid these problems. Well, we didn't have those rooms
12 this night, so we put him by the elevator. Okay, well, all right.
13 So the pilot is then released back to rest until he can be
14 reassigned.

15 Q. Do you feel like your -- the counsel that you and Crystal
16 conducted with Sarah Boots was effective and that you -- she
17 walked out of that situation with an enhanced and better
18 understanding of her responsibility as a 121 captain?

19 A. On the -- when she walked off the job deal?

20 Q. No, after your counseling, that you and Crystal helped her.

21 A. Okay, so this is -- so we're talking she's already qualified
22 versus when she was going to upgrade?

23 Q. After the counseling you and Crystal had with her for her
24 walking off the job.

25 A. Okay. I don't know. Crystal -- you know, so I -- what I

1 told Sarah was, I am not convinced that you are ready to be a
2 captain, mature enough to be captain, and something like that. I
3 need -- you need to think about that because, you know, just
4 walking off the job because it's inconvenient, that doesn't make
5 sense. That's not how we do business. So why don't you go home
6 and think about it. Give Crystal a call in the morning. So then
7 Crystal and I talked about it, and Crystal -- the next day, I
8 said, you know, what do you think? She's like, I think she heard
9 us. Perfect.

10 Q. Get any feedback or any other -- any feedback later on about
11 how that came out of that for her or --

12 A. Oh, yeah. I've heard the rumors, of course. Yeah, right.
13 You know.

14 Q. What rumors?

15 A. The rumors of that, you know, that she was being forced to
16 fly -- there was no evidence of that -- that she called off
17 fatigued. There was no evidence of that. She never brought up
18 fatigue.

19 Q. Was her position as a captain in jeopardy after that event?

20 A. In jeopardy? That's interesting. That's an interesting use
21 of word because --

22 Q. Was there any thought process at management level, like
23 Crystal or anybody at PenAir or up even at your level, that maybe
24 she should be not a captain?

25 A. I think that, after the conversation, you have to see how it

1 went. Was behavior changed? It's all about changing behavior.
2 It's -- so if she's not able to show the maturity level -- any
3 captain, any pilot, frankly, who cannot show that maturity level,
4 myself included, if you aren't mature in your job, then, yeah, of
5 course, your job is in jeopardy.

6 So, in her particular case, let's see if she internalizes or
7 not. It's not about punishing. It's about changing behavior.
8 You get to behavior and then she can go about her life. She can
9 show up, fly the plane, collect her check, have a nice life.
10 That's all. That's all anybody asks. But in this particular
11 case, taking your entire crew -- because it was -- you know, she
12 was -- didn't feel like waiting anymore, that's not a airplane
13 conversation. It had nothing to do with the airplane. It had to
14 do with the job, her job, of just simply walking off the airplane.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks. I'm going to take a pause and
16 move -- do one more quick -- do you have, do you have follow-ups?

17 DR. SILVA: I just want a follow-up. Yeah, I just had one on
18 something Marvin said earlier.

19 BY DR. SILVA:

20 Q. Given what you know about Paul's experience, both total
21 experience and experience with the airport, do you think that he
22 would have been safe? Or would you have been confident in his
23 skills to fly to Dutch Harbor without the 300-hour minimum?

24 A. I would say the answer to that is yes. Yes.

25 Q. What about his experience would have led you to that decision

1 or opinion?

2 A. Well, you know, a couple of things. One, he's a very
3 experienced line officer. He's a highly qualified line officer.
4 He's not some just got his ATP last week kind of guy. Number two,
5 he's a mature person. Number three, that process is done every
6 single day with all 80 of the 121 carriers. So you could take a
7 guy who sat in the right seat for 15 years in one airplane and put
8 him in the left seat of the most senior airplane, and he is cut
9 loose, and away he goes. And that process works day in and day
10 out in the lower 48 with no troubles.

11 So why would that be any different for Paul Wells? The logic
12 applies equally. He was a -- there was nothing there in his
13 training. There was nothing there in his behavior. There wasn't
14 -- there was nothing there. He was a guy, he went to school, took
15 the ride, did the OE, flew the trips and no different than anybody
16 else.

17 Q. So, from what I'm hearing, even if he had never flown into
18 that airport before, just doing the qualification ride should have
19 been -- that would have -- just having that qualification by the
20 check airman would have been sufficient?

21 A. Yeah, if that's what the GOM said was required, then that's
22 what was required. You know, I --

23 Q. Right.

24 A. That's what was required, that's what was required.

25 Q. So, but regardless of the regulations or the policies, in

1 your opinion, do you need a set amount of experience into an
2 airport like Dutch Harbor or a special airport in order to safely
3 fly there?

4 A. In my opinion? In my opinion, if that's what -- it's hard to
5 answer that question the way you're phrasing it because the way --
6 in my opinion, that the training program and the GOM requirements
7 are set up the way they are for a reason. And if he meets the
8 criteria, you have to assume whoever wrote that had their reasons
9 for putting those in place. And if he met the criteria, then he
10 would be good to go.

11 That would be no different than any other captain who has
12 never been into -- let's fill in the blank -- Charleston, West
13 Virginia. Tricky little spot, especially in the wintertime. You
14 can have a pilot who's flown his entire life in the southern
15 United States in a turboprop and comes up north and flies a jet in
16 Charleston, West Virginia, at night down at low mins.

17 Is he qualified? He is. Expect him to execute his job. So,
18 if there was something unusual about the airport, it would be in
19 the GOM, and he'd have to follow it. Same with Paul Wells. He
20 was a qualified line officer. He should be able to execute his
21 job, Atlanta to Dutch Harbor.

22 Q. So, in your opinion, would -- is that 100-hour -- or even
23 100-hour or 300-hour minimum necessary?

24 A. Yeah, that's a good question. Let's put it this way: I
25 don't see it as necessary. However, it can't hurt to leave it.

1 It can't hurt to leave it, which is what we did over on the Corvus
2 side based on a different thing, but we left in there -- you know,
3 there were things in there like, you have to have Alaska time.

4 I'm like, what does that mean? I mean, air is air and
5 physics are physics. What does that mean exactly? So does a guy
6 who flew into Anchorage on the ILS on a 7-4, is that Alaska time
7 because he just came from Hong Kong? Does he have to have Hong
8 Kong time? Does he have to have JFK time? Where do we draw the
9 line here on this kind of stuff?

10 So leaving it -- which is what we've done over there. We
11 left it. Okay, so we leave it. And it's -- and it actually --
12 it's -- it takes care of itself in general, but it only takes care
13 of itself because we have one fleet type over there.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Right? You look at a multi-fleet type airplane or airline,
16 not Southwest. Let's look at United. You can have a 7-3 FO, sits
17 over there, loves his life, and then his wife says, I need more
18 money, and he bids for 777 captain out of San Francisco. He goes
19 from O'Hare, right seat. Never went to San Francisco. Now he's a
20 777 captain going over to Hong Kong. We don't go into him and
21 say, oh, you need all this special stuff. We say, here's the
22 training program. You do your OE. You come out the other end.
23 You come off high mins, go forth and operate.

24 Q. Okay.

25 DR. SILVA: That's all I have. Thank you.

1 MR. ABBOTT: Okay.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Dujuan?

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yes.

4 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

5 Q. So I want to back -- talk about Crystal here and the airport
6 qualification. You mentioned earlier that it was a big mistake on
7 the airport qualification because she, Crystal, missed it.

8 A. Um-hmm.

9 Q. And as a rookie mistake -- so who within the organization,
10 PenAir, should have been providing oversight on the decision
11 making that Crystal should have been --

12 A. That would be the DO.

13 Q. Okay. So director of operations should have either trained
14 Crystal on this requirement or this -- or discussed this with
15 Crystal?

16 A. How he wants to do it is up to him. But at the end of the
17 day, you know, the DO -- the chief pilot reports to the DO. And
18 then the DO, if he has his level of trust -- so, you know, it's a
19 -- the term is, you know, well, how long of a leash are you going
20 to have, you know? So new chief pilot, you might put that chief
21 pilot on a very short leash on the other -- just like we do with
22 the airline captains, right. We have high mins. They're on a
23 short leash. You are not allowed to be just going anywhere. You
24 got high mins, hundred and a half added to all approach mins.
25 That's a short leash.

1 In this particular case, I don't know what conversations
2 Crystal had with Dick referenced that concept. That is why we
3 tried to give her the mentoring and the guidance and the way of
4 thinking about things so that she could do that. You know, it's a
5 job fraught with places to go and make mistakes. It's fraught
6 with it, from money to schedule to family to this kind of stuff.
7 Identifying pilots who may be having problems -- that's why
8 Crystal and Tom and Sarah went to the HIMS program. If you're
9 familiar with what HIMS is, right, it's all about alcohol and
10 drugs and recognizing those kind of behaviors in pilots, so you
11 can recognize those problems long before it actually manifests.

12 It's a -- it takes a long time to become good at that. Pilots
13 -- professional pilots are a unique group of people. And those
14 who earn their living doing this are a unique group of people.
15 And you have to know how to work with them so that they can do
16 their job correctly and you support them. And sometimes part of
17 support is helping them understand where those problems are. So
18 for Crystal, yeah, that was -- you know, she reported to Dick.
19 Dick was responsible for Crystal. What restrictions he put on her
20 or didn't, I --

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. That's all the questions I had. Thank
22 you.

23 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Dujan. Brandon?

24 MR. WILSON: I have none.

25 MR. FRANTZ: Follow-ups? Tony?

1 MR. FISCHER: No.

2 MR. FRANTZ: No? Okay. Deke, I think we're done. Anything
3 we didn't ask you about regarding this accident that you think we
4 should have?

5 MR. ABBOTT: We haven't talked about the brakes on the
6 airplane.

7 MR. FRANTZ: Can you tell us anything about the brakes on the
8 airplane?

9 MR. ABBOTT: The -- if you take a look at the pictures, right
10 -- so the airplane's equipped with anti-skid. Airplane touched
11 down, and I read your -- I read that report that you guys put out
12 -- touched down on the 1,000-foot marker. That's good. Left out
13 word "locks up."

14 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah, I'm sorry. I was just -- I mean, the
15 question was anything you can tell us that we don't already know?

16 MR. ABBOTT: No, I'm putting out there that when I -- you
17 know, I was a fully qualed aviation safety inspector, accident
18 investigator. When I saw that, I was like, good grief, how does a
19 transport category airplane with perfectly good anti-locks have a
20 flat spot, a tire that ran through and went flat? And what in the
21 world went on with that tire, and what happened to the other three
22 wheels?

23 MR. FRANTZ: Right. But I mean, that's not something we
24 should have asked you about. Or --

25 MR. ABBOTT: No, I don't know anything about it. To me,

1 anti-skid is push the brake pedal and it works, right? No, I --
2 you know, the other thing is, I think you might want to look at,
3 you know, Crystal's -- yeah, absolutely, she made a mistake with
4 the qual piece paperwork. And that, in and of itself, had -- did
5 not cause this event by any stretch of the imagination.

6 I don't know if there are others that are like that in the
7 files, but honestly, I think that's a -- I think the culture there
8 of sort of a family-owned, family-run thing, and that, I believe,
9 you know, manifested with Sarah's behavior -- oh, I can just do
10 whatever I want. I don't know. I think there's probably
11 something there.

12 And, yeah, I -- that's -- let me see. I made a little list
13 of any other questions. I think we hit them all, though. The
14 performance of the airplane -- let's see here. I think the
15 performance needs to be looked at. Right, you got that, got that,
16 got that. Yeah, we got -- you do this -- not this exact airframe,
17 but this type, suffered a dual-engine failure at altitude? Do you
18 know that?

19 MR. FRANTZ: Seems like I read that somewhere recently. Yes.

20 MR. ABBOTT: Yep. I -- you know, there, in my book, there is
21 a potential certification issue with this airplane. I've never
22 heard of a transport category airplane having a double-engine
23 failure unless it was, like, volcanic ash, contaminated fuel.
24 Okay, that's understandable. So, as we sit here today, at this
25 moment, we have this type that suffered a double-engine failure at

1 altitude. It had no power for 100 seconds. That's a long time.

2 MR. FRANTZ: Okay.

3 MR. ABBOTT: Additionally, we now have an airplane that
4 touches down within 2 knots of its maximum tailwind component, and
5 both pilots had their feet on the brakes, and the left outboard
6 blows, there -- I believe there is a -- I believe there are
7 certification issues to look at with this airplane.

8 It is a -- from my perspective, you know, it is a very touchy
9 piece of equipment. I've never seen an airplane that is this
10 sensitive to environmental factors. It is very sensitive. So I
11 bring that up. I have no idea if those are linked, but hard to
12 believe an airplane touches down essentially on speed at the right
13 spot, and one tire just lays rubber down until it blows, and it
14 goes off the end. There was -- there's something else there.

15 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Anything else you want to add?

16 MR. ABBOTT: No.

17 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. I think we're finished.

18 We can go off the record.

19 (Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Deyuos "Deke" Abbott


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002

PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: November 4, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Kimberlee Kondrat
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/14/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: DAWN SAMUELSON
Pilot Records, PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Thursday,
December 5, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Ms. Samuelson)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Dawn Samuelson:		
By Dr. Sevillian		6
By Dr. Silva		11
By Mr. Frantz		16
By Mr. Fischer		19

I N T E R V I E W

(1:30 p.m.)

1 DR. SEVILLIAN: Good afternoon, Dawn.

2 MS. SAMUELSON: Good afternoon.

3 DR. SEVILLIAN: My name is Dajuan Sevillian. I'm an NTSB
4 investigator. I specialize in human performance. Have you ever
5 been in an NTSB investigation before?
6

7 MS. SAMUELSON: No, I haven't.

8 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Just to give you a high level -- the
9 NTSB focus here is safety. We don't have any type of authority
10 for certificate action or taking action against anyone. We're
11 just here for safety and safety recommendations, for that process.
12

13 Here today we have several people at the table, NTSB
14 investigators as well as parties to our investigation. And so the
15 parties provide really good input and information to the NTSB to
16 help support our investigation, so that's why they're here. So
17 we'll hear from them in a moment. And we also have the FAA here
18 as well, but they're not here for enforcement purposes. They are
19 for safety only. Okay? So the -- part of our process is, you're
20 allowed to have one representative with you during the interview.

21 MS. SAMUELSON: Yes.

22 DR. SEVILLIAN: Who would you like to represent you today?

23 MS. SAMUELSON: I'll let him, sitting with me.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Oh, go ahead.

25 MR. CAMPBELL: Morgan Campbell.

1 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. And as I stated before, we have a
2 recording device here, but it's going to be part of our
3 transcription. This will be a public docket at a later date. So,
4 but with that being said, I want to get the folks to introduce
5 themselves and go around the table.

6 So what we'll do is we'll start off with Marvin. Go ahead,
7 Marvin.

8 MR. FRANTZ: How are you doing? I'm Marvin Frantz. I'm an
9 operational factors investigator with the NTSB.

10 DR. SILVA: I'm Sathya Silva. I am a human performance
11 investigator, also with the NTSB.

12 MR. WILSON: And you know me, Dawn. I'm Brandon Wilson. I'm
13 a check airman.

14 DR. SILVA: And Tony?

15 MR. FISCHER: Dawn, I'm Tony Fischer, and I'm with the Denali
16 CMO.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. So those will have two rounds of
18 questioning, and then, just as an FYI, if there's a question that
19 you don't understand, you know, it's also fine to say that either
20 you don't remember something or you don't have any knowledge of
21 that, et cetera.

22 MS. SAMUELSON: Okay.

23 DR. SEVILLIAN: So that's fine. So any questions before we
24 get started?

25 MS. SAMUELSON: No.

1 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

2 INTERVIEW OF DAWN SAMUELSON

3 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

4 Q. So, for purposes of transcription, could you please state
5 your name -- full name and with spelling.

6 A. Dawn Samuelson, D-a-w-n, S-a-m-u-e-l-s-o-n.

7 Q. Okay. And what is your role here at PenAir?

8 A. I'm pilot records.

9 Q. Pilot records. And could you give me just sort of a brief
10 understanding of what that role is? What do you do as -- in pilot
11 records?

12 A. I enter qualifications into SkedFlex from pilot and flight
13 attendant training. And I keep the records in my office.

14 Q. Okay. Could you give us a brief background of your aviation?

15 A. I'm a small airline -- a small aircraft pilot. I haven't
16 flown in 9 years; I'm not current. I'm one check ride away from
17 my commercial. I came here, and I've been taking care of pilot
18 and flight attendant training.

19 Q. Okay. What aircraft do you fly?

20 A. They're small airplanes. They're little Piper Cadets and
21 Cessnas.

22 Q. Okay. So, pilot and flight attendant records, you handle
23 here at PenAir?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. Could you give me an overview of the process for how

1 you handle pilot records?

2 A. Pilot records, from a new hire, they go through ground
3 school. They go through SIM training. All the required paperwork
4 gets signed off by the SIM instructors, by our check airmen here.
5 The completed paperwork comes to me. It goes to our -- sorry, our
6 director, which is Kirk. He signs off on it. Then it comes to
7 me, and then I enter everything into SkedFlex, which qualifies
8 them to start -- to go on -- okay, I'm trying to explain SkedFlex.
9 It goes into our database and shows the required training
10 qualifications they have to fly, which SOC has, gets to look at a
11 different side of it.

12 Q. Okay. And you input that information into SkedFlex?

13 A. Yep.

14 Q. Okay. So, on the order of qualifications, do you handle the
15 airport qualification data entry into SkedFlex for pilots?

16 A. I do.

17 Q. Okay. And what's the process on getting the information for
18 pilot airport qualifications?

19 A. My job is to get the signed paper, and I enter it into
20 SkedFlex, what's stated on the paper.

21 Q. Okay. Do you know in general what usually you're looking for
22 on that paper to put into SkedFlex?

23 A. Yes. I look at -- now, you're talking -- okay, re-ask the --

24 Q. For airport, airport qualifications.

25 A. Special airport qualification?

1 Q. Special, yes.

2 A. So, what I look for -- before I enter it, I look for -- I
3 have to enter the date and the airport and the date of the signoff
4 and make sure I have the required check airman and pilot signature
5 on there. And then I have the manager of flight standards'
6 signature on there; then I enter it into SkedFlex.

7 Q. Okay. So, when you're looking at this piece of paperwork,
8 are there any hours that you're, that you're --

9 A. Is there -- no.

10 Q. So there's -- okay.

11 A. No hours -- that are logged on the paper? No.

12 Q. Yeah, right. Okay. No hours logged on the paper. So when
13 you -- you're basically taking that information that you receive
14 once a pilot is ready for qualification --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- and then you're just putting that into the system.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. So, after it's put into the system, what happens then,
19 after it's in the system?

20 A. After it's in SkedFlex, then he's qualified to fly because
21 he's considered green in SkedFlex.

22 Q. When you say considered green, is there --

23 A. Yes. A go. I'm sorry.

24 Q. A go. Okay.

25 A. He's considered to go.

1 Q. Right. Is there any situation where there would be a
2 different color that comes up saying that someone is not qualified
3 for flying special airports?

4 A. Are you guys familiar with SkedFlex?

5 Q. No.

6 A. So let me backtrack. So a special airport is an independent
7 qual, so you either have a master qual or an independent qual.
8 Now, our special airport is independent, so that is something I
9 have to put into SkedFlex for them to go. If they're not
10 qualified to go, it's not in -- it's not under their
11 qualifications in their flight.

12 Q. Um-hmm. So you talk about the independent and then the
13 master qual?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What's the master qual?

16 A. The master qual is if you get -- okay, for example, a new
17 hire pilot. You put in Saab 2000 new hire pilot and then
18 there's -- you add that in, then there's a list of qualifications.
19 Did they take general subjects? Did they take this? You have all
20 these qualifications in the master qual. Then down below, you
21 have independent quals, and a special airport is that independent
22 qual, and that would not be in SkedFlex unless I put it in there.

23 Q. Okay. I got you.

24 A. Because it doesn't -- not everybody goes to those. That is
25 an independent qualification under the captain.

1 Q. Okay. How often do you get pilot qualification paperwork in
2 for Dutch Harbor?

3 A. On the new -- on a, on a captain?

4 Q. Yes. On a captain.

5 A. Um-hmm.

6 Q. Is that -- does that happen often for Dutch Harbor or is
7 Dutch Harbor a airport that you see come through your desk for
8 inputting it into SkedFlex often?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Okay. What about, are there any other airports that you see
11 come through and you have to input the data into?

12 A. Is there other special airports for PenAir?

13 Q. Special airports.

14 A. Yes, there is.

15 Q. Which ones are those?

16 A. Kodiak, and I want to say, Sand Point. Yeah. Those three.
17 That's it.

18 Q. Okay. Is there any -- do you have any communication after
19 you've put the information into SkedFlex with the chief pilot,
20 check airmen, or is it, once you've done that input into the
21 system, then you're done?

22 A. Do -- communication as in?

23 Q. Do you talk with the chief pilot on -- under any
24 circumstances?

25 A. Uh-huh. I work, I work with the chief pilot. Yes.

1 Q. So you work with the chief pilot with respect to the entry of
2 the records for the qualification, or -- is that what you do?

3 A. Yeah. Because they're signed off.

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Okay. All right. Those are the
5 questions I have for now. Let's turn it over to Sathya.

6 DR. SILVA: Okay. Some clarifications on those.

7 BY DR. SILVA:

8 Q. So, from what I understand of what you're saying, it's, it's
9 either, yes, you're qualified; no, you're not qualified?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So are you familiar with the requirements for these special
12 airports?

13 A. Pretty much.

14 Q. Okay. So there's that hourly requirement in addition to the
15 qualification ride.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Correct? Okay. So, when you get that paperwork, does that
18 mean that the hourly requirements are met?

19 A. When I get the paperwork, it is -- hang on, I'm trying to
20 think. When I get the paperwork, I have to make sure it has all
21 the required signatures. The chief pilot is one of them. The
22 check airman is one. The pilot is one. And then the director of
23 training. I have to make sure all their signatures are on there,
24 and with all those, I believe they're good to go.

25 Q. Okay. So would you say that it is the responsibility of the

1 people who sign that form to make sure that the hourly
2 requirements are met?

3 A. On the GOM it's discretionary under the chief pilot to make
4 the decision. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. So where would the chief pilot come into the process?

6 A. I believe after, I believe after the flight with the check
7 airman.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I believe that the chief pilot would be next. I believe that
10 would be the second signature. Yes. I believe the chief pilot
11 would be next.

12 Q. Okay. So it's not your responsibility to make sure that all
13 of the requirements in the GOM are met. It's your responsibility
14 to verify that, that paperwork reflects it.

15 A. Yes. And enter it.

16 Q. Okay. So there's -- from -- again, I'm trying to get a feel
17 for SkedFlex. So there's no provision in there that says, oh,
18 yeah, this is -- this signature means you're qualified at whatever
19 point that you reach 100 hours, or you reach 300 hours. Is it,
20 like, keeping tabs of the hours? Is there a way for it to keep
21 tabs of hours and --

22 A. Oh, in SkedFlex?

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. Keep tabs of the hours?

25 Q. In terms of a, in terms of a minimum requirement to fly

1 somewhere.

2 A. The independent qual?

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. So with the master qual would it do that?

6 A. Hang on a minute.

7 Q. I don't know if it's completely --

8 A. I'm trying to think.

9 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Yeah.

10 A. Because SOC, they do one part, and SkedFlex -- SkedFlex

11 counts down, I know, in days. I guess that would be a different

12 department than me.

13 Q. Okay. Okay.

14 A. Yes. That would be a different department. And does

15 SkedFlex -- no, I don't, I don't think so.

16 Q. Okay. So it's, it's a check the box, is really what --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- I'm understanding. Okay. Are you the only one in pilot

19 records?

20 A. In the office?

21 Q. Yeah. Like, are you the only --

22 A. No.

23 Q. -- person doing it? Okay. How many people are in your

24 department?

25 A. I have Kirk (ph.) in my office.

1 Q. Oh, okay. Is anyone else doing pilot records, or are you the
2 only person responsible for pilot records?

3 A. I'm the only person responsible.

4 Q. So there are some hourly requirements. Are you aware of any
5 waivers for the 300-hour requirement for special airports?

6 A. It's not -- it's discretionary on the chief pilot.

7 Q. Okay. Is there any minimum hourly requirement in addition to
8 the discretion?

9 A. None, no.

10 Q. Okay. Is there any documentation that you need from the
11 chief pilot to --

12 A. To qualify them?

13 Q. -- to where -- yeah, to issue essentially a waiver to
14 that -- to the minimum hours?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Like I said, mine's just a -- I get the sheet of paper with
18 all the signatures -- with all the required signatures; that gives
19 me a go to add it in SkedFlex.

20 Q. Okay. So as keeper of pilot records, do you -- have you ever
21 received any kind of letter of recommendation from anyone to do
22 special airports training?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you recall the instance that happened?

25 A. I got one for Greg Pfeiffer.

1 Q. Do you remember when that was? About.

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. Do you remember if it was before or after the
4 accident?

5 A. It was after.

6 Q. Okay. And that was the first time you'd seen a letter of
7 recommendation?

8 A. No. I've seen, I've seen some before.

9 Q. Okay. In what cases were they before? Is it -- was it a
10 waiver for the --

11 A. I've never seen -- I don't know what a waiver looks like.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Like I said, I just get the signed off sheet by the required
14 people that need to sign off on it, and then I enter it.

15 Q. Okay. So what is your interaction with the chief pilot when
16 it comes to airport qualification requirements?

17 A. A lot of times I get papers in my box with airport
18 qualifications. They -- I get a piece of paper, make sure I have
19 all the signatures, and I enter it.

20 Q. Do you work with the chief pilot face to face?

21 A. His office is on the first floor; I'm on the third floor.

22 Q. Okay. Was that the same with Crystal when she was here?

23 A. Yep. Her office was on the first floor as well.

24 Q. So you didn't have a lot of --

25 A. Oh, I do. I work a lot with them.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. I work a lot with the chief pilot.

3 Q. Did you -- but do you -- and is that in terms of emails or
4 phone calls? Do they do -- do they come up to your office?

5 A. All of them.

6 Q. Okay. How was it working with Crystal?

7 A. It was fine.

8 Q. Have you ever received any kind of pressure to input
9 qualifications into the system without the appropriate paperwork?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Do you remember putting -- inputting Paul Wells' airport
12 qualification into the system?

13 A. I do.

14 Q. You do?

15 A. I do.

16 Q. Can you walk us through what you -- how that process looked
17 and what you remember from it?

18 A. It has all the required signatures on it, and I entered it
19 into SkedFlex.

20 DR. SILVA: Okay. Those are the questions I had. Thank you.

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya. Marvin?

22 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks.

23 BY MR. FRANTZ:

24 Q. Dawn, just to ground this a little for me. Is this the form
25 that you understand we've been talking about?

1 A. Yes, it is.

2 Q. For airport qualifications?

3 A. It is.

4 Q. Okay. So show me the signatures you're looking for on this
5 form.

6 A. I'm looking for the pilot's signature there.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. The check airman and manager of flight standards.

9 Q. Okay. And then when you enter this in a -- this is the form
10 you would receive in your inbox when someone --

11 A. Yes. Or a hand delivery, yes.

12 Q. And you would, and you would take this form, and then you
13 said you just go to SkedFlex and --

14 A. And then I enter it.

15 Q. And you said a date. What date would you put in SkedFlex?
16 The ones that's labeled --

17 A. Completion date.

18 Q. -- segment completion date?

19 A. Um-hmm.

20 Q. Okay. And you have no responsibility or requirement to
21 verify anything other than to make sure everything is signed and
22 dated. Is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. Do you know who, do you know who is responsible for
25 verifying that everything -- specifically the hours. Do you know,

1 do you know if there's a person responsible to verify that the
2 pilot has completed -- met these hour requirements when they --

3 A. I know it's at discretion of the chief pilot if they're under
4 those.

5 Q. Okay. Okay. But the chief pilot -- is the chief pilot
6 typically the person giving you this form versus, like, the check
7 airman or the manager of flight standards who also sign it?

8 A. Sometimes I get it -- sometimes it's in my box or the chief
9 pilot.

10 Q. Okay. And once that you have gone to SkedFlex and put
11 in -- is it a dropdown menu that allows you to check a --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- check something that says, special airport qual?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Once you do that, and then next time that pilot's scheduled
16 for a special airport, there won't be any alarms or any warnings,
17 oh, not qualified. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. I mean, he should be good.

20 A. Um-hmm.

21 Q. Okay. Okay.

22 MR. FRANTZ: That's all I have for now. Thank you.

23 MS. SAMUELSON: Thank you.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Marvin. Brandon?

25 MR. WILSON: I don't have any questions. No.

1 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Yes, Tony?

2 BY MR. FISCHER:

3 Q. Dawn, do you do the -- work with the pilot's -- oh, I'm
4 sorry. I should have put this on. Do you work with the pilot's
5 record improvement act, the PRIA records also?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. You do. And are you only doing PenAir records at this time?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR. FISCHER: Okay. All right. That's all I have.

10 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Tony. Appreciate it.

11 MR. FISCHER: Yeah.

12 DR. SEVILLIAN: So we'll go through a second round of
13 questioning here.

14 MS. SAMUELSON: Okay.

15 DR. SEVILLIAN: I don't have any questions right now, so I'll
16 look to Sathya.

17 DR. SILVA: I'm good.

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Marvin?

19 MR. FRANTZ: No. Nothing.

20 DR. SEVILLIAN: Brandon?

21 MR. WILSON: Nothing.

22 DR. SEVILLIAN: Tony?

23 MR. FISCHER: Nothing.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. Well, thanks, Dawn, for coming
25 in. And is there anything --

1 MR. FRANTZ: All right, Dawn, that's a record.

2 Congratulations.

3 (Whereupon, at 1:52 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
 DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
 OCTOBER 17, 2019
 Interview of Dawn Samuelson

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 5, 2019


was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Betty Caudle
Official Reporter



Romona Phillips
Transcriber



Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/14/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: IAIN CONNOLLY
Acting Director, Systems Operations Center
PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Tuesday,
December 3, 2019

APPEARANCES:

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

MORGAN CAMPBELL, Attorney
Fox Rothschild, LLC
(On behalf of Mr. Connolly)

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Iain Connolly:	
By Dr. Sevillian	6
By Dr. Silva	11
By Mr. Frantz	15
By Dr. Sevillian	21
By Dr. Silva	22
By Mr. Frantz	25
By Dr. Sevillian	28

I N T E R V I E W

(1:46 p.m.)

1
2
3 DR. SEVILLIAN: Iain, thanks for joining us today.

4 MR. CONNOLLY: No problem.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Like I said before, my name is
6 Dajuan Sevillian. I'm a human performance investigator with the
7 NTSB, and what you're seeing around the table is just a party
8 system where we have folks come in and support our investigation.
9 So we have, obviously, NTSB personnel, but we have also FAA, but
10 they're not here for the enforcement aspect, just for safety. So
11 have you ever been involved with an NTSB investigation?

12 MR. CONNOLLY: Fortunately, no.

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. Our mission, in general, is improving
14 safety and providing recommendations for the industry.

15 MR. CONNOLLY: Um-hmm.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: And we look -- you know, the reason why
17 you're here is you're an expert, and we want to include you in
18 these discussions to understand, for example, crew scheduling and
19 how that supports our investigation.

20 MR. CONNOLLY: All right.

21 DR. SEVILLIAN: So what we'll do -- I talked to you about, we
22 have this recorded; you're okay with that.

23 MR. CONNOLLY: Not a problem.

24 DR. SEVILLIAN: And you're allowed one representative, and
25 who would you like to represent you?

1 MR. CONNOLLY: Luckily provided for me, sir.

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. And what's -- could you say his name
3 for --

4 MR. CONNOLLY: Actually, it's -- of course.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay.

6 MR. CONNOLLY: Go ahead, sir.

7 MR. CAMPBELL: Morgan Campbell.

8 MR. CONNOLLY: Thank you, Morgan.

9 DR. SEVILLIAN: So with that being said, we'll go through a
10 series of questions. We'll do sort of a two-round type of
11 questioning, and then if you have questions after that, we'll go
12 through that process as well.

13 MR. CONNOLLY: Fair enough.

14 DR. SEVILLIAN: So first, let's go through introductions with
15 the team. And we'll start with Marvin. Go ahead.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Hi, Iain. My name is Marvin Frantz; I'm an
17 operational factors investigator with the NTSB.

18 MR. CONNOLLY: All right.

19 DR. SILVA: I'm Sathya Silva; I'm a human performance
20 investigator with the NTSB.

21 MR. WILSON: Iain, check airman. Or Brandon, sorry.
22 Brandon. You know me.

23 MR. CONNOLLY: Yes, sir.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay. And Tony.

25 MR. FISCHER: I'm Tony Fischer; I'm an aviation safety

1 inspector --

2 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, so with that being said, any
3 questions before we get started?

4 MR. CONNOLLY: No, sir.

5 DR. SEVILLIAN: Anything I missed? Okay.

6 INTERVIEW OF IAIN CONNOLLY

7 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

8 Q. So, for the record, could you please state your name with
9 spelling?

10 A. Yeah, definitely. The name is Iain Connolly. The first name
11 is the Gaelic spelling, so it's I-a-i-n. And the last name is
12 C-o-n-n-o-l-l-y.

13 Q. Okay, all right. And what is your role here at PenAir?

14 A. My role right now is I'm the acting director of the SOC,
15 which is systems operation control.

16 Q. Okay. And what does the system operations control consist
17 of?

18 A. Yeah. SOC, essentially, is a 72-hour window. My job, being
19 the director, is a little further down the line, but you're
20 looking at yesterday, today, and tomorrow for regular operations,
21 recovery, aircraft scheduling, crew scheduling, revenue,
22 management decisions. Simply put, if something breaks and we have
23 to swap things around, we choose where things go and why they go
24 where they go.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Passenger accommodations, as well.

2 Q. All right. Could you discuss high-level CliffsNotes of your
3 aviation background?

4 A. Yeah, very simple, actually. Went to UAA, I got a degree in
5 aviation administration. I came to PenAir in 2012 as an SOC
6 agent, the entry level role in the department. Became a lead a
7 couple of years later. To be quite honest, I actually got bored
8 with what I was doing. I learned what I thought I could learn,
9 moved over to safety; I was an auditor for about 6 to 9 months.
10 The role of SOC manager became open after that, so I applied for
11 it, went back, was an SOC manager for roughly 2 years.

12 The company went through its period of bankruptcy. I became
13 concerned about the future of the company and my paycheck, my bank
14 account. I resigned, went down the street to Ravn, became the --
15 a senior safety systems analyst, was in safety for 9 months,
16 always wanted to get back into flight ops. The position of
17 manager of crew scheduling for Corvus and Hageland became open,
18 applied for that, was fortunate enough to get it. Was in that job
19 for almost a year, little under a year, probably.

20 During that time, Ravn Air Group purchased PenAir. Because
21 of my familiarity with both certificates and a feeling of a lack
22 of harmony between the two certificates of moving flights between
23 -- just flight ops irregularities: If one certificate is short a
24 crew member, an aircraft, the ability to swap flights between the
25 two certificates is advantageous, swapping from a 1900 to a 2000,

1 vice versa -- I was asked to come back over here on an interim
2 basis in my current position and help out until the merger of the
3 single operating certificate was completed.

4 Q. Okay. Can you give us an understanding of the crew
5 scheduling process at PenAir?

6 A. Yeah. It's actually very simple. Right now we have a crew
7 planning department, which has been pared down to one individual
8 due to the size of our current needs. The bid process was
9 recently swapped from a blind bidding to a preferential bidding
10 process, so those crew members now give the crew planning
11 department 10 days at which they would like off, two of which are
12 considered must-have days, a higher priority for their days off.

13 They say if they would want an a.m. or a p.m. line, they give
14 just, really, anything: If they want to fly a lot, if they want
15 to be on reserve, just little notes where you can say hey, I
16 prefer not going to Bethel, whatever, that type of thing. Crew
17 planning works with the schedule once it is turned over by
18 commercial to build a preferential bid for each crew member.

19 Then once the bid is published, usually towards the last week
20 of each month, SOC takes control -- not control, takes over the
21 handlings of the crew scheduling duties on a daily basis, be it
22 callouts for sickness, be it jury duty, be it for anything else,
23 someone like a check airman for this type of thing. They would
24 assign individuals off reserve; they would work within 117
25 legalities and the company policy -- oh, pardon me -- 117 FARs and

1 the company policies to staff any flights that would come open
2 after the bids are published.

3 Q. Are you involved with any fatigue risk management?

4 A. If a crew member calls in fatigued, our standing policy is to
5 immediately remove the individual. We have a training, first of
6 all, but yes. If a crew member calls in fatigued, we remove them
7 immediately from the line, ask them to file a fatigue report with
8 the safety department, and we mark them as fatigued and not
9 available for duty within our operating system of SkedFlex.

10 Q. So with the merger between PenAir and Ravn, what do you see
11 has changed the most as far as crew scheduling?

12 A. The swap to preferential bidding was a rather large one.
13 Blind bidding, at least in my entire time at PenAir and I know, so
14 before my joining the company, was the standard practice. Very
15 minor swap there. Let's see, what else has been changed? I
16 really don't have any other great answers that stand out for you.

17 Q. Do crew members ever provide feedback to you?

18 A. On a daily basis.

19 Q. Okay. And what does that feedback look like?

20 A. Anything from -- we had a member -- a new FO today brought in
21 cookies to attempt to thank one of our -- our crew planner for the
22 schedule. Yeah. So something is -- a thank you like that.

23 I've had individuals vent to me on a just, hey -- which
24 they're allowed to do with our company policy; it's your
25 footprint. If you're assigned to an 11:00 a.m. flight to a 3:00

1 p.m. flight, like Brandon, and that flight cancels, I have the
2 ability to move him forward or backwards, not only within the 117
3 FARs, but within the footprint. I can go 2 hours forward or 1
4 hour backwards without having to ask his permission.

5 That often -- you have a life outside -- if you're a pilot,
6 you have a life outside of PenAir. Just because I have that
7 ability doesn't mean you want me to do that to you. Hey, you're
8 making me miss little Jimmy's football game, and that stinks for
9 you and little Jimmy. And we try to work with them on a daily
10 basis to improve the process and create a level of understanding
11 for both the company and the pilot. Yeah.

12 Q. And when scheduling crew members, is it ever a requirement to
13 schedule crew members based on level of experience?

14 A. Um-hmm. We have a company policy of green on green. Two
15 crew members, be it 100 hours and typed together, they'll flag
16 with our -- I don't know how familiar you guys are with SkedFlex,
17 if it's been shown to you. We have a crew scheduling program,
18 it's an old program, that the FARs are built into, but we also
19 have company policies that are built into it.

20 It's a nice failsafe in case the human eye fails or brain or
21 whatever you may say. The software itself will flag, it will say
22 red -- the strip itself will turn red, and it'll tell you -- you
23 hover it and -- until you get a warning of what the issue is. We
24 also have special airports -- a special airport -- a company
25 policy, 300 hours within type and seats -- within seat, actually,

1 for the captain. And then we also have some -- just company
2 policies with minimums for airports, that type of thing.

3 Q. Are there any changes being made to the airport qualification
4 lately?

5 A. We probably have an uptick on the choice of the company's
6 ability to waive the 300-hour requirement for some individuals.
7 Previously, not commonplace, and I wouldn't say it's commonplace
8 now, but based on our percentage of pilots, the signing off of
9 individuals prior to 300 hours is larger.

10 Q. And is there any type of effect with that qualification on
11 crew scheduling?

12 A. Actually, if anything, it would make the life of crew
13 scheduling easy because I have more applicable -- or qualified
14 crew members for destinations. That would be really the only
15 change to our lives.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Yeah.

18 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right. That's the questions I have for
19 now.

20 Sathya?

21 DR. SILVA: Sure.

22 BY DR. SILVA:

23 Q. To follow up on that 300 hours, you said that there's a
24 percentage of pilots who are getting the sign-off before 300
25 hours. Do you -- can you give me a number estimate?

1 A. I really would have to look at my roster to poll. I know of
2 a couple occurrences, but I would need to reference SkedFlex to
3 give you a solid number.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. So how does that sign-off interface with this system?

7 A. Yeah, not a problem. The qualification for special airport,
8 be it Dutch, Sand Point, Kodiak, was built into the SkedFlex
9 individually. Our crew -- our pilot records department, we
10 schedule the crew member with a check airman for that airport
11 after they, after they've achieved the hours, and then through
12 that paperwork, the captain either -- the check airman either
13 signs off a captain for the special airport or doesn't.

14 Once they are officially signed off, our crew planning
15 department goes into SkedFlex, finds the crew member individually,
16 finds the qualification, enters the dates of the sign-off, the
17 check airman's name, and any applicable information. It's not my
18 field of expertise, but that's relatively it. And then once that
19 crew member has signed off within SkedFlex, no warnings or
20 violations would pop if paired -- or if assigned to one of those
21 flights.

22 Q. So there's -- okay.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. So once the sign-off is in, in the system --

25 A. Um-hmm.

1 Q. -- there's no warnings.

2 A. Correct. Brandon, if we put Brandon on Sand Point prior to
3 his qualification, the flight statement would be red, we'd hover
4 it, and it would say he's not qualified. The exact verbiage,
5 forgive me, but not qualified SB -- S, special airport SDP. Once
6 he's qualified, we'd hover over it, there would be nothing. If
7 someone went in and pulled the qualification, just unclick the box
8 or pull the information out, it would re-pop that violation.

9 Q. Does the system incorporate total hours into that?

10 A. The system -- once again, not my field of expertise; I
11 shouldn't speculate. I believe it is a simple click of a box, but
12 once again, my role in crew scheduling does not handle the
13 qualifications of the crew member, just the enforcement of the
14 qualifications to the flight schedule.

15 Q. Okay. So when you say a check of the box, what do you mean?

16 A. I believe it is a drop-down within SkedFlex where they enter
17 the applicable information, yeah.

18 Q. Okay. Who would be the right person to talk to?

19 A. That would be pilot records, I would believe, which would be
20 Dawn Samuelson.

21 Q. Okay. Okay. Do you have any flight time?

22 A. I have 28 hours in a Cessna. My wife got pregnant, and I
23 didn't have the money to keep flying.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. So that's why I went over to the management side.

1 Q. Got it. So is there a title here called the manager of crew
2 scheduling?

3 A. Not currently filled. There is not a title of manager of
4 crew scheduling.

5 Q. Okay. So would you be above in that --

6 A. Yes, if we had one, crew planning would be separate from SOC,
7 and then the crew scheduling and dispatch would be -- well,
8 actually just crew scheduling and SOC in this case would be under
9 me.

10 Q. Okay. So do you know why it's not filled?

11 A. We don't currently have the need for that level of staffing
12 based on what's on our plate. When I came back in over -- pardon
13 me -- from the Corvus certificates, one of the things we did was
14 reduce staffing just to -- we were throwing money away. Very
15 easily.

16 Brian, who you may have met, our VP of safety, walked me
17 through this, made sure that we felt it was the right decision.
18 And then ever if it became the need to staff back up, those FTEs
19 still exist, but we are currently not staffing them.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. What we were once is not what we are now from the level of
22 operations, when I previously left.

23 DR. SILVA: Yeah, okay. All right, that's all the questions
24 that I have.

25 MR. CONNOLLY: Okay.

1 BY MR. FRANTZ:

2 Q. Okay, Iain, I just have a few. First of all, you don't --
3 how long have you been acting director?

4 A. April 1st of this year. Comical walking through the door on
5 April 1st.

6 Q. You don't have day-to-day experience or interface with the --
7 with SkedFlex?

8 A. I've worked with SkedFlex since the company's had it. I work
9 daily with SkedFlex.

10 Q. Scheduling, making schedules or --

11 A. Well, I mean, the schedule is created within a program called
12 Schedule Manager and then imported into schedule by -- commercial
13 team builds that, and then I import it into SkedFlex. The crew
14 schedules are built -- well, the crew schedules are paired with
15 the commercial flight lines by crew planning and with the
16 assistance of myself.

17 Q. I'm so confused.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. So schedules, schedules are --

20 A. Could we say what are schedules first?

21 Q. -- built and then pilots bid on them, the schedules or --

22 A. Well, the flight schedule is commercially available for sale,
23 as you -- if you wanted to go to King Salmon, that type of flight
24 -- flight, yeah.

25 Q. Yeah. No, not that kind; the crew's.

1 A. Okay, okay. So crew schedules, it's a preferential bidding
2 system where, once the commercial flight schedule is released, a
3 crew member is assigned to flights based on their preference of
4 bidding. If they're an a.m. person, we tend to put them on an
5 a.m. line --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- if they're a special airport captain, we put them on -- or
8 if they weren't a special airport captain, we would assign them to
9 a line that wasn't a special airport line.

10 Q. Okay, so you have a line that is -- it's called -- not
11 called, but -- there are no special airports in X lines -- number
12 of lines, because you have some captains that aren't special
13 airport qualified?

14 A. I would not say that level of transparency exists. I know
15 when the -- I know -- we know what a special airport line in crew
16 planning, myself, is and then we would only assign a captain to
17 it, and then if we didn't have a special airport, it would go into
18 open time where someone could pick it up. Or we'd talk to a
19 commercial team -- a member of the commercial team to cancel that
20 flight because we couldn't staff it.

21 Q. And so getting qualification for special airport, you
22 described someone clicks a box that says this person's now special
23 airport qualified.

24 A. Well, no, that -- no. The process of special airports, you
25 would have -- you would normally, through the GOM, achieve 300

1 hours.

2 Q. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. I mean, once that's all done --

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. -- someone comes in and says, okay, now this guy's special
7 airport qualified. They can go into SkedFlex, through a menu,
8 click a box that says he now flies special --

9 A. As long -- yes. That person has special privileges in
10 SkedFlex, so they could do it and not your average --

11 Q. And who is that person that does that?

12 A. That would be pilot records, Dawn Samuelson, the individual I
13 mentioned earlier.

14 Q. So she is looking at pilot records, monitoring someone's
15 qualifications or not -- when somebody new gets qualified, she
16 will say, oh, this person's now qualified. She'll go to SkedFlex
17 and do a drop-down, click, say he's qualified?

18 A. Once the, once the check airman has completed the --

19 Q. Yeah, right.

20 A. Yeah, yes. Yeah.

21 Q. When she gets -- does that all go to her, that paperwork?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Once the check airman and everybody has signed it off, it
24 goes to her?

25 A. All the Ts are crossed and the Is are dotted, yes.

1 Q. And she takes it and says -- she clicks the box that says
2 qualified --

3 A. My verbiage of click the box might be overly simple, but --

4 Q. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

5 A. But yes.

6 Q. Okay, okay. Have you ever seen -- in dealing with SkedFlex
7 or crew scheduling, you ever see any of those things pop red?

8 A. Oh, yes.

9 Q. Where it says this person, he can't fly this because he's not
10 qualified?

11 A. Yes, we actually have a crew member where -- working to get
12 signed off this week for Kodiak and Sand Point, and right now, if
13 we went to SkedFlex to either the 11th or 12th, I forget which day
14 he's flying, his flight segment right now is currently red. If he
15 doesn't achieve that sign-off 2 days prior, we'll remove him from
16 that, and we'll find another crew member for that assignment.

17 Q. Okay. So how much in advance does that popping red as you
18 described happen? Does it --

19 A. Oh.

20 Q. -- happen as soon as that crew member is awarded the line?

21 A. Correct, sir.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. When we scheduled this originally, the second we put, in this
24 case, Captain Greg Pfeiffer on that line, it was smart enough to
25 know that he didn't have that qualification; it was smart enough

1 to know that he's not paired with a check airman, so therefore
2 he's not legal. His observation ride, for lack of a better term,
3 which he's achieving in the next 2 days for Kodiak and Sand Point,
4 he's paired with a check airman; he's not flagging because of that
5 pairing system.

6 Q. So it's not happening the day of the flight?

7 A. Oh, no, sir.

8 Q. It's in advance.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You can't have so-and-so on this line because it's a special
11 airport and he's not qualified.

12 A. Yeah. One nice thing about SkedFlex is there's an alert tab,
13 you click on it, for any flight from now -- actually, any, any
14 flight that's ever existed within SkedFlex, either past or future,
15 as long as -- if there's any violation on there, that will
16 actually still be in the system unless it was cleared by a member
17 of the department for a glitch or for extension applied if it's a
18 117 extension.

19 But there's a backlog of anything in there, and yes, the
20 second a qualification issue is on there or a flight time issue or
21 whatever it will be, it's both past and future on there, if the
22 crew member is assigned to it.

23 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any of those violations popping
24 up for Paul Wells?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Special airport violation?

2 A. No. We could go back and audit the system with no problem,
3 but no, there -- Paul would've always been paired to the check
4 airman for his observed ride and then -- he would've been paired
5 with the check airman, and then after that, once assigned -- if
6 somebody was assigned previous to a sign-off, his pilot records,
7 checking him off, he would've flagged red.

8 And then at that point it would've been observed prior to the
9 flight assignment, and we would've contacted the pilot record and
10 say, hey, is Paul not good for the assignment or has he not been
11 checked off or what's the issue?

12 Q. So, to the best of your knowledge, that never happened?

13 A. It never happened, sir.

14 Q. The red flag never popped up?

15 A. It would not have popped up, because any time he would've
16 been assigned to one of those flights, he would've been legally
17 assigned based on the company policies.

18 Q. The box would've been checked, then --

19 A. That is correct, sir.

20 Q. -- qualified for this airport box.

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. FRANTZ: Okay. And that is -- okay, okay. I think
23 that's all. That's all I have for now, thanks.

24 MR. CONNOLLY: No problem.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Marvin.

1 Brandon.

2 MR. WILSON: I have nothing for you.

3 MR. CONNOLLY: All right.

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: Tony?

5 (No audible response.)

6 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right.

7 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

8 Q. The system operation control center, is that located --

9 A. Right above us.

10 Q. Okay, okay. And that controls -- operation control center,
11 is there going to be any changes with the change with Ravn?

12 A. Yes, we -- they have the ROCC, the Ravn Operational Control
13 Center. When we finally do have single operating certificates,
14 the dispatches will be combined; our members of crew planning will
15 be joining their crew scheduling department. I don't know what's
16 happening with our maintenance coordinators, not necessarily my
17 world.

18 And then our -- their director of the ROCC, Marty Case, is
19 intrigued by our SOC agents' role. Their dispatchers have a
20 larger responsibility -- what they are doing is larger than our
21 dispatchers do as far as their focus. Our dispatchers are
22 dispatching the flight, following the flight, planning the release
23 weather. Their dispatchers are having to deal with the regular
24 ops of hey, how do we -- if Flight X cancels, how do we move those
25 passengers. Bringing our SOC into theirs, he would like to see if

1 we can help alleviate some of the pressure on their dispatchers by
2 assigning those tasks to the individuals who are comfortable here
3 handling them.

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: Okay. That's all the questions I have for
5 right now.

6 Sathya?

7 BY DR. SILVA:

8 Q. Yeah, I just wanted to follow up. You mentioned that there's
9 documentation of any violations that would apply to the system.
10 If I were going to ask for that documentation, what would I ask
11 for?

12 A. The alerts tab would show any violations or warnings.
13 SkedFlex is -- one of the nice features of SkedFlex is if you're
14 -- it's a cumulative or a daily flight or FTP issue. If Brandon's
15 flying -- Brandon's legal for 8 hours for the day. If he gets
16 within 7 hours and 30 minutes, it'll turn yellow. So it's not a
17 violation, it's a caution or a warning, so the alerts page would
18 be the accurate, probably, verbiage for that.

19 Q. And you said that's daily?

20 A. Yes, ma'am. Actually, it's whatever time frame you apply to
21 it. We could do it for a day, we could do it for 3 years,
22 whatever, whatever it is.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. And when is the schedule assigned again?

1 A. The schedule for -- actually, for right now, for January,
2 commercial will be finalizing it roughly on the 7th. Crew
3 planning has until the 25th to return it to the crew members.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And then -- the schedule is never final, of course, because
6 aviation -- but those are our rough dates of commercial gives it
7 to crew planning the 7th, crew planning gives it to the crew
8 members on the 25th.

9 Q. Okay. So -- okay.

10 A. And then any changes after the 25th would be on SOC.

11 Q. On SOC, got it. Now, we were talking about how smart the
12 system is.

13 A. Um-hmm.

14 Q. Given a situation -- and again, I understand that this is --
15 from what you're understanding, this is more of a check the box.

16 A. Appreciate it.

17 Q. Would it be able to tell -- let's say you need to make a
18 100-hour mark, and that's a requirement.

19 A. Um-hmm.

20 Q. Would it be able -- and let's say that 100-hour mark is
21 planned to occur mid-month.

22 A. Um-hmm.

23 Q. Would it know that after, let's say, the 16th of January,
24 this person will have 100 hours and can fly into --

25 A. So -- okay. SkedFlex -- yeah, your example's perfect. We

1 need them to get 100 hours. On the 15th is when we -- their
2 schedule should have it for the 100 hours. Flights cancel, so
3 they don't hit their 100 hour by the 15th. On the 16th, yes, it
4 would know. It is a rolling clock. It knows how much they
5 originally signed for and it knows how much they're currently
6 accumulating.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. If that answers your question.

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. Okay, cool.

11 Q. So would you still get the schedule with the anticipation?

12 A. Yes. And then -- yes, and then it would be on SOC to remove
13 that crew member when they didn't meet the requirements of their
14 flight. I mentioned that we have Captain Pfeiffer, who's going
15 for a sign-off on either Saturday or Sunday. He's going to
16 Kodiak; he's currently a red. If he doesn't -- if tomorrow Kodiak
17 cancels, he will remain red for that, and 2 days prior is where we
18 -- is usually our cutoff date for -- to finalize the schedule.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. We would remove Captain Pfeiffer unless we were somehow, once
21 again, able to schedule him for Kodiak.

22 Q. Got it.

23 A. Yeah.

24 DR. SILVA: Okay. Okay, that's it.

25 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Sathya.

1 Marvin.

2 BY MR. FRANTZ:

3 Q. Yeah, sorry, I'm confused again.

4 A. Not a problem, sir.

5 Q. You were just talking about, you know -- I thought the only
6 thing that qualified the person for special airports --

7 A. Um-hmm.

8 Q. -- had nothing to do with what SkedFlex knew or thought their
9 hours was, it was only that box had to be checked that said
10 qualified for special airports.

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. Is that correct or not?

13 A. Well, it would flag them because the qualification isn't
14 being met. The qualification isn't being met because they haven't
15 either achieved the hours or because -- I'm sorry, yes. You're
16 correct, I'm sorry. One or the other were met. You could either
17 have the hours -- the special airport's a bad one for this
18 example; I shouldn't have used hours and then Pfeiffer. Let's
19 think.

20 We can try to use special airports, but if the qualification
21 is built so you require a certain number of hours, it would allow
22 an individual to sign them off prior to the completion of those
23 hours. It would allow that and then it would override -- I
24 shouldn't say that because I don't know it for sure; that would be
25 a question for Dawn Samuelson. Apologies for confusion on that.

1 Q. So if the box is checked, somebody went in, somebody from
2 crew records went in and said -- pilot records --

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. -- went in and checked the box because they thought that
5 person was qualified, but CrewSked [sic] has just an overarching
6 -- has the program --

7 A. Um-hmm.

8 Q. -- saw that, was it even tracking that person's PIC hours?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And so CrewSked [sic], would it recognize --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- this person has 80 PIC hours but the box is checked, so is
13 the -- does it turn red or not?

14 A. Well, if the box was checked, the flight would not turn red.
15 If the crew member didn't meet the qualifications, be it hours, be
16 it number of landings, be it night hours, whatever, whatever the
17 requirement for the qualification is, if -- SkedFlex would track
18 it. And then if it's an hour, it would be rolling hours, it would
19 know -- if you need 100, it would know if -- when you're at 88, it
20 would know when you're at 94, it would know you're at 105, and
21 then SkedFlex also knows when the box has been checked.

22 The crew schedule on duty is under the position that we trust
23 our pilot records to properly qualify and track the crew members'
24 qualifications. Our crew schedulers are not required to follow
25 Brandon's hours as he gains them. They work with pilot records

1 and ask for -- when a crew member is flagging, why are they
2 flagging, and do I need to remove them from the schedule.

3 Q. So does SkedFlex know that, before they can allow a pilot to
4 go to a special airport, he has to have 100 PIC --

5 A. I don't know the breakdown of that specific qualification
6 well enough to speak to it.

7 Q. Well, if that's the qualification for special airport, 100 or
8 300 --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and SkedFlex would turn to red if the person didn't have
11 100 PIC hours.

12 A. I would think that, yes, that would be the case because Greg
13 is not currently flagging for his hours, Greg is flagging for his
14 special airport qualification.

15 Q. So if he doesn't have 100 hours, but --

16 A. But he does.

17 Q. But if -- no, not Greg.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. A generic pilot --

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. -- doesn't have the 100 hours, but his box has been checked,
22 special airport --

23 A. That would override the hours.

24 Q. So there wouldn't be -- it wouldn't pop red if he was
25 scheduled to go to Dutch Harbor.

1 A. I believe you are correct, yes, sir.

2 Q. Is that your understanding of it?

3 A. Yes, that is my understanding of it. I appreciate that
4 verbiage.

5 Q. So, once the box is checked, who -- SkedFlex doesn't care how
6 many PIC hours the person has.

7 A. That is correct --

8 Q. Is that correct?

9 A. -- because the follow -- the proper procedures through the
10 company policies have been followed, so that crew member can be
11 qualified for whatever that qualification is.

12 Q. Okay. Thanks for clearing that up for me.

13 A. I don't think I did a very good job, but --

14 Q. I think I got a picture.

15 A. Okay.

16 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, that's all I got. Thanks.

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thanks, Marvin.

18 MR. FRANTZ: Thanks, Dajuan.

19 DR. SEVILLIAN: Hey, Brandon?

20 MR. WILSON: I've got nothing for you.

21 BY DR. SEVILLIAN:

22 Q. I just have one more follow-up here and -- so the -- for crew
23 scheduling --

24 A. Um-hmm.

25 Q. -- Dawn Samuelson, do you know who she reports to?

1 A. Actually, no, I don't.

2 Q. Okay, all right. But she would be involved with the
3 understanding if the qualifications were met?

4 A. Um-hmm.

5 Q. Okay, all right. All right, that's all the questions I have,
6 so is there anything that we should have asked you that we didn't?

7 A. I don't believe so. I think you hit on the things I would've
8 expected to have been asked upon and probably more, so --

9 Q. Is there anyone that you suggest we speak to?

10 A. Obviously, you guys all wrote Dawn's name down, that's
11 obviously a good bat. No, I don't believe so. There's no names
12 that spring to mind, or roles.

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, well, we appreciate you coming in
14 and talking with us and helping us out.

15 MR. CONNOLLY: No problem.

16 DR. SEVILLIAN: All right, thank you. Off the record.

17 (Whereupon, at 2:18 p.m., the interview concluded.)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Iain Connolly


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 3, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to
the recording accomplished at the hearing.


Betty Caudie
Official Reporter


Karen D. Martini
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 4/21/2020

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA- *

DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA * Accident No.: DCA20MA002

OCTOBER 17, 2019 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: IAIN CONNOLLY
Acting Director, Systems Operations Center
PenAir

PenAir Offices
6100 Boeing Avenue
Anchorage, Alaska

Thursday,
December 5, 2019

APPEARANCES:

MARVIN FRANTZ, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DUJUAN SEVILLIAN, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

TONY FISCHER, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

BRANDON WILSON, Line Pilot/Check Airman
PenAir

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Iain Connolly:		
By Dr. Silva		4
By Mr. Frantz		9
By Dr. Silva		14

I N T E R V I E W

(1:54 p.m.)

1 DR. SILVA: Thanks for coming back in, Iain.

2 MR. CONNOLLY: Not a problem.

3 DR. SILVA: We appreciate the flexibility here. Again, I'll
4 run through our pre-brief again, but you've met everyone here.

5 MR. CONNOLLY: I have.

6 DR. SILVA: So we'll skip that. Do you want Morgan here with
7 you?

8 MR. CONNOLLY: I'm fine currently. But thank you.

9 DR. SILVA: Okay. So you are entitled to have a
10 representative.

11 MR. CONNOLLY: Yeah.

12 DR. SILVA: Okay. And you know what it's going to look like.
13 So I just had some follow-up questions, given the other --
14 further information that we have received.

INTERVIEW OF IAIN CONNOLLY

15 BY DR. SILVA:

16 Q. How do -- in terms of pilots starting training for airport
17 qualification training, special airports qualification training,
18 how is that intent conveyed to you when it comes through
19 scheduling?

20 A. The chief pilot will bring to crew scheduling or myself, in
21 this case, candidates that they think are ready to start that
22 process. And then it literally is, hey, we'd like to start
23
24
25

1 Brandon for Sand Point. We'd look at, when would you like to
2 start this process? December 15. Starting December 15, we'd find
3 you a check airman to schedule them for that.

4 We'd ask how many signoffs -- or how many observer rides,
5 whatever you want to call them. How many -- a ride-along with the
6 check airman that you feel would be necessary. And we'll just
7 keep going until the check airman is satisfied with the captain
8 being upgraded or signed off for the airport. How many rides that
9 they feel necessary, and then we'd keep scheduling until that was
10 satisfied.

11 Q. So is that done -- does the chief pilot come by in person?
12 Is that email?

13 A. It could be anything. I've had phone calls, emails, in
14 person. Yeah, any of the above. In my world, there's no formal
15 process, is I think sort of the easiest place to put it as.

16 Q. Okay. In the case of Paul Wells, did you have any specific
17 discussion on airport qualification?

18 A. I actually -- a lot of meetings. Sparked many curiosities
19 among my mind, and one of those was try to find how that process
20 was started for Wells. I went through my emails, couldn't find
21 anything from the chief pilot at the time. So I'm guessing it was
22 either a phone call or in person of, hey, we would like to start
23 or -- start for Captain Wells for the special airports. Yeah.

24 Q. So when the chief pilot comes to you, is that -- from your
25 understanding, is that -- has that already been discussed with the

1 pilot?

2 A. Yes. In a couple of cases, we had the chief -- that
3 particular chief pilot say, hey, I'd like to start it with these
4 individuals. And I said, have they been contacted? This was not
5 Captain Wells. This was two other individuals who are not
6 currently special airport qualified. They still -- they started
7 to have some rides, but we stopped the process. Not because of
8 poor performance or anything. It just -- it was held because of
9 the incident that occurred.

10 She informed me, no, they had not been, so I called one of
11 them. I spoke to one in the office and called one directly and
12 said, hey, I've been told to start you down this path; are you
13 comfortable doing that? Yeah.

14 Q. And would you consider that part of your normal
15 responsibilities?

16 A. No, that was not something I would have done earlier in my
17 career at PenAir. Yeah, that's something I just felt the need to
18 do.

19 Q. Okay. So in your experience, would that have been something
20 you would have expected the chief pilot to do before coming to
21 you?

22 A. I don't know, and that's a horrible answer. My level of
23 familiarity and comfort with previous chief pilots was greater
24 because of my time and experience with them. I don't know if
25 that's a lacking on my part or a relationship or whatever it may

1 be, but I never did it previously because I never felt the need
2 to, I guess. Yeah.

3 Q. Who were these two individuals?

4 A. Sarah Boots and Ross Myers are the two that we -- that I was
5 asked to start the process for.

6 Q. Okay. When you were asked, did you have any insight into how
7 many hours that they held?

8 A. Not previously. I went and looked, just out of curiosity.
9 Yeah.

10 Q. When was that? When did you go looking?

11 A. Several months ago. I apologize. I don't have the exact
12 date.

13 Q. That's okay.

14 A. Yeah, just -- this was most likely -- so we're in November --
15 I'm guessing September. But once again, I'm really just throwing
16 a dart at a board. Yeah.

17 Q. So when -- so you got the notification from Crystal about
18 that. So when in that process did you go check their --

19 A. Oh, almost immediately. Yeah, almost immediately.

20 Q. So just out of curiosity?

21 A. Just out of my own pure curiosity.

22 Q. Why did that pique your curiosity?

23 A. Once again, the level of comfort, probably, with the chief
24 pilot and -- yeah, just level of comfort and wanting to make sure
25 that I -- not that -- my opinion doesn't matter, but I care about

1 my own opinion. Yeah.

2 Q. Okay. Okay, so in your research, what did you find in terms
3 of their hours?

4 A. That they were both right around that 300-hour mark. Yeah.
5 They are both over it now. I want to say that they were both
6 under, but they were, like, I mean -- it was standard practice for
7 a conversation to start prior to the 300, because you're aware of
8 their hours. So very -- everything there was very standard and on
9 the level. It met my expectations of what I would expect from the
10 company, so that was positive. Yeah.

11 Q. Had Crystal come to you with any other special airports
12 qualification?

13 A. We had two other members of the staff -- or not the staff --
14 of the crew who would receive their special airport qualification
15 prior to their 300, but due to their experience with the company
16 and their experience at those airports, nothing that was
17 non-appropriate to me. Yeah.

18 Q. When was that? Do you know?

19 A. The summer. I don't -- I'm horrible at dates and names.
20 That would have been the summer, though, because they both started
21 this fall to fly to those airports.

22 Q. Okay.

23 DR. SILVA: Okay. I'll just see if anyone else has any
24 follow-ups.

25 MR. CONNOLLY: Can I mention one thing real quick?

1 DR. SILVA: Absolutely.

2 MR. CONNOLLY: My lack of knowledge for the qualifications.
3 We spoke about the special airport qualifications being this
4 checking of the box, being the hours. So that special -- that
5 qualification, the hours are being tracked of the crewmember, but
6 they're not applied to the qualification. The qualification
7 itself literally is the checkbox or the signoff of the check
8 airman. So I apologize for the confusion last time we met. I
9 think that was partly there because of my lack of understanding of
10 the qualification.

11 DR. SILVA: Okay. We appreciate the clarification.

12 MR. CONNOLLY: Cool.

13 DR. SILVA: Thank you. Marvin?

14 MR. FRANTZ: Yeah.

15 BY MR. FRANTZ:

16 Q. And you, you're currently an SOC manager? Is that your
17 title?

18 A. Director of SOC, but yeah.

19 Q. Director SOC?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. And you came on that recently; am I right?

22 A. I was asked to come back over on -- I started on April 1.

23 Q. And before that, what were you doing?

24 A. I was over at Ravn as their manager of crew scheduling for
25 Corvus and for Hageland.

1 Q. Manager of crew scheduling?

2 A. Um-hmm.

3 Q. And now you're manager of -- or director of the systems
4 operations center.

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Is that --

7 A. Acting.

8 Q. You said "acting." Is that -- okay. Does that -- are you
9 the director of the dispatch operations?

10 A. No, sir. I do not have --

11 Q. SOC doesn't mean dispatch?

12 A. Correct. It's very confusing. It's their model. The OCC is
13 dispatch, crew planning, crew scheduling, SOC, and our maintenance
14 coordinator. That's all of OCC. SOC is within OCC. OCC
15 encompasses all of those different groups.

16 Q. And the S stands for?

17 A. Systems.

18 Q. Systems operations center?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And crew sched, is that --

21 A. Crew scheduling would be --

22 Q. Is that a part of systems operations?

23 A. The way it was originally designed, which it is not currently
24 in full process, is yes, it is under SOC, the way it was designed.
25 The reason it's not that now is because there isn't a crew

1 scheduling department.

2 Q. If a pilot -- okay. Do you have any -- well, would you,
3 either in your previous role or in your role here, if a pilot
4 called in and was turning down a flight for weather, would you
5 become aware of that?

6 A. Yes. Turning as in they were not -- the pilot wasn't
7 comfortable launching based on the weather? They would call into
8 dispatch and discuss the weather. We're in the room with
9 dispatch. Dispatch would inform us, say that Captain Wilson isn't
10 comfortable at Sand Point. We'd say, hey, understood; it's your
11 flight. Would there be any benefit to holding that flight? Is
12 weather going to improve, anything like that?

13 Mainly for a financial reason. The company obviously wants
14 to complete the flight. We want to get passengers from point A to
15 point B. So SOC has the, has the financial or revenue input on
16 the company's behalf and for the passenger to get them to their
17 final destination. But the captain and dispatch would be the ones
18 canceling a flight for weather.

19 Q. So is that requirement, responsibility on your part -- that
20 complete the flight, financial responsibility you described, does
21 that ever involve contacting a pilot and questioning or asking the
22 pilot why he wouldn't go, or would he -- why he's not taking this
23 flight and trying to convince him in any way to, why don't you
24 come in and take this flight?

25 A. Quite -- I mean, not quite frankly, but if we had a weather

1 issue, it is not out of the norm where I would call Brandon and
2 say, hey, Brandon, what do you think? Is there any point of
3 holding onto this flight? Can we -- do you think the mission will
4 be able to be completed today? And as a pilot, he'd give me his
5 experience. Yeah, maybe an hour. If we hold an hour, the weather
6 might get better; there's a new forecast coming out.

7 Same thing with dispatch. We do the same thing of, hey, do
8 you guys think holding it would be beneficial? If not, we'll --
9 dispatch will cancel and we'll move those passengers down the
10 line.

11 Q. How often does something like that happen?

12 A. Daily. I mean, not the contacting the pilot directly. But
13 that type of communication, of conversation is a daily thing.

14 Q. And when it does happen, how long is it? Is there a typical
15 waiting period, well, we're just going to wait and see on the
16 weather? And is there typically any kind of cutoff point that
17 says, beyond this point, we're going to have to do something else?

18 A. 100 percent, yeah. And "typical" is hard because it's
19 Alaska, and Alaska weather is obviously very temperamental. Today
20 we had this exact thing. We have a King Dilly triangle in the
21 morning where you go to King first, and then it goes to Dilly,
22 then it goes back to Anchorage. Captain Thompson hit King. Dilly
23 weather actually dropped on the way to King, so we already knew
24 there would be an issue there. We landed in King.

25 Dispatch talked to the captain. The new forecast came at the

1 top of the hour. The forecast was for weather to be below
2 minimums until 1 o'clock. Financially, it didn't make sense for
3 the company to hold that flight till 1 o'clock because of the
4 downline ramifications to the schedule. So at that time, we said,
5 hey, if the captain and dispatch are comfortable canceling the
6 flight due to weather, the company obviously has -- well, not the
7 company -- SOC has no desire to hold onto it longer.

8 Q. Does SOC ever have any kind of role in interacting directly
9 with the captain that says no, I'm not doing the flight and, you
10 know, here's the reason? Does SOC, your side, have any role in
11 talking with the captain?

12 Or is he strictly talking with the dispatcher or the
13 operations center manager in the decision-making? Or does your
14 side, the crew scheduling side, ever come into play, like, to try
15 to convince this captain to wait or go, or something different
16 than he wants to do at that moment?

17 A. I don't think you can convince -- a simple answer, no.
18 Obviously, the company wants to complete flights. There's -- it
19 would not be beneficial with anyone in SOC to attempt that path.
20 So therefore, we don't do that.

21 Q. Does anyone in dispatch, as far as you know?

22 A. No --

23 Q. Does OCC?

24 A. I would say our current form of dispatch is conservative. It
25 has no desire to launch any flight that is even close or remotely

1 questionable. Our dispatch right now is -- once again, I've been
2 here 7 years. They have no desire to even make things even
3 remotely questionable.

4 Q. How often does that situation come up where pilot and
5 dispatch might have a disagreement about the flight, I don't think
6 it should go? How often do you see that?

7 A. Next to none. I think probably since I've come back, I can
8 count on one hand the number of times they have even hung up the
9 phone and even just made a sigh or anything like that. Next to
10 never happens. Right now, our crew and our dispatcher seem to be
11 on, seem to be on the very same page, which I think is probably
12 positive.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Okay, thanks, Iain.

14 MR. CONNOLLY: Yeah.

15 MR. FRANTZ: That's all I have.

16 DR. SILVA: Dujuan, did you have anything?

17 DR. SEVILLIAN: I don't have anything.

18 DR. SILVA: Tony?

19 MR. FISCHER: Nothing from me.

20 MR. WILSON: Nothing from me.

21 DR. SILVA: Okay. I just had one more -- actually, no. Two
22 more.

23 BY DR. SILVA:

24 Q. So along the lines of Marvin's last question about
25 disagreements between OCC and the pilot, have you seen -- and

1 maybe this was what you were discussing, but have you seen any
2 cases where there have been disagreements between OCC believing
3 that a flight should go and the pilot declining?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. What are those circumstances to --

6 A. The pilot -- the one that is, that's popping up in my mind, I
7 will reference directly, because that's the one that's popping
8 out. There was a, there was a -- the forecast was for freezing
9 rain back in Anchorage around the time of the arrival. It was a
10 p.m. flight triangle, as I mentioned for the day's morning. We
11 have a p.m. Dilly King; we reverse the routing. Dilly weather was
12 legal. King weather was legal. 3 hours later, the forecast for
13 Anchorage had the possibility of freezing rain. Pilot wasn't
14 comfortable accepting the flight because he had a fear of not
15 being able to get back into Anchorage.

16 There was no -- we weren't -- King was legal, Dilly was
17 legal. We could have gone to those two destinations. We could
18 have maybe -- I don't want to say -- not "could have." A
19 conversation could have occurred of -- getting back into Anchorage
20 wasn't the topic at hand. The topic at hand was your first
21 destination, then your second destination, then your return. He
22 didn't want it. He didn't take it. Flight cancelled. Yeah. So
23 we had legal destinations and chose not to operate the flight.
24 Yeah.

25 Q. Was there -- how did that discussion go?

1 A. Actually, very long and drawn out, with dispatch, in my
2 opinion, attempting to lead him down a path of, hey, you can make
3 your first destination no problem; you can make your second
4 destination no problem. And then once again, it came to the third
5 destination, and he once again reiterated his point of, hey, I
6 don't think I can get back in.

7 Dispatch, okay. If you can't get back in and you won't take
8 the flight, we get it. Hey, SOC, we're going to cancel this
9 flight due to weather. And it canceled probably after about 20
10 minutes of weather discussion.

11 Q. Okay. When it comes to legal weather versus -- yeah. Below
12 minimums versus --

13 A. Well said, yeah.

14 Q. -- let's say near minimums, but legal versus above minimums.
15 I want to make that distinction. From an OCC/SOC/dispatch point
16 of view, is there a difference between near minimums but legal,
17 and --

18 A. Yes. As long as it is legal to dispatch -- and we'll use
19 iffy, if you don't mind that term.

20 Q. Sure.

21 A. If the weather is iffy, if the, if the pilot is comfortable
22 accepting the flight assignment and dispatch is comfortable
23 releasing it, then it comes to SOC's input of, hey, do you want to
24 roll the dice, as it were?

25 An experienced pilot, Brandon included, going to Dutch Harbor

1 -- and I'm not saying these are his words. I should actually take
2 Brandon out of the equation because he's in the room. A different
3 pilot might say, hey, I think I have a 40 percent chance of
4 getting in. SOC would then say, hey, I have 45 people on this
5 flight. I have no ability to move them downline; we didn't get in
6 yesterday due to weather. Sure, we'll spend, we'll spend the
7 money to take a look, is the terminology. Do we have a legal
8 alternate? Can we get back into Anchorage? What's that type of
9 process?

10 And then yes, if the, if the weather is iffy, a conversation
11 will take place between the pilot of, hey, yeah, I'll take a look.
12 Hey, let's make it -- let's roll the dice and take a look and see
13 if it's worth our time and the company's money. And then if it's
14 30 percent or whatever it may be and the weather is still legal
15 but close to -- or it's iffy, we might cancel because it's not
16 financially worth it. Yeah.

17 Q. Have you had any cases where a pilot -- the weather may have
18 been legal, but -- and in terms of ceiling visibility kind of
19 things, it may have been legal, but the pilot is not comfortable?

20 A. Um-hmm.

21 Q. Do you have any examples that you can provide?

22 A. Oh. It happens, it happens so often with questionable
23 weather in Alaska. Nothing that openly stands out, but on a
24 weekly basis, there are conversations where the weather is close
25 to legal, and then it is up to the comfort of the pilot and

1 dispatch of whether they want to go or not. I don't think I
2 answered your question, though, if you want to rephrase it.

3 Q. No, it's okay. So I mean, are there -- do you know of any
4 cases where OCC or dispatch may be pushing for a flight that the
5 pilot has --

6 A. "Pushing" is an interesting word. A desire, a belief that we
7 can complete the flight. It's never -- pushing, to me, becomes a
8 negative situation, if that makes sense.

9 Q. Okay. Yeah.

10 A. And that's not your word. There have -- healthy weather
11 discussion where -- not a disagreement, but a discussion of, hey,
12 I think our chances -- the dispatch, hey, I think our chances are
13 good or bad. And the pilot would say, hey, no, I don't think our
14 chances are good. And them meeting at the same table to discuss
15 it. I think we have a healthy environment between those two
16 groups over weather, if that helps. Yeah.

17 Q. You mentioned that you operated in Corvus' group scheduling.
18 Does Corvus have special airport requirements?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you recall what those are?

21 A. Yes. 300 hours for the captain or the first officer.

22 Q. Okay. And that's a qualification the first officers can get
23 as well?

24 A. That is correct, yes. It's handled differently at Corvus
25 than it is in PenAir.

1 Q. Okay. I was just curious.

2 DR. SILVA: Okay. Anybody have anything else?

3 MR. FRANTZ: No.

4 DR. SEVILLIAN: No.

5 MR. WILSON: No.

6 MR. FISCHER: No.

7 DR. SILVA: All right. Thank you.

8 MR. CONNOLLY: Yeah.

9 DR. SILVA: We really appreciate the time.

10 MR. CONNOLLY: Not a problem.

11 DR. SEVILLIAN: Thank you for coming back in.

12 MR. CONNOLLY: Not a problem, sir.

13 DR. SEVILLIAN: Yeah, yeah.

14 (Whereupon, at 2:14 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: PENAIR FLIGHT 3296 CRASH AT UNALASKA-
DUTCH HARBOR AIRPORT, ALASKA
OCTOBER 17, 2019
Interview of Ian Connolly


ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20MA002


PLACE: Anchorage, Alaska

DATE: December 5, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.


Betty Caudle
Official Reporter


Eileen Gonzalez
Transcriber


Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 5/28/2020