

Factual Report – Attachment 2
Records of Conversation

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

WPR19MA177



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

David Lawrence
Aviation Safety Investigator
Operational Factors Division, AS-30

Date: 6/24/2019 (1145 HST)
Person Contacted: Frank TK Hinshaw, Skydive Hawaii
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: David Lawrence, NTSB

Narrative:

- He worked for Skydive Hawaii, and was the son of the company president. He worked in various jobs, and held an A/P license, was a pilot, rigger, and had about 3,000 jumps.
- He used to be a tandem instructor (TI) but had not been current since 2015.
- He worked about 5-6 days each week.
- Skydive Hawaii had 1 CE208 (Caravan), 1 CE208B, and a C182. He had flown skydivers before in the Caravan.
- He said Tony (Skinner) trained Jerome in March as a new pilot on the King Air. As a new pilot, he observed Jerome fly normal takeoffs and landings, although he had a little trouble handling the radios. However, in the last weeks, he noticed that Jerome had changed his takeoff profile on runway 8, and appeared to be showing off. He would take the airplane off and stay above the runway in ground effect, lift the gear up and let the airplane accelerate, and then would pitch up and begin banking to the left prior to the threshold of 26. He would rotate the airplane and bank simultaneously. He said it looked like Jerome was trying to get the most out of the airplane when he was using a high pitch and bank, clearing the ironwood trees that lined the highway by about 50 feet.
- He said they used to have a King Air, and the normal profile was to maintain Vy straight ahead until about 300 feet above the ground, and then begin the turn to the crosswind leg.
- He said on the day of the accident, Pacific and Skydive Hawaii weren't taking loads since the weather around noon he observed poor skydive weather with winds from the south which can also produce mountain rotors. He said the winds were south at about 5-10 mph with "tons" of clouds. They were landing on runway 08, and he saw layers of clouds with tops at about 7,500 feet.
- He said he had complained to the HNL FSDO office about Pacific flying through clouds, but was told he had insufficient evidence. He said he was told by the FSDO that it did not matter if they were flying through the clouds so long as they were safe. The inspector's name was Kalilikane, and they spoke on June 17, 2019 (he showed the NTSB investigator his cell phone with a caller



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ID number from the FAA as [REDACTED]). He also asked the FAA if they could have more visibility as the airport.

- He said they parked their airplane at HNL across from the FSDO office, and flew it to HDH each day they were flying parachutists.
- When asked if he saw Jerome pitch and bank simultaneously, he said yes, and the bank angles were greater than 45 degrees.
- He said Jerome seemed to be getting more aggressive with his takeoffs, maybe because he was starting to figure out the flow of the operation and gaining more confidence with the airplane.



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

David Lawrence
Aviation Safety Investigator
Operational Factors Division, AS-30

Date: 6/24/2019
Person Contacted: Morgen Jackson, Former OPC Pilot
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: David Lawrence, NTSB

Narrative:

- He worked part time for Skydive Hawaii. He flew the Monday before the Beech accident and was in a CE208.
- He was trying to build some multi-engine time, and flew for a short while for OPC. He never met the owner, George.
- He did meet Mike Martin at OPC, and thought Mike was “unofficially” the mechanic for OPC since he would see Mike tinkering with the airplane, and did “a lot of work on the airplane.”
- He said the left engine on N256TA was leaking oil the several times he flew it.
- He flew for OPC sporadically since the company had difficulty keeping commercial multi-engine rated pilots.
- He said Tony Skinner was the regular OPC pilot and one who checked him out on N256TA, and he said that training from Tony “was a joke.” His training was minimal, and when completed, Tony hopped out of the airplane and told him “not to get uncoordinated.”
- He never signed any paperwork at OPC. The last time he flew for OPC was in November 2018.
- He said HDH could be a busy airport, and they could typically climb to a jump altitude in about 15 minutes.
- Tony told him that when he can down from altitude in the Beech, you have to come down with power to take care of the engines. He said Jerome liked to “chop” the power for the return to the airport. He said Jerome “abused the airplane” but was not too much of a “hot dog” pilot.
- He said at HDH there were always jumpers coming down, so banking hard at 100 feet off the ground after takeoff to avoid the landing area for the parachutists was not unusual to make the turn over the beach park.
- He said the airplane was never parked in the hanger, and the maintenance was always done outside. The left engine always looked “wet” from all the oil leaks, and it wouldn’t surprise him if the left engine failed on takeoff.
- He said there was a lot of salt spray at the airport, and he never saw the airplane get washed.



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- He said Jerome would descend the airplane much faster than other pilots. Tony told him to descend at about 200 pounds of torque.
- He said that when he flew at OPC, he never met the owner of the company, there were no procedures given to him to follow, and there was no training on how to fly the airplane. OPC did not have any written procedures.
- Tony told him that he was flying so much, he needed a break, which is why they asked him to come fly for OPC. The guy who flew for OPC before Jerome lasted only 10 days and then quit.
- He said that the tail of N256TA looked like it had a lot of "bondo" on it, and you could see the repaired area on the tail.
- When asked how they conducted their weight and balance for each flight, he said he was told to top the nacelle tanks and put 25 gallons of fuel in each wing for the day's flights. There was no formal paperwork involved in calculating the weight and balance for each flight. The clipboard they had on the airplane was to record hobbs times and temperatures.



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

David Lawrence
Aviation Safety Investigator
Operational Factors Division, AS-30

Date: 6/25/2019 (1300 HST)
Person Contacted: Matt Jaskol, Witness
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: David Lawrence, NTSB

Narrative:

- Mr. Jaskol was a skydiver on N256TA on the flight just prior to the accident flight.
- He said that the takeoff was not alarming, but the bank was enough for him to notice.
- He said the pitch on the takeoff was fine, it was just the steep bank, then a flattening out, then steep again.
- The engine noise sounded good, and he thought the pilot was trying to "peel" off hard to avoid the parachute landing area.
- The pilot did not give them any briefing when they boarded, and he had no interaction with him. They did receive a briefing from the instructors regarding the landing site.
- He did not see the impact on the accident flight after they got down on the ground from their previous flight.
- He said he heard the prop pitch make a sound just prior to impact, but he did not see the impact.
- He heard the sound first, then looked that way. He said he heard the props make a sound, and thought they the pilot may have feathered one of the engines.



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Scott E. Allen, Jr.
FAA Safety Team, FPM
Honolulu Flight Standards District Office

Date: 6/25/2019 (1524 HST)
Person Contacted: Jonathan House, Witness
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: Scott E. Allen Jr. (note-taker), David Lawrence

Narrative: Called Mr. House at [REDACTED], he stated that he was then (as he received the call) in a car with several fellow-skydivers who had been at Dillingham and that his group of nine (09) had taken the so-called 'Sunset Jump' at Oahu Parachute Center (OPC) in the mishap airplane immediately prior to the accident flight. He described himself as an experienced skydiver with 'lots' of jumps.

PART ONE Mr. House's description of his own jump flight, on the flight immediately preceding the accident flight:

Mr. House noted that on their flight/jump (which was his first jump at OPC), he was seated to the rear of the airplane, at the right of the fuselage, so he did not have the opportunity to interact with the pilot, as is his normal practice. He reported that there were thirteen (13) souls aboard on his flight, nine (09) in his group, a tandem instructor (01), two student-solo jumpers (02) and the pilot (01). Note: the pilot and the two student-solo jumpers (who landed, immediately obtained fresh parachutes, and re-boarded the aircraft on its accident flight) were killed in the crash that occurred on the next takeoff. Jonathan said that on takeoff, the airplane began a left bank lower than he was accustomed to seeing. He stated that he had seen other pilots accelerate in ground effect, but did not think that Jerome had done that on their flight. He reported that Jonathan's left turn out on his flight had been more aggressive than he would consider normal. He also said that at some point in the left, climbing turnout, the pilot had briefly relaxed the turn (Mr. Wood described it as a 'little plateau,' noting that he was using that word for want of a better descriptor) then resumed the more aggressive profile and he felt the resumption of G-forces. Jonathan said that they departed the airplane at an altitude of 12,500 to 13,000 feet, that it was partly cloudy, but none were immediately below them, and estimated the winds at "5 to 8 miles per hour." Jonathan confirmed that the jumpers were back on the ground prior to the plane having landed after they jumped out.

Mr. House was texted to confirm the number of souls board his flight and he responded: "The tandem was one of our group. Here it is by name. Jess (tandem student), Brian (TI), Steve, Stephan, Curt, Jin, Kynen, Matt, Don, Jonathan, student jumper 1, 2, Jerome (pilot)." He then texted, "...so it was just 13 aboard your flight." Mr. House responded, "Correct."



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...CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1:

Scott E. Allen, Jr.
FAA Safety Team, FPM
Honolulu Flight Standards District Office

Date: 6/24/2019 (1524 HST)
Person Contacted: Jonathan House, Witness
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: Scott E. Allen, Jr., David Lawrence, Jonathan House

PART TWO Mr. House's witnessing the final seconds of the accident flight, and the crash:
After his own jump, Mr. House was standing in the vicinity of the 'packing tent' at OPC, when he observed the accident aircraft "veering" left to right towards the trees bordering the airfield. He did not witness the takeoff roll, but said that he has observed a lot of airplanes, and that the trajectory of the accident aircraft was unusual enough that it caught his attention. He said that he very quickly realized that the airplane would not be able to clear the trees bordering the airfield. He said there were no unusual noises, there was no smoke from the engines or airframe, the airframe appeared intact when it was in the air, but it continued to bank, went inverted, and impacted the ground.



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

David Lawrence
Aviation Safety Investigator
Operational Factors Division, AS-30

Date: 6/25/2019 (1911 HST)
Person Contacted: Isaaah Suenaka-Rodrigues, witness
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: David Lawrence, NTSB

Narrative:

- He was 20 years old, and was driving west on Farrington Highway alongside the airport, heading toward the beach, when he saw the accident.
- He was heading west on the road.
- He said he saw the airplane when it started to roll, and then it turned on its side to the left.
- When it turned, it turned over on its back, and then nosed down into the ground along the fence.
- He said the airplane did not catch on fire initially after it crashed, and did catch on fire until about 3 seconds after the impact.
- He did not hear the airplane since he had his radio turned on.
- He did not see any smoke or fire from the airplane prior to impact.
- He estimated that the airplane got to about 400 feet in altitude.
- He first saw the airplane right when it came over the tree level. He saw the impact through the line of trees along the road.
- He had driven down that road many times, and did not remember ever seeing that particular airplane.
- He remembered that the airplane was grey colored, but could not tell how many engines it had.



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Scott E. Allen, Jr.
FAA Safety Team, FPM
Honolulu Flight Standards District Office

Date: 6/26/2019 (0854 HST)
Person Contacted: Scott McDonald, Witness
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: Scott E. Allen, Jr., Scott McDonald

Narrative: Called Mr. McDonald at [REDACTED] to follow up on his having reported witnessing an aggressive takeoff from HDH the day prior to the accident.

Mr. McDonald identified himself as Major McDonald, Royal Canadian Air Force. He advised that he holds a commercial certificate, has approximately 4,000 flight hours, has flown light and heavy airplanes, up to the Aurora (the Canadian designator for the P-3 Orion). He has served as a Wing Flight Safety Officer, has attended Flight Safety training, and earned his current posting to Marine Base, Kaneohe, where he will be on-station for approximately two more years.

Major McDonald was at a picnic table near the departure end of HDH Runway 8. He had gone out to Dillingham with his family to watch the sunset and at approximately 1830 his attention was drawn to a white King Air "with the door open or with a glass door" performing a remarkably aggressive left pull out during its takeoff from HDH. He recalled thinking "That's really pushing it close to the ground."

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Sky Diving Plane Crash
Date: Tuesday, June 25, 2019 2:10:31 PM

Aggressive pitch up, David, not sure if this is the guy you already spoke to.

Elliott Simpson

Senior Aviation Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
Western Pacific Region - Los Angeles

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: Gros of Erik [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2019 3:51 AM
To: Simpson Elliott [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: Sky Diving Plane Crash

FYSA Canadian Military Pilot witness the night before the accident-see statement below

Regards,

Erik

-----Original Message-----

From: Scott and Sabine iCloud [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, June 25, 2019 12:11 AM
To: eyewitnessreport [REDACTED] >
Subject: Sky Diving Plane Crash

Good day,

I would like to give a witness report of a take off I saw at Dillingham Airfield the night before the accident.

My family was at the beach for sunset on Thursday 20th of June. We were sitting at a picnic table across the street from the end of the runway and witnessed a very aggressive take off of a King Air aircraft, similar to the one that crashed on Friday Night. This occurred at approximately 1830 hrs.

We are not sure if it the same organization, aircraft or crew but the maneuver was as aggressive pitch up and to the left shortly after the end of the runway. I have not seen an aircraft of this type do this before.

We saw the aircraft at the end of the runway in ground effect, approximately 10 feet off the ground and then in pulled up and to the left in one motion. This put the aircraft at an estimated 70 deg or more turn as it climbed out.

I am a military pilot who has flown, turbo-prop and jet aircraft in a military training unit in Canada. I am used to seeing closed patterns and aggressive maneuvers and this was one maneuver that I thought looked dangerous when I saw it.

I think if there are crew or passengers that were on that flight on Thursday night they could comment on this as well.

I am able to discuss further if needed.

Sincerely,

Scott MacDonald



Sent from my iPhone



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

David Lawrence
Aviation Safety Investigator
Operational Factors Division, AS-30

Date: 6/26/2019 (1520 HST)
Person Contacted: Adam Townley Wren, Pilot
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: Bob Swaim (note-taker), David Lawrence, NTSB

Narrative:

Mr. Wren (ATW) called on June 25 in the afternoon and these are notes I took while Dave Lawrence spoke to him on speakerphone:

Fred Sorenson (FS) owns the company Flight Contract Services and did the first flight after the N256TA airplane was repaired two years ago. This was to North Las Vegas.

ATW took up Tony Skinner (TS) in the accident airplane and has known TS for a long time.

ATW did his own series of stalls and other flight checks and the airplane had been rigged fine. He wanted to make sure the airplane flew right before flying over the ocean for 14 hours. It had no adverse tendencies in trim or in stalls and was completely airworthy after the repairs.

For a 40% overweight ferry, they have a variety of DARs and FSDOs that they will work with. Las Vegas has a hit or miss record so they may go to California for a FSDO to approve the paperwork and flight. "The Honolulu FSDO knows us pretty well."

The engines were performing to book specs. ATW does an extensive pre-ferry flight to make sure the fuel flows, temperatures, and other performance numbers are right where they are supposed to be.

[Dave Lawrence asked what ATW did to check out TS and the answer was:]

"The check out was more of a familiarization." They did stalls at altitude because that is where the jumpers will get out, pattern work, and engine out procedures. The KingAir can roll pretty quick if an engine has a problem and you have to react within about two seconds. ATW gave TS at least three days of training and also flew the first jumpers for Oahu Parachute Center (OPC).

ATW is (was?) an Army (Guard?) helicopter pilot and his regular job is flying a Boeing for an airline.



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ATW does not remember the accident airplane needing to use any abnormal rudder or aileron trim.

The only mechanical issue ATW knew of was when the fuel strainer leaked after the airplane got to Hawaii and was being flown there.

The phone call ended at 3:49 pm.



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

David Lawrence
Aviation Safety Investigator
Operational Factors Division, AS-30

Date: 6/26/2019 (1800 HST)
Person Contacted: Fred Sorenson
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: David Lawrence, Bob Swaim NTSB

Narrative:

- Mr. Sorenson called the NTSB to provide information about the ferry of N256TA.
- He worked for Flight Contract Services. He said he picked up the airplane in California, with the ferry kit.
- He said he flight tested the airplane, took it up and did a stall series. He said the airplane flew fine.
- The reason he did the flight test was because he was going to be flying the airplane 30% over max gross weight for the ferry flight, and wanted to make sure it flew fine.
- The Wichita ACO issued the overweight authorization, and the DAR Kenneth Scherado issued the permit.
- Because they were going to operate heavy, he said he did a "pretty good" test flight.
- He said the tail repair had been signed off, and he had no issue with it.
- When asked if he used a test card to conduct the flight test, he said no, and it was based on his experience, and he did the test flight per the normal procedures; stall series, high altitude stall at 15,000 feet, steep turns as 60 degrees. He did not do negative G maneuvers, just whatever pitch was necessary to recovery from the stall.
- When asked how the airplane trim was, he said the airplane flew "hands-off". It did not have an autopilot, so he wanted to make sure it trimmed out fine since he was going to be flying it over the water.
- When asked if it had zero trim, he said he considered it to be within half a point in all levels, with no adverse trim in slow flight either. He also ran a Vmc demo all the way up to high speed cruise, and the trim was fine.
- He brought the airplane to minimum controllable airspeed, and it had enough rudder authority.
- He thought he would be the one to fly the airplane to Hawaii, but a scheduling conflict prevented it, and Adam to the flight.
- For the test flights, he was solo.
- The cabin configuration was the pilot a co-pilot seats, and 2 jumpseats (the straddle benches).



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- When asked how long he had to prepare the airplane, he said about 3 weeks. He said George (OPC owner) was paying for the ferry.
- He said he had met Pat Garcia (the airplane owner) when he picked up the airplane in Lincoln, California, and made sure everyone was covered on the insurance
- The Letter of agency for theme to sing the 8130 came from Pat. Pat gave Flight Contract Services authority to sign the 8130.
- When asked when Adam got involved, he said that was about 10 days before delivery.
- When asked about the previous accident, he said he knew about it before he picked it up regarding the tail replacement, got the logbooks, which was followed by a month long discussion. He said sometimes they got into longer discussions based on older airplanes.
- When asked if he had any problem getting paid from George, he said they did have an outstanding balance. There was a lien clause in the contract, but they did not have to put a lien on the airplane since they were getting paid off by George.
- When asked who accepted the airplane at OPC, he said Adam turned the keys over to George.
- He was not very familiar with Bobby the mechanic, but had met him before.
- He had lived in Hawaii and flew for Hawaiian Airlines for a number of years.
- He started delivering airplanes in 1974, and had done 576 deliveries across the ocean. He also had about 45,000 total flight hours.
- He had copies of all the paperwork on N256TA and logbook entries, along with pictures, and offered to send these to the NTSB. He was not sure if he had copies of the 337's.



NTSB RECORD OF CONVERSATION

David Lawrence
Aviation Safety Investigator
Operational Factors Division, AS-30

Date: 6/27/2019 (1344 HST)
Person Contacted: Danielle Marriott, Accident Pilot's Roommate
NTSB Accident Number: WPR19MA177
Attendees: David Lawrence, NTSB

Narrative:

- She was the roommate of the accident pilot.
- She said that 3.5 to 4 weeks ago, Jerome was off work for about 3 days, which was unusual. Jerome told her that they were doing some maintenance on the airplane for a fuel leak.
- After the three days, Jerome went back to work, but returned home the same day and told her that they were still working on the problem since it had gotten worse.
- She said that Jerome also told her that one of the jumpers at OPC was doing the oil changes on the airplane.
- When asked if Jerome had any concerns about flying for OPC, she said not that she recalled. She said they did talk about how someone got paid \$10,000 to fly the airplane from California to Hawaii.
- She said Jerome did not drink, smoke or do drugs, and led a very clean lifestyle. She said his daughter was planning on coming to Hawaii in a few weeks to spend about a month with him, and he was looking to move to a place on the beach that had more room for them.
- To her knowledge, Jerome did not have any financial difficulties. He had previously been an investment banker in London, and always paid his rent on time.
- When asked about his sleep patterns, she said he was always in bed by 2100-2130, and typically woke up at 0700 and went to work about 0730. He did not work on Tuesdays.



Record of Conversation

Date/Time: August 28, 2019 at about 12:00 EDT

Mr. Patrick Garcia, Owner N256TA

Location: Telephone

Participants: NTSB, Elliott Simpson IIC; NTSB, Gregory Borsari; NTSB, Captain David Lawrence; NTSB, Scott Warren; NTSB, Robert Swain; NTSB

Representation: Mr. Michael Dworkin

NTSB Accident Number – WPR19MA177, Beech King Air 65-A90, Registration N256TA, Mokuleia, HI. (Dillingham Airfield)

On August 28, 2019, beginning at about 12:00 EDT, Mr. Garcia agreed to speak via telephone and to have notes taken, which follow. These notes are not a verbatim transcript. In attendance was William (Rocky) Garcia, Patrick's father.

After introductions were completed and a brief explanation about the NTSB investigative role, Patrick was asked if he could tell us when and why he purchased the airplane and then walk us through the history of the airplane up until the accident. Patrick said he purchased the aircraft approximately the beginning of 2011. He purchased it because he owns a company called Sky Dive Sacramento. He owned a Cessna 182 and was increasing the business. He purchased N256TA from someone in Canada. The Canadian seller flew the airplane down to California and Patrick started utilizing it for skydiving flights at his company. After a few years he leased the airplane out to a different sky diving company in the hopes of increasing the number of aircraft he owns. There was an incident in Byron, and after repair, he leased it to Oahu Parachute Center (OPC) in Hawaii. He leased it out with the intention of purchasing a Cessna Caravan.

Asked if he recalled what month in 2011, he purchased the aircraft, he responded not exactly sure of the month. He remembered negotiating through the winter and trying to get the airplane flown down with the winter weather in from Canada to California. Asked if he still had the 182, Patrick said he that did.

Asked if N256TA was a direct lease, he told us there were no intermediary parties involved. He added that he thought we had a copy of the lease, which Captain Lawrence confirmed during the interview that the (NTSB) does have a copy.

Prior to leasing to OPC, he leased the airplane to DBA (doing business as) Bay Area Sky diving. He thought the actual company name was Aero Sport, Inc.

He told us that OPC contacted him about 2.5 years ago (October, November timeframe). Asked who the point of contact at OPC he told us George Rivera. Asked how he determined that OPC would be okay to lease the aircraft to, Patrick said that George Rivera is well known in the sky

diving industry. He's been working as a parachute rigger and sky diver as long as Patrick has been in the industry (about 12 years), and has been a pilot and skydiver for about 25 years.

Asked if he has ever been over to Hawaii to visit OPC he said yes, he has been there about five or six times. Asked if he had any concerns with OPC with regard to the airplane while there, he said no.

Asked if he had any other financial connection with OPC beyond the aircraft lease, he said no.

Patrick was asked who was responsible for setting up the ferry flight from the mainland to Hawaii, and he told us that it was George Rivera. Asked if he (Patrick) was responsible for configuring the airplane for the ferry flight, he told us, no that a ferry flight company took care of that.

Asked if he could summarize any maintenance requirements that were in the lease, he stated that he would have to look at the lease for details, but he knew OPC were in charge of the maintenance on the airplane. Including finding and using an A&P and IA for that maintenance.

OPC was responsible for all the maintenance while the airplane was leased to OPC using the Beech Phase Inspection program, the aircraft manufacturer's maintenance program.

Asked if he was satisfied with OPC's selection of the mechanic he said yes. He said his point of contact for the maintenance was Robert (Bobby) Seladis. Patrick did not know Bobby prior to him working on the accident airplane. He did meet Bobby. Asked about where Bobby worked prior to OPC, he said he thought he worked on another King Air 90 at another sky diving operation on the field, but he could not remember the name of the outfit. Asked if he knew why Bobby left the previous company, he told us no that he did not know why.

Asked how the upcoming maintenance was being tracked and if he managed what needed to be done on the aircraft, he told us that Bobby would send him text messages with the times and flight cycles on the airplane. Asked if Bobby was tracking maintenance coming due, he added that yes, either phone calls or text messages which the NTSB was provided copies of.

Asked if he knew if anybody else worked on the airplane besides Bobby, he said that George typically assigned mechanics, but as far as he knew, George was not a mechanic. Asked if he was not a mechanic how was George involved, he told us that he would relay information or what was needed by Bobby for the maintenance.

Asked if he knew what the other people's capabilities were who worked on the airplane, or if he knew if they were licensed or unlicensed, he said, Bobby has the IA and it this should be on file.

With regard to the previous event when the N256TA experienced an inflight loss of the right-hand horizontal stabilizer, he stated that he did not acquire N98B (the airplane donor parts were taken from) as an airworthy aircraft, but only for parts, and explained that he only purchased the airplane for the parts needed to repair N256TA. He added that N98B had a gear up landing, and was located at the same airport.

Asked if he knew how they determined the parts from N98B were in a serviceable condition. He said that he did know whether the NDT, NDI inspection was performed on N256TA before it was returned to service. He added that he did not remember who performed the inspection. Asked if he knew who removed the tail components from the donor aircraft, he told us that he knew two IA's that were working on it. The signatures are in the logbook and he provided the names. Asked if he knew who verified that the stabilizer was interchangeable with the accident aircraft, he said it would be those two mechanics.

Asked if he knew if there were any differences in the parts used from the donor airplane versus the parts on his airplane, he said he did not know of any differences or similarities for that matter. He added that everything looked the same to him, but he was not an IA, not a mechanic.

It was explained to Patrick that the left upper wing skins of N256TA looked to be wrinkled outboard of the engine as a result of the event when the horizontal stabilizer departed. When asked if he knew anything about it, he stated that he thinks that is incorrect and he reviewed two NDT NDI reports, and that wrinkles were brought to his attention at the first inspection, and he was told that is typical for an older aircraft.

Asked to clarify where the two NDT, NDI reports were from, he told us that he understood they needed to be done every 36 months.

Asked if he had any knowledge of one of the wings upper skin, main spar attach area where it appears to be puckered at the joint. He talked about his understanding of the NDT, NDI inspections of the main spar where the wing is supported, and all the attaching hardware is removed, and the inspections are done. One was done do to the 36-month requirement and the other for the Byron event.

When asked if he was aware when flying the airplane of the need to use full aileron trim and some rudder trim in order to fly straight and level, he said that he had many hours of flight experience in N256TA and it liked trim. Asked to elaborate, he told us that once the aileron trim was set it was fine, and he added he remembered that the trim would normally be biased to one side or the other but could not remember which side.

Asked if the trim bias condition existed before or after the loss of the horizontal stab, he said it was only before, because he did not fly the airplane after the horizontal stabilizer incident. He added that he only flew the airplane when it was at his sky diving center in Lincoln. He also added that the trim was like that ever since he owned it.

When asked if he knew that the airplane had a gear up landing prior to his ownership, he said no, he did not know that, but it would not surprise him. He added that most of the airplanes he looked at for purchase that have retractable gear seem to have had something like that happen in the past.

Asked how long the airplane sat after the horizontal stabilizer repair work and the leasing it to OPC, he said about one year.

When asked if the horizontal stabilizer was repaired specifically for him, he said it was. Asked if he selected who did the repair work, he said yes, based on the advice of his IA. Asked if he was familiar with the company that performed the work, he said yes, he was.

Asked about the engineering review that was conducted in 2010 for the conversion of the aircraft for parachute jumping and removal of the optional equipment not needed for parachute operations, he stated that he believed Rocky Mountain performed the work, and he was told that they were a very reputable company. He described the work they performed as incredible and of high quality, and prior to purchase he reviewed the entire aircraft and made sure everything was correct. The reputation of Rocky Mountain was one of the reasons he decided to purchase the airplane.

When asked who maintains the aircraft records, he said that Bobby had them last. It was his understanding that Bobby had them under “lock and key” in his apartment office. Asked if he maintained any copies of the records, he replied, that he did not.

Asked if he had any of the engine overhaul records, he said they would be in the logbooks. Asked if he had any older logbooks, specifically for the left engine (as the logbook we have only goes back to the hot section inspection and not the overhaul), he said he has a box of older records back in his hangar. (After some discussion as to whether to search for what was asked for, the group felt it was best just to send the entire box to the NTSB, and Patrick agreed.)

When asked if OPC ever sent any maintenance records to him, he said he had some pictures sent to him of the invoice and the logbook entry.

Asked if he talked to Bobby since the accident, he replied, no. He added that he reached out to him several times but has not heard anything. Prior to the accident he would hear from him about once a week, sometimes more often.

The group discussed the Beech phase check maintenance program, and asked why one of the first items Bobby put in the logbook was for a 100-hour inspection per the advisory circular in chapter 43, and that it was changed to a phase check. When asked if he had anything to do with that, Patrick said that when he saw that entry, he showed it to the IA he works with in Lincoln, and was told that it was inaccurate and inappropriate for that airplane. It is not on a 100-hour inspection, that it is on the Beech phase inspections. The IA explained the difference between the phase inspections and 100-hour inspections like on his Cessna. He added that he contacted George and Bobby to get it corrected.

Asked if Bobby corrected the entry to his satisfaction, and if he went back and did any additional work, he told us yes, and there is an invoice for the additional work that had to be done for the phase inspection. He added he could not recall which phase it was, and that he needed more time to get the extra items completed and that he sent Bobby additional money after that work was done.

Asked if he provided Bobby with the phase inspection program, he said he understood it was in the Beech manual. He had his IA make copies of the Phase inspections so that they had copies of the items a check list. All four phase inspections were copied into his own binder.

When asked how Bobby tracked when maintenance requirements were coming due, he said that he was advised that Bobby worked on the airplane every week. Tuesday was the day set aside for maintenance, no flying Tuesday so they could keep up with any needed maintenance. He added he used the Hobbs time for tracking.

Asked if he knew anything about the need for daily engine wash requirements due to operating in a salty environment, he asked if we were talking about the engine compressor washes. The group clarified the question about internal engine washes due to operations in a salty environment, and he said he was told that they were done, and that they were done very often because of the environment. That was something he noticed that was different from flying the aircraft in California versus in Hawaii.

Asked if he was billed for the engine washes, he said he would have to look. He does not remember specifically for washes, rather he is typically just billed for time. He added he knows he was shown a tool that was made specifically for washes, and that it looked almost like a pressure washer type of attachment. He added, he never saw washes being performed, but reiterated that he was told that they were performed regularly.

Asked if he had to approve of any of the maintenance ahead of time that needed to be done, he said he always was, but never stopped them from doing the work. He was always notified what was done the previous week. Added that if a phase inspection was coming due that he would know several weeks before that started.

Asked if the FAA ever contacted him about the airplane and why, he stated yes, they did an onsite inspection and they had a concern with some of the seatbelts, specifically that some of their labels were difficult to read. So, he purchased brand new hooker harnesses and sent the new seatbelts to OPC. That was the only item. The squawk did not require grounding the aircraft labels were just difficult to read. He added that they probably were in the OPC mailbox about the time of the accident, and unlikely to have been installed. The FAA inspection was recent, maybe about a month to six weeks before the accident. It took about one month for Hooker Harness to build the belts, he added that he thought the inspector was from the Honolulu FSDO. The Hooker Harnesses were single point harness specifically for the Beech, for use by the skydivers.

Asked specifically how he knew George, or got to know him, he said that George came to him and that he was looking for an aircraft to lease.

Asked if the billing is just done by text messaging, he said there maybe one or two in his email, but text messages seemed to be the quickest. Any formal billing would be with George at OPC, and he has a photo or picture of what the invoice looked like. Everything was supposed to go through George.

When asked that it was his understanding the puckers in the wing were there prior to the horizontal stab separation, he said that, yes it was. The first time it was shown to him was from the NDT, NDI inspector.

Patrick was asked to clarify the aileron trim condition, and stated that he never flew the airplane straight and level, because he flew sky divers, and such a flight profile is never used. He was not sure how to answer the question as it was not a commuter airplane, and just went up and down. He added that he never needed to adjust the aileron trim, except after maintenance, or when it was adjusted by another pilot. During one of the phase inspections they would go through the full range of motion and the trim, but once he had it set, he never had to adjust it again during flight.

Asked if he had any photos of the skydivers seating and the harnesses, he said he would have to look and see. However, there are literally thousands of skydiver photos out there.

He was asked if he had any photos from the past that would show the characteristics of the top of the wing, such as the wrinkles that were discussed earlier. He responded that he never went out of his way to take photos aimed that way. Being in the skydiving business, he thinks there are thousands of photos available, but he offered to look, although nothing unusual was ever brought to his attention. The wrinkle that he was aware of was very minor, and could only be seen when the airplane was in a hangar. He reiterated that he was concerned, but was told by mechanics that this was very common for King Air airplanes of that vintage. He went to say why they do the NDT, NDI inspections of the spar, and the spars support the wing and during those inspections they pull every bolt out of the spar and inspect it. He added that he flew the airplane for three years. Asked about getting copies the NDT, NDI reports he said they would be in the logbooks, which is where he saw them last.

Patrick was asked if he recalled hearing about any engine issues while the airplane was being operated in Hawaii, such as power loss, un-commanded power excursions, either up or down, or un-commanded throttle movements. He said the simple answer is no, and added that he did talk to one of the pilots when he first got there that was moving the throttles all the way forward to the stops, and concerned that the engine power was fluctuating at those high levels. It was Patrick's understanding there was a wastegate that would open up at those levels, creating the functions. When he found out the pilot was advancing the throttles to the stops, he asked him not to do so as, he was concerned because his training experience led him to believe that this was not appropriate for a high-performance engine. That was the only issue the pilots came to him with. He was aware that Bobby was working on the rigging the engine controls to get them to match each other. Most pilots want the throttle handles to match up. Again, that did not stem from a problem, it was from the pilots wanting the throttles to match up. Asked when they were doing that rigging, he said it was about a year ago.

He was asked who else performed work on the aircraft besides Bobby for clarification. He stated that he believed there was another mechanic before Bobby came in and he wasn't sure if he was an AI, but he may have done the first phase inspection. He thinks Bobby showed up shortly after the airplane got there, but cannot be certain. But he does know Bobby was not the first person to put his hands on the airplane. He was the one that I discussed all the maintenance on was with

him after I met Bobby. He seemed to know a lot about the plane. Asked if he was the only one doing the maintenance, he said him and anyone under his direction.

Asked for further detail on when he first saw that a 100-hour inspection was done instead of the phase inspection, what was it that alerted him to this? He stated that he showed the entry to an IA that he has worked with in the past, and he told him that was inappropriate for the King Air, which needed phase checks. He added that the photo of the logbook entry showing the 100 inspection was showed to his IA in California. Asked if that was routine to get pictures of the logbook entries, he stated no, and he thinks that is the only one he has.

Patrick was not sure how weight and balance calculations were being performed by OPC, but the weight and balance was in the airplane with the flight manual. He also believes a copy may be in the logbooks, and the box of additional records he has. When asked how weight and balance was performed in Skydiving, with the multiple combination of parachute jumpers and equipment, he stated that it will differ between the type of airplane you are flying, but with regards to the N256TA it also depends on which direction the co-pilot seat is facing. As a rule of thumb when he was flying N256TA, he would look back to make sure no one was aft of the door opening and that the majority of occupants were either forward of the wing or on top of it. And that as a pilot that is really easy to look over your shoulder and make sure that is happening. He stated that at the very aft of the King Air is a toilet, and no one should be back there. There is also a red piece of tape on the floor as a marker to not go behind the red tape. He would not allow a jumper to sit back there. The seat belts do not go back there so no one is allowed that far back.

With regard to the position of the red tape, when asked if it is based on weight and balance calculations, he stated that he believes so, and thinks the last weight and balance work was done by Rocky Mountain. He recalled that a maximum of fourteen jumpers were allowed with the right seat turned around. He added that if he could remember, that the further forward the weight was, the better.

With regard to when the airplane was coming out of Byron, he stated that it was flown to Lincoln prior to being picked up by the ferry company. He does not recall the specific name of the pilot that flew it to Hawaii, but he was aware that the pilot had many hours of flight experience in the type. The work performed in Lincoln consisted of a flight through turbulent air inspection, which may have also included the NDT, NDI inspection (he stated that this was not when he was shown the left wing wrinkles, they were revealed on the first inspection shortly after he purchased the airplane).

Patrick recalled that Heath Hall made copies of the phase inspection checklist. Pat provided them to Bobby I handed it to him. Okay, where did you get it from? I handed him a binder that all of the Beechcraft phase inspections that I had copied. He got them from Heath the other IA. So, he printed them out in California? Yes. And that was one of the times you visited OPC? Yes.

Patrick did not remember anything specific regarding the regularity of tires changes, he had seen both new and worn tires in the garage where work was performed, and it was his understanding that Bobby was the mechanic who replaced them.

When asked, Patrick stated that he was aware of a series of videos of the horizontal stabilizer separation accident, and he had seen those videos.

When asked about the location of an occupant who was singing a chant in a video onboard N256TA taken just before rolling open the door up who was leading a chant, he stated that he was forward of the red tape. (subsequent review of this video during the interview revealed that this was correct). He stated that nobody sits aft of the red tape, although during egress there are moments when the tape can be momentarily crossed. This is common for egress from all jump airplanes.

When asked if he knew anything about the airplane having surging problems or bleed valves that might be opening/closing, he stated that he would have to look at his notes, but doesn't believe there are any such issues.

Asked if the name of Mike Martin is familiar, Mr. Garcia stated that he had not heard of his name. He was aware of Tony Skinner, who was the original OPC pilot, and he stated that he was a really good pilot, and good person, who ultimately left OPC to fly cargo in a King Air between the islands. Asked if Mr. Skinner ever did any work on the airplane, or if he had any mechanic ratings, he said he likely did regular pilot "maintenance" such as preflight work, and he had never paid him to perform mechanic duties.

With regard to payment for work performed on the airplane, Mr. Garcia would pay either George or Bobby, but if George paid for the work, then his lease check would be reduced by that amount. Typically, money is wired between accounts. Patrick did not pay by check. Although George had stated in the past that he needed money so that he could pay his, "guys" Mr. Garcia was never aware of specifically who they were. All messages on this subject are included in the text messages that Mr. Garcia provided.

The last time he visited OPC was February 2019. He did not have any specific reason or concern with the operation that would force him to go, and would often like to do unannounced visits. Each time he went he found the airplane was being well maintained, and kept in an overall clean condition. He is not an IA, so could not do an informed check, but checked from the perspective of a pilot doing a preflight inspection, such as confirming the landing gear fittings were well lubricated. The last time he visited he had limited range of motion due to a broken arm. Prior to the February visit he was there in September. He has a friend who is a commercial pilot, so is able to fly there from California on a "buddy" pass, with space available, and often at the last minute.

Asked if he knew Rick Rogers, he said, no, the name does not sound familiar. He does not think he met the accident pilot formally, but may have met him briefly in passing.

He had observed landings and takeoffs on his visits, and did not see anything untoward. The airplane always sounded good, and appeared to be operated appropriately, and no different than any other skydiving operation he has been involved with.

He observed runway 8 takeoffs, and the airplane would always turn out toward the ocean and be over the water before reaching the landing zone to the east. None of the operators ever took

intersection departures, always using the full runway length, which e found interesting because the runway was very long and this was unlike his airport in California, where intersection departures were common. He never saw any pilot of N256TA perform aggressive takeoff maneuvers, nor had he been informed that it was ever being flown in a dangerous manner.

He was aware of other co-owners of OPC, but George was the only partner he had contact with, or has ever met. He had been told by George that the other partners were just investors.

The question was asked that in the lease there is a clause that says no aerobatics will be performed with the aircraft, there is an additional clause that states as the owner, you have the option to prevent certain pilots that you identify from not being allowed to fly the aircraft. Mr. Garcia was asked how he would know who the actual pilot was, so that he could exercise that clause. Mr. Garcia responded that he would observe the pilot flying on his visits and use that as an opportunity to exercise the option. He would not tolerate anyone mistreating the airplane. He added the clause based on his experience operating in Byron California.

Asked about the recent FAA inspection and if he knew the two FAA inspectors, Mr. Garcia stated no, but the text messages from George should detail the interactions further. It is his understanding that inspections at Dillingham are common, and a regular occurrence.

Mr. Garcia is a commercially rated pilot, and has five to six thousand hours of flight experience in multiple aircraft types. He has flown many skydiving flights.

With regard to the airplane's aileron trim, it appeared to be biased to one side or the other, doesn't remember which side, he did recall that it was maybe 2/3rd to one side of neutral to fly straight and level, but it had come that was when he bought the airplane from Canada, and prior to the 2016 accident. Once the aileron trim was set, he did not ever have to touch until either another pilot flew it or during phase inspections where the trim would be moved as part of the inspection.

This was the only airplane he had flown or owned that had aileron trim, so he has no basis to compare the airplane with. He had many questions about the airplane over the years that he owned it, he does not recall if the trim was ever a concern, but he always felt comfortable flying the airplane, and always felt discrepancies were addressed. During the time he had owned the airplane, he had performed slow flight tests, about no stall practice. He did not encounter any stability issues with the airplane during slow flight.

Following up on the wrinkles in the left wing, Mr. Garcia reiterated that after discussing with multiple mechanics, that stated that this was normal for a King Air of this vintage, and that the NDT, NDI inspection results gave him a high degree of confidence in the structural integrity of the wing. Specifically, the wrinkle was in the skin, and not the spar.

He had confidence in OPC's ability to make money, although cash flow was an issue. Mr. Garcia's primary concern was that he was sent checks from OPC in time, and there were times when he would be frustrated when the payments from OPC did not arrive on time. He

understood Mr. Garcia's frustration, as he was often awaiting payment from outside groups, but he often felt like he was, "third in line" to get paid.

It was his understanding that there were plans for OPC to expand his business, and the King Air was chosen because it had lots of capacity should they need to expand.

With regard to weight and balance, it was brought to the attention of Mr. Garcia that the most current weight and balance was from 2009. Mr. Garcia stated that it is possible that there was a more recent record, but it also seems plausible that it was 2009, as this was when Rocky Mountain Aircraft worked on it.

Back on the subject of him inspecting the airplane at OPC, he reiterated that he had inspected the airplane about five to six times since it went to Hawaii, and he was especially vigilant because it was his main source of income. He would like to have got out to see it more often.

Conversation concluded at about 1:50 PM EDT