

Textron Aviation B300
Addison, TX
June 30, 2019
CEN19MA190

**NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

ATTACHMENT 2

INTERVIEW SUMMARY

3 Pages

Interview: Mr. Scott Ledet, C Shift Battalion Chief, Addison Fire Department

Date: July 3, 2019

Location: Via telephone

Representative: Declined

Present: Chief David Jones, Addison Fire Department

Addison Fire Department (AFD) employed 51 all-career firefighters who were all required to be ARFF trained. The fire department had two stations. Station 1 was at the airport, which was owned by the town of Addison. Station 2 was located at 3950 Beltway Dr., about 2 miles away. The minimum staffing was 14 personnel. On the day of the accident there were 15 personnel on duty – 10 at Station 1 (including a battalion driver) and 5 at Station 2. All 10 firefighters responded from Station 1 in five vehicles:

Station 1

Battalion 101 (2)

Squad 101 (2)

Engine 101 (3)

Truck 101 (1)¹

Rescue 101 (2)

Two additional AFD units responded from Station 2 with 5 firefighters:

Station 2

Quint 102 (3)

Medic 102 (2)

AFD utilized a “Quad City” automatic aid response system which included Farmer’s Branch Fire Department, Carrolton Fire Department, and Coppell Fire Department. AFD was the only ARFF-trained department as Addison was the only city among the four with an airport. Chief Ledet explained that Station 1 was equipped with a ringdown service – a direct line from the tower to the Quad City Dispatch Center. When activated by the tower an audible signal was heard in the station. When an AFD dispatcher answered the call, the conversation between the tower and dispatcher could be heard throughout the station

Chief Ledet was preparing to eat breakfast about 0905 and heard a “loud, thunderous boom.” There was a lot of construction near the station and he thought it might have been a large truck hitting a pothole. He did not think much of it but the ringdown came on immediately and announced an Alert 3. The firefighters immediately proceeded to their assigned vehicles to respond.

Station 1 was about 200 yards from the hangar that the airplane struck. Upon leaving the station he immediately saw heavy black smoke from north side of the hangar in one location. The vehicles proceeded on Airport Parkway to the airport perimeter control gate. All AFD and automatic aid vehicles had a remote opener to activate the gate. It opened without incident and his vehicle took the service road and maneuvered around debris to get to the hangar. (Once onto airfield he normally requested permission from ATC but did not do so because they did not need taxiway or runway access in this case.) Due to the route taken Chief Ledet had seen nearly all 360 degrees of the scene. He realized that only north part of the hangar was affected. He saw a large hole at roofline of hangar on the north side and immediately had dispatch upgrade

¹ The station cross-staffed the rescue unit with their truck crew. (The truck was not normally used during an Alert 2 or Alert 3 response.) Two firefighters responded to the scene in Rescue 101 but the 3rd seat firefighter saw that the hangar was on fire and responded in Truck 101.

the call to a second alarm for a structure fire. He also requested they notify his chief that they had a structure fire secondary to an Alert 3.

The other vehicles from Station 1 had followed his route and he began setting up a command structure. There was a large debris field on the concrete north of the hangar but no other structures were involved. He directed Rescue 101 to come around and attack the fire through the large hole in hangar roof. He also noticed that there was a secondary fire on ground to the left of the hangar that was not producing as much black smoke. He heard the secondary fire “popping and crackling” and he initially thought it was an electrical panel fire. The hangar was completely engulfed in fire and smoke. He instructed Rescue 101 to fight the high fire because Squad 101 had also come around with their apparatus and had a straight shot to the secondary fire, which he later learned was the airplane fuselage. He did not immediately realize that Rescue 101 had set up at a location where they could use bumper turret on the secondary fire and the roof turret on the roof of the hangar. They were putting agent on two fires at the same time.

He exited his vehicle and began getting the command board set up. Secondary units began arriving. He redirected Engine 101 to go back around to Eddie Rickenbacker Dr. and attack the secondary fire. He also wanted them to make entry into the offices there and do a search. It was Sunday morning at 0900 but he just wanted to make sure no one was inside. Engine 101 complied and established a water source at a hydrant on Eddie Rickenbacker Dr. Quint 102 arrived from Station 2 from the south on the airport service road.

Chief Ledet knew the owner of the hangar and that it usually housed a helicopter, a Falcon 50, and a 737. He believed the accident aircraft was still in hangar and was concerned about the fire spreading into the 737. He instructed the firefighters from Quint 102 to gain entry into hangar to check for secondary fires. With the amount of smoke that he saw coming from the hangar he assumed that one or more other aircraft were already on fire.

Automatic aid units began arriving and he asked some of them to assist the Quint crew with forcing open the hangar doors. They had already disconnected the power so the doors did not open electrically and they were struggling. There was another hangar to the north and he saw a man watching them. Chief Ledet had a police officer flag him down and ask if he could help. He said yes and got a couple other guys and responded in a golf cart. They eventually got a fork lift and started pushing the doors open. They also cut the door opening chain and eventually got inside. There was a lot of heat and smoke inside but not much fire. The fires had been knocked down within about 14-15 minutes. There was a little smoke and steam but the main threat had been knocked down.

Chief Ledet made contact with tower and asked how many people were on board. The tower said possibly two but was not sure. He asked the tower to provide the souls on board information to dispatch when they had it. Firefighters had gained access to hangar and offices and were relaying reports. Fuel had worked its way into the walls but did not ignite. Another chief on scene requested a face-to-face meeting with him and informed him that the secondary fire was actually the accident airplane. It was difficult to tell it was an airplane because it was a “mangled mess.” Upon approaching it, they noticed it was on its right side. They began to see victims inside and personal belongings, but they still did not know how many people were on board.

The scene started winding down and several hours later they did receive confirmation that 10 people were on board. About 1330-1400 the units returned to the station after briefing FAA and FBI agents. They left scene in their control. After rehydrating they coordinated with the medical examiner and assisted with victim removal. They were able to confirm that there were 10 people on board.

He later had a conversation with a pilot who witnessed the accident. The pilot told him he thought they had a left engine failure. After speaking with the witness, Chief Ledet believed the airplane struck the hangar at the roofline then hit floor, slid through the bottom half of a rollup door, and exited the building. He believed that if the door had not been there the airplane would have stayed in the building. He also viewed footage from one of our an AFD member's vehicle that was parked in the parking lot near Station 1 and captured the entire event.

When asked if his tactics or attack would have been any different had he known the location of the accident airplane upon arrival, he stated that he might have concentrated more on it but that there was no way to know it was an aircraft until the fire was extinguished.