

**NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF HIGHWAY SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**MOTOR CARRIER FACTORS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S
FACTUAL REPORT**

A. CRASH INFORMATION AND CRASH SUMMARY

For crash information and a summary of the crash, refer to the Crash Information and Summary Report, in the docket for this investigation

B. MOTOR CARRIER FACTORS GROUP

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C. DETAILS OF THE MOTOR CARRIER FACTORS INVESTIGATION

Due to travel restrictions imposed by COVID-19, NTSB investigators did not travel to the scene and other locations to interview company representatives or physically obtain records. Investigative information was provided to investigators electronically.

There were numerous vehicles involved in this crash. The focus of this investigative report is the history and operations of the motor carrier and driver of the 2013 Freightliner truck-tractor towing a 2017 Utility semitrailer operated by K Express Incorporated of Bensenville, Illinois. This report documents the employment, driver screening, hours of service of the driver of the 2013 Freightliner.

This report also includes the carrier's roadside inspection history, safety culture and government oversight by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the State of Illinois, Department of Public Safety.

1. Motor Carrier History and Operations – K Express Incorporated

K Express Incorporated (K Express) had been in business since 2004 and according to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), the carrier was issued USDOT number 1248031. The carrier was registered as a “for-hire” motor carrier of general freight with a principal place of business located in Bensenville, Illinois. The carrier had active operating authority issued on May 13, 2004, and was issued MC # 486848. According to the carrier’s latest MCS-150¹, the carrier employed 28 drivers and operated 28 trucks.

K Express operated primarily in the Midwest and used several Chicago area freight brokers to obtain freight.

K Express had routine and preventative truck maintenance completed at their shop located at their primary place of business. K Express employed a mechanic who completed the necessary repairs and inspections.

1.1. Hiring Process

When needed, K Express advertised open driver positions via word of mouth and online using the website wwwIndeed.com.² Once a completed application was received, prospective driver candidates would be vetted using a specific criterion. This criterion included:

- A negative pre-employment-controlled substance test
- Pre-employment registration and query of FMCSA’s drug and alcohol clearinghouse
- A clean driving record
- At least two years relevant driving experience

The carrier did not indicate they utilized FMCSA’s pre-employment screen program (PSP).³

Once the candidate was accepted or pre-qualified, they would then be brought in for an orientation consisting of “one on one” training provided by the safety manager covering the following topics:

- Proper completion of Driver Vehicle Inspection reports
- Hours of Service
- Defensive driving

¹ Motor Carrier Identification Report – See Motor Carrier Attachment MCS-150 K Express Inc.

² Indeed.com is a worldwide employment website.

³ PSP is a screening tool that assists motor carriers in investigating crash history and roadside safety performance of perspective drivers. <http://www.safer.fmcsa.dot.gov>

- Company policies to include:
 - What to do if involved in an accident
 - Cellular phone use⁴, safety belt use, distracted driving
- Complete training on the M2M in motion Electronic Logging Device functions and usage.⁵

1.2. Management Safety Practices

Safety culture is the collection of the beliefs, perceptions, and values that employees and employers share in relation to risks within an organization.⁶ The building block for a positive safety culture is proper management safety practices.

K Express had an established policy and procedures package. These policies included: accident reporting, drug and alcohol testing, hours of service, use of safety belts, distracted driving, and a safe driving program. The policies provided did not show evidence that K Express had a fatigue management program or a program providing awareness of sleep apnea.

K Express also had implemented a disciplinary program policy, outlining the consequences of having hours of service violations discovered. The drivers were required to sign each policy to signify they had been reviewed and understood. The crash driver had acknowledged his policies on October 24, 2019 upon his initial employment and K Express was unable to provide any documentation the crash driver had been subjected to discipline through this policy.

At the time of the crash, K Express did not have any specific, written policy of recurrent training or conducting periodic reviews. K Express had an informal policy (non-written) of regularly interacting with its drivers to provide ongoing training to discuss compliance with regulations, particularly when an issue arose.

K Express had hired a fulltime safety manager and acquired the assistance of a safety consulting firm to assist in increasing compliance with regulations and improving their safety performance. The consultant was conducting a ‘mock’ compliance review once per quarter and providing guidance and answers on regulatory questions and discussions.

NTSB investigators inquired if there had been any policy changes or procedure changes since the Arlington, Wisconsin crash. The carrier stated they had obtained a PowerPoint presentation to review with the drivers regarding defensive/motivational driving.⁷ The presentation had slides covering following distances, avoiding distractions, staying alert and driving defensively.

⁴ Cellular phone policy stated no hand held use as per the CFR.

⁵ <https://www.m2minmotion.com/>

⁶ Cox, S. and Cox, T. (1991) *The Structure of Employee Attitudes to Safety- A European Example*. Work and Stress, pp. 5, 93-106 and Rip, Airie (1991), *The Danger Culture of Industrial Society*” Communicating Risks to the Public, Springer Netherlands, pp. 345-365.

⁷ Motor Carrier Attachment – Motivational Driving PowerPoint.

2. Federal Oversight – Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

The primary mission of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is to reduce crashes, injuries and fatalities involving large trucks and buses.

The FMCSA was established as a separate administration within the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) on January 1, 2000, pursuant to the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. FMCSA is headquartered in Washington, DC and employs more than 1,000 people in all 50 States and the District of Columbia, all dedicated to improving the safety of commercial motor vehicles (CMV) and saving lives.⁸

2.1. CSA and SMS

In 2010, the FMCSA introduced the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) system as an initiative to improve large truck and bus safety and ultimately reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities that are related to CMVs. It introduced an enforcement and compliance model that allows the FMCSA and its state partners to contact a larger number of carriers earlier to attempt to address safety problems before crashes occur. Along with CSA, the FMCSA also rolled out an operational model called the Safety Measurement System (SMS), which replaced its predecessor, known as the SAFESTAT model. SMS uses a motor carrier's data from roadside inspections, (including all safety-based violations), state-reported crashes, and the Federal Motor Carrier Census to quantify performance in the following Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories (BASICS).

2.2. CSA BASICS⁹

- **Unsafe Driving** — Operation of CMVs by drivers in a dangerous or careless manner. *Example violations:* Speeding, reckless driving, improper lane change, and inattention. (FMCSR Parts 392 and 397.)
- **Hours-of-Service (HOS) Compliance** — Operation of CMVs by drivers who are ill, fatigued, or in non-compliance with the HOS regulations. This BASIC includes violations of regulations pertaining to records of duty status (RODS) as they relate to HOS requirements and the management of CMV driver fatigue. *Example violations:* false HOS RODS and operating a CMV while ill or fatigued. (FMCSR Parts 392 and 395.)
- **Driver Fitness** — Operation of CMVs by drivers who are unfit to operate a CMV due to lack of training, experience, or medical qualifications. *Example violations:* Failure to have a valid and appropriate commercial driver's license (CDL) and being medically unqualified to operate a CMV. (FMCSR Parts 383 and 391.)
- **Controlled Substances and Alcohol** — Operation of CMVs by drivers who are impaired due to alcohol, illegal drugs, and misuse of prescription or over-the-counter medications. *Example violations:* Use or possession of controlled substances/alcohol. (FMCSR Parts 382 and 392.)

⁸ <https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/mission>

⁹ CSA Methodology retrieved from www.fmcsa.dot.gov

- **Vehicle Maintenance** — Failure to properly maintain a CMV and/or properly prevent shifting loads. *Example violations:* Brakes, lights, and other mechanical defects, failure to make required repairs, and improper load securement. (FMCSR Parts 392, 393, and 396.)
- **Hazardous Materials (HM) Compliance** — Unsafe handling of HM on a CMV. *Example violations:* Release of HM from package, no shipping papers (carrier), and no placards/markings when required. (FMCSR Part 397 and Hazardous Materials Regulations Parts 171, 172, 173, 177, 178, 179, and 180.)
- **Crash Indicator** — Histories or patterns of high crash involvement, including frequency and severity based on information from state-reported crashes.

A carrier’s measurement for each BASIC depends on the following:

- The number of adverse safety events (violations related to that BASIC or crashes).
- The severity of violations or crashes.
- When the adverse safety events occurred (more recent events are weighted more heavily).

After a measurement is determined, the carrier is then placed in a peer group (i.e., other carriers with similar numbers of inspections). Percentiles from 0 to 100 are then determined by comparing the BASIC measurements of the carrier to the measurements of other carriers in the peer group. A percentile of “100” indicates the worst performance.

The FMCSA established threshold levels that would require agency action. Unsafe Driving, HOS, and Crash BASICs were set at lower thresholds because of their inherent risk. Additionally, passenger and hazmat carriers have lower thresholds than all other carriers because of their inherent risk. **Table 1** represents the thresholds set by the FMCSA that help prioritize agency intervention and resource management.¹⁰ K Express was classified as an all-other carrier under this criterion.

Table 1. BASIC thresholds.¹¹

BASIC	Passenger Carrier	HM Carrier	All Other Motor Carriers
Unsafe Driving, HOS, Crash	50%	60%	65%
Driver Fitness, Drug & Alcohol, Maintenance	65%	75%	80%
Hazardous Materials	80%	80%	80%

On a carrier’s SMS profile, which is publicly available on the SAFER website for passenger and hazardous materials carriers only, an alert symbol is displayed in any designated

¹⁰ Retrieved from www.fmcsa.dot.gov.

¹¹ Retrieved from <http://csa.fmcsa.dot.gov/FAQs.aspx>.

BASIC where the carrier has exceeded the corresponding threshold.¹² This is also referred to as having an “alert” in a BASIC. At the time of the crash the carrier displayed an alert in the unsafe driving and hours of service BASICs. A further review showed that K Express had an unsafe driving BASIC alert status for the last consecutive 68 months, since September of 2014. At times, the unsafe numbers had trended down, but remained in Alert status.

The carrier had successfully exited the FMCSA New Entrant Program with a New Entrant safety audit on October 27, 2004. Since obtaining its USDOT number, the carrier has had 7 compliance reviews (CRs) prior to the crash and a postcrash review. **Table 2** summarizes K Express’s CR history, agency conducting the CR, date of the review, findings, and the nexus behind the review.

Table 2. K Express Inc CR History.

Date	Agency	Proposed Rating	Final Rating	Reason
October 21, 2008	FMCSA	Unsatisfactory	Conditional	Complaint - hours of service
December 3, 2008	FMCSA	Not Rated	Not Rated	Follow - up to October 2008 CR
February 10, 2010	Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT)	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	SAFESTAT Priority
December 24, 2011	FMCSA	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Complaint - hours of service
January 13, 2016	FMCSA	Not Rated	Not Rated	Alerts - maintenance and unsafe driving
January 19, 2018	FMCSA	Conditional	Satisfactory	High Risk - alerts unsafe driving, crash, and hours of service
April 13, 2020	FMCSA	Not Rated	Not Rated	Alerts - unsafe driving and hours of service
July 1, 2020	FMCSA	Not Rated	Not Rated	Post-Crash

During these CR’s there were violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) cited along with recommendations and numerous remedies suggested by FMCSA. K

¹² FMCSA BASIC information publicly available for passenger and Hazardous Material carriers only. See additional information at the FMCSA Safer website: <http://safer.fmcsa.dot.gov/CompanySnapshot.aspx>.

Express had submitted several corrective action plans (CAPs) to FMCSA. After FMCSA reviewed these CAPs, the CRs from October 21, 2008, December 24, 2011, and January 19, 2018, were all upgraded from the proposed findings to an upgraded final rating of either conditional or satisfactory.

During course of the previous investigations, FMCSA investigators continuously noted a high rate of occurrence of unsafe driving violations. As part of the CR process, FMCSA provided ways to mitigate and possibly reduce the unsafe driving activities. These included:

1. Develop a policy, signed by the drivers, stating they are responsible for adhering to all safe-driving-related Federal, State, and local laws and ordinances.
2. Develop a policy requiring drivers to submit copies of all roadside inspections and citations for moving violations to management with 24 hours.
3. Develop a policy penalizing drivers for speeding even if a Federal or State citation is not issued roadside.
4. Establish a policy that prohibits dispatchers from assigning drivers to a load that cannot be completed without speeding.
5. Develop a written progressive disciplinary policy focused on taking corrective action to ensure drivers comply with regulations and policy. This could include, among other things, written warnings, suspensions, or work restrictions, monetary penalties, and termination.

During the July 1, 2020, post-crash compliance review, FMCSA investigators cited the following violations:

- 395.8 – Failure to require records of duty status to be completed in prescribed form and manner (Crash Driver).
- 395.8(e)(1) – False report of records duty status (inaccurate) (Crash Driver).
- 391.23(m)(2)(i)(C) – Using a copy of a medical examiner’s certificate as proof of the driver’s medical certification beyond 15 days after the date of issuance (Crash Driver).
- 382.701(a) – Failing to conduct a pre-employment query.
- 391.21(a) – Using a driver who has not completed and furnished an employment application (Crash Driver did not provide a list of employers for preceding 3 years).
- 391.53(a) – Failing to maintain records relating to the investigation into the safety performance history of a new or prospective driver (Crash Driver).
- 392.2 – Unsafe Driving.

As a result of the violations found in the July 2020 post-crash CR, FMCSA investigators made the following recommendations specific to hours-of-service violations. There were no additional suggestions for addressing the unsafe driving issues.

- Develop a policy requiring a driver to report their available hours during a “check-in call”.
- Develop a policy to require drivers to comply with the hours-of-service regulations and turn in records of duty status and supporting documentation within 13 days of completing trips.
- Establish a policy stating that drivers are required to check with their supervisor to report “fit-for-duty” status before starting a job and require that drivers that are ill or the abilities or alertness is impaired be prohibited from safety sensitive assignments.

. The post-crash CR resulted in a “Conditional” rating.¹³

2.3. Illinois Department of Transportation Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Oversight

The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) has the authority to enforce the FMCSRs from the Illinois Compiled Statutes: 625 ILCS 5/Illinois Vehicle Code, Article 1 outlined in the excerpt below. The statute also states that the Illinois State Police are the only agency allowed to conduct roadside inspections. IDOT conducted a compliance review of the carrier February 10, 2010, resulting in a rating of satisfactory.

- **(625 ILCS 5/18b-102) (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 18b-102)**
 - Sec. 18b-102. Authority of Department. To the extent necessary to administer this Chapter, the Department is authorized to:
 - (a) Adopt by reference all or any portion of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations of the United States Department of Transportation, as they are now or hereafter amended.
 - (b) Conduct investigations; make reports; issue subpoenas; conduct hearings; require the production of relevant documents, records and property; take depositions; and, in conjunction with the Illinois State Police, conduct directly or indirectly research, development, demonstrations and training activities.
 - (c) Authorize any officer or Department employee to enter upon, inspect and examine at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner, the records and properties of persons to the extent such records and properties relate to the transportation by motor vehicle of persons or property.

¹³ Motor Carrier Factors Attachment – Post-crash Compliance Review

(d) Conduct a continuing review of all aspects of the transportation of persons and property by motor vehicle in order to determine and recommend appropriate steps to assure safe transportation by motor vehicle in Illinois.

(e) Administer and enforce the provisions of this Chapter and any rules and regulations issued under this Chapter. Only the Illinois State Police shall be authorized to stop and inspect any commercial motor vehicle or driver at any time for the purpose of determining compliance with the provisions of this Chapter or rules and regulations issued under this Chapter.

(Source: P.A. 90-89, eff. 1-1-98.)

- **625 ILCS 5/1 – 115.05 (Illinois Vehicle Code, Title and Definitions)**

- Sec. 1-115.05. Department. The Department of Transportation of the State of Illinois, acting directly or through its duly authorized officers and agents, except that in Chapter 5 and Articles X and XI of Chapter 3 of this Code, "Department" means the Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois.

(Source: P.A. 90-89, eff. 1-1-98.)

2.4. Roadside Inspections

K Express was subject to 15 roadside inspections from November 9, 2019, to June 12, 2020. There were three roadside inspections involving the driver in this crash.

- January 8, 2020, with no violations discovered.
- February 13, 2020, with an inoperative low beam headlamp.
- June 12, 2020, the post-crash inspection completed by the Wisconsin State Patrol.

2.5. Crash Reports

From 2018 to May 2021, the K Express had been involved in six crashes including the crash in Arlington, Wisconsin. NTSB investigators located another fatal crash that occurred in Ohio on May 10, 2021, at 12:54 p.m., where a K Express truck tractor in combination with a semitrailer rear-ended another truck-tractor combination unit on U.S. Route 30 in the Township of Mifflin, Ohio.¹⁴ As a result of that crash, the driver of the K Express vehicle suffered fatal injuries. The 2021 Ohio crash did not result in any action by FMCSA.

FMCSA has developed guidance for its personnel to assist them in determining which crashes require additional investigation and/or CRs. They refer to these crashes as “significant crashes”. FMCSA defines a significant crash as a crash involving a commercial motor vehicle with three or more fatalities, an unusually high number of injuries, or a combination thereof, and/or crashes involving a commercial vehicle that are likely to result in heightened interest and of which detailed knowledge would be beneficial. Any incident where the NTSB sends investigators, any

¹⁴ Motor Carrier Attachment – Ohio Crash report dated May 10, 2021

incident involving a Mexican commercial vehicle, or any incident including extensive National media coverage.¹⁵

2.6. Controlled Substance and Alcohol Testing

Under 49 CFR 382.301, motor carriers are required to administer pre-employment-controlled substance testing and not employ a driver in a safety-sensitive function (driving) until a negative test result is obtained. Also 49 CFR 382.305 requires motor carriers to randomly test all subject drivers to random alcohol and controlled substance testing. There were no issues discovered with K Express's program or testing.

In the comprehensive post-crash review completed in July 2020, FMCSA investigators also did not discover any violations with the randomness and scheduling of the controlled substance testing within K Express's program.

FMCSA did note a violation of 382.701(a) for failing to complete a pre-employment query for a driver other than the crash driver.

2.7. Hours of Service

As of December 18, 2017, 49 CFR 395 required carriers to install and maintain an Electronic Logging Device (ELD) to track the driver's hours of service.¹⁶ An ELD is a device or technology that automatically records a driver's driving time and facilitates the accurate recording of the driver's hours of service.

There are certain parameters that would allow carriers to be exempt from the ELD requirements. These parameters include operating a commercial vehicle in a manner requiring completion of a record of duty status on not more than 8 days within any 30-day period; in a driveaway-towaway operation in which the vehicle being driven is part of the shipment being delivered; in a driveaway-towaway operation in which the vehicle being transported is a motor home or a recreation vehicle trailer; or in a commercial vehicle manufactured before model year 2000. Since the operations of the truck-tractor combination with a semitrailer operated by K Express did not meet any of these exemption conditions, therefore, an ELD was required.

K Express had utilized an ELD to account for the driver's hours of service. The device used was "M2M in motion".¹⁷ The device was self-certified and on the approved list of ELDs maintained by FMCSA. This device was a cellular-based device that was connected to the engine of the truck-tractor.

3. Crash Driver

The driver for K Express in this crash was a 55-year-old male. The driver had been employed by the carrier since October 24, 2019.

3.1. Driver's Qualification

¹⁵ <https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/2021-09/Consolidated-eFOTM-Manuals%207.0.3.pdf>

¹⁶ <https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&ty=HTML&h=L&mc=true&=PART&n=pt49.5.395>

¹⁷ <https://www.m2minmotion.com/>

The driver’s qualification (DQ) file followed 49 CFR 391.51 and contained a copy of the driver’s motor vehicle record, and most of the other required documentation. FMCSA noted that the crash driver did not provide a list of employers for the previous 3 years as required on his application for employment.

According to the DQ file the driver had a medical certificate on file which showed an issue date of March 7, 2020 and was valid for one year with an expiration date of March 7, 2021. The DOT physical was performed by a medical professional that was listed on FMCSA’s national registry. For further information regarding the driver’s medical qualification refer to the *Medical Officer’s factual report*.

3.2. Driver’s License and History

At the time of the crash the driver held a valid Illinois Class A-M Commercial Driver’s License (CDL), with endorsements to tow double/triple trailers and operate motorcycles, tank, and hazardous materials vehicles. The driver had a CDL in Illinois since February of 1992. The driver’s latest Illinois CDL was issued October 2019 and had an expiration date of November 2023. The driver’s CDL was restricted, requiring him to wear corrective lenses.

For additional driver’s history refer to the *Human Performance Group Chairman’s Factual Report*.

3.3. Driver’s Employment History

According to the driver’s applications and the background checks maintained in the DQ files of K Express and the driver’s previous employer, the driver held at least eight DOT regulated safety sensitive (driver) positions since obtaining a CDL.¹⁸ The crash driver’s reconstructed employment history is listed below in **Table 3**.

NTSB investigators were able to obtain the driver’s previous DQ files from Altom Transportation Inc. Investigators noted that in the Altom application the driver had listed five carriers where he had previously been employed. In his application to K Express, the driver only listed employment with Lake County Trucking Inc. from April 1999 to October 2019 a period where he had previously listed 3 different employers to Altom. In the driver’s application to Altom, he did not list Lake County Trucking as a place of employment.

Lake County Trucking was a company reportedly owned and operated by the driver. A search of the FMCSA database failed to locate company information or a USDOT number associated with the Lake County Trucking name.

Table 3. Employment History.

Employer	Start Date	End Date	DOT Regulated
Containerport Group	March 2019	October 2019	Yes

¹⁸ Safety Sensitive Position – refer to driving positions which fall under the jurisdiction of the FMCSRs.

Altom Transport Inc	June 2013	March 2019	Yes
CBSL Transportation Services Inc	April 2013	June 2013	Yes
Klemm Tank Lines	April 2009	March 2013	Yes
MAP Transportation	June 1999	November 2008	Yes
Systems Transport	June 1989	June 1999	Yes
Thorn Trucking	June 1984	June 1989	Yes

3.4. Driver's Controlled Substance and Alcohol Testing

According to documents maintained by K Express, the driver had three FMCSA regulated controlled substance and/or alcohol tests on file.

A pre-employment-controlled substance test conducted on October 21, 2019, and the driver was subject to random DOT alcohol and controlled substance tests on March 10, 2020. Both the pre-employment and random tests had negative results.

A post-crash blood sample was obtained and forwarded to the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) Forensic Sciences Laboratory for analysis. For additional information refer to the *Medical Factual Report*.

3.5. Driver's Hours of Service (HOS)

As previously stated, K Express utilized an ELD to track the hours of service. NTSB investigators used the data provided through the ELD and completed an 8-day history of driving and on-duty time.¹⁹ That history is outlined below in **Table 4**. There were no violations of the hours-of-service regulations detected during this period. FMCSA did note that the driver had two violations during this period. He failed to note the correct bill of lading number on his ELD, and he had misused the personal conveyance heading to travel an additional 8 minutes to a place to park. Both these violations were cited in the post-crash CR as a form and manner violation and a nominal false entry.

Table 4. Driver's 8-Day History

Date	Disposition of hours
June 12, 2020	Approx. 3 hours on-duty & driving
June 11, 2020	11 hours 15 minutes on-duty & driving

¹⁹ Human Performance Attachment – ELD information.

June 10, 2020	12 hours on-duty & driving
June 9, 2020	10 hours on-duty & driving
June 8, 2020	13 hours 21 minutes on-duty & driving
June 7, 2020	24 hours off-duty
June 6, 2020	6 hours 19 minutes on-duty & driving
June 5, 2020	12 hours 41 minutes on-duty & driving

3.6. Truck-Tractor and Semitrailer Maintenance

The truck tractor involved in the crash was a 2013 Freightliner (unit # 52) towing a 2017 Utility dry van semitrailer (unit # 53524). Maintenance records for both truck-tractor and semitrailer were maintained by the carrier and met or exceeded the requirements of the FMCSRs. The carrier provided records showing preventative and scheduled maintenance was being conducted. The annual inspection for truck tractor was conducted in August 2019 and the annual inspection for the semitrailer was conducted in December 2019. For further information refer to the *Vehicle Factors Group Chairman's factual report*.

D. DOCKET MATERIAL

The following attachments are included in the docket for this investigation:

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Motor Carrier Attachment – MCS-150

Motor Carrier Attachment – Motivational Driving PowerPoint

Motor Carrier Attachment – Post-Crash Compliance Review

Motor Carrier Attachment – Ohio Crash report dated May 10, 2021

END OF REPORT

Shawn Currie
 Motor Carrier Factors Group Chair