

**Appendix M**

Al White, Olympic – Interview Transcript

Pipeline Rupture and Fire  
Bellingham, Washington  
June 10, 1999  
DCA-99-MP-008

ALFRED H WHITE JR  
807 PENN DRIVE  
FRIENDSWOOD, TEXAS 77546  
281.932.5895 CELL  
281.993.9762 HOME  
409.938.6940 OFFICE

November 20, 2001

Jon R. Zulauf  
Tower Building Suite 1301  
1809 Seventh Avenue  
Seattle, Washington 98101

Re: Case No. 99-2-01467-3; Dalen V. Olympic Pipeline -- "...change to the page..."


Jon;

Please note below the changes that I would like to be added to the deposition that I provided on October 23, 2001 relative to the above-mentioned matter.

- 1) Pg 7; Line 5(a) should be; 807 Penn Drive, Friendswood, Texas 77546
- 2) Pg 12; Line 11; change "coordinating" to "coordinator."
- 3) Pg 13; Line 2; "Len Sager" not "Lynn Sager."
- 4) Pg 18; Line 25; change "core team coordinator" to core team leader."
- 5) Pg 19; Line 13; change "Hart" to "Clark" College.
- 6) Pg 41; Line 10 and Line 17; I was officially based and lived in the Portland/Vancouver areas until approximately May of 1997. I commuted from Des Moines, Washington to Portland everyday until approximately May of 1998 when at that time I was appointed Best Practices & Reliability Coordinator in May of 1998 based out of Renton, Washington.
- 7) Pg 77; Line 1; should have said, "Incidents" rather than "near misses."
- 8) Pg 80; Line 4; "nine/eight" should be "nine/eighty."
- 9) Pg 94; Line 7; "Fernhill" should be "Ferndale."
- 10) Pg 110; Line 18; "Wanbrant" should be "Ron Brentson."
- 11) Pg 120; Line 5; "Deanne Owing" should be "Deanna Oein."
- 12) Pg 122; Line 4; should be, "...or engineering..."
- 13) Pg 152; Line 22; I believe Chris Herrera mentioned in passing during his 18:00-06:00 shift starting on 6-10-99 that based on the data that he electronically reviewed, the subject line in question had been re-started.
- 14) Pg 161; Line 12; Add George Guzman.
- 15) Pg 162; Line 19; "Len" instead of "Lynn."
- 16) Pg 169; Line 14; "Len" instead of "Lynn."
- 17) Pg 169; Line 15; "Len" instead of "Lynn."

- 18) Pg 169; Line 21; "Len" instead of "Lynn."
- 19) Pg 170; Line 2; "Len" instead of "Lynn."
- 20) Pg 170; Line 8: "Len" instead of "Lynn."
- 21) Pg 170; Line 12; "...explain to the Olympic employees..." instead of "Board."

Respectfully Submitted,



Alfred H White Jr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

\*\*\*\*\*  
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF \*  
THE OLYMPIC PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE \*  
IN BELLINGHAM, WASHINGTON JUNE 10, 1999 \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

ORIGINAL

Tukwila, Washington

Tuesday, October 3, 2000  
8:00 a.m.

Board of Inquiry

HONORABLE ALLEN BESHORE, Chairman  
National Transportation Safety Board

CLIFF ZIMMERMAN  
Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

JERRY SCHAU  
BP Pipelines

PATTI IMHOF  
Vice President  
IMCO General Construction

PETER KATCHMAR  
U.S. Department of Transportation

LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS  
U.S. Department of Ecology

ANTHONY BARBER  
Environmental Engineer  
Environmental Protection Agency

JAMES CASH  
Chief Technical Advisor  
National Transportation Safety Board

EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTERS, INC.  
(301) 565-0064

Board of Inquiry

ERIC SAGER  
National Transportation Safety Board

JOHN PARRISH  
Daniel Corporation

GEOFFREY SMITH  
City of Bellingham

## I N D E X

| <u>INTERVIEW OF:</u> | <u>PAGE:</u> |
|----------------------|--------------|
| Alfred White         | 4            |
| Sandra Marie Conlan  | 90           |
| Robert Daniel Yount  | 160          |
| Ronald David Burt    | 223          |

| <u>EXHIBITS</u> | <u>IDENTIFIED</u> | <u>IN EVIDENCE</u> |
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| <u>White</u>    |                   |                    |
| Exhibit 1       | 6                 | 6                  |
| Exhibit 2       | 17                | 17                 |
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| Exhibit 4       | 27                | 27                 |
| <u>Conlan</u>   |                   |                    |
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| <u>Burt</u>     |                   |                    |
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## P R O C E E D I N G S

8:20 a.m.

## INTERVIEW OF ALFRED WHITE

CHAIRMAN BESHORE: My name is Allen Beshore.

Mr. White, thank you for coming in this morning.

As I said, my name's Allen Beshore. I'm the lead investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board into this accident, pipeline rupture and fire that occurred in Bellingham last June of 1999.

I'm going to start off the process and kind of ask you a few questions. Then when I either run out of questions or when I need to collect my thoughts, then what I'm going to do is ask -- go around the table and ask each of these folks to kind of follow up with some questions that they may have.

Since they're going to be asking questions, I'd like for them to go around the room and introduce themselves so you know who they are and who they're affiliated.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I'm Cliff Zimmerman. I'm an accident investigator with the NTSB.

MR. SCHAU: I'm Jerry Schau.

MR. PARRISH: My name's Johnny Parrish. I'm with -- formerly Fisher-Rosemont Petroleum.

1 MS. IMHOF: I'm Patti Imhof with Imco General  
2 Construction.

3 MR. KATCHMAR: Peter Katchmar with Office of  
4 Pipeline Safety.

5 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: Linda Pilkey-Jarvis with  
6 the Department of Ecology.

7 MR. BARBER: I'm Tony Barber with the U.S.  
8 EPA.

9 MR. CASH: Jim Cash with the Safety Board.

10 MR. SAGER: Eric Sager, NTSB.

11 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Mr. White, if you could  
12 just state your full name, please?

13 MR. WHITE: Alfred H. White, Jr.

14 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And your -- do you have a  
15 representative with you today for --

16 MR. WHITE: Yes, I do.

17 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- could identify himself?

18 MR. ZULAUF: I'm John Zulauf representing Al  
19 White.

20 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: John, how can you be  
21 reached?

22 MR. ZULAUF: My address is 1809 Seventh  
23 Avenue, Seattle, Washington, Suite 1301, and zip code  
24 is 98101. Phone number is 206-682-1114.

25 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. And I think, Mr.



1 Zulauf, just for the -- for the record here, we want to  
2 introduce a couple of -- of items as exhibits, is that  
3 correct?

4 MR. ZULAUF: That's right. Al White has  
5 agreed to come here to testify pursuant to a compulsion  
6 order that we signed I think the 11th or 12th of  
7 September the year 2000, signed by Jim Hall, who I  
8 gather is the chairman of the National Transportation  
9 Safety Board. And what I'd like to do is make that  
10 compulsion order a -- an exhibit here.

11 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. We'll get a --  
12 we'll get a copy of that made and then mark that as  
13 White #1.

14 MR. ZULAUF: That's fine.

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay?

16 (The document referred to was  
17 marked for identification as  
18 White Exhibit 1 and was  
19 received in evidence.)

20 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: All right. Mr. White, if  
21 you could just start out with your education  
22 background? Tell us a little bit about that.

23 MR. WHITE: Well, I attended public schools  
24 in the Seattle -- Seattle area as well as a short stint  
25 at Bellevue Community College after high school. I

1 further went on to attend Portland Community College in  
2 the '90s as well as Clark College in Vancouver,  
3 Washington in the '90s, and Washington State  
4 University, which I attended, and about three credits  
5 shy of securing my B.A. degree in political science  
6 from Johnston State University.

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Did you get Associate's  
8 Degrees of some sort --

9 MR. WHITE: No.

10 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- from those  
11 institutions?

12 MR. WHITE: No.

13 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Just tell us about  
14 your history, if you would, at Olympic Pipeline, when  
15 you were hired and just kind of go from your roles  
16 there and --

17 MR. WHITE: Okay. I started at Olympic  
18 Pipeline in 1978 as a pipeliner, construction pipeliner  
19 working for the supervisor of construction. And did  
20 that for about a year and nine months when an opening  
21 became available in field operations.

22 So I applied and successfully acquired that  
23 position as a field operator based in Renton,  
24 Washington. And about eight or nine months after that  
25 a position opened up in the control center. And I

1 applied and was successful again at acquiring that  
2 position as a operations controller. I was a  
3 controller, oh, from roughly 1980 to 1990.

4 After that I assumed the position of area  
5 supervisor of operations and maintenance with  
6 responsibilities from Olympia, Washington to Portland,  
7 Oregon. That stint I had from 1990 to 1998.

8 In 1998 I became best practices and  
9 reliability coordinator. And I held that position till  
10 roughly I'd say August 16th or August 15th of this  
11 year, which I became management of change coordinator  
12 for B.P. Pipelines.

13 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Sorry. Would you repeat  
14 your last --

15 MR. WHITE: Management of change.

16 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Management of change?

17 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

18 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Let's go back to your --  
19 to your role then in 1998 as best practices and  
20 reliability coordinator. Can you tell us what that  
21 position involves?

22 MR. WHITE: Well, the -- in 1998 Aqualon  
23 Pipeline, the operator at the time of Olympic, they  
24 came together as -- as an entity in their downstreams,  
25 units of Shell and Texaco, and which formed Aqualon

1 Enterprises. And the pipeline president at the time  
2 decided to appoint best practice coordinators in all  
3 the districts nationwide in an effort to, oh, capture  
4 synergies and -- and ideas that's out there amongst the  
5 work force with -- with hopefully the ending result  
6 of -- of enhancing the bottom line.

7 And so my role as a best practice coordinator  
8 was to solicit ideas up and down the pipeline and have  
9 a process which was adopted within Aqualon Pipeline  
10 across all the districts to -- to find ideas and to  
11 seek approval from upper level management and with  
12 hopes of some cost savings and -- and profit increases.

13 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Would that also include  
14 ideas in terms of -- of safety issues or advancements?

15 MR. WHITE: Yes. There was some ideas that  
16 came forth from the other practitioners across the  
17 Aqualon Pipeline that were -- that included some safety  
18 components, yes.

19 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: From other division  
20 offices --

21 MR. WHITE: Yes.

22 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- in your same --

23 MR. WHITE: Within --

24 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- similar role?

25 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

1                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  What -- what might some of  
2 those be, for an example?

3                   MR. WHITE:  Gosh, I really can't think of any  
4 right offhand, but one of --

5                   (Pause)

6                   MR. WHITE:  I really can't think of any right  
7 offhand.  I would have to go and -- back and look at  
8 some of the ideas that were generated from some of my  
9 colleagues in the Mississippi Valley area.

10                  CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  Okay.  Let's -- let's talk  
11 about ideas that were generated from within Olympic.  
12 Can -- just to help me understand a little bit here,  
13 Olympic, was it its own entity until Aqualon became  
14 involved in 1998 or was Olympic operated by Texaco or  
15 Shell or somebody --

16                  MR. WHITE:  In 19 --

17                  CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  -- kind of explain that,  
18 if you would?

19                  MR. WHITE:  Okay.  In 1998 or prior to  
20 Aqualon coming to play, Olympic was operated by Texaco  
21 Trading and Transportation.  And then once Aqualon came  
22 to be, Aqualon became the operator as Aqualon is the  
23 downstream sectors of Shell Pipeline and Texaco  
24 Pipeline, Texas -- Texaco Trading and Transportation.

25                  CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  Okay.  So were you at that

1 time a Texaco employee?

2 MR. WHITE: No, sir. I've been an Olympic  
3 employee -- had been an Olympic employee from 1978 to  
4 August of -- 15th of this year.

5 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Now, you reported -- well,  
6 I want to talk first about as of the time of the  
7 accident in June of 1998. At that point in time you  
8 were reporting to --

9 (Pause)

10 MR. WHITE: As of June 10th of last year I  
11 was -- of 1999 I was reporting to Doug Beu.

12 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay.

13 MR. WHITE: Because I believe in May of last  
14 year a previous supervisor, Frank Hopf, elected to go  
15 on a special assignment to work on strategic and  
16 technical goals as it applies to the business  
17 development and Cross-Cascades issues, and he just --  
18 from what I understand, it was very difficult for him  
19 to -- to focus on cross -- Cross-Cascades and the day-  
20 to-day operations of Olympic. So he delegated much of  
21 his duties and -- and authority to Doug Beu back in May  
22 of 1999. So I reported as of that time to Doug Beu.

23 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. That was about a  
24 month, then, before the accident?

25 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

1           CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Prior to that were you  
2 reporting -- I mean is that -- was that a formal --  
3 prior to that were you for all practical purposes  
4 reporting to Doug or was Frank still involved?

5           MR. WHITE: Prior to May of last year I was  
6 reporting to Frank.

7           CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Was -- was it  
8 difficult to get access to -- to Mr. Hopf because of  
9 the amount of time he was spending on Cross-Cascades?

10          MR. WHITE: I would say yes.

11          CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Has he -- did you -- we'll  
12 cover that here in a little bit. Had you ever been to  
13 the water treatment plant before the accident?

14          MR. WHITE: No, sir.

15          CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Let's go back to,  
16 if we could just kind of jump around here a little bit.  
17 Let's go back to 1996 and '97. Did you -- you were  
18 area supervisor at that point in time, correct?

19          MR. WHITE: That's right.

20          CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And you were on the  
21 southern portion of the system, is that --

22          MR. WHITE: That's right.

23          CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- basically --

24          MR. WHITE: That's right.

25          CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- Olympia down to

1 Portland?

2 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Were you involved in the  
4 internal inspection runs that were done in '96 and '97,  
5 smart --

6 MR. WHITE: No, sir.

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So as area  
8 supervisor that was handled out of the group in, what,  
9 corporate?

10 MR. WHITE: No. It's my understanding that  
11 if there was a internal inspection performed it was  
12 handled out of the construction department and the  
13 engineering department based here locally in our Renton  
14 head office.

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So those folks were  
16 kind of based centrally and not --

17 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

18 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- under your control at  
19 the --

20 MR. WHITE: No.

21 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- area level?

22 MR. WHITE: That's right. That's right.

23 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So what did the  
24 area supervisors -- what did you guys -- what was your  
25 responsibilities? Is there --



1           MR. WHITE: Well, if there -- if there was a  
2 pig run or an inspection tool run in our given area we  
3 would provide support for tracking the tool from the  
4 origination point to the destination point as well as  
5 provide resources when it came down to unloading the --  
6 the scraper trap, the pig out of the scraper receiver,  
7 that type of thing. And that's -- that's about as --  
8 to the extent of our responsibilities as an area  
9 supervisor, just to -- just to provide resources to  
10 help track the pig throughout the pipeline corridor.

11           CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So just to be  
12 clear, you weren't involved in any of the -- if -- if  
13 pig runs were done while you were supervisor in your --  
14 your area you weren't involved in any way in the  
15 evaluation of that data?

16           MR. WHITE: No, sir.

17           CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Determining what was going  
18 to go --

19           MR. WHITE: No, sir.

20           CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Let me ask you in  
21 the same period too, '96 and '97, if -- if somebody was  
22 going to be excavating in the pipeline had -- would  
23 that be something that they would -- would coordinate  
24 through the area supervisor? Was there a, you know, an  
25 outage schedule? Was there notice given?

1 MR. WHITE: If a third party contractor was  
2 --

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: No, I'm sorry. If you  
4 guys were going to -- if somebody in your construction  
5 group was going to come in and dig up the pipeline to  
6 repair it, is there internally within Olympic -- how  
7 would you as area supervisor be notified?

8 MR. WHITE: The construction department, at  
9 least in -- in -- in my area, they would at least give  
10 me a heads-up, the construction supervisor. Al, you  
11 know, we're coming down to your area. We've got some  
12 digs, a wash-out, say, at milepost 230 or whatever.  
13 And they would at least give me a courtesy call --  
14 contractors there, and -- but as far as my operators or  
15 the mechanical technicians or electrical technicians,  
16 there would really be no direct involvement by them,  
17 with the possible exception of locate. If one call was  
18 transmitted out from our one-call department and then I  
19 would get -- or the -- the various facilities up and  
20 down the pipeline would -- or the affected rather, the  
21 affected facility personnel would be notified of that  
22 one-call. And oftentimes on the transcript it would  
23 say, okay, this is an Olympic job. But that's just  
24 purely for notification purposes only.

25 But that's about as limited as -- as it -- my

1 role at that time and as well as the folks that  
2 reported to me back in '96 and '97 relative to a  
3 construction project. They would just contact me just  
4 on a courtesy call.

5 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: If they were going to shut  
6 the pipeline in, would that be something your people  
7 did? You're going out nicely and the pipeline's being  
8 cut out --

9 MR. WHITE: Oh, most definitely. We would be  
10 involved in it. We would get --

11 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: You had -- you had the  
12 operations --

13 MR. WHITE: That's right. That's right.  
14 If -- if we were going to shut it down for some  
15 repairs, yes, I would be involved for isolation  
16 purposes and scheduling of resources like that --

17 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. You were -- you  
18 were a controller then from -- for a couple of years --  
19 for nine months, I believe you said.

20 MR. WHITE: Excuse me?

21 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: You were a pipe --  
22 operations -- oh, I'm sorry. Never mind. You were an  
23 operations controller from approximately '90 --

24 MR. WHITE: 1980 to 1990.

25 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: 1980 to 1990?

1 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

2 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Now, in terms of operating  
3 in the control room, do -- when you were on operation  
4 did you ever have a -- a blocked valve close on you in  
5 terms of on the pipeline, that you can recall?

6 MR. WHITE: Without -- uncommanded?

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Correct.

8 MR. WHITE: Not that I can -- not that I  
9 can --

10 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: I want to talk a little  
11 bit, Al, about some e-mails that were sent that I'm  
12 sure you're probably aware of. Bear with me a minute  
13 here and let me find some of these. There was a  
14 proposal by you -- this was after Bayview Station was  
15 constructed. And there was a proposal by you to have a  
16 -- a meeting to discuss some operational issues. I  
17 just want to ask you a few questions about that.

18 MR. WHITE: Okay.

19 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: We'll mark this into  
20 exhibit as White Item 2.

21 (The document referred to was  
22 marked for identification as  
23 White Exhibit 2 and was  
24 received in evidence.)

25 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And do you recall that e-

1 mail, Al?

2 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And basically, it says  
4 that you -- well, let me -- let me ask you, basically,  
5 to describe what it -- what it proposes.

6 (Pause)

7 MR. WHITE: Oh, I'm sorry. What was -- I'm  
8 sorry.

9 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: I was just going to ask  
10 you to go ahead and describe basically what your  
11 proposal is is that's -- that's outlined in that -- in  
12 that e-mail.

13 MR. WHITE: Well, basically, this was a  
14 follow-up to a previous e-mail submitted by John Smith,  
15 one of our controllers, who included me in the  
16 distribution. He apparently had some issues regarding  
17 Bayview, its operation, to account for product and  
18 other accounting and -- and administrative task. And  
19 so he sent an e-mail out to a number of folks, which  
20 included myself. And I took it upon myself, there  
21 again as a best practice coordinator, to kick this e-  
22 mail out to some folks and -- with hopes that we can  
23 come together as a group to talk about Bayview, talk  
24 about its -- the scope of Bayview, the original intent  
25 of Bayview, and I'm just hoping that we could come

1 together as a group and -- and -- and visit.

2 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Had anybody else expressed  
3 concerns to you besides this e-mail from John Smith?

4 MR. WHITE: Yes. In my role as best practice  
5 coordinator from 1998 to, well, the incident, in my  
6 visits into the control center and walking, you know,  
7 in -- into Renton, since my office was in Renton at  
8 that time, folks would oftentimes ask me questions  
9 relative to Bayview and -- and complain about why do we  
10 have it, what is its purpose, this and that and the  
11 other. And I would tell 'em, you know, I'm not a  
12 troubleshooter, I really don't know that much about the  
13 facility, you probably should talk to your supervisor  
14 or talk to Frank and -- and -- and engineering.

15 So they would beat up on me hard, almost --  
16 well, in -- especially prior to us bringing Bayview on  
17 line. It was a daily -- daily event. And I guess once  
18 John Smith sent out the e-mail and included me in the  
19 distribution list, I took it upon myself to at least  
20 try to put this to bed with -- that was my intent, was  
21 talk about the issues.

22 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Let me give you a  
23 second item here that we'll -- is that the e-mail that  
24 you're referring to from John?

25 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

1                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE: We'll label that as White  
2 #3.

3                                   (The document referred to was  
4 marked for identification as  
5 White Exhibit 3 and was  
6 received in evidence.)

7                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And actually, can I -- can  
8 I have one of those back, please?

9                                   (Pause)

10                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Let's go back through --  
11 okay. Prior to the commissioning of Bayview, did you  
12 have a lot of discussions with people on the design  
13 issues? I'm assuming that was what people was bringing  
14 up --

15                   MR. WHITE: Not so much the -- not so much  
16 design issues. There again, these were just water  
17 cooler-type of discussions or having a cigarette out at  
18 the gazebo. It -- yes, design relative to -- not so  
19 much design but operational issues. How do we cut  
20 benches? How do we float into and -- float into tanks  
21 and tight-lining? Folks were asking, well, what is the  
22 -- what's the definition of a tight-line? This was  
23 just something very, very new to traditional pipeliners  
24 up here in the northwest. We were accustomed to  
25 pumping into customers' storage tanks and then be done

1 with it. And Bayview was a strange beast for many of  
2 the folks that -- in my opinion, especially the  
3 controllers who had to -- responsible for operating  
4 it -- efficiently, so.

5 But as design issues or design questions  
6 really didn't come to my attention until after, I  
7 believe, February or March of 1999 when we tied in  
8 the -- the last segment into Bayview Terminal. Prior  
9 to November or so of 1998 it was scheduling issues.  
10 How are we going to schedule product in and out of  
11 Bayview? How are we going to do batch changes in and  
12 out of Bayview? And those type of things. And  
13 frankly, I just referred that -- I listened to 'em, but  
14 frankly, I says, surely you got somebody working on  
15 these issues, or take it to your supervisor. I'm still  
16 trying to learn my job, trying to figure out what  
17 that's all about as best practice coordinator.

18 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. And then the -- I  
19 guess just -- the nature of the issues changed, then,  
20 as the station was commissioned? Is that --

21 MR. WHITE: Yes. The issues -- issues  
22 changed as -- as they came to me after the  
23 commissioning of Bayview, after we actually started  
24 putting product in the line and product into the  
25 tankage at Bayview and popping out of it as well.



1                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Let's -- let's explore  
2 some of those issues a little -- little more. I mean  
3 can you give me some examples what stands -- what types  
4 of issues specific were brought up?

5                   MR. WHITE: Post -- after -- after  
6 commissioning --

7                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- associated with the  
8 commissioning and operational issues thereafter.

9                   MR. WHITE: After commissioning from time to  
10 time they would tell me about surge relief indications,  
11 that type of thing. That type of thing, you know. Al,  
12 you know, it seems like every -- everything we do, you  
13 know, 'cause there's Allen Station, which is about two  
14 miles downstream of Bayview, and I -- I'd hear comments  
15 such as "it seems like every time we try to start or  
16 shut down a pump then we get a surge indication at  
17 Bayview." And you know, it was just -- just a general  
18 concern and/or complaint issue out at the, you know,  
19 control center.

20                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So these were --  
21 what -- what controllers do you recall specifically?  
22 All of 'em?

23                   MR. WHITE: Oh, I would say pretty much all  
24 of 'em. You'd have the -- the Dave Smiths, Mike  
25 Ransom, Mike Howser, Ron Burt. I mean it was pretty

1 much unanimous, you know, and the product scheduler.

2 Tom Davidson. He makes frequent visits into  
3 the control center, and him and I'd go outside and  
4 smoke and he would oftentimes tell me of the, you know,  
5 the nightmarish conditions up there and -- and very  
6 little, if -- if at all, direction as far as overall  
7 direction which where are we going to go as far as  
8 processes and procedures. And you know, I -- I felt  
9 like I was out of the loop of it, you know. I'd  
10 oftentimes tell him, like I said earlier, you need to  
11 take it to Frank or engineering or the supervisor of  
12 operations to resolve.

13 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Do you know if they  
14 -- if they did that?

15 MR. WHITE: I have no idea. I have no idea.  
16 I mean oftentimes -- some -- some of the times a guy  
17 says, well, we've -- we've talked to 'em but we get  
18 little or no feedback, or they would just push 'em off,  
19 you know, saying hey, just, you know, leave me alone or  
20 something of that nature. But as far as an actual  
21 written document, I -- I'm not aware.

22 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So just to kind of  
23 maybe generalize that a little bit, your -- there was a  
24 general sense of frustration I gather --

25 MR. WHITE: Yes.

1                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  -- amongst the controllers  
2                   that they were unable to -- to operate after the  
3                   installation of Bayview --

4                   MR. WHITE:  Well, -- well, controllers as  
5                   well as some of the field people.

6                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  Some of the field people  
7                   also?

8                   MR. WHITE:  People -- people up -- up north,  
9                   yes, they -- I -- I'd even heard that some of the field  
10                  people purposely would drive by Bayview prior to  
11                  commissioning and after it was commissioned because  
12                  they didn't want nothing to do with it.  We already --  
13                  we added -- hired a young lady to be the Bayview  
14                  Terminal operator, and that was her job to master that  
15                  facility.  But --

16                  CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  Who was that?

17                  MR. WHITE:  That was Deanna Oien.

18                  CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  Okay.

19                  MR. WHITE:  And the other guys, they -- at  
20                  that -- at that particular juncture, they tried to  
21                  steer clear of it because, in my opinion, they were  
22                  scared of it.  And so --

23                  CHAIRMAN BESHORE:  Okay.  So when you say  
24                  "drive by," they -- they avoided the facility --

25                  MR. WHITE:  They avoided it, right.  They'd

1 go from Allen -- they'd go to Allen Station and -- and  
2 Anacortes but bypass Bayview and vice versa.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Did -- in any of these  
4 conversations that you say they mentioned surge  
5 release, did they mention, you know, block valve  
6 closures? Did they --

7 (Pause)

8 MR. WHITE: Vaguely. I remember maybe once  
9 or twice one of the controllers may have told me -- I  
10 think it was Dave Clemens -- where something happened  
11 either downstream of Bayview -- I think we had some  
12 product contamination issues at Bayview, and before he  
13 knew anything the Ferndale inlet valve came closed on  
14 him. Something of that nature. I -- I believe I even  
15 commissioned or tried to coordinate a near-miss review  
16 around that incident.

17 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Oh, okay. So there was --  
18 would that -- would there have been some documentation  
19 of such --

20 MR. WHITE: I -- I believe so. I have to go  
21 back and look at my files, but that -- and matter of  
22 fact, I believe that was prior to -- yeah, that was  
23 prior to June 10th 'cause we had a slew of product  
24 degradation issues because of -- of a lot of uneasiness  
25 associated with the operation of -- of Bayview prior to

1 June 10th of last year.

2 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So this was in --  
3 this was in advance, then, of your memo here asking for  
4 -- for a meeting -- or your e-mail here? These  
5 discussions --

6 MR. WHITE: Yes, I believe so.

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- we're all talking  
8 about?

9 MR. WHITE: Yes, I believe so.

10 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: All right. So then, did  
11 -- did a meeting ever occur to discuss these issues and  
12 resolve anything?

13 MR. WHITE: Unfortunately, no. What happened  
14 was I kicked out the e-mail. I received some favorable  
15 responses from some of the participants or the folks  
16 that were on the distribution list. Even talked to my  
17 then-supervisor Doug Beu, who told me that --  
18 basically, he told me, I don't want it to be a free-  
19 for-all; if -- I want the folks to send me an e-mail of  
20 what they would like to talk about prior to this  
21 meeting ever happen or else we're not going to --  
22 basically, we're not going to have a meeting.

23 And you know, I took issue with that, but  
24 then I think it was a few days later we all received a  
25 reply back from Frank Hopf. And it was unanimous

1 amongst the troops that it was -- who received that  
2 e-mail response, they were taken back by Frank's  
3 comment. I guess I still could have went on and -- and  
4 coordinated the meeting, but I -- I -- I never did.  
5 Frank and I had a hot-cold type of relationship for a  
6 few years so I felt pretty -- I felt pretty hurt by his  
7 response. I thought I was trying to initiate a good  
8 thing in asking for a little get-together.

9 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. And you mentioned  
10 this -- this response. Let me just add another one of  
11 these exhibits here, if I could, and you could take a  
12 look at that. Is that the response you got then back  
13 from Mr. Hopf?

14 MR. ZULAUF: This is #4, then?

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Yes, that would be #4.

16 (The document referred to was  
17 marked for identification as  
18 White Exhibit 4 and was  
19 received in evidence.)

20 MR. WHITE: Yes. And -- and quite frankly,  
21 we were all pretty surprised because, again, he was on  
22 a special projects, if you -- working on, Cross-  
23 Cascades as well as other strategic endeavors on behalf  
24 of Olympic. So he would -- would -- you know, he was  
25 in and out of the office -- more out of the office than

1 in, so we were very surprised to -- to see that comment  
2 from him and -- and particularly in that context.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So you viewed that  
4 as -- as being critical of your efforts to --

5 MR. WHITE: Oh, yeah.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- to -- to what? To hold  
7 a meeting or critical of your efforts to -- in trying  
8 to troubleshoot Bayview?

9 MR. WHITE: Well, both. Both because -- and  
10 I talked to the likes of -- Wanbrants and David Justice  
11 and Richard Claussen in the warehouse relative to  
12 Frank's response, and it just blew me away personally  
13 as well as the others that -- that I visited with that  
14 he really didn't understand or comprehend or did not  
15 want to understand and comprehend the issues that many  
16 folks had surrounding Bayview. And they were -- we  
17 were looking for leadership and guidance from someone  
18 relative to production of manuals and -- and training  
19 and not only out in the field but in the control  
20 center.

21 You know, as John Smith indicated in his e-  
22 mail, him and Mike would do things one way on their  
23 shift and then Louie on the next shift would do  
24 something entirely different. There was just no  
25 consistency, no uniformity as far as how to account for

1 barrels, how to -- just no process. And whose  
2 responsibility should it have been to develop that  
3 process? I really don't know.

4 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So if you could,  
5 just kind of outline what Frank's or read Frank's --

6 MR. WHITE: Okay.

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- response.

8 MR. WHITE: Frank's response was, "I must say  
9 that I am increasingly concerned over our seeming  
10 inability to take charge of Bayview and make it work  
11 for us. If we can't operate Bayview after five months  
12 then we have no hope of being able to operate Cross-  
13 Cascades. Bayview is now an essential part of Olympic  
14 Pipeline and an essential part of each of our jobs."

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So this e-mail  
16 response was after the -- basically, you were reporting  
17 to Doug Beu because you had --

18 MR. WHITE: Yes.

19 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- you had contacted Doug  
20 about setting up the meeting?

21 MR. WHITE: That's right. That's right.

22 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And I guess --

23 MR. WHITE: And I was trying to make it  
24 happen, too. I was talking to folks. I'm -- I've  
25 talked to folks and says, okay, Doug wants you guys to



1 submit your concerns, your issues before we actually  
2 have this meeting. So I was trying to -- even though I  
3 didn't want that type of format, I just wanted to get  
4 into the meeting and let's just do some brainstorming,  
5 get all the stakeholders involved. But since I was  
6 reporting to him I decided to go, you know, obviously,  
7 conform with his wishes.

8 And by the time I was able to get all the  
9 concerns together because a lot of the guys, especially  
10 in the control center, they'd push me off by saying,  
11 Al, I'm not going to put it on the e-mail. If that's  
12 what Doug wants, then I'm sorry, it's not going to  
13 happen. So I was really struggling. And then Frank's  
14 response came back so it pretty much deflated our egos  
15 and our -- our -- our sense and sensibilities at that  
16 time.

17 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: So you didn't view him as  
18 being protective or receptive to this process?

19 MR. WHITE: Who's that?

20 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Frank. By his response.

21 MR. WHITE: That -- that was -- that was my -  
22 - my -- my impression. Yes, that's -- that's how I  
23 felt.

24 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Or Doug?

25 MR. WHITE: Yeah. In a -- yeah. Because,

1 again, you know, I -- I was willing to facilitate the  
2 meeting and I had a lot of folks interested in coming  
3 together and let's -- let's talk about it. Let's --  
4 whether it's communications, training, product  
5 scheduling issues. It never materialized.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So, my sense from  
7 you is that there was a lot of differing. I mean with  
8 counting issues, with operational issues, there was  
9 training issues, all these things were expressed to  
10 you, procedural issues. And -- and so this meeting  
11 never occurred to bring all that --

12 MR. WHITE: Yes.

13 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- forward to an open  
14 format --

15 MR. WHITE: Yes.

16 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- to discuss?

17 MR. WHITE: That's right. From 1998 -- from  
18 once I -- I transferred back to the Seattle area and --  
19 and obtained the best practice position to tie in of  
20 Bayview and -- and finally to commissioning and up to  
21 the date of my e-mail. That's the reason why I  
22 highlighted just a few of some of the issues that I  
23 wanted to at least talk about in the meeting.

24 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And people were reluctant  
25 to put this into writing?

1           MR. WHITE: Yeah, 'cause they were busy.  
2           They -- they -- they said that we -- we've brought up  
3           some of these issues before to folks, why should I go  
4           through -- jump through yet another hoop by putting out  
5           an e-mail about what I want to talk about? They were  
6           very frustrated, at least the -- folks in the control  
7           center. They said, we don't have time to put out e-  
8           mails. We've got a pipeline to operate.

9           CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Let's -- let's --  
10          okay. The -- let me talk about the process for  
11          reporting these things to -- to management. Is it just  
12          by e-mail? Is there some form that people fill out if  
13          they've got a concern that they submit to management?  
14          I'm not -- I guess what I'm looking at is a process for  
15          reporting -- deficiencies may be not the right word --  
16          problems, concerns. Is there a reporting mechanism  
17          where they --

18          MR. WHITE: Are you specifically talking  
19          about equipment failures? 'Cause we do have a  
20          maintenance report write-up. At least we did at that  
21          time. And like if a pressure switch needs to be  
22          calibrated or something is wrong with one of our valve  
23          operators we have a maintenance write-up report that is  
24          initiated by either the controller or the operations  
25          technicians out in the field and for review by their

1 supervisor as well as corrective actions taken by the  
2 mechanic or electrical tech.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Would that be a  
4 station maintenance --

5 MR. WHITE: Yes.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- log form?

7 MR. WHITE: Yes. Our -- yes. The  
8 maintenance form. Yes. Maintenance log.

9 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Did you review those as  
10 part of your best practices role or --

11 MR. WHITE: No. No. Oh, I -- as -- as an  
12 area supervisor, yes, I reviewed those, but as a best  
13 practice coordinator no. I mean never -- again, I was  
14 struggling just trying to -- trying to define what my  
15 roles and responsibilities within the district as the  
16 best practice coordinator, so that typically was  
17 handled by the area supervisor as far as reviewing the  
18 maintenance write-ups.

19 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. So that would be  
20 assigned to the area supervisor --

21 MR. WHITE: That's right.

22 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- and then he would  
23 assign it to the appropriate personnel?

24 MR. WHITE: That's right. That's right.

25 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Now, you mentioned

1 investigation into near-misses. Is that something that  
2 fell under your role?

3 MR. WHITE: Yeah, by default. I was  
4 appointed by Frank, who at that time back in April of  
5 1999 was my supervisor. Asked me to at least  
6 facilitate and coordinate future near-miss incident  
7 reviews.

8 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: For the record, we have a  
9 new entry into the room. Geoff Smyth from the city of  
10 Bellingham. So we'll just go ahead and go on, Geoff.

11 Was there -- was there a reporting format for  
12 a near -- like a near-miss report form that would be  
13 completed on a near-miss?

14 MR. WHITE: No. Nothing formal at all. I --  
15 matter of fact, you know, Frank submitted an e-mail  
16 back in 1996 highlighting, you know, the purpose of  
17 near-miss reporting and the structure and sent it out  
18 to all the facilities. But oftentimes it was -- it was  
19 administered in a hit-or-miss type of fashion.

20 Some folks -- at least the perception was  
21 some areas would receive reviews and -- while others  
22 did not. So there was a lot of push-back from the  
23 folks out in the field to even report near-misses for  
24 fear of being ridiculed in the -- in the near-miss  
25 review because of their -- Frank's original structure,

1 the supervisor of regulatory affairs as well as -- also  
2 oversaw health safety and environmental would  
3 facilitate the near-miss review.

4 And the likes of Ken -- I believe Ken Carlton  
5 was one of the first individuals to participate in a  
6 near-miss review, and he didn't like the outcome. In  
7 his opinion, it was more of a finger-pointing session.

8 So from 1996 onward the actual process of  
9 reporting and review of -- of near-misses and  
10 incidences such as product degradation was, in my  
11 opinion, helter-skelter. It was very fractured. So in  
12 1999, April of 1999, Frank asked me to take that  
13 responsibility on as far as, you know, getting the  
14 necessary people together to review near-misses and  
15 incidences. That was it.

16 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. And that was in  
17 April of '99?

18 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

19 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Did you -- did you go  
20 through that process? I mean did you have any of those  
21 prior to this accident in June of '99? Do you recall?

22 MR. WHITE: Oh, did I have any near --

23 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Did you go through this  
24 process, I guess?

25 MR. WHITE: Oh, yes. Yes. We -- we had a

1 few -- had a few -- lot -- lot of product degradation  
2 issues. It -- it seemed like it was weekly.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And you think one of those  
4 might have kind of involved a blocked valve closure --

5 MR. WHITE: Yes. You know, and I -- I don't  
6 know for sure, but you know, Dave Clemens definitely  
7 was the controller on duty. Larry Shelton was the  
8 outgoing controller. Something happened relative to  
9 product degradation, and one thing led to another. I  
10 -- I just vaguely remember some mentioning about the --  
11 the Fernhill inlet valve going closed and --

12 (Pause)

13 MR. WHITE: -- and it just -- you know,  
14 many -- many folks felt at the time it was -- it was a  
15 design issue, you know, to protect the fancy 300  
16 piping. It just -- a little different -- different  
17 piece than what many of us are accustomed to in other  
18 segments of the pipeline.

19 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Now, as -- as a former  
20 controller, you would understand what that means. I  
21 mean that would be -- a block valve closed, that's --

22 MR. WHITE: Yeah --

23 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- a cost --

24 MR. WHITE: Exactly. Exactly. I mean, you  
25 know, there's surge relief valves. You know,

1 oftentimes a surge relief valve would be activated, say  
2 down at Portland Delivery, and that's pretty much  
3 normal at high velocity -- velocities going from path  
4 of least resistance to a little bit more resistance.  
5 And -- but a main line block valve closing, especially  
6 uncommanded, that's -- that's heavy duty. I mean the  
7 impact, especially if you've got pumps still running at  
8 the upstream location, it causes for some rapid  
9 decision-making.

10 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. If -- did -- now,  
11 let me just go to a couple of things here. Was there a  
12 -- was there some kind of a review done on this -- this  
13 accident in June that you guys have done that --

14 MR. WHITE: Relative to the June 10th  
15 incident?

16 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Yes, relative to the June  
17 10th incident.

18 MR. WHITE: With so much going on post-  
19 incident, personally I did not know how to ask for a  
20 review without threat of being --

21 (Pause)

22 MR. WHITE: -- just -- just slammed by my  
23 colleagues. I -- I just felt very uncomfortable about  
24 suggesting a near-miss review with everything going on  
25 up in the city of Bellingham where, you know, we had a



1 bunch of folks living and working in the city of  
2 Bellingham. But once I was assigned to Bellingham in  
3 August of last year I did ask one of my colleagues,  
4 okay, don't you think we ought to do some type of a  
5 review? She says that she asked that question to Frank  
6 Hopf and he says we will do one in time.

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And who was she?

8 MR. WHITE: Sandy --

9 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And you had mentioned  
10 previously the environmental safety and compliance  
11 person when you were talking about the near-missing --  
12 miss reporting thing --

13 MR. WHITE: Yes.

14 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- prior to you -- you  
15 said Ken Carlton was the natural --

16 MR. WHITE: He was the first one under  
17 Frank's new near-miss reporting policy back in 1996 or  
18 1997. Ken Carlton was the first employee to go through  
19 that process. He didn't like its outcome. Basically,  
20 he told me it was -- you really didn't have a panel of  
21 his peers. From what I remember, it was a lot of  
22 supervisory exemplars that was in attendance and he  
23 felt very uncomfortable about some of the kinds of  
24 questioning as well as the outcome.

25 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: So he felt that they were

1 somewhat punitive?

2 MR. WHITE: Yes. Yes.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Did you have any -- any  
4 involvement in the design of the Bayview facility?

5 MR. WHITE: No, sir.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And in terms of -- did you  
7 have any responsibility for training? Was there a,  
8 quote, "training coordinator" within the organization?  
9 Was that left to the --

10 MR. WHITE: That's -- historically, it's been  
11 left up to the area supervisor to ensure that his --  
12 his or her direct reports are trained in the various  
13 aspects of facility equipment as well as the various  
14 assets within the -- his territory.

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Or in the headquarters  
16 office, whoever the appropriate supervisor is, I'm  
17 assuming?

18 MR. WHITE: Yes. Yes.

19 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Is that a more formalized  
20 overall --

21 MR. WHITE: Well, no, it's -- it's  
22 typically -- it's -- it hasn't historically been  
23 something centralized. It's been something that is --  
24 the area supervisor up north historically has his --  
25 his way of administering training and development

1 issues just a little bit differently than, say, a --  
2 the south area supervisor.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Did -- now, this -- in  
4 this case around Bayview -- people were stressing --  
5 expressing frustration with training and other things,  
6 was that -- was that a general frustration that might  
7 have applied to all -- I mean let me just rephrase  
8 here. Did -- would you consider Olympic to have an  
9 aggressive training program?

10 MR. WHITE: Overall, no. No.

11 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Would you consider it to  
12 be adequate?

13 MR. WHITE: Adequate, yes. A lot of it was -  
14 - OJT from what I believe to be very experienced people  
15 out in the field as well as those in the control  
16 center. I trained a number of folks in the control  
17 center. But out in the field it was OJT. The  
18 mechanics and electricians, they had craft -- they had  
19 their own training manual, if you will, administered or  
20 developed by Shell Pipeline years ago. It was  
21 adequate. But relative to our operating personnel --  
22 operations personnel, there was room for improvement.

23 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And what about the O & M  
24 procedures? Did you have any responsibility for  
25 updating those procedures or -- part of your role?

1           MR. WHITE: As -- in the '90s it was asked --  
2 prior to I would say the mid -- '94 or either '95,  
3 those tasks were typically handled by someone within or  
4 a group of folks within Renton, the head office Renton.  
5 The Ron Brentsons, Dewayne Whitlow played an  
6 instrumental role in updating the manuals.

7           In my opinion, it -- it became so  
8 overwhelming for Ron to do by himself because of so  
9 many changes out in the field with the specific  
10 equipment. Olympia Station would have Type X control  
11 valve actuator whereas up in Anacortes Station they  
12 would have Type L. There was -- you know, there was  
13 lack of consistency and uniformity at that time.

14           So management at that time decided, well,  
15 we're going to give more responsibility to the area  
16 supervisor. The area supervisor ought to know what  
17 type of equipment is in his -- his geographical area.  
18 And so I started getting involved in that at that time,  
19 but it was administered in a -- in a very fractured  
20 type of fashion.

21           And -- and -- I worked extensively on -- in  
22 one given period I worked extensively one weekend on  
23 updating the manuals with the help of -- of some of the  
24 operators that worked for me as well as electricians  
25 only to send back what I believed was a -- a pretty

1 good draft copy only, but it was thrown back in my face  
2 by somebody in Renton that they didn't like the  
3 verbiage or whatever. So we went around and round with  
4 the O & M manuals as far as updating it for quite some  
5 time.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Who would that have been?

7 (Pause)

8 MR. WHITE: Ron Brentson didn't like -- yeah,  
9 Ron Brentson. This was way back when, '94, '95.

10 And then, I believe -- we had so much going  
11 on with landslides and the like. I believe in '96 and  
12 '97 Frank appointed a team of folks to basically take  
13 responsibilities for two or three stations and update  
14 the manuals. Brian Connelly, he took responsibility, I  
15 believe, for a couple locations in my area. I don't  
16 remember the other stakeholders. I'm quite sure Ron  
17 Brentson was involved as well.

18 The final product, I don't know what happened  
19 to it. It was --

20 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: When -- when was that,  
21 now?

22 MR. WHITE: I believe '96 or '97. That's  
23 when Frank appointed a team to take responsibility to  
24 update the manuals within a given area. Brian  
25 Connelly, for instance. Just for instance, supposed to

1 take responsibility Castle Rock, Olympia Station, and  
2 maybe Tacoma Station, which is south of here. With the  
3 cooperation of the area operating personnel with hopes  
4 of finally getting a good, accurate finished product  
5 relative to operations and management.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: And you haven't seen that  
7 finished product?

8 MR. WHITE: Well, prior to June -- prior to  
9 June 10th, no, because the folks oftentimes in the  
10 control center and out in the field would say, you  
11 know, this is not right, this is not -- we really  
12 didn't have one person or one group that was delegated  
13 to update the O & M manual on a consistent basis prior  
14 to June 10th.

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Now, let me go back to the  
16 near-miss or -- you said you weren't comfortable  
17 raising the issue of having a meeting on this specific  
18 accident in June of '99. Were you discouraged  
19 specifically by anybody in doing that kind of thing?

20 MR. WHITE: Well, you know, I don't -- I  
21 don't know the exact date, but I did ask for a near-  
22 miss review for an incident. I don't know which  
23 incident, again, 'cause we had so many prior to June  
24 10th. And maybe I'm just thin-skinned, but I asked for  
25 the review because there was a lot of conflicts with

1 schedules, asked for the review to be held on a Friday.  
2 And one of my colleagues kicked me an e-mail back, why  
3 do you want to have the review on a Friday, don't you  
4 know that's a 980 day? A 980 day means there was a lot  
5 of people off on Fridays.

6 So I -- I really don't know if I even had a  
7 review on that particular incident. I believe, again,  
8 it was like a product degradation issue. So obviously,  
9 that was a -- that particular incident was a much  
10 smaller scale relative to the Bellingham incident, so  
11 with Frank up -- up north and -- and Frank being tied  
12 -- tied down by all -- everything that's going on, I  
13 was really struggling about -- as to who I could even  
14 invite to the near-miss review or the incident review  
15 rather because I was thinking about the legal  
16 implications 'cause in the reviews that I've had or  
17 facilitated I typically wanted to have at least the  
18 person that was involved or knew a lot about the  
19 incident to take part in the review as well as some of  
20 the other stakeholders or the -- I -- I try to have a  
21 diverse crowd in that group and not a bunch of  
22 supervisors and management folks -- hourly folks -- a  
23 cross section.

24 So relative to the Bellingham incident, I --  
25 I felt that even if I suggested having an incident

1 review they would have just laughed at me because of  
2 all the legal implications.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Let's talk about Mr. Hopf  
4 for just a second. Can you -- you reported to him for  
5 some time, I'm assuming. Can you characterize just his  
6 style of management?

7 MR. WHITE: Well, it's kind of hard. He's --  
8 at least in my -- again, like I said earlier, him and I  
9 had pretty much a hot and cold relationship for --  
10 since 19 -- 1989. Somewhat distant. And some issues  
11 you would think that it would take a month or two to  
12 make a decision on and he'd take care of it right away.  
13 On other issues of -- of more important content, it'd  
14 take him quite some time to get back to you.

15 In my opinion, he -- he's a futurist, a  
16 visionary, make a good business development manager.  
17 But as far as day-to-day operations relative to the  
18 work force, I -- I've been around better managers,  
19 especially relative to day-to-day operations. And once  
20 Cross-Cascades became a pipe dream, many of us saw less  
21 and less of him. And -- but many of the managers that  
22 reported to him felt uncomfortable making any decisions  
23 for fear of having their hands slapped by Frank in the  
24 end. And Doug, he was one of them. Monty -- is  
25 another who I used to work for him.



1                   It's just been -- there was a lot of  
2                   frustrations in his management style -- not him  
3                   personally, just his management style -- by folks that  
4                   have worked for him since 1989.

5                   CHAIRMAN BESHORE: What about -- what about  
6                   Doug? Did you find him to be approachable as a  
7                   manager? Receptive? What was his style?

8                   MR. WHITE: Doug was -- he's -- he's --  
9                   compared to his predecessor, Doug was an office  
10                  manager. Felt more comfortable in the office sending  
11                  out and delegating than out in the field and visiting  
12                  with the hourly work force as well as the first-line  
13                  supervisors. And a lot of the employees had some  
14                  problems with that. At least, they came to me with  
15                  some concerns.

16                  I -- I got along with him well, but he -- you  
17                  know, within a year of -- within a few months, rather,  
18                  of him coming to the northwest he started feeling a  
19                  little uneasy working with Frank because he oftentimes  
20                  would tell me that -- that he'd -- you know, it was  
21                  hard for him to get any kind of direction from Frank as  
22                  far as which way he should roll relative to -- to his  
23                  management style.

24                  CHAIRMAN BESHORE: So Frank had a tendency to  
25                  micro manage? Is that --

1 MR. WHITE: Yes.

2 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- accurate?

3 MR. WHITE: Yes. That -- you know. Where  
4 oftentimes many others wanted him to just let us do our  
5 job. Just let us do it.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: So you feel like other  
7 managers became less capable of making decisions  
8 because of that?

9 MR. WHITE: Yes.

10 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: How is -- well, aside from  
11 -- let me -- let me -- aside from what we've discussed  
12 about in terms of frustration on the part of people  
13 about Bayview and other things, overall morale aside  
14 from that, how was morale within the company?

15 MR. WHITE: Prior to June 10th it was very  
16 bad. Very, very bad.

17 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Was there -- I mean was  
18 there lingering hostilities from the merger? Is this  
19 kind of thing --

20 MR. WHITE: No. Well, lack of information.  
21 Yeah, we -- we were hearing rumors and oftentimes  
22 folks, including myself, would go to Frank. Even the -  
23 - I think a couple days before the incident and  
24 basically, obviously, he probably couldn't say because  
25 of his -- because of his position couldn't say, but a

1 lot of -- a lot of us heard rumors and other ends of  
2 the pipeline with other companies about what's going on  
3 relative to Olympic, this, that, and the other. But  
4 then we would go back and get confirmation or try to  
5 get confirmation from the management, and management  
6 wouldn't say anything, wouldn't confirm or deny, that  
7 type of thing. So there's -- it was a lot of  
8 frustration. A lot of frustration amongst the work  
9 force prior to June 10th.

10 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Let me -- let me go  
11 ahead at this point and see if anybody else has any  
12 questions. I'm going to start -- Cliff, do you have  
13 any questions?

14 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yeah. Morning, Mr. White.

15 MR. WHITE: How you doing?

16 MR. ZIMMERMAN: I'd like to explore this  
17 subject in just a little bit more detail about who was  
18 responsible for the operation of Bayview Station -- at  
19 the time of the accident? You may have some direct  
20 reporting relationships and some input, so let's  
21 start --

22 MR. WHITE: Responsible for the operation of  
23 Bayview? In my opinion, for one it was the area  
24 supervisor. As far as day-to-day operation, we had  
25 Deanna Oien as -- assigned to Bayview as the Bayview

1 products terminal operations technician.

2 MR. ZIMMERMAN: And she reported to?

3 MR. WHITE: To David Justice, who's -- who  
4 was at that time the area -- Frank retitled him to --  
5 from an area supervisor to an area coordinator, north  
6 area coordinator. And he responsibility for the  
7 pipeline and assets from Renton, Washington to Cherry  
8 Point.

9 And for fill-in and relief purposes, there's  
10 Perry Dalaba, who's -- I believe his title at that time  
11 was an Anacortes operator -- operations technician as  
12 well as Holly Williamson. They filled in for Deanna  
13 when she was off or had a conflict of schedules or on  
14 vacation or sickness.

15 MR. ZIMMERMAN: And who did David Justice  
16 report to?

17 MR. WHITE: He reported to Doug Beu, who at  
18 that time -- even though he had taken over for Frank,  
19 but his -- he was supervisor of -- of -- manager of  
20 operations -- operations and maintenance.

21 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Okay. But -- fact talk about  
22 it in regard to when the station went on line, which  
23 was back in 1998, was it December?

24 MR. WHITE: I'm -- I'm thinking December --  
25 November or December when we tied in one of the legs,

1 and then it was three -- about two or three months  
2 later when we tied in the other leg.

3 MR. ZIMMERMAN: At that point Doug was --

4 MR. WHITE: Doug was a manager of operations  
5 and maintenance, and David Justice reported to him.

6 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Now, when things occurred  
7 with -- when operational problems occurred at Bayview  
8 Station and they created problems at the control  
9 center, can you tell me back in November-December  
10 what -- what procedure was there to resolve problems?

11 MR. WHITE: I really don't know because back  
12 in November or December the -- take, for instance, the  
13 control center folks reported to Ron Brentson. Ron  
14 Brentson reported to Frank. I'm only going to assume  
15 that they either wrote an e-mail, typed an e-mail or  
16 verbally expressed their concerns and frustrations to  
17 their supervisor Ron Brentson for resolve. What  
18 happened I -- I really don't know. I really don't.

19 MR. ZIMMERMAN: In your role, perhaps, as  
20 best practice coordinator, did you have some  
21 understanding about how pipeline operation problems  
22 were resolved between departments? That is, if there  
23 was a problem with operating a station by the  
24 controllers and if there is some repair that's going to  
25 be affected by another department how would Ron

1 Brentson go about getting that done?

2 MR. WHITE: I would only assume that if there  
3 was problems that he's aware of that he'd talk to the  
4 area coordinator and at that time the -- and/or the --  
5 the area coordinator, who had responsibility over the  
6 operational folks, and at that time we had a  
7 maintenance supervisor, Jim Carter who had  
8 responsibility over construction, maintenance, and all  
9 that sort of folks. And I'm only assuming Ron would  
10 have solicited some kind of assistance from either one  
11 of those folks to resolve any of the problems  
12 associated with Bayview or any other facility. But  
13 again, this is -- I'm thinking particularly back, you  
14 know, upon commissioning, back in February or March of  
15 1999.

16 MR. ZIMMERMAN: You mentioned that back in  
17 1996 -- pardon -- yeah, 1996 Frank put out a memo on  
18 the structure for incident reviews. Tell us some more  
19 about how his -- the essence of his mission or --

20 MR. WHITE: Well, first, he talked about the  
21 value of capturing -- and reporting -- and from what I  
22 remember, he specifically -- he specifically stated  
23 that if there is a near-miss the near-miss will be  
24 facilitated and coordinated by then it was Bill Molke,  
25 who was the supervisor of regulatory affairs. And Bill

1 Molke -- this was way back in '96 before Bill was  
2 reassigned to Cross-Cascades.

3 And it was Bill Molke's responsibility to, I  
4 believe, to coordinate a team, get a team together to  
5 review all near-misses and incidences. Like I  
6 mentioned earlier, maybe two or three reviews in maybe  
7 a two- or three-year span, and that was a -- part that  
8 may be because Bill was reassigned to Cross-Cascades  
9 and it took management at least a year or two to  
10 replace him. So maybe that's one of the reasons why,  
11 you know, this reporting and reviews kind of went by  
12 the wayside after Bill Molke was reassigned to Cross-  
13 Cascades office --

14 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Do you recall whether a memo  
15 was sent to all line management in order to get this  
16 process off or --

17 MR. WHITE: It was sent to all -- it was sent  
18 -- it was sent to --

19 MR. ZIMMERMAN: And -- and who --

20 MR. WHITE: Go ahead. I'm sorry.

21 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Did this procedure have any  
22 requirements about the time frame to report an  
23 incident?

24 MR. WHITE: I don't remember.

25 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Did it talk about how the

1 incident reporting would be handled by the chain of  
2 command? Chain of supervision?

3 MR. WHITE: There again, I -- I really don't  
4 remember. I do remember Frank stating that the purpose  
5 was not to affix blame but to -- to develop an action  
6 plan for sharing lessons learned, if you will, up and  
7 down the pipeline. And I've mentioned a couple times  
8 earlier that just after the first review Kenny Carlton  
9 felt pretty -- pretty upset about it, and obviously, he  
10 shared his experience with his colleagues up and down  
11 the pipeline.

12 And even -- there was a near-miss review even  
13 in my area, about two of 'em, based on Frank's --  
14 Frank's initial model. And I felt -- I participated  
15 and it didn't turn out too bad.

16 But then there was other instances in other  
17 areas of the pipeline, and particularly up north, but  
18 there was no review so the folks in my area were  
19 saying, Al, what's going on? Some folks get near-miss  
20 reviews and get -- you know, have darts thrown at 'em  
21 but other areas do not. So it was a hit-and-miss. It  
22 was administered very, very haphazard, in my opinion.

23 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Are you familiar with the  
24 abnormal condition reporting procedures and how those  
25 conditions are handled in the control center?



1 MR. WHITE: Yes.

2 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Can you tell everyone  
3 basically what that procedure is?

4 MR. WHITE: Well, back up a little bit. I'm  
5 aware of what's in our procedure manual but as far as  
6 practice prior to June 10th I really don't know. I  
7 really don't know because according to our procedure  
8 manual, abnormal condition's supposed to be  
9 communicated or at least written down somewhere. Prior  
10 to June 10th I really don't know what mechanism that  
11 the controllers used to communicate and/or write down  
12 abnormal condition events. I really don't know what  
13 vehicle they used.

14 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Could you -- have you been  
15 involved in -- in any reviews of abnormal condition  
16 reporting that were considered near-misses?

17 (Pause)

18 MR. WHITE: Yeah, I can think of -- well, a  
19 couple --

20 (Pause)

21 MR. WHITE: Abnormal events -- right offhand  
22 I --

23 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Valve closures and that --

24 MR. WHITE: Yeah, I'm thinking of -- of  
25 controllers swinging to the wrong shipper and the gate

1 valve -- the shipper's valve being closed or the  
2 manifold valve being closed as one, if not two. There  
3 again, this was a controller-initiated action. But as  
4 it applies to maybe a valve going closed, no, I can't  
5 think of an actual near-miss review right off hand that  
6 I have facilitated during this last year or two, year  
7 and a half.

8 MR. ZIMMERMAN: You mentioned that there are  
9 procedures in the operations manual -- abnormal  
10 conditions --

11 MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

12 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Do you feel that they're --  
13 before the -- at the time -- at the time that Bayview  
14 Station was put into service, -- were you involved in  
15 any way as best practices coordinator looking at  
16 those --

17 MR. WHITE: No.

18 (Pause)

19 MR. ZIMMERMAN: You mentioned that there was  
20 some disagreement about what changes were going to be  
21 made to the operations manual, and since there was a  
22 yearly review required how were those -- how were those  
23 proposed changes handled in order to update --

24 MR. WHITE: Quite honestly, as an area  
25 supervisor, I was always under the thinking that that

1 was something pushed out away from Renton, from  
2 somebody in Renton. By whom I don't know. That hey  
3 guys, it's time for you -- e-mail or correspondence  
4 sent -- sent out to the area supervisors to start  
5 reviewing the manuals because it has to be done within  
6 the next 90 days, you know. But the last time I  
7 remember anything even close happening in that  
8 particular fashion was way back in, you know, like '95,  
9 '96 when Frank asked -- to come together to start  
10 reviewing the manual.

11 MR. ZIMMERMAN: And -- and who -- and -- and  
12 was there some person that was designated that you  
13 would send that information to? You know, a person  
14 that gathered it centrally or -- or, you know, they --  
15 they requested changes and wanted them in 90 days. Who  
16 -- who was that person that was looking for that  
17 information?

18 MR. WHITE: It would be Ron Brentson or  
19 either Sandy Conlan who we would oftentimes send stuff  
20 her way because she was our entrant at -- at the time.  
21 And our manuals became available electronically I  
22 believe about three -- three years ago. All the paper  
23 copies were removed from our facilities. So you know,  
24 we access our -- operations and maintenance procedure  
25 manual electronically, and Sandy's responsible for

1 updating the manuals electronically. There again, it  
2 was only the -- she can only input the -- the data  
3 based on what is received to her from the field, you  
4 know.

5 MR. ZIMMERMAN: At -- at Olympic Pipeline,  
6 did the operations manual include not only fuel  
7 practices but did it include the control center  
8 practices --

9 MR. WHITE: Yes.

10 MR. ZIMMERMAN: -- on how to operate the  
11 pipeline?

12 MR. WHITE: Yes.

13 (Pause)

14 MR. ZIMMERMAN: I'm going to pass --

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Jerry?

16 MR. SCHAU: I don't have any --

17 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Patti?

18 MS. IMHOF: Mm-hmm. Do you know who designed  
19 Bayview?

20 MR. WHITE: I don't know for sure, but it's  
21 my understanding it was Jacob's Engineering.

22 MS. IMHOF: An outside --

23 MR. WHITE: Yes.

24 MS. IMHOF: -- engineering firm, then?

25 MR. WHITE: That's right.

1 MS. IMHOF: And you were working for Olympic,  
2 obviously, when -- when we -- Imco General Construction  
3 did the work at the Bellingham Water Treatment plant?

4 MR. WHITE: Yes.

5 MS. IMHOF: Do you remember when that work  
6 was going on?

7 MR. WHITE: I have no idea. I have no idea  
8 at all -- down in Portland dealing with floods and  
9 landslides.

10 MS. IMHOF: -- Olympic -- prior to the June  
11 10th incident, did Olympic have any kind of a crisis  
12 management program in place?

13 MR. WHITE: Could you further define "crisis  
14 management"?

15 MS. IMHOF: Well, crisis management program  
16 would be when a company tells its employees what to do  
17 if there's a crisis, how to define one, what -- what  
18 might be included or considered a crisis and -- and how  
19 -- how to respond in the field. The chain of command,  
20 who to --

21 MR. WHITE: Well, we -- we had an incident  
22 command structure. We -- many of us -- training as it  
23 applies to the incident command structure for major  
24 instances at that time we utilized resources out of  
25 Equiva, which is an arm of Aqualon. Equiva Crisis

1 Management Center out in Houston. But yes, we're  
2 required by law to have a structure and plan in place  
3 relative to -- to managing and cooperating with various  
4 agencies as it applies to incidences of various  
5 proportions. And we -- depending on the magnitude of  
6 the incident, as we found out last year, and then  
7 Equiva Crisis Management team would pull out of Houston  
8 to come give and give us some -- as well as the other  
9 districts.

10 MS. IMHOF: Had you ever experienced a crisis  
11 prior to the June 10th?

12 MR. WHITE: Nothing of this magnitude. I  
13 mean as a controller, you know, I had been on shifts  
14 when pump stations have blown up as well as releases up  
15 at Allen Station. But I haven't -- not directly  
16 involved but on duty as a controller during upset  
17 conditions, yes.

18 MS. IMHOF: And did you feel like there was  
19 adequate knowledge or preparation for how to deal with  
20 crises?

21 MR. WHITE: At the time I -- I mean I feel  
22 comfortable, you know. One of my colleagues in the  
23 field, you know, he could have been severely injured as  
24 he was very -- I mean the percussion from the explosion  
25 knocked him to the ground, and -- but I felt

1 comfortable at the time of -- that I handled the  
2 situation well and started the documentation process  
3 and making phone calls in the, you know -- but as far  
4 as formal training at that time, there again I'm  
5 talking back in the '90s -- '80s rather. It's  
6 primarily on OJT.

7 MS. IMHOF: I'm sorry? OJT?

8 MR. WHITE: On-the-job training.

9 MS. IMHOF: Okay.

10 MR. WHITE: I'm sorry. On-the-job training.

11 You know, there was really -- you know, when I came to  
12 the control center, really no formal training. It was  
13 on-the-job training. I felt like I was trained by some  
14 of the best at that time.

15 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Peter?

16 MR. KATCHMAR: Yes. Morning, Al.

17 MR. WHITE: Good morning, Peter.

18 MR. KATCHMAR: You stated some time back  
19 earlier on that -- that you were doing near-miss  
20 reviews, and you did one on a valve closure of Bayview?  
21 Do you remember --

22 MR. WHITE: Not on a -- not on a valve  
23 closure. It was --

24 MR. KATCHMAR: You said something about  
25 product contamination issues.

1                   MR. WHITE: Product -- there was a product  
2 contamination issue, I believe, at Bayview that --  
3 where -- Larry Shelton and -- had gotten off shift.  
4 Dave Clemens had come on. And during the process of  
5 him shutting down the line I believe -- I have to go  
6 back and look at my notes -- the incoming valve came  
7 closed and it caught Dave Clemens by surprise. Now,  
8 obviously, he can't stop -- stop a valve once it's in  
9 travel, but he -- he rectified the situation. That was  
10 just one of the contributing issues or factors in my  
11 review was the fact that this valve came closed and the  
12 controller really didn't know that he -- 'cause he had  
13 so many alarms going off at one time. He was trying to  
14 rectify the product degradation issue and -- 'cause he  
15 had just come on shift. It was just an ugly situation  
16 between 6:30 and 7:00 in the morning.

17                   MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. In -- in doing that  
18 review, though, did anybody question why the valve went  
19 closed?

20                   MR. WHITE: No, we didn't question it because  
21 we -- we were told that's the way it was designed.

22                   MR. KATCHMAR: Good. The -- the valve is  
23 designed to close when the pressure inside the station  
24 reaches 700 pounds.

25                   MR. WHITE: I don't know the exact --



1           MR. KATCHMAR: So the "uncommanded" is not  
2 really the correct term. "Unintended" is maybe not the  
3 correct term because the PLC at Bayview was designed  
4 such that that valve was going to close when the  
5 pressure inside got 700 pounds.

6           MR. WHITE: I believe that's correct.

7           MR. KATCHMAR: Are you aware of any other  
8 safety factors, safety devices in Bayview that would  
9 keep the pressure from achieving 700 pounds in the  
10 station?

11          MR. WHITE: No. My --

12          MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. I -- I'm just asking,  
13 if you would.

14          MR. WHITE: -- I don't know -- I don't know -  
15 -

16          MR. KATCHMAR: Because if -- when you're  
17 doing this near-miss thing, it seems to me there is a  
18 relief valve that's supposed to be set at 650 pounds.  
19 And if that relief valve had have worked correctly the  
20 pressure would never have receive -- got to the 700  
21 pounds and then the valve would never have closed.

22          MR. WHITE: Right. Right.

23          MR. KATCHMAR: And I'm just wondering that,  
24 you know, was this not ever looked at? And I know that  
25 the question's been asked to everybody over and over,

1 were there any unintended valve closures that you know  
2 of, and everybody keeps saying no. And it's really not  
3 --

4 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Let's -- can we ask the  
5 questions and not --

6 MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. Okay.

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- not discuss --

8 MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. Did you -- did you do  
9 anything about that --

10 MR. WHITE: No.

11 MR. KATCHMAR: -- or know about that relief  
12 valve or --

13 MR. WHITE: No.

14 MR. KATCHMAR: Okay.

15 MR. WHITE: No. Prior to June 10th, no.

16 MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. Okay. You also  
17 mentioned that you had discussed doing an incident  
18 review of the June 10th incident with Sandy and that  
19 you think or what -- please go over that one more time.  
20 What -- what did she say or --

21 MR. WHITE: Well, -- and I only asked her  
22 about the incident review after I was reassigned up to  
23 Bellingham. And she had told me at that time that she  
24 suggested it to Frank and Frank told her yes, we will  
25 do one in time. And that was it.

1                   MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. The other thing, back  
2 in the 1980 to 1990, you were a controller?

3                   MR. WHITE: Yes.

4                   MR. KATCHMAR: And at what point -- I -- I  
5 think you also said something about you trained some  
6 other --

7                   MR. WHITE: Yes, I --

8                   MR. KATCHMAR: -- controllers? And who were  
9 they?

10                  MR. WHITE: Deanna Carter for a short stint  
11 before she decided controller was not for her -- to be  
12 a controller was not for her. Mark Krueger, who no  
13 longer works for the company. Mike Ransom and Ron  
14 Bernt.

15                  MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. And in -- in training  
16 these people, do you train them to do just exactly what  
17 they're told to do or do they know what's going on in  
18 the entire system while they're controlling the  
19 pipeline?

20                  MR. WHITE: No, the way I train them  
21 there's -- they know -- they know what's going on  
22 throughout the entire pipeline system.

23                  MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. So anything that's  
24 going on in the control room they would be aware of?

25                  MR. WHITE: That's the way I trained 'em. I

1 don't care if it's segment one, segment three. It was  
2 a little different back then because the way we  
3 operated our pipeline system, it was more of a buddy  
4 system. One day Controller A would take care of the  
5 paperwork, administrative work, as well as, you know,  
6 glance at the screens for surveillance. But the other  
7 guy would primarily operate the pipeline, do valve  
8 switches, start pumps. And then on the next day they  
9 would switch roles. It was more of a team effort back  
10 in the '80s when Mobil Pipeline was operating this  
11 and -- and the way that, you know, I trained 'em.

12 But things changed in the later '80s where  
13 they decided to -- management decided to give each  
14 controller their own pipeline to run. That changed.

15 MR. KATCHMAR: All right. Thanks.

16 MR. WHITE: Mm-hmm.

17 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Geoff?

18 MR. SMYTH: Hi, Allen. I'm Geoff Smyth.

19 Excuse my tardiness this morning.

20 On that -- you said you're the best practice  
21 coordinator. Would that be both positive and negative  
22 issues that would come up in the company operation?  
23 Would they get disseminated both positive-negative or  
24 was it just a positive type of --

25 MR. WHITE: By intent it was supposed to be

1 --

2 MR. SMYTH: Yes.

3 MR. WHITE: -- positive as it was envisioned  
4 by Aqualon Pipeline management to be positive for me to  
5 go to internal as well as external companies to try to  
6 find good, better, and best practices to implement  
7 within the company or within Aqualon Pipeline. But it  
8 turned out that it was a negative because oftentimes my  
9 colleagues saw me as the ultimate troubleshooter, if  
10 you will, especially as it applies to Bayview. They  
11 would come to me with problems and issues, and  
12 oftentimes I would say guys, you know, I'm -- I'm not a  
13 mechanic or, you know, take it to your supervisor.

14 But you know, so I was kind of torn because  
15 they would ask me, well, what does best practices  
16 really do if you don't -- you -- if you don't -- can't  
17 help me deal with Bayview? That -- that's --

18 MR. SMYTH: And so with -- so with that --  
19 with -- if -- if there was something happening in  
20 another station or another pump station that you might  
21 have been able to incorporate into -- into the issue as  
22 Bayview would you have done that? If there --

23 MR. WHITE: I don't quite understand the  
24 question.

25 MR. SMYTH: If -- if the operation of Bayview

1 or -- or something at Bayview which you were getting  
2 questions by other employees on, if you found something  
3 in it -- out, another station was operating or some  
4 other issue that you could relate back to Bayview,  
5 would you have done that?

6 MR. WHITE: Oh, yes. 'Cause oftentimes, you  
7 know, early on the -- I was trying to compare and  
8 contrast the operation of, say, Portland Delivery  
9 facility versus Bayview and some of the discussions,  
10 they've said, well, we have a pressure surgeance  
11 indication at Portland Delivery -- well, the -- inlet  
12 or the incoming valve does not go closed, the surge  
13 relief valve would go off -- to the tank. And in my  
14 trying to understand the design and features of Bayview  
15 I oftentimes asked the question, well, why aren't we  
16 designing -- why wasn't Bayview designed the same way  
17 as Portland Delivery? One -- I understand engineering,  
18 Jacobs, Frank, they wanted to do something else to  
19 protect the --

20 MR. SMYTH: So then -- so then you mentioned  
21 then -- if that's the case then would someone like  
22 David Justice, who's the area coordinator, who was  
23 responsible for Bayview, would he have known that he  
24 could have come to you with his issues with Bayview?

25 MR. WHITE: No. See, that wasn't the -- that

1 wasn't -- as the best practice coordinator, you know,  
2 my role really was not to be a, again, a  
3 troubleshooter. David Justice -- if he had design  
4 problems or if he had concerns relative to a -- a valve  
5 or relief valves or whatever associated with Bayview or  
6 any other facility, he would go to the -- at that time  
7 the construction supervisor. Was Jim -- Jim Cargo, and  
8 he --

9 MR. SMYTH: Mr. Cargo.

10 MR. WHITE: And he -- Jim Cargo was the  
11 supervisor over construction and maintenance to resolve  
12 the matter electronically and mechanically or whatever.  
13 No, I was not in the loop relative to --

14 MR. SMYTH: So then you mentioned you were  
15 unaware that -- that -- that the valve in question here  
16 might have closed and opened in excess of over --  
17 times?

18 MR. WHITE: No, I was -- I was unaware -- the  
19 guys would oftentimes tell me about surge indications  
20 at Bayview. If you shut down a pump at Allen, you  
21 know, even under controlled matters surge -- surge  
22 indication. But as far as valve closures, no.

23 MR. SMYTH: Were you also aware of a  
24 potentially scheduled meeting to discuss the -- the  
25 valve closing issues at Bayview that didn't occur

1 before June 10th but was supposedly going to be  
2 scheduled?

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Let me interject. We went  
4 through some exhibits right before you got here on e-  
5 mails that Al had sent out --

6 MR. SMYTH: Oh.

7 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- so we did talk about --

8 MR. SMYTH: Okay. Okay. I'll catch up --  
9 sorry about that -- then could you name the two  
10 individuals again who might have had access to Bayview  
11 when Deanna was -- was either on vacation or -- or out  
12 or off? There would be -- the two --

13 MR. WHITE: By -- by design, by David's  
14 model, the relief operators will be Perry Dalaba and  
15 Holly Williamson. They were the operators assigned to  
16 Allen Station as well as Anacortes Station.

17 MR. SMYTH: Thanks, Al.

18 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Linda?

19 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: Hi, Mr. White.

20 MR. WHITE: Hello.

21 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: I just have a couple  
22 follow-up questions. You mentioned that after you tied  
23 in the last segment that Bayview design became an issue  
24 in some of the general concern about the station.  
25 What's your understanding of the purpose of the Bayview



1 Station?

2 MR. WHITE: Once to -- well, in discussions  
3 that I had heard it involved -- in the early years of  
4 Bayview -- well, at that time it was Arlington  
5 Terminal. I mean it -- the location had been changed  
6 so many times over the years, but was to give us the  
7 opportunity in a fungible system to operate the  
8 pipeline more ratable. As -- at the time of Bayview's  
9 inception we had an imbalance, if you will, between  
10 Anacortes feeding the Seattle area markets versus  
11 Ferndale refineries feeding the other segments.  
12 Anacortes would be shut down -- the Anacortes to Renton  
13 16-inch line would be shut down roughly about 12 to 18  
14 hours per week.

15 So, in my understanding of the vision of  
16 Bayview was to allow Olympic the opportunity to keep  
17 the 16-inch pipeline flowing 24 hours a day, seven days  
18 a week by utilizing the products that were stored in  
19 Bayview -- Bayview Terminal.

20 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: Okay. So -- so it was  
21 product storage and to -- to be able to keep product  
22 moving --

23 MR. WHITE: That's right.

24 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: -- during the times  
25 that --

1 MR. WHITE: That's right.

2 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: -- 16-inch line -- okay.  
3 Thank you. You -- you -- in your e-mail you -- you  
4 mentioned training at Bayview as an issue. Can -- do  
5 -- what do you recall about the sort of general  
6 training that occurred when the Bayview Station came on  
7 line, whether it be to operators or field folks or  
8 controllers?

9 MR. WHITE: It's my understanding that it was  
10 -- since I spent majority of my time in the Renton  
11 area, it was my understanding -- that's the reason why  
12 I included training on the e-mail was that it was  
13 literally no training. It was just on the job. You  
14 know, you just try it and if it works it works, if it  
15 doesn't it doesn't.

16 Out in the field David Justice, recognizing  
17 he didn't -- he was living in the Puget Sound area,  
18 Seattle area. So I -- he -- it -- he really -- I don't  
19 know -- to tell you the truth, I really don't know how  
20 active he was in the training and the development of  
21 the field people as it applies to Bayview Terminal  
22 since he had responsibilities in this area as well and  
23 lived down here too.

24 But as far as the control center and having a  
25 process relative to the different activities going in

1 -- pumping product in the tank, pumping it out, there  
2 needed to be some -- some kind of a training symposium  
3 or something relative to bringing the folks up to speed  
4 in the control center, that's for sure.

5 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: So you mentioned Dave  
6 Justice and a lack of training with field -- on the  
7 field end of it. Would Ron Brentson have been  
8 responsible for the training of the controllers?

9 MR. WHITE: I -- it's always been my  
10 impression that the training development -- the first-  
11 line supervisor is -- is -- is responsible.

12 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: Okay.

13 MR. WHITE: To ensure that resources,  
14 opportunities are made available.

15 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: Okay. Also in your e-  
16 mail you list operations -- operating procedure just as  
17 a general area of complaint. Do you recall whether  
18 there were complaints from folks about false alarms?  
19 Was that an issue?

20 MR. WHITE: Hmm. No. False alarms. Hmm.  
21 No. Not at all.

22 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: Okay.

23 MR. WHITE: I can't -- it just -- just eludes  
24 me right now.

25 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: I just have one last

1 question about getting back to the near-miss review,  
2 the issue of near-miss reviews and your role in that.  
3 After the June 10 release do you recall the spill at  
4 the Renton facility in August? It was from a pump,  
5 some kind of a pump failure. Did you have a near-miss  
6 review on that?

7 MR. WHITE: Yes, we did.

8 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: A few months after that  
9 there was another spill from the same pump. Did you  
10 have a near-miss review on that?

11 MR. WHITE: Yes, we did.

12 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: Okay. That's all my  
13 questions.

14 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Tony?

15 MR. BARBER: Hi.

16 MR. WHITE: Hi.

17 MR. BARBER: I guess I'd like to get a sense  
18 from you of -- of -- as a former operator and also  
19 having dealt with the other operators more recently  
20 kind of what the -- the knowledge level of the control  
21 room operators are with regard to the computer systems  
22 being used to -- to monitor the pipeline. In other  
23 words, how detailed was their knowledge of how the --  
24 the -- the data was -- was transmitted and the program  
25 was set up in the computer system? Or were they more

1 of a limited knowledge just -- just as to what they  
2 could control there or monitor their screens?

3 MR. WHITE: Well, as a whole all the  
4 controllers in there are very knowledgeable of -- of  
5 the pipeline regardless of which -- which segment.  
6 There's a lot of experience in there not only working  
7 on our system but other systems nationwide. The --  
8 if -- if -- if I was to make a suggestion, I strongly  
9 would encourage additional training as it applies to  
10 PLDS system, but it's gotten a lot better over the last  
11 year or so as far as folks and their -- their ability  
12 to interpret data submitted by the PLDS system. Gotten  
13 a lot better.

14 MR. BARBER: How much -- how much training do  
15 you get on -- as -- as an operator --

16 MR. WHITE: As a field operator or  
17 controller?

18 MR. BARBER: -- as a control operator on leak  
19 detection?

20 MR. WHITE: Again, I really don't know other  
21 than just on-the-job training and -- which -- that's  
22 what I received back -- back in the old days, in  
23 addition to hydraulic training. It's just -- but  
24 recently, as you're probably well aware, controllers  
25 have gone down to Houston to get some simulator

1 training. And a few of them that are in there today  
2 received similar type of training back in 1990, I  
3 believe. They went to Houston to participate in some  
4 simulator training, which I believe there's some -- it  
5 simulates some skills and some release systems.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Jim?

7 MR. CASH: Nothing.

8 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Okay. Eric?

9 MR. SAGER: How old are you, sir?

10 MR. WHITE: Excuse me?

11 MR. SAGER: How old are you?

12 MR. WHITE: 42.

13 MR. SAGER: Prior to coming to Olympic, have  
14 you -- where else had you worked?

15 MR. WHITE: I worked -- did some retail at  
16 Union 76 pumping gas as well as Shuck's Auto Supply  
17 Center, auto parts, and did primarily retail.

18 (Pause)

19 MR. SAGER: When you were -- when you were a  
20 controller, was there a Scata system for you to  
21 operate?

22 MR. WHITE: Yes.

23 MR. SAGER: Is it primarily the same system  
24 that we have today?

25 MR. WHITE: Yes, but upgraded.

1 MR. SAGER: The one that we had on June --

2 MR. WHITE: Yes. But upgraded.

3 MR. SAGER: I'm sorry?

4 MR. WHITE: It -- it's been upgraded since,  
5 yes.

6 MR. SAGER: What were the upgrades?

7 MR. WHITE: Are you talking about prior to  
8 June 10th?

9 MR. SAGER: Prior to June 10th.

10 MR. WHITE: Oh, prior to June 10th, okay.  
11 Then if it's prior to June 10th, that I am aware of,  
12 'cause I had been out of the control center since 1990,  
13 so I'm not aware of any upgrades. I'm quite sure there  
14 had been but I'm not really a techie in that fashion.  
15 I'm not aware.

16 MR. SAGER: When you were discussing the --  
17 the kinds of concerns that were being expressed to you  
18 by many people about Bayview, you turned -- or you --  
19 you said you were trying to put this to bed. That's  
20 one of your --

21 MR. WHITE: Right.

22 MR. SAGER: -- objectives. What did you mean  
23 by that?

24 MR. WHITE: Well, I would at least -- my --  
25 my goal was after holding this meeting we could develop

1 some action items and -- and appoint some champions  
2 to -- to ensure that these action items would be --  
3 would be resolved in a timely fashion and where  
4 everybody is comfortable, whether it's the folks out in  
5 the field, operators, the electricians, product  
6 accounting folks, the controllers obvious. That was --  
7 that was my hope, that after a meeting or two we could  
8 all rest easy at night.

9 MR. SAGER: What action items needed to be  
10 brought up and resolved?

11 MR. WHITE: Well, particularly as it applies  
12 to training. Training on how to operate the facility  
13 either locally or remotely by way of the control  
14 center. You know, again, I had a vision that any of  
15 the outstanding issues that had come to me prior to  
16 that -- that May e-mail that the controllers would feel  
17 a lot better the direction that the company was going  
18 to go relative to the training -- or in the operation  
19 of the Bayview facility.

20 Product accounting, product scheduling. At  
21 that time the -- basically, the product scheduling had  
22 to be handwritten to tell the controllers what to do  
23 and what not to do. Again, my -- my vision at that  
24 time was to get some kind of update 'cause we were  
25 going through a -- a major capital improvement project



1 relative to our product accounting and scheduling  
2 program. But it's been -- we're behind schedule. Been  
3 behind schedule for like the last year and a half. I  
4 at least wanted to -- for the folks in the control  
5 center and all the other stakeholders to find out  
6 what's going on relative to the product accounting and  
7 scheduling new and improved program. Just, you know,  
8 items such as that.

9 MR. SAGER: When you were training other  
10 controllers, were you provided any training for how to  
11 do the training?

12 MR. WHITE: No, sir. I was just identified  
13 as one of the best in there, if not the best, so they  
14 just assumed that I'd be a good trainer, too.

15 MR. SAGER: Over the period of time that you  
16 have been at Olympia -- or Olympic, would you say that  
17 training quality has improved, stayed the same, or  
18 declined?

19 MR. WHITE: Continuous training, prior to  
20 June 10th has declined. Continuous training and an  
21 improvement, in my opinion, has declined.

22 MR. SAGER: Declined in terms of its being  
23 offered or in terms of its quality?

24 MR. WHITE: Both.

25 MR. SAGER: Who would be a good person to

1 talk with at -- at the company to understand the  
2 training problem -- problems there?

3 MR. WHITE: Prior to June 10th or now?

4 MR. SAGER: Prior to June 10th. The problems  
5 that existed prior to June 10th. But who would be  
6 useful today to talk to?

7 MR. WHITE: I'd say Tom Davidson, for one.

8 (Pause)

9 MR. WHITE: And well, he doesn't work for us  
10 anymore. Other than that, I would say Rich Claussen.

11 (Pause)

12 MR. WHITE: And -- and Dave Clemens, who --  
13 who works for Olympic at this time. Dave Clemens.

14 (Pause)

15 MR. SAGER: Several of the controllers and  
16 the field personnel had asked you for help -- training,  
17 as I understand?

18 MR. WHITE: Well, they -- they didn't  
19 necessarily ask me for help. They just -- they -- they  
20 used me as a sounding board and figured that since I  
21 reported to the manager I have influence upon him to  
22 make some things happen since I'm only assuming they  
23 have -- they went the normal route to voice their  
24 opinions and concerns and never received a resolve, so  
25 they came to me.

1 MR. SAGER: Well, that was my next question.  
2 Why do you think they did come to you?

3 MR. WHITE: Because of my --

4 MR. SAGER: -- and concerns?

5 MR. WHITE: Because of my long-term  
6 relationship work -- you know, they -- they -- they  
7 have always felt comfortable talking to me and sharing  
8 issues, concerns, whether good or bad because of my  
9 long-term tenure in the control center and -- and also  
10 as a former trainer in the control center.

11 MR. SAGER: Had you been able to resolve some  
12 of their complaints and to -- to give them some less  
13 concern?

14 MR. WHITE: Well, I feel like I failed  
15 relative to Bayview. But in other issues because of  
16 the reporting structure in -- in our organization prior  
17 to June 10th I -- I -- I don't think I did them much  
18 service at all. I just listened to 'em and expressed  
19 my -- my sympathy for their -- on their behalf because,  
20 you know, quite honestly, over the years I've had a  
21 strained relationship with the -- you know, it's been  
22 hot and cold with -- with Ron Brentson, who was their  
23 supervisor. So I just wanted to stay out of trouble  
24 and wanted to just get along, so I just felt very  
25 uncomfortable going to Ron and saying, hey, these are

1 -- this is the concerns that your people have, you need  
2 to address them because it's -- it's reached past the  
3 boiling point in there. So I just felt very  
4 uncomfortable with it.

5 MR. SAGER: Did you feel uncomfortable enough  
6 that you never went to him with these or you felt  
7 uncomfortable because you did go to him with some of  
8 these concerns?

9 MR. WHITE: No, I felt uncomfortable to --  
10 about going to him about the concerns because, again, I  
11 feel like these guys ought to be comfortable enough to  
12 go to their supervisor, express their concerns, and  
13 then there is another level if they're not fully  
14 satisfied. They can go to Frank, who at that time was  
15 the manager. You know, I felt very uneasy about them  
16 coming to me when I'm not their immediate supervisor.

17 MR. SAGER: So what you're saying is you  
18 technically never did advocate directly with their  
19 supervisors for them?

20 MR. WHITE: That's right.

21 MR. SAGER: All right.

22 MR. WHITE: That's right.

23 MR. SAGER: In our discussion of morale you  
24 characterized it as very, very bad. Why was it very,  
25 very bad?

1           MR. WHITE: Lack of -- from many, lack of  
2 leadership. Empowerment at that time was -- had ran  
3 amok. Management advocated back in the early '90s  
4 empowerment, but a lot of employees, including myself,  
5 really didn't know what empowerment meant. So you had  
6 folks just running around helter-skelter doing their  
7 own thing, little accountability, you know. It just --  
8 pretty bad, yeah.

9           MR. SAGER: How would you describe the  
10 corporate culture at that time? We're talking prior to  
11 June 10th now.

12           MR. WHITE: Prior to June 10th corporate --  
13 in a flux. There -- then the rumors of us being sold  
14 either outright or at least in part sold. Aqualon was  
15 still trying to find their identity, so in my travels  
16 across the country there was frustrations that -- even  
17 within Aqualon because you had the former Shell folks  
18 not really knowing what the former Texaco folks and  
19 they're trying to find their own identity. It was in a  
20 state of flux as far as corporate structure.

21           MR. SAGER: Structure or culture?

22           MR. WHITE: Well, the culture as it applies  
23 to Olympic because we really just didn't know what our  
24 future was going to look like because of the continued  
25 rumors of us being -- potentially being sold.

1           MR. SAGER:  What were the kinds of things  
2           that were valued among the lower-level managers?

3           MR. WHITE:  Amongst the first-line  
4           supervisors, you know, they -- I would say, at least  
5           out in the field, out in the field, very close-knit,  
6           almost like a family.  There again, I'm talking out in  
7           the field.  To the -- that was important to try to keep  
8           the troops motivated to come to work every day.

9           MR. SAGER:  And what was valued here at  
10          this -- the control center?  What kinds of things were  
11          valued?

12          MR. WHITE:  Excuse me?

13          MR. SAGER:  What kinds of -- excuse me.  What  
14          kinds of things -- what kinds of -- of things were  
15          valued?

16          MR. WHITE:  For the most part --

17          MR. SAGER:  Behaviors.  What kind of  
18          behaviors --

19          MR. WHITE:  That were valued?  Man, prior to  
20          June 10th, I can't think of any.  I really can't think  
21          of any, other than a paycheck.  Yeah, I just can't --  
22          can't -- from my observation and my discussions, it was  
23          a very solemn group in there prior to June 10th.

24          MR. SAGER:  How did you learn about incidents  
25          after you were given the responsibility of coordinator?

1           MR. WHITE: By e-mail or someone would call  
2 me and say, Al, this took place yesterday or early this  
3 morning, I think we need to have a review -- a review  
4 on it. And I would follow up by asking the particulars  
5 and then solicit some volunteers to try to find the  
6 root cause of -- of the incident.

7           MR. SAGER: Did you get some of these from  
8 supervisors?

9           MR. WHITE: As -- yes. Supervisors as well  
10 as hourly folks, yes.

11           (Pause)

12           MR. SAGER: When you were a controller did  
13 you have occasions to use the operation -- the  
14 operating and maintenance manual?

15           MR. WHITE: When I was a controller, yes, I  
16 used that often. Often. Regularly.

17           MR. SAGER: Has it gotten longer?

18           MR. WHITE: Excuse me. I'm sorry.

19           MR. SAGER: Has it gotten --

20           MR. WHITE: Did you say "review" the manual  
21 in your original question? What was it? Or "read"?

22           MR. SAGER: Use -- use it.

23           MR. WHITE: Use it, okay. I thought you said  
24 "review." Use the manual? Yes. I used it regularly.

25           MR. SAGER: Has it gotten longer since you

1       came -- does it -- is it longer in -- does it include  
2       more information today than it did when you were using  
3       it?

4               MR. WHITE: I don't believe so. No, if -- if  
5       anything it's -- it is -- it's become more lengthy as  
6       it applies to emergency response but not that much.

7               MR. SAGER: In the manual that was in -- in  
8       service on June 10th, you alluded to that as being on  
9       the computer?

10              MR. WHITE: Mm-hmm.

11              MR. SAGER: It has its own PC?

12              MR. WHITE: Excuse me?

13              MR. SAGER: Does it have its own computer?

14              MR. WHITE: Well, no, it -- our district  
15       locations up and down the pipeline we have our own  
16       intranet in which the operating personnel can just  
17       click -- double-click and view the most recent version  
18       of our -- of procedural manual.

19              MR. SAGER: Can you search it electronically  
20       for key words?

21              MR. WHITE: I don't believe -- no, I don't  
22       believe so. I haven't been shown it. You -- we may be  
23       able to, but Sandy Conlan, she's the -- she's our guru  
24       in that respect.

25              MR. SAGER: Have you had any complaints from



1 controllers about this manual?

2 MR. WHITE: Yes.

3 MR. SAGER: And what were those complaints?

4 MR. WHITE: Prior to June 10th?

5 MR. SAGER: Prior to June 10th.

6 MR. WHITE: That it's -- needs to be updated.

7 And you know, it -- they would come to me, again, as a  
8 sounding board, and I really did not know who to go to  
9 even prior to June 10th to start getting that --  
10 getting this initiative moving forward.

11 MR. SAGER: Did you get the impression that  
12 the controllers were using it with regularity or they  
13 were avoiding using it for any particular reason?

14 MR. WHITE: My opinion, due to -- in my  
15 opinion, they were probably avoiding using it because  
16 they knew that it was outdated. So I think -- why --  
17 why try to -- why even access the information if I know  
18 for a fact that, you know, the setting may be wrong or  
19 whatever, so.

20 (Pause)

21 MR. SAGER: That's all I have. Thank you.

22 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: I have just a couple quick  
23 questions here as a follow-up.

24 Are you familiar with the -- controllers have  
25 like an emergency log form they complete, and I think

1 they also have what's -- like an outage report.

2 MR. WHITE: Mm-hmm.

3 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Is that something that you  
4 review in your --

5 MR. WHITE: No.

6 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: -- in your role?

7 MR. WHITE: No, sir.

8 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Early on in the -- the --  
9 in the -- shortly after the accident, were you ever  
10 discouraged from cooperating with any authorities in  
11 terms of this investigation?

12 MR. WHITE: No, sir.

13 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Does anybody else have any  
14 -- any questions? Mm-hmm?

15 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Al, what reasons did the  
16 controllers give you for their comments that -- what  
17 issues needed changing in the -- in the operations  
18 manual?

19 MR. WHITE: What --

20 MR. ZIMMERMAN: What -- what was wrong with  
21 the operations manual? It wasn't up-to-date, you  
22 mentioned. What -- what kind of things weren't up-to-  
23 date?

24 MR. WHITE: Oh, like -- on the equipment list  
25 at that time it -- the controllers may know for a fact

1 that a teacle motor had replaced a GE motor, just in --  
2 but in the O & M manual it said GE. Well, teacle  
3 should have been in its place. The -- a lot of minor  
4 things, you know, where it -- it will identify our  
5 customers and it would say "Texaco and Shell" when  
6 actually it should say "Aqualon."

7 Really, as far as anything more technical  
8 than that, that's really about -- that's the only thing  
9 that I can think of right now. They would just say it  
10 in general that, hey, the manual needs to be updated.  
11 They really wouldn't define what sections. It just  
12 seemed like it was a -- a global thing, if you will.

13 MR. ZIMMERMAN: You mentioned that they were  
14 questioning whether they should be using it. I  
15 wondered if there were any critical operating issues  
16 that, you know, weren't --

17 MR. WHITE: No.

18 MR. ZIMMERMAN: -- being addressed at all and  
19 there were abnormal conditions that needed to be  
20 changed --

21 MR. WHITE: No.

22 MR. ZIMMERMAN: -- result of incidents.

23 MR. WHITE: To operate the pipeline on a day-  
24 to-day basis, the average controller rarely accessed  
25 the OMPM, even if it was updated at that time to

1 operate the pipeline efficiently and safety -- safely.  
2 Typically, when they really, really need the updated  
3 version of the OMPM manual is when we perform station  
4 checks out in the field and the field representatives  
5 will call the controller and say, okay, did you get  
6 this alarm, vice versa, and the -- that's when it's  
7 really, really important to make sure we have an  
8 updated version of the -- the OMPM not only in the  
9 control center but in the field to make sure that we  
10 are comparing apples and apples and not apples and  
11 oranges.

12 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Okay. That's all I have.

13 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Anybody else have a  
14 follow-up? Linda?

15 MS. PILKEY-JARVIS: I just -- just want to  
16 throw it out in general, Al. Is there anything else  
17 that you want to tell us or that you may be thinking  
18 that we maybe haven't asked you about that -- in terms  
19 of the cause of the incident or things that we may need  
20 to know?

21 MR. WHITE: No, I can't think of anything  
22 else. Had a lot of highlights and low-lights. I can't  
23 think of anything.

24 CHAIRMAN BESHORE: Linda asked my last  
25 question. I guess --

**From:** John Smith  
**To:** # Dispatchers; Beu, Doug; Davidson, Tom; Justice, David; Klasen, Richard; White, Al  
**Date:** 5/10/99 8:49PM  
**Subject:** Bayview

Does anyone, besides myself and Mike R, think that it's time to sit down and have a talk about issues concerning Bayview? It's getting frustrating to operate when you have 8-10 people doing the same thing (operations and accounting) but in a different manner.

The fact that this is a "learning experience" for everyone isn't quite cutting it anymore. There are some guidelines that need to be set so that everyone is on the same track.

First and foremost, accounting. How do we account for these barrels going into and out of Bayview? It sounds plain and simple, do the paperwork like you normally would. But, that's not the case. Just about every time we have a Bayview operation, there's some confusion as to how the paperwork should be done to make the numbers come out. Are we supposed to use the meters, or are we supposed to go by the tank gauges. The last note that I saw said use the tank gauges. Well, Sunday nite that scenario didn't work out because the tank gauge(s) weren't working. As far as I knew, they were supposed to be in working order.

That brings up operations. Should we have an operator get opening and closing gauges on the tanks that we are working? What about "floating" the tanks? Are we empowered to float the tanks when we want to (if it's the same product) or do we do things the way they are on the schedule?

Another thing. Are we ever gonna have any "classes" on Bayview? I just found out on my last shift that the Bayview screens have poke points that you can click on that are different than our other screens. Receiving email msgs about these things are nice, but showing us would be a lot better.

These are just a small amount of things that have been brought up in the control room on Bayview.

This msg isn't meant to be confrontational so please don't take it that way. I (and others in here) would just like to have some things cleared up.

John

Exhibit White #3

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**From:** Frank Hopf  
**To:** # Dispatchers; Berry, Jeff; Beu, Doug; Brentson, Ron; Cargo, Jim; Carlton, Ken; Connolly, Brian; Dalaba, Perry; Davidson, Tom; Greene, Ronald; Greenidge, Ron; Hammett, Craig; Huff, Ken; Johnson, Dave; Justice, David; Kiene, Rick; Klasen, Richard; Martir, RoseAnn; Oien, Deanna; Roberts, Ken; Stevenson, Wally; Traphofner, Jim; White, Al; Williamson, Holly; Wittmer, Kevin; Yocom-Zutant, Kerry; Yount, Dan  
**Date:** 5/18/99 9:25AM  
**Subject:** Re: Fwd: Bayview

I must say that I am increasingly concerned over our seeming inability to take charge of Bayview and make it work for us. If we can't operate Bayview after five months, then we have no hope of being able to operate Cross-Cascades. Bayview is now an essential part of Olympic Pipe Line and an essential part of each of our jobs.

>>> Rick Kiene 05/12/99 01:43PM >>>

Will attend, think it ought to be at Bayview for that reason. Is a time and date set? It would be advisable to do this ASAP, suggest 5/18 at 9:00 am, to be able to answer concerns coming out of the meeting. If not, please include me. Thanks Rick,

>>> Al White 05/11/99 05:12PM >>>

I propose that a meeting be held to discuss issues surrounding Bayview Products Terminal and Olympic's operations as a whole. While I recognize that work and day off schedules may prevent many of you from attending, it is my hope that all of you who have a passion for this issue will submit your concerns AND possible solutions to David, Doug, Jim, Ron, Richard, Craig, and myself PRIOR to the meeting for review. I am hoping that there will be representatives from many work groups with the goal of engaging in critical, but yet substantive dialogue.

The focus of the meeting is to identify and define problem area(s) and to discuss possible corrective actions in addition to assigning a sponsor(s) with hopes of expediting the corrective action process. Key issues may include, but not be limited to;

- a) BPT general operating practices.
- b) BPT measurement and accounting issues.
- c) BPT quality control concerns.
- d) BPT product scheduling issues.
- e) Control Center and Field Operations/Maintenance issues.
- f) Communications.
- g) Training.
- h) Other.

This meeting may take an hour, but please expect to be in attendance for at least three hours which will allow the many areas of concerns to be addressed and solutions recommended. It is my hope that we can come together and discuss these and other issues on or before 6-15-99.

Thanks  
Al

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Exhibit White #4

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