<u>Appendix I</u>

Lloyd Tieken, Olympic - Interview and Deposition Transcripts

Pipeline Rupture and Fire Bellingham, Washington June 10, 1999 DCA-99-MP-008

of that you feel like needs to be brought to our 1 2 attention to complete our investigation of the 3 accident? Not that I can think of. If I think of 4 Α 5 something off line, I'll get back to you. 6 MR. SMYTH: I would appreciate that. Thank 7 you. 8 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Let's go off the 9 record. 10 (Record paused.) 11 (Mr. Smith excused.) 12 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Mr. Tieken, my name is 13 Allen Beshore. I'm a lead investigator for the 14 National Transportation Safety Board into the pipeline 15 rupture and fire that happened in Bellingham, Washington in June of 1999. 16 17 I want to thank you for answering some of our 18 questions. 19 And what we're going to do is start off and 20 I'm going to ask you a few questions. And when I 21 either run out of questions or just need time to 22 collect my thoughts, then we're going to go around the 23 room and some of these other folks may have some 24 follow-up questions for you. 25 So we're going to start off by introducing

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ourselves again. We just did that. But, that way, 1 you'll know who everybody is and who they represent. 2 Next to me -- he's not here right now --3 Cliff. He'll be around a little later. Cliff 4 Zimmerman is with the National Transportation Safety 5 6 Board also. 7 MR. PARRISH: I'm John Parrish with Daniel, 8 formerly a... 9 MS. MAZZOLINI: I'm Dione Mazzolini with the 10 Ecology and Environment. 11 MR. KATCHMARE: Peter Katchmare with the 12 Office of Pipeline Safety. 13 MR. SMYTH: Geoffrey Smyth, City of Bellingham. 14 MS. PILKE-JARVIS: Linda Pilke-Jarvis with 15 16 Department of Ecology. 17 MS. IMHOF: Patti Imhof, IMCO General 18 Construction. 19 MR. CASH: Jim Cash with the same group. 20 MR. SAGER: Eric Sager, with NTSB. 21 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: And, Mr. Tieken, you 22 have a representative with you today. If he could 23 identify himself? 24 MR. MARTIN: Michael Martin, appearing for 25 Mr. Tieken.

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2	LLOYD HARRISON TIEKEN, JR.	
3	having been duly sworn, was called as a witness and was	
4	examined, and testified as follows:	
5	INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Okay, and could you	
6	just state your full name for the record, please?	
7	MR. TIEKEN: Lloyd Harrison Tieken, Jr.	
8	BY MR. BESHORE:	
9	Q And, Lloyd, if you could just describe for us	
10	your educational background?	
11	A High school education. High school graduate.	
12	And the rest of it is just pretty much on-the-job	
13	training.	
14	Q Could you go through your history, your	
15	tenure with Olympic Pipeline?	
16	A Just Olympic, I've been with them since '94.	
17	Prior to that, I've had fifteen years with Mobile	
18	Pipeline.	
19	Q And, in '94, when joining Olympic, what was	
20	your role?	
21	A As an operational controller, pipeline	
22	controller.	
23	Q Was that your role at Mobile?	
24	A Yes, it was.	
25	Q For your entire tenure there?	

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1	A	No.	
2	Q	For the last, roughly, how many years?	
3	А	Total with Mobile was right in the	
4	neighborhood of five plus.		
5	Q	As a control?	
б	А	As a control.	
7	Q	Have your duties expanded or changed at	
8	Olympic pipeline since then?		
9	А	A little bit. As much as I would care to	
10	take on a	nd attempt to pursue.	
11	Q	But, your title has been controller all	
12	along; is	that correct?	
13	A	That is correct.	
14	Q	Did I understand you had some special	
15	assignmen	ts at times throughout your tenure? Is that	
16	correct?		
17	А	Yes.	
18	Q	And those involved were computer-oriented	
19	type issue	es?	
20	А	Yes, it was primarily building displays for	
21	the vecto:	r SCAZA system.	
22	Q	Now did you do any of that prior to the	
23	commissio	ning of Bay View or prior to	
24	А	No.	
25	Q	So was your specialty	

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1 A little bit leading up to the commissioning. Α 2 So I guess your special assignment was 0 SCREENS 3 basically to do the screenings for Bay View? 4 Α Yes. 5 0 Is that fair? That's fair. А 6 And had you built SCATA screens before? 7 Q 8 А I had not. So this was a new function for you? 9 0 10 Yes. А 11 0 Would you have any input in the design of the Bay View facility? 12 13 А Somewhat. 14 0 In terms of what? Just in terms of the end product. I mean 15 А 16 there are definitely constraints, you know, display 17 constraints that kind of limit you to what you can or 18 cannot do. 19 But, yes, I pretty much decided on a basic Folled layout and then pulled the dispatchers, for my end. 20 In terms of layout, are you talking still in 21 0 22 terms of display of information? Or did you have input into what information was recorded and obtained? 23 24 Α Just the display of what information was 25 available.

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So the layout of the facility or the physical 1 Q 2 facility out there, did you have any input into the 3 design of the hiding system or the monitoring systems 4 or anything like that? The actual facility? 5 Α No, sir. 6 0 Did you work then with what was called the 7 Automation Group? Were you part of the group that was 8 involved with that? 9 Α I wouldn't say that. I was just primarily with the control center group and with Todd Smith, who, 10 LEAK at that point in time, was a controller, lead detection 11 KANA person. And on special assignment doing the displays. 12 13 I was never -- never heard of any kind of Period for and the provide many count 14 alignment towards an automation. 15 0 And so when you say you got the buy-in from 16 the other controllers, you discussed with them methods 17 of display of the data and what their thoughts were as you were building the screens? 18 19 А Yes, the displays themselves. Yeah, I would bounce ideas off of them. I could make up skeletons, 20 21 nonfunctional skeletons, and put them out there for the 22 guys to use, or just give me feedback on, and things like that. 23 24 And then throughout this time frame, you were 0 25 also -- I believe you also operated a pipeline on shift

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1 on occasion, too; is that correct? 2 А Yes. 3 So you had kind of a dual role. At times, 0 you were a controller and you were also on a special 4 5 assignment? А 6 Yes. 7 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Let's go off the record for a minute. 8 9 (Record paused.) INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Let's go back on the 10 11 record here, if we can. 12 BY MR. BESHORE: 13 Okay, and we were talking about you had a 0 14 dual role basically in terms of doing some display 15 development as well as in filling in shifts as a 16 controller. 17 And you mentioned that some of the screens 18 you began to develop prior to actually Bay View coming 19 on line. And you continued in that role, I guess, as 20 Bay View was commissioned. 21 Α Yes. 22 To finish up. Q 23 А Yes. 24 And since the accident, has your role changed Q 25 again or are you --

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A I have, due to loss of one of the controllers and manpower issues, I have had less opportunity to work special assignment because I've been needed on shift. So I've been spending more time on shift as a controller.

6 And continuing to work on displays and do 7 display work and things as time allows, but not 8 officially on special assignment.

9 Q Let's talk about just the time frame shortly 10 after Bay View was commissioned. Did concerns arise 11 about the operation? Were there operational issues 12 associated with the new facility a concern of some of 13 the controllers?

A Being a new facility and being completely unfamiliar, yes. And there was the concern that the facility itself being designed with 300 series piping basically plugged in to the middle of a 600 series system was a concern.

19 Q That was a concern to all of you?
20 A Yes. It just didn't make sense.
21 Q And how did you guys express that concern?
22 How did you personally I guess express that concern to
23 others?

A It was just kind of a general -- just a general concern since, you know, just "We don't like

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this." We pretty much all voiced our opinion verbally. 1 There was never anything written that I'm aware of. 2 Did you express your opinion to Mr. Brenson? 3 0 4 Α Oh, yes. He was the supervisor? 5 Q He was my supervisor, yes. 6 Α Did he concur with your concern? 7 0 He did. 8 А Do you know if he took that on up the chain 9 0 of command? 10 11 А I don't know. 12 Were there other concerns that arose as you 0 13 guys were trying to operate the pipeline once the facility was installed? Do you recall? 14 15 Α Just that it was difficult to operate due to proximity to Allen pump station. That created -- just 16 made it difficult to operate. 17 18 That proximity, how did that manifest itself Q in the operational issue? 19 If I -- do you mean from an operational 20 Α 21 perspective, how did I perceive this impact on the 22 pipeline that Bay View facility had? Is that what you're asking? 23 24 Yes. 0 Basically, on routing over to, through and 25 А

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back -- see, we had a pipeline running straight to
Allen. We routed approximately two miles over, two
miles back. And that Bay View facility routed through
a series of three control valves, number of 90s, you
know, through a bunch of equipment, which basically
made it more difficult, or just increased the
restriction.

8 What I want to say is increased the pressure 9 drop between the discharge of the source station to the 10 suction side of Allen.

And what that means is with having large 2,500 horsepower large impeller pumps at Allen station, they take a pretty good bite, it made product supply just a little trickier in starting those pump units.

Q Let me try and digest that to where I understand that. One of the issues then was because of the size of the pumps at Allen, you may draw product away too quickly from Bay View because it was so close?

A Yes. Yes.

19

20 Q And now I guess also, given how close these 21 facilities are together, any problem or upset on either 22 one or the other one, your reaction time is pretty 23 short?

24 I'm guessing.

25 A That's part of it.

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Q If you had something go down in Allen, you didn't have much time to do anything before its impacting Bay View. Would that be correct?

4 A Yes. There was no time. There was just no 5 time.

Q Do you recall some of the specific issues that were happening that were concerns that people were trying to understand how to operate the system as it's being designed?

10 A Well, the primary concern was the fact that 11 the facility was designed to protect itself at 700 psi 12 rating. It would go into shutdown mode and isolate.

When the pipeline was running on top and we were flowing at maximum rate, if we had a major upset at the Allen pump station, we would be hardpressed to avoid triggering that 700-pound threshold and incurring this resultant isolation of the Bay View facility.

18 Q So the incoming valve into the receiver at19 Bay View would close?

20 A As well as the outgoing, yes.

21 Q Okay, so they both --

A The facility protected both sides, yes.
Q And then that would obviously cause
operational havoc, I guess. Well, havoc is not the
right word, but...

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Yeah, it created, you know, it did what it 1 А was supposed to do and it just created some problems to 2 deal with, you know. Fortunately, the valve travel was 3 relatively slow so we had adequate time to be able to 4 respond to these scenarios. 5 Was your response basically to shut the 6 0 7 pipeline down because this was occurring? Yes, sir, that's all you could do. 8 Α That's all you could do? 9 0 Well, sometimes, I guess shut down quick 10 enough to where you didn't even have an opportunity to 11 12 shut it down, it just did so kind of itself? Is that true? 13 Well, I think several of the scenarios have 14 А all had a chance to play out there. There were times 15 when, you know, we were running the line and we learned 16 17 to run the line in a way where we could run effectively and avoid that 700-pound pressure load. 18 19 Okay, let's run through the scenario where 0 you're doing a switch from Renton to Seattle. Just 20 kind of run through that scenario for us. 21Now you're aware that there's this potential 22 for the valve to close, shut down this facility. 23 How do you try to avoid that happening in 24 25 that scenario?

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If we're routing the pipe from, you know, 1 Α 2 from Renton from a typical profile to Seattle, the LUPPER overall pipeline is being increased by 9,600 barrels. 3 So your pressure load is increasing gradually. 4 5 You have a fairly long period of time, 6 depending on how we were running into Renton, and it's 7 all subject to the profile running into Renton. If we were at minimum back pressure set point on the Renton 8 delivery, the line between Allen and Renton is pretty 9 10 flat, pretty low-pressure profile, okay. 11 So that when you swing to Seattle, you've got 12 a substantial time frame before you absolutely have to 13 get a unit on. And even then, the pressure is rising 14 slowly. 15 The next step would be to boost at 16 Woodinville station to offset that increasing pressure 17 loss gradient with the use of lift from that unit. 18 At the same time also, your flow rates, your 19 maximum flow rate into Seattle is about 2,000 barrels 20 an hour lower than it is into Renton. 21 So you've got flow rate restrictions that 22 kind of max you out as well. So you'll want to be 23 reducing more to balance this profile. 24 Okay, so your main goal is to get Woodinville 0 started, and then you do basically -- you didn't have 25

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to necessarily start units further on back up the 1 system, or you just adjust? 2 You would probably want to drop units up 3 Α Now this is all assuming that we're wanting to 4 north. get a maximum rate. This is an assumption. Okay? 5 6 Q Okay. 7 А In that we don't want to go slower than 8 8,000. If that's the case, we wouldn't stop Woodinville. We would just shut down units north. We 9 wouldn't start Woodinville, just run the line to gain 10 the desired rate. 11 Okay, well, I guess my question is just you 12 0 have to start at getting it at Woodinville. 13 14 Α Yes. 15 0 In order to effect this delivery change. 16 But, once you've got that under control, you don't 17 really have to do a lot I guess on backup the system. 18 It's more adjusting flow rates? 19 I would say that is a true statement. That's А 20 a true statement. 21 And you're going to have some time to make Q 22 those adjustments, more so? 23 Α Yeah, yeah, I mean, I can't say. The time 24 window is relevant once again to the pressure load. But, you know, my perception of the normal profile and 25

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how I run the pipeline, you know, my experience is that
 way.

3 It gives me this history that I'm drawing
4 these answers from.

5 . Q That's what we're trying to get.

A And that is what I would do. I believe then we would, yes, to restrict the north end, we might drop -- if we're sourcing out of Anacortes, or are we sourcing out of Ferndale, you know, that's another part of this.

And I'm assuming in this profile you want aFerndale checkpoint source?

13 Q Yes, coming down from Cherry Point.

14 A Same profile as the day of the accident?
15 0 Yes.

A In that case, yes, we would restrict at
Ferndale by pressure set point on the control valve.

18 Q Would you quit injecting the DRA at any point 19 in that sequence? So you, I guess were you personally 20 operating the system at any time when this valve flows, 21 this station at Bay View was isolated?

22 A Yes.

Q Do you recall how often that might have been?
A It was fairly often, you know, until we
learned how to deal with it. It was fairly often.

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Do you recall what the circumstances were in Q 1 any of those cases leading up to that occurrence? 2 I would say primarily all of them were an 3 Α Allen failure of some sort. And the inability to get a 4 response into Ferndale station before that pressure 5 load rose above the 700 psi point. 6 7 0 Okay, so what kind of things were happening 8 that might trigger that? When you're running fast, when we were 9 Α profiled to run fast or on top, as is how we refer to 10 it, I believe we were running both the big units at 11 Ferndale, maybe even the third unit, you know, to where 12 we're really, really moving product as fast as the 13 14 system would allow. And Allen pump station would be on -- would 15 basically be on suction. After -- when we would run on 16 17 top through Bay View without boosting at Bay View, we 18 could actually pull away from Ferndale with Allen 19 station. In other words, pump faster out of Allen than 20 they could supply through Bay View. 21 22 Okay. 0 Okay, so what happens then is, if we're 23 А 24 running that way on top and we lose one of our 2,500

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horsepower units, you know, which is pushing, putting

up, you know, 500-700 pounds, well, that's 1 automatically translated upstream. 2 And if that pressure load at Bay View is 3 sitting at, you know, a hundred pounds, 60 pounds even, 4 you know, you're real near that 700-pound threshold. 5 Just with the loss of one unit. 6 And what happened then is there were three 7 control valves at Bay View, which is less than 2,000 8 barrels or 3,000 barrels upstream of Allen station. 9 And if any one of those came into play for 10 whatever reason, depending on its role, if it actuated 11 at all, then that feed to Allen station was disrupted 12 and we would end up losing the other pump. 13 So you've got -- if you think about it, 14 you've got four control valves within 3,000 barrels. 15 There's another one at Allen. 16 0 Right. Right. Three at Bay View and the 17 А fourth at Allen. And the interaction of those and 18 their characteristics all made it extremely tricky to 19 keep balanced. 20 Now there were several emails I was going to 21 Q 22 ask you about on control valve issues. They went out in Yollers to setpoints. And I can find it, if you 5 23 need, to recollect with regard to memory. 24 But, do you remember that issue specifically? 25

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Can we try and help explain what was trying to be 1 2 accomplished by those set point changes? 3 Α The secondary control valve, which was 4 working its primary role at this point in time on the 5 incoming side of the facility, its role was to act as a 6 back pressure regulator to maintain a minimum pressure 7 rating across the meter run for adequate measurement. 8 When we'd run Allen pump station, you know, 9 if we didn't keep pressures just right, it would start 10 controlling back to hold a minimum. I think originally 11 it was set at 25 psi. 12 And then it was lowered to 10 because we 13 needed that extra 15 pounds to feed out. 14 Because it would restrict flow to try and Q 15 keep back pressure on the meters? 16 А Correct. 17 And that's the one that --0 18 And that's part of it that would cause --А 19 that was one of the elements that might and may have 20 and did cause interaction between the pump stations and 21 the facilities. Do you recall whether problems of Woodinville 22 0 set point had caused pressure backups back into Allen 23 similar to what might have happened on the day of the 24 25 Do you recall that ever happening to you? accident?

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1 А Well, I don't recall it specifically. But it 2 stands to reason that when you're in that profile and 3 you're pumping on top with Woodinville boosting with 4 two pump stations, or two pumps, and a power bump hits 5 it, you know, being an electrical drop, and both units 6 fall down, well, that pressure wave is coming up line 7 and you're going to lose something at Allen. And, you know, the domino effect. 8 9 0 What were the discharge pressures... never 10 mind. Let me just move on. 11 At any time during the process when people 12 were trying to evaluate these concerns at Bay View, did 13 anybody mention to you that there were concerns about, 14 or did anybody express any concerns about the relief 15 valves not functioning? 16 We were primarily operating in a tight line Α 17 mode and there was concern that the relief valves were 18 not functioning properly. And those concerns were 19 voiced on occasion and the valves were tested. 20 The mechanics came right out and tested and 21 checked them and set them. And, you know, did what 22 they were supposed to do and basically told us they 23 were working properly. 24 Okay, do you remember ever personally doing Q

25 that?

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I do. 1 А And so you contacted a technician and said 2 0 3 what? Oh, you mean as far as initiating the concern 4 А about a relief valve not doing what it's supposed to be 5 6 doing? 7 А Right. I seem to recall doing that, yes. 8 0 9 Do you recall who it was that you were asked Q 10 to check it out or mentioned it to? GREENIDGE I want to say Ron Greenage. The area chief 11 А at that point in time, I believe, would have been David 12 Justice, as well as my supervisor, Ron Brentson. 13 And your understanding was that they went out 14 0 and checked things out? 15 Every time I expressed a concern, it was 16 А 17 addressed. You know, I can't give you specifics but I want to say of my own personal knowledge of them 18 testing and checking those relief valves and checking 19 the settings was in the neighborhood of four to six 20 21 times, just, you know, of my own experience. Maybe more like three to five at the most, 22 23 something like that. 24 0 Was this something documented in written form or was this a verbal communication? 25

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Well, my communication was primarily verbal. 1 А As far as the documentation on site by the individual 2 who did the work, you know, I don't know what he did. 3 Well, I was thinking in terms of you Q 4 reporting this to somebody that was documented that 5 there was a verbal report. 6 7 А Oh, a specific documented report? No. 8 0 You picked up the phone and called somebody. Said, "Hey, we're having this problem. Would 9 Α you check it out?" And then, you know, pass it on to 10 my supervisors if the problem wasn't addressed. 11 And would they call you back and say, "Hey, 12 0 we came out and checked it out"? 13 Generally, I would be on duty when they would 14 Α be there doing the calibrating. And then they would 15 actually reduce the release spring load to a lower 16 17 pressure and actually run product through it to verify 18 that the valve is functioning. 19 Okay, and you were in contact with them when Q 20 that was going on, basically? 21 А Yes. And, you know -- yeah, and trying to run the 22 pipeline while they basically dropped the pressure out 23 24 from under me. 25 Well, I guess whenever they're doing Ő

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something like that, they make you aware of it because you're going to see an indication right here and know what's going on.

A Oh, yes. Oh, yeah, I'm aware of it ahead of time and I can just basically watch it happen. And if they're too slow, there's nothing I can do. You know, I'm shutdown.

8 Or, yeah, if they're too slow. So I'll try 9 to have as much pressure there as I can handle and then 10 they'll do their thing. And if they're quick enough to 11 where they test it and they don't route all the stream 12 to the tank, well, then we're --

13 Q And you can see this physically and pressure D 14 fluctuations on the SCATA system when they were doing 15 these tests?

16 A Yes.

Q Do you remember -- I was going to ask you for dates, but that's probably asking far too much. Do you remember any specific dates?

20 A I can give you the time frame. Between, I 21 would say, the first -- before June 10 in that six 22 month period, but no specific dates.

Q All right. And you were aware, or were you aware, I guess, that this relief valve, or valves were basically set at the lower pressure than the 700

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pounds? And, basically, it was kind of a two-tiered 1 2 protection system; correct? А Correct. 3 Did you experience the same types of concerns 4 0 on the 10th coming through Bay View as on the 16th? 5 А Yeah. 6 And so, personally, that happened to you also 7 Q as you were operating the system? 8 9 А Yes. That would be the incoming block valve, I 10 0 guess, or incoming -- it might be a receiver valve on 11 ANACONTES the end course side? 12 If a 700 pound threshold was hit, all sides 13 Α were closed. Incoming and outgoing. 14 Oh, okay, well, I --15 Q The facility would shut down, yes. And, yes, 16 А 17 the incoming, yes. I'm sorry. I just want to clarify, but both 18 0 19 the incoming and outgoing on the same pipeline would close when 700 pounds was... correct? 20 21 А Correct. So it would also be the same thing if it was 22 0 HNACONTES SIDE the end course side? 23 24 А Yes. 25 Q But it would not affect the Ferndale side if

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1 that happened?

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A I don't believe it would.

3 Q But it would affect both the incoming and the 7 2 4 outgoing with OSHA?

5 A That's correct.

6 Q Do you remember any other issues in terms of 7 Bay View's facility that were a concern to people? 8 A The application of a single relief, or surge 9 relief flow switch that applied to all of the relief 10 valves.

I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt. 11 0 That was a concern. The other concern was 12 А just the fact that, you know, transient pressure waves 13 travel so rapidly and with the proximity of Bay View 14 being so close to Allen, we were all concerned that, 15 you know, those pressure waves could pass through the 16 facility more rapidly than any physical device could 17 18 respond.

And that concern was voiced as well by pretty much the group as a whole, the control center group as a whole.

Q Now that sounds like a safety concern.Maybe, it's an operational concern?

A That is -- was a safety concern, yes, though not being engineers, hydraulic engineers in that, you

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1 know, it's a theory.

You know, we trusted the engineers to knowwhat they're doing.

Q And the concerns associated with the flow switches, whatever, for the individual relief valves, is that a concern that was expressed prior to the accident, that you recall?

8 A Well, yeah, as we experienced them, we would 9 report them as being questionable, yes.

MR. TIEKEN: Now could you clarify that question, Allen, please?

12 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Well, my understanding 13 is that the switch, the flow switch into tank 209, is 14 triggered by two different scenarios, not necessarily 15 just...

16 MR. TIEKEN: That is true.

INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: So I thought that was 17 the concern you were talking about earlier. So that's 18 kind of why there was -- were you talking about that 19 same concern being expressed prior to the accident? 20 MR. TIEKEN: That's part of it, yes. But, 21 the fact that we had a single flow switch that would 22 give us a surge relief indication, in reality, there 23 were maybe eight relief devices that could be 24

25 responsible for the flow.

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Only having a single indication, you know, 1 didn't make sense from a diagnosis position. You know, 2 3 who's relieving where. BY MR. BESHORE: 4 So that's a little different issue. 5 0 -And, yes, now that you brought that up, for 6 А 7 me. it wasn't a concern if -- well, it was a concern if the sump pump was running, yes. It would show surge 8 relief. And if we did, indeed, have a surge then, it 9 would be masked. 10 You know, that's another perspective to it. 11 Now, in terms of people or in terms of 12 0 training as far as what you all needed to do 13 differently for training the controllers on the 14specific aspects associated with Bay View terminal, did 15 you receive any? 16 A lot of it was just like our on-the-job 17 А training. Nothing -- I guess I should say no 18 structured training. 19 I guess I'm wondering, given these concerns 20 0 about proximity ... anybody could come in and say you can 21 avoid, or if you do these things, then you have a 22 better chance of this valve coming in here to Bay View 23 24 not closing on you. Or was that just totally left for you guys to 25

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1 figure out from experience?

Well, and you almost have to do that. That's 2 Α pretty much how it played out. As we would use the 3 facility and learn from it, we would share this 4 information with one another. You know. 5 And the intent of my supervisor, Ron Brenson, 6 his whole intent -- and I support him in that -- was to 7 -- I'll use the term. I've used it before -- to use 8 the facility in baby steps. 9 You know, we know what it says it will do on 10 11 paper. We know what it's supposed to do. But, until we actually use it and can understand exactly what it 12 does and how it does it in reality, it's difficult to 13 sit here and say what it will or will not do, unless 14 you gain that actual experience. 15 And that was really the intent, was to never 16 operate it at a higher level than we felt confident and 17 comfortable. 18 The concern was I guess the general feeling 19 0 that these were design problems, design issues? 20 Could you be more specific, Allen? I don't 21 Α follow you. 22 Well, I guess I mean the concerns that we're 23 0 talking about in terms of placement of sensors on 24 individual relief valves, the way the station is 25

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1 configured with 300 pound piping.

I mean these are all design issues; correct? 2 They are. They are. They are design issues. 3 А And, you know, that's the way we got it from the 4 engineering firm. 5 Now when you were operating and the situation 6 0 occurred at the inlet valve to Bay View isolated (he hter 7 section on the 20 or the 16 and basically the system 8 went down, would you consider that to be an abnormal 9 10 operation? А Yes, I would. 11 Do you recall did you generate whatever 12 0 paperwork was necessary, or was there any paperwork 13 necessary to document that abnormal operation? 14 Generally, it was documented by email to our 15 А 16 supervisor. Do you remember generating an email 17 0 concerning this specific type of event to your 18 supervisor? 19 20 Yes, I do. А Did you fill out an outage report or anything 21 Q like that? 22 No, sir. 23 А Would it have been more than one email 24 0. 25 concerning the inlet valve closing?

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1 А Yes. sir. Do you have copies of those emails? 2 0 3 I don't. А INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Okay, did I ask you 4 5. about an outage log? I think I just did. 6 MR. TIEKEN: Yes. 7 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: I was thinking ahead. 8 I'm sorry. BY MR. BESHORE: 9 How about O&M procedures? Were the O&M 10 0 procedures updated to reflect the Bay View facility 11 being on line? 12 Yes. Not -- somewhat. I can't recall 13 А exactly, you know, what the procedures were at that 14 point in time in the manual. I don't know. 15 16 0 Do you recall if anybody came around and said, you know, we've revised the O&M account for the 17 new Bay View station and, you know, went through any 18 19 changes with you? I don't recall that, no. I do recall the 20 А topic and I do recall it being a work in progress. 21 22 The procedures. 0 23 А The procedures, yes. Now were you assigned any role in developing 24 0 those procedures? 25

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1 Α I was not. Did you have any role or responsibility for 2 0 training others? 3 Just what I took upon myself in the process 4 А of building the screens, the displays, and having to 5 plot those schematics, you know, on to displays and 6 7 things. I would say I became pretty familiar with the 8 equipment on hand. And every chance I got, yes, I 9 tried to help the fellows understand what the operation 10 entailed and the pieces of equipment involved, and so 11 on and so forth. 12 13 Okay, so you would walk them through the new 0 14 screens if they had any questions. 15 А You bet. It was kind of an informal role for you but 16 0 17 it was --18 Α Yeah, and the screens were there and we 19 pushed them to use them, become familiar with them, and 20 ask questions before they actually had to use them in a live operation, 21 22 They had the opportunity to do that as well 23 as study the schematics and become familiar with the 24 facility.

25 Q All right, let's talk a little bit, if we

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could, Lloyd, about -- while we're on the subject and before we get off the subject of O&M procedures, in 1999, early in '99, reportedly, the O&M manual was revised in a pretty broad fashion prior to an OPS audit.

Do you recall the manual being revised or reissued or anything like that in that point in time? A I recall the manual being converted from basically hard copy to digital. And accessible via Intranet.

11 That's the milestone that I remember. But I 12 don't recall any specific, you know, revisions to it. 13 It was pretty much just take the existing manual and 14 convert it to digital format just through manual data 15 entry.

16 Q Do you recall when that was?

17 A Like -- not specifically, but early 1999 18 maybe. You know, not specifically. I really don't 19 know.

20 Q Okay. But, at that point in time, your 21 recollection is it basically all of a sudden became 22 electronic and available through that format, not 23 necessarily that there were a lot of revisions to it? 24 A That is correct, yes.

25 Q And did anybody, you know, express to you

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that there had been changes or come around and say 1 "We've revised the manual and these are some of the 2 3 highlights"? Α No. 4 Okay, now let's --5 0 I do recall some hard copy updates to the 6 A No, that was our -- never mind. That was our 7 manual. spill response plans I believe I was updating then. 8 When were those done? 9 Q I don't know. In '99. А 10 Sometime in '99 before the accident? 11 0 Sometime in '99, yes. They were constantly 12 Α being changed, you know, and it was not just revisions 13 to the procedures or anything; just basically title 14 changes and things. 15 We've been through quite a few different 16 17 people there. Contractors are constantly changing, you 18 know, things like that. Let's talk a little bit about the specific 19 0 day of the accident. When did you come into work on 20 June 10? 21 Around 6:30 or 7. 22 А Is that your normal start time? 23 Q 24 Α Yes. Let's start at the beginning of the day. Ιf 25 Q

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you can, just kind of walk through us what you recall
 from that morning?

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Just for me it was business as usual. I had 3 А taken on other -- you know, I'm very interested in 4 computer electronics and things, and computer science. 5 And I took it upon myself to learn as much as I could. 6 So my routine was to come in and check the 7 ACAD health of the SCATA machines and change out the backup 8 volumes on the tape drives. And, basically, just look 9 the system, make sure that it's healthy in as many 10 respects as I could recognize. 11 And then that's what I did. And then I went 12 I had numerous -- you know, as special assignment, 13 on. it's really difficult to go in and just be, you know, 14 just do screens. 15 So I would do different things. I would 16 study on the SCAPA system, try to be learning an aspect 17 of it. Work with Todd on things he was doing in the 18 database, you know, brainstorm ideas for database work. 19 Ideas for, you know, PLC programming, just anything and 20 everything that we could get in and do. 21 But, primarily, this day it was come in at 7, 22 do my health checks on the SCATA system, change out, 23 manage the backup archive tapes. And then get to work 24 on the displays that I had been working on. 25

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And that's what you were doing this morning? Q 1 That's what I was doing this morning. 2 А Nothing unusual at all at that point in time 3 Q in the morning? 4 No, sir. 5 А All right, let's just go on then from there. 6 Q 7 What did you do next? Pretty much just that. I believe at one 8 Α point in time I had walked past my supervisor's office 9 and kind of gave him a verbal rundown on my plans for 10 11 the day, just out of courtesy. 12 And Todd mentioned to me that he was leaving somewhere around lunchtime. I believe he had a 13 function to go see his daughter perform in, or do 14 something like that. 15 And at some point in time there, my 16 supervisor asked me if I would create some historical 17 data containers for our Olympic Junction pump units. 18 Okay, so Ron Brenson asked you to create 19 0 these containers so that they could archive some data 20 from those points, to look at later, I guess? 21 Yes. 22 Α But it was at his direction that you did 23 0 this? 24 Yes, sir, at his request. 25 А

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1 Q Okay, so you went about this process then? 2 Can you just explain a little bit the process 3 of doing that, if you could?

A It's pretty straightforward. It's utility and template-driven. There is a utility within the vector program called VDBCS, which is an acronym for Vector Data Base Configuration System.

8 And you just drill down to the data base you 9 want to create a record for and there is a fill-in-the-10 blanks template that you do this with.

I had the luxury of being able to take a similar record and display it directly above, two windows. It's like a Windows environment where you could the a windows one above the other. And that was my routine. I would the one

above the other, use it as a template and basically fill in the blanks and change the information where necessary.

19 Q Okay, so you could pull up another data point 20 that already had this set up?

21 A An identical --

22 Q Just do the same thing --

23 A Yes.

24 Q -- to create this new contingent?

25 A Yes, and I had done it before.

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Now what time was that, approximately? 1 Q 2 А At that point in time, I believe I was getting started on that around 1500, 3 p.m., a little 3 bit before that. Something like that. 4 Then what happened after that? 5 Q After that, I did my routine of checking the 6 А SCATA system for errors. And things appeared to be 7 fine initially. 8 Then, on checking it a little bit later -- I 9 don't know. It may have been as many as ten minutes, 10 11 you know, I checked it again. And it started showing 12 that it was having trouble with the historical data 13 base. At that point in time, I started wondering if 14 I had made an error in the records I created, so I 15 opened them up again. Actually, I had the one open 16 that I used for a template and just reopened the one I 17 18 had created. A total of three times. I triple-checked my 19 20 work. And there was nothing out of the ordinary with 21 it. So I felt confident my work was done right in that these errors being generated were, I guess, after the 22 fact. 23 24 There are times when what appear to be brief windows, you know, be it 30 seconds to us, where there 25

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might be some exposure to a computer but yet it's ticking off errors at the rate of milliseconds, you know.

4 So it's generating thousands of errors in 5 what we see as maybe a 10-20 second exposure time 6 frame. And sometimes they just cycle through.

And the machine, you know, at that brief point in time saw something it didn't like and then it finishes digesting and reporting and then it's okay.

10 So I saw that. I triple-checked my work. I 11 felt confident it was fine. And I believe I took a 12 break or went and got a cup of coffee or went to the 13 other side or something, and came back into the 14 computer room.

When I came back into the computer room, I 15 sat down at the terminal. This was approximately 3:30, 16 something like that. Sat down and, you know, hit the 17 keyboard on this terminal that was hosted by the main 18 frame computer that was on line, the primary. 19 DW 02 I believe it was OLEO-2 at that point in 20 time. And it was unresponsive. And almost 21 simultaneous to that is when Ron Burke stuck his head 22 in the door and said, "Hey, the computer is slowing 23 down and it's not reacting." 24

At that point in time, I did everything I

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knew to do to give them a functional SCATA computer.

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A standard fallback routine is if anything is suspect, you know, in the computer world, you delete it. You know. And I was aware that the only change that had happened to that machine were those historical archives that I had created.

7 So I went in and deleted them. Well, no, let 8 me rephrase that. I tried to go into the on-line, the 9 main frame computer that was primary, and I could not 10 get access. It was tied up in a little -- I could not 11 get priority to work within that computer system.

12 So I went to the secondary computer, which is 13 kind of mirrored and -- well, it's not mirrored. It is 14 a redundant hot backup.

I was able to get into the data base there and delete the records, or so I thought, the records there. And that was my plan of attack was to eliminate the offender, the only offender that I was aware of, the only thing that had changed, and then fail over to the secondary machine.

In this case, the secondary machine was the No. 1 machine. And that's what I did. I could not do an orderly fail-over because the primary was nonresponsive.

So, when I deleted the two records out of

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real time memory on the secondary machine, I was forced 1 to do the only thing I knew to do, and that was halt 2 04102 the CPU on OLEO-2 machine, which was in primary role. 3 Okay. At that point in time, 2 did halt and 4 1 was functioning somewhat. You know, I can't -- it 5 wasn't healthy. There were some points that appeared 6 to be polling and scanning. But it was by no means 7 8 healthy and alive. Realizing and wanting to make sure I had 9 something for backup, I had, after I halted 1, I 10 immediately began rebooting number one. So I had yet 11 another machine that was coming back up live to try to 12 nutfail 2. 13 And that's what happened. Just prior to 2 14 starting up doing it's final startup queue, I halted --15 or 2 coming back as primary, I halted No. 1 and 2 came 16 back primary, and we regained SCATA supervision over 17 18 the system. And just shortly after that happened, my 19 supervisor, Ron Brenson, came in the computer room and 20 I outlined what had transpired and all of my actions, 21 22 and so on. After I gave him a rundown of this, he 23 24 quickly jumped on line, and I believe he recognized that even though I had deleted the two records from the 25

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secondary machine, that there would still be mirrored if.
over.

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It's like deleted and the primary would still 3 have the potential of shadowing it over in this primary 4 redundant role. And the records still did exist. 5 And he went ahead and took note that there 6 was actually a typo displayed now in one of these 7 8 fields. And he deleted that. You know, and this was after the machine -- I 9 believe timingwise the machine was up and running and 10 we -- and things in the control center appeared to be 11 working normally once again. 12 And that was pretty much what I was tuned in 13 The duration was approximately 30 minutes, 14 on. something like that, from start to finish. 15 Okay, I have a couple of kind of layman type 16 Q questions. We'll probably go through this in a little 17 bit more detail in a few minutes, but my questions are 18 fairly simple. 19 When you say you first tried to get in on the 20 OLEO-2 computer when you came back from your break, had 21 your coffee and you came back, and you said you sat 22 down at the screen and you noticed that it was 23

24 unresponsive.

25

A Yes. I had attempted to invoke the error-

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checking utility and a response never came back. 1 2 0 Now were you in the Vector program, or is this in the overall computer operating system? 3 It's an overall -- what happens is you open 4 А what's called a terminal session. And you can do that 5 from any workstation that, you know, has granted 6 7 access. You can log on and have a session going. And 8 that's what I was doing. The session was being 9 generated and managed by the operating system on that 10 SCATA host computer. 11 It wasn't, per se, specifically the SCATA 12 The SCATA system basically had its own -- it thing. 13 It's configured, it runs on its own disk with 14 does. the operating system on its own disk. They're 15 separate. 16 Though, in its entirety, this place is shared 17 18 by all. Okay. Yes, I guess I was wondering if you 19 0 were looking at SCATA information in the Vector or if 20 you were looking at the basic computer itself. 21 No, I was looking at -- I had just a black 22 А screen and I was using a utility that just goes out and 23 says "Report the software, the SCATA's software's 24 It's a utility. health." 25

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And that program didn't function? 1 0 It did not respond. 2 А And then so you -- well, I'll just leave off 3 0 on my questions and we'll go through that in a little 4 bit more technical detail here. 5 Let me just kind of skip back on then to at 6 7 that point, well, what caused Ron to come in, Ron 8 Brenson, to come into the room? 9 Did he just happen to come by? No. He had been voice-paged over the 10 Α 11 intercom. I don't know that he had been but I'm assuming that he had been paged. You know, paged with 12 13 his belt pager. 14I'm sure the controllers were attempting to communicate with him, but I don't know that for a fact 15 because I wasn't in there. 16 17 And he did come right to the computer room, 18 you know. So he must have got the information 19 somewhere. Did you page him to the -- I mean did you 20 0 page him on the voice phone to the computer room? Or 21 did you ask somebody to --22 Yes. When I did the intercom throughout the 23 А 24 local buildings, I asked that he come to the computer 25 room.

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But you didn't issue a page to his pager? 1 Q I may have. I don't believe so though 2 А because I was intent on getting the computer running. 3 Okay. But, in any event, he showed up. Q 4 In any event, he showed up, yes, sir. 5 А How about Todd? Did you call Todd? 6 0 I believe Todd was paged. And I'm pretty 7 А sure I paged Todd to get his assistance with this. And 8 he responded. But it was, you know, after I had gotten 9 2 back as primary successfully. 10 Okay, was it after then also you and Ron had 11 Q gone in and deleted these other additional records or 12 whatever that --13 Yes, sir. А 14 Okay, so Todd got called subsequent to that? 15 0 Yes, sir. 16 А And you went through the scenario with him. 17 0 Did he understand what your problem had been? 18 No, I don't believe it's ever been 19 А 20 understood. And you had never experienced this problem 21 0 22 ever before? No, sir. 23 А All right. So then were you and Ron still 0 24 together then in the computer room when Todd called in? 25

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Yes, we were.

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2 Q And then how about after your communication
3 conversation with Todd? Was Ron there for the duration
4 of the conversation?

A He was. And one other issue was showing up on 2 after reboot. And it was nothing. You know, it was deemed of real insignificance. It was a formatting issue in the reporting back format where there were additional lines in the reporting.

10 And it was just a matter of Todd doing 11 starting and stopping and restarting the process that 12 made those, you know, made that report come back in its 13 proper form.

And Ron was there for that. And, really, that's all. I gave Todd a rundown. And I believe he was headed on his way back in anyway. It's pretty difficult to talk about that over the phone.

18 Q At any time during this sequence of events, 19 did you look at the SCATA information by chance to see 20 what was happening out on the pipeline? Or were you 21 specifically looking at computer data?

A I was tunneled in on the computer data. I did not specifically look at the pipeline. I did pass through the control center after I failed -- halted 2 and went to 1 because there's a duration where the

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network connectivity is lost and then the
 reconnectivity happens.

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And then, you know, you're in the control 3 center and you're making sure the displays come up. 4 Well, I did that. I passed through behind 5 the controllers and saw that the screens, you know, the 6 connectivity was there. But that's as far as it went. 7 I wasn't really even thinking about the 8 operation of the system. 9 Now was that when OLEO-1 was trying to 0 10 11 operate? That was right about mid-point through that 12 А thirty-minute. I would say roughly twelve to fifteen 13 minutes through that thirty-minute time frame is when 14 15 that happened. Actually, no, it might have been sooner than 16 that. Maybe, ten minutes into it. 17 But, based on your glancing at I guess or 180 looking at the monitors in the control center, could 19 you tell anything about the functionality of the system 20 at that point based on that observation? 21 I could tell that it wasn't healthy and that 22 Α some of the points appeared to be returning data. Some 23

24 of the points didn't.

25

That's what I could tell.

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1 0 And you were able, I guess -- well, let me ask one more quick question on this, and then I'll let 2 3 somebody else ask most of these questions. 4 You were able to run the diagnostic at that point, right, on the QLEO-1 system? You said there was 5 a diagnostic tool that was to check the health of the 6 7 system. And you were able to run it on the OLEO-1 8 9 machine in this interim period; is that correct? 10 А No, sir, I never ran it on the 1 machine. 11 The 1 machine didn't appear to be functioning properly It didn't appear to be failed, but it didn't 12 to me. appear to be functioning properly. 13 So then I was pretty much relegated to a 14 series of command line routines to ensure that 2, yo 15 know, logging in date and time, booting up the 16 secondary machine, which boot up at that point in time 17 on that machine was -- boot up alone was in the 18 neighborhood of thirteen minutes plus. Something like 19 20 that. And during this, you know, you're prompted 21 for information: what type of file transfers, date and 22 23 time, you know, things like that. 24 Okay, so I must have misunderstood. Q So you 25 did run that diagnostic tool then back when OLEO-2 came

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back on line at the end -- after the two failovers, I 1 elyø 2 quess, basically. OLEO 2 was back to primary machine. And then you ran this diagnostic tool? 3 Yes, 2 was back to primary. I had gone out 4 А and passed through the control center, saw that things 5 appeared to be getting back on track, and then went 6 7 back in. 8 And, you know, to be honest with you, I could 9 be mistaken as to whether I ran that diagnostic or not. 10 But I'm sure I did. I'm sure I did because of the 11 formatting of the reporting was off. And then let's just go on and we'll maybe a 12 Q little further on the computer issues here in a few 13 minutes. But let's just go on then to the sequence of 14 events after that. 15 You and Ron were together still in the 16 17 computer room? Is that correct? 18 А Yes. 19 And then what happened? 0 20 He and I engaged in a conversation for А 21 duration. I'm going to say roughly a half an hour. You know, we share similar likes and interests. 22 23 And, you know, we bounced off this, you know, just basically different ideas and just kind of talked. 24 25 And then headed out of the computer room.

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And on our way out of the computer room at that point in time -- no, prior to heading out of the computer room -- I want to say somewhere around 4, 4 or 4:10; maybe something like that -- Kevin Divig had come in and asked if it's okay to restart the pipeline system.

At that point in time, I told Kevin that, yes, from a computer perspective, things appear to be stable and functioning properly. We've got, you know, approximately ten minutes of stable activity, you know: Do things look right on your pipeline system? I didn't ask him that. But, that's I guess

13 we assume that.

And then Ron replied that, yes, it was okay. Whether that was verbal or a nodding of the head or what, I don't remember.

17 Q Was there any conversation as to why the line 18 was down?

19 A At that point in time, no.

20 Q Okay. So Kevin just basically said, "The 21 line's down, I need to restart it"? Okay?

22 A Yes, that was what I witnessed.

Q Do you know if Ron Brenson had been in there in the control room before he came into the computer room?

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	3	inaraace	w you made.			
	4	A	I may have.	I may have. I se	em to recall	
	5	something. I'm not sure though that and, you know.				
.	6	that's wrong. I mean, if there's something going on in				
	7	the pipeline, he pretty much knows it. I'm sure he				
	8	knew what	was going on.		,	
	9	You know, I could tell you that just from				
	10	experience, that if there was ever anything going on,				
	11	he knew a	r, who was or	1		
	12	duty and	who, you know,	was doing what.		
	13	Q	Okay. But, i	n this brief conv	versation, th	nere
	14	were no s	pecifics about	the status of an	ything other	;
	15 than "the pipeline's down and cannot be star"					et.
	16	you recal	13			
	17	А	Yes, that's c	orrect,		
	18	Q	Then what hap	pened at that poi	int?	
	19	A	At that point	. that's when we	kind of star	ted
	20	our, or c	ontinued on ou	r talking about t	hings. And	
	21	Kevin Wen	t back and sta	rted up the syste	2m.	
	22		Shortly after	that, roughly, f	lifteen or	
	23	twenty mi	nutes, Ron and	I were kind of w	orking our v	13Y
	24	out of th	e computer roc	m. And Kevin, yo	ou know, rusl	<i>r</i> eg
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"We've got a report of a large volume of 1 KIENE gasoline from Rick Keeny in Watkin Creek." And that 2 Ferndale had been shut down already and the block 3 valves were closed at 7 and 12, I believe it was -- or 4 7 and 16, I think. 5 And then we pretty much -- I'm not sure what 6 7 happened then other than me sitting down and starting 8 to assist any way I could in keeping a phone log, 9 trying to help make phone calls, notify people, things like that. 10 Okay, so did you and Ron Brenson then follow 0 11 Kevin into the control room to find out more? 12 13 А Yes. And attached to your deposition, there was 14 0 two pages of handwritten notes that we had been 15 provided previously. Is that the log you're referring 16 17 to that you generated? They weren't all generated by me. Some of 18 А the first entries were entries that were preexisting, 19 and I wanted to combine all of them on a document that 20 I was managing. 21 So that's -- the first few of them weren't my 22 23 specific, just a copy over. But, that overall document that we've been 24 0 25 produced at Quin was basically produced then by you?

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1 Α Yes. During this --? 2 0 During that accident, yes, sir. 3 A When you and Ron went back into the control 4 0 room and you were helping out, do you remember what did 5 you do specifically at that point? 6 7 Did you make phone calls? Did you look at the computer? What did you do? 8 I pretty much, since I had not been running 9 А the pipeline or knew where any of the people were and 10 we had two controllers that were senior to me in there 11 working it, I did the phone calls. That was pretty 12 13 much all I did. I don't recall anything else other than maybe 14 creating a form for tracking contractors for one of the 15 supervisors. I think I did that. 16 17 And that's it. Okay, did you look at any pressure trends? 18 0 I do -- actually, I did do a little bit of 19 Α pressure trending but, you know, it wasn't anything 20 that I was real successful at and felt good about the 21 results, that it was publishable. 22 And I believe also I think Brenson told me he 23 had been working on some of those. I'm not clear on 24 But, for whatever reason, it's something I 25 that.

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didn't follow through on and take ownership of. 1 2 It's fairly, a process of building trends is 3 fairly intensive. And I kept getting pulled away from 4 it and doing other things and just didn't -- didn't see 5 any sense in continuing to try to do something that 6 somebody else was already working on. 7 Well, based on the trends that you were able 0 to access, did you draw any impressions? 8 I'm not talking publishable. I'm just 9 talking to you as a controller accessing this 10 information. Did anything stand out in your mind that 11 12 vou saw? No. 13 Α 14 0 Do you remember what trends you looked at? Not specifically, no. 15 А You didn't print any? 16 0 I would have, I mean I would have been 17 Α 18 trending the affected section, the discharge, you know, control of suction at Ferndale, the incoming pressure 19 at Bay View, you know, things like that is I believe 20 21 what I was trying to do. 22 But, you can trend them for any time 23 duration. And like I say, it's very tedious to get all three of them overlapping, you know, to where you're 24 25 happy with the results and want to print it.

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1 And, no, I did not print it. Well, I may 2 have printed it and then tossed it. I didn't keep 3 track of it. But you don't have any reaction or 4 Q recollection of what you saw? 5 Well, no, I don't. You know, if you're 6 Α 7 asking me if something looked horribly wrong based on 8 those trends, no. 9 I'm asking you if something stands out now--0 10 Α If something stands out? No. 11 0 -- and your recollection based on what you 12 were doing, what you saw. 13 Α No. Not at all. Okay. Then do you remember -- I know you 14 Q 15 said you were making the phone calls. Do you recall 16 did you make notifications to every agency, or is that 17 something that the supervisor did? Yes, that was relegated up the incident 18 Α command structure; primarily, Ron Brenson would take 19 care of that as well as the rest of the structure above 20 21 us. So you're making phone calls generally to 2.2 Q 23 internal Olympic people to mobilize your own team 24 members in your group? 25 Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Informational in А

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nature. You know, let people know that we've got a 1 2 major situation here and that we may need you, things - 3 like that. 4 I did -- I received a call from Rick Keeny, 5 too, when the creek caught fire. Let me see where that call was. That's one I'll never forget. 6 7 Were you actually talking to him on the phone 0 when the ignition occurred? 8 9 А Yeah. Yeah. 10 Q And I'm sure he was pretty shook up? 11 А Yeah. Yeah, he was. You know, we all... 12 Q Okay. We talked a little bit about Ron. As 13 a manager, what kind of a management style would you 14 say that Ron had? His style is very easy-going, easy to talk 15 Α 16 to. I was on good, very good rapport with Ron. Ι 17 think he respected me and I respected him -- and I 18 still do. I think he -- I think he had too much to do. 19 20 I think the Equilon structure filled his plate up too much to do. So, a prioritization with him -- and this 21 22 is my perception, my... I believe prioritization for 23 him was an issue. 24 But, as far as him as a manager, in my 25 perspective, he's one of the best I've ever worked for.

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Do you have any kind of a sense for how he 1 Q Horf got along with Frank Huff? 2 Yeah. Yeah, they were at odds on issues. I 3 Α can't tell you specific issues but I do know that 4 5 issues that were important to us in the control center were not issues to Frank. I do know that. 6 7 And you felt like Ron would -- Brenson -0 would strongly express the concerns of the control 8 center and represent those concerns to Frank? 9 10 А I assume that. That was your impression of --11 Q Yeah, you bet ya. 12 Α 13 0 -- him as a supervisor? 14 Α Yes. 15 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: All right. Well, I 16 think I'm going to go on and see if Cliff has any questions. 17 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Can we have a break for a 18 19 minute? INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Yes, let's break. 20 21 Okay, I'm sorry. Yes, please. 22 (Recess.) INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Cliff had a few 23 24 questions. BY MR. ZIMMERMAN: 25

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1 Q Good afternoon.

A Hello.

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Q Could you tell me what Olympic's policy was regarding whether where there was a commission, that could be a possible leak? What were you supposed to do?

7 A Minimize loss and shut the system down. You 8 know, shut the system down in a manner to minimize loss 9 and get people mobilized to deal with it.

Notify their immediate supervisors, and
 respond.

12 Q Okay. In reality, how do you go about 13 complying with that policy when you have a potential 14 leak but you don't know if it's a leak?

You have some system indications that youhave a leak.

17 A I don't quite understand the question. If 18 you don't know you have a leak, you wouldn't be 19 inclined to do any kind of a response.

20 Q Okay, let me back up then.

21 On your system, do you have leak indications? 22 A We have a leak detection computational model 23 that can declare a leak, yes.

Q And are those declarations always accurate?Is there always a leak?

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Not that I'm aware of. You know, we haven't 1 Α 2 really tested it out, to be honest with you. I mean we believe in it. We believe it to be accurate. 3 So, when you do get a leak declaration and 4 0 you believe it to be accurate, what actions do you 5 6 take? As I outlined before, you would shut down in 7 А the manner that reduces, you know, product loss for 8 9 whatever you deem to be the suspect site, and isolate 10 it. Notify it. In the incident that happened on June 10, did 11 0 we have a leak declaration? 12 I believe the leak detection system did issue 13 Α an order, yes. 14 Because of the computer problems, do you know 15 0 whether the controller received that declaration? 16 17 I don't know. А I believe one was logged. I know one was 18 19 logged and issued. But, you know, since I wasn't in 20 the control room, I have no knowledge other than that. Tell me a little bit about the leak detection 21 Ō software that you have that is -- I'm going to say part 22 of your SCATA system? 23 I don't think that would be appropriate. 24 А It's driven -- its telemetry, it's being fed telemetry 25

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by a passthrough that is the same system that hands it 1 to the SCATA system, you know. It picks it up from the 2 SCATA system to use for its calculations. 3 The data is passed through the SCATA system 4 0 5 to the leak detection software? It doesn't just go 6 there? You know, I'm not real expert on the exact 7 А data flow or path. I know that the leak detection 8 model gives its information the same way SCATA gives 9 its information. And where in the data flow that 10 occurs, I can't sit here and tell you that. 11 Have you ever seen a copy of API Standard 12 Q 13 1130 regarding leak detection requirements? I may have. 14 Α You may have? You're just not sure? 15 0 Correct, I'm not sure. 16 А You're not sure if you ever read that? 17 0 There's a number of details in that standard if you do 18 have leak protection system that are required then, DOT 19 regulations. 20 And that's where my question came from. 21 Have 22 you ever seen that... want to use that standard? 23 А A lot of information is passed to and through our control center. That may have been a document that 24 25 I read and perused, but it wasn't a document that I

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1 used in my every day job or was responsible for any 2 type of compliance. 3 And I wasn't part of any team that said, 4 okay, this model has to comply with these regulations. 5 So I might have read it and digested it and 6 forgot. 7 And this regulation went into effect 0 8 recently. The standards have been prepared for a while 9 but it was not the part that... mentioned... 10 I was just again trying to find out if you 11 had any familiarity. 12 Α Yes, I knew that there was, you know, coming 13 down the pike was -- I was aware that there was a 14 regulation for a leak detection system. 15 But, when that would be forced, you know, that's... 16 17 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you. That's all I 18 have. 19 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Geoff? 20 MR. SMYTH: I don't have anything. 21 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Johnny? 22 MR. PARRISH: I don't have anything. 23 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Dione? BY MS. MAZZOLINI: 24 25 Were you at all involved in helping try to Q

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determine the amount of product that was lost?

2 A No, I was not.

BY MR. KATCHMARE:

4 Q Hi, Lloyd.

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A couple of things on confirming what you had told Allen to some of his questions. When you were talking about Ron Brenson, your supervisor, you said that as an afterthought that you thought he may have too much to do; they relied on him heavily, his workload.

11 When did that start? Had he always had too 12 much to do?

13 A You know, I don't know. At that point in 14 time, or in now, I've only been with the company for 15 six years. I'm really quite junior to the company 16 compared to the other employees.

But, part of that would be answered by myperception of what was too much.

I would say my perception of thinking that he
had too much to deal with or too many responsibilities,
I would say probably manifested around '97.

I would say something like that, as early as '97.

Q And what occurred in '97 that you think may have put too much on his plate?

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I can't say anything specifically other than 1 Α just, you know, "Oh, you do that, too? You do that, 2 too? You do that, too? You do that, too? 3 Okay. Was Mr. Brenson available to you as 4 0 5 much as you needed him to be available to you? 6 Α Yes. Yes. 7 For the whole five, six year tenure there? Q 8 А Yes. 9 0 And his availability hadn't gone down in the past year? 10 No, not that I can -- no. You know, there 11 Α 12 were little things that, you know, went unaddressed. But, from a scale of priorities, they were little 13 14 things, like scheduling issues and things like that. 15 Okay? In discussing the computer when you failed it 16 Q over and that whole scenario, you had said that 17 actually Ron had showed up when the OLE had come back 18 19 up healthy? 20 А Yes, sir. And you all went in there and looked at these 21 0 22 finals and you found something wrong, or he found something wrong with one of them? 23 24 А Yes, sir. There was what appeared to be a 25 typo in one of the fields.

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1 Could you explain what a typo is? 0 2 An incorrect piece of data like, instead of А saying "OLLEE" as OLJH, you know, NNN, it said 3 4 OLJH.NNN. 5 0 Was that something that you would have 6 entered it? 7 Α No. 8 This is something generated by the computer? 0 9 А I believe it to have been. As I previously stated, I tripled check that record and felt 10 confident -- and still feel confident -- that I did my 11 work right. It's really -- and the reason I can say 12 13 that with confidence is I don't know if you ever use 14 patterning, but you can kind of stand back and look at 15 a document in its entirety. 16 And if this pattern doesn't match this 17 pattern, it jumps out at you. And when you've got the windows tiled like 18 19 that, a blank spot between letters jumps out. 20 0 Right. Right. 21 And that would have happened. А 22 Q I guess my question, to be more specific, was 23 this typo in one of the blanks that you would have filled out? 24 25 А It was in one of the records. I believe it

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1 was-- I don't know for sure but I believe it was 2 recognized to be in one or both of the records I 3 created.

Q Another question. If the computer was up and running healthy, why do you think Mr. Brenson wanted to delete that file, or did, in fact, delete those two files?

8 A Because I believe, like I had told you 9 before, that any time the computer is running along 10 healthy and it gets sick, well, what has changed?

11 The only thing that changed that initially 12 made the computer sick was my creation of those 13 historical containers.

And he had no reason to believe that that wasn't the case at this point in time, that it just hadn't gotten around to using those records and that it would get sick again.

That's an assumption on my part of what he was thinking. But I would have done the same thing, you know, had I recognized the potential for them to still exist, even after jumping through these rebooting hoops.

Q Good. When Ron Burke came out and alerted you to the fact that the computers were sluggist, or whatever he did say to you, was Ron Brenson there at

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1 that point?

2 A No.

Q Okay, did Mr. Burke seem excited?
A Not, you know, Ron very seldom seems excited.
But, no, not at all. He just came in and said, "Do you
realize this?" And that was simultaneous with me
getting a nonresponsive command prompt.
So I mean we pretty much knew it as soon as

9 it was manifest. He did mention that, you know, what 10 Kevin had done and that there was some sense of getting 11 this fixed.

12 Kevin had swung his line from Renton to 13 Seattle and that the pressure was in a gradual 14 increasing profile.

So, if we could, you know, the sooner the better to get control.

17 Q So Ron Burke had told you all that. Kevin h 18 had made his swing --

A He had told me that Kevin had made his swingto Seattle. That's all he told me.

Q Okay, and he expressed that the sooner the better, you can get this computer up and running? A I can't say that he expressed that or I knew the developing scenario in my mind. Q And then you paged Ron Brenson?

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1 A Yes. It may have been both the intercom page 2 as well as the alpha numeric.

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Q When Ron showed up in the computer room, did he say anything to where he may have known that Kevin had shut down the line, or had line shut down? His line?

7 A No. I didn't give him a chance. I just 8 immediately wanted to, while it was fresh in my mind, 9 go over my situation with him. And then just in case -10 - you know, it was critical to me that I had taken the 11 right steps and done the right things because I didn't 12 want it to recur. That was paramount in my mind.

13 Q Let's go to -- well, let's stay there for a 14 minute. When Kevin came out, Ron was still with you? 15 Ron Brenson was still with you?

A At which point in time? Kevin came out twice, the first time to ask about restarting, and the second time when he informed us of the product in Watkin Creek.

20 Q Okay, so can you walk through --

21 A And ron was with me for both of those.

22 Q All right. Well, did Ron say anything when 23 Kevin came out and mentioned, or asked the question,

24 "Can I restart the line?"

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25 A We were both standing side by side and I, you

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know, I told Kevin from a healthy SCATA system side, it 1 2 looked okay. And I believe Ron nodded yes in agreement, or did agree that it was okay. 3 4 · I don't know. I can't sit here and say that, yes, I heard Ron say "yes." I don't recall. I know 5 6 that sounds lame. 7 I understand. I'm just asking questions. Q So was Ron curious as to why that line was 8 down? Ron Burke's line wasn't down. 9 I don't know. I have no idea what Ron was. 10 А Like I said, I hold him in highest esteem. He always 11 12 seems to know what's going on. 13 There was no reason for me to assume any 14 differently then that he hadn't done his homework, and he knew what was going on, you know. That would be my 15 16 assumption. 17 Okay, but you're the one that paged him. And 0 you just don't know if he came to you through the 18 control room? 19 20 А Correct. 21 Q Because he already knew what was going on 22 there? You have no idea? 23 I have no idea. Α 24 But he didn't act surprised that Kevin's line 0 had been shut down? 25

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No. Lines shut down, you know, often. 1 А 2 0 That particular line? The Ferndale, or 3 Cherry Point to Ferndale to Bay View? No, they all do. There's a lot of pieces of 4 А equipment on them that are subject to failure. Not 5 failure but, you know, shutdowns and things. 6 7 Have you been able to sit down and discuss Ø with other people in Olympic what happened on June 8 10th? 9 Not in a formal manner, no. But, since it's 10 Α 11 happened, it's definitely been a topic. We all discuss 12 it and such, not formally. Do you feel like you know everything that was 13 0 going on about the event from the Olympic employee 14 15 perspective? All the aspects? 16 I feel like I know enough of all of the А factors involved with the accident, yes. 17 18 Have you personally ever called a refinery to Q 19 stop the flow in a pipeline that you could not control? 20 А I have not. 21 0 Do you understand that that's what happened 22 this day? I don't know what happened in the control 23 А I wasn't in there. 24 room. That's why I asked you the first question, if 25 Q

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you had discussed this with other people, if you had 1 2 learned about all the events of this day. 3 And you haven't been told that, that somebody 4 called maybe the refinery to shut the product off? 5 Α I don't know. It might have been mentioned 6 but whether it was actually mentioned in the context of 7 something that was done that day, I don't know. 8 Let's go out to the Bay View Products Q 9 terminal and the six months just after it was 10 commissioned. 11 Do you know whether the Ferndale or the 12 Anacortes line was commissioned through Bay View first? 13 А I want to say Ferndale, but I'm not sure. 14 0 You had mentioned when Allen had asked you--15 Actually, it may be Anacortes because -- no, А 16 I don't remember. Allen had asked you about the relief valves 17 0 18 out there? 19 Α Yes. 20 And you had mentioned something about 0 21 verbally calling a mechanic and asking them at three to 22 five different times to check those valves? 23 I can't say that -- I know of one time for А 24 sure that I did the verbal call. But I want to sav 25 that the valve was serviced that I'm aware of three to

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1 four times.

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Q Okay.

3 A Not me specifically asking the mechanic to4 fix it.

5 Q Okay, but can you go through that scenario? 6 What I'm after is do you remember what the 7 pressures were?

8 A Generally, it was post 700 psi shut-in. I 9 recognized that the valves were set -- I believe they 10 were set 50 pounds under that 700 psi threshold.

Now it seemed to me that they should have
relieved, any time they were exposed to anything less
than the 700, they should be relieving.

However, in real life, I've seen relief valves that you can gradually increase the pressure up above their relief set point. And if it's done gradually, it takes a percentage above what their set point is for them to actually function, especially if it's a gradual profile.

I explained it away to myself that that's what was going on, that they weren't getting at. I mean, once the telemetry saw 700, more than 700, the control valves are closing to protect the loop inside. The reliefs are inside. And all of a sudden, we're 50 pounds over where they're supposed to be

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1 relieving. And maybe they never see enough to relieve. 2 And that's, you know, because I had seen them 3 a couple of times act, you know, close, act like they were functioning. The mechanics had checked them. 4 5 I felt like, when they were needed, they were going to work. I believed that they were going to work 6 7 when they were needed. That the 700-pound thing was just muting that spike that was necessary to actuate 8 9 them. 10 0 Now this one time that this occurred when you 11 were on duty as a controller out there, you mentioned 12 that the mechanics actually went out pretty much right 13 away. And I guess the line had shut down so you had to 14 start it back up. 15 And you said they did some kind of a flow 16 test? You know, I can't tell you exactly what 17 Α happened on any given day. But I do have the 18 experience of a line shutting down. I do have the 19 experience of them on several occasions calibrating and 20 dumping the relief valves. 21 22 0 Do you know at what pressures they would have 23 done that? 24 The pressures were lower than the 700 pounds. Α 25 We wanted to stay away from the high end of it. They

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could lower the pilot down to where they're below the 1 existing line pressure, which would allow them to 2 function and dump. 3 And that's what they would do. 4 Yes, but you had to have started some flow. 5 0 6 Yes. No, the line was flowing when they were Α 7 doing this. 8 At what kind of a pressure would they have 0 reduced the relief valve? 9 Whatever I was able to run the line at 10 Α 11 comfortably and felt good about as a controller, you 12 know. 13 0 Could you give me a figure? 14 А Three to four hundred pounds. Guesstimate. 15 Maybe, five. Did you ever have to call somebody out to 16 0 open that isolation valve at Bay View on 1902 coming 17 18 into Bay View? Isolation valve? 19 А The motor-operated valve, inlet receiver 20 Q 21 valve. 22 А Okay, receiver inlet valve? Yes. 23 0 24 I believe I have, yes. А Do you know what they would have done to open 25 0

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A I believe that there was a way for them to --J I believe there was a way for them to relieve the incoming pressure, or manually, you know, set the alignment to where they could reduce the incoming pressure below the 700-pound threshold so that a reset was capable?

And be that generally when that happens, you know, downstream goes down and the south end of the line is slacked or lower pressure. They could take things on manual and open the downstream valve and then crack the upstream valve and allow pressure to bleed off slowly through the receiver inlet valve, and on down line until it drops below that threshold.

Q Do you know if that was a common occurrence? A I believe that, initially, we experienced some of that. But, as we got to learn and know the station, we were able to get the line shut down quickly enough and avoid that higher pressure sitting on the incoming side of the facility.

Therefore, the shutdown would do its thing. The valves would cycle shut and then we could reset it, and open it up and resume operation.

24 MR. KATCHMARE: Thank you, Lloyd.
25 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Geoff.

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MR. SMYTH: I've just got a couple of quick 1 2 questions on some training. I maybe missed it. 3 BY MR. SMYTH: Were you trained at home station there in 4 0 Renton on the SCATA system, or did you travel somewhere 5 and receive training? 6 For training on SCATA, it was pretty much 7 А mentor training there at Renton in a very controlled 8 9 environment, and very basic stuff. And was that taught by Olympic personnel, or 10 Q the SCATA manufacturer had someone come in and train 11 12 you? 13 No, it was Todd Smith and I. And I would not Α attempt to do anything without buyin from Todd. And he 14 was always there, you know, to coach me and mentor me. 15 16 I did have at any point in time, I had the 17 capability of contacting Bob Deberet and Teledyne Brown, any other support there at any point in time if 18 I felt I needed to. 19 Did you ever ask for like more training from 20 Q 21 the supervisors or Todd or anyone to go to Teledyne? 22 А I did, yes. 23 And what was their response? 0 24 They allowed me to go to -- they made А arrangements and I was able to go do an introductory 25

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D course on the newer SCATA system, which pretty much 1 2 encompasses the old one. I went to a course in Dallas. 3 And I also attended a course in Houston. Dallas was the training and, prior to that, was 4 5 Huntsville, Alabama at Vector User's Exchange. And that was all post-June 10? 6 0 7 А It was post-June 10, yes. 8 Okay, so before June 10, did you ask for any 0 9 training to go down to Dallas, or Texas before that? 10 А I had expressed interest, but no one ever 11 said no. I had expressed interest. 12 But, no one ever came forward --0 13 No one ever said --Α -- and said, "Well, here's your plane ticket. 14 0 You're ready to go." 15 Yeah. You don't express interest, you know, 16 А if you don't have the talent and they just send you 17 off. I mean there's got to be an evaluation period to 18 show that you may -- that it's not just --19 20 0 And do you know did Todd ever attend any 21 classes from then that he would be able to teach you 22 then? 23 А Yes. I believe Todd had been to classes. I'm sure he had been to User's Exchange. And I'm sure 24 25 he had been through the introductory at the Teledyne-

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1 Brown facility.

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2 Q Was there a standard that you were training 3 to?

A Well, not that I'm aware of, but bear in mind that the things that I was doing with SCAFA wasn't nuts and bolts stuff. I mean it's utility-driven every day stuff. I mean it wasn't anything -- there was nothing I was doing that had the potential, short of hitting the halt button on the CPU, of crippling the SCAFA system.

11 Q And I'm kind of -- just for my own knowledge 12 here. Special assignment, is that something that --13 who assigns you? I mean do you get assigned that 14 because of your interest in going towards the SCATA? 15 And what is a special assignment?

A The special assignment is just a generic label that may not even be used by -- I mean that's something I picked up with Mobil. It may not even be used by Olympic. Just an assignment to other than what I was doing.

There was a need for display screens to be built for the Bay View terminal. I had shown some interest, and still do, and pretty much have learned how to maintain the displays on the system.

Q So it wasn't anything HR Department gave you

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1 a special assignment? 2 А Correct. Special... 3 0 А Correct. 4 MR. KATCHMARE: I was just curious. Okay, 5 that's all I have. 6 7 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Linda. MS. PILKE-JARVIS: Yes, just a couple, thank 8 9 you. BY MS. PILKE-JARVIS: 10 What's your understanding of the purpose in 11 0 Olympic constructing a Bay View station? 12 13 Α The intent, I believe, was to increase throughput, the capability of the tank farm and the 14 inventory that it was able to utilize. 15 The intent was to basically increase 16 throughput and stabilize throughput issues. 17 By utilizing tankage in a float operation, 18 you know, we could basically be filling tankage, 19 20 pumping into and out of tankage at Bay View with maintaining a head. So that if the refineries had any 21 kind of an upset or anything like that, the pipeline 22 23 continues pumping along on down the line. And their upsets do not affect us. If they 24 have turn-arounds and other things like that coming 25

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down the line, we could stockpile volume there and 1 THROUGHT allow them to do work without losing downtime from down 2 Time. 3 That's part of it. There are other parts of 4 it as far as the relationship to it and our Cross-5 Cascades project that we have been working on. It was 6 primarily an efficiency tool from what I understand. 7 And the ultimate goal was to increase 8 throughput through reducing downtime. 9 Was the downtime from the refineries? Was it 10 0 your impression that it was a little problem or a 11 medium-sized problem or a big problem before Bay View? 12 А I don't feel, since I've been there for such 13 a short period of time, I don't feel qualified to 14 answer that accurately. 15 How does Bay View fit in with Cross-Cascades 16 0 17 project? There would be greater demand in feeding the 18 А Cross-Cascades pipeline system. Therefore, the need, 19 20 you know, for increased throughput exists. Thank you. You worked as a controller for 21 0 Mobil for I think you said five years before you came 22 to Olympic. 23 Yes, five plus, five and a half, maybe more. 24 А Do you have any sort of general impressions 25 Q

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about differences in being a controller for different
 companies and corporate culture policies?

A Actually, they're all very similar in their policies and their cultures, things like that. Olympic is very unique in its structure in that there are actually-- it's a tandem operation.

You've got two controllers side by side
operating simultaneously. It's the first time I've
ever been exposed to that was here.

10 That's about it. Just, the culture is pretty11 similar.

12 Q Do you mean when you say tandem operation, do 13 you mean the difference was that you got to work with 14 somebody as opposed to working alone in the control 15 room? Is that what you mean?

A Carlor

16 A That is correct, yeah. All the other systems 17 I had ever worked prior to now were a one-man console 18 operation. I believe that's probably the industry 19 standard.

Though I think networking capabilities have broadened the capability of oversight to adjacent consoles and things to monitor stand-alone systems remotely, you know, in the event this man gets hung up in the can or something, you know. Things like that. Q During the time that you've worked at

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Olympic, have you ever participated in a near-miss
 review?
 A Yes.

A Yes.

4 Q Was that prior to June 10th?

5 A Yes.

Q And would you say that there was an open atmosphere at Olympic for folks to report near misses and conduct reviews and try to understand how to connect?

10 A Yes. And, though I believe it was in its 11 infancy, you know, the near miss thing had existed in--12 by infancy, I mean a whole formal process being 13 established and everyone getting on board.

I believe the process existed before but it wasn't nearly as formal as it was growing to become. It was open-minded and actually a good thing.

17 Q Can you recall what the circumstances of the18 near miss was that you participated in?

A I believe the one that I was involved in was a ton-volume contamination on Seattle, at Seattle Harbor Island, where we had a line fill of gasoline, 9,600 barrels that was to be pushed in, and then diesel was behind it.

24 And the receiving terminal for both the gas 25 and the diesel were the same company. And they had

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prealigned and were open and ready to receive both the
 gas and the diesel.

And the controller on duty aligned up to the diesel side and put gasoline, a volume of gasoline on top of a diesel fuel tank.

6 That was the one that I was actually directly 7 involved in.

8 Q And then how was it communicated generally 9 back to Olympic? You know, whatever resolution came 10 out of the near miss? How was a prevention measure 11 implemented after a near miss review?

12 A I believe at that point in time Al White had 13 taken ownership of that process and was publishing near 14 miss incident reviews on email. And emailing them out 15 to everyone.

Q Thank you. You talked about your impression was that Ron Brenson had too much to do. Did you ever have that general impression within other areas of the company? Were there other sections that perhaps had too much to do, and too few people?

A My overall perception was that we were a lean organization, is that there was always way more work than employees, you know, to do it.

24 Q Just two more questions.

25

You told us that after you failed over from

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OLE-2 to OLE-1 that you then went into the control room and looked at the screens to try to see if it was coming back up.

A Yes.

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Q Did you say anything to the controllers? Anything, you know, for example, explain what was happening, or tell them that it would take a little bit more time to come up or tell them not to send commands until it came fully up?

10 A I believe that when I passed through, I 11 mentioned that -- I let them know what I was doing, the 12 steps I was taking, that I have halted 2. One appears 13 to be ill. The connectivity is there.

And I think they may have provided me with some feedback as far as ramp a setpoint or something, and that it seemed sluggish and not like -- like it wasn't working like it should?

And, at that point in time, Kevin mentioned that he had had Jim Traphoffer shut down the pump at Allen Station.

21 Q I'm sorry? Could you say that again? 22 A Kevin Divig had had Jim Traphoffer, I 23 believe, shut down a pump at Allen Station.

Q Kevin had Jim shut down the pump station -- a pump at Allen Station?

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Yes. 1 Α Jim is somebody in the field? 2 Q 3 А Yes. How would Kevin communicate to Jim? 4 0 Telephone. Nextel. We have Nextel systems, 5 А which are like two-way radios, telephones. 6 That's just the first time that --7 0 Yeah. He didn't say that specifically to me. 8 А 9 You know, you have a habit of kind of talking out loud 10 when you're in the control center. It's a way of sharing information, you know. 11 And if someone's available to pitch in, they 12 13 will. Thank you. Here's my last question. 14 0 Have you ever, yourself, or heard of other 15 controllers where both computers had been lost at the 16 same time, other than this day? 17 No. I believe this is the first time it's 18 Α ever occurred. 19 Ъ Ever hear anybody say that the SCATA had 20 Q slowed down prior to this day? Had it be unresponsive? 21 22 А Not specifically. There may have been some 23 instances in the past, like years ago, that people had talked about. But I can't tell you specifically that, 24 yes, we have seen this, you know. 25

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1 MS. PILKE-JARVIS: Thank you. MR. TIEKEN: You're welcome. 2 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Patti. 3 BY MS. IMHOF: 4 5 Q When you came to work for Olympic in 1994, 6 were you aware of the new project that was going on at 7 Bellingham at the water treatment plant in the same 8 pipeline... 9 I was not. А 10 Was there any communication that you can 0 share with us between the control room and the field 11 about times when excavation was occurring, or where you 12 13 needed to be performed or informed? Not that I'm aware of, no. We do have a 14 А guideline, a reporting guideline, that if the pipeline 15 is unsupported, if it's excavated, if they're digging 16 around it, you know, if it's close enough to where we 17 18 face the risk that, you know, we're to be notified and 19 to be aware that they're there working. 20 But, here again, I was brand-new. You know, 21 I could very well -- I'd just been focusing on my training material and it had happened, but I have no 22 23 knowledge of it. 24 MS. IMHOF: Thanks a lot. 25 MR. TIEKEN: You're welcome.

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INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Jim.

MR. TIEKEN: Hi, Jim.

3 BY MR. CASH:

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Q In the displays when you're building Dig's Creek, do you -- how do you normally do that? Do you start from scratch, or do you pull one up that's sort of the same and then change the values that you need, or do you do it from scratch each time?

9 A Bay View was scratch because there was 10 nothing else like it. But, once you have an initial 11 schematic or templet with the points existing, you can 12 utilize that by deleting and undeleting pieces of it to 13 create other -- to speed up the process of creating 14 other --

Q The first one is a lot of work.

16 A The first one is a lot of work.

17 Q The second one is --

18 A Yes.

19 Q Do they normally use the same nomenclature 20 for the valves and the same nomenclature for the 21 pressure sensors, all that stuff? Is that generally 22 the same?

A It generally had been the same in the past.
However, in the interest of creating a uniform data
base, we decided to change that a little bit. Just in

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point-naming is all rather than trying to name a
 certain -- let's say you've got a pressure transmitter
 here in Bay View on the 20-inch receiver.

In the past, it would be, okay, Renton, 20inch receiver in the past this point would be an analog point. So the third character in would be an A for a denoting an analog data base.

8 The first three might be RTN analog, and then 9 it would be like 20-inch RCV TMP. What we decided to 10 do was a one on one application of the P&ID for these 11 devices rather than trying to come up with a naming 12 convention for each device, the P&ID drawing has 13 instrumentation numbering on it.

So we utilized that for point identification.And that's really the only thing that changed.

16 Did you go back and change them all? Q Yes. The intent was to use that as a 17 А 18 standard and work our way through the system in its 19 entirety to where any operator, any electrician could 20 open up the drawings and I could say, okay, I've got 21 trouble with this pressure transmitter or temperature 22 transmitter.

You say, okay, look on your drawing. It's
this guy. You go out to the pipeline. That device has
that label on it to where there is no confusion as to

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1 exactly what device you were referring to. 2 Q So you're switching to their instrumentation 3 people's --4 Α Well, we're basically -- we still use the BPT, the first three, and the analog or the I. But 5 then the last character denotations would be -- and 6 7 that's something that's invisible to the controllers. 8 They don't generally see that. 9 Q Right. 10 А So, yeah, that's what we did. Do you feel or have you had any training, 11 Q formal training, besides OGT training on building 12 13 screens? 14 Α No, sir. 15 So do you feel that you're using all the 0 16 capabilities that are built into the screens as far as 17 colors, sounds? I don't feel that I'm an expert, no. I feel 18 Α 19 like I got a pretty good handle on it. And using most 20 of the attributes, symbols, things like that. But, no, 21 there's more I can do. There is more I can do. 22 Just not enough time? Q 23 That's probably it, yeah, because that was my А 24 second job. I was trying to be a controller also. 25 And when you bounce between them, it's a lot.

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1 It's a big job to keep current on and digest and 2 maintain. 3 Have you had any formal training in VMS 0 4 operating systems? 5 I have not. А 0 Just OJT again? 6 OJT again, yes, in a mentored, controlled 7 А 8 environment with Todd. And, generally, when that was 9 done, that training, if there was any kind of a threat, 10 it was done on a machine that was off-line. 11 0 Do you maintain a VMS documentation set, or 12 do you have CDs? 13 А We have, actually, we have the documentation set I believe in what they call -- I think we have 14 We have the CD and we have the --15 both. 16 Q The lines? The tapes, the volumes. 17 А But you don't have the book volumes? 18 0 19 Oh, yes, we do. We have the old original А 20 volumes and we have the CDs. Sorry. I thought you 21 were talking to the actual program itself. Is your SCATA set up to automatically, like 0 22 when VMS kicks off, you know, once VMS comes up, does 23 it automatically start up SCATA, or is that a manual? 24 The SCATA command set? 25

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The SCATA command set. Once you're at the А 1 menu prompt, you have a choice to start it. And once 2 you start that, yes, it will line up the processes and 3 then trip the final flag, which simultaneously starts 4 5 the SCATA system. 6 That's not automatic? If there was nobody Q there, it would just sit there? 7 Correct. Unless it's a fail. 8 А No, but coming up from a cold blue 9 0 From a cold blue, no, it requires 10 А interaction. 11 I'm going to come back to that. 12 Q 13 The terminal that you were doing the --14 building the historical records, is that an external? 15 A DEC windows terminal of some sort? 16 A Yes. 17 So that would be like a lap terminal? It's a 0 network terminal? 18 It's a network terminal, yes, the transport. 19 Α I don't believe we were using LAT. I believe we were 20 using DEC's proprietary transport. It might be. I--21 I think you're the only ones that use it. 22 Q 23 А Okay. 24 But it's not a serial terminal. You do have 0 25 a console for each machine... to the console port?

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1	A At that point in time, w	e did, yes.
2	Q That was just a regular	teletype printer?
. 3	A It was, yes. A logger t	ype. It looks like a
4	typewriter.	-
5	Q Yes, an LE-100?	
6	A That's it.	
7	Q In general, how would yo	u kind of
8	characterize your system as far as	let's say disk
9	space? Is that generally an issue	or do you normally
10	have plenty of space and you aren'	t too concerned about
11	that?	
12	How would you generally	characterize prior to
13	the	
14	A Prior to any upgrades or	anything?
15	Q Well, the June 10th.	
16	A Well, to be honest with	you, I'm not I
17	don't know enough to make a judgme	nt call on that. But
18	it was never an issue. It was nev	er something that was
19	ever voiced, said, "Oh, we're runn	ing out of disk
20	space, let's do this." Never an i	ssue.
21	Q How about like processor	? Idle time and all
22	that? Was that	
23	A I was aware of the proce	ssor load percentage
24	and that it, you know, and that it	was running up
25	there. You know, up in the 85 per	cent range, something
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1 like that.

Continuously? 2 0 3 Α I don't know if that was continuously or not. I don't know. Once again, remember, I'm very, very 4 junior when it comes to SCATA expertise. 5 0 In your mind, how long does it take like for 6 a cold boot for VMS to come up? 7 At that point in time, it was twelve to 8 Α 9 fifteen minutes, depending on how rapidly -- if you're 10 standing right there responding to the day time input and the logger prompts, file transfer prompting and 11 12 such, it would take twelve to fifteen minutes. And I don't understand what it's prompting 13 0 for. This is VMS when it's coming up, or SCATA? 14 This is, well, they work hand in hand. 15 А Those machines were dedicated as SCATA, so the VMS, the OS 16 would start first. 17 Okay and that --18 0 And then prompt for date and time and your 19 Α login. It was date and time primarily and then it 20 21 would do its startup thing. Then you would be required 22 to I believe log in to VMS, and then you would have the menuing option to do real time system startup for the 23 Vector-SCATA system. 24 25 And, at that point in time, you initialize,

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PAGE OLYMPIC PIPE LINE CO 4252357717 07/19/2001 03:35 P 03/03 206 624 2805 JUL-17-2001 18:03 SIDERIUS 265 say. yes, real time system startup. Then it asks you 1 for a transport option, or a file transport option. 2 You know, which files do you want to copy over. 3 But, say cold boot to VMS was fifteen 4 0 5 minutes? To VMS? I don't know. The entire process to 6 А SCATA startup is fifteen minutes. I would say the cold 7 boot VMS to that first prompt and those first machines. 8 I would guess it to be maybe six. I don't know. It's 9 10 just a guess. It took almost as long as starting SCATA? 11 0 12 Well, I don't know. VMS may be quicker. A 13 I've never paid attention to that aspect of it. 14 You kind of alluded that you had known about D 15 several pressure relief valve cycles at the Bay View 16 station in the previous months before the June 10th? 17 If I search -- I have backups say in the last 18 two months. Would you think there's a good chance of 19 having a hit in there on one of those pressure valve 20 cycles in the last two months? 21 Oh, there were a bunch of them, you know. A 22 yeah. But, whether the line was actually active or 23 not. I know that there's been numbers passed around for the frequency of relief valve indications and all of 24 25 that. EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTERS, INC.

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A lot of those were done in an idle state 1 while we were checking the facility out, you know. 2 So you'd have to be careful not to --3 0 Yes, you'd have to be careful to say, oh, 4 Α veah, you've had this many instances of this. Well, 5 6 you know, the truth is a lot of those times, the 7 facility was shut down. I was considering going back those last 8 0 several months and just querying, searching through, 9 10 looking for those. 11 Α Feel free. At 3 o'clock in the morning, there are 12 0 13 probably --14 Α They're probably the real thing, yeah. Yes, unfortunately, we haven't been able to twist the 15 16 mechanics' arms into coming out at all times of the 17 day, you know. But, if it's 2 o'clock in the afternoon, it's 18 0 19 maybe a test; right? It's hard to say. But, generally, if they're 20 Α going to be out there testing, it could happen at any 21 time. But, yeah, they plan their day and it will be 22 23 during normal working hours. And you'll probably see a lot of them grouped 24 together, a lot of activity. 25

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Can I just go through one more time and just 1 0 make sure that I have it straight on the failure? 2 You bet. 3 Α So you did the historical record change. And 4 0 then you felt you typed it in. You basically cut and 5 6 pasted from. 7 No cut and paste. It was all typed in input Α 8 on the form. However, I had the other form right above 9 it that was full, so I knew which fields needed what. 10 And the form above it was for an identical point at another pump station. 11 12 0 So all you had to do was make the correct--13 Follow the pattern. Α 14Yes, but change the data input source to be 0 15 the correct one. 16 Α Correct. 17 I wondered why you had the two screens up and Q 18 I thought you were cutting and pasting. 19 I wish. I wish it was that easy. А 20 So then you submitted that and it seemed to 0 21 take it okay. And then you -- no, you didn't go away 22 then. It was starting to generate errors after a 23 while? 24 А Yes, after that initial test, you know, and 25 things looked okay to me, I felt pretty good about my

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1 work and I did something else. You know, I don't know 2 what I was doing, something, maybe looking at my 3 display work documenting, you know, something. I don't know. I don't know what I was doing. 4 ·Q Right. 5 And then when I checked it again -- and 6 Α 7 that's normal. You do something, you check it and give 8 the machine a chance. It can dynamically set 9 priorities. You know, give it a chance to digest and 10 check it again and make sure that it likes what it's 11 gotten. And when I did check it again --12 13 It was still on your X-terminal? 0 This was still on my X-terminal, yes. 14 Α It was still responding at that point. 15 0 16 And this was still on the number two machine. А 17 That terminal was on the 2 machine. 18 Q It was actually on both unless you closed the 19 other window; right? 20 Well, now the other machine, I didn't Α 21 necessarily have to be logged on to the other machine 22 at that point in time. You know what I mean? 23 Anyway, just two windows. And they could 24 both be on the same machine. Anyway, that's it. And 25 then about ten minutes later, I started getting these

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errors.

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Do you remember what error it was? 2 Q It was pertaining to the historical data 3 Α I believe it was -- and I believe it was 4 base. complaining about those specific records I had created. 5 Okay, and then you checked your work and it 6 0 7 was still responding okay? Checked my work. My work came back clean. 8 А 9 It looked good. I felt and you know it was still generating alarms, you know, at its normal frequency, 10 which is a lot of alarms. You know, a lot of errors. 11 And then, you know, the computer seemed to be 12 healthy. And form what I understood, that was normal. 13 I mean, there was nothing I could do in that data base 14that would cripple that computer. 15 Had you ever made a record change that 16 0 generated alarms? 17 I have, yes. 18 А It appeared the same way? 19 0 Appeared the same way. And I would just back 20 А out by deleting the record and -- or looking at it, 21 22 noticing my error, and that. So, at that point, you had deleted -- you 23 Q went in and deleted the records that you --24 No, at that point in time, I felt, like No. 25 Α

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I said, that there was a -- how do I put this -- that there was a time frame that seemed short to me that the computer had saw something it didn't like and started generating errors.

Well, it's thinking in milliseconds,whatever.

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Q Right.
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8 A And it's generating these alarms and that 9 they will go away because I was confident in my work.

10 So the computer was healthy. Everything 11 seemed just fine plus the knowledge that nothing really 12 I could do there would hurt the health of the machine. 13 I walked away for approximately 20 minutes or

14 something; came back to sit down and double-check to 15 make sure that the errors were gone and that it had, 16 you know, done what I was thinking it should do, when 17 it was unresponsive.

And, at that point in time, almost simultaneous to me typing in the command and waiting at the prompt going "huh", Ron sticks his head in the door and says, "This thing is not responsive."

22 And that's when I started the routine of 23 trying to do a recovery.

24 Q All right. And you went to the console; that 25 didn't respond either?

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My initial, yes, the console was 1 Α unresponsive. The LA-100 was unresponsive. 2 The machine would not respond to me, 2. However, I was 3 able to access the data base through an x-term that was 4 5 on the secondary. 6 Okay, that was the replicated data base? 0 7 А Yes. The only one at that time? 8 0 9 А Yes. And data base records are in real time memory. My thinking was that I could go up and delete 10 11 it on the secondary on real time and that that would take care of it. 12 And that was my intent. I was able to get in 13 14 I was able to delete the records. I felt that there. 15 they were gone. At that point in time upon deletion, 16 having no other means to do an orderly fail on 2, the only thing I knew to do was halt it. 17 18 And that's what I did. At that point in time, it was my belief that 1 was then primary, should 19 20 have taken over role as primary, function as primary. I made my pass through the control center, went back. 21 22 It wasn't doing it. I immediately started the reboot process on 23 24 2. I may have started it before I even left. You Knowing that it took a while and I wanted to be 25 know.

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speedy. And just prior to 2 coming up final, I halted 1 2 1 to make sure there wasn't additional mirroring or 3 corruption happening back from 1 to 2. How far along -- was 2 coming back up when 4 0 5 vou--Oh, just I crashed one just prior to the 6 А final message that SCATA was started. There's a 7 8 duration. You follow the --9 I see. So the VMS was up and you had already 0 kicked up SCATA. 10 The VMS was up. SCATA was starting. 11 А It's got like 13 processes that it starts before it gets to 12 the final live flag. And at that point in time, JAMMIT 13 14 trips it and it comes live. So you just halted. 15 0 16 And I just halted 1, and 2 at that point in А time appeared to be healthy. 17 18 0 What was your indications that 1 wasn't cutting the mustard there? 19 The pass through the control center, the fact 20 Α 21 that some of the sites appeared to be displaying a 22 "sianne" color which denoted communications failure. 23 Some were; some weren't. 24 I'm sure the dispatchers mentioned that there 25 was sluggish response or no response from set point

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ramping. Things like that. 1 You didn't, you know, run any test or 2 0 anything on 1, run the command that --3 You know, I felt under the gun. I felt like 4 А if it was going to get better in that twelve to fifteen 5 minutes, 2 was booting, that it was going to get 6 7 better. 8 I'd done all I'd known to do, you know. MR. CASH: Excuse me for a second to see 9 10 this. (Perusing documents.) 11 12 That's it for me. Thanks. MR. TIEKEN: You're welcome. 13 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Eric. 14 MR. TIEKEN: Hi, Eric. 15 BY MR. SAGER: 16 On June 10th, were you asked to provide a 17 0 18 urine specimen? I was. 19 Α What time? 20 0 Later on in the evening, probably. I believe 21Α I was over -- this incident happened somewhere around, 22 you know, 1630-1700. And I believe I donated around no 23 24 later than 1830, 1900. 25 Q What time were you asked to provide a

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specimen?

2 A I don't remember.

Q • Do you recall who asked you?

4 A No. I was handed a package and I went to the 5 hospital.

6 Q You don't remember who handed you the 7 package?

8 A No.

9 Q Would you have any objection to providing the 10 Safety Board with the results of any tests that were 11 done on that specimen?

12 A No.

13 Q On the 10th of June, were you taking any 14 medications?

15 A If I was, it would have been Sudafed for 16 sinuses, and that's it. And you'll probably find some 17 caffeine in there, too.

18 Q How much caffeine?

19AOh, I don't know. I drink three to four cups20a day.

21 Q Do you drink coffee when you're not working?

22 A Yes, sir.

23 Q What time did you come to work?

24 A Between 6:30 and 7.

25 Q How much sleep had you had?

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1	A A full night, thank God. I really relish
2	working days. The older I get, the shift work is more
3	difficult for me. But, yeah, I'd slept real well. I
4	always do.
5	Q What time did you go to bed?
6	A Now that's a good question. I would say my
7	normal no later than 10.
8	Q Is that your routine?
9	A Yes.
10	Q When you're working days?
11	A You bet ya.
12	Q And how many hours of sleep do you normally
13	get when you're not working?
14	A When I'm not working day shifts, it averages
15	around six to seven. You know, it depends on when I
16	get to bed. Last night, I was in bed and asleep by
17	probably no later than 10, you know. And I'm up by
18	4:30, you know. So, six and a half to seven.
19	And then, if I get tired, I'll get eight to
20	nine, something like that.
21	Q When you're not working?
22	A Oh, when I'm not working? It depends on
23	I'd better not say that.
24	(Laughter.)
25	I get about the same, I would say. I've got

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a pretty solid clock, you know. I would say more
 though. I would say generally eight, eight to ten,
 maybe a little more.

Q Per night when you're not working?
A When I'm not working, yeah. Maybe, make it
seven to nine, I would say. You know, a little more,
not a whole lot more.

Q I know this is asking a lot from your memory
9 but do you remember how you were feeling on the 10th?
10 A I was feeling great. Yeah, feeling good.

11 Q In what respect?

12 A All respects. I was confident in the work I 13 was doing. I was pleased that I got to do something 14 and be working outside of the control center. I was 15 welcoming the opportunity. I liked it. I liked what 16 I'm doing. Still do.

17 Q Do you smoke?

18 A No, sir.

19 Q Do you use any tobacco?

20 A No, sir.

21 Q How would you describe your diet?

A Boy, my wife works full time. Not enough home-cooked meals. I would say it's good though. I get adequate food.

25 Q What is adequate food?

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Well, you tell me (laughing). 1 А 2 Tell me about it. 0 3. I have good food. I, you know, just what do Α you want to know? I bake potatoes. I eat steaks. I 4 eat Ramin. I eat Macaroni and Cheese. You know, I eat 5 everything. Greens. A little bit of everything. 6 7 Breakfast, I'll generally have a muffin, something like that, a blueberry muffin or a scone with 8 9 my coffee. And your mid-day meal? 10 0 Mid-day meal, Eric, it will be whatever I 11 А 12 happen to grab out of the frig. You know, I'll have some fast foods that I can nuke. When I'm working 13 14 special assignment as I was that day, I'll go out for lunch, you know. 15 16 Sometimes, I won't eat lunch out. I'll eat it at my desk. But I'll eat whatever I have. You 17 know, leftovers if I'm lucky. 18 And your main meal? 19 0 20 А My main meal? Yes, that's your mid-day meal that we were 21 0 talking about. 22 My mid-day meal? 23 А 24 0 That's what we were just talking about, 25 wasn't it?

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Well, I don't know. I was kind of touching 1 Α base on all of them, sir. But, if you're referring to 2 3 my main, which you call mid-day meal -- I've always thought a dinner is my main meal. But, okay, if you 4 think main is mid-day, I'll have -- whatever I have. 5 Ramin soup. Sandwiches. You name it. 6 7 0 Was there anything unusual or any serious or major departures from this kind of food on the 9th and 8 9 10th of June? No, sir. 10 А Nothing stands out in your mind? 11 Q No, sir. 12 А How many days had you worked consecutively on 13 Q 14 the 10th? Well, it was a normal week, Monday through 15 Α 16 Friday. What day was the 10th? I want to say -- was 17 it a Tuesday? It was a Thursday? So that would be my fourth day. 18 19 I have to apologize. I don't mean to be flip about the meals, you know, but it's pretty tough when 20 21 you start describing them unless you, you know, unless you're anal about baloney sandwiches day in and day 22 23 out. 24 Q No problem. Were you on the 10th under any

25 particular personal stress, not associated with work?

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I have had some stress in my life but on that 1 А particular day, I don't recall any that may have been, 2 3 you know, may have impacted my performance in any way, shape or form. 4 5 And you're taking no prescription 0 6 medications? 7 А That is correct. That is correct. 8 Earlier, you alluded to how controllers 0 sometimes work by talking out loud. 9 Yes. 10 А Y Have you ever worked with Kevin Divig? 11 Q Λ Yes. 12 Α Does he talk out loud? 13 0 14 Α He does. 15 Does he talk out loud all the time or when 0 he's excited? Or any other remarkable time? 16 I can't give you any specifics. Kevin, you 17 А know, Kevin will talk. You know, we all kind of talk 18 to ourselves now and then. You know, I mean it's no 19 20 more than any other individual, I don't believe. No, there's nothing that stands about, you 21 22 know, Kevin thinking out loud. It does not stand out in your mind that he 23 0 works in silence though? 24 Let me rephrase it. Is he a particular quiet 25

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1 worker?

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2	A Huh-uh.
3	Q And it wouldn't surprise you if he was
4	talking out loud, and it wouldn't surprise you if he
5	was not talking? Is that what you're trying to say?
6	A Well, I'll tell you, you know, we do so much
7	communication on the phone, on the Unicator, with
8	our backs to one another. You know, it all mixes
9	together.
10	I don't you know, that's a tough call.
11	Q When you were with Mobil, what capacity did
12	you hire out on?
13	A Did I hire in as? As a pipeliner.
14	Q And does that mean you were working outside?
15	A Yes, sir, I started out on the pipeline
16	digging it up and coating it and repairing it and
17	painting it.
18	Q Was that right out of high school?
19	A No, sir. I was twenty years old, I believe,
20	when I started.
21	Q Service time?
22	A With Mobile? No. Oh, military?
23	Q Yes.
24	A I'm a military brat, but no service for me.
25	Q And what had you done between the time of

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1 high school and you joined Mobile? 2 I was a cook. А 3 0 Would you trace your work history while you 4 were with Mobile? Why, sure. Pipeliner, station operator, 5 А field gauger. 6 7 And at about what time intervals? 0 Okay, pipeliner was relatively short -- six R Α Station operator, relatively short -- six 9 months. 10 months. Field gauger, initial stint, approximately, two years. Pipeline controller initial stint, 11 approximately two years, I would say. That's a total 12 of five, is it? 13 Okay, and then for the next six or seven 14 years, I believe I was a field gauger out of Torrence 15 meters. And then for the balance I was -- and maybe 16 less on that field gauger thing. 17 Two years also I ran the prover truck. I was 18 a measurement person, calibrating flow meters 19 throughout the State for Mobil. 20 Running a tractortrailer setup. And then I was a controller for the 21 🖉's Dallas National Control balance of my time in Mobil 22 23 Center. How many years total did you have? 24 0 grand total? Fifteen. 25 Α With Mobild.

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Q Why did you leave?

2 Why did I leave? Well, for one thing, I grew А 3 up in Alaska and I'm not particularly fond of Texas. For another thing, my father lived in Spokane 4 and had gotten cancer and was dying. And that was the 5 main thrust is I wanted to get somewhere close to where б I could be with my dad before he died. 7 8 And who hired you here? 0 I was interviewed primarily by Ron Brenson 9 А but I went out to dinner with Ron Brenson, Duane 10 11 Whitlow, Will Hood, Dave Smith on my initial contact. 12 And Dave Smith, I had worked with him with I had some history with Dave on the West Coast Mobil 13 14prior to hiring. 15 Q Do you have much contact with Al White? 16 Yes, a little bit. A little bit. Not much. Α 17 What kind of contact do you have with him? Q 18 А Initially --19 0 Current contact. 20 Current contact? А 21 Q Just back of the 10th. 22 Α Well, very little currently. He's, you know, 23 he's -- we've kind of all been upset since August 16 24 when BP took over, you know. And we kind of really 25 don't, you know, don't see a whole lot of each other

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while things shake out and people get their different
 positions and such.

I do realize that Al had for a while there been appointed to leading up to management of change processes within BP. And that's -- and I might see him briefly on a daily basis. Just briefly.

Q Had he ever consulted you about complaints
that he had gotten from controllers? About Bay View or
any other controlling problems?

10 A He took ownership of -- I believe there was 11 towards the end of the Equilon thing, or in the middle 12 of the Equilon -- I don't know if it was Equilon or 13 Texaco at that point in time. But, at that point in 14 time, I think it was Equilon.

You know, we were getting -- the controllers were getting a little bit frustrated with the Bay View situation. Al did take ownership of an issue raised by John Smith and tried to help facilitate meetings along those lines and address some of these issues that John felt he had.

And I think then he was spearheading Equilon's version of management of change, then as well as other -- another title, Best Practices, I believe it was.

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He was part of the Near Miss thing. He's

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1 another guy that was taking ownership and doing as much 2 as he could. 1 3 0 Between Kevin and Ron Burke, who is the more Λ senior controller? 4 5 I believe Kevin is. A 6 What would make him more senior? Q 7 А Experience. 8 In terms of? 0 Time in grade, as well as I believe at one 9 А 10 point in time there was -- there's a title, too. Kevin 11 is a Controller II, and Ron is a Controller I. At that 12 point in time, that label existed, or those titles 13 existed. What do they mean? 14 Q Controller II generally means that you 15 А 16 accomplish certain on-the-job training bench marks, 17 including training other people for the job. Time -- I 18 believe there was a ten-year time frame, things like 19 that. 20 And I'm sure that your track history was part 21 of that benchmark, you know, things like that. 2.2 Q Were there just two levels of controllers at that time? 23 24 А Yes, sir. And then controller trainee, or something 25 0

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equivalent? 1 2 I would imagine, yeah, something like that. А MR. SAGER: That's all I have right now. 3 Thanks. 4 5 MR. TIEKEN: Okay. Thanks, Eric. INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: I have a few questions 6 7 for you. 8 First of all, I think just as an 9 administrative matter, I need to label this Compulsion Order as Exhibit Tieken No. 1, because I did that 10 11 earlier. 12 So I'm going to do that and that will be entered into the record. Do we need to go off the 13 14 record? 15 (Record paused.) (Whereupon, the previously-16 17 identified document, marked as Exhibit Tieken 1 for 18 identification, was received 19 20 into evidence.) 21 BY INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: 22 Q And I believe I just was talking about the label on your exhibit here, the Compulsion Order. And 23 so just for recordkeeping, we'll make sure we get that 24 25 entered in.

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You had mentioned, Lloyd, the diagnostic 1 program. Does that generate some kind of a record, a 2 file that's created that it stores the results of that 3 in somewhere? 4 There is an error dot dat file, yes, that 5 А 6 mirrors that. And is that like rewritten every time you run 7 0 that diagnostic? 8 No. If I understand it correctly, that is 9 А written all the time. When I run the diagnostic, it 10 11 just plays it back. Oh, okay, so that diagnostic assesses that 12 0 13 file and tells you what's in it? 14 А I think so. Actually, to be honest with you, 15 I'm not absolutely clear on the relationship between 16 the two. It may be that when I run that utility, I'm 17 getting them as they happen and it's not playing 18 anything back. But, they read by me and deposit it in the 19 error dot dat file. 20 21 But you believe that that would store some 0 record of some of these error messages in that file? 22 23 А Yes, sir. About how many different screens did you 24 0 develop for the Bay View facility, do you recall? 25

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Okay, let's see. I would guesstimate, well, 1 А 2 seven or eight, something like that. Is that a typical number compared to the rest 3 0 of your station facilities? 4 I don't know that you can say there's a 5 А typical number. I would say, since Bay View is so 6 7 large and complex, it's more than other facilities. 8 Q So other facilities probably have fewer than 9 that? 10 А Yes. And there could very well be more. 11 There may be as many as 12. Okay. Now how was your morale as of the time 12 0 13 of the accident? It was good. Okay? You know, it was good. 14 Α How about the morale of your co-workers in 15 Q 16 general? You know, co-workers in general, I would have 17 Α 18 to say morale was probably average, you know. Average. 19 Maybe, below average. 20 Was it better or worse than, for example, 0 21 when you joined the company? I can't say it was any worse. To me, it just 22 Α seemed to be a norm. Not that great, you know. Not 23 24 that great. 25 0 So you didn't notice any decline for any EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTERS, INC.

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particular reason in morale?

A Not -- no. No. No, just concern as to the perceived workload that Bay View might implicate in its operation, you know, and what that would mean. And a lot of that is the fear of the unknown, I believe. You know.

7 Q How about did you notice any kind of a 8 tension I guess between the former Texaco people or 9 former Shell people or that kind of thing that you 10 noticed in your...?

11 A The only, you know, there was a division. 12 Without a doubt, there was the Equilon people and there 13 was the Olympic people, you know.

And whether that was perceived or what or just driven by title, I don't know. But it just seemed -- it almost seemed like, you know, since they were administrators, that what they said went. And that our feedback was ignored if it didn't agree with, you know, their agenda.

That was the feel. Whether it's, you know, I can't tell you whether it was real or not. I'm real happy to work there. I always have been.

Q Well, I was asking your perception -A I like what I'm doing. And that is it.
There was definitely a morale issue. Not so much

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Shell and Texaco but each time a new administrative 1 company walked in the door, they had their own pet 2 plans that were rolled out. 3 And even to the point of -- I've been told. 4 I haven't experienced -- where they would try things 5 that the Olympic people knew wouldn't work, and they б would ignore feedback because they wanted to learn 7 themselves, you know. Things like that. 8 And the Equilon people were senior 9 0 management, correct? 10 Yes, they were. 11 А They were the management team. 12 0 They were the management team, yes. 13 А The management team was the Equilon. 140 15 Yes. A As a controller, were you aware when the pipe LINE 16 Ω لملاسم 17 was finalized? I can't say always. Generally, we would be 18 А made aware of he saw something that we needed to know 19 about. And I believe a schedule was published. 20 But, as far as him saying, Hey, I'm flying now and this is 21 what I'm flying -- no. 22 MR. SAGER: Where was it published? 23 MR. TIEKEN: I don't know. I can't tell you 24 25 where. I want to say I've seen one, you know.

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BY MR. BESHORE:

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2	Q So I guess what you were getting at was a
3	posted in the control room on a weekly basis?
⁻4	A No. No, no, I don't believe anything like
5	that took place. It was more or less, "Yeah, the pilot
6	flies it." I may have even heard it, you know, word of
7	mouth, "The pilot flies it once a week," you know.
8	Q Now I want to ask you a question about if an
9	operator, for example, at the local to the Bay View
10	facility entered a command into the system there, at
11	the computer system. And they can operate certain
12	things and devices within Bay View; correct?
13	A Yes, sir.
14	Q From a console there?
15	A Yes, sir.
16	Q Is that going to show up in your command
17	center as an uncommanded entry?
18	A Yes, it would.
19	Q An uncommanded entry may also be the result
20	of somebody physically doing something manually;
21	correct?
22	A Yes. However, prior to at Bay View facility,
23	a valve moving was someone at the valve. The valve has
24	to be taken into an off/auto state. And we get state
25	indications from the valve.

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So we would, you know, prior to a valve 1 operating, we would show that "state" changed from 2 "remote" to "off auto". 3 Would you see that same change from remote to Ο 4 off auto if a command were issued to the console at Bay 5 6 View for that same way valve closure? You wouldn't get 7 that extra little indication? No, sir. 8 А INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Does anybody have any 9 other questions? All right, Peter. 10 MR. KATCHMARE: Thank you, Allen. 11 BY MR. KATCHMARE: 12 Lloyd, when you were at Mobils and you were 13 Q out in the field and they brought you in to be a 14 controller, how much training -- how long did it take 15 you before you were allowed to operate alone? 16 With Mobil being the first time I had ever 17 А been a controller? Oh, I want to say six months maybe, 18 something like that. 19 20 And then when you came to Olympic, you 0 obviously had a history of being a controller. How 21 long did it take you to come up to speed to where they 22 allowed you to go into the rotation? 23 I want to say in the neighborhood of three, 24 А 25 three to four months, something like that.

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Okay. When you went into the control room 1 0 after you had halted only 2, and only 1 was coming back 2 3 up. And you walked into the control room, you mentioned that you had overheard Kevin on the phone 4 5 asking someone -- or Jim -- at Allen Station to shut 6 down a pump there? 7 That's incorrect. А Okay. 8 0 9 I overheard Kevin talking out loud. He may Α have been directing it at me, stating that he had had 10 Jim shut down a unit at Allen station. 11 It had already happened? 12 0 13 А I don't know. My assumption is that it had 14 happened at that point in time, yes. 15 Okay. Did you hear anything else, or did 0 Kevin say anything else to you about anything else that 16 17 he had done? Didn't have time. I was just passing through 18 Α scanning the monitors. And, you know, taking care of 19 20 the computers. That was my primary role at that point 21 in time. 22 Did Ron Burke say anything to you while you 0 were in there? 23 24 А I don't recall anything, no. Ron looked 25 pretty busy.

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293 Ron Burke looked pretty busy? 1 0 Yeah, he looked pretty busy. 2 А 3 0 Doing things on the screen or on his 4 paperwork? Whatever he was doing, he just looked busy. 5 Α I don't know if he was on the phone talking to people, 6 7 logging information, what. But, whenever I was in there, he was busy. 8 9 When you were saying that the controllers 0 usually talk out loud, the question is: 10 Would Kevin have, in your opinion now -- I 11 know you weren't in there -- but would Kevin have said 12 to Ron Burke, "I think I'm going to call Jim at Allen 13 station and have him turn those pumps off"? 14 Or would he have asked if Ron Burke thought 15 16 that was a good idea? How do you think that would have 17 gone? I think that that was Kevin's line and he 18 А would have just done whatever -- he knew where his 19 people were. Ron was running his line. Kevin knew 20 where his people were, when they were getting there, 21 22 what his options were. He knew the history of the pipeline for that 23 time frame leading up to it. I believe it was Kevin's 24 call, you know. 25

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When you're operating one or the other of the 1 0 2 line segments, you just indicated that Kevin knew where his people were. When anybody arrives at a station, do 3 they call into the control center to say "I'm here"? 4 5 А They try to, yes. Okay, and that's how you would know? 6 0 7 Well, unless you had managed to contact them А and they were near by and directed them there for help. 8 9 And you also mentioned that Olympic is one of 0 10 the -- the only one that you know of that they work people in tandem. 11 12 Have you ever worked a line that has been looped? 13 14 А Yes. I have. 15 0 And you've worked it by yourself? Yes, I have. Wolverine Pipe Line System. 16 А Okay. And it's very similar to the --17 0 In some respects, yes. It's similar in its 18 А capability. But, when I was running it back in '93, 19 '92, their philosophy was way different. 20 They were point to point. They didn't strip. 21 22 They -- you know, they've got no topography to deal with. You know, it's a very linear hydraulic 23 It's similar but different. 24 profile. 25 So, in your estimation, this is a lot more 0

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1 complex loop system?

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A This system, because of the flexibility options, and in addition to Bay View, yes, it is an extremely complex system.

5 Q Is there enough work for two controllers to 6 operate the Olympic pipeline system?

A Is there enough work?

Q The reason I'm asking, this is the first place you worked in tandem with someone. Could one person operate this entire system? Or would that be too much?

12 A I honestly believe that would be too much 13 work for one person. I think if all your ducks are in 14 a row and everything's just perfect, and maybe if they 15 slowed them down and the scheduling was just right and 16 nothing right, yeah, you might get away with it.

17 Q Have you ever had a relief valve go off while 18 you were operating the pipeline system? Any portion of 19 the pipeline system?

20 A Yes, I have.

21 Q And how many barrels may have gone into the 22 tank?

23 A We're talking where?

24 Q Doesn't matter to me. Anywhere.

25 A It depends. It depends on where you're at

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and the kind of flow rate and things. Generally, I 1 would say anywhere from five to ten barrels. 2 Could be more if the relief failed. You 3 know, failed to reset and hung open. It just all 4 depends. But, on the average, five to ten barrels, I 5 would say, would be a good average. 6 That's what I wanted was just some kind of a 7 Q quantity. You were talking about the near miss - 8 reviews. Were there any near miss reviews done on the 9 valve closure at Bay View? 10 I don't know. None that I'm aware of. 11 А Any -- not with Bay View? 12 0 Now wait a minute. When you say with the А 13 "valve closures", are you referring to when the 14 facility was doing what it was designed to do, protect 15 itself? Since it was doing what it was designed to do, 16 17 that wouldn't be considered a near miss, I don't 18 believe. 19 I mean it was designed to do that. It was 20 doing its job. Were any of these concerns at Bay View 21 0 considered near misses? Or were any of these problems 22 ever taken to a level where anybody, a group of people 23 sat down and discussed them? 24 25 They may have. А

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Q To your knowledge?

2	A To my knowledge, I believe that they were
3	discussed. But whether it was a professional forum or
4	whether it was just impromptu. "We happen to be here
5	in the safety meeting. Let's talk about this."
6	I believe all were aware that we were dealing
7	with issues at Bay View.
8	Q Can you remember a safety meeting, attending
9	a safety meeting where they discussed problems at Bay
10	View?
11	A I don't know. I can't. But I do want to say
12	there was a meeting or two talking about by the
13	supervisors, area chiefs, my supervisor, Frank, maybe
14	Doug.
15	But I can't say for certain.
16	Q Did you feel comfortable with the people that
17	you called out to help you with the problems that you
18	were having at Bay View? Were you comfortable with
19	their experience level and knowledge that they could
20	fix the problem?
21	A I felt comfortable that the problem could be
22	fixed, whether it was one, two or three people. It's
23	kind of the nature of the business if it's mechanical-
24	related, you know, and the operator can't deal with it,
25	you call the mechanic.

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1 The mechanic says that it's got tied into the 2 electrical side of things. I feel comfortable that the 3 problem would be fixed, yeah.

Q Okay, but I guess it happened three to five times that you know of when they were called out and it never had done this.

7 A No, each time they tested it and calibrated 8 it, it worked as it should have. I mean they checked 9 it, they tested it, they calibrated it. You know, they 10 flowed through it.

It appeared by all rights to me, the suspect
relief valves, that they were working and set properly.
MR. KATCHMARE: Thank you, Lloyd. I'm done.
MR. TIEKEN: You're welcome.

15 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Linda.

MS. PILKE-JARVIS: I'm sorry. I have one.
MR. TIEKEN: That's okay. I've got 'til 6.
(Laughter.)

19 BY MS. PILKE-JARVIS:

20 Q I just wanted you to answer another question 21 comparing your experiences with Mobile, your 22 experiences with the one...

And I'm wondering how you would compare Olympic's efforts to safeguard its pipeline with Mobile's efforts to safeguard its pipeline?

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1 And I know that's a very broad question. 2 Would you say that one company was more aggressive than 3 the other?

A I would say that not necessarily aggressive but managed closer, I guess. You know, within the Mobile thing, there was a lot of step by step forms and processes and things that addressed certain issues that I saw more of there than here.

9 But that's about all, you know.

10 Q So what I understand you to say is that, at 11 Mobile, you found that it was a more formal process to 12 safeguard its lines?

13 A It seemed to be, yes. At least, that was my14 perception.

15 Q What kind of tools are available for a 16 company to safeguard its lines?

17 A Safeguard it from?

18 Q Damage.

A Damage? From deterioration? From what?
There's training. There's public awareness. There's
cathodic protection. There's engineering. There's
operational considerations.

There's right-of-way maintenance. There's
right-of-way oversight. There's a visual inspection,
internal inspections with any number of tools, be it

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caliper, magniflux, whatever.

You know. Does that answer the question? 2 Do you feel that Olympic's procedures for 3 Q 4 safeguarding the line were adequate? I believe that the people that had 5 А Yes. their jobs to do to ensure that that pipeline was safe 6 to operate were doing their jobs. I had no -- I had no 7 indication that anything other than that was actually 8 9 happening. MS. PILKE-JARVIS: Thank you. 10 MS. IMHOF: I had a question I'd like to ask. 11 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Go ahead, Patti. 12 13 BY MS. IMHOF: 14 0 Lloyd, can you characterize the atmosphere in the office, the control room and the computer room on 15 the afternoon of June 10 around 3:30, the time of the 16 17 explosion? Well, from 3:30 to 4:30 I was in the computer 18 А 19 room. And, in there, it was basically just me until Ron came in there. And as far as that goes, you know, 20 the atmosphere was task-driven, intense, and confident 21 22 that I was doing as much as I could do. 23 And as far as the control room, on my passthroughs, you know, the atmosphere seemed to be an 24 atmosphere of concern and watchfulness. 25

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Was the atmosphere kind of like a normal day 1 0 in the office, or was it -- I mean I know that in my 2 office, if something is going on, there's a lot more 3 4 tension or excitability, urgency. 5 Was it --There was a level of urgency and of course I 6 А was, you know, pretty active. Here, again, I didn't 7 pay attention to or even digest what I was seeing as 8 far as what they were doing to do their job. 9 But, yes. Like I said, watchfulness. 10 There was an urgency, of course. Kevin was on the phone, I 11 guess, at times, you know. I don't know. But, yeah, 1213 it seemed urgent. But, you know, not "the sky is falling." 14 But, nearly everyone was focused on trying to 15 0 figure out what was going on? 16 17 А Yes. You knew something was going on. 18 0 Well, we knew what was happening. We 19 А couldn't see what was happening but we were visualizing 20 the events of what was happening out on the pipeline. 21 And Kevin more than anyone knew that because 22 23 he knew where the people were, what had been done And he was watching it happen in his mind. 24 where. 25 Even though that computer goes away, you

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know, you kind of know and have a feel for what the 1 system is doing. Like I said, a gradual pressure 2 3 increase until it hits the point of where the snap 4 switch will shut it down. 5 You know, shut down this pump station. Then. 6 the domino effect. The rest of them shut down. 7 All of these protective devices are there to do just that, to keep the pipeline from ever over-8 9 pressuring. And as far as I know, the pipeline never did 10 exceed MOP. 11 So, in your kind of evaluation of the 12 0 situation that you all were dealing with at that time, 13 14whose responsibility would it have been or what would have prompted making a call or contacting someone in 15 the field, or the emergency 911 and City of Bellingham, 16 17 you know? At which point in time? This is post-18 Α release, or this is before? 19 No, I'm talking about just between that whole 20 Q 21 process from 3:30. 3:30 seemed to me to be the time 22 that everyone kind of knew you had a problem. 23 A Well, no, 3:30 was when the computers went 24 down and we lost the ability to actually physically control the pipeline from that location. 25

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Q right.

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2 However, remember, we've got all kind of A 3 safety devices out there on the system that are backup protection that are designed to keep things safe. 4 So you're assuming all of those things --5 0 you're operating, you know, your computer is operating. 6 And, therefore --7 8 А Well, it's the best we can do. You know, not 9 to mention the engineering and the pressure testing, 10 the ratings, things like that. The switches were set to be substantially 11 12 lower than what the pressure testing on the system, you 13 know, yielded. So, yeah, we felt confident that the 14protective devices would do their job. And it wasn't a 15 -- I believe that the feel was that it wasn't -- the 16 airplane wasn't upside/down and diving. You know. 17 I believe that it was landing on auto pilot. 18 I don't know if that's an appropriate analogy or not. 19 But, you know, we feel and have felt strongly that our 20 system is safe. 21 But, ultimately, it was Kevin Divig, the man 22 23 who had that historical profile of the operation and 24 the history of that line for that time frame. It was 25 his call.

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INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: When did you think it-

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MS. IMHOFF: I found my question.

4 (Laughter.)

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5 BY MS. IMHOF:
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Q Some of the other pipeline companies that Ecology works with in the State seem to have a very aggressive policy or kind of corporate/cultural belief that an aggressive excavation program along with the other methods that they have of safeguarding their line isn't appropriate.

So, in other words, they're willing to
excavate when they have other indications that there
may be problems.

Did you find that Mobile had a policy or a culture about aggressive excavation?

A No. I didn't, to be honest with you, I really had no knowledge of that type of thing going on when I worked with Mobil.

20 And it always kind of historically been 21 divorced from the control center. That whole side of 22 things is transparent to us until someone says "Whoops, 23 you know, we got a big problem. You guys need to 24 reduce operating pressure."

25 That's generally, when we knew there was a

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problem, the problem was identified and we were told to
 reduce operating pressure.

3 You know, it's not like we were looking over 4 the smart tool informations and telling them. We always, you know, the pipe was good. 5 So the same with Olympic experience? You 6 0 can't really answer that question because it --7 The answer is: Is Olympic more than any 8 Α No. To be honest with you, I never worked with 9 other? 10 other companies that had informed me as much about work 11 being done on or near the line and digs and things like 12 that. Am I understanding you correctly that you're 13 0

14 saying that, as a controller, you were more often 15 informed of work on the pipeline for Olympic than you 16 were for Mobil ?

17 A Yes.

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18 Q Is that the same as saying that Olympic
19 performed more work? Or are you saying you were more
20 informed or they performed more work?

A It may be strictly, if I'm hearing you right, I think it would be the previous, that I was more informed, you know.

And it could very well be the nature of the fact that a lot of the other systems were in locations

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that weren't as wet. We had some pretty amazing years 1 2 with land movement and such on this system. 3 You know, this is a rather unique environment 4 up here. So maybe that's part of it, too. 5 0 That was thoughtful, well-answered. 6 What did the controllers do on downtime or 7 slow time that they had between products in the control 8 room? 9 There really wasn't much down or slow. But А I'll tell you what. If a line was basically in an 10 11 operational state and things were slow, we always helped one another, you know. 12 13 That is the beauty of the tandem operation, 14 is to be able to say, "Hey, what do you think? I got 15 this going on. What do you think?" 16 You know, and it's a really neat dynamic to 17 be able to bounce ideas off of one another and brainstorm together. And when you solve things, it's 18 19 nice. But, not always possible. There are times in there when it's all each 20 21 guy can do to run his line. 22 Do you have in the control a TV or a radio or 0 23 exercise equipment? At that point in time, we had a radio, and we 24 А 25 had a Nordic track and some exercise equipment, yes.

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You said at that time. Is it still there? 1 0 No. Equilon deemed it inappropriate and 2 А 3 moved it out. MS. IMHOF: That's all my questions. Thanks. 4 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Geoff. 5 MR. SMYTH: I just have one trying to 6 7 reclarify here. In and out of the control room, because you've had Ron Burke discuss the fact that 8 Kevin didn't leave the control room. 9 BY MR. SMYTH: 10 11 When you were moving from the computer room Q to control room, was he always -- Kevin -- was he 12 always at his terminal that you remember? 13 My recollections are that he's always at his 14 Α 15 terminal, with the exception of him coming into the 16 computer room and asking if it's okay to restart. So you physically remember him there the two 17 0 times that you walked through to look at the screens, 18 19 he was --Yeah. My recollection is that he was in 20 Α 21 I don't recall him being gone. there. 22 MR. SMYTH: Thanks. 23 MR. TIEKEN: You bet. 24INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Jim, did you have some 25 questions?

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MR. CASH: I just have one more. 1 BY MR. CASH: 2 You had said earlier that the only deletions 3 0 4 that you had done was to remove the two records that 5 you had put in. That is correct. 6 Α There wouldn't be any reason for you to 7 Q remove any other VMS files, VMS data files, records? 8 9 No, sir. А And as far as you know, nobody else did? 10 Q Yes. As far as I know, that's the scope of 11 Α 12 my knowledge was my deletions initially through the Xterminal 01 and my supervisor's deletions of the same 13 records that appeared to have the typo on M. the 14 stand-alone 02. 15 MR. CASH: Okay, thanks. 16 17 MR. TIEKEN: You bet. INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: I have a couple of 18 questions here. 19 BY INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: 20 First of all, what's a gauge? 21 0 22 А A field gauger is or a gauger -- my duties involve ticketing, meter calibration, tank gauging, 23 quality testing, automatic custody transfer, lease 24 oversight, sealing. All of the above. 25

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Is Wolverine, are they a Mobil pipeline? 1 Q I don't believe so. I believe it was 2 А structured similar to Olympic in that there are 3 multiple ownership with Mobil contracting the 4 operation of the system. 5 So when you were operating the Wolverine 6 Ο system, you were a Mobil employee; is that correct? 7 That is correct. 8 А You mentioned, too, the other places you've 9 0 been in terms of the tandem operation was not --10 anywhere else you had ever been had you ever run across 11 that. And to me implies more than Mobil, or is there 12 other companies you've worked for as a controller? 13 Just Mobil but in different No. 14 Α environments. When I worked initially for Mobils, 15 I was the controller at Torrence refinery. And there was 16 one per shift all by ourselves. 17 When I moved down and became a controller 18 again for Mobil in Dallas in U.S. operations, there 19 20 were multiple segregated consoles operating their 21 national network so you could walk down the hall and, you know, see any system was rather unique. 22 23 You know, so I could go see like the Banger system up or the Wolverine system or the Octopus 24 gathering system for the ethanes and butanes for that 25

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1 type of system, you know. All kinds of systems. 2 0 You mentioned, too, that in terms of the 3 addition of the containers for the archiving of the 4 data pools. And you were talking about the work that you did with the SCATA software package. 5 And I think you said something to the effect 6 that we needed to remember that what you were doing was 7 really basic stuff, that it shouldn't affect the 8 functionality of the software package. 9 10 Is that something you had mentioned today? Yes, sir. I believe that to be true. 11 А 12 Q And yet we're saying also, or people are saying that the subsequent computer slowdown and 13 14 failure was a result of things that you were doing with 15 that understanding in mind with the software. 16 I guess my question to you is do you believe 17 that? That the changes you were making was the result 18 of this computer? 19 А Do you mean caused or precipitated, or 20 caused, had a hand in this failure? 21 0 Yes. I don't believe the work that I did caused 22 А 23 the problem. I believe that it's a coincidence. That's my gut feeling. 24 25 So you think something else caused this Q

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problem and it just happened at the same time 1 coincident to what you were doing? 2 Yes. It may very well have been something 3 А invisible to me, something as simple as tapping a key 4 at an inappropriate time. 5 You know, I don't know. You wouldn't think 6 so. Who knows? But, all I can do is sit here and tell 7 you that I went over that record three times plus. And 8 9 it was right. And when it came back and it looked corrupt 10 on the other machine, when and where that happened, I 11 don't know. I don't think -- I don't believe even the 12 experts could tell you. 13 Well, as far as you know, this was never 14 0 recreated? I mean, this type of failure was never --15 16 let me stop it there. 17 А Yeah. But they never were able to reproduce this 18 0 event in any way, shape or form? 19 That's the way I understand it. Even 20 А following what I have done. I'm assuming they followed 21 what I have done to my steps to have created it. 22 23 But, it's never been replicated. I mean, 24 honestly, I would like to know what happened as much as 25 anyone.

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Would anybody else have been doing anything 1 0 in that system potentially, unrelated to what you were 2 doing, that might have caused -- I mean I want to make 3 sure I understand who had access to get in there and 4 actually do something. You. And do you know who else 5 it might have been? 6 I knew Ron Brenson did. I knew Todd Smith 7 А did. They are the only two that I was -- maybe David 8 Johnson also. 9 Who is David? 10 Q He's in the accounting side of things. He 11 Α may have had access to it. But -- and there is another 12 program where information is brought out from the 13 system that -- no, that's not related -- that the 14 15 accounting people use. But they would be the only ones that I'm 16 17 aware of. 18 0 I mean you're not aware of anything that these other people were doing? I mean, well, let me 19 rephrase that. 20 Are you aware of any of them doing anything 21 22 in the system at this particular time? If they were, you're not aware of it? 23 24 А Yeah. I don't believe that security was an

25 issue there. I believe that, you know, so few people.

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And everybody had a respect for what it was and what it 1 did. So people didn't just, "Gee, I'm going to play 2 3 with the computer." So, yeah, none that I'm aware of. 4 No, I wasn't meaning to ... 5 Q 6 Α I understand. 7 But, essentially, somebody could be in there 0 8 inadvertently doing something? 9 They could. They could. А 10 And caused something to happen and somebody Q 11 else would --12 And, really, I would have to ask you, if you А want the best answer to that, Todd would be the man to 13 14 ask. And the exercise equipment, you said that's 15 0 16 gone. That it was inappropriate? 17 А Yes. Right after the accident, or was that --18 Q 101.00 GAST Right, when Carl Guest came in. 19 А So that was Carl's. 20 0 21 And I believe his impression, he felt that it Α 22 may be -- my feel is that it was an issue of public 23 relations. That it may not look good if cameras come in the control center and here's exercising going on in 24 25 light of this beating we've been getting since June 10.

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Just in your viewpoint was it inappropriately 1 Q used as far as you could tell? 2 Not at all. I believe it's a good thing. 3 А 4 You stimulate the blood flow, you know, in the middle 5 of the night. It's good for you. Exercise, we all know it's good for you. б 7 And if there is an opportune time, if there 8 is a one or two window when segment 1 was down and that guy couldn't bring himself up and do it. I believe 9 10 it's a good thing. 11 Could you hear the audio alarms from Point 0 Track? 12 13 А You could stand right there and work out on it and watch your screens. 14 15 You can see your screens? 0 16 Α See your screens, yes. 17 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Does anybody else have any questions? 18 19 (No response.) 20 INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Just the final 21 question. 22 Is there anything else that we haven't asked 23 you about that you're aware of, or that others asked 24 you about that you feel we should know in order to 25 complete this investigation?

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MR. TIEKEN: I would have to say that you've pretty much covered it all. I can't think of anything. INVESTIGATOR BESHORE: Thank you. We'll go off the record. Thank you. MR. TIEKEN: You're welcome. (Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the interviews were concluded.)

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(active)	2	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE	
	3	This is to certify that the attached	
	4	proceedings before: NTSB	
	5	proceedings beiore.	
	6		
	7	In the Matter of:	
	8	PIPELINE ACCIDENT	
	9		-
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	12	were held as herein appears and that this is the	
	13	original transcript thereof for the file of the	
	14	Department, Commission, Administrative Law Judge	
	15		
	16	EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTERS, INC. 1320 Fenwick Lane, Suite 702 Silver Spring, MD 20910	
	17	(301) 565-0064	
	18	Official Reporter	
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National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594 In the Matter of the National Transportation Safety Board Investigation of the Pipeline Accident Occurring in Bellingham, Washington, on June 10, 1999.

COMPULSION ORDER

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board:

- 1. That Lloyd Tieken has been called to testify or provide other information in this matter;
- 2. That Lloyd Tieken has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination;
- 3. That in the judgment of the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, the testimony or other information from Lloyd Tieken may be necessary to the public interest; and
- 4. That this order has been issued with the approval of the Attorney General or her designated representative, pursuant to 18 USC Section 6003 and 28 CFR Section 0.175.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to 18 USC Section 6002 and 6004, that Lloyd Tieken appear and give testimony or provide other information which he has refused or is likely to refuse to provide or give on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination as to all matters about which he may be questioned in this matter.


IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in accordance with the provisions of 18 USC Section 6002, Lloyd Tieken shall forever be immune from the use of such testimony or information or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony against him in any prosecution, penalty or forfeiture, either State or Federal or otherwise; but the witness shall not be exempt from prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under this order.

Dated this 1204 day of Splenky, 2000.

Exhibit Tieken #1

	or the state of Washington	I F	RANK S. KING, as the ersonal Representative	of the)
IN AND FOR THE CO		2 1	State of WADE B. KING, RANK S. KING and MARY I	and
HERINE DALEN, individually	}	3	UNG, individually, and (. HELL, individually, a PASON KING, individually	TRACY
presentative of the Estate STEPHEN M. TSIORVAS, and as	-{	4 3	ASON KING, individually	
ardian ad Litem for ANDREW		5	Plaintiffs,	\$
TSIORVAS and GEORGE K. IORVAS; and KYRLACOS		6	vs.) NO. 99-2-01467-3
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VB.	NO. 99-2-01468-1	9 1	oreign corporation, EQ NIERPRISES, LLC, a fore	ที่นอง {
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PELINE COMPANY, LLC, a reign corporation, BOULION IERFRISES, LLC, a foreign reporation; and FRED	LLOYD TIEKEN	11	Defendants.	}
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reign corporation, BOULION PELINE COMPANY, LLC, a reign limited liability	REPORTED BY: Katie McCoy,	17	Third-Party Plainti	lffs, }
reign limited liability mpany; and EQUILON TERPRISES, LLC, a foreign	RPR, CSR	18	- VS.	}
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CO GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., domestic corporation, and	·{	22		
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PEARANCES :	3	1	APPEARANCES (Continued)	-
For the Plaintiffs DAVII	d beninger	1 2	APPEARANCES (Continued)	-
For the Plaintiffs DAVII Tsiorvas and King: Liver Ber	D BENINGER ra, Barnett, Brindley, ainger & Orminghem		For the Defendant	MICHAEL R. SPAAN
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For the Plaintiffs DAVII Tsiorvas and King: Luver Ber 701 1 6700 Seatu For the Plaintiff DAVII Tsiorvas: Plat	D BENINGER ra, Barnett, Brindley, ninger & Curningham Pifth Averne Columbia Center tle, WA 98104 N B. PLATIS is Law Firm	2 3 4	For the Defendant Crognale: For the Defendant	MICHAEL R. SPAAN Patton Boogs 1031 West 4th Avenue Suite 504 Anchorage, AK 99501 DOUCLAS WEIGEL
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1		time on June 10th, 1999?
2	A	I was not in the Control Center.
3	Q	Where were you?
4	A	I was on special assignment in the computer room.
5	Q	What was the special assignment?
6	A	SCADA support and training.
7	Q	Which meant you were doing what?
8	A	Support with the software.
9	Q	What do you mean by support? Were you holding it up?
10		Were you helping to fix it? Were you maintaining it?
11		What were you doing?
12	A	Specifically?
13	Q	Yes, sir.
14	A	Specifically which?
15	Q	You had a special assignment. What was that special
16		assignment requiring you to do? I mean I understand
17		the job title, but what were you doing?
18	A	As SCADA support I was primarily creating PIC files.
19	Q	Which means what?
20	A	A PIC file is an end user display that the pipeline
21		controller utilizes to operate the pipeline.
22	Q	Were you doing the work on the SCADA system yourself
23		or were you under somebody's supervision?
24	A	I was under I was actually working together with
25		Todd Smith.

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> (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 11

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		±
1	Q	Who was the company attorney that you met with?
2	A	Dick Allen.
3	Q	And the videotape, is that something you saw here or
4		where was that?
5	A	It was at their facility at their office.
6	Q	And did you bring a copy of the video with you?
7	A	No.
8	Q	How long did you meet with, in preparation for the
9	ł	deposition, with either your attorney or your attorney
10		and Olympic Pipe Line's attorney?
11	A	About ten hours.
12	Q	why so long?
13	A	I had a lot of questions. I've never done this
14	1	before.
15	0	You went through a Grand Jury proceeding, correct?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	You testified for how long before the Grand Jury?
18	A	Maybe two hours. Maybe. Maybe longer.
19	Q	Had you met with the U.S. attorneys before testifying
20		before the Grand Jury?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	How long did you meet with them?
23	A	Approximately 16 plus hours.
24	Q	Did you take notes or have any notes taken of either
25		of these meetings, either the ones you went through
	ļ	
	F	

- 10 1 Q Was Mr. Smith another operations controller? 2 А At that point in time he was. 3 What was he before and after that? 0 Before -- well, I don't know what he was before. 4 А 5 After, he is now a system engineer. 6 0 What systems is he engineering for? 7 The SCADA system. А 8 Q I'm going to back up and I'll come in touch with a lot 9 of these in quite a bit more detail. We'll spend some 10 time talking about some things, but what have you done to prepare for your deposition? 11 12 I have watched a videotape on a deposition proceeding. Α 13 I've met with my attorneys, or my attorney and the 14 company's attorney, and just discussed the process. 15 Who is your attorney? Q Michael Martin. 16 А 17 And is Mr. Martin a family, longtime family attorney 0 18 for you or was he hired specifically after this June 19 10th, 1999, rupture and explosion? One question, please. 20 А 21 Sure. How did Mr. Martin become your attorney? Q 22 Post June 10th, А 23
- Q Is this somebody you hired or is it paid for by the 24
- Olympic Pipe Line? 25
 - Paid for by the company. А

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1		with Mr. Allen and Olympic Pipe Line or the ones with
2		the U.S. attorneys?
3	A	No.
4		(Exhibit No. 217 was marked.)
5	Q	Did you bring anything today in response to the
6		subpoena which I've marked as Exhibit 217?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	Will you provide that to me, please, sir?
9		MR. MARTIN: I've got three documents for
10		you, David. I've got in response to the subpoena
11		you asked for offers of employment, and I think
12		there's enough copies here for everyone to pass them
13		around. That's the first one. That's the offer made
14		by BP.
15		MR. BENINGER: What I'll do is mark that as
16		Exhibit 218.
17		(Exhibit No. 218 was marked.)
18	Q	I'll show you what's marked as Exhibit 218. Do you
19		recognize what that is, sir?
20	A	Ido.
21	Q	What is that?
22	A	That is an offer of it was an offer of employment
23		from British Petroleum for pipeline controller.
24	Q	Same position, just different company, correct?
25	A	Correct.
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		(Isl)ID TIEREN - BY MR. BENNNER)
[13
1	Q	And this would take effect, does it say on here?
2	А	August 15th, 2000. I don't know if it says it here.
3	Q	Is this the same salary that you had before or did you
4		get a pay raise as well?
5	A	My salary has not actually, my salary has not been
6		determined as of yet.
7	Q	They put something down in here is that still of
8		The annual salary. Is that still under
9		negotiation then?
10	A	It is. I accepted this as is, but I intend to
11		negotiate.
12	Q	I assume upper; is that right?
13	A	I would hope so.
14	Q	Is that the salary that you left off with at
15		Olympic Pipe Line or is it lower?
16	A	It's, it's the same base rate. However, a
17]	provision it's excuse me. What I meant to say
18		is it's the same.
19	Q	Okay. It's a long way of getting at it. It's the
20		same, correct?
21	A	Correct.
22	Q	There were a couple other
23	1	MR. MARTIN: The second document you asked
24		for, documents regarding immunity, and the first one
25	ŀ	is a letter dated April 20th, 2000, from the United
	1	
	L	KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 13 of 239
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(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

		15
1		for this deposition. The last, it's a letter dated
2		August 29th, 2000, from the government to me regarding
3		imunity provided by the government for purposes of
4	1	this deposition.
5		(Exhibit No. 220 was marked.)
6	Q	Showing you Exhibit 220, is that a copy of the letter
7		referenced by your counsel from the government to
8		Mr. Martin, your current attorney?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	And it basically states that the deposition that you
11		give today and the testimony will not be used against
12		you, either directly or indirectly, in any criminal
13	1	case being brought by the U.S. Attorney's Office,
14	1	correct?
15	A	Yes.
16		MR. MARTIN: David, I forgot. I've got two
17		other documents here.
18		MR. BENINCER: Okay.
19		MR. MARTIN: The first is a document created
20		by Mr. Tieken on June 10th when he tried to recap the
21		events that took place. The second is a list,
22		handwritten list, essentially of the same thing, and I
23		don't believe I've got copies for everybody. I've got
24		several here. We can have some more made.
25		(Exhibit No. 221 was marked.)

		(LIDID TIEREN - EX MR. HENLINGER)
		14
1		States to Richard Tallman who was previous counsel for
2		Mr. Tieken.
3		(Exhibit No. 219 was marked.)
4	Q	I'll show you what I've marked as Exhibit No. 219. Do
5		you recognize what that is?
6	A	Yes,
7	Q	This was written to your former attorney, Mr. Richard
6		Tallman; is that correct?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	And he was the attorney hired by Olympic Pipe Line for
11		you after the June 10th, 1999, rupture and explosion?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	And it was after this date of April 20th, 2000, that
14]	you provided testimony to the Grand Jury?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	When was that testimony?
17	A	I don't recall specifically.
18	Q	Within the last month or at the early part of the
19		sumer?
20	A	Earlier in the year.
21	Q	Before now and after April 20th, correct?
22	A	Correct.
23	Q	The next exhibit is what?
24		MR. MARTIN: The last is a letter dated
25		yesterday from the government to me regarding immunity

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(LIOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

		16
1		MR. MARTIN: Probably do those as two
2		separate exhibits, I would guess. The top page and
3		then the last two pages.
4		(Exhibit No. 222 was marked.)
5		MR. ALLEN: You've marked the top page 221?
6		MR. BENINGER: Correct.
7	Q	So let me show you Exhibit No. 221, and up at the top
8		there it has June 10, '99, up at the very top. Would
9		you explain what that document is, please?
10	A	It's a recap of the actions that I took while working
11		in the computer room.
12	Q	On June 10th, 1999?
13	A	On June 10th, 1999.
14	Q	Was this put together as part of an emergency log or
15		is it something different?
16	A	No, it was just it was a personal document that I
17		created to remind myself of the actions I took on that
18		day of the action, of the incident.
19	Q	Did you put this together on June 10th, 1999?
20	A	I did.
21	Q	And when abouts was that?
22	A	I don't recall.
23	Q	Was it done on your computer at home or at work?
24	A	It was done on the computer at work and saved to a
25		floppy disk.
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ſ		17
1	Q	Did you prepare an Emergency Log?
2	Ă	No.
3	Q	Do you know what I'm talking about by an Emergency
4		Log?
5	А	More specifically, please?
6	Q	Yeah. I think that's the name of the document, is an
7		Emergency Log that controllers are supposed to put
8		together following any emergency or abnormal
9		situation.
10	A	No.
11	Q	No, you didn't prepare one? No, I did not.
12 13	A Q	You do understand what I'm talking about though,
14	Ŷ	correct?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And is the, quote, "Emergency Log", is that the right
17		designation for that?
18	A	Yes, I believe.
19	Q	Do you know if anybody put together an Emergency Log?
20	A	No.
21	Q	Is an Emergency Log something that is supposed to be
22		prepared by a controller following an energency?
23 24	A O	Yes. Do you know why that wasn't done in this case?
25	Q	MR. VERWOLF: Objection. Said he didn't
		KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 17 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		(206) 622-6897
1		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
2	A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes.
2 3	A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log?
2 3 4	A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event.
2 3	A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log?
2 3 4 5	A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event. Why?
2 3 4 5 6	A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event. Why? For a record.
2 3 4 5 6 7	A Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event. Why? For a record. Why do you need a record?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A Q A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event. Why? For a record. Why do you need a record? Can you be more specific?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	A Q A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event. Why? For a record. Why do you need a record? Can you be more specific? Sure. You're got computer printouts and you've got people's memory and all sorts of other things going on. Why do you need a specific record termed an
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	A Q Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event. Why? For a record. Why do you need a record? Can you be more specific? Sure. You're got computer printouts and you've got people's memory and all sorts of other things going on. Why do you need a specific record termed an Emergency Log?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	A Q A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 19 question. Yes. And what's the purpose of an Emergency Log? To document the event. Why? For a record. Why do you need a record? Can you be more specific? Sure. You're got computer printouts and you've got people's memory and all sorts of other things going on. Why do you need a specific record termed an Emergency Log? I believe it would be, you know, just the formal
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Γ		18
1		anow.
2		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
3	A	No.
4	0	Have you had any discussions with anybody about either
5	*	preparing one or why it wasn't prepared, the Emergency
6		Log, in this case?
7	A	No.
8	0	Who is responsible for ensuring that an Emergency Log
9	~	is prepared following an emergency?
10	A	Ron Brentson.
11	Q	And what's his position?
12	Ā	Control Center supervisor.
13	Q	Why is he responsible for ensuring that an phergency
14	*	Log is prepared?
15		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
16	A	As supervisor, ultimately the actions of the Control
17		Center fall under him.
18	o	So as a Control Center supervisor, his job is to
19	¥	ensure that the controller in charge during an
20		energency prepares an Emergency Log; is that correct?
21	A	Yes.
22	0	And is the controller in charge during the energency
23	-	also required on their own to prepare the Energency
24		log?
25		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
		KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 18 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		20
1		Is an Emergency Log required by all controllers to be
2		made following an emergency?
3		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
4		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection, no
5		foundation.
6	A	Yes.
7	0	How do you know that?
8	A	As a controller it is part of my routine.
- 9	Q	We had some of these folks say that you didn't have a
10	[^]	foundation or an understanding as to why a controller
11		would have to prepare an Emergency Log so I'm trying
12		to lay a foundation with you as to how would you know
13		the controllers are supposed to prepare an Emergency
14	ļ	Log following an emergency?
15	A	Routine.
16	Q	It was part of your training?
17	A	Yes.
18	0	Was it part of the standard practices and procedures
19		that you were trained in and expected to follow at
20		Olympic Pipe Line?
21	A	Yев.
	1	• • • • •

- Q And it's something that you would have learned, not
 conly in your direct training, but also in watching and
 observing other co-workers in carrying out their job
- 25 functions as well, correct?

		(TETTET TIEVEN - DI IAK' DENTIVER)
Γ		21
1	A	Could you repeat that, please?
2	Q	Sure. Not only is it from your direct training that
3		you know an Emergency Log is supposed to be completed
4		by every controller during an emergency, or following
5		an emergency rather, but also from observing and
6		working with other co-workers, you understand that
7		this is a requirement as well, correct?
8	A	I understand from my training, period.
9	Q	Why didn't you make an Emergency Log following this
10		occurrence?
11	A	I was not in the Control Center.
12	Q	The Emergency Log is only required of people in the
13		Control Center?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	Who was in the Control Center on June 10th, 1999?
16	A	Kevin Dyvig, Dave Smith, Ron Burt.
17 18	Q A	And who was their supervisor? Ron Brentson.
19	Q	Back in June, 1999, what was the job title for Kevin
20	Ŷ	Dyvig?
21	A	Operations Controller 2.
22	Q	The job title for Dave Smith?
23	A	Operations Controller.
24	Q	The job title for Ron Burt?
25	A	Operations Controller.
1		
	L	KATIE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 21 of 239 (206) 622-6897
	L	KATTE MCCOY, MPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 21 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		(206) 622-6897
1	0	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
1 2		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 23
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2	Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 23 Does somebody normally monitor the health of the machine?
2 3	Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 23 Does somebody normally monitor the health of the machine? Yes.
2 3 4	Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 23 Does somebody normally monitor the health of the machine? Yes. Who's normally in charge of that?
2 3 4 5	Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 23 Does somebody normally monitor the health of the machine? Yes. Who's normally in charge of that? Todd Smith. When Todd Smith is off duty, who fills in to monitor the health of the machine?
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		(LEUI) TIENDA - BI PR. BEALAREA)
Γ		22
1	o	And Ron Brentson was a Control Center supervisor,
2	2	correct?
3	A	Correct.
4	0	Where are the SCADA facilities located in connection
5	*	with the Control Center?
6	A	Approximately 20 steps out through secure doors and in
7		through a secure door.
8	Q	Part of the same facility but not part of the actual
9	-	Control Center; is that right?
10	A	Correct.
11	Q	And in the, working in the SCADA facility at the time
12	_	of the nupture and explosion were yourself and Todd
13		Smith; is that right?
14	A	Repeat that, please?
15	Q	Sure. At the time of the supture and explosion in the
16		afternoon from, let's say 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. on June
17		10th, 1999, who was in the SCADA area?
18	A	Me.
19	Q	You alone?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	Other than creating PICs, were you doing anything else
22	Į	with the SCADA program itself at that time period?
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	What else were you doing?
25	A	Monitoring the health of the machine.
	Į –	
		CATLE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 22 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)
		24
1	1	be was off duty?
2	A	Ron Brentson.
3	0	That was one of his job duties in addition to being
4	1	Control Center supervisor?
5	A	As far as I know.
6	Q	What does one do when they monitor the health of the
7		machine?
в	A	There's a command line that you can invoke that's
9		integrated with the software package that Vector
10	1	software has, and you just type the letters E-S-E-A
11	1	and hit enter, and this spawns a reporting process.
12	Q	Sort of like an internal diagnostic?
13	A	Yes.
14	1 ~	ESEA stands for what?
15	1	Error basically I don't know.
16	-	You don't know what the acronym means?
17		I don't.
		The didn't stand for T death land 5 Test second and
18	-	It didn't stand for I don't know? Just error and some
18 19 20		other things, right? Yes.

- 21 Q Now, when you type in ESEA, how often would you do 22 this?
- 23 A Several times a day.
- 24 Q Any routine set up?
- 25 A Random. No routine. First thing in the morning when

And who would monitor the health of the machine when

25

Q

25

1		you come in because the machines have been unmonitored
2		overnight.
3	Q	What sort of information does the ESEA tell you then?
4	A	Whether errors are being generated.
5	Q	Errors as in the computer's making errors?
6	A	I'm no expert on this specific software piece.
7	Q	But you were one of the only two people who was
8		responsible for monitoring the health of the machine
9		though, correct?
10	A	Correct.
11	Q	And the only tool you really had to monitor it was
12		this ESEA designation that spits out information,
13		correct?
14	А	Correct.
15	Q	So given the what kind of training did you have
16		then to be a monitor of the health of this machine?
17	A	Mentoring and on-the-job training.
18	Q	Mentoring means what?
19	A	Todd Smith and I work together.
20	Q	Is that basically the same as on-the-job training?

- 21 Yes. А 22 And so how long did you go through a training program Q then, the QJT, to learn how to monitor the health of 23
- 24 the SCADA machine?
- Ongoing. As often as I was in there I was training. 25 Α

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)

1		27
1	A	No.
2	Q	No tests or anything like that performed?
3	A	No.
4	Q	Did you feel after eight months of QJT on monitoring
5		the health of the machine that you were qualified to
6		be able to monitor and interpret the data to determine
7		the health of the machine?
8	A	Yes,
9	Q	What was the health of the machine on June 10th, 1999?
10	A	More specifically when?
11	Q	Let's say
12	A	It started fine.
13	Q	Did anything change with the health of the machine
14		by start, when do you come on shift to start
15		monitoring the health of the SCADA machine on June
16		10th?
17	A	Approximately 7:00 a.m.
J8	Q	And you ran an ESEA internal diagnostic on the health
19		of the machine at that time?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	And what did the results tell you?
22	A	That the machine was healthy.
23	Q	Did anything change throughout the day?
24	A	Yes.
25	0	And how?
	l	

		26
1	Q	And Todd Smith, did he go to some special school or
2		something to learn how to monitor the health of the
3		machine?
4	A	I don't know.
5	Q	Did you get handouts or booklets, or any specialist
6		come in to teach you about how to monitor the health
7		of the machine?
8	A	We have manuals, yes.
9	Q	Is there a manual what would it be called that
10		would teach you how to monitor the health of the SCADA
11		machine?
12	A	There are a number of them. There are there are
13		several.
14	Q	Just give me whatever names you know.
15	A	Inside SCADA. Inside Vector.
16	Q	Are those two magazines or one?
17		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
18		question.
19	A	It's a binder, three-ring binder.
20	Q	Is it one binder though?
21	A	There are numerous binders. Inside Vector is one.
22		Introduction to Vector is another. There are specific
23		volumes on each aspect of this software property.
24	Q	Were you checked off on your understanding and
25		knowledge of monitoring of the health of the machine?

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

28

1	А	Errors were generated later after I had performed a,
2		an addition of a historical record.
3	Q	Was that part of your job duties, to add historical
4		records?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	And what year was the training data designed for the
7		SCADA system?
8	A	I don't understand.
9		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
10		question. Foundation.
11	Q	These booklets and things that you were given to learn
12		how to monitor and interpret the results of the ESEA
13		on the SCADA system, what year was that information
14		put together?
15	A	I dan't know.
16	Q	Do you know if it was up to date or out of date?
17	A	I don't know. It appeared to be up to date.
18	Q	Why do you say that?
19	A	The information in the manuals applied to the work I
20		was doing.
21	Q	Do you know when the last time was that the SCADA
22		system actually, when was the SCADA system put into
23		service; do you know?
24	A	Not specifically, no.
25	Q	Do you know when the last time any upgrades had been
	l	

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ſ		29
1		made to the SCADA system before June 10th, 1999?
2	А	Yes. The SCADA software was upgraded by Todd Smith
3		approximately October or November, 1998.
4	Q	How about the hardware?
5	A	Approximately December, January, 1998, 1999. The
6		memory capacity was increased.
7	Q	By how much?
8	A	To maximum, which I believe is 256K on these models.
9	Q	Was the SCADA system state of the art?
10		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
11		question. No foundation.
12	Q	Co ahead.
13	A	Define state of the art.
14	Q	Was it how do you define state of the art?
15	A	Brand new, leading technology.
16	Q	Let's use leading technology. Was the SCADA system
17		you had in place on June 10th, 1999, leading
18	1	technology?
19	А	No.
20	Q	How do you know that?
21	A	I am familiar with hardware. It was older.
22	Q	The hardware was older?
23	A	Plenty adequate. More than adequate to do the job it
24	1	had to do.
25	0	Then why was it upgraded after the occurrence?
		KATTE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 29 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)
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-		(111/11 TIDUCH - DI IN. DEVINGEN)
		30
1	A	After what occurrence?
2	Ô	After the explosion and rupture that we're here about.
3	2	Why was the system upgraded if it was plenty adequate?
4	A	My answer would be assumptive. Just to add
5 5	~	additional my assumption would be an additional
5		margin of error, you know, an additional to give
7	~	the machine additional margin for error.
8	Q	How much was it upgraded after the explosion and
9		deaths of three kids?
10		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
11	_	question.
12	A	I understand by 750 percent.
13	Q	750 percent?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	And this 750 percent upgrade in the system afterwards,
16		you felt that was just to give an additional margin of
17		error?
18	A	I said that would be an assumption on my part. I
19		don't know specifically why.
20	Q	Were you involved at all in any of the decision making
21		on upgrading the SCADA machine after the deaths?
22	A	No.
23	Q	You and Todd Smith were the only two people assigned
24		by Olympic to monitor the health of the SCADA system,
25		correct?
1		
		KATLE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 30 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
[(206) 622-6897
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		35
1		correct?
2	A	No. We have purchased hardware.
3	Q	You've purchased state of the art SCADA hardware,
4		correct?
5	A	Yes, hardware.
6	Q	And that was purchased, the state of the art SCADA
7		hardware was purchased through Teledyne Brown?
8	A	No.
9	Q	Who was that purchased through?
10	A	I dan't know.
11	Q	What was the reason you were sent to be trained on the
12		state of the art SCADA system?
13	A	Just for training, to understand the software better.
14	Q	Did you feel the training was helpful?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	How long was the training course?
17	A	Approximately well, I don't know exactly. About
18		two days.
19	Q	Did you learn a number of new things that you didn't
20	}	know before?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	Through this training did you develop a better
23		understanding of the SCADA system and how it operates?
24		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
25		question.
	}	

		34
1		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
2		question. No foundation.
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	How do you know that?
5	A	We have purchased state of the art equipment.
6	Q	When?
7	A	First part of 2000, I estimate.
8	Q	Why has it not been installed yet?
9	A	I dan't know.
10	Q	Are you going to be involved in the installation?
11	A	I don't know.
12	Q	Are you going to be involved in the monitoring of the
13		new SCADA system?
14	A	Idon't know.
15	Q	Have you been trained in the new SCADA system?
16	A	I have had a very basic introductory training course
17		on the new SCADA system, yes.
18	Q	Where was that done?
19	A	That was done in Alabama, Huntsville, at Teledyne
20		Brown's facility.
21	Q	Is Teledyne Brown the one that is providing the state
22	1	of the art SCADA system?
23	A	Un, from what I understand, if BP decides to go with
24	ł	that, yes, Teledyne Brown would be the vendor.

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Q You've purchased the state of the art SCADA system,

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KATIE McCOY, RPR, CSR (8/30/00 ... Page 34 of 239 (206) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

36

1		MR. FINEGOLD: Object to the form of the
2		question. Which SCADA system?
3		MR. ALLEN: Yes, ambiguous.
4	Q	Go ahead.
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	Who else went on the training of the state of the art
7		SCADA system?
8	A	Todd Smith.
9	Q	Anyone else?
10	A	No.
11	Q	Are you participating in any of the decisions by BP as
12		to whether or not you're going to implement the state
13		of the art SCADA system?
14	A	No.
15	Q	Who's involved in those decisions; do you know?
16	A	I believe Todd Smith and Greg Russell.
17	Q	Who is Greg Russell?
18	A	BP's IT.
19	Q	Their IT person?
20	A	Pardon?
21	Q	BP's IT person?
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	Let's go back to where we were. On June 10th, 1999,
24		you had imputted some historical data into the SCADA
25		system, correct?

37 Correct. Historical data means what? Actually, that's not correct. Correct it if you want. We've got that from you earlier so go ahead and correct it if you want to correct your answer. I created historical containers, a location within the database for the historical information to be stored. So you actually didn't add a historical record? I did. You made the container and you put some things in the container for the historical data? The putting happens internally. So you created a historical container under the SCADA system that then updates itself automatically? Correct. And so was the creation of the historical container something that you have done before? Yes. And was it something that you did right or wrong this time that caused some errors to be produced? Not that I'm aware of. Did the errors occur shortly after you created the	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q A Q A Q A Q A	38 Did you ever come to an understanding as to what cause and effect your creation of the historical containers may have had on the SCADA system and the errors that were produced? No. How quickly after you created the container on the SCADA system for the historical data did the errors start coming? Approximately ten to 15 minutes. What sort of errors are we looking at? Historical processing errors. It appeared to be related to the work that I had done. Why do you say that? Because in the error coding, in the error log when y invoke ESEA, it tells you which historical, which
Historical data means what? Actually, that's not correct. Correct it if you want. We've got that from you earlier so go ahead and correct it if you want to correct your answer. I created historical containers, a location within the database for the historical information to be stored. So you actually didn't add a historical record? I did. You made the container and you put some things in the container for the historical data? The putting happens internally. So you created a historical container under the SCADA system that then updates itself automatically? Correct. And so was the creation of the historical container something that you have done before? Yes. And was it something that you did right or wrong this time that caused some errors to be produced? Not that I'm aware of.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	A Q A Q A Q	and effect your creation of the historical containers may have had on the SCADA system and the errors that were produced? No. How quickly after you created the container on the SCADA system for the historical data did the errors start coming? Approximately ten to 15 minutes. What sort of errors are we looking at? Historical processing errors. It appeared to be related to the work that I had done. Why do you say that? Because in the error coding, in the error log when y
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something that you have done before? Yes. And was it something that you did right or wrong this time that caused some errors to be produced? Not that I'm aware of.	18		been accomplished.
Yes. And was it something that you did right or wrong this time that caused some errors to be produced? Not that I'm aware of.		Q	Does it tell you what about the work that was
And was it something that you did right or wrong this time that caused some errors to be produced? Not that I'm aware of.	19	*	accomplished it doesn't like?
time that caused some errors to be produced? Not that I'm aware of.	20	А	It does not. It just tells you which of the proces
Not that I'm aware of.	21	••	is unhealthy or is acting up.
	22	Q	How were you trained on creating these historical
	23	*	containers?
historical container?	24	A	Just by doing it. It's pretty straightforward. It
Yes.	25		a fill-in-the-blanks template.
39			40
What is the template called?	1		what?
The template exists in a utility software piece of the	2	A	By time. It's realtime data that is stored there.
Vector SCADA software. It is called "Historic	3	Q	So you're creating a container serving as an archi
Record".	4		system based upon time?
And you just fill in the template and that gives	5	A	Yes.
additional capacity on the SCADA system for it to	6	l Q	So how often are you creating these containers the
self-automate and fill in the historical data?	7	A	Not very often. You know, off and on as the need
That's not I don't understand.	8		arises.
When you go through the template for the historical	9	Q	How does the need arise if it never fills up?
record, what are you doing then, creating the	10	A	You lost me.
container for the machine to self-automate and fill in	11		Where does the need come from?
with the historical data?	12	A	Any telemetered value coming in SCADA can be
Correct.	13		historized
And once you fill out the template, this occurs	14		Is that a word?
automatically?	15	A	and contained. Well, I think so.
Correct.	16	♀	I'm teasing you. I have a tendency to do that as
And how long does it keep going until the container is	17	_	well.
full?	18	A	I think so. Can be historically archived, so
The container never fills.	19	Q	I'm trying to find out where the need came from the she of the set
Why have you had to do this before?	20	1	though. If we're just doing this on a time contin
There are there are times in the life of the SCADA	21	1	that never fills up, where does the need come in s
system where we need to archive data. It's a way to	22	1	that we need to set up a different archiving or
archive data and recall them from these containers.	23		segregate the archiving?
It's a tcol.	24	A	
Are you doing it by years or by time or by subject or	25	Q	What do you mean by need then?
archi It's Are y	ve data and recall them from these containers. a tool.	ve data and recall them from these containers. 23 a tool. 24 rou doing it by years or by time or by subject or 25	ve data and recall them from these containers. 23 a tool. 24 A rou doing it by years or by time or by subject or 25 Q

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	ĺ		41
	1	А	With any point being able to be historically archived,
	2		if we deem it necessary we create a new record for
	з		that point, and there are thousands of points coming
	4		into the SCADA system.
	5	Q	Why on June 10th did you deem it necessary to create a
	6		new archive?
	7	A	We wanted to monitor the vibration or have a
	8		historical record of the vibration levels of those, of
	9		the pump units at Olympia junction.
	10	Q	Why?
	11	A	Vibration levels were, in those pump units were less
	12		than perfect and we would use the data to troubleshoot
	13		and analyze for repair purposes.
	14	Q	Which pump units were you looking at, all or any in
	15		particular?
	16	A	The two. I created records for the two pump units at
	17		Olympia junction.
	18	Q	Olympia, okay.
	19	A	Yes.
	20	Q	Is the SCADA system used as a safety tool?
	21	A	You bet.
	22		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
	23		question.
	24	Q	In what way?
	25	A	It allows us to monitor it is one of the safety
			KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 41 of 239 (206) 622-6897
)			KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 41 of 239 (206) 622-6897
)		[KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 41 of 239
)			KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 41 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 43
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)	1 2		KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Fage 41 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER) 43 And I understand that you've been given some immunity to be able to testify, correct?
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)	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q A Q A Q A Q A	KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 41 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD THEKEN - BY MR. HENINGER) 43 And I understand that you've been given some immunity to be able to testify, correct? Yes. Who else with the company that you're aware of has been given immunity? MR. MARTIN: Objection. Foundation. MR. ALLEN: Join the objection. I don't know. Anybody else? MR. WOLFE: He just answered that he doesn't know. Anybody else? I don't know. You haven't talked to anybody about whether they're going to testify or not testify before the Grand Jury?
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q A Q A Q A Q A Q	KATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 41 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (ILOYD THEKEN - BY MR. HENINGER) 43 And I understand that you've been given some immunity to be able to testify, correct? Yes. Who else with the company that you're aware of has been given immunity? MR. MARTIN: Objection. Foundation. MR. ALLEN: Join the objection. I don't know. Anybody else? MR. WOLFE: He just answered that he doesn't know. Anybody else? I don't know. You haven't talked to anybody about whether they're going to testify or not testify before the Grand Jury? Yes.
	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q	KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Fage 41 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. RENINCER) 43 And I understand that you've been given some immunity to be able to testify, correct? Yes. Who else with the company that you're aware of has been given immunity? MR. MARTIN: Objection. Foundation. MR. AILEN: Join the objection. I don't know. Anybody else? MR. WOLFE: He just answered that he doesn't know. Anybody else? I don't know. You haven't talked to anybody about whether they're going to testify or not testify before the Grand Jury? Yes. And who would those people be you've talk with about

- 20 Q Who else?
- 21 Holly Williamson. А
- 22 Who else? Q

23

24

- A That's all I can recall.
- Have you talked with any other people as to whether Q 25 they were going to be taking the Fifth Amendment in

ſ		42
1		tools. It allows us to manitor the system remotely
2		and operate the system, the pipeline system.
З	Q	Now, back on June 10th, 1999
4		MR. WOLFE: David, could we take a hreak?
5		MR. BENINGER: Sure.
6		MR. DAHL: Going off the record. The time
7		is approximately 10:31 a.m. 🙀
8		(Recess taken at 10:31 a.m.)
9		MR. DAHL: Back on the record. The time is
10		approximately 10:44 a.m.
11	BY M	R. BENINGER:
12	Q	I forget exactly where I was when we left off, but let
13		me do a couple other things. You know I'm here on
14		behalf of the families that lost two of the little
15		boys in the explosion, correct?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	And this is going to be typed up and put into what we
18	ļ	call a deposition. It will be transcribed and typed
19		up for you to read and for them to read as well. You
20	l I	know that?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	And I may also give it to other expects and other
23		people for them to read as well. Do you understand
24	ł	that?
25	A	Yes.

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 44

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[
1		answer to questions either by myself or in response to
2		the U.S. Attorney's Office or anyone else?
3	А	No.
4	Q	Let's go back to where we were, and that is on June
5		10th, when you created the historical data container,
6		was that at approximately 2:50 in the afternoon?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	And I say that because I'm looking at Exhibit 221 at
9		the top there. Is that what you did, plus or minus
10		1450?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	That was the time you were imputting the data or is
13		that the time that you were creating this document?
14	А	That was the time the process started.
15	Q	And then you tried to set out in Exhibit 221 the
16		various things that you did in putting through the
17		process, putting in the historical data and then
18		checking the system and getting the errors response
19		back, connect?
20		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
21	ł	question.
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	As you walked on through, and I'm looking at this
24	1	here, when you're talking primary machine and
25		secondary machine, what are you talking about there?
	l	
	1	

KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897 Page 43 of 239 KATLE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897 Page 44 of 239

		(TTATIN : TEVAN - PI INK' PENTINEK)
ſ		45
1	А	Two mainframe computers, one in primary role, one in
2	n	secondary role as back-up.
3	0	And the primary one, is that the SCADA system that is
4	-	primarily used and operated?
5	A	No.
6	Q	Which one is primarily used and operated, the primary
7		or the secondary SCADA?
8		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
9		question. It's confusing.
10	Q	You have one SCADA system that's operated on two
11		Nainframe computers, correct?
12	A	yes.
13	Q	and the one mainframe computer is a primary mainframe
14		computer?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	and then you have a second mainframe that's a
17		secondary mainframe?
18	A	Yes.
19	Q	Do you normally operate off of the primary mainframe
20		computer?
21	A	Always.
22 23	Q A	When do you use the secondary mainframe computer? In the event of a failover.
23 24	â	And can that be the failover request, that be done
25) ~	both automatically with the system as well as
	4	
	1	
		KATTE MOTTY, ROR, CSR 08730700 Page 45 of 239
		KATLE MCCLY, RPR, CSR 08730/00 Page 45 of 239 (206) 622-6897
	ļ 	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
	[(206) 622-6897
1		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
1	AQ	(206) 622-6897 (11.0YD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47
	1	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No.
2	Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything
2 3	Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILDYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the
2 3 4 5 6	Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (HLOYD THEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes?
2 3 4 5 6 7	Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (HOYD THEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever run the you lost your coat there. I
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not.
2 3 4 5 7 8 9	Q A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 21	Q A Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever run the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Q A Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (HOYD THEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q A Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever run the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before this?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever run the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before this? Yes.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before this? Yes. On how many occasions? Weekly.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD THEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before this? Yes. On how many occasions? Weekly. And for what reason?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before this? Yes. On how many occasions? Weekly. And for what reason? That was the routine.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before this? Yes. On how many occasions? Weekly. And for what reason? That was the routine. What was the routine?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 47 No. Everything is identical? As a nonexpert, yes. All of the information, all the screens, everything else would be the same between the secondary and the primary mainframes? Yes. Had you ever num the you lost your coat there. I don't know if you need that or not. I do, thank you. Had you ever used the back-up or the secondary mainframe computer to run the SCADA system before this? Yes. On how many occasions? Weekly. And for what reason? That was the routine.

- 22 primary/secondary.
- 23 Q So the two mainframes, is there one that's actually
- 24deemed the primary and one that's deemed the secondary25or is the one that's operating deemed the primary?

		(TETTID TIBUEN - DI ME' DENTIVER)
		46
1		manually?
2	А	Yes.
3	Q	On June 10th, 1999, did you do a failover manually?
4	A	Yes.
5	Q	Wity?
6	A	The machine bogged down, the primary machine bogged
7		down and became unresponsive.
8	Q	By unresponsive, do you mean it locked up and was not
9		providing any response at all or was it slowly
10		responsive?
11	A	Locked up.
12	Q	When it locks up, is there a system so that
13		automatically the failover kicks in and the secondary
14		mainframe comes on line?
15	A	No.
16	Q	So even with a lockup, that must be done manually, the
17		switchover between the primary to the secondary
18]	mainframe?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	What is the time delay in doing the switchover or the
21	1	failover as you call it?
22	A	Approximately 30 seconds.
23	Q	Is there a difference at all in the systems or the
24		processing times between the primary mainframe and the
25		secondary mainframe?
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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		48
1	A	Yes.
2	Q	As to the latter question or the first question?
3	А	The latter.
4	Q	So these systems then every other week, of the two
5		mainframe computers, every other week they switch from
6		being primary to secondary; is that correct?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	On June 10th, the switchover or the failover, that was
9		a nonscheduled switchover from the primary to the
10		back-up, correct?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	How long did you anticipate leaving it in that mode?
13	A	Leaving it? I don't understand.
14	Q	Leaving the SCADA system being run off of what was at
15		that point in time the secondary mainframe.
16	A	No longer than I had to.
17	Q	Your plan was then to switch it back to what at that
18		point had been the primary system?
19	A	I, I dan't I dan't know.
20	Q	Do these two mainframes, do they have any permanent
21	1	designation that we would be able to separate the two
22		out?
23	A	As OLY01 and OLY02.
24	Q	CTX05
25	A	Yeah.
	1	

XATTE McCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 48 of 239 (206) 622-6897

[49
1	Q	Which stands for what?
2	A	Olympic machine 01, Olympic machine 02 for 1 and 2.
3	Q	And the primary that you had operating before the
4		failover, that was OLY01 or OLY02?
5	A	2.
6	Q	And you switched that over to OLY01; is that correct?
7	A	Yes.
B	Q	And when you went to OLY02, did that not have the same
9		problems with the historical container?
10		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
п		question.
12	Q	I'm sorry, when you switched to OLY01, did that not
13		have the same problems with the historical container?
14	A	I dan't know.
15	Q	The software changes that you made, would that be
16		applicable to both OLY01 and OLY02?
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	Do you know why, if you simply switched over the
19	Į	mainframe computers, it might have solved your error
20		problem?
21	A	No.
22	6	Why did you do the switchover?
23	A	We needed control. We needed to be able to monitor
24		and operate our systems.
25	°	At that point in time though when you did the
	1	
	L	KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 49 of 239 (206) 622-6897
)		(LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)
		51
ı	{	to cause a problem to both mainframes?
2	A	I don't understand. Would you rephrase that, please?
З	Q	Sure. If you're thinking in your mind I might have
4]	caused a problem to the software and that problem may
5		infect both OLYO1 and OLYO2, so if I just switch over
6		I may have the same problem. It may lock up. Now
7		I've got both computers down. Before you did that did
8		you try to notify somebody and say, hey, I may have a
<u> </u>	1	

9 problem here?
10 A Okay, could you be more specific? That sounded like
11 two questions in one to me.

12 Q It might have been. Give it the best shot that you13 could and I'll try to break it down.

MR. MARTIN: Object.

MR. ALLEN: Objection, instruct the witness not to answer.

MR. BENINGER: There's going to be no instructions not to answer, no instructions not to answer unless you want to go and deal with that.

MR. ALLEN: You can go deal with it. MR. HENINGER: That's fine. You're entitled

to make an objection and that's it.

MR. ALLEN: You asked a confusing question.

MR. BENINGER: That's fine. That's the objection.

		switchover, you thought that it may have been related
		to the software changes you made to the historical
		container?
	A	I did not know what the problem was.
	Q	That's what the error message was telling you though,
		ween't it?
	A	Not specifically, no.
	Q	The error message was related to the historical data
		though, connect?
	A	To historical data. I can't tell you which data
ļ		specifically.
	Q	Did you actually, when you made the switchover, were
		you actually thinking in your mind, I wonder if
		there's something that I did that caused this problem
		when I did the historical container?
	A	Yes.
	Q	And so were you also thinking, well, if I did this, if
		I caused this problem by doing the historical
		container software change, that's going to affect both
		the OLY01 as well as OLY02?
	A	Yes.
	Q	So what were you doing then before you made the
		switchover to have some sort of tertiary back-up in

- place for this, if, in fact, it did turn out that you had caused a problem with the software that was going

KATLE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 50 of 239 (206) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)

]		
ł		54
1	Q	Go ahead.
2	A	Would you rephrase the question, please?
3	Q	What did you do to try to preempt any problems that
4		may have come from the two computer systems that may
5		be going down because of your software change?
6	A	I deleted the two records that I created.
7	Q	That was before or after OLY02 locked up?
8	A	That was after.
9	Q	And was OLY01 on line at that point?
10	A	Yes.
11	0	What time did you make the switchover between OLYO2 to
12		OLY01?
13	A	Approximately 1535.
14	Q	Now, when you made the switchover, were you aware of
15		any other alarms going off notifying you of any other
16		problems in the system besides this error message?
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	What other alarms or warning signals were you getting?
19	A	Ron Burt had come into the computer room and told me
20		that the computer was unresponsive or the SCADA system
21		was unresponsive.
22	Q	How far in advance of the switchover did Mr. Burt tell
23		you this?
24	A	Approximately five minutes.
25	Q	Was it because of his report to you that the computer
	1	

_		(LIJUIL) (IEREN - BI MK. BENINSER)	F		
		53			54
		system was unresponsive that you did the switchover or	1		another.
		was it because it actually locked up?	2	Q	And you're switching that over or are you swinging
	A	Both, but, yeah, primarily because it locked up.	3		that over or what are you doing?
,	Q	Did it lock up when you were using it or was that a	4	A	Opening one series of valves and closing another
		report that you got that the system had locked up?	5		series of valves.
	A	Virtually simultaneous. I recognized the	6	Q	Is that done from the Control Center?
		unresponsiveness of 02 at almost the same time Ron	7	A	Correct.
		stuck his head in and said, hey, the SCADA is	8	Q	And at the point in time you were told that the syste
		unresponsive.	9		was unresponsive, did that have anything to do with
	Q	Were you aware of any of the other operations that	10		the valves being unresponsive?
		were going on at that point in time from the control	11	A	Repeat, please,
		rcom?	12	Q	Sure. The operation that was being done was a
	A	No. Yes.	13		switchover which would involve opening and closing
	Q	What were you aware of?	14		certain valves, correct?
	A	When Ron Burt put his head in the door and told me	15	A	Correct.
		that the SCADA was unresponsive, he also told me that	16	Q	And when you had it reported to you that the system
		Kevin had just swung the line from Renton to Seattle	17		was unresponsive, were you understanding that to mea
		so we would like to get control as, you know, fix it	18		that the valves were not opening or closing as they
		ASAP.	19		were supposed to?
	Q	Did they indicate there was any problem when they	20	A	I understood this switching over to have been
1		swing the line from Renton to Seattle?	21		complete.
	A	No.	22	Q	Before it became unresponsive?
	Q	What do you mean by "swung the line from Renton to	23	A	That was my assumption.
		Seattle"?	24	Q	What happened after that point when Ron Burt comes :
	A	The stream is routed from one delivery facility to	25		and tells you that the system is unresponsive?
		KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 53 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)			XATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 54 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		(206) 622-6897			(206) 622-68 97
		(206) 622-6897 (1LOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 55			(206) 622-6897 (110YD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 56
	A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 55 I'd focused on okay. Initially paged my supervisor	1		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 56 would have been pretty much immediate by 3:35 had 1
		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 55 I'd focused on okay. Initially paged my supervisor to let him know that we had an upset condition in	2		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 56 would have been pretty much immediate by 3:35 had 1 functioned properly.
	A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 55 I'd focused on okay. Initially paged my supervisor to let him know that we had an upset condition in SCADA.	2 3	Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 56 would have been pretty much immediate by 3:35 had 1 functioned properly. But by process, what are you talking about, process
	A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 55 I'd focused on okay. Initially paged my supervisor to let him know that we had an upset condition in SCADA. Who was that?	2 3 4	Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 56 would have been pretty much immediate by 3:35 had 1 functioned properly. But by process, what are you talking about, process It's a by process. Can you be more specific?
	A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 55 I'd focused on okay. Initially paged my supervisor to let him know that we had an upset condition in SCADA. Who was that? Ron Brentson.	2 3 4 5	Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 56 would have been pretty much immediate by 3:35 had 1 functioned properly. But by process, what are you talking about, process It's a by process. Can you be more specific? You said the duration of the process took 20 to 25
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ſ		57
1		computer specific piece in the Operations Maintenance
2		Procedures Manual addressing this particular problem
3		at this point in time.
4	Q	As of June last year, did you have specific training
5	-	which let's you know that a computer specific problem
6		like the primary computer locking up and going down
7		required certain steps to be taken?
8	А	Just no.
9	Q	So it would be safe to say that you didn't take any
10	_	specific steps when OLY02, the primary computer,
11		locked up in order to deal with an abnormal situation
12		or an emergency situation?
13	A	The normal steps are to get it back on line.
14	Q	That's it?
15	A	Yeah.
16	Q	I just wanted to make sure you didn't initiate any
17		other procedures you might have been trained on
18		dealing with a computer malfunction or a computer
19		upset condition. You didn't institute any shutdown
20		procedures or institute any other sort of protocol
21]	other than just simply trying to get the back-up on
22		line; is that correct?
23	A	That is correct.
24	Q	From your position in the SCADA room, can I call it a
25		SCADA room?
	L	KATTLE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 57 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(LLCYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		59
ı	ļ	clear earlier. In the computer room, do they also
2		have, if there's a problem with the line itself, do
3		they also get those alerts or those warnings or those
4	1	alams in the computer room?
5	A	They can.
6	0	But they don't always?
7	A	They don't always, no.
8	Q	Which ones go to the computer room as well as to the
9		control room and which ones don't?
10		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
11		question. It's vague.
12	A	More specifically?
13	Q	That's what I'm trying to find out from you, more
14	1	specific. Which alarms are in both the computer room
15		and the control room and which ones aren't?
16	1	
	A	I guess they can and they can't. If it depends on
17	A	
17 18		I guess they can and they can't. If it depends on
		I guess they can and they can't. If it depends on the display. You can display any screen you want in
18		I guess they can and they can't. If it depends on the display. You can display any screen you want in the computer room, and if the alarm summary screen was
18 19		I guess they can and they can't. If it depends on the display. You can display any screen you want in the computer room, and if the alarm summary screen was displayed, if it had been displayed, then I may have,
18 19 20		I guess they can and they can't. If it depends on the display. You can display any screen you want in the computer room, and if the alarm summary screen was displayed, if it had been displayed, then I may have, had I had the chance to look at that screen and pay
18 19 20 21		I guess they can and they can't. If it depends on the display. You can display any screen you want in the computer room, and if the alarm summary screen was displayed, if it had been displayed, then I may have, had I had the chance to look at that screen and pay attention to the pipeline with, you know, over and

Q Is the only way that an operator in the control room is alerted that there's an alarm is if they have the

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58

A Sure.

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4 5

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- Q How would you call it?
- A Computer room.
- Q The computer room. From your position in the computer room, do you have access to any of the other lights or warmings or anything else on the SCADA system itself telling you how the integrity or function of the line is?
- 9 A Yes.

~	~	165.
10	Q	And were you getting any alerts after Ron Burt came
11		in let me do it this way: Before Ron Burt came in
12		to tell you that the computer was unresponsive, were
13		you getting any warnings or alerts from any problems
14		or safety concerns on the line itself?
15	A	No.
16	Q	After Ron Burt came in to tell you that the computer
17		was unresponsive, did you get any alerts that there
18		was a problem of safety or the integrity of the line?
19	A	No.
20	Q	Never?
21	A	No.
22	Q	Why not?
	1 -	

- 23 A I wasn't running the pipeline. I was trying to get24 the computers functional.
 - Q But were any alerts -- I guess maybe I didn't make it

KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 58 of 239 (206) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

_		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. HENINGER)
[60
1		alarm summary screen on?
2	A	Um, no.
3	õ	I mean the system is set up so that the alarm sounds
4		so that people can then be alerted to go find out what
5		the problem is, correct?
6	Α	It is.
7	Q	I'm looking now in the computer room though as to
8		what's in the computer room to give the general alarms
9		to let you know to either go to the alarm surmary
10		screen or go to some other screen to find out what the
11		problem is. Does that exist in the computer room?
12	A	Yes, it exists from an R&D perspective. When I'm in
13		the computer room I'm not running the pipelines. I'm
14		not paying attention to the alarms. My role in there
15	I	is to work with SCADA.
16	Q	Now, did the alarms not go on in the computer room or
17		did they go on and you just didn't pay attention to
18		them?
19	A	I don't know.
20	0	You don't recall an alarm?
21	A	I can't tell you which display was displayed that day.
22	Q	Gets back to what I said earlier. Is there a general
23		alarm that goes to the computer room that,
24		irrespective of what's being displayed, let's you
25		know

		(LIDXD J.TEREN - BY MK. BENINSER)
[61
1	A	No.
2	Ω	How does that work in the control room so you don't
3		have the alarm summary on?
4		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
5		question. Vague, incomplete.
6	A	Could you be more specific?
7	Q	Okay. Actually, when you met with counsel, did he
8		kind of key in on some code words that if he says
9		vague or specific, that you need to ask for more?
10	A	No.
11	Q	How does the let me do this: In fact, I'm going to .
12		do some hierarchy here. Why don't you tell me how the
13		hierarchy works in the control room. What's the
14		hierarchy in the control room?
15	A	As it pertains to?
16	Q	Personnel.
17	A	Even, shared response or shared, you know, status.
18 19		With one exception, the controller with a 2 title, as
19 20		Kevin had, has more time and grade. However, we view one another as equals and work side by side.
20 21	Q	The another as equals and work side by side. How many people are normally in the control room?
21	A	Two.
23		On this day there were three. Why?
2J 24	`	MR. FINEGOLD: Object. That's not what he
25		said.
	1	
		KATIE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08730/00 Page 61 of 239 (206) 622-6897
	· 	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		(206) 622-6897
1	A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. EENINGER) 63 Correct.
2	AQ	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER) 63 Correct. And what is segment 1? What is that person? What are
2 3	٥	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. EENINGER) 63 Correct. And what is segment 1? What is that person? What are they responsible for?
2 3 4		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. EENINGER) 63 Correct. And what is segment 1? What is that person? What are they responsible for? At that point in time the alignment was generally 16,
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
[62
1		MR. ALLEN: Misstates former testimony.
2		Join the objection.
3	Q	Maybe I missed something. You said in the Control
4		Oenter were three people, Kevin Dyvig, Dave Smith and
5		Ran Burt?
6	A	Throughout the day that is true, but at any given
7		point in time there were only two.
8	Q	How did that work then?
9	А	Dave Smith worked mainline in the morning and Ron Burt
10		relieved him at 3:00 p.m.
11	Q	So normally there's two people in the control room?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	And how are the duties divided up between those two
14		people?
15	A	One's on mainline, one's on segment 1, and typically
16		the mainline is a much more difficult system.
17	Q	What does the mainline do?
18	A	It, okay, 20, it is generally an alignment of two of
19		the four refineries to Allen Station, to Renton via
20		the 20 inch and then boosted from Renton to Portland
21		via the 14 inch. That constitutes our label
22		"mainline".
23	Q	And is the person that's monitoring the mainline, that
24		would be one person who would be monitoring the 20
25		inch up north of Renton and the 14 inch down south?
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

64

1	Q	So the number there at any one time is the same,
2		correct?
3	A	Not always.
4	Q	What situations would they not be?
5	A	Training situations. There would be three.
6	Q	That was just like before though, too, wasn't it?
7		Training situations there would be three?
8	A	Correct.
9	Q	Are there any situations though now that you have
10		different numbers of people in there than you would
11		have had before?
12		MR. ALLEN: Speaking of before June 10th?
13	Q	Before June 10th.
14	A	Would you repeat that, please?
15	Q	Sure. Are there any situations where there's
16		different numbers of people in the control room now,
17		where those same situations before June 10th it would
18		be different?
19	А	No.
20	Q	You said eight. Do you mean there's eight controllers
21		total?
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	How many controllers total were there before June
24		10th?
25	A	10, I believe.
	1	

		······································
[65
1	Q	Why are there two less now?
2	Ă	Todd has taken a position out of the Control Center, a
3		system engineer, and Dave Smith is on his way out as a
4		measurement person.
5	Q	Who was fired?
6	-	MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
7		question. No foundation.
8	A	- Fired?
9	Q	Yeah. I mean we all read in the paper
10	A	Who was not offered a position?
11	Q	There was a big press conference that BP had about
12		firing workers. You heard about that, didn't you?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	Who were those people who were fired?
15	A	Mark Kruger.
16	Q	Who else?
17	A	Kadel Rayburn.
18	Q	Kay?
19	A	Kadel.
20	Q	Rayhum?
21	A	Frank Jasso and Todd Gean.
22	Q	Gean?
23	A	Gean.
24	Q	And were these controllers before?
25	A	No.
	L	KATIE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 55 of 239 (206) 622-6897
ļ		KATIE MCCDY, MPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 65 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLCYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER) 67
1	[(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 67
1	A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER) 67 Yes.
	[(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 67 Yes. Who was taking their place?
2	A Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER) 67 Yes.
2 3	A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER) 67 Yes. Who was taking their place? Ricky Rawson has replaced Ron Brentson, and Kevin is
2 3 4	A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER) 67 Yes. Who was taking their place? Ricky Rawson has replaced Ron Brentson, and Kevin is not replaced yet. He's still dispatching.
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		66	_
1	Q	Where were these people?	
2	A	Field operators.	
3	Q	So the big hoopla that BP made, were there any people	
4		in the control room that were actually fired? Any	
5		controllers that were actually fired?	
6		MR. ALLEN: Objection to the form of the	
7		question.	
8		MR. FINECOLD: Objection to the form of the	
9		question.	
10	A	No.	
11	Q	Okay. Were there any new controllers that were	
12]	brought in?	
13	A	No.	
14	Q	There were some controllers and supervisors that I	
15		understand were reassigned, Dyvig and Brentson?	
16	A	Yes.	
17	Q	What were you told as to the reason for the	
18		reassignment?	
19	A	Nothing.	
20	Q	Didn't have to do with safety concerns?	
21	A	Nothing.	
22	Q	Did it have to do with public relations?	
23	A	Nothing.	
24	Q	They just let you know that these people were being	
25		reassigned and that was it?	
]		
		KATIE MCLDY, KPR. CSR 08/30/00 Page 66 of 239	_

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

_		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)
		68
1	A	Idon't know.
2	Q	This Ricky Rawson, was that some is that a male or
3		female?
4	A	A male.
5	Q	Is that someone who was with the company before?
6	A	No.
7	Q	They were brought in by BP?
8	A	Can we back up?
9	Q	Sure.
10	A	Which company?
11	Q	Olympic Pipe Line.
12	A	Okay. No.
13	Q	Were they with Equilan before?
14	A	No.
15	Q	Were they with Texaco or Shell or Arco?
16		MR. FINEBOLD: Object to the form of the
17		question. Who is they?
19	Q	Go ahead.
19	A	Who is they?
20	Q	Who do you think I'm talking about? Lawyers like to
21		make objections, but do you know who I'm talking
22		about?
23	A	I think Ricky Rawson.
24	Q	All right.
25	A	No.
	1	

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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)
[69
1	0	Who was Ricky Rawson with before?
2	Ā	BP.
3	Q	That you know of who are the controllers? Maybe
4		I'll get that list. Who are the controllers, the ten
5		people in June, 1999?
6	A	Myself, Ron Burt, Chris Herrera, Kevin Dyvig, Dave
7		Clements, Mike Ransom, John Smith, Dave Smith, Todd
8		Smith. I think that's all of them.
9	Q	I got nine of them. I'll read it back to you. Lloyd
10		Tieken, Ron Burt, Chris Herrera, Kevin Dyvig, Dave
11		Clements, Ransom, John Smith, Dave Smith, Todd Smith.
12	A	That's correct.
13	Q	Nine of them? Were there any other ones that you
14		could think of?
15	A	That sounds like all of them.
16 17	Q A	The Smiths, are they related? Todd and Dave are brothers.
18	Q	Of these nine controllers who were there June 10th, or
19	ļĭ	employed, I should say, June 10th, 1999, have any of
20		then been relieved of duty?
21	А	Yes.
22	Q	Which ones?
23	A	Chris Herrera.
24	Q	And why was Chris Herrera relieved?
25	A	I believe he was actually, I don't know.
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		71
1		terminated or anything?
2		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
З		question.
4	A	No.
5	Q	Is it basically business as usual out there?
6		MR. MARTIN: Object to the form of the
7		question.
8		It will never be business as usual.
9	1 -	Same people doing the same things that they did in
10 11		June, 1999, same positions, same operations, as
12		they're currently employed and doing now; is that right?
13		Yes.
14		Has there been training that has been done for all
15	1 -	these nine people?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	And tell me about the training that has been done.
18	A	Frank Hopf did a hydraulic seminar on basic pipeline
19		hydraulics.
20	• Q	When was that?
21	. А	For a period of one day plus. Late 19 excuse me,
22		after the incident. I can't tell you specifically.
23	1 -	Before he left?
24		
25	i o	Did you ever understand why he left?

		(LLOYD TLEXEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		70
1	Q	When was Chris Herrera relieved?
2	A	I don't know.
3	Q	Before or after BP took over management?
4	A	Before.
5	Q	Other than Chris Herrera, anyone else relieved of
6		duties of these controllers that you've listed?
7	A	No.
8	Q	Have each of the controllers that you've listed been
9		offered employment with BP?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	Any of them that you're aware of that has not been
12		offered employment with BP?
13 14	A	No.
14 15	Q	One of the articles talked about, of the BP, the big press conference they had, talked about serious
15 16		concerns of the controllers on duty at the time. Do
16 17		you remember that?
17 18	A	I really don't read the paper.
19	Q	But you were made aware though of the fact that there
20	*	were some concerns of BP that were expressed at the
21	1	press conference of the controllers at the time?
22	A	Vaguely.
23	Q	Do you know, have any of the controllers at the time
24		that these serious concerns were expressed about, have
25		they been put on administrative leave or fired or
	1	1
		KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 70 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(206) 622-6897
1	A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER)
1		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 72
	A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no.
2	A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadn't he?
2 3	A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadn't he? Yes.
2 3 4	A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadn't he? Yes. He was there before you came on in, what, '94?
2 3 4 5	A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadh't he? Yes. He was there before you came on in, what, '94? Yes.
2 3 4 5 6	A Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadn't he? Yes. He was there before you came on in, what, '94? Yes. And he'd been there for a number of years before you
2 3 4 5 6 7	A Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadn't he? Yes. He was there before you came on in, what, '94? Yes. And he'd been there for a number of years before you came on in '94, correct?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	А Q А Q А Q А	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadn't he? Yes. He was there before you came on in, what, '94? Yes. And he'd been there for a number of years before you came on in '94, correct? Yes. And after this incident he leaves and you're not told
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 72 Not no. He had been there for a long time, hadn't he? Yes. He was there before you came on in, what, '94? Yes. And he'd been there for a number of years before you came on in '94, correct? Yes. And after this incident he leaves and you're not told why he leaves? No. Were you aware that he was taking the Fifth Amendment in response to questions? Yes. MR. WOLFE: Object. No foundation.
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occurred?

Г		73
1	A	No.
2	0	How did you hear that he was going to be taking the
3	¥	Fifth Amendment?
4		MR. WOLFE: Excuse me. Could we get a time
5		frame?
6	0	Go ahead.
7	_	MR. WOLFE: Object to the form of the
8		question. No time frame, and it's a critical issue in
9		that Mr. Hopf, in that the timing of the alleged
10		invocation or purported future invocation of the
11		privilege occurred after Mr. Hopf left the employment
12		of the Olympic Pipe Line Company.
13		MR. ALLEN: Objection.
14	Q	Go ahead.
15	А	Would you repeat the question?
16	Q	Sure. How did you hear that he was going to be taking
17		the Fifth?
18	A	I don't recall.
19	Q	You have the did you also know that the president
20		of the company, Crognale, that he was going to be
21		taking the Fifth as well?
22	A	I did not.
23	Q	How about Brentson? Brentson is still in his position
24 25	A	or has he been moved finally? Repeat
		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		75
1	Q	That wasn't shared with you?
2		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
3	A	No.
4	Q	Did the company have any meetings with the employees
5		to talk about all the publicity and people taking the
6		Fifth Amendment and those kind of things?
7 8	ļ	MR. WOLFE: Object to the form of the question.
9	0	Had there been a meeting that was going on on that?
10		MR. WOLFE: Excuse me. I want a conference
11		with counsel at this point
12	Q	Had there been a meeting that was going on with that?
13		MR. ALLEN: Objection to the form of the
14	{	question. It's compound and misleading.
15	Q	Go ahead.
16	A	No.
17	Q	No companywide meetings to discuss what happened and
18	1	what went on?
19	A	No.
20	¢	Was there any company investigation that you were part
21	.	of to try to determine what went on?
22 23	A	More specifically?
23 24	°	Anything in general. Was there any investigation that you're aware of that you participated in into why this
25		went on and what could be done to prevent it?
		where we want the factories are
		KATIE McCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 75 of 239 (206) 622-6897

ſ		74
1		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
2		question. Compound.
3	Q	Is Ron Brentson still in his position or has be
4		finally been moved to a new position?
5	A	He has been he is effectively in the same position
6		with less, without the Control Center supervisor
7		piece.
8	Q	And has Ricky Rawson taken over that?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	And did you know that he was taking the Fifth
11		Amendment as well?
12		MR. FINEGOLD: Objection.
13 14	A O	No. That hasn't been shared with you at all, that your
14	Ŷ	direct supervisor, the president of the company and
16		the vice-president of the company, those three people,
17		were all taking the Fifth Amendment?
18		MR. VERWOLF: Objection. There's no basis
19		for this.
20		MR. WOLFE: This is misleading to the
21		witness.
22		MR. MARTIN: Object as compound.
23	Q	That wasn't shared with you?
24		MR. WOLFE: These are false representations
25		that are being made to the witness at this point.
	L	21 mm 46 mm 10 /31 /110 - 11 - 12 - 12 - 12 - 12 - 12 - 12 -
		KATTE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 74 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		(206) 622-6897
1		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER) 76 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
2		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 76 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question.
2 3	A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 76 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. I don't understand "this".
2 3 4		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 76 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. I don't understand "this". Ch, the explosion and rupture and death of three kids.
2 3	A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 76 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. I don't understand "this".
2 3 4 5	A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 76 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. I don't understand "this". Oh, the explosion and rupture and death of three kids. You understand that, right?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A Q Q A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 76 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. I don't understand "this". Oh, the explosion and rupture and death of three kids. You understand that, right? I do. Any investigation that went on into why three people died and what could be done to prevent a rupture and occurrence like this again? MR. MARTIN: Object to the form. MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question as compound. You asked two questions. I'm confused. Please, restate. Sure. Any investigation that you're aware of as to why three people died and what could be done to prevent this in the future? NO. Did that seen odd to you that there was no internal company investigation into this? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the

- 24
 a spill of less than 250,000 gallons?
- 25 A Yes.

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
ſ		77
1	Q	Does the company do an investigation when there's been
2		a spill of less than 10,000 gallons?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	Does the company do an investigation when there's been
5		a spill of less than 5,000 gallons?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	Then why wouldn't it seem unusual to you when we have
8		a spill of over 250,000 gallons that kills three
9		people?
10		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
11		question.
12	A	No one told we specifically that an investigation was
13		taking place. One may have been.
14	Q	But isn't that unusual to you, given the magnitude of
15		the spill, as well as the fact that three people died,
16		compared to the fact that when they have minor spills
17		with no people dying, they do an investigation and
18		here they don't?
19		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
20		question.
21		MR. VERWOLF: Argumentative, compound and no
22		foundation.
23		MR. ALLEN: Join all three of those bases
24		for objection.
25	Q	Co ahead.

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

		79
1		argumentative as well.
2	A	Again, please?
3	Q	See if we can read it back. Are you saying Olympic
4		Pipe Line investigates small scale leaks without
5		deaths but doesn't investigate large scale leaks with
6		deaths?
7	A	I don't know.
8	Q	Can you think of any reason has there been any
9		spill before of over 1,000 gallons that you can think
10		of that wasn't investigated by Olympic?
11	A	I can't.
12	Q	Can you think of any reason why Olympic wouldn't
13		investigate, do an internal investigation of this
14		spill given the magnitude of the release and the fact
15		that three people died?
16	A	I can't.
17	Q	Purpose of an investigation would be what?
18	A	I believe it to be to establish why it happened and to
19		avoid any further problems.
20	Q	Okay.
21	A	A learning tool.
22	Q	A learning tool. And do you think it's better for the
23		company to learn off of small mistakes with small
24		spills or big mistakes that kill people?
25		MR. VERWOLF: Object to that as
	1	

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		76
1	A	Again, please?
2	Q	Sure. Given your past history with this company,
3		knowing that they investigate spills that are less
4		than 5,000 gallons and spills that don't kill people
5		and spills that don't destroy a mile and a half of the
6		environment, didn't it seem unusual to you that there
7		wasn't a companywide investigation into this spill
8		that involved over 250,000 gallons and took three
9		lives?
10	A	No.
11	Q	Why not?
12	A	It's different, a different type of release. You
13		know, I've never been involved in anything like this
14		so I didn't to be honest with you, I didn't know
15		what to expect.
16	Q	What do you mean it's a different type of release?
17	A	It's large scale is what I mean.
18	Q	Are you say
19	A	With deaths.
20	Q	Are you saying Olympic Pipe Line investigates small
21	1	scales without deaths but don't investigate large
22		scales with deaths?
23		MR. SPAAN: Object. You misstated his prior
24	1	testimony. He said he didn't know.
25		MR. ALLEN: Join that objection. It's

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

		80
1		argumentative.
2	A	I think that any learning is good.
3	Q	On a weighting scale, would you think it would be more
4		important to figure out why this spill happened to
5		avoid any further problems or loss of life like this
6		again in the future, more so than a small spill that
7		didn't involve any loss of life?
8	A	I would you repeat that, please? I'm getting
9		tired. Can I take a break?
10	Q	Sure. Let's see let me get a quick answer to this
11		question that's pending and then we'll let you take a
12		break.
13	A	And that was would you restate, please?
14	Q	Sure. On a weight scale, would you think it would be
15		more important for Olympic to figure out why this
16		spill happened to avoid any further problems or loss
17		of life like this again in the future, more so than a
18		small spill that didn't involve any loss of life?
19	A	Yes.
20		MR. BENINGER: And I promised you you could
21		take a break and we'll do it.
22	i i	MR. DAHL: Going off the record. The time
23	1	is approximately 11:34 a.m.
24		(Recess taken at 11:34 a.m.)
25		MR. DAHL: Back on the record. The time is

[81
1		approximately 11:43 a.m.
2	By MR	. BENINCER:
3	Q	Now, Mr. Tieken, it's been a little over a year since
4		this rupture and explosion occurred, correct?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	What have you, as a controller for Olympic Pipe Line,
7		been told as to the cause of this occurrence?
8	A	Nothing specifically.
9	Q	So there's been no training that has been given to you
10		or education that has been given to you to serve as a
11		learning tool as to how to avoid any further problems
12		like this happening in the future?
13	A	Yes, training, you know, basic, just refreshing, you
14		know, our knowledge base on hydraulics and such.
15	Q	What about hydraulics played a role in this? What
16		about hydraulics played a role in causing this rupture
17		with the spill of 250,000 some gallons that took three
18		lives? What about hydraulics was so important in
19	_	that?
20	A	Hydraulics in pipeline is important, period.
21	Q	But I'm thinking, you said something about training so
22		I'm trying to figure out how, as a result of three
23		people dying in this rupture and release occurring,
24 25		why hydraulics was the thing that was focused on and you were trained in?
23		
	L	KATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 81 of 239
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	,	(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		83
1	Į	as we have here in Washington State for Olympic Pipe
2		Line?
3	A	It was a simulator. Conditions could be simulated
4		throughout the spectrum, but if it was exact replica,
5	1	no.
6	Q	Did it have the same sort of leak detection systems on
7		the similator as Olympic Pipe Line had in place?
8	A	No.
9	Q	Does it have the same sort of leak detection systems
10	1	on the simulator that Olympic Pipe Line has in place
11		now?
12	A	No.
13	-	The simulator, was that something that was brand new
14		with Equilon?

15 А NO. 16

Had you ever been given the opportunity to train on 0 this simulator before?

No. 18 А

17

20


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24

25

- 19 Q Had anyone else with Olympic Pipe Line that is in charge or hired as a controller been given the opportunity to go to Equilon and train on the simulator before the June 10th, 1999, catastrophe? 22 MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
 - Yes. А
 - Who? Q



82

1	A	I I don't know specifically.
2	Q	Who do you think generally was allowed to go down and
3		train before the June 10th fire and deaths on the
4		similator?
5	A	I believe the bulk of the controllers went down. It's
6		πy understanding the bulk of the controllers went down
7		prior to my hiring on with Olympic.
8	Q	That would have been back in 1994?
9	A	Prior to that, yes.
10	Q	So this simulator for leak detection systems, the
11		purpose of that, I assume, is to give people, the
12		controllers, the opportunity to simulate a leak and
13		learn how to respond to that in an efficient and a
14		safe manner, correct?
15	A	No.
16	Q	What's the purpose of the leak detection simulator?
17	A	To recognize the signature of a leak.
18	Q	Simple recognition, that's it?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	No response? Isn't the simulator to help you respond
21		to it?
22	A	Some response, yes, yes.
23	Q	Is the primary purpose of it simply to detect the
24		signature of a leak or then to figure out what to do
25		to respond to the leak? They've got to go hand in
	1	

		(LILUID TIENEN - BY MK. BENIN&R)
ſ		85
1		glove, don't they?
2	A	They do, yes.
3	Q	So the simulator really does both. It helps you to
4		detect the signature of a leak and then to respond to
5		it in an efficient and safe manner, correct?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	Since you've been hired on in 1994, have any other
8		controllers been given the opportunity to go down to
9		refresh themselves on the simulator?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	Who?
12	A	All of us.
13	Q	I'm talking, I'm sorry, before June 10th. Since
14		you've been hired and before June 10th, has anybody
15		else been given the opportunity to go down and train
16	ļ	on the simulator?
17	A	No.
18	Q	Do you know why?
19	A	No.
20	Q	Equilon did actually manage the pipeline, correct?
21	{	MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
22	1	Calls for a legal conclusion.
23	A	At yes.
24	Q	How do you know that?
25	A	It was armounced when Equilon entity became a reality.
	1	
		KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 85 of 239
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)
		87
1	A	All with the exception of Larry, John Smith and
2		myself.
3	Q	Any other simulators that you've been given access to
4		like a SCADA simulator, operation simulator, any other
5		simulators that you were given access to to train
6	1	either before or after June 10th?
7	A	No.

- 7 Α
- Now, the training then, you talked about a one day 8 Q training session on hydraulics, a seminar done by 9 Frank Hopf, correct? 10
- Yes. 11 А
- 12 Q And you talked about being able to use the leak detection simulator. Where is that located? 13
- 14 А It's Two Shell Plaza in Houston.
- 15 Q When was that? 16 After the incident. I don't -- I would say November А
- of '99 would be a ballpark. 17
- And did all the controllers go down then? 18 Q
- 19 А Yes. 20 Q Other than those two things, what other training have 21 you been given since June 10th?
- We have been given a test, a knowledge test, a basic 22 A pipeline knowledge test which incorporates Bayview 23 facility. 24
- Who gave this test? 25 Q

		(LLOYD TIEXEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
ſ		86
1	Q	And the simulator, was that at the Texaco facilities
2	_	or was that at the Shell facilities?
3	A	Shell.
4	Q	And you understand Shell and Texaco are the two
5		companies that merged to form Equilon, correct?
6	A	Yes.
7		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
8	Q	And so even before 1994 when they were still separate
9		entities, Shell made their simulator available for the
10		Olympic Pipe Line crews to come down and train on
11		their leak detection simulator, correct?
12	A	I don't know.
13		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
14	Q	How did you answer my question before that the bulk of
15		the controllers went down to the, now we know Shell
16		simulator and trained on them before you came on board
17		in 1994?
18	A	My fellow controllers told me.
19	Q	The what controllers would those have been that
20		were there before you? We had nine that were listed
21		down here. Which ones were there before you? You
22		probably can't read my writing very well.
23	A	I just remembered the one I missed. Larry Shelton.
24	Q	Of those ones, which ones were there before you were
25	l	hired on in '94?

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 88

		00
ı	А	Frank Hopf.
2	Q	This was before he left?
з	A	Yes.
4	Q	And was there additional training that went along in
5		preparation for the test?
6	A	No.
7	Q	Were the results posted?
8	A	No.
9	Q	Were the results made known to the people who took the
10		test?
11	A	Individually.
12	Q	How did you do on the test?
13	A	I did well, a hundred percent.
14	Q	How long was this test?
15	A	This test was about, oh, half an hour at the most.
16	Q	Okay. Other than a one day hydraulic seminar, access
17		to the leak detection simulator and a half hour test,
18		what other training have you had since this
19		catastrophe on June 10th?
20	A	Well, effectively training is ongoing day in and day
21		out.
22	Q	That's just learn from your mistakes type training on
23		the job, correct?
24		MR. VERWOLF: Object to characterization.
25		MR. ALLEN: Object to form of the question.
	1	

_		
ſ	_	89
1	A	It's learn on the job, not by mistakes.
2	Q	You learn from your mistakes though, which is why you
3		do an investigation of mistakes, correct?
4		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.
5		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
6	A	Sure, we try to learn from our mistakes.
7	Q	You not only learn from your mistakes, but you also
8		learn from other people's in the industry's mistakes
9		as well, correct?
10	A	That's a wise thing to do, yes.
11	Q	Not only is it wise, it actually is done at Olympic.
12		They'll send around memos and they'll have seminars
13		talking about some of the other spills in the country,
14		New Jersey and those kind of places, correct?
15	А	Yes.
16	Q	You actually had a seminar on the 1992 spill in New
17		Jersey, didn't you?
18	A	Not that I recall.
19	Q	Was that part of a seminar or any training that you
20		had, was information on the 1992 spill in New Jersey?
21	A	Not that I recall.
22	Q	You never had that given to you as an example of a
23	ĺ	learning tool to avoid some of the mistakes that
24		happened in New Jersey?
25	A	I may have. I recall a document on a spill from the
		-

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> (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 91

1		you learn from the mistakes they made in dealing with
2		those ones, correct?
3	A	That was more for field personnel targeting. It was
4		targeting field personnel.

Were you involved in that seminar? 5 Q

22

23 24

- 6 I was able to attend one of them. A
- 7 By being able, you mean your employer, Olympic Pipe Q Line, only let's you attend one of the seminars put on 8 by DOE for spill response? 9
- No, I could attend whatever seminar I wanted to at any 10 Α 11 point in time.
- Did Olympic Pipe Line make it mandatory for you to 12 Q 13 attend or was it just if you want to go, fine; if you don't want to go, fine, too? 14
- Some meetings were mandatory and some weren't. Which 15 Α 16 ones were mandatory, I don't know.

17 I'm trying to get a little bit of a handle as to what 0 18 sort of program Olympic had in place before June 10th to help train people to do their job better, whether 19 20 it's a refresher course or simulators or seminars they would put on, anything like that? 21

There was -- I do now -- you've kind of piqued my Α memory. They were required, on initial training before certification, to complete a computer based training nodule. 25

90	


1		NTSB belonging to Colonial Pipeline for review, but I
2		didn't, you know, really view it as a training as much
з		as just an overview of, you know
4	Q	What sort of training did Olympic have set up then for
5		you operators to learn from either your mistakes or
6		other people's mistakes? Was there any?
7	A	Just what I've mentioned.
8	Q	What did you mention?
9	A	What we've gone over.
10	Q	No, no, we've gone over things after the June 10th .
11		catastrophe. I'm trying to figure out before June
12		10th, what kind of training or seminars or ongoing
13	ł	education did Olympic have to help you all figure out
14		here's other mistakes from other people; how can we
15		avoid this in our company?
16	A	No.
17	Q	None from Olympic, correct?
18	A	No.
19	Q	How about didn't the DOE, didn't they put on
20	ļ	seminars for you?
21	A	DOE, Department of
22	Q	Ecology.
23	A	Ecology? Actually, spill response training, yes.
24	0	And as part of that spill response training they
25	1	brought up some other spills in the country to help

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 92

1	Q	And the computer based training module was designed to
2		do what?
3	A	Called OBT, and, actually, we had to do that again.
4		That is yet another piece of training that we had to
5		do again as well post June 10th as a refresher.
6	Q	What is the CBT, the computer based training module?
7	A	It covers a variety of issues of the pipeline
8		operation, alignment. You know, it covers DOT rules
9		and regulations. A basic, you know, how to operate a
10		pipeline. You know, just pipeline in general.
11	Q	Is this a simulator that you're able to use or is it
12		from books?
13	A	It's on a PC.
14	Q	And is that what you did before your initial
15		certification in '94? Was that when it was?
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	And since '94, your initial certified, any refresher
18		courses to go back through and retrain on this or
19		update it or anything like that?
20	A	No.
21	Q	So since 1994, you had received no other further
22		computer based training; is that correct?
23	A	No.
24	Q	And Olympic Pipe Line didn't make it mandatory for
25		once a year or once every two years or on any periodic

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		basis, to go through some additional training on a
1		
2		computer based training or a leak detection similator
3		or anything like that?
4	A	No.
5	Q	No regular training of any type from Olympic Pipe
6	_	Line, correct, that was mandatory?
7	A	Correct.
8		MR. DAHL: This is the end of tape No. 1 in
9		the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is
10		approximately 12:01 p.m. Going off the record.
11		(Linch recess taken at 12:01 p.m.)
12		(Exit Mr. Platis.)
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		KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 93 of 239
		KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 93 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
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1	А	Yes.
2	Q	And is that going to remain a permenent condition or
3		once the other segment, the 16 inch line comes back
4		on, do they intend to split those functions back up
5		again between the controllers?
6	А	I don't know what BP plans to do.
7	Q	Your job then now is to once again be running the
8		pipeline, correct?
9	A	Correct.
10	Q	To do your job you need to know that the equipment
11		that you're using is safe to do it in a safe manner,
12		correct?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	And you wouldn't run an unsafe pipeline, would you?
15	A	No.
16	Q	Let me go back then because we know that what occurred
17	ļ	June 10th, 1999, was a tragedy, wasn't it?
18	A	Yes.
19	Q	And in order for you to feel confortable to go back to
20	ļ	operate this pipeline, you would want to make sure
21		that it is, in fact, safe and that tragedy isn't going
22	1	to be repeated, wouldn't you?
23	A	Yes.
24 25	Q	What steps have you done to determine the cause of that tragedy on June 10th, 1999?
		KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 97 of 239
	L	KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 97 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
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2 3 4 5 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A 0 A A 0 A A 0 A A A A A A A A A A A A A	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 99 I don't know. So if you don't know what caused the occurrence, how can you be sure that the pipeline is now safe to operate? I can never be 100 percent positive. At any point in time schemene can damage the pipe unbeknownst to me. Again, is it your assumption that the reason the June 10th occurrence happened was because of damage to the pipe? I believe it. I believe that the pipe had been damaged, yes. So is your belief that the cause of the June 10th, 1999, occurrence was because of damage to the pipe? That's it? That is my personal belief, yes. Any other reason that the June 10th, 1999, rupture and deaths occurred other than damage to the pipe? No. Why didn't Olympic find the damage to the pipe if it's really a safe pipeline?
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		And a second and the second
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1	A	I personally just pay attention to the information
2		that's published, you know.
3	Q	How do you know the pipeline is safe now?
4	A	Well, we have well, we have run tool runs. We have
5		done MFL tool runs, magniflex tool runs, caliper tool
6		runs, things like that, which are instruments that
7		tell us the health of the pipe itself.
8	Q	So are you saying to me that the reason that this
9		occurred, this tragedy occurred before, was because
10		the pipe itself wasn't healthy? That's why? 🔩 👘
11	A	No, I'm not telling you the reason it happened at all.
12	Q	If you don't know the reason, then how do you know
13	 	it's safe now?
14	A	Well, I would like to see the official results of, you
15		know, why the pipe failed from NTSB, but I haven't
16		seen that.
17	Q	That, again, is just focused on the pipe itself,
1.8		correct?
19	A	Correct.
20	Q	Let me just ask you in a straightforward, broad
21		question. What caused the June 10th, 1999,
22		occurrence?
23		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
24		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection, no
25		foundation.
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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

		100
1	A	I don't know.
2	Q	If you don't know any of those, how do you know there
3		still isn't damage that they haven't found that they
4		haven't fixed?
5	A	Idon't.
6	Q	So are you just willing to just simply keep running
7		the pipeline with the same level of assurance that you
8		had before this tragedy as you sit here now?
9		MR. VERWOLF: Objection. Argumentative.
10		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
11	A	Would you rephrase that or repeat?
12	Q	Sure. Can you tell us that this pipeline is now safe
13		to operate?
14	A	I believe it is.
15	Q	Based upon what?
16	A	Based upon the maintenance, just based upon the
17		knowledge that the people responsible for keeping the
18		pipeline healthy and all the checks and balances in
19		place are doing their job.
20	Q	These checks and balances were all there before,
21		weren't they?
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	And the people were all there before, weren't they?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	So what's changed between the tragedy and now that you

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101 The an assurance that this pipeline is safe? tople, same checks and balances. What's tople, same checks and balances. What's ty thing that I'm aware that has changed is we agreement stepped up, I believe in response to sement with the city of Bellingham, we have the up the smart tool runs through the system tell us the condition of the piping, and I te that's the case. t's it. So you think the difference between the ty that occurred and now as to why this is safe ause they've stepped up the smart pig runs? the difference. A difference. ther differences? The smart pig you say is one ives you a level of safety to be able to operate hrough neighborhoods and parks, correct? hat mean yes?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q A Q A Q A Q	102 pressure, so we're operating at lower pressure systemwide by 20 percent margin. Smart pigs, cathodic protection and 80 percent of MOP. Anything else? No. You're aware that there were smart pig runs before this tragedy on the pipeline, aren't you? Yes. And you're aware that those smart pig runs had given information back to Olympic to make decisions on as to what they're going to do about it, correct? Yes. Are you aware that there were discussions between
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y that occurred and now as to why this is safe ause they've stepped up the smart pig runs? e difference. A difference. ther differences? The smart pig you say is one ives you a level of safety to be able to operate hrough neighborhoods and parks, correct?	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18		what they're going to do about it, correct? Yes. Are you aware that there were discussions between
ause they've stepped up the smart pig runs? e difference. A difference. ther differences? The smart pig you say is one ives you a level of safety to be able to operate hrough neighborhoods and parks, correct?	12 13 14 15 16 17 18		Yes. Are you aware that there were discussions between
e difference. A difference. ther differences? The smart pig you say is one ives you a level of safety to be able to operate hrough neighborhoods and parks, correct?	13 14 15 16 17 18		Are you aware that there were discussions between
ther differences? The smart pig you say is one ives you a level of safety to be able to operate hrough neighborhoods and parks, correct?	14 15 16 17 18	Q	
ives you a level of safety to be able to operate hrough neighborhoods and parks, correct?	15 16 17 18		
hrough neighborhoods and parks, correct?	16 17 18		Olympic supervisory personnel and the DOE on actually
	17 18		going and inspecting certain defects right where the
	18		rupture occurred?
hat mean yes?		A	Repeat that, please.
		Q	Sure. Are you aware in '96 and '97 of correspondence
	19		between DOE and Olympic to go out and inspect certain
you. Other than smart pigs, what else?	20		defects they found near the water treatment plant in
ic protection.	21		Bellingham?
than smart pigs and cathodic protection, what	22 23	A	MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation. No.
changes have been made that assure that this e now safer than it was back in June, 1999?	23	0	Are you aware of changes that have been made and the
operating at 80 percent of maximum operating	25	¥	procedure that Olympic uses to evaluate the smart pig
COY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 101 of 239	J		KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 102 of 239
(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)			(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
103	}		104
	1		pig somehow makes the line safe where it wasn't safe
	2	ł	before?
you had smart pigs before the tragedy in June,	3	ĺ	MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
t?	4		question.
	5		MR. VERWOLF: Asked and answered.
ou still have smart pigs now but you're not aware	6	Q	Go ahead.
y changes that have been made in the way that	7	A	Please repeat.
analyze or respond to the data, how can you say	8	Q	What is it now about the smart pigs that you believe
mart pigs do any difference?	9	1	make the line safe, safer than the use of the smart
ieve the, as the use of smart tools has, you	10		pigs was before June, 1999?
grown, that business, that the tools have become	1 11		MR. ALLEN: Same objection. Asked and
STORE STATE OF STATE (SECOND STATE STATE	12		answered.
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I	13	A	The technology of the tools themselves.
	14	0	And so you think that the technology you mean
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I	15		technology as far as identifying problems in the line,
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable.	16		correct?
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. Ou saying that the problem before was that the	1	A	I mean technology in the entire process, the tool
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. Ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the	17		itself, perhaps, you know, the way the technicians
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the t or just that it wasn't responded to?			interpret the data. I don't know. I'm no expert on
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the t or just that it wasn't responded to? to expert on smart tools. I'm not saying any	18		tools. That's out of my field of knowledge really.
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the t or just that it wasn't responded to? to expert on smart tools. I'm not saying any fic element bears any responsibility.	18		I understand, but as the operator, the person running
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the t or just that it wasn't responded to? to expert on smart tools. I'm not saying any fic element bears any responsibility. i need to go through, I want to go through and	18 19 20	Q	the pipeline and having to run it in a safe manner, I
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the t or just that it wasn't responded to? to expert on smart tools. I'm not saying any fic element bears any responsibility. need to go through, I want to go through and out why you think that this line is safe to	18 19 20 21	_	
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the t or just that it wasn't responded to? to expert on smart tools. I'm not saying any fic element bears any responsibility. Theed to go through, I want to go through and out why you think that this line is safe to ate now, and one of these is you claim the use of	18 19 20 21		want to know what it is about these smart pigs now in
er, greater resolution, more reliable, etc., I the technology itself has become more reliable. ou saying that the problem before was that the itself didn't tell enough information on the t or just that it wasn't responded to? to expert on smart tools. I'm not saying any fic element bears any responsibility. i need to go through, I want to go through and out why you think that this line is safe to ate now, and one of these is you claim the use of smart pigs. The smart pigs have been around	18 19 20 21 22		want to know what it is about these smart pigs now in one year's time that has given you this confidence
er t ou it	expert on smart tools. I'm not saying any	ueed to go through, I want to go through and 19	weed to go through, I want to go through and19ut why you think that this line is safe to20e now, and one of these is you claim the use of21Q

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Г		105			106
1	А	I've never lost any confidence that the pipelines can	1	Q	So you think that smart pigs should be run on a
2	'n	be run safely. Right out of the box these pipelines	2	. ¥	regular basis to ensure that damage doesn't happen in
3		are tested to double pretty much twice the burst	- 3		between runs, correct?
4		pressure of what they're actually operated at and	4		MR. VERMOLF: Objection, no foundation.
5		they're set to be protected not to exceed that. I	-		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
6		really have never lost	6		question. Argumentative.
7	0	These tests didn't do the citizens of Bellingham much	7	A	I don't.
8	-	good on June 10th, did it?	8	0	How often should they be run then in order to give you
9	А	No.	9	-	that level of security to run a safe pipeline?
10	0	So now let's go back through to see what we do to	10		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
11	-	safeguard the operation to the pipeline, and one of	11		question. No foundation.
12		the things you mentioned is the use of the, of this	12	Q	Go ahead.
13		new and improved smart pig; is that right?	13	A	I believe if a a smart tool run actually may only
14	A	Yes.	14		need to be run once when the pipeline is built. If
15	Q	But I need to figure out what exactly it is about the	15		the checks and balances were in place so that no one
16	_	use of the smart pig now compared to '96 and '97 that	16		could get near our pipelines underground without us
17		somehow gives you a level of confort that this rupture	17	{	being made aware of it, fully aware of it at all
18		and explosion will never happen again?	18	1	points in time, any time they're closed, then I
1.9		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, asked and answered.	19		believe that even just once would be enough.
20		MR. ALLEN: Same objection.	20	Q	And it doesn't I guess we've talked about this a
21	Q	Go ahead.	21	1	little bit before. Detection and response, they've
22	A	One other facet in this is the passage of time. The	22		got to go hand in glove for any real safe procedure to
23		pipeline could have been damaged and covered in the	23		be involved, right?
24		interim between when the last tool was run and now, so	24		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
25		the most current the run, the better I feel.	25		question. It's vague and ambiguous.
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)			(1LOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER)
		(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 107	1	[·
1	A] 1	A	(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER)
1 2	A Q	107	1		(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108
		107 I didn't catch the question.	1		(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINJER) 108 No.
2		107 I didn't catch the question. Let me do it a little bit this way: It doesn't do,	2	Q	(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108 No. Okay, so it's not just a matter of detection, but it's
2 3		107 I didn't catch the question. Let me do it a little bit this way: It doesn't do, for safety processes, it doesn't do Olympic much good	2	Q	(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108 No. Okay, so it's not just a matter of detection, but it's a matter of responding to any sort of potential harm
2 3 4		107 I didn't catch the question. Let me do it a little bit this way: It doesn't do, for safety processes, it doesn't do Olympic much good just to be informed of construction work along the	23	Q	(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108 No. Okay, so it's not just a matter of detection, but it's a matter of responding to any sort of potential harm to that pipe that's important, isn't it?
2 3 4 5		107 I didn't catch the question. Let me do it a little bit this way: It doesn't do, for safety processes, it doesn't do Olympic much good just to be informed of construction work along the pipeline if they're not going to send somebody out	2 3 4	Q A Q	(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108 No. Okay, so it's not just a matter of detection, but it's a matter of responding to any sort of potential harm to that pipe that's important, isn't it? Yes.
2 3 4 5 6	Q	107 I didn't catch the question. Let me do it a little bit this way: It doesn't do, for safety processes, it doesn't do Olympic much good just to be informed of construction work along the pipeline if they're not going to send somebody out there to monitor the activities, correct?	2 3 4 5 6	Q A Q	(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108 No. Okay, so it's not just a matter of detection, but it's a matter of responding to any sort of potential harm to that pipe that's important, isn't it? Yes. What has Olympic done that you're aware of since the
2 3 4 5 6 7	Q	107 I didn't catch the question. Let me do it a little bit this way: It doesn't do, for safety processes, it doesn't do Olympic much good just to be informed of construction work along the pipeline if they're not going to send somebody out there to monitor the activities, correct? I can't I can't answer that.	2 3 4 5 6 7	Q A Q	(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108 No. Okay, so it's not just a matter of detection, but it's a matter of responding to any sort of potential harm to that pipe that's important, isn't it? Yes. What has Olympic done that you're aware of since the June 10th explosion to increase their monitoring of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Q	107 I didn't catch the question. Let me do it a little bit this way: It doesn't do, for safety processes, it doesn't do Olympic much good just to be informed of construction work along the pipeline if they're not going to send somebody out there to monitor the activities, correct? I can't I can't enswer that. It's common sense. MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9	Q	(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 108 No. Okay, so it's not just a matter of detection, but it's a matter of responding to any sort of potential harm to that pipe that's important, isn't it? Yes. What has Olympic done that you're aware of since the June 10th explosion to increase their monitoring of any potential digging around the pipeline? MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation. MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
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(TTOXD	TIEKEN	-	BĂ	MR.	BENINGER)
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1	Q	So let's see if we can go to cathodic protection. Did
2		the lack of cathodic protection cause this rupture and
3		explosion?
4	A	I dan't know.
5	Q	Okay. What was wrong with the cathodic protection
6		before?
7	A	I an unaware of any problem with the cathodic
8		protection.
9	Q	What has changed in the cathodic protection that gives
10		you this increased level of safety now?
11	A	Nothing. It's working fine as far as I know.
12	Q	Then is it the fact that this is, the pipeline is now
13		only operating at 80 percent of the maximum operating
14		pressure that gives you the level of comfort to think
15	İ	that this pipeline can be run safely compared to June
16		10th, 1999?
17	A	No. It's a number of things. That's part of it, but
18		it's also the design and the engineering of the system
19		as well as the, all of the fail-safes that are in
20		place. First of all, like I said, it's tested out.
21		It's hydrotested out to a certain pressure which is
22		maintained, and then approved to operate substantially
23		lower than that, something along 80 percent less than
24		that, so there's that full 80 percent margin of error
25		on top of that.

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1		MR. WOLFE: There is no basis for this man
2		to be offering expert testimony.
3	Q	Go ahead.
4		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
5	A	Repeat, please.
6	Q	Sure. What has changed between July or June 10th and
7		now in the design and engineering of the pipeline that
8		leads you to believe it can be operated safely?
9	A	Nothing.
10	Q	Okay. Now that we've gone through other than what
11		we've just gone through, is there anything that you
12	1	can point to that's changed between June 10th and now
13		that leads you to believe the pipeline could be
14		operated safely?
15	A	I'll restate. I've never felt that the pipeline
16		couldn't be operated safely.
17	Q	But it wasn't, was it?
18	A	Yes, it was.
19	Q	You believe on June 10th the pipeline was operated
20		safely?
21	A	Yes, I do.
22	Q	And you believe on June 10th when it was operated
23		safely, then why did three people die? What caused
24		three people to die?
	A	Idon't know.

(LTOAD	TIEKEN	-	BX	MR.	BENINGER)
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1	Q	That didn't do these three little boys that died any
2		good, did it?
3		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
4	Q	Did it?
5	A	No.
6	Q	So I'm trying to figure out now, compared to right
7		before these boys were burned to death, as to what's
8		changed that you can say the pipeline can be operated
9		safely?
10		MR. VERWOLF: Asked and answered.
11		MR. ALLEN: Objection.
12	Q	I thought it was asked and answered but now we're
13	1	getting a number of other things besides smart pigs,
14	2	cathodic protection, 80 percent MOP and the passage of
15		time. Anything besides those three things?
16	A	Did you list design and engineering?
17	Q	I was listing what you told me and that was added in a
18		second ago, right?
19	A	Yeah, yeah.
20	Q	Let me get into design and engineering. What has
21		changed in the design and engineering of this pipeline
22		from July 10th to the present that gives you a level
23		of safety?
24		MR. WOLFE: I object to foundation.
25		MR. ALLEN: Yeah.

KATIE BCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 110 of 239 (206) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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		112
1	Q	But you've already closed your mind to the fact that
2		it might have been operator error? Is that what I'm
3		hearing?
4		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.
5		MR. ALLEN: Same objection. Argumentative.
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	You have closed your mind to that?
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	What is that based on, the investigation that you did?
10	A	Based on my knowledge of the system. Even if there
11		was no operator intervention, the system is designed
12		to protect itself and shut down without ever being
13		able without any human intervention whatsoever.
14	Q	Did it shut down?
15	A	Did it?
16	Q	Yes.
17	A	I don't know.
18	Q	How would you know that? You were in the control
19		room, weren't you? You were in the SCADA room?
20	A	I was in the computer room attending to the computers.
21	Q	And you had no idea whether the system was up or down?
22	A	No, sir.
23	Q	When did you first learn that there was a leak?
24	A	I believe around 1630.
25	0	Around 4:30?

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[113			
1	A	Yes, sir.			
2	° Q	How did you learn there was a leak?			
3	Ă	Kevin Dyvig met Ron Brentson and I in the hallway			
4		outside of the Control Center and made the statement			
5		that gasoline has been reported in Whatcom Creek by			
6		Rick Kiene.			
7	Q	Rick Kiene reported that gasoline had been reported			
8	Ā	No, that he saw gasoline in Whatcom Creek.			
9	Q	So you and the control room, at that point in time,			
10	-	knew it was your gasoline from Olympic Pipe Line; is			
11		that right?			
12	А	I wagn't in the control room.			
13	0	You, as well as the other people, the other			
14	¥	controllers and supervisors at Olympic Pipe Ling, knew			
14		that the gasoline in Whatcom Creek was from your			
16		pipeline?			
10	A	Since we had the only pipeline in the neighborhood			
18	^	that was our well, I don't know.			
19	0	What did you think at the time?			
20	A	Well, I felt that we had the only pipeline in the			
20	Î.	neighborhood so if it was true, that there was a			
22		likelihood, yes.			
23	0	And so if I'm understanding right, the people in the			
24	×	control room, the first time they understand that			
25		their pipeline is ruptured is from a report by			
		KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 113 of 239			
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)			
		115			
1	A	No.			
2	Q	Had they told you that the pipeline had been shut			
3		down?			
4	A	Kevin mentioned that he had shut the system down prior			
5		to Rick calling.			
6	Q	I thought the system was supposed to shut down			
7	1	automatically if there was a leak or a rupture?			
8		MR. VERWOLF: Objection. Assumes the			
9		shutdown was a result of the leak or rupture.			
10	• <u> </u>	I thought you told me earlier the system was set up so			
11		that it would automatically shut down in the event of			
12		a npture?			
13	A	I never said that.			
14	Q	Is the system set up to do that?			
15	A	No.			

- 15 A No.
 16 Q So you can have a rupture and the system just keeps pumping? Is that what I'm hearing you say?
 18 A No, let me backtrack. Yes, the system should shut down in the event of a large leak.
- 20 Q And by large leak, you mean what kind of a leak?
- 21AWell, I would rather not get into that because then22you're talking, you know, very individual system23characteristics, you know. A full pipe breakage, for24example, should -- will shut down a pump station.
- 25 Q Kind of like what we had here on June 10th, right?

		114
1		somebody else that they see it in the water?
2		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
з		question.
4		MR. VERWOLF: Object, no foundation.
5		MR. ALLEN: No foundation.
6	Q	Is that right?
7	A	I don't know.
8	Q	You didn't see anything on the SCADA system that
9		indicated there has been a rupture and leak?
10	A	SCADA system is separate from the pipeline control
11		side.
12	Q	You didn't see anything, any alarms, no alarms that
13		were in the computer room, correct?
14	A	Correct.
15	Q	And you had received no information from anybody that
16		there was a rupture and potential leak before Rick
17		Kiene called in, correct?
18	A	No. Before Kevin informed us in the hallway.
19	Q	And Kevin's report was solely off of Rick Kiene's
20		observations, correct?
21	A	I don't know.
22	Q	When you heard the discussion between Kevin Dyvig and
23		Ron Brentson and yourself, was there any discussion as
24		to that there's notification or an alarm of a leak on
25		the system?
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

116 Yes. 1 А Let's say you lose one to five percent, you leak one 2 0 3 to five percent of the volume flow. Is that enough to trigger an automatic shutdown? 4 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the 5 6 question. No foundation. 7 I don't know. А You're a controller. You don't know what the 8 Q operating parameters are for automatic shutdown for a 9 10 leak? 11 I do. However, it's dynamic. А Meaning what? 12 0 13 A The pipeline isn't always operated at X amount of 14 pressure here and X amount of pressure here. At any given point in time that pressure is variable. 15 16 Depending on where the leak might occur, you know, one to five percent may be enough. 17 And it may not? 18 0 19 Α And it may not. 20 Q So you've got -- actually, what type of leak detective 21 system do you have on this pipeline or did you back in 22 June of 1999? 23 We do. А Same one as you did in '99? 24 0 25 А Yes.

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1	Q	117
_	0	
2	¥	What was it?
~ [A	It's a model comparative system built by Modisette $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$
3		Associates.
4	Q	How does it function?
5	A	It basically creates it's got a database that
6		creates a mathematical profile of the pipeline system
7		and it compares what it thinks flow in vs. flow out
8		based on telemetered values fed into it as well as
9		constant values that exist in its profile, be that
10		elevation, ground temperature, etc., and compares its
11		flow in, its calculated flow in, flow out vs. realtime
12		net flow in, net flow out, and basically publishes a
13		difference between the two.
14	Q	What margin of error does it have for detection?
15	A	I don't know.
16	Q	If the computer system is not responding or responds
17		slowly, is the leak detection system going to be tied
18		into that?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	So if you're having a problem with OLY01 and OLY02,
21		that's also going to lead to a problem with the leak
22		detector system reporting its values back to the
23	ļ	control room, correct?
24	A	I believe so.
25	0	Do you know if the problems with the computers led to

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

		119
1		foundation.
2		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
3	A	No.
4	Q	I mean before you decide that you're going to go and
5		continue to operate a pipeline that has resulted in
6		the death of three people and burned a mile and a half
7		swathway through a park in a city, don't you think it
8	ļ	would be reasonable for you to try to figure out what
9		other potential causes there may have been to this
10	İ	accident?
11		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.
12		MR. ALLEN: Argumentative and no foundation.
13	Q	Go ahead.
14	A	I believe that that is being done. I just believe
15		it's complex enough that the results aren't published
16		yet.
17	Q Q	In fact, you don't have any of the results being in
18		and it's 14 months afterwards, correct?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	And you keep operating the same pipeline with the same
21		checks and balances with the same personnel with the
22	1	same smart pigs and the same cathodic protection and
23		the same design and engineering that you had when this
24		tragedy occurred, aren't you?
25		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.
	1	
	1	

_		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		118
1		a slow response or slow detection by the controllers
2		in the control room as to the leak in this case?
3		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, compound.
4	A	I don't know.
5	Q	Was your understanding though that Mr. Dyvig was the
6		one that shut down the system, not the system shutting
7		itself down automatically, correct?
8	А	Yes.
9	Q	Did you have an understanding as to when he or
10		samebody else shut the system on or turned the system
11		an?
12	A	No.
13	Q	Had you been made aware that, in fact, the pumps had
14		been turned on two times before the explosion and
15		burning of these children occurred?
16		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation and
17		argumentative.
18		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
19	A	No.
20	Q	You'd never been told that?
21	A	No.
22	Q	If you learned that, doesn't that raise some questions
23		in your mind as to whether there may have been some
24	1	operator problems that led to this unsafe condition?
25		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, speculation, no

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER)
120
Contrary to his testimony.
MR. ALLEN: Objection.
Yes.
So what is it then that gives you the assurance that
this really can be done safely and we're not about to
have another Bellingham explosion?
MR. ALLEN: Objection, asked and answered.
The fact that it had been operated safely for 30 some
years prior carries some weight in my mind.
Is that all the weight? Is there anything else that
you're relying upon for the hope that this tragedy
doesn't occur again other than you did it 34 years
without killing screbody?
No.
In fact, during those 34 years you had 43 spills,
didn't you?
MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
I don't know.
Do you know how many spills there were in those 34
years?
Idon't.
If there were more than 10, would that cause you some
concern that it could be operated safely?
MR. ALLEN: Objection, no foundation,

argumentative.

4 Q

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6 7

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9 10 Q

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13 14 A

15 Q

19 Q

20 21 A

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23 24

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			And a second and the same and an and a second and a secon
	ſ		121
	1	A	I would have to know specifics.
	2	0	Here's the problem I have, is you're relying on 34
	3	-	vears of operation and whatever that record was to
	4		give you your level of safety that it can still be
)	5		operated safely now, aren't you?
	6		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
	7		question. Argumentative.
	8	A	No.
	9	Q	Isn't that what you just said, that the fact that it
	10	¥	had been run for 34 years is given, I think you said,
	11		considerable weight?
	12	A	That is part of the equation but only part.
	13	ō	
	14	¥	Let's focus on that part then. I want to see how strong that survives scrutiny, that 34 year history.
	14		
			How many spills are you aware of during that time?
	16	A	One since, that I've been here that I've actually, you
	17		know, been here during, and
	18	Q 	One since the June 10th, correct?
	19 20	A	No.
	20	Q	You were aware of the spill at the Renton facilities,
	21	 .	weren't you? Yes
	22 23	A	Yes.
	23	Q	So that's at least one since June 10th that you're
	~ ^ '		
	24 25		aware of, correct?
	24 25	A	Yes. KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239
			Yes. KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897
)			Yes. KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239
	25		Yes. KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 123
	1		Yes. KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th?
	25 1 2		Yes. KATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINSER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
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	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	A Q	Yes. MATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection.
	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A Q A	Yes. KATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. NO.
	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A Q Q	Yes. KATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (206) 123 Were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. Nb. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. Nb. And the public wasn't aware that DDE had requested
	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	A Q A Q	Yes. KATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. No. And the public wasn't aware that DDE had requested that Olympic go in and inspect the defect right by the
	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	А Q Д	Yes. NATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. No. And the public wasn't aware that DDE had requested that Olympic go in and inspect the defect right by the water treatment plant where this rupture occurred,
	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	А Q Д	Yes. KATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. No. And the public wasn't aware that DDE had requested that Olympic go in and inspect the defect right by the water treatment plant where this rupture occurred, were they?
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•	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	A Q A Q	Yes. NATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. No. And the public wasn't aware that DDE had requested that Olympic go in and inspect the defect right by the water treatment plant where this rupture occurred, were they? MR. VERMOLF: Same objection. Argumentative. I don't know.
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•	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A Q A Q A Q	Yes. NATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (110YD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. No. And the public wasn't aware that DDE had requested that Olympic go in and inspect the defect right by the water treatment plant where this rupture occurred, were they? MR. VERMOLF: Same objection. Argumentative. I don't know. And the public hadn't been made aware of the fact you put a new Bayview Station in that had all kinds of problems, had they? MR. ALLEN: Objection. Argumentative, no foundation. I don't know.
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	25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A Q A Q A Q A Q	Yes. NATTE MCCOY, NPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 121 of 239 (110YD TIEKEN - BY MR. EENINGER) 123 were they, on June 10th? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Argumentative. No. And the public wasn't aware of the fact that there were smart pig runs before June of 1997, were they? MR. ALLEN: Same objection. No. And the public wasn't aware that DDE had requested that Olympic go in and inspect the defect right by the water treatment plant where this rupture occurred, were they? MR. VERMOLF: Same objection. Argumentative. I don't know. And the public hadn't been made aware of the fact you put a new Bayview Station in that had all kinds of problems, had they? MR. ALLEN: Objection. Argumentative, no foundation. I don't know.
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		122
1	Q	How about before? How about in the time that you've
2		been there before? If you're really relying on the
3		past history, what do you know about the leaks and
4		spills in that past history?
5		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form.
6		Argumentative.
7	A	I it is my understanding that the lion's share or
8		the bulk of the previous spills and problems we had
9		were due to third party damage.
10	Q	You are aware then of a number of spills and problems
11		that you had before June 10th, aren't you then?
12	A	Hearsay.
13	Q	And that hearsay then, you believe that those spills
14		and problems that you're aware of were third party
15		damage is what you're thinking?
16	A	Yes, some of them.
17	Q	How about the Ebby Slough? Are you aware of the spill
18		at the Emby Slough?
19	A	No.
20	Q	So do you think that is there some new system that
21		you have in place to prevent third party damage that
22		gives you the assurance that the prior history
23		wouldn't simply be repeating itself?
24	A	Well, I'm hoping public awareness will play a role.
25	Q	But the public wasn't in charge of the control room,

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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		124
1	A	Define big.
2	Q	It's a problem. We can agree on that?
3	A	I can't say a problem.
4	Q	Is it being used?
5	A	Currently, no.
6	Q	Hum, if it's not a problem, why isn't it being used?
7	A	Good question.
8	Q	What did it cost, 20 million dollars?
9	A	I don't know.
10	Q	That's a rough ballpark, isn't it?
11		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
12	ļ	Asked and answered.
13	A	I don't know.
14	Q	Are you telling me that you're not aware of any
15		problems with Bayview as to why it's not being used
16		now?
17	A	No.
18	Q	There are problems there, aren't there?
19	A	I don't know if I would characterize them as problems.
20	Q	How would you characterize them?
21	A	Um
22	Q	How would you characterize them?
23	A	Perhaps poor design.
24	Q	Perhaps a poor design? Did perhaps poor design cause
25		a lot of frustration among the operators and
	1	

MR. ALLEN: Objection.

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സ്ത	TIEKEN	-	ΒY	MR.	BENINGER)

		125
1		controllers before this explosion?
2	A	There was some frustration, yes.
3	Q	And what was the frustration over?
4	A	Basically, I can only actually, I don't know,
5		except for personally I can only speak for myself.
6	Q	Okay, go ahead. You actually wrote some memos on
7		this, dich't you?
8	A	I have.
9	Q	About Bayview and the incoming lines and things,
10		didn't you?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	Why don't you tell us about that. What's the problems
13		that you were aware of with the Bayview Station?
14	A	The only problems you know, I felt confident
15		operating the facility. You know, I feel like it did
16	1	what it was supposed to do and worked as well as it
17		could under what it was designed to do. The only
18		problem that I perceived personally was the facility's
19		proximity to Allen Pump Station.
20	Q	You had problems with the valves opening and closing,
21	1	dich't you, on the commands?
22	A	No.
23	Q	You didn't have problems and write to people about
24		changing the valves so they could be opened or closed
25	1	with opened or closed commands issued from the Control

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> (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 127

1		
1	A	Yes.
2	Q	And the Bayview Station had only been in existence
3		for, what, six months before our explosion and deaths?
4	A	Yes.
5	Q	And during that time there had been, what, 50, 60
6		times that the valves had closed uncommanded?
7	A	I don't know the exact count.
8	Q	That's a ballpark though, rough ballpark, isn't it?
9	A	That may be, yes. That may be.
10	Q	And that breaks down to what? I mean 50, 60 times is
11		like a couple times a week, isn't it, for the six
12		months it's in operation?
13	A	Those valves were closed uncommanded whether the
14		pipeline was running or not, you know.
15	Q	Is that a good thing?
16	A	Well, there were lots of times when those valves were
17		closed during testing and the pipeline was shut down.
18	Q	Lots of times it was closed when the pipeline was
19		numing, correct?
20	A	I think there were some, yes.
21	Q	And when it closes when it's running it sends a wave
22		up the pipeline that travels at, what, the speed of
23		sound, I think I remember from your training manuals?
24	A	Correct.
25		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1		Center?
2		MR. VERWOLF: With regard to Bayview, are
3		you asking?
4		MR. HENINGER: Bayview, yes.
5	A	I don't know if it was in regards to a problem. Could
6		you be more specific?
7	Q	Are you aware of problems at Bayview which caused
8		valves to be opened or closed or cause any disruption
9		of the operating schedules?
10		MR. ALLEN: Objection to the form of the
11		question. Compound. Which question do you want him
12		to answer?
13	Q	Go ahead.
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	And was this an ongoing problem expressed both by you
16		and the other dispatchers?
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	And there were even meetings that were going to be set
19		up to discuss the numerous problems that people were
20		having with the Bayview facility, but that meeting
21		wasn't set up until after or wasn't scheduled to take
22		place until after our explosion on June 10th, right?
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	And one of the problems had to do with valves closing
25		uncommanded a number of times, didn't they?
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1		question. No foundation.
2	Q	What kind of problem does that have or potential
з		problems does that create in a pipeline when you have
4		a valve close uncommanded with fuel in the line or
5		product in the line?
6	A	It's dynamic. It depends on the status of the line
7		when the valve closes.
8	Q	Fully operating, closes uncommended full of product,
9		what potential problems?
10	A	It will cause a degree of a pressure surge depending
11		on how far upstream the previous, the upstream
12		facility is, and as well as the speed at which the
13		valve closes.
14	Q	From Bayview where is the upstream facility?
15	A	Which upstream facility?
16	Q	Nearest upstream facility?
17	A	Anacortes.
18	Q	How about going north of the line?
19	A	Ferndale.
20	Q	How far is that?
21	A	You know, I don't know mileagewise. I can tell you
22		barrelwise.
23	Q	Tell me barrelwise. How many barrels is that?
24	A	About 48,000.
25	Q	48,000 barrels between Bayview and
	1	
	1	

		129
1	A	Ferndale.
2	Q	Bayview and Feundale; is that correct?
3	A	Yeah.
4	Q	Along that section of the line how many check valves
5		are there?
6		MR. ALLEN: Between Bayview and Ferndale?
7		MR. BENINGER: Yes.
8	A	Idon't know.
9	Q	Was that on that test that Frank Hopf gave you?
10	A	It may be. I don't recall the questions specifically.
11	Q	How many questions were on that test?
12	A	Oh, 20, guesstimate.
13	Q	What did Bayview, the Bayview Station have to do with
14		this catastrophe?
15	A	Idan't know.
16	Q	You don't know what the operators had to do with the
17		catastrophe, correct?
18	A	Correct.
19	Q	You don't know what Bayview had to do with the
20		catastrophe, correct?
21	A	Conrect.
22	Q	You don't know what the prior identified defects and
23		failure to fix those had to do with the catastrophe,
24		do you?
25	A	Correct.
	L	KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 129 of 239
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		131
1		three million some dollars, correct?
2	1	MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
3		question. Misstates the fact.

You're aware of that? You work at the company, for

MR. ALLEN: Argumentative. That couldn't have possibly missed anyone's attention

that OPS was fining the company for a number of

MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.

But it couldn't have missed the attention of anyone at

that company that they're going to be fined a record

amount by OPS for the violations that have occurred

MR. MARTIN: No foundation.

It certainly didn't escape your attention, did it?

Did Olympic post the "Notice of Probable Violations and Proposed Civil Penalties" by the OPS so that all

the the controllers and operators and employees could

MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative. MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.

different violations, correct?

I believe it was potentially.

and been going on out there, correct?

I don't know how to answer that.

I was aware of that.

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24 25 А

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goodness sakes.

I am.

130 1 Q Do you really feel like you know enough to be able to believe that the line can be safely operated? 2 3 А Yes. And you're going to say that whether you find out all 4 Q the results of the NTSB or the OPS or not, correct? 5 6 Yes. А 7 In fact, one of the things that you've -- are you 0 8 aware of the cite, the fine that was just issued by 9 OPS within the last, oh, month or two months? 10 MR. ALLEN: I object to the form of the 11 question. Misstates the facts. 12 0 Are you? 13 More specifically? А What do you mean more specifically? You know OPS 14 0 15 issued a four million dollar fine, don't you, or three 16 million dollar fine? 17 MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative. 18 MR. VERWOLF: Object to the question. False 19 statement. 20 MR. BENINGER: What's false about it, 21 counsel? 22 MR. MARTIN: It's a notice of a potential 23 violation. 24 I'm sorry. You are aware that OPS issued a notice of 0

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a potential violation in which they're fining Olympic

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)

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1		use it as a, what did you say, learning tool? Did
2		they post it anywhere so you could use it as a
3		learning tool?
4	A	Yes. We had a copy of it in the Control Center.
5	Q	So you then are aware of the fact that OPS noted a
6		number of problems at the Bayview Station regarding
7		the opening and closing of valves, correct? Correct?
8	A	Being a potential in nature, I believe that, you know,
9		this had not been established concretely yet.
10	Q	I'm sorry, did you use this as a learning tool or did
11		you disregard it because it was only potential?
12	A	I read through it.
13	Q	Did you use it as a learning tool or not?
14	A	Yes.
15		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
16		question. Vague.
17	Q	So you didn't really put weight in the fact that it
18		was, as somebody mentioned, potential fine and things
19		to incorporate as a learning tool for you to make sure
20		that things are done safely, correct?
21	A	Repeat that?
22	Q	Sure. You didn't just say, oh, jee, I guess this is
23		just a probable violation? You didn't look at that
24		and say just because it's probable and not a hundred
25]	percent certain, I'm not going to use this as a

	(LLUID TIEREN - BI MR. BENINGER)	P-		(LLUYL) TIEREN - BY PR. HENINGER)
	133			134
	learning tool, correct?	1	Q	The defect.
A	Correct.	2	A	I don't know.
	MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.	3	Q	That would give you some real concern if there's
o	You looked at it and said there's some interesting	4	¥	defects that Olympic knows about in the line but
v	-	5		
	information and information that I didn't know about			they're just not sending anyone out to inspect them
	that may explain a potential cause for this tragedy,	6		repair them. That would give you concern, wouldn't
	correct?	7		it?
A	Repeat, please.	8		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
Q	Sure. When you looked through this, there were some	9		question. Misstates the record and argumentative.
	things that you hadn't been made aware of before;	10	А	It's not my field of expertise.
	isn't that right?	11	Q	You run this pipeline, don't you?
A	Yes.	12	A	Ido.
lo	One of them had to do with the smart pigging that had,	13	Q	And you need to run it safely, don't you?
	in fact, been done before this occurrence in the two	14	A	I do.
1	years before?	15	0	And the integrity of those pipes is a key component.
A	Yes.	16		numing it safely, isn't it?
Ô	And it was in the '96 and '97 smart pigging runs that,	10	А	It is.
۲Ľ				
	in fact, had detected a defect that Olympic never	18	Q	So if you learn there's something wrong with the
	inspected? You learned that, didn't you?	19		integrity of the pipe, that's something you would t
A	Yes.	20		special attention of, wouldn't you?
0	And you learned that the DOE actually requested that	21	A	Yes.
1	Olympic inspect it and they still never got around to	22	Q	Now, learning there were detections of possible
}	inspecting it, right?	23		wrinkle bends, possible mashes and defects in the l
	MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the	24		that went uninspected by Olympic, didn't that give
	question. Misstates the point.	25		some concern as to whether there's other defects in
	KATIE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 133 of 239 (206) 622-6897			КАТЦЕ МССОЎ, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Раде 134 об 239 (206) 622-6897 (ЦАСУО ТЕКЕХ - БУ МЯ НЕМПИСТВР)
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A Q A	KATLE MCCOY, KPR, CSR. 08/30/00 Page 133 of 239 (LOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 135 the line that Olympic simply isn't inspecting? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. Yes. What did you do about it? I expressed my concern that that may be the case.	2 3 4 5 6	A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 136 The concern, really there was no real large amount concern because we felt confident they were doing their job well. I don't know why this one was miss I don't know. And what exactly gives you the confidence they're doing their job well?
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	1		who was primarily heading that up has left Olympic and
	2		gone to work for Equilon, and now currently a
	3		gentleman by the name of Kurt Hiashita is heading up
	4		the smart tool program.
	5	Q	So is it the fact that Kurt now has taken over the
	6		program that gives you the confidence that this isn't
	7		going to be repeated again; namely, that the defects
	8		that were found and asked to be inspected by DOE are
	9		actually going to be inspected now?
	10	A	I've always had confidence that, you know, they were
	11		doing their job.
	12	Q	Must have shook your confidence though once you see
	13		this and find out they didn't do their job, right?
	14		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
	15		question. Argumentative.
	16	A	Somewhat.
	17	Q 2	Wasn't it more than somewhat? Somewhat.
	18 19	A Q	Did you go talk to Klassen or did you go talk to the
	20	¥	other fellow and find out why didn't they do their
	21		job?
	22	А	No.
	23		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
	24		question.
	25	Q	Did you do anything to figure out what's actually
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			KATIE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 137 of 239 (206) 622-6897
)			KATTE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 137 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINDER)
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		(LIJED TELEN - BI MK. BENINSK)
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1		being done to make sure that the people are doing
2		their job to inspect the pipeline for the defects?
3	A	No.
4	Q	What concerns were expressed by the controllers as to
5		the fact that the inspectors didn't do their job in
6		'97 right in the area where this rupture occurred?
7	A	Idon't know.
8	Q	But you were there, right?
9	A	I know my concerns.
10	Q	Tell us your concerns.
11	A	Just were there any Others missed.
12	Q	What answers did you get?
13	A	I did not, you know, I personally did not pro I did
14		not follow up on that, you know, in a you know, I
15		did not follow up on that.
16	Q	You learned, also, that the Olympic personnel
17		continued to operate the pumps at the Cherry Point and
18		Femdale Stations for 15 minutes after the line had
19		been shut down, originally shut down?
20	A	On repressure?
21	Q	On June 10th, 1999, after the line had been shut down,
22		you learned that Olympic personnel continued to
23		operate the pumps at Cherry Point and Ferndale
24		Stations for another 15 minutes, correct?

MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the 25

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1		question.
2	А	Idon't recall. Can I see a copy?
3	0	Sure. You can look at mine. I'm looking at item No.
4	-	4. I think everybody probably has a copy of the
5		probable violations issued by the OPS.
6	A	okay.
7	Q	You were aware of that, weren't you?
8		MR. ALLEN: Objection. What's the question
9		for the witness?
10	A	Via this document.
11	Q	Via that document you were aware of it, weren't you?
12	A	By reading this I became aware of it.
13	Q	Not just today. You were aware of it back when it was
14		posted in the control room, weren't you?
15	A	Right.
16	Q	So at that point in time you knew that the operators
17		in the control room continued to operate the pumps for
18		another 15 minutes, weren't you?
19	1	MR. VERWOLF: Objection. Assumes the
20		correctness of the document. No foundation for the
21		witness.
22]	MR. ALLEN: Objection. No foundation.
23	Q	Go ahead.
24	A	I don't know. Would you I missed your question.
25	ļ	Would you say it again, please, David?

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. HENINGER)

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- 1		
1	Q	Yeah. Was the entire report of the "Notice of
2		Probable Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty" by the
3		Office of Pipeline Safety posted in the control room?
4	A	I am not sure. I would assume so.
5	Q	Let me give you the whole thing here and let you look
6		at it. That's my copy of it.
7		(Pause in the proceedings.)
8	A	As far as I can tell, it was all there.
9	Q	One of the items was the fact that the controllers
10		continued to operate the pipeline, look at item No. 4,
11		continued to operate the pipeline for another 15
12		minutes after it was abnormally shut down, correct?
13	A	I don't know.
14	Q	That's what it says there, doesn't it?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	So what did you do to determine whether that was
17		correct or incorrect?
18	A	What did I do?
19	♀	Yes, what did you do?
20	A	I don't, I don't follow you.
21	Q	You read this, correct?
22	A	Yeah.
23	Q	And that raised concerns to you as to whether the
24		operators and controllers were doing their job right,
25	ł	carrect?

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		(III)YIJ TIEKEN - BY MK. BENINGER)			(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
[141		1	142
1	A	0kay.	1	Q	You've got to know that not only you're doing it
2	Q	It did, didn't it?	2		right, but the people you're working with know how to
3	A	No.	3		do it right, correct?
4	Q	This did not raise a concern to you, if this is true,	4	A	Yes.
5		that the operators were doing their job right?	5	Q	And not only for when you're on shift do you need to
6	A	Well, I don't know the status of the pipeline when	6		know it's being operated safely, but you want to know
7		that occurred. I don't know the actual status of the	7		it's being operated safely when you're not on shift as
8		pipeline when that event occurred. Was it full? Was	8		well, don't you?
9		it empty? You know, I don't know. I can't answer	9		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
10		that.	10	A	Yes.
11	Q	What did you do to find this out, to see whether or	11	Q	You can understand the parents that I represent who
12		not the people that you have such confidence in to run	12		have lost their boys, that they want to know this
13		the pipeline safely really can do their job or not?	13		pipeline is being operated safely no matter if Lloyd
14		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.	14		Tieken is involved there or if anyone else is involved
15		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.	15		there? You can understand that, can't you?
16	A	That's not my place. That's my supervisor's place to	16	A	Yes.
17		do that.	17	Q	And you can understand that when they see something
18	Q	I don't care whose place it is. You, when you're	18		like this, that, in fact, operators making deliberate
19		running this pipeline, have to know that it's being	19		decisions to turn the pumps on to keep them operating
20	ļ	nın safely, correct?	20		after it's been shut down, that might raise some real
21	A	Correct.	21		concerns in their mind as to how well these operators
22	Q	You've got to rely not just an yourself but an people	22		are running that pipeline, correct? You can
23		you work with, correct?	23	1	understand that, correct?
24		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.	24		MR. ALLEN: Objection. No foundation and
25	A	Repeat, please.	25		argumentative.
		KATIE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 141 of 239 (206) 622-6897			KATLE MCCDY, RPR, CER 08/30/00 Page 142 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)			(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
	<u> </u>	143	1		144

1	A	No.
2	Q	You don't? You don't think they would have a concern
3		whether the operators know what they're doing just
4		like the OPS had a concern whether the operators know
5		what they're doing?
6		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative and
7		compound.
8	A	I believe there, yeah, there should be some concern.
9	Q	I mean, Mr. Tieken, for goodness sakes, even the BP
10		officials, who have taken over this pipeline, at a
11		press conference said they have concerns about the
12		individuals who were in the control room that day.
13		Even they said they had concerns, right?
14		MR. VERWOLF: Is that a question?
15		MR. ALLEN: Objection to the question if
16		there is one.
17		MR. SPAAN: Speech.
18	Q	Correct?
19		MR. ALLEN: It's argumentative.
20	A	I don't know how their concerns relate to the
21		individuals, in what respect.
22	Q	You would agree with you know who Larry Peck is?
23	A	I've met him once.
24	Q	BP official involved in the management of the pipeline
25		now, correct?
	L	

1 2 Q Would you agree with him that, quote, "The fact that the pipeline was restarted, I don't think you can say 3 4 anything but that that was a mistake, " end of quote. You would agree with that, wouldn't you? 5 6 А No, 7 Q Why not? 8 A Because I wasn't operating the pipeline. 9 So you don't know whether or not the people that were Q operating the pipeline made a mistake or not, do you? 10 11 Yes. Α And you don't know whether the people operating the 12 Q 13 pipeline are still capable of making the same mistakes that led to three people getting killed or not, do 14 15 you? MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative. 16 17 Repeat. А 18 Q You don't know, as we sit here today, that the people 19 that are operating the pipeline besides yourself are 20 still capable of making the same, the same mistake that led to three people getting killed, do you? 21 22 MR. ALLEN: Objection. Misstates the 23 witness' testimony. 24 Α Idon't. 25 You're a concerned parent yourself, aren't you? Q

Yes.

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ſ		145		
1	А	Of course.		
2	0	What have you done to ensure that the pipeline is now		
3	-	being operated by controllers who actually know what		
4		to do in an energency situation who aren't going to		
5		nun pumps for 15 minutes after it's been abnormally		
6		shut down?		
7		MR. ALLEN: Objection. No foundation and		
8		argumentative.		
9		MR. FINEGOLD: Compound question.		
10	A	Specifically?		
11	Q	Yeah.		
12	A	I have confidence in my co-workers that they know what		
13		they're doing.		
14	Q	Same co-workers that BP officials said that they have		
15		concerns about, same ones that were in the control		
16		room, correct?		
17		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the		
18		question. Misstates the record.		
19	Q	I'm sorry. Okay, let me do it this way: Why don't		
20		you go ahead and read, this is a newspaper article.		
21		Why dan't you read into the record, why don't you read		
22		in there as to what was said.		
23	A	"We also have concerns about the individuals that were		
24		in the control room that day."		
25	Q	And that's being said by whom?		
	L	XATIE MOCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 145 of 239 (206) 522-6897		
)		(LLOYD TIEXEN - BY MR. BENINGER)		
	<u> </u>	147		
1		MR. VERWOLF: Objection.		
1		MR. ALLEN: Objection. Vague and		
2		argumentative.		
ور	Ι.	ch yuristicul vor		

4	A	I don't know.
5	Q	How about the quote that you see from Larry Peck,
6		that's the other fellow, the official there, that
7		talks about being a mistake that was made in
8		restarting the pipeline? Do you agree with that?
9		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
10		question.
11	A	Idon't.
12	Q	If these people have concerns about the controllers on
13		duty and also believe that a mistake was made, do you
14		have any evidence to rebut that?
15	A.	Idan't.
16	Q	One of the other things that was brought up by the
17		Office of Pipeline Safety was all the problems they
18		had at the Bayview Station. You're aware of that,
19		correct?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	Were you aware of this before or after the OPS came
22		out?
23		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
24		question. Vague.
25	A	More specifically?

		146
1	А	Talley said. He said, "Olympic had reassigned
2		supervisor Ron Brentson, a defendant in wrongful death
3		lawsuits filed by parents of the two boys killed."
4	Q	Talley is who?
5	A	Bobby Talley is the on site, I believe he's the
6		manager of the facility, the top dog next to the
7		president.
8	Q	And so he's quoted as saying that he has concerns \rightarrow
9		about the people in the control room that day, meaning
10		June 10th, 1999, correct?
11	A	I don't know that.
12	Q	That's what he's being quoted as saying, isn't he?
13	A	He's saying that, yes, but I don't know what concerns
14		he has, how his concerns relate.
15	Q	How about this
16	A	He might be concerned that, you know, they're having
17]	mental problems. I don't know what he's concerned
18	1	about.
19	Q	Do you think maybe the preceding paragraph helps
20		clarify that where it talks about that Bobby Talley
21	1	acknowledged public concerns about those in the
22		Control Center on the day of the accident. That those
23		concerns are dealing with their fitness to perform
24		their job, not just concerns of stress after the
25	1	accident, but their fitness to perform their job?

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1	Q	Sure. The problems out at Bayview with the valves,
2		were you aware of it before or after OPS came out and
3		documented this?
4	A	Which valves?
5	Q	Which valves were causing problems out there?
6	A	I don't know specifically which valve was considered,
7		is considered to be causing a problem.
8	Q	Do you know that there was more than one valve out
9		there causing problems at Bayview?
10	A	No.
11	Q	You do now from the OPS report, don't you?
12		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
13	A	No.
14	Q	You didn't read in the OPS report that RV 1919 has
15		closed uncommanded over 50 times?
16		MR. VERWOLF: Objection. Assumes the
17		accuracy of the report.
18	A	No.
19	Q	You did read that part of the report though, right?
20	A	I scanned it. I didn't read it specifically. Would
21		you like me to read it right now?
22	Q	Why would you only scan it? There's never been
23		something as big as this in the whole history of the
24		Olympic Pipe Line where three people have died,
25		correct?
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		(TTOXD JIEREN - BY MK. BENINGER)
ſ		149
1		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
2	Q	Correct?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	And you got nothing from the company to explain why
5		the accident happened, correct?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	This is really the first piece of an investigation and
8		conclusions into what occurred that you're given, this
9		report from the OPS, right?
10		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
11	А	Yes.
12	Q	So are you telling me you just scanned it and then
13		went about business as usual?
14		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative,
15		compound.
16	A	Yes.
17	Q	Are you seriously telling me that you didn't spend a
18	ļ	considerable amount of time reading through this
19		document from page to page to figure out how you could
20		run this pipeline safely and not kill more people?
21		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.
22		MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	You didn't do that?
25	A	No.
	1	
	L	KATIE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 149 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		151
1		training that you'd gone through?

2 A No. You paid more attention to the other training than you 3 Q did to the OPS findings as to this tragedy? 4 MR. ALLEN: Objection to the 5 6 characterization. 7 Yes. А 8 Q Why? 9 А Well, I, I guess they -- they seemed more -- they just seemed more relevant, I guess. 10 11 Good God, sir, can you think of anything more relevant Q 12 than the explanation as to why three people died in 13 the operations of your pipeline? 14 MR. ALLEN: Objection. Object to the form 15 of the question. Argumentative. 16 Un, no. А But somehow talking about hydraulics at a one day 17 Q 18 seminar by Frank Hopf seemed like it was more relevant 19 as to whether this pipeline is safe to operate or not? MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the 20 21 question. It's argumentative. 22 Is that a question? Α Yes, it is. I'll have her repeat it if you'd like. 23 Q 24 Please. А 25 (The question was read back.) KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897 Page 151 of 239

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
Γ		150
1		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
2	Q	How long do you think you took reading through this,
3	-	the first glimpse you have into why three people died
4		from the operations of your pipeline?
5		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
6	Q	How long did you take?
7	A	I don't know.
8	Q	Two minutes?
9	A	I read through the document.
10	Q	30 seconds?
11		MR. ALLEN: Same objection.
12		MR. MARTIN: Asked and answered.
13	A	I read through the document.
14	Q	I want to know how long you took to read through this.
15	A	Five minutes.
16	Q	So 12 pages, five minutes to read through it and you
17		say you really only skimmed through parts of it or did
18		you actually read every sentence on every page?
19	A	I don't recall.
20	Q	Was there a company meeting on this to go through it
21		and talk about what has been revealed so far so people
22		can use it as a learning tool? No.
23 24	A Q	NO. On skimming through this, is this kind of the same way
25	Ŷ	you use this as a learning tool like the other
	1	
1		KAITE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 150 of 239
		(206) 622-6897
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)
		152
1	A	152 I don't want to judge relevance one to another.
1 2	A Q	
		I don't want to judge relevance one to another.
2		I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us.
2 3	Q	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection.
2 3 4	Q	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was
2 3 4 5	Q	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	0	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Q Q A	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing. I don't know how to answer that.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Q Q A Q A	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing. I don't know how to answer that. Just truthfully. I don't know how.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q Q A Q A	<pre>I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us.</pre>
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q Q A Q A Q	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing. I don't know how to answer that. Just truthfully. I don't know how. When you read through this on Bayview, did you do anything to try to figure out, look, have these valves been fixed, has this problem been addressed?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q Q A Q A Q A	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing. I don't know how to answer that. Just truthfully. I don't know how. When you read through this on Bayview, did you do anything to try to figure out, look, have these valves been fixed, has this problem been addressed? We have not used Bayview since. I don't know.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q Q A Q A Q	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing. I don't know how to answer that. Just truthfully. I don't know how. When you read through this on Bayview, did you do anything to try to figure out, look, have these valves been fixed, has this problem been addressed? We have not used Bayview since. I don't know. Bayview has to get used in some respect. I mean the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q Q Q Q Q Q	I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing. I don't know how to answer that. Just truthfully. I don't know how. When you read through this on Bayview, did you do anything to try to figure out, look, have these valves been fixed, has this problem been addressed? We have not used Bayview since. I don't know. Bayview has to get used in some respect. I mean the line nms right through Bayview, doesn't it?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q Q A Q A Q A Q A Q A Q	<pre>I don't want to judge relevance one to another. You just did for us. MR. ALLEN: Objection. So I need to know whether you actually thought it was more beneficial for you, in determining whether the pipeline is a safe pipeline, the one day seminar you went through with Frank Hopf or the findings from the OFS as to the problems that ead existing. I don't know how to answer that. Just truthfully. I don't know how. When you read through this on Bayview, did you do anything to try to figure out, look, have these valves been fixed, has this problem been addressed? We have not used Bayview since. I don't know. Bayview has to get used in some respect. I mean the line runs right through Bayview, doesn't it? No. So the whole line of product can be circumvented around Bayview without going through Bayview at all? Yes.</pre>
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Г		153
1	Q	And since June 10th, 1999, both lines have been
2	¥	circumvented around Bayview, the 16 and the 20 inch?
3	А	Bypass has been put in place, yes.
4	Q	And neither one of the lines was used through Bayview
5	-	then ever since June 10th, 1999; is that right?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	If Bayview was safe, why wouldn't they keep using it?
8	A	Idon't know.
9	Q	No one told you anything?
10	A	No.
11	Q	Dich't you think that this report might be interesting
12		to know why you're no longer using Bayview?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	But you only scanned through it or did you actually
15		read it?
16	A	Iscanned through it. I didn't, you know, I didn't
17		actually digest it. I'm not I don't really I
18		didn't actually digest it. I scanned through it.
19	Q	I didn't say did you eat it or anything. I said did
20		you read through this and you found it particularly
21		interesting to know if this may be the reason why
22		you're not using Bayview anymore, correct?
23		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form.
24	-	Argumentative.
25	A	No.
	<u> </u>	KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 153 of 239 (206) 622-6897
)	[KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 153 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER) 155
		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 155
1	А	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know.
2		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know. But didn't you try to find out? You are interested in
2 3	А	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know. But didn't you try to find out? You are interested in being able to make sure this pipeline can be run
2	А	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know. But didn't you try to find out? You are interested in
2 3 4	A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know. But didn't you try to find out? You are interested in being able to make sure this pipeline can be run safely, correct?
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2 3 4 5 6	A Q A	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know. But didn't you try to find out? You are interested in being able to make sure this pipeline can be run safely, correct? Yes. So did you try to find out why did they go unnoticed
2 3 4 5 6 7	A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know. But didn't you try to find cut? You are interested in being able to make sure this pipeline can be run safely, conrect? Yes. So did you try to find out why did they go unnoticed at Bayview for so long?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 155 And I don't know. But didn't you try to find out? You are interested in being able to make sure this pipeline can be run safely, conrect? Yes. So did you try to find out why did they go unnoticed at Bayview for so long? It is my job to operate the pipeline. When I'm given
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1		
1	Q	Did you ask anyone, hey, why aren't we using Bayview
2		anymore? Heck, that cost us 20 million bucks. Did
3		you ask anyone that?
4	A	No.
5	Q	Just sort of shrugged your shoulders and said one less
6		problem to deal with. I won't have to worry about
7		Bayview anymore?
8	A	Just pretty much. Just, you know, that job's a big
9		job, you know, so going on with business.
10	Q	Business as usual?
11		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
12		question if it's a question.
13	A	Is that a question?
14	Q	Yes, just going an with business, just keep an going,
15		correct?
16	A	Continuing to do my job.
17	Q	Your job relies on not only the other personnel but
18		the equipment that you're using as well, correct?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	And so this must have been particularly interesting to
21	ļ	you that Bayview had some defects that the OPS cited
22		Olympic for and that may also be, those defects, the
23		reason why it's not even being used anymore, correct?
24		MR. ALLEN: Objection to the form of the
25		question. It's compound.
	{	
	1	

CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897 KATIE MCODY, RPR, Page 154 of 239 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 156 you would address that, wouldn't you? 1 2 А Yes. Same thing with the pipeline, if there's problems that 3 Q are being reported, investigated and determined by 4 5 somebody, that's something that would be particularly 6 interesting to whether your car really is good to go 7 and safe or not, correct? 8 Yes. А 9 Q So what did you do then when you esd told your car, your pipeline here wasn't good to go, that there ead 10 11 values that esd a problem, that esd a problem some 50 plus times? 12 13 MR. VERWOLF: Objection. He stated that 14 Bayview was not operating. 15 Go ahead. ο MR. ALLEN: Objection to the form. 16 The document was from OPS. 17 А 18 Q So? I would like to see something from Olympic Pipe Line. 19 А 20 Q We would, too. We really, really would, but you're not aware of any investigation that they're doing into 21 22 why this occurred, are you? 23 It hasn't been made clear to me that they have or they А 24 are or aren't. 25 In fact, you didn't do any investigation as to why Q KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897 Page 156 of 239

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
ſ		157
1		this occurred, did you?
2	А	No.
3	Q	You're not aware of anything being done by the
4		controllers to try to figure out why this occurred,
5		are you?
6		MR. FINEGOLD: Asked and answered.
7		MR. ALLEN: Objection, asked and answered.
8	A Q	so right now, in fact, you don't even have anything
10	¥	from Olympic to say what OPS has alleged here is
ш		wrong, do you?
12	A	No.
13	Q	When they put this up in the bulletin board they
14		didn't say, hey, take this with a grain of salt, we
15		don't believe it; nah, this is not what our
16		investigation reveals; nah, this isn't what really
17		occurred. They didn't give you any of those kind of
18 19	А	disclaimers, did they? No, and may I see that document again?
20	Q	No, and may I see that occurrent again? Of course you can.
20	A	I may have confused it with the other document or is
22		that
23	Q	The other 12 page document that came from OPS
24	1	detailing the fines and the reason why they believed
25		that Olympic was in violation? You confused those
		KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 157 of 239 (206) 622-6897
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
	ſ	
-		159
1	A	It appears to be the same document.
2	A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to
		It appears to be the same document.
2 3		It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the
2 3 4	Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you?
2 3 4 5	Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Q A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Q A Q A	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, correct? Correct.
2 4 5 7 8 9	Q A Q A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, correct? Correct. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Q A Q A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, correct? Correct. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document? Did the Olympic personnel give you a copy yourself to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Q A Q A	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, conrect? Correct. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document? Did the Olympic personnel give you a copy yourself to take home?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Q A Q A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, correct? Correct. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document? Did the Olympic personnel give you a copy yourself to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q A Q A Q A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, connect? Connect. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document? Did the Olympic personnel give you a copy yourself to take home? No.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q A Q A Q A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, correct? Correct. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document? Did the Olympic personnel give you a copy yourself to take home? No. Why not?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q A Q A Q A Q	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, correct? Correct. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document? Did the Olympic personnel give you a copy yourself to take home? No. Why not? MR. VERWOLF: Objection, speculation.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q A Q A Q A Q A	It appears to be the same document. Again, you've never seen anything from Olympic to respond or rebut any of the allegations made from the OPS, have you? No. And you haven't talked to any of the controllers who say that some of the things in here are wrong, correct? Correct. Did you actually get a copy yourself of this document? Did the Olympic personnel give you a copy yourself to take home? No. Why not? MR. VERWOLF: Objection, speculation. MR. ALLEN: Join the objection.
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
ſ		158
1		ones?
2	A	Yeah.
3	Q	Why don't you look through it again and see if that
4		is, in fact, what Olympic posted or if they posted
5		something else.
6	Q	Why don't we do this. Why don't we take a quick break
7		while you read through that. I know you did it once
8		on the record, the video, and said that looked like
9		what was there, but why don't you read through that
10		again and see if, in fact, that's what you saw that
11	-	was posted.
12		MR. DAHL: Going off the record. The time
13		is approximately 2:28 p.m.
14		(Recess taken at 2:28 p.m.)
15		MR. DAHL: Back on the record. The time is
16	-	approximately 2:42 p.m.
17	BY M	R. BENINGER:
18	Q	Mr. Tieken, have you had a chance to look through the
19		12 page document entitled "Notice of Probable
20		Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty" directed to
21		Mr. Gass from Chris Woodell from the Office of
22		Pipeline Safety?
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	Is that the document which was posted on the bulletin
25		board or whatever it was in the control room?
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)
		160
1	A	No, it was on the desk.

~	~	NO, IL Was di lie deak.
2	Q	Is there a place where they post these sort of things,
3		the various fines they may get and leaks and
4		investigation reports, anyplace they post that?
5		MR. ALLEN: Objection to the question. No
6		foundation.
7	A	Yeah, I don't know.
8	Q	There's no, I guess what do they call it, an accident
9		prevention program where they have bulletin boards
10		that are set up in the workplace there for employees
11		to be able to go to to see about different accidents
12		and investigations that have taken place?
13	A	No.
14	Q	And there's probably also then not a weekly safety
15		meeting that you all take part in?
16	A	There is.
17	Q	There is, okay, and the minutes from those meetings
18		are posted where?
19	A	I believe on the Intranet.
20	Q	And has OSHA come out and cited you all for not having
21		a bulletin board and cited you with the accident
22	ł	prevention policies within OSHA and WISHA?
23	A	Not that I'm aware of.
24	Q	The minutes of the safety meeting, esd those given out
25		to the various individuals or just simply posted on
	1	

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		161
1		the Intranet?
2	A	I believe they're posted on the Intranet, which is
3		available for everyone, and we do have a process
4		called "near miss reviews", which there are whenever
5		there are near miss incident reviews, and they're, the
6		results of those are published.
7	Q	What is that?
8	A	In the event of, you know, something that might be
9		considered a safety or operational hazard is
10		experienced, the individuals involved are brought
11		before a number of supervisors and a process is
12		reviewed.
13	Q	So that was probably done here then, right?
14	A	It hasn't yet.
15	Q	Hmm, do you know what they're waiting for?
16	A	I don't. Just that it's a very complex issue.
17	Q	Yeah, but they've dealt with complex issues before
18		though, right?
19	l	MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
20		question.
21	A	I don't know.
22	Q	You think that that's a reasonable excuse not to do,
23		what did you call that, near miss?
24	A	Near miss.
25	Q	The fact that this wasn't a near miss but an actual
	1	
	l	KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 161 of 239
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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 163 1 The Grand Jury testimony was recorded. А 2 0 Have you seen any transcript of that? 3 And I believe that the U.S. attorneys, our meetings Α 4 esd recorded, yes. There wasn't a stenographer but 5 they took notes. 6 Other than -- have you seen those notes? 0 7 Α No. 8 Any other statements that you've ever seen that you've Q 9 given relating to this other than what you've produced here today? 10 11 No. Α 12 Let me go back through and the one statement, which Q we've marked as Exhibit 221, this talks about what you 13 did in the SCADA room, correct? 14 15 I believe -- yes. Α 16 And one of the things that we had was that we had Q 17 OLY 1 or, excuse me, OLY 2 was the primary at the time 18 that the problems started to occur, correct? 19 Α Yes.

- Q That slowed down and then locked up on you, didn't it? A Yes.
- Q When it starts to slow down, are there priorities in the system that get processed? Is there any sort of internal priority as to what gets processed if there's a slowdown?

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		162
1		hit where three people died, do you think that
2		justifies not doing this review panel?
3		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
4	A	No.
5	Q	The fact that the reason why it occurred may be
6		complex, do you think that justifies not getting
7		started to do an investigation?
8	A	They may be.
9	Q	You haven't been called before any board though, have
10		you?
11	A	Not at work.
12	Q	And you're not aware of any other controller who's
13		been called before any board from Olympic on this
14		investigation, correct?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	Yes, that's correct, you're not aware of any person;
17		is that right?
18	A	Yes.
19	Q	Now, did you give statements to anybody else? Have
20		you given a statement to anybody?
21	A	What kind of statement specifically?
22	Q	Any kind of statement. Any recorded statement,
23		handwritten statements, any kind of statement?
24	A	I've spoken with the U.S. Attorney's Office.
25	Q	Did they record that in any document?

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(LICYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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		164
1	А	It can decide its own prioritization.
2	Q	Do you know what that is?
3	A	No.
4	Q	When you did the switchover to OLY 1, OLY 1 started to
5		have problems then, too, didn't it?
6	A	OLY 1 never came on line successfully.
7	Q	You said that, "It only appeared to be partially
8		successful with OLY 1 performing sluggishly and
9		unresponsive." That led me to believe that it
10		actually came on line, it just wasn't doing a very
11		good job, but you're saying it didn't even come on
12		line?
13	A	Yeah, as far as I'm concerned, it did not come on
14		line.
15	Q	So this would be about 3:30, 3:35, correct?
16	A	Yeah, 3:35 plus.
17	Q	So at 3:35ish we have both computers down?
18	A	Effectively, yes.
19	Q	And what are you supposed to do in a procedure like
20		that when you have both computers down?
21	A	Get one of them working.
22	Q	Well, you had problems with the one. You had problems
23		with the other, so you now have two computers down.
24		What are you supposed to do?
25	A	Get one of them working.
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_		(LIUI) TIEREN - EY MR. BENIMER)
[165
1	Q	Are you supposed to notify your Control Center
2		supervisor as well?
3	A	I had tried to do that already.
4	Q	Are you also supposed to institute abnormal
5		procedures?
6		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
7		question. Vague.
8	Q	I mean
9	A	Am I?
10	Q	Yes. I don't know if it's vague or not. That's what
n		it's entitled, "Ahnormal Procedures" of the Operations
12		Manual for Controllers, right?
13	A	Okay.
14	Q	There's a whole training you go through to deal with
15		abnormal procedures, right?
16	A	Okay.
17	Q	Is that correct?
18	A	May I read it?
19	Q	Of course you can, and you've seen the one that I've
20		tagged there which is 5.7. One of the abnormal
21		procedures is when both computers go down.
22	ļ	MR. FINEGOLD: Is that 5.7?
23		MR. BENINCER: 5.7, yes, sir.
24	A	Okay.
25	0	Now, did 5.7 tell you something that you didn't
		KATIE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 165 of 239
		(206) 622-6897
		(ILOYD TIEKEN ~ BY MR. BENINGER)
		167
l		believed that, if there was any control. I don't
	1	

1		believed that, if there was any control. I don't
2		think at that point in time that I don't believe
3		that was established.
4	Q	Let me see if I understand
5	A	That both esd down completely.
6	Q	You have OLY 2 that you had to shut down because it
7		had locked up on you?
8	A	Connect.
9	Q	You switched over to the only back-up you had which
10		was OLY 1 and that never really came on line. It was
11		unresponsive, sluggish and didn't come on line,
12		correct?
13	A	It was on line.
14	Q	I thought you just said earlier it never came on line?
15	A	Well, poor choice of words. It was on and as far as,
16		you know, whether it was fully functional or not, that
17		was, you know, that would be an issue.
18	Q	We know it wasn't fully functional?
19	A	Correct.
20	Q	We know it was functional
21	A	Correct.
22	Q	Dysfunctional?
23	A	It was dysfunctional.
24	Q	Dysfunctional to the point that it was failing?
25	A	It was not doing its job properly.

166 1 already know and ead trained in? 2 А No. 3 0 So ead you aware that under the abnormal procedures 4 protocol, that if both computers go down, that you ead { 5 supposed to institute the abnormal procedures protocol, right? 6 7 Yes. А 8 0 And that includes notifying your supervisor, correct? 9 Α Yee. And shutting down the pipeline? 10 0 11 That part wasn't up to me because I wasn't running the Α 12 pipeline. 13 Who was it up to to shut down the pipeline once you 0 had Control Center computer failure? 14 Well, it would be up to the controller on duty. 15 А Who was that? 16 0 In this case it would be Kevin Dyvig. 17 А Did you notify him then that both computers ead down 18 0 approximately 3:35ish? 19 I don't recall. 20 А 21 You should have done that though, right? 0 22 I -- well, I may -- had I believed they ead, you know, A my statement of two never coming up after the fact was 23 that -- was, was now. Then, I don't know if I had 24 25 that, if I believed that at that point in time, if I KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897 Page 166 of 239 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 168 It was failing, unresponsive, going to lock up like 1 0 2 OLY 2? 3 Well, I don't know that. Α Did you keep it operating or did you turn it off? 4 0 5 No, I shut it off. А And the only reason you shut it off is if it was going 6 0 7 to fail on you, right? 8 А Well, that's -- no. So now at this point in time, 3:35ish, you've got OLY 9 0 2 shut down and failed on you, locked up, and you've 10 got OLY 1 needed to be shut down as well because it 11 wasn't going to perform correctly, right? 12 13 А Correct. 14 0 Both computers are down, correct? 15 А Well, 1 was not performing as well as it should have, if at all. I was never able to establish that it was 16

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 167 of 239 (206) 622-6897 Okay, you had OLY 2 down and you had OLY 1 which you

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Okay.

No.

Correct?

completely broke.

So both computers ead down?

I can't say that absolutely.

Did you turn then both down or not?

now say was actually on line but ---

		169
1	A	It was primary.
2	Q	It was primary but it just wasn't performing the
3		responses. It was unresponsive and sluggish?
4	A	Correct.
5	Q	Do you think that's a good computer?
6	Ā	No.
7	Q	That was a failed computer at that time to be able to
8	_	nun that system?
9	A	I had no idea when it might, it might clear up and be
10		healthy the very next second or not. I don't know
11		when it was going to get healthy.
12	Q	You didn't give it that chance, did you?
13	A	Sure. I left it on line until I rebooted 2.
14	Q	And it never did work? The entire time you esd trying
15		to reboot 2, it never did come back on line, did it,
16		to the point where it was functioning?
17	A	Well, it never yeah, it never
18		MR. FINEGOLD: He hadn't finished his
19		answer.
20	1	MR. ALLEN: Let the witness finish his
21	Ì	answer.
22	A	It never became fully stable, no.
23	Q	So you've got two computers, one that's down and one
24		that never becomes fully stable about 3:35ish,
25		correct?
	1	
	L	KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 169 of 239
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. HENINGER)
1		171
2		
	Q	171 you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you
3	_	you know, completely without control.
3 4		you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you
	A	you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you ead completely out of control?
4	A Q	you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you ead completely out of control? Both machines halted, black screens up front.
4 5	A Q	you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you ead completely out of control? Both machines halted, black screens up front. So as long as one was sort of chugging along, never
4 5 6	A Q	you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you ead completely out of control? Both machines halted, black screens up front. So as long as one was sort of chugging along, never coming on line, not being responsive, that, you think,
4 5 6 7	A Q A	you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you ead completely out of control? Both machines halted, black screens up front. So as long as one was sort of chugging along, never coming on line, not being responsive, that, you think, is going to be okay?
4 5 6 7 8	A Q A	you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you esd completely out of control? Both machines halted, black screens up front. So as long as one was sort of chugging along, never coming on line, not being responsive, that, you think, is going to be okay? At any point in time, you know, it may have. I don't
4 5 6 7 8 9	А Q Д	you know, completely without control. What would it have taken for you to determine that you esd completely out of control? Both machines halted, black screens up front. So as long as one was sort of chugging along, never coming on line, not being responsive, that, you think, is going to be okay? At any point in time, you know, it may have. I don't know.
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Because I was busy trying to get -- I didn't have a

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KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897

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		Annoraan aaan wat wat hat a aasta watte
[170
1	A	Correct.
2	Q	And at that point in time did you, in fact, tell Kevin
3		Dyvig that you've got a problem with the computers.
4		You don't know how serious it is or how long it's
5		going to be, but you've got a problem with both
6		computers down?
7	A	He was aware of it as an end user, but whether he was
8		aware that both computers esd, you know, that to
9		call I did not specifically tell Kevin that, yes,
10		both computers are down.
11	Q	Kevin Dyvig should have been aware that both computers
12		esd unresponsive as the end user, correct, at 3:35ish?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	At that point whose job is it to institute abnormal
15		procedures and shut down the line?
16	A	I believe it would be the, the controller.
17	Q	Kevin Dyvig?
18	A	Yes.
19	Q	Why wouldn't you have that responsibility to do as
20		well?
21	A	Because I was working in the computer room.
22	Q	But why wouldn't you have the responsibility to notify
23		him just like every operator has a responsibility to
24	İ.	prevent any problems?
25	A	Just I never really felt that we ead completely,
	ļ	
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		172
1		chance. I was busy trying to get one of them
2		functioning and that required immediate attention,
3		hands-on there at the terminal to get it done.
4	0	What would it have taken you to notify him?
5	A	I would have well, I would have had to take the
6		time to walk in there and, you know, tell him
2	1	···· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1		chance. I was busy trying to get one of them
2		functioning and that required immediate attention,
3		hands-on there at the terminal to get it done.
4	Q	What would it have taken you to notify him?
S	A	I would have well, I would have had to take the
6		time to walk in there and, you know, tell him
7		specifically, does he understand this.
8	Q	You don't have any communication between the computer
9		room and the control room?
10	A	There's a telephone, yes.
11	Q	Oh. Is it a telephone that you just pick up and
12		you've already got a live line or you've got to dial
13	l	numbers?
14	A	No, I've got to dial numbers.
15	Q	So would it just simply have taken you the time to
16		pick up the phone, dial the numbers and for him to
17	ļ	pick it up, and say, hey, look, I've got a problem
18		here. I don't know how long it's going to be, but
19	1	I've got a problem here. Both computers are
20		malfunctioning?
21	A	I believe he was aware that both computers esd
22		malfunctioning.
23) Q	He should have been aware if he was doing his job,
24		correct?
25	A	Whether he was aware that they esd fully down or not,

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		(LILIYL) TIEKEN - BY MK. BENINSER)
ſ		173
1		if that was his trigger to start the abnormal thing
2		and definitely shut the system down. I don't know
3		what he was thinking.
4	Q	Wait a minute. You act like there was some question
5		as to what the trigger is. You ead trained in
6		triggers as to what condition of the computers
7		triggers an abnormal condition, right?
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	So tell us, what was that training? What esd you
10	-	supposed to do?
11 12	A	Can you restate the question, please? Sure. Tell us what you esd supposed to do. What
13	Q	Sure. Tell us what you ead supposed to do. What trigger does it take for you to institute the abnormal
14		shutdown procedures for computer malfunctions?
15	А	Upon knowledge that both computers are nonfunctional.
16	o	Nonfunctional?
17	A	Yeah, or down, failed.
18	Q	How about malfunctioned?
19	Ā	How about it? I don't understand what you're asking.
20	Q	What do they define as failed when you esd trained?
21	A	I don't know if we went into a specific definition,
22		you know.
23	Q	Well, to be trained adequately you'd have to consider
24		both the hairsplitting you're doing now, whether it's
25		failed vs. malfunctioned, right?
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		KATIE MCCOY, RFR, CSR 08/30/00 Fage 173 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)
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1		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 175
		(206) 622-6897 (ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
1		(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 175 abnormal conditions and respond to abnormal
1	AQ	(206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 175 abnormal conditions and respond to abnormal conditions, correct?
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q A Q A Q A Q	(206) 622-6897 (LLOND TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 175 abnormal conditions and respond to abnormal conditions, correct? Yes. Okay, so here did you identify an abnormal condition at approximately 3:35ish when both computers ead malfunctioning? Yes. What did you do to respond to the abnormal condition? Tried to get one of the computers functioning. And did you assume that Mr. Dyvig would know that the computers ead in an abnormal condition so that he would take whatever steps ead appropriate to institute the abnormal shutdowns? I did not prompt him. I yes.
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		(LILUXE) TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINJEK)
		174
1	А	I would think so, yes.
2	Q	Tell me what was done to adequately train you so you
3		could recognize a potential abnormal condition with
4		the computers.
5	A	Just the reading of the text.
6	Q	And did you read that text to say if those computers
7		are just malfunctioning, you don't need to take steps
8		to institute the abnormal procedures, or only if
9		they're down, dead, can't be revived, I'm not going to
10		do it?
11	A	I wasn't involved in that decision.
12	Q	But you had to make the decision because you esd in
13		the computer room?
14	A	The decision to say they esd dead?
15	Q	The decision to institute abnormal procedures.
16	A	I'm not sure. I'm not sure that that was my
17		responsibility.
18	Q	It's every employee's responsibility that's working on
19		there, correct, if they know of an abnormal condition?
20		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
21	Q	Conrect?
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	That's not argumentative. That's the facts. That's
24		what you ead trained, that it's every single
25		employee's responsibility to be able to identify
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		(206) 622-6897
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		176

_		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		176
1	A	Yes.
2	Q	And you assume that Kevin Dyvig also recognizes that
3		this is an abnormal condition, correct?
4	A	Yes.
5	Q	And so you're expecting that the line is going to be
6		shut down?
7	A	No.
8	Q	In accordance with the abnormal conditions you didn't
9		expect the line to be shut down?
10	A	I wasn't running the line.
11	Q	I know. I know Kevin Dyvig was running the line,
12		right?
13	A	Right.
14	Q	You expected him to institute the abnormal procedures
15		to shut down the line based upon the abnormal computer
16		condition, correct?
17	A	Correct.
18	Q	So you expected the line to be shut down?
19	A	I didn't I wasn't thinking about the line. I was
20		thinking about the computers.
21	Q	What's more important, the line or the computers?
22	A	In my role that day, it was the computers. I was
23		focused on the computers.
24	Q	The computer only serves the line, doesn't it?
25	A	In a sense.

		(TITTE TIEVEN - DI ME. DEVINER)
ſ		177
1	Q	The SCADA system is nothing more than a safety tool
2		for the safe operations of that line, correct?
3	A	One of them.
4	Q	And so the primary goal is to make sure that line is
5		nn safely, correct?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	So the maintenance of the SCADA system is secondary to
8	_	making sure that line is run safely, correct?
9 10	A Q	Yes. So esd you, in fact, understanding that when you had
11	Ŷ	an abnormal condition with the computers, that the
12		line was going to be shut down so that it could be
13		operated safely given the problem you esd
14		experiencing?
15	A	Repeat that, please.
16		MR. BENINGER: Katie, would you read that
17		back?
18	_	(The question was read back.)
19 20	A	No.
20 21	Q A	Why not? I was focused on the computers.
2⊥ 22	Q	But you have to be able to think beyond the computers
23	E.	because the computer is only one tool to serve the
24		ultimate responsibility of safety of the pipeline,
25		correct?
	 -	(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		179
1	A	I wasn't out front. I wasn't in the control room.
2	Q	The trigger for the control room was the computer
3 4	A	failure, correct? Both computer failure.
5	Q	That's right, and you esd taking care of both
6		computers' failures, weren't you?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	And you expected the fact that both computers weren't
9		operating to be conveyed to Kevin Dyvig who was the
70	1	end user of that, correct?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	So with him knowing that the computers are not
13 14		operating properly, he should have instituted abnormal shutdown procedures, correct?
15	A	Yes.
16		Okay. So when you institute an abnormal shutdown
17		procedure, when can you restart the line?
18	A	Upon approval from your supervisor.
19	Q	The supervisor on June 10th, 1999, would have been
20		wito?
21		Ron Brentson.
22	1 ~	So you would expect, if the line was shut down as it
23		should have been for the computer malfunctions, that
24	1	Ron Brentson would have come to you first to find out if it was safe to turn the line back on?
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25		II IC was sale to turn the Ime back dir
25		TI TE was bare to thin the time back dif

		(LIJUU TIEREN - BY MK. BENINGER)
ſ		178
1		MR. ALLEN: Objection to the form of the
2		question. Argumentative.
3	A	One would hope to get there.
4	Q	So approximately what was it, about an hour later you
5		esd told that the line had been shut down?
6	A	Approximately, yes.
7	Q	And so that shouldn't have come as any sumprise
8		because you know an hour earlier the line should have
9		been shut down, right?
10		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.
11		MR. SPAAN: Objection, argumentative.
12	A	No.
13	Q	No what?
14	A	I didn't know that it should have. I didn't even I
15		didn't think about the operational side of things. I
16		had one thing on my mind, the computers.
17	Q	You knew it should have been shut down though,
18		correct, if the operator was performing in accordance
19		with the Operation Manual for Controllers, correct?
20	A	Provided it met that criteria, yes.
21	Q	It did meet the criteria, didn't it?
22	A	I don't know.
23	Q	What do you mean you don't know?
24		MR. ALLEN: Objection, form of the question.
25	l	Argumentative.
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

180

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		180
1	A	Ron Brentson was with me.
2	Q	And did he ask you if it was safe to turn the line
з		back on?
4	A	When the question was asked by Kevin if it was safe to
5		restart, I stated from the computer perspective, yes,
6		with Ron next to me.
7	Q	When was that question raised?
B	A	I want to say approximately 1605, 1600, 1605,
9		something like that.
10	Q	So about 4:05 I guess I've got a little problem
11		because I thought you told me earlier the first time
12		you esd aware that the line was down was when he came
13		in about 1630, about 4:30, and said there had been a
14		leak with gas?
15	A	Yeah, correct.
16	Q	So really at 1605 though you knew the line was down
17		and you esd being asked whether it was safe to turn it
18		back on from a computer perspective, correct?
19	A	At 1605, after the computers had been, you know,
20	1	gotten back functional and appeared to be stabilized
21	1	and healthy, at that point in time, you know, Kevin,
22		who was operating the pipeline system, you know, was
23		responsible for that piece.
24	Q	I didn't ask you who was responsible. I just want to
25		make sure that we're now on the same page. By 1605
	ł	
	1	

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
ſ		181
1		you know the pipeline is shut down, don't you?
2	A	I do.
3	Q	And you know that you have Ron Brentson coming in and
4		Kevin Dyvig asking from the computer perspective, is
5		it okay to turn the line back on, correct?
6	A	Correct.
7	Q	And you say from a computer perspective, yes, it's
вļ		okay to turn it back on, correct?
9	A	Connect.
10	Q	From an operator, a controller's perspective, what are
11		the steps that should have been followed before the
12		line was turned back on at 1605?
13	A	Kevin would ask his supervisor for approval to
14		restart.
15	Q	What would the supervisor do in order to give that
16		approval?
17	A	I I don't know what he would do.
18	Q	So the operator just simply turns it all over to the
19		supervisor to say you make the call. Tell me if it's
20		okay to turn the line back on, right?
21	A	Correct.
22	۹ I	And if the supervisor doesn't give the authority to
23		turn it back on, it shouldn't be turned back on,
24		correct?
25	A	Correct.
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

ſ		183
1		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
2		question.
з	A	Repeat, please?
4	Q	Sure. Did you have an understanding at 1605 that the
5		pipeline had been shut down because of the computer
6		problem?
7	A	No.
8	Q	Did you have any understanding as to why the pipeline
9		was down at 1605?
10	A	No.
ц	Q	Was it your assumption it was simply down because of
12		the computer problem?
13	A	To be honest with you, I wasn't thinking about the
14		pipeline.
15	Q	Actually, that's what you had said earlier.
16	A	I wasn't thinking about the pipeline.
17	Q	At 3:30, 3:35 you weren't thinking about the pipeline
18		either, correct?
19	A	Correct.
20	Q	All the way up through 1605 you weren't thinking about
21	ļ	the pipeline, correct?
22	A	Correct.
23	Q	When did you first start thinking about the pipeline
24		again?
25	A	When Kevin mentioned there was a report of gasoline in
	1	
	1	

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)
		182
1	Q	And is the controller supposed to go through and check
2		to see why the line was shut down?
з	A	Un, the controller should definitely know why his
4		pipeline was shut down.
5	Q	And do you remember before 1605 if it was shut down
6		voluntarily, meaning Kevin Dyvig or someone instituted
7	i	the abnormal shutdown procedures and did it
8		themselves, or whether it automatically shut down?
9	A	I don't know.
10	Q	Do you know if there esd any other alarms that esd
11		going on at 1605 indicating possible problems with the
12		line?
13	A	I did not.
14	Q	Esd you part of any discussions in which that
15		occurred?
16	A	I was not.
17	Q	How did you solve the problem with the SCADA
18		conputers?
19	A	When OLY 2 was recycled and brought back primary, it
20		at that point in time came up healthy. The point in
21		time when it was recycled, just prior to it coming on
22	1	line, I had, I halted 01 so there wasn't the wild card
23		of the interaction between the two.
24	0	Did you understand that the computer was shut down at
25		1605 because of the computer problem?

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

ĺ		184
		10 1 0 0 0 0
1		Whatcom Creek.
2	Q	That was about 4:30, correct?
3	A	Yes.
4	Q	Had you had any indication that there esd any alarms
5		or any other internal signals to notify screbody that
6		there had been a release?
7		MR. ALLEN: Objection, asked and answered.
8	A	No.
9	Q	How does that occur? How do the controllers in the
10		control room get notified that there may be a rupture
11		or leak in the line with product coming out of the
12		line?
13	A	Pressure indications.
14	Q	Go ahead, any other way?
15	A	Leak detection system.
16	Q	Any other ways?
17	A	Overshorts.
18	Q	What's an overshort?
19	A	An overshort is a manual comparison of barrels in vs.
20		barrels out done on a ledger.
21	Q	Any other way you can think of? Pressure indicators,
22		leak detection system, overshort?
23	A	Flow rates.
24	Q	Any other ways?
25	A	No.

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	185	ſ		186
. c	Q Now, does this require somebody to go look at these	1	Q	So an I understanding that the leak detection system
:	figures or is there some internal alarm that sounds or	2	_	activates, let's you know that thousands of gallons
	that lights up or that activates when there's a	3		are rushing out of this system and the only way
	significant discrepancy in these things?	4		anybody knows about it in the control room is if they
5 A	A It may be both.	5		happen to go to the event log or if they happen to go
5 C	Q How about with the leak detection system? How does	6		to the alarm log?
, []	one know that the leak detection system is signaling a	7	A	No, the alarm log is always displayed 24 by 7 and it's
	leak?	8		right there, right there.
, j	A It will generate an alert on the alarm event log.	9	Q	Where is it right there?
al d	Q So you've got to go to the log? That's a separate	10	Ā	Between the two controllers' work stations.
1	screen, correct?	11	Q	So you have a separate monitor that displays nothing
2 2	A No, that's the alarm event summary is the summary	12		but the alarm log and never changes, correct?
3	log where the alarms cycle through identifying	13	A	Dedicated, yes.
4	conditions to the controller. Alarm event. When an	14	Q	And that dedicated alarm monitor, how does it signal
5	alarm corres across the board, it's logged in the event	15	-	that there's an alarm that's going off? Are there
6	logger.	16		flashing lights, colorization, sounds?
7 0	Q And the event logger is where?	17	A	Flashing text message with audible indication.
	A It's on the SCADA system.	18	0	What's the audible?
	Q And it's a screen that you go to on the SCADA system,	19	Ā	A series of dings.
0	correct, like a program that you go through? Like if	20	0	Like could you describe it for us?
1	I'm looking at a Windows system, there would be	21	Ā	Well, back then it was a, it was more like a piercing
2	another system you can go to to find out all the other	22		hom, more like beep, beep, beep, beep, you know.
3	alarm logs?	23	Q	Now what is it?
4	A You can look at the event database. It's a log of	24	A	Now it's a ding, a FC based ding.
5	events.	25	Q	Ding, ding, ding, ding?
	KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 185 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIFKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)			KATIK MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 186 of 239 (206) 622-6897 (LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINEER)
Γ	187			188
2	A Yes.	1		MR. DAML: Going back on the record. This
1	Q The flashing text would be what color?	2		is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of
3	Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red.	2 3		is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m.
3	Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that	2 3 4		is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER:
3 4 5	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? 	2 3 4 5	Q EX 1	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on
3 4 5 6	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a 	2 3 4 5 6		is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. WR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a
3 4 5 6 7	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication 	2 3 4 5 6 7		is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. MR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated
3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8		is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. MR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. EENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9		is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other
3 4 5 7 8 9 10	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	0	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. WR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Q	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. MR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sume the PLDS does alert down below there or not.
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q Q	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. MR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the PLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the PLDS? Is that the leak detection?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q A Q A	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. MR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the FLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes.
3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if something at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q Q	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the PLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the PLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain arount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q A Q A	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the FLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain arount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q Q Q	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. WR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the FLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Taxoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain arount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q A Q A	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. WR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the FLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain anount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tages. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q Q Q	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. AR. EENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the FLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if something at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain amount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tapes. MR. BENDER: Why don't you go ahead and 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q Q Q	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the PLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the PLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say that I've actually looked there to say that it's down
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if something at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain arount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tapes. MR. BENINSER: Why don't you go ahead and switch them. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q A Q A A	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the PLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say that I've actually looked there to say that it's down on that lower region or not.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain arount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tapes. MR. EDNINGER: Why don't you go ahead and switch them. MR. DAHL: This is the end of tape No. 2 in 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q Q Q	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the PLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the PLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say that I've actually looked there to say that it's dow on that lower region or not. Maybe that brings up another question. After we have
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacome Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain amount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tapes. MR. DAHL: This is the end of tape No. 2 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q A Q A A	<pre>is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. WR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the FLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say that I've actually looked there to say that it's down on that lower region or not. Maybe that brings up another question. After we have this occurrence that goes on and we have these thing</pre>
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if something at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain amount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tapes. MR. DAHL: This is the end of tape No. 2 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:17 p.m. Going off the record. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q A Q A A	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. EENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the PLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the PLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say that I've actually looked there to say that it's dow on that lower region or not. Maybe that brings up another question. After we have that are going on in the computer room and shut down
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if screething at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacome Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain amount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tapes. MR. DAHL: This is the end of tape No. 2 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q A Q A A	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. WR. BENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activated on the bottom of the screen it will notify them that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, I'm not sure the FLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the FLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't know if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say that I've actually looked there to say that it's dow on that lower region or not. Maybe that brings up another question. After we hav this occurrence that goes on and we have these thing
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q The flashing text would be what color? A Red. Q Any other lights inside the control room that activate? A Along the bottom of each and every display there is a region that will allow the display of an indication that something is in alarm state for approximately six locations before that region is filled. Q You've got A Five or six. On each screen there's a little line, one line of text along the very bottom that will say like OLY Station, if something at OLY Station is in alarm, and then at Tacoma Station and so on. That is another location, but once there's more than a certain amount, maybe five or six, the region is filled and you can see no more. MR. DAHL: Excuse me, counsel. We have four minutes before we switch tapes. MR. DAHL: This is the end of tape No. 2 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:17 p.m. Going off the record. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q A Q A A	is the beginning of tape No. 3 in the deposition of Lloyd Tieken. The time is approximately 3:26 p.m. R. EENINGER: So the, whether the controller is designated on segment 1 or the mainline, they're going to have a screen that if the leak detection system is activate on the bottom of the screen it will notify then that there's an alarm for that, correct? Maybe, if that region is not filled up with other alarms, and to be honest with you, 1'm not sure the PLDS does alert down below there or not. What's the PLDS? Is that the leak detection? That's the leak detection, yes. You're using this day in and day out. You don't kno if it activates on the screen? It activates but it alerts It's activates on the alarm summary but whether it actually displays down on that region, I can't say that I've actually looked there to say that it's dow on that lower region or not. Maybe that brings up another question. After we have that are going on in the computer room and shut down

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1		been any training given to the controllers dealing
2		specifically with things in the manual such as
3		abnormal conditions, energency conditions, those sort
4		of things?
5	А	We are expected to read and understand what's in
6		there.
7	Q	I know, and you esd expected to do that before June
8	-	10th as well, correct?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	And that's part of the problem I have is whether the
11		people read them and if they did read them, whether
12		they understood them. My question to you though is
13		after June 10th, did the company go through some
14		specific training on the things that are in the
15		Operation Manual for Controllers? Did they go back
16		and train you on these things?
17	A	No.
18	Q	So you've, even up to today, you've had no additional
1 9		training on being able to identify and institute
20		abnormal procedures, correct?
21	A	The CBT, the computer based training modules, covered
22		some of that as it pertains to the DOT regulations.
23	Q	That's it, just to the DOT regs, right?
24	A	Correct.
25	Q	And was everyone required to go through the computer
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		(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINCER)
		191
1		monitor, I should say?
2	A	Monitons.
3	Q	How many monitors for each controller?
4	A	Four for the mainline side and three for the segment 1
5	ļ	side.
6	0	Let me go through the mainline side then. For the
7	i i	mainline side how many different screens can be shown

8 on the four monitors?

9 A One each.

10QSo each screen then becomes dedicated or each monitor11becomes dedicated to a particular function, correct?

12 A Yes.

 13
 Q
 And those don't change then; is that right? By having

 14
 four monitors you don't need to change the screens?

15 A No, they do change.

16 Q Then let's look at the four monitors for the mainline.
17 Monitor No. 1, what different screens can be shown on
18 that?

19 A Any upwards of a thousand.

20 Q So you can change to at least a thousand different 21 screens that can be shown on monitor 1?

- 22 A On all of the monitors.
- 23 Q What does monitor 1, what is that used for? What is24 that measuring or recording?
- 25 A Depends on the controller. Whatever he wants for his

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1		based training module?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	How long was that training?
4	A	Approximately ten to 12 hours, something like that.
5	Q	And that's something everybody went through?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	How much of it was dedicated to abnormal procedures?
8	A	I don't recall.
9	Q	Five minutes, five hours?
10	A	Oh, I would guesstimate very little, yeah.
11	Q	Under five minutes?
12	A	Maybe ten minutes at the most relative to the DOT
13		regulations.
14	Q	And there would be no additional training that was
15	1	given to you relative to Olympic Pipe Line's manual
16		for abnormal procedures, correct?
17	A	Correct.
18	Q	And there was no additional training given to you
19	1	relative to Olympic Pipe Line's procedures for
20		evergency shutdowns, connect?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	Now, help me understand the screens. We have one
23		monitor which is dedicated to the alarm log, correct?
24	A	Correct.
25	Q	Each of the controllers has their own screen or own
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 192

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1		operating philosophy.
2	Q	So the mainline would have four screens that can have
3		up to I'm sorry, four monitors that can have up to
4		a thousand different functions to be monitored,
5		correct?
6	A	Over a thousand different displays are available to
7		any monitor, yes.
8	Q	Do you have ones that when you're on the mainline that
9		you predominantly look at?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	What are those?
12	A	Start-up or summary displays. They're an overview of
13		the pipeline.
14	Q	Is that on all four screens or on just one?
15	A	One.
16	Q	What about the other three monitors? What do you
17		primarily look at?
18	A	Primarily segment displays and station displays.
19	Q	Segment and station, define those. What are those?
20	A	Segment would be, a segment display for segment 2
21		would be from Renton Station to Oly Station. Segment
22		3 would be from basically Castle Rock Station to
23	1	Portland.
24	Q	The station that would be to the particular station
25		itself, correct?

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Ī		193
1	А	Correct.
2	0	On, let's say, monitor 3, what do you primarily have
3	-	on there for mainline?
4	A	I can't say I have primarily anything on a specific
5		numbered monitor. The monitors, you know, it's too, I
6		guess, vague.
7	Q	You have four monitors. Are there four primary
8		screens that you look at?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	Start-up, the segment station, those are two. What
11		about the other two?
12	A	Okay, on which side? Okay, mainline or segment 1
13		side?
14	Q	I'm still stuck with mainline because that's the only
15	1	one that's got four, right?
16	A	Right.
17	Q	When I'm talking three I'll talk three for segment 1,
18		but let's stick with mainline now, okay?
19	A	Okay. My preferred layout is start-up display on
20		screen 4, which is the first screen you sit at. The
21]	next screen in line is segment 2, then segment 3, with
22	1	the fourth screen being utility and seldom used for
23		other than monitoring purposes.
24	0	On the bottom of each one of these monitors do you
25		have the ability to have flashed to you that there's
	1	
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		195
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1		that bottom line.
2	Q	Even if there's four other alarms in, as long as
3		there's not five or more it's going to show up on the
4		bottom line, correct?
5	A	Something like that. I'm not absolutely sure about
6		the number but, yes.
7	õ	Is there an audible alarm that's sounded?
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	And where is that? Is there a central place for the
10		audible alarm or does each terminal have some speaker
11	Í	system?
12	A	Each side has an alarming bell, basically a horn.
13	Q	And then how about the dedicated alarm terminal? Does
14		that have any audible alarm?
15	A	No.
16	Q	So you have, for your screen you're going to get a
17		flashing light and you're also going to get an audible
18		alarm, correct?
19	A	A flashing location.
20	Q	Location, okay. Is that flashing location also going
21		to show up, even if it was on the mainline, going to
22		show up on the segment 1 operator's screens?
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	And the audible alarm, is that going to come over the
25	•	audible system that's on the segment 1 side?

_		(TENTER I TONEN - DI MK. BENINSEK)
	_	194
1		an alarm that's being sounded?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	And are you able to set those so that you can have
4		different alarms coming up on different screens?
5	A	No.
6	Q	The alarms that will show up at the bottom of the
7		screens for each one of the monitors, is there
8		something other than the leak detection signal?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	What else? What other alarms show up there?
11	A	They're not alarm specific. They're site specific.
12	Q	So explain that.
13	A	It will say Oly Station, Renton Station, Castle Rock
14		Station.
15	Q	How does the controller then figure out what the alarm
16		is?
17	A	He'll look and monitor the alarm summary listing and
18	1	that tells him specifically which point is in alarm.
19	Q	If an alarm goes off at, let's say you're on the
20		mainline at the Oly Station, is it going to show up on
21		the screen with flashing red?
22	A	Which screen?
23	Q	Any of the screens that you have on, any of the four
24		monitors.
25	A	If there are no other alarms in, it should show up on

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

1		196
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1	A	Yes.
2	Q	So segment I is going to be able to have the same
3		indications of an alarm as the mainline person,
4		correct?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	Is there a screen in the computer room as well?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	And on that screen in the computer room, would that
9		also have this minute reader, or whatever it is, at
10		the bottom that would let you know if an alarm was
11	1	going off?
12	A	I'm not sure.
13	Q	You've been there for months and months. You've
14	ł	looked at your screen, right?
15	A	Yeah.
16	Q	On your screen have you ever seen that little minute
17	1	reader at the bottom where an alarm would show up?
18	A	I can't say for sure yes or no.
19	Q	You've never been trained as a controller that the
20		screen in the computer room would have on the bottom,
21		just like the other screens do, the indication of an
22		alarm; is that right?
23	A	No.
24	Q	And in the computer room is there an audible
25	A	No, that is not right.
		-
	1	

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

6		197
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1	Q	Is there an audible alarm as well?
2	A	There may be.
3	Q	You don't know that?
4	A	I've answered this before, I believe. There can be if
5		the proper screen is displayed, if the terminal is
6		turned on.
7	Q	Wait a minute. You either have the physical hardware
8		there or you don't. Do you have the physical hardware
9		there to sound an audible alarm or not?
10	A	Yes, it is there, but whether it is going to sound the
11		alarm or not is configurable.
12	Q	Okay, and so you're saying the person in the control
13		room can override this little reader thing at the very
14		bottom of the screen that comes up no matter what
15		screen you have on?
16	1	MR. ALLEN: Are you speaking of the monitor
17		in the control room? It's confusing.
18		MR. FINEGOLD: You've been talking about the
19		other room.
20	İ	MR. BENINGER: The computer room, not the
21		control room.
22		MR. FINEGOLD: You just said the control
23		room.
24		MR. BENINGER: I'm sorry. I'm in the
25		computer room right now.

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		199
1	Q	Control Center.
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	And does that same little ticker tape of alarms show
4		up on the screen in the computer room?
5	A	It may on may not.
6	Q	Depending on?
7	A	Depending on whether it I believe it does, but I am
8		not sure. It's a different display mechanism in the
9		computer room.
10	Q	How many months have you spent in the computer room?
11	A	A bunch.
12	Q	How come you don't know whether or not on the screen
13	t	in the computer room the ticker tape of alarms is
14		there or not?
15	A	Because when I'm in the computer room I'm working on
16]	host terminals. I'm not working on, you know, or a
17		PIC building program. I'm not working with those
18		displays, so I'm not in there using those displays and
19		watching for alarms. I'm not there to do that. I'm
20		doing other things.
21	Q	I understand you're not there to do it, but I want to
22		know whether you can do it if you wanted.
23	A	Idon't know.
24	Q	And maybe I asked you this, but do you know whether
25	ļ	there's an audible speaker that will sound an alarm in
	1	
	1	

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		190
1	Q	In my mind I'm in the computer room right now, and on
2		the screen I'd be looking on if I was the controller
3		assigned to the computer room, are you telling me I
4		can override the little reader message on the bottom
5		of that screen that shows the alarms?
6		MR. VERHOLF: Objection.
7	A	No.
8	Q	Have you ever been in the computer room when the alarm
9		had been activated?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	And did you see it on the screen or not?
12	A	I don't recall.
13	Q	Then how did you know there was an alarm activated?
14	A	If the proper display is displayed, the alarm listing
15		can be displayed. The alarm listing can be displayed
16		in the computer room.
17	Q	So you can pull up that alarm listing just like at
18	ĺ	that designated terminal in the control room, correct?
19	A	Yes.
20	Q	But in the control room you have, no matter which
21		screen you have up, you get this, I'm going to call it
22		a little reader message, the little ticker tape at the
23		bottom, that will alert the controller to an alarm in
24		a particular area, correct?
25	A	And you're talking the Control Center?
	1	

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1		the computer room?
2	A	Yes.
з	Q	And have you actually heard the alarm being sounded in
4		the computer room?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	At that point you could go to the alarm log and figure
7		out what exactly is going on, connect?
8	A	I could, yes.
9	Q	And that alarm that would sound in the computer room
10		is for what type of alarms?
11	A	The same as the Control Center.
12	Q	Leak detection, pressure, overshort, flow rates, all
13		those things, correct?
14		MR. FINEGOLD: Objection.
15	Ά	Yes.
16	Q	Let me go back to where we esd some questions back and
17		that was on June 10th, anywhere after 2:30 in the
18		afternoon, esd you aware of any alarms that esd
19		sounded?
20	A	No.
21	Q	You never heard or you just don't recall whether an
22		alarm was sounded at any time from 2:00 onward on June
23		10th?
24	A	I never heard.
25	Q	If an alarm had been sounded, you should have heard
	1	

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		(ITTITUD LIEVEN - RI MK' RENTIVER)
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1		that, correct?
2	A	If the alarm was turned on, if the display was on, if
3		the computer was on, you know.
4	Q	Any of those ones you should have heard it, connect?
5	A	If.
6	Q	If what? Go ahead.
7	A	If the computer was on, if the bell was tunned on, if
8		the proper display was on. I don't recall.
9	Q	Is there a reason why that you turn off the bell in
10		the computer room?
11	A	Yeah.
12	Q	You do that?
13	A	Yeah.
14	Q	There must be a procedure as to when the bell should
15		be on or off in the computer room. What is that?
16	A	There is not.
17	Q	How do you override the bell in the computer room?
18	A	I don't know.
19	Q	You turn it off though?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	How did you do that?
22	A	I don't turn it off.
23	Q	Who does?
24	A	Primarily Todd does. It could be just a volume
25		setting.
	Į	
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		203
1	Q	Brentson wasn't there?
-	1	

1	Q	Brentson wasn't there?
2	A	Brentson was in the computer room.
3	Q	Why was Brentson in the computer room?
4	A	He had responded to his page.
5	Q	Did you and Brentson ever figure out why the computer
6		was malfunctioning following your input of the
7		historical, I don't want to call it conduit but
8		historical, what did you call that again?
9	A	Container.
10	Q	Container. Did you ever figure out why it was
11		malfunctioning?
12	A	No.
13	Q	So you had both computers that malfunctioned and you
14	1	never figured out why there was a malfunction even
15		today?
16	A	Correct.
17	Q	Doesn't that cause you some concern that it could
18		happen again and the system could go down again?
19		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
20	1	question. Vague.
21	A	Some.
22	Q	Not enough to do anything about it?
23	A	No.
24	Q	Actually, what would it take for you to do any sort of
25		investigation into the safety of this operation room?
	1	

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 202 1 Q Do you ever turn it on or off, the bell in the 2 computer room? Did you? 3 A It could be something just as simple as changing 4 displays, turning off that display. That will disable 5 the bell as well. 6 To turn off a display? Q 7 А Yean. 8 Q Even -- I mean the bell comes through with that ticker 9 tape alarm too, doesn't it? No. 10 А 11 Q Why not? 12 Α If the display is off, the display is off. There is 13 no display. 14 You mean the terminals --Q It's like a windowed display. 15 А 16 And you turn the whole thing off? Q 17 Yeah, and you continue working with other windows, А other programs in the computer room. That's what we 18 do back there is we primarily do R&D on the computer 19 20 side of things. So I'm going to have you walk me through from 1605, 21 Q 22 which is when Dyvig and Brentson come to you asking if it's okay to turn the pipeline back on respecting or 23 vis-a-vis the computer, and you say it is, correct? 24 Dyvig came and asked us. 25 A

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

CSR

KATIE MCCOY, RPR,

		204
1		MR. ALLEN: Could I have the question read
2		back?
3		(The question was read back.)
4		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
5		question.
6	A	It would take, it would take the knowledge that it was
7		up to me specifically, you know, to take ownership of
B	1	a certain you know, if it fell under my
9		responsibility then I would, I would work on it.
10	Q	Every controller's responsibility is to make sure the
11		pipeline is run safely, right?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	So is there some more specific direction you would
14	1	need in order to investigate these things that we've
15	-	talked about, the computer going down, the abnormal
16		shutdowns as to whether people understood they esd
17		supposed to do something, the cause of the computer
18		going down, the cause of the Bayview problems, the
19		fact that people turned the computers or the system
20		back on?
21	A	David, they're all specific fields of expertise. The
22		computers, the engineering side of facilities, I am no
23	1	expert. I'm not an engineer. I am not a computer
24		expert. I'm a pipeline controller.
25	Q	How about within your field then of pipeline control.
	1	

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)	_		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		205			206
1		Have you done any investigation as to why the manuals	1	Q	Because you saw a video they gave you about a
2		esd ignored, why the procedures weren't followed	2		deposition that pretty much answered most of your
3		tightly? Should you have done anything on that within	3		questions on that, right?
4		your area of expertise?	4	A	Yes.
5		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.	5	Q	So you had about nine or so other hours that you
6		MR. ALLEN: Objection, argumentative.	6		questioned this lawyer about stuff and you only asked
7	Q	Go ahead.	7		two questions of your supervisor about stuff related
8	А	I have asked questions of my supervisor.	8		to this case?
9	Q	What ead you told? Your supervisor is Brentson?	9	A	More or less.
10	A	Yes.	1.0	Q	I mean this lawyer is a nice man but he doesn't know
11	Q	What questions did you ask?	11	_	diddly about operations of the pipeline, does he?
12	A	Why aren't the manuals on the Intranet, for example.	12	A	I don't know what he knows.
13	Q	What else?	13	Q	So why would you question him for some ten hours and
14	A	More current, maintained more currently.	14		not talk to your supervisor, who knows all about
15	Q	What else? That's about it.	15		pipelines, more than just two questions?
16	A	I mean you had ten hours of questions for some lawyer	16	A	There may have been more, David, you know.
17	Q		17	Q	What ead you told then on why there aren't manuals on the Intranet?
18 19	*	that represents the company, right?	18 19		
20	A Q	In regards to this process, yes. You probably had a lot less than ten hours of	20	A Q	Well, basically it's they're being worked on. The check's in the mail type thing?
20	Ŷ	questions just as to what's going to happen in a	20	¥	MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
22		deposition, right? It wasn't just generalities about	22		question. Argumentative.
23		a deposition you questioned this lawyer for ten hours	23		MR. EENINGER: I'll withdraw that.
24		for, did you?	24	o	How long ago did you ask this question and get the
25	А	No.	25	-	answer, quote, "It's being worked on"?
г		(LLOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)	г		(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		207			208
1	A	Oh, every couple of months.	1	A	Yes.
2	Q	So it's been, quote, "being worked on" for almost,	2		
3		wheth stress	-	Q	How far along are you on this project of getting the
4	A	what, since	3	Q	How far along are you on this project of getting the manuals inputted on the Intranet?
5	Q	As long as I've been there.	3	A	menuals inputted on the Intranet? Oh, I, I would judge it would be 95 percent.
6		As long as I've been there. Okay. So for the last six or so years it's being,	3 4 5		manuals inputted on the Intranet? Oh, I, I would judge it would be 95 percent. How many hours do you think you've been working on
7		As long as I've been there. Okay. So for the last six or so years it's being, quote, "worked on", correct?	3 4 5 6	A Q	manuals inputted on the Intranet? Oh, I, I would judge it would be 95 percent. How many hours do you think you've been working on this each week over the last six years?
-	A	As long as I've been there. Okay. So for the last six or so years it's being, quote, "worked on", correct? Yes.	3 4 5 6 7	A Q A	manuals inputted on the Intranet? Oh, I, I would judge it would be 95 percent. How many hours do you think you've been working on this each week over the last six years? Me personally?
8	Q	As long as I've been there. Okay. So for the last six or so years it's being, quote, "worked on", correct? Yes. And do you know who's actually working on it?	3 4 5 7 8	A Q A Q	manuals inputted on the Intranet? Oh, I, I would judge it would be 95 percent. How many hours do you think you've been working on this each week over the last six years? Me personally? Yes. You are one of this team that you talked about
8 9	Q A	As long as I've been there. Okay. So for the last six or so years it's being, quote, "worked on", correct? Yes. And do you know who's actually working on it? Yes.	3 4 5 7 8 9	A Q A Q A	manuals inputted on the Intranet? Oh, I, I would judge it would be 95 percent. How many hours do you think you've been working on this each week over the last six years? Me personally? Yes. You are one of this team that you talked about Oh, personally, maybe 60 at the most.
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		(JALVIN LIENEN - EX MR. BENINGER)
[209
1		Line?
2	A	I don't know.
3		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, argumentative.
4	o	What esd you told by Mr. Brentson as to why aren't
5	-	these manuals on the Intranet yet? What esd you told?
6	A	It's in the works. It's being worked on.
7	Q	And that was the last thing that you heard from him on
8		that?
9	A	In process.
10	Q	And your questioning you had was why not maintain the
11		manuals more current?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	What esd you told on that?
14	A	In process. Big job.
15	Q	Big job just to make them current?
16	A	Un-huh.
17	Q	Does that mean yes?
18	A	Yes.
19	Q	But it's also the menuals, to make them current,
20		that's an important safety tool, isn't it?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	That's an important safety tool just like
23]	investigating causes of near misses or actual hits or
24		other accidents is an important safety tool as well,
25	1	correct?
	1	

KATLE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 209 of 239 (206) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

	ſ		211
:	1	A	When I've got a pipeline to run, you know, that's what
;	2		Ido.
:	3	Q	Isn't it good to be able to run that pipeline with
	4		current, state of the art knowledge?
	5	A	It is.
	6	Q	And the only way everyone is going to be able to have
	7		that current state of the art knowledge is that these
	8		manuals get updated and the information shared?
	9	A	Yes.
1	0	Q	Where is your manual?
1	1	A	Currently, on the Intranet.
1	2	Q	Yours is?
1	з	A	Yes.
3	4	Q	Do you have any physical manual?
1	5	A	No.
1	.6	Q	Any updated menuals?
1	7	A	Yes.
2	18	Q	Where are those?
-	وا	A	Intranet.
1	20	Q	How would I find it on the Intranet?
:	21	A	Via the browser. You just click the file. Generally
2	22]	it's marked "Home".
1	23	Q	Home?
:	24	A	Home.
;	25	Q	Is that personal for you?
		1	

		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
[210
1	A	Yes.
2	Q	And maintaining these things more current isn't being
3		done any more than the investigation into this
4		explosion, correct?
5	А	Repeat, please?
6	Q	Sure. Making more current the manuals so that they're
7		available as a safety tool for controllers isn't being
8		worked on any more diligently than the investigation
9		into the causes by Olympic of this explosion?
10		MR. ALLEN: Objection, lack of foundation.
11	Q	Is that right, from your knowledge?
12	A	I don't follow you.
13	Q	You're not aware
14	A	I don't follow the question.
15	Q	You're not aware of anything that's being done to make
16		the manuals more current, are you?
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	What's being done on that?
19	A	All employees are charged with reviewing the manual
20	l	and identifying anything that is not, you know, proper
21		in it, that is incorrect.
22	Q	So you would have done that as well, gone through the
23		manual and done the same thing?
24	A	Yes, as time allows.

¢,

2

25 Q What does that mean?

KATIE MCCOY, KPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 210 of 239 (206) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

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1	A	That's pretty much companywide. Most people keep our
2		manual as their "home".
3	Q	Is everybody responsible for updating, for making the
4		manual more current or is that assigned to any one
5		particular person?
6		MR. VERWOLF: Objection, no foundation.
7	A	I don't know.
8	Q	What happens if your computer goes down?
9	A	There are numerous others.
10	Q	You just go move yourself to some place that the
11		terminal is going to be working on?
12	A	There are two, one for each controller, yes, and then
13		there are others as well.
14	Q	And if your computer goes down, your computer is
15		linked into the mainframe computer, correct?
16	А	Not correct.
17	Q	How is the computer set up?
10	A	Which computers?
19	Q	You have your own stand-alone computer?
20	A	Business machine is what we refer to it as, yes.
21	Q	Your business machine?
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	What does that business machine do, your computing?
24	A	It provides us access to Office documents, the Office
25		suites, the e-mail correspondence, the scheduling
	1	

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)	
213	
1 software, you know, Outlook, Microsoft's r	nanagement
2 tools.	-
3 Q Did you send any e-mails on why is there n	no
4 investigation or what's this whole busines	ss with the
5 OPS report or any of those kind of safety	concerns?
6 A NO.	
7 Q Why not?	
8 A A document from OPS is not, to me is not a	an offici al
9 document from my management stating that	~~ you know,
10 it is not from my management. It's to my	management.
11 I don't expect that, you know, that to be	to me
12 maybe I misinterpreted it.	
13 Q Who regulates your operations?	
14 A DOT, OPS.	
15 Q I'm sorry, you said who?	
16 A OPS.	
17 Q So the federal agency that would be respo	nsible over
18 you to regulate all your activities is wh	6 ?
19 A OPS.	
20 Q And who was the one that wrote the probab	le violations
21 based upon their investigation of your co	mpany's
22 activities into this?	
23 MR. VERWOLF: Object to charact	erization.
24 It's potential violations.	
25 MR. BENINGER: No, no, probable	e. Probable
XATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 2 (206) 622-6897	213 OF 239
(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)	
215	
1 A Could you read, could you repeat the prev	vious three
2 questions?	
3 Q Sure.	

5 A As a controller, that's what I don't understand is you asked me first that OPS governs all of my activities
7 as a controller, and I don't understand that to be
8 true.
9 Q If you do something as a controller, would OPS have authority to come in and review that?

11 A Isuppose.

12 Q Do they have authority to come on in and investigate13 what you did as a controller?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Do they have authority to fine the company if you did
16 something in violation of their rules as a controller?
17 A Yes.

- 18 Q Is there any part of your job as a controller that OPS
 19 wouldn't have the ability and authority over you?
- 20 A I'm not sure.
- 21 Q Are you aware of anything?
- 22 A I'm not sure. I am not.
- 23 Q You're not aware of it or you're not sure of it?
- 24 A I'm not aware of anything.
- 25 Q Let me zip you back to 1605 on June 10th. What do you

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 214 1 is the term. 2 So who is the one that wrote the probable violations 0 з after their investigation into this incident? 4 А OPS. 5 The same governing body that regulates all of your 0 6 activities as a controller? 7 MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the question. No foundation. B 9 0 Is that right? 10 I don't know. А You don't know? 11 0 12 А Yeah. 13 Truly, you don't know that OPS regulates all the 0 14 activities of the pipeline operations? MR. ALLEN: That's a different question, 15 counsel. 16 17 0 You're not serious on that, are you? 18 Yea. А 19 Yes, you really don't know that OPS regulates all the 0 pipeline activities? 20 21 А I know that. 22 Okay, then why did you say "no" earlier? 0 It was a different question. 23 А 24 0 What was the question you said no to then? What part

25 of it?

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KATIE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 214 of 239 (206) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

216 do after you tell Brentson and Dyvig that from a computer perspective it's okay to restart the line? I just responded yes, that the computers look healthy, А to Kevin. Did you do anything else? 0 А NO. What happened after that? 0 А Kevin went back in and I believe, well, I -- well, Kevin went back to the Control Center. What did Ron do? 0 А He and I continued to have a conversation. About what? 0 А Personal matters. I don't recall specifically. It wasn't about the computer and it wasn't about what 0 was going on in the Control Center? We had discussed, had time to discuss a big portion of А that already. That was interspersed throughout the conversation. Q Maybe you'd better go back. Why don't you tell me as much about the conversation you can remember of you and Mr. Brentson, When Ron showed up --А What time was that, by the way? 0 I want to say approximately 1645, maybe 1650. А Did he explain to you why it took so long for him to 0

Г		217			
		to your call?			
1	_	respond to your call?			
2	A	No. Was it unusual for him to take ten to 15 minutes to			
3	Q	respond to the call?			
4	-	No.			
5	A	NO. Go ahead.			
6	2	Upon arrival I outlined to the best of my recollection			
7	A	what had transpired, just exactly what I wrote down on			
8		221.			
9		Yes, sir.			
10		The exception to that text is the deletion of the			
11	A	historic containers which I had created, and we			
12	{	discussed that prior to restarting, and that was it.			
13	0	Any discussions on any other problems in the line			
14	ľ	other than the computer problems you have just talked			
15	1	about?			
16 17	A	No.			
18		Kevin Dyvig comes in. How long is he there?			
18		Very briefly.			
20		Ope minute?			
20	1 -				
22		and the second three second Mr. Proptson discuss what?			
23		in pature.			
24		I don't recall with, you know, regards, you know, as I			
2		thought of different things. Actually, that piques my			
2.					
		YATTE MCOV, RPR. CSR 08/30/00 Page 217 OF 239			
		XATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 21/ of 239 (206) 622-6897			
		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)			
		219			
	1	know, having a personal discussion and discussing, you			
	2	know, as questions arise in my mind about what may or			
	3	may not have happened.			
	ſ	Q And what, does he continue to stay in the computer			
	5	room then with you until Mr. Dyvig comes back in to			
	6	tell you about the gasoline spill?			
	7	A Yes.			
	8	Q So Brentson never does leave, from 1605, never does			
	9	leave and goes over to the control room before you			

both are told that there's a gasoline leak; is that 10 right? 11 12 А Yes. And you're talking during this half hour time period 13 0 or 25 minute time period about all personal things or 14 are you talking about computer and company related 15 stuff with Mr. Brentson or what?

All of the above. I'm not sure.

- Did you guys go on a break or take a break or anything 0 then? No. А Are you sitting or standing or what are you doing? 0 Standing. А And you hear no other alarms that go off during this
- 0 time, correct?
- Correct. A

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WHATTER TITERED - DI MER. DENVIRAMENT 218 memory to -- I remember that I had also tried to contact Todd Smith during this situation and he called in and was able to modem in, I believe, and look at the computers as well. Did you talk to him before or after you got the OLY 2 back on line? After. Α So you went from OLY 2 to OLY 1 back to OLY 2 and then 0 you talked to Todd Smith? Correct. Α And he modemed on in and did what? 0 And looked at the computers. 12 A And what did he tell you? 13 o That they looked okay. 14 А Was he able to figure out any reason why the 15 0 computers, both of them, malfunctioned? 16 Not that I'm aware of. 17 Α And I think I probably asked you this, but even until 18 0 today you've never learned a reason as to why the 19 computers, both of them, malfunctioned; is that right? 20 Yes. 21 А

Todd Smith calls in and then what? 22 0

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We have the discussion, finish with Todd, and then 23 Α Kevin walks in about 1605. Asked his question and 24

then goes out and Ron and I continue discussing, you 25

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 220

And the first notification that you have that there's ο another problem with the line is when Mr. Dyvig comes in; is that right? Yes. A And what does he say --5 0 What does Kevin --6 A -- specifically? 0 7 What does Kevin say? 8 А Yes. sir. 9 0 Kevin comes out of the door of the Control Center as Α 10 we are exiting the computer room, meets us in the 11 hallway. He kind of holds the door open and says, 12 "I've had a report of a large volume of gasoline in 13 Whatcom Creek from Rick Kiene.* 14 Did he seem to be in a hurry? 15 Q Oh, yeah. He was rushing in there. А 16 Who is Rick Kiene? 17 0 Rick Kiene is a quality assurance person that came 18 А from Aroo Refinery. 19 Why is he up there, the Whatcom Creek area? Q 20 I don't know. 21 А And exactly what, he said that there's a large 22 Q volume -- ead you and Ron Brentson talking about next 23 week's meeting at Bayview during any of this portion? 24 I don't recall. 25 А

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_		(ILOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINYER)
r		221
		221
1	Q	Where ead you and Lloyd or you and Mr. Brentson going
2		when you left the computer room and met up with Dyvig?
3	A	Just easing our way out into, you know, out of the
4		computer room during conversation and, you know, on
5		our way into the Control Center.
6	Q	Why are you going there?
7	A	Coffee pot is in there.
8	Q	So you ead going to take a little bit of a break?
9	A	Sure.
10	Q	Did you have your coffee cup with you that you ead
11		bringing?
12	A	No.
13	Q	So you esd going to go into the control room to get
14		some coffee and just sort of kibbitz in there?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And Ron then comes out and did he actually seem like
17		he was in a hurry or was he just informing you?
18	1	MR. ALLEN: You misspoke yourself.
19	Q	I'm sorry, Kevin Dyvig comes out and did he seem to be
20	{	in a herry?
21	A	Yes, he was concerned.
22) Q	What happened at that point? He says there's a
23		gasoline leak from a report by Rick Kiene and what's
24	1	the response?
25	A	Okay, and we all went into the Control Center.

KATIE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 221 of 239 (205) 622-6897

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

ſ		223
1	Q	What do you do then besides just being two ears and
2		two eyes?
3	A	I believe I attempted to build some trends, some
4		pressure trend displays to try to see how the pressure
5		locked, you know, to get some idea of what the
6		pressures ead doing at Cherry Point and Ferndale, as
7		well as Bayview.
8	Q	Esd you trying to figure out whether there really was
9		a leak?
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	Or did you actually shut the line down and act as
12		though there was a leak?
13	A	The line had already been shut down and we esd, and
14		Kevin was treating it as if there had been a leak.
15	Q	And what does the manual tell you that you're supposed
16		to do if you get a report of a gasoline leak?
17	A	Notify call 911 and notify the authorities.
18	Q	Did you do that at 4:30 then?
19	A	I did not.
20	Q	Did you see anyone else that did that at 4:30?
21	A	I did not.
22	Q	Who was responsible for making sure that the things
23		that ead set out in the manual ead actually being
24		dane?
25	A	I believe it's a shared responsibility with the
	1	

r		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
		222
1	Q	And then what did you do?
2	А	Just proceeded to it was shortly thereafter that,
3		you know, that the phone calls started coming in that
4		the creek actually caught fire and I started, you
5		know, logging events.
6	Q	The creek doesn't catch fire until almost 5:00.
7	A	Well, it's really, it's all quite blurry. It was a
8		long time ago, but basically that's what I remember is
9		that we started, you know, investigating actually,
10		I just kind of stood back and listened in. I can't
11		tell you exactly what I was doing, to be honest.
12	Q	What was being done to investigate whether there was a
13		leak or not?
14	A	I don't know.
15	Q	You don't know or you don't remember?
16	A	I don't know.
17	Q	You esd there though, right?
18	A	Yes.
19	Q	And you weren't just being an observer. You esd going
20		to try to help out in this situation, correct?
21	A	¥ea.
22	Q	This would be an emergency situation if there ead, in
23	ĺ	fact, large volumes of gasoline from your pipeline
24	l	going into a creek, right?
25	A	Yes.
	L	KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 222 of 239

(LLOYD TIEKEN	-	BY	MR.	BENINGER)
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		(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)
[224
1		controllers on duty and the Control Center supervisor.
2	Q	You would have been one of those controllers on duty,
3		right?
4	A	No, sir.
5	Q	Because you esd on special assignment?
б	A	Yes, sir.
7	Q	And so you didn't feel that was your responsibility to
8		try to take up the slack when these people esd dealing
9		with an emergency and call 911?
10	A	I did not know what had or had not been done. I was
11	ļ	dealing with the computers primarily.
12	Q	Did you learn how long they had suspected there was a
13		leak?
14	A	And there may be a problem with my time line. I'm not
15		absolutely sure I was in the Control Center between
16		the 16 I believe I was in there just shortly before
17		the, when Rick Kiene first called in, 1655. It may
18	1	not have been as early as 1635.
19	(Q	1635 was when he called in a huge gasoline release,
20	1	correct? Let me show you
21	A	Yeah, that was copied off of Kevin's notes. I did not
22		take that.
23	Q	1635 up at the top was when he called in and Kevin's
24		notes have written down that it wasn't just a leak.
25	1	This was a huge gasoline release, correct? That's
		KATLE MCCDY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 224 of 239
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Г		225
1		what he reports?
2	Α	What Kevin said, that there was a large volume of
3		gasoline in Whatcom Creek.
4	Q	I'm sorry, what did you write down?
5	A	Huge gasoline release.
6	Q	I'm sonry, go ahead and read the whole thing. "Rick
7		Kiene called"
8	A	"in a huge gasoline release," and that's my terms.
9		That's my terminology.
10	Q	Your terminology of trying to accurately depict what
11		was said and reported at 1635, correct?
12	A	Actually, that's not true. I'm not sure as to like
13		I said, I copied Kevin's notes onto this paper. I'm
14		not sure where my logging actually occurred. I
15		believe it was later, like 1648.
16	Q	Why was Kevin taking notes?
17	A	He was we ead busy with the initial notification
18		and basically troubleshooting the situation.
19	Q	If he's so busy why is he taking notes to document the
20	[time lines and things?
21	A	That's part of the job.
22	l Q	Is that part of the Energency Log that you're supposed
23		to have?
24	A	Yes.
25	0	Do you know what happened with that Emergency Log?
	1	
	L	KATTE MCCOY, RUR, CSR 08/30/00 Page 225 of 239 (206) 622-6897
)		(ILOYD TIEKEN - EY MR. BENINGER)
	ſ	227
		15
3		and a start that and mint m?
	3 A 4 C	the and been that there a huma
	- 1	gasoline release, there's nothing on any of the
	5 (6	monitors or anywhere in the control room letting you
		know that there's an alarm or an alert about a
	7	potential leak; right?
	8	No. I mean, ves, that is right. I wasn't running th

- No. I mean, yes, that is right. I wasn't running the Α 9 system. 10
- Was the decision made to shut the system down at that 11 Q point in time immediately based upon Rick Kiene's 12 report? 13
- Idon't know. 14 А

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- Did it continue to operate for a little while while 15 Q you ead in the control room before it was shut down? 16 NO. 17 А
 - Who then shut it down? Q
- Well, I don't know I should say. Not no. I don't A know. 20
 - Was it shut down though by the time you got into the Q control room with Mr. Brentson?
 - I, I believe as we went back into the control room, А here again, the time line is fuzzy, at some point in
 - time Kevin said that pressures didn't look right so he

		(TITLE TILLE - DI LE DEVINSER)
F		226
1	A	No.
2	0	So before you get in, he's already, Mr. Dyvig has
3	-	already written down that Mr. Kiene called and talked
4		about a huge gasoline leak, or release I should say?
5	A	A huge volume of gasoline in Whatcom Creek, yes.
6	Q	That's already been written down, correct?
7	A	I guess, yes.
8	Q	And then do you learn about it from him that there's
9		been a, Rick Kiene reported a huge gasoline release in
10		Whatcom Creek from his written entry or from him
11		verbally telling you?
12	A	Verbally in the hallway when Ron Brentson and I esd
13	{	coming out of the computer room is when I heard it
14		from Kevin.
15	Q	Let me back up. At the 1605 meeting did you have the
16	•	understanding that Ron Brentson gave the okay to try
17	1	to restart the pipeline at that point?
18	A	Yes.
19	Q	And did Mr. Dyvig tell you how many times that he
20		attempted to restart the pipeline and what conditions
21		he was faced with?
22	A	No,
23	s Q	During the time that you ead in there there ead no
24	:]	discussions as to here's what I've been doing and
2	5	here's the responses I've been getting?

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KATLE MCCOY, RPR,

1		had shut the line down and closed the block valves
2		prior to Rick Kiene's call.
3	Q	So you think Kevin may have had some notification from
4		the system itself, from the SCADA system, that there
5		may be a problem even before Rick Kiene called in? Is
6		that what I'm hearing?
7	А	Yes.
8	Q	Do you know if the line was purged after a leak was
9		suspected?
10	A	No.
11	Q	You don't know or
12	A	I don't know.
13	Q	Do you know if Mr. Dyvig shut the line down once he
14		suspected there may have been a release based upon the
15	ł	readings he was seeing from the SCADA system or did he
16		wait until he had confirmation from Rick Kiene?
17	A	I don't know.
18	Q	Do you know why you weren't notified and Mr. Brentson
19	1	wasn't notified in the computer room when Mr. Dyvig
20		was having some concerns over the readings on the
21		SCADA system?
22	A	Repeat, please?
23	Q	Yes. Mr. Dyvig, you understood, had some concerns
24		over the readings on the SCADA system before Rick
25	5	Kiene called, correct?

KATTE MCCOY, RPR, CSR 08/30/00 (206) 622-6897

		(LLUTU TIEREN - BY MK. BENIMER)
[229
1	A	Yes. Well yes.
2	Q	What's the procedure to be followed if there are
3		concerns raised on the readings on the SCADA system?
4	A	To shut down and minimize any release as much as you
5		can with the equipment at hand.
6	Q	Immediately or is there a delay in there or what's the
7	1	procedure?
8	A	It depends on where the leak might be. If the leak
9		is, you know, upstream of a pump station with a big
10		hill and you can actually pump more by during the loss
11		of product, you are ultimately min attempting to
12		minimize the volume that eventually gets out. You
13		know, close it, block the nearest upstream block valve
14		and basically pump it until it's flat and there's no
15		pressure on the line. That's what flat means. That
16	Į	would be one scenario.
17	Q	The other scenario is to shut the system down
18		immediately?
19	A	There's many scenarios, you know.
20	Q	And is this just based on the controllers' on-the-spot
21		decisions as to what to do or are the scenarios
22		trained on and set forth in some manual?
23		MR. ALLEN: Objection, form of the question,
24		compound.
25	A	Yes. The first question?
	1	
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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

[231					
1		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the					
2		question. It's confusing.					
3	A	It is confusing. Could you narrow it down, narrow the					
4		question?					
5	Q	Sure. Am I really understanding that what you're					
6		saying is that the controller has to make a judgment					
7		call based not upon protocol and not upon industry					
8		standards or anything else, but just based upon what					
9		sort of experiences they've had in the past?					
10	A	Based upon all of that and the current profile of the					
11		system he is numning and the history of that system					
12		from the beginning of his shift to that point in time.					
13	Q	With the six years you've been with Olympic, how many					
14		times have you shut down the system for an abnormal or					
15		emergency situation?					
16	A	Oh, maybe six at the most.					
17	Q	And, for instance, if one of the valves up in Bayview,					
18		the 50 some times that they closed, unintentionally					
19		closed, is that a situation, an abnormal situation in					
20		which the pipeline should be shut down?					
21	A	I don't believe the valves closed unintentionally.					
22	Q	You did read the report from the OPS about the number					
23		of times that the valves closed uncommanded up there					
24		at Bayview, correct?					
25	A	Yes.					
	1						

(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER) 230

1	Q	Answer any of them.
2		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
3		question. Give the witness a question to answer.
4	A	The first part of that last question, please?
5	Q	Is the procedure set out in any manual or any
6		training?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	So there's protocol that's set up to handle each
9		situation and it's just not left to the operator's
10		on-the-spot determination?
11	A	Generic protocol.
12	Q	Then how do the operators and controllers learn to do
13		the right things for each situation?
14	A	It's a judgment call. A lot is a judgment call.
15	Q	And do you get judgment by experience?
16	A	By experience.
17	Q	And do you get experience by bad judgment?
18	A	And good judgment.
19	Q	And so the way the system is set up is sort of the
20		good and the bad experiences, on-the-job training,
21		just sort of goes in and the operators have to kind
22	1	of, depending on how many bad experiences or good
23		experiences they have, make a judgment call as to what
24		they're going to do when faced with a potential
25		release?

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

232

1	Q	And uncommended means unintentional, doesn't it?				
2	A	No.				
3	Q	It means it intentionally closed from an operator's				
4		intention and that's why it closed?				
5	A	The valves can close to protect. It was a safety				
6		feature.				
7	Q	It can also close just because it malfunctions, right?				
8	A	Yes.				
9	Q	Now, the valve closed uncommanded up in the Bayview				
10		area. Is that an abnormal situation that requires a				
11		line to be shut down?				
12	A	It πay be, yes. Yes.				
13	Q	May be or is that something you're trained for?				
14	A	Yes, it is, if it is closed unintentional.				
15	Q	Unintentional or uncommanded or do they really mean				
16		the same thing to you?				
17	A	No.				
18	Q	So what's the difference then? If it's unintentional				
19		and the valve closes, is that an abnormal situation				
20		that requires immediate shutdown?				
21	A	I'm not sure how to answer that.				
22	Q	Just based upon your training. Have you been trained				
23	1	that an unintended mainline valve closure is an				
24		abnormal procedure that requires a shutdown?				
25	A	Yes.				
	1					
	1					

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		233				
1	Q	If you have an uncommanded mainline valve closure, is				
2		that an abnormal procedure that requires a shutdown?				
3	A	Yes.				
4	Q	And you're not allowed to restart the line without				
5		doing an investigation and getting concurrence from				
6		your supervisor, correct?				
7	A	Yes.				
8	Q	Now, any of the 50 some times that the Bayview Station				
9		had an uncommanded or unintentional valve closure				
10		there, esd you on duty and had to shut down the line?				
11	A	Yes.				
12	Q	How many times?				
13	A	I don't know specifically.				
14	Q	More than one?				
15	A	Oh, yes, yes. Maybe as many as ten. Maybe, maybe				
16		more.				
17	Q	So maybe ten or more times you ead on duty when the				
18		Bayview valve created an abnormal procedure requiring				
19		you to shut down the line, correct?				
20	A	The Bayview valve did not create an un did not fit				
21		the criteria.				
22	Q	For what?				
23	A	For unintended valve closure.				
24	Q	Then why did you have to shut the line down?				
25	A	Because Bayview isolated itself.				
	1					

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(LLOYD TIEKEN - BY MR. BENINGER)

ĺ		235
1		question if it's a question. It's confusing,
2	0	When the Bayview Station had the valve closures,
3	ž	uncommanded and unintended valve closure, did you shut
4]	down the pipeline or no?
5	А	Yes.
6	0	So while you esd on duty that happened, what, ten plus
7	-	times?
8	А	Yes.
9	0	And the reason that it was shut down was why?
10	A	It
11	0	The line?
12	A	The line? Because I could no longer flow through the
13	Į	Bayview facility.
14	Q	I thought that you didn't have to flow through the
15		Bayview facility.
16	A	At this point in time we did.
17	Q	So all up until the reroute occurred when did the
18		reroute occur?
19	A	I don't know. I would guesstimate within the last six
20		months, something like that.
21	0	So before the reroute you had to go through the
22		Bayview facility?
23	A	Yes.
24	0	Both the north line coming down from Ferndale and the
25	1	Anacortes line had to flow through the Bayview

		(14511) ILENER - DI PR. DOMINERI
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ı	Q	So when you had an unintended mainline valve closure
2		at Bayview Station, under your policies and procedures
3		you're required to shut down the line, correct?
4	А	The valves at Bayview are not mainline valves. They
5		are receiver, incoming receiver valves and launcher
6		valves.
7	Q	So if the valves at Bayview closed, you're saying that
8		that isn't an abnormal procedure covered by the
9		manual?
10	A	Cornect.
11		MR. ALLEN: Finally got there.
12	Q	And all the other operators and people should agree
13		with that as well if you're properly trained?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	Is it another malfunction?
16	A	No.
17		MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
18		question.
19	Q	It's not a valve that opens or closes. The failure of
20		a valve to open or close when commanded is not another
21		potential malfunction which is under 5.6 of your
22		operating procedures as an abnormal condition
23		requiring ehutdown?
24	A	No.
25	1	MR. ALLEN: Object to the form of the
	1	


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1		facility?
2	A	Yes.
3	Q	Bayview was an integral part of getting all the fuels
4		from all four refineries, correct?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	And did it require a physical reroute of the line
7		around Bayview to be able to circumvent that?
8	A	Yes.
9	Q	And that was done approximately six months ago; is
10	i	that right?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	What esd you told as to why you circumvented the
13		entire Bayview line or station?
14	A	f really wasn't told any specific reason.
15	Q	With the physical reroute of the line, had the
16		decision been made then that Bayview was not going to
17		be used anymore?
18	A	Oh, no.
19	Q	When has the decision been made that Bayview is not
20		going to be used?
21	A	It's never been made.
22	Q	It's just not being used?
23	A	It is used occasionally.
24	Q	When?
25	A	Occasionally as scheduling requires.

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1		The Hon. Steven J. Mura
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4		
5		OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
6	COUNTY	OF WHATCOM
7	KATHERINE DALEN, individually and as) the Personal Representative of the Estate of)	
8	STEPHEN M. TSIORVAS, and as ()	NO. 99-2-01468-1
9	TRIODVAR and GEODGE K TRIODVAR.	
10	and KYRIACOS TSIORVAS,)	FIRST AMENDED
11) Plaintiffs,)	NOTICE OF VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF LLOYD TIEKEN
12)	
13	v.)	
14	OLYMPIC PIPE LINE COMPANY, a ()	
15 16	COMPANY LLC, a foreign corporation,	Tieken
10	EQUILON ENTERPRISES, LLC, a foreign)	EXHIBIT NO.シィア
18	FRANK HOPF, RON BRENTSON)	
10	and JOHN DOES,	K. McCoy
20	Defendants.	
21		
22	OLYMPIC PIPE LINE COMPANY, a)	
23	foreign corporation, EQUILON PIPELINE) COMPANY LLC, a foreign limited liability)	
24	company; and EQUILON ENTERPRISES) LLC, a foreign limited liability company,)	
25		
26	Third-Party Plaintiffs,)	
27	v. (
28) IMCO GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO.,)	
29	a domestic corporation, and JOHN DOE () DEFENDANTS ONE THROUGH FOUR, ()	
30	DEFENDANTS ONE THROUGH FOUR,)	
31	Third-Party Defendants,	
32)	
		LUVERA, BARNETT BRINDLEY, BENINGER & CUNNINGHAM attorneys at law
	FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF VIDEOTAN DEPOSITION OF LLOYD TIEKEN - 1 U:\CATHY\Olympic\depositions\tieken-2.dep	PE 6700 Bank of America Tower Center • 701 Fifth Avenue Seattle, Washington 98104 (206) 467-6090

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1 2 3 4 5	FRANK S. KING, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of WADE B. KING, and FRANK S. KING and MARY L. KING, individually, and TRACY K. BELL, individually, and JASON KING, individually,)) NO. 99-2-01467-3
_	Plaintiffs,) FIRST AMENDED) NOTICE OF VIDEOTAPE
6		DEPOSITION OF LLOYD TIEKEN
7	VS.	
8 9	OLYMPIC PIPE LINE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, EQUILON PIPELINE)
10	COMPANY LLC, a foreign corporation,	
11	EQUILON ENTERPRISES, LLC, a foreign corporation, and FRED CROGNALE,	
12	FRANK HOPF, RON BRENTSON	
13	and JOHN DOES,	
14	Defendants.	
15		
16	OLYMPIC PIPE LINE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, EQUILON PIPELINE	
17	COMPANY LLC, a foreign limited liability)
18	company; and EQUILON ENTERPRISES LLC, a foreign limited liability company,	
19	bbe, a foreign innied naointy company,)
20	Third-Party Plaintiffs,	
21	v.	,)
22 23 24	IMCO GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., a domestic corporation, and JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS ONE THROUGH FOUR,	
25 26	Third-Party Defendants,	
27	TO: LLOYD TIEKEN	
28	AND TO: MICHAEL G. MARTIN	
29 30	YOU AND EACH OF YOU, PLEA	SE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 30 (a)(8)
31		position upon oral examination of the following named
32		hic means, will be taken at the request of the Plaintiffs:
	FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF VIDEOTA	LUVERA, BARNETT BRINDLEY, BENINGER & CUNNINGHAM ATTORNEYS AT LAW
	DEPOSITION OF LLOYD TIEKEN - 2	6700 BANK OF AMERICA TOWER CENTER • 701 FIFTH AVE

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6700 BANK OF AMERICA TOWER CENTER • 701 FIFTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104 (206) 467-6090

1 2 3 4 5	 WITNESS: Lloyd Tieken DATE: Wednesday, August 30, 2000 TIME: 9:30 a.m. PLACE: Luvera, Brindley, Beninger & Cunningham Bank of America Tower 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6700 Seattle, Washington 98104 	
6	The deposition upon oral examination is subject to continuance or adjournment from time to	
8	time or place to place until completed, and to be taken on the grounds and for the reason the said	
9	witness will give evidence material to the establishment of the plaintiffs' case, and is directed to bring	
10 11	items responsive to the attached Subpoena Duces Tecum pursuant to Washington Rule of Civil	
12	Procedure $30(b)(1)$.	
13	DATED this \underline{SP} day of July, 2000.	
14 15	LUVERA, BARNETT, BRINDLEY, BENINGER & CUNNINGHAM	
16	Shard R	
17	DAVID M. BENINGER, WSBA 18432	
18 19	PAUL N. LUVERA, WSBA 849 Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
20	Automoys for Fighting	
21		
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23 24		
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	LUVERA, BARNETT BRINDLEY, BENINGER & CUNNINGHAM attorneys at law	
	FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF VIDEOTAPE 6700 Bank of America Tower Center • 701 Fifth Aven DEPOSITION OF LLOYD TIEKEN - 3 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104 U:\CATHY\Olympic\depositions\ticken-2.dep (206) 467-6090	UE

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1	DECLARATION	OF MAILING
2 3	The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury u the below date, I mailed, or caused delivery of a tru	nder the laws of the State of Washington, that on e copy of the foregoing to:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Mr. Michael R. Spaan Patton Boggs 1031 West 4th Avenue, Suite 504 Anchorage, AK 99501 Mr. Nick S. Verwolf Davis Wright Tremaine 10500 NE 8th Street, Suite 1800 Bellevue, WA 98004 Mr. Richard F. Allen Mr. Chris Nicholl Cozen & O'Connor 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 5200 Seattle, WA 98101-3033 Mr. John W. Wolfe Attorney at Law 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6110 Seattle, WA 98104 	Mr. Laurence Finegold Attorney at Law 1809 7 th Avenue, Suite 1301 Seattle, WA 98101 Mr. Francis S. Floyd Floyd & Pflueger 2505 Third Avenue, Suite 300 Seattle, WA 98121-1445 Mr. Harry B. Platis Platis Law Firm 4303 - 198 th Street S.W. Lynnwood, WA 98036-6725
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32	Dated this 2nd day of August, at Seatt	CATHERINE GALFANO LUVERA, BARNETT BRINDLEY, BENINGER & CUNNINGHAM
	FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION OF LLOYD TIEKEN - 4 U:\CATHY\Olympic\depositions\tieken-2.dep	ATTORNEYS AT LAW 6700 BANK OF AMERICA TOWER CENTER • 701 FIFTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104 (206) 467-6090

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U.S. Departmer f Justice

United States Attorney Western District of Washington

 601 Union Street, Suite 5100
 Tel: (206) 553-7970

 Seattle, Washington 98101-3903
 Fax: (206) 553-0755

April 20, 2000

Please reply to: Helen J. Brunner Assistant United States Attorney Direct Line: (206) 553-5172

Hand Delivered


Mr. Richard C. Tallman Tallman and Severin LLP 1011 Western Avenue, Suite 803 Seattle, Washington 98104-1040

Re: Compulsion Order for Lloyd Tieken

Dear Mr. Tallman:

On April 19, 2000, United States District Judge Robert S. Lasnik signed an order pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 6002, compelling your client to provide testimony and other information in connection with an investigation of the Olympic Pipe Line Company. As a result, any statements or testimony given consistent with the order, and any information directly or indirectly obtained as a result of such statements or testimony, cannot be used against Mr. Tieken in either State or Federal Proceeding. The exception, of course, is a prosecution for perjury, giving false statements or contempt if Mr. Tieken if he provides something other than truthful statements and testimony.

Consistent with this order, it expected that Mr. Tieken participate in an interview immediately prior to his grand jury appearance. It is the government's understanding that Mr. Tieken is willing to go forward with this meeting solely because of the Compulsion Order entered by Judge Lasnik and the protections that this Order provides. Because any such statements will be made as a direct result of the Court's order, and therefore are compelled, like more formal testimony, such statements are





Richard C. Tallman April 20, 2000 Page Two

subject to same protections against use in any subsequent proceeding and will be treated by the United States in that manner.

Sincerely,

KATRINA C. PFLAUMER United States Attorney

Thel u

HELEN J. BRUNNER Assistant United States Attorney



United States Attorney Western District of Washington

601 Union Street, Suite 5100 Seattle, Washington 98101 Tel: (206) 553-7970 Fax: (206) 553-0755

August 29, 2000

By Facsimile and Mail

Assistant United States Attorney Direct Line: (206) 553-4127

Mr. Michael Martin Siderius Lonergan & Martin 500 Union Street, Suite 847 Seattle, WA 98101

Re: Your client: Lloyd H. Tieken, Jr.

Dear Mr. Martin:

I understand that the your client, Lloyd H. Tieken, Jr., has been subpoenaed to give a deposition in a civil case arising from the Olympic pipeline rupture on June 10, 1999.

The United States Attorney's Office agrees that any statements made by your client during that deposition concerning the subject of the civil lawsuit will not be used against him, either directly or indirectly, in any criminal case brought by the United States Attorney's Office, with the exception of knowing false statements or perjury which may be used for any purpose.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

KATRINA C. PFLAUMER United States Attorney

LAWRENCE LINCOLN Assistant United States Attorney

Tiellen
EXHIBIT NO. 220
K. McCoy



Please reply to: Lawrence Lincoln 6-10-99 +/- 14:50 Created historic records for olympia station pump units 1 and 2. Procedure: On Vax workstation 2 I vertically tiled tw o decterm displays (OLYO1top,OLYO2bottom). In the top window(Olsecon dary) I entered VDBCS and displayed a "Listing" of the historic reco rd for motor vibration at olympia station (OLJHU2MVIB)to use as a te mplate for data input.

In the lower window(primary02) I entered VDBCS and created the "hist oric" record skeleton. To complete the record I then copied the appr opriate data from the window above and saved the record to the "real time" system.

(repeated the procedure for the second record) records created were OLJU1PVIB & OLJU2PVIB.

Checked the historic record listing on SCADA to ensure the records w ere resident and they were. Checked the primary machines for error listings,...all OK.

Using the upper window (secondary02)I accessed the two associated re cords in the analog record section of VDBCS entered the appropriate data (yes to historical collection, associated record OLJHU*PVIB).


Checked the primary machine for error listings,...all OK. Checked the secondary machine for error listings,...all OK. Checked SCADA for the ability to trend the new points, was unable to display a trend, I then realized a problem existed with the records

Checked the primary machine for error listings, errors showing now.

Back to VDBCS numerous times (3 or 4) scrutinizing the two newly cre ated historical records and the two analog records. All data and da ta fields looked good. It was somewhere in this time frame referenc e that both mainframe systems bogged down and became unresponsive.

Speedy access to the primary machine via "console logger" to perform an orderly shutdown was not an option as the device was not respond ing. I then opted to Halt the primary OLYO2 (immediatly starting th e reboot) and forced a over to OLYO1. The failover to OLYO1 only app eared to be partially successful with OLYO1 performing sluggish and unresponsive.

I then brought OLY02 up as quickly as I could. As soon as an ONLINE status was displayed by OLY02 I halted OLY01 and OLY02 successfully started SCADA in the primary role.



7-10-99 1639 FE SD INTIAL NOTFIATION 16:33 MMP 16 & 7 Block walves CloseD 1135 TRICK KIEW CATED IN Huge GADOVE Pelerse PERSONE Del PER IOUR & WORD 16:40 Doug, BEAU MED Hall FINE DEPT ALLED, & MIFD 654 JEFF BEDRY D SIM TRAPHERED A/WV FOR BOOMDI 16:50 DAVID JUSTICE GAILED IN 16:57 JINI (ALGO . MOTIFSED 1703 DAVD J. NOTAVED TO CLOSE BLOCK 27.7 KAREN G. Noticses @ Home 17:05 1150 Kick lieve REPORTS to fime E: WATER METTREST. The 1695 Tine Reported and Creek 1710 CANEN GREAT CALLO IT THO SAM TENAN CALLO IN ANTED 1712 Jim Inaley ATRIS 1712 SAM GALLANT NTO, HEADING TO TENTEN MAG 194 GREENTRE NOD MIS AI white Calco M 1715 Dat Gregor Called not 1714 Rick Lieve Starding By @ Viding & Evening State 1716 Seff & Dege TRATCER HEADED North 1716 DEANNA RYDER TRUCK 1719 KWIN WITTMER [MILE FROM SITE REL DAVES Sim Clow CRISIS MANT HOUSED N. 713-937-3541 NSO. 1727 SAM PERTON CALLOD INS NTPD Tieken EXHIBIT NO. 222 K. McCoy

172 Holly W. CAVED in (WAVAIL 1728 MARK K. CALLED IN 1729 DATEN R. CALLON 173 A PEDDY @ Block VALUE MP 27.7 1734 Black Vave @ 27.7 Closed - Porcy Dalasa 1752 Whatrom Co. Esperancy mang 1750 Kadel R. called M. 1803 Jeff B 1/0 7959ed out m/p16 BV 1808 Som Reneas Logges m 1934 Ron Greenidge at Bellingham Maxima with PR 6-11-98