



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

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Group Chair's Factual Report

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

WPR21FA286

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A. ACCIDENT

Location: Truckee, CA
Date: July 26, 2021
Time: 1318 Pacific daylight time (PDT)¹
2018 coordinated universal time (UTC)
Airplane: Bombardier Inc., CL-600-2B16, N605TR

B. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL GROUP

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C. SUMMARY

On July 26, 2021, about 1318 Pacific daylight time, a Bombardier Inc., CL-600-2B16 airplane, N605TR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Truckee-Tahoe Airport (TRK), Truckee, California. The pilot, co-pilot and 4 passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)* Part 91 personal flight.

D. DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION

On Monday, August 2, 2021, that air traffic control (ATC) group convened at TRK airport traffic control tower (ATCT) and interviewed the local controller (LC) and ground controller (GC). Following the interviews, the group conducted a tour of the control tower. The onsite portion of the investigation was completed, and the group departed the facility.

E. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.0 History of Flight

ATC services were provided by TRK ATCT. The factual data included in this history of flight summary were derived from ATC audio recordings, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aircraft Accident Package, and FAA automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) data.

About 1314, the pilot of N605TR contacted the TRK local controller (LC) stating they were on the RNAV (Area Navigation)² runway 20 approach and advised they

¹ All times are Pacific daylight time (PDT) unless otherwise noted.

² RNAV is a method of navigation that permits aircraft operation on any desired flight path within the coverage of ground or space-based navigation aids or within the limits of the capability of self-

would need to circle to land runway 11. The LC instructed the pilot to report the airport in sight and breaking off the approach [for the circle to runway 11]. Figure 1 is the TRK airport diagram which depicts the location of runway 20 and runway 11. Figure 2 is the RNAV runway 20 approach chart illustrating the approach procedure.





Figure 1. TRK Airport Diagram depicts the location of the runways and taxiways.

contained aids, or a combination of these.



The LC informed the pilot that they could enter the left downwind for runway 11 or cross over the top of the TRK airport for a left downwind runway 29. N605TR acknowledged the transmission.

About 1316, the pilot of N605TR advised the LC that they were making a right turn and reported runway 11 in sight. The LC cleared N605TR to land on runway 11, issued the current wind information³, and informed the pilot that they were not in sight from the tower.

³ Weather information is located in the Meteorology Factual Report.

[The LC stated, during the interview⁴, that she visually acquired N605TR when the airplane appeared to be on a tight downwind (runway 11), abeam taxiway foxtrot.] Figure 3 is a Google Earth screenshot of the ADS-B flightpath of N605TR. The screenshot depicts the location of taxiway F and the ATC tower relative to N605TR's flight track.

About 1318, both the LC and ground controller (GC) reported they observed N605TR drop below the tree line and then observed an explosion. Subsequently the TRK tower personnel initiated the emergency response notification procedures.




Figure 3. Google Earth screenshot illustrating the final portion of N605TR.

2.0 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)

ADS-B data⁵ on N605TR was provided by the FAA Accident Investigations Office, AVP-100.

⁴ Interview transcripts are located in Attachment 1- Interview Transcripts.

⁵ ADS-B data is located in Attachment 2 - ADS-B Data.

3.0 Weather Information⁶

The official weather observation current at the time of the accident was documented using standard aviation routine weather reports (METAR). The following METAR was recorded at 1245:

KTRK weather observation at 1245 PDT (1945Z), automated, wind from 090° at 5 knots, visibility 4 miles, ceiling broken at 2,300 ft agl, temperature 32° Celsius (C), dew point temperature 6° C, altimeter 30.14 inches of mercury (in Hg), with smoke. Remarks: visibility 3 ½ variable 5 miles in smoke, ceiling broken at 2,300 ft.

The airport had an automated weather observation system (AWOS)⁷ installed, which issued observations every 20-minutes in the fully automated mode, and hourly with specials, as needed, when in manual mode. The AWOS was operated in manual mode between 0700 to 2130 and was augmented by a surface-based observer. The TRK tower controllers were not limited aviation weather reporting station certified and did not augment the observations.⁸

4.0 Truckee Airport Information

4.1 Airspace

Truckee Tahoe Airport was designated as Class D airspace during air traffic control tower operational hours. That Class D airspace extended upward from the surface to and including 8,400 feet mean sea level (msl) within a 4.2-mile radius of the Truckee-Tahoe Airport.

4.2 Airport Traffic Control Tower

TRK ATCT is a non-federal control tower (NFCT). A NFCT does not fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government. These private entities have contracts with state and local governments to provide ATC services⁹ at that airport. A NFCT is not associated with the federal contract tower program or funded by the FAA.

The TRK ATCT was staffed with 2 controllers at the time of the accident: the local controller and the ground controller; both controllers were qualified as supervisors. The ATM was in the tower cab, but not assigned a position.

⁶ For detailed weather information for this accident, see Meteorology Group Chairman's Factual Report in the Docket.

⁷ The AWOS provides weather through a VHF broadcast locally for pilots to obtain the latest weather conditions, which is updated every 1-minute.

⁸ Augmentation requirements are contained in FAA JO 7900.5E, "Surface Weather Observing," paragraph (2.5)(a)(1).

⁹ Advisory Circular 90-93B recommends publications, administrative, and operational procedures that assist in the management of a NFCT.

F. LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1- Interview Transcripts

Attachment 2 - ADS-B Data

Attachment 3 - Aircraft Accident Package

Attachment 4 - TRK ATC Audio Recording

Submitted by:

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