



SURVIVAL FACTORS ATTACHMENT

First Responder Interview Transcripts

Philadelphia, PA

HWY23FH014

(59 pages)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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FATAL VEHICLE FIRE & COLLAPSE OF
INTERSTATE 95 NEAR PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA ON JUNE 11, 2023

Accident No.: HWY23FH014

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Interview of: DOMINIC MIRELES
Office of Emergency Management

Via telephone

Thursday,
July 6, 2023

APPEARANCES:

RONALD KAMINSKI, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

I N D E X

ITEM

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Interview of Dominic Mireles:

By Mr. Kaminski

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MR. MIRELES: Hello, this is Dominic.

MR. KAMINSKI: Yes, hello, Mr. Mireles, my name is Ronald Kaminski with the National Transportation Safety Board. How're you doing today?

MR. MIRELES: Hey, I'm well, thanks. How about yourself?

MR. KAMINSKI: Do you have a couple minutes to talk with me?

MR. MIRELES: I do, yeah.

MR. KAMINSKI: I'll try to keep it as brief as possible. I know you're pretty busy.

MR. MIRELES: No worries.

MR. KAMINSKI: First of all, I just want to get your okay if I could record this so I don't have to interrupt you and we can just talk freely.

MR. MIRELES: Yeah, that's no problem. It's just for note taking purposes?

MR. KAMINSKI: Great, thank you, and this will -- I'll have this transcribed and it'll be in our docket as well. But basically, I'm just calling to get an overview. It looks like you guys just did an amazing job.

MR. MIRELES: Thank you.

MR. KAMINSKI: I'm from Chicago, another big city, and I would hope that Chicago would do what you guys did. I was very impressed with, you know, how you guys handled everything and from what I could see, you did a really nice job.

1 MR. MIRELES: Thank you, I appreciate that.

2 INTERVIEW OF D. MIRELES

3 BY MR. KAMINSKI:

4 Q. But if you could just give me a description, kind of starting
5 from the point you were notified and how you got things in motion?

6 A. Sure, if you don't mind, just give me a second to pull up one
7 of our internal notes.

8 Q. Sure.

9 A. So, I'll just give you some background really quickly. So,
10 the city's Office of Emergency Management, we're a city county in
11 Philadelphia, so we are the emergency management agency that, you
12 know, has reached back to our state emergency management agency
13 and we are separate from the Police Department and Fire
14 Department. We're a function within the city managing director's
15 office and, you know, we really serve to integrate services, and
16 plans, and resources for any, you know, complex or severe
17 emergencies, disasters, or even planned events.

18 And so, it's a function, you know, both what we plan for but
19 then we also sit on an operations role with some regularity and
20 really, I think we're -- I appreciate the kudos, but I think we're
21 pleasantly unique, or at least pleasantly situated in that there's
22 really great working relationships. Not just across city
23 departments, but, you know, our state and federal partners here as
24 well. So, you know, there's a lot of, like, the same crew gets to
25 work together and whether it's around the planning meeting,

1 whether it's around planned special events -- you know, a major
2 event in the city, or whether it's around an emergency. So, we
3 have a 24-seven watch desk that's staffed by two to three people
4 at any given time.

5 Their mission -- it's called the regional integration center
6 and their mission is to kind of be the eyes and ears for emergency
7 management needs for the city. They have prescribed thresholds
8 based on what they're monitoring and they're monitoring local
9 media, national media, monitoring the public-safety radio. Their
10 phone number and email address is shared with a few hundred
11 operational partners across, again, the city and the region and,
12 you know, otherwise, taking it all in whether it's weather,
13 whether it's policy and fire responses, or other operational
14 reports.

15 So, that morning, our team was aware, really from the time
16 that the Fire Department was dispatched to this incident and began
17 monitoring and, you know, it's two big things that really, kind
18 of, escalated this incident for our office. Very typically, a
19 vehicle fire on 95 or adjacent wouldn't have escalated, but one of
20 the immediate things was the declaration of a hazardous materials
21 situation due to it involving a tanker. That declaration being
22 made by the Fire Department over radio.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. And then secondly, we have access to kind of the fire grounds
25 (indiscernible) channels and hearing reports of a collapse of the

1 -- you know, the major interstate were two really big escalatory
2 pieces for us.

3 Q. Sure.

4 A. And so, one of the things you'll see is kind of that initial
5 notification that went out. Off the top of my head, I think --
6 actually, I can pull that up. Hold on, I just want to see how
7 many partners were on that. So, we work closely with, obviously,
8 you know, police and fire dispatch, but are a separate function.
9 So, sometimes there's a little bit of -- and I don't know if it's
10 good or bad, but sometimes a little bit of overlap between what we
11 might be sending and some other reports that come out of those
12 entities. But a lot of times, we'll be on the phone and just
13 cross referencing what we're hearing or, you know, request for
14 resources, relaying them between operations centers that way. And
15 so, that first notification I'm pulling up now.

16 Q. Is that at 6:40? Does that sound right?

17 A. That does sound right. Yeah, and so at 6:40, that first
18 notification would've just been an internal. Again, it wasn't
19 entirely clear -- well, at that point, the collapse hadn't
20 happened, it looks like. It looks like some of the concrete just
21 had kind of started to fail.

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. And so, it was just an internal notification to get staff at
24 the ready and, you know, have people monitor and stand by. But
25 also, that early in the morning, you know, it's limited who's on

1 email.

2 Q. Sure.

3 A. So, then they pushed out an update number one about 15
4 minutes later with the report of the collapse and it looks like
5 that stayed as an internal notification until --

6 Q. About -- it looks like 12 minutes later?

7 A. Correct, yeah, so the cadence continued, I'm just looking at
8 when we started to integrate partners on that.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. But in any case, you know, during that time, there's also
11 kind of subsequent phone notifications. So, I got a call -- our
12 watch center called our kind of on-call administrator, who then
13 called me and relayed what we had. We quickly devised -- just
14 based on what we heard, particularly hazmat and collapse, we
15 quickly devised that I would go to the scene, along with one of
16 our on-call team members, just to kind of start getting eyes and
17 ears and that she would report to our emergency operations center
18 to kind of start -- we weren't sure if we were going to activate
19 at that point, but just to kind of start bringing some additional
20 resources to our watch desk. We also had scheduled for the day a
21 deployment of the city's mobile command post to a special event
22 elsewhere in the city, so we had some team members and, you know,
23 our main kind of field apparatus moving to prepare for that. So,
24 let me see if I can pull up the notes on what time we were out
25 there.

1 Q. So, you enacted your emergency operations plan? Is that the
2 plan you would've --

3 A. Yeah, I mean, I think that's a good way to put it. So, you
4 know, we have a base emergency operations plan if you're familiar
5 with the different ways they're organized and, you know, what that
6 means is --

7 Q. Yeah, I looked at it online, yes.

8 A. Yeah, and what that means is, you know, it's kind of just the
9 really major elements of how we monitor, and how we escalate, and
10 how we organize. Obviously, you know, anything hazardous
11 materials related or anything transportation related isn't in that
12 base EOP, it's in a supporting annex that we don't necessarily
13 have made publicly available. But to your point, you know, we
14 went through the initial elements of any major emergency, which is
15 kind of going and verifying, you know, making some broad
16 notification to operational partners, and also to city leadership.
17 Then otherwise, starting to manage -- you know, manage the
18 consequences and get ahead of the consequences from there.

19 Q. Right, so would I be able to get a copy of that plan? Is it
20 -- since it's a little bit different than the basic operations
21 plan that's online?

22 A. So, I actually wouldn't say that we have a city-wide
23 transportation incident plan, you know, that would be in a state
24 to share. I do know that, for instance, the Fire Department and
25 -- well, I know for the Fire Department, you know, they have

1 operational procedures that are specific to their element. But
2 one of the things that, you know, we identified is having a
3 written transportation emergency plan isn't something that we
4 currently have in our portfolio.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Especially one that contemplates -- as you know, this was a
7 state roadway with city impacts, so especially one that
8 contemplates the state roadway being the primary. You know, I
9 think -- I'm not sure if your questions will get to this point,
10 but I think some of the roles and responsibilities is something
11 for us to kind of look into further, hot wash, and to figure out
12 okay, it was a state roadway, but what is the role of the state
13 going to be? Not necessarily state PennDOT, but state emergency
14 management or others versus what our role is going to be here
15 locally because, you know, we seek planning and guidance out of
16 our state as it relates to snow squalls and kind of mass casualty
17 incidences that way.

18 Q. Right.

19 A. Particularly if it kind of hit the western part of the state
20 and we would never kind of write an alternate plan, you know, we
21 would just have supporting elements to what the state's plan was
22 in that case. So -- and I will say, early on in the incident, we
23 recognized -- I mean immediately in the incident, we recognized it
24 was a state roadway and, you know, there may be some state
25 priority and state plans that supersede anything that we want to

1 do. And so, one of the things we did pretty quickly out of our,
2 you know, Philadelphia Regional Integration Center was make
3 connection with the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and
4 say hey, look, you know, we're here for any coordination calls or
5 any elements that you want to stand up and send our way.

6 Q. Sure, so you mentioned that --

7 A. So, a long way to say that -- yeah, a long way to say that we
8 don't have transportation annex that I, you know, would be able to
9 share.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. It just, unfortunately, doesn't exist to that extent.

12 Q. Okay, so -- but the other plans -- I mean, just looking at
13 the annex of -- that was online, I mean, you have a damage
14 assessment plan, a debris management plan. Eventually, were those
15 -- as the time went on, were those brought in at all?

16 A. Yeah, so, you know, we were kind of on standby for the
17 hazardous materials plan -- especially if there were community
18 impacts, or, you know, a significant amount of individuals that
19 were impacted, we were on standby -- although, it was pretty clear
20 really early, you know, should this be a mass casualty event --
21 you we have a mass casualty plan as well that integrates our
22 healthcare partners.

23 Q. Sure.

24 A. But those didn't seem like they were needed necessarily, at
25 least to the full scale. You know, there was a little bit of a

1 hazardous material situation and the runoff into the storm system
2 and the impacts and the Coast Guard, and DDP, (ph.) and Water
3 Department were looking into. But then the other elements that --
4 you know, we did do virtual damage assessment, but in this case
5 with the infrastructure and the damage really being limited to the
6 bridge itself, it wasn't a physical damage. It was more the
7 business and economic damage, if you will, that we had kind of
8 turned our focus to. So, you know, the damage assessment plan
9 mostly contemplates a hurricane comes through and knocks down or
10 impacts homes and also impacts businesses, et cetera. So, it's
11 our way to kind of capture that and relay that up to the state.

12 Q. I understand.

13 A. And in this case, it was more so economic injury.

14 Q. Yeah.

15 A. Which we did capture and did relay to PEMA with our, again,
16 City Commerce Department to ultimately -- I think just the other
17 day we got an SBA declaration for some low-interest loans for
18 folks. So, like I said, yes, elements for that plan, we didn't do
19 anything with debris management. The state completely managed
20 that piece of it. So, all in all, I think our role was pretty
21 limited to supporting the local detour plan the Philadelphia
22 Police devised.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. And then just making sure that, you know, the information was
25 shared as best as possible both, you know, in the initial

1 response, but then in the ensuing kind of recovery and rebuild.
2 There were a lot of moving parts and, obviously, PennDOT did a
3 fantastic job of really the recovery and rebuild. But as that
4 reverberated into kind of our local networks, our businesses, et
5 cetera, where city services kind of crossed over with that, that's
6 where we focused a lot of our time.

7 Q. Sure, now you mentioned earlier a hot wash, did you get --
8 was there any kind of after-action review that was done, do you
9 know?

10 A. Not at an inter-agency level that I'm aware of.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I think there's some interest there. But, you know, again,
13 kind of going back to is it a state response, is it a local
14 response, you know, are we basing it based off of the
15 infrastructure or based off of where the impacts were, et cetera,
16 we haven't committed to doing a formal, inter-agency after action.
17 We just, internally, hot wash every event that we do.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And that's -- I mean, that stuff is really specific, you
20 know, to our posture.

21 Q. Right, okay, I really didn't have any other questions, I just
22 wanted to again, get your statement. Like I said, it sounds like
23 you guys did an awesome job. Well, before I could -- when I was
24 there, I was only there for -- we were there for, like, four days.

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. But had great cooperation with the State Police to the Philly
2 Policy, the Fire Department. (Verbatim) It was a nice
3 experience, you know, for as crazy as it was going on there for
4 those couple days after, I thought you guys did a great job
5 handling it.

6 A. Thank you for that and yeah, it was good to be a part of, you
7 know, unfortunately, with the loss of life and the other impacts.
8 But I think, you know, all the points you made as far as how well
9 things did go and how cooperative everybody was, it was good to
10 see and I'll say too --

11 Q. Just working together -- everybody just working together and,
12 you know, I didn't hear of anybody -- any kind of squabbling going
13 on or anything like that, you know, worrying about territories or
14 whatever.

15 A. Right.

16 Q. It's just like everybody just worked together. It was nice
17 to see.

18 A. Yeah, absolutely, and I think we're very fortunate that we're
19 resourced pretty rich in this area.

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. You know, I think Philly Police being able to pivot 30 cops
22 on a shift to a detour is not insignificant.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. But yeah, no, I mean, it's -- I appreciate the comments and,
25 too, I'd be open if you have any -- do have any feedback either

1 something about our office, or specific about your experience, or
2 just observations that you have. I will say kind of early in that
3 first day, I think your team had made some outreach and just kind
4 of -- I don't know if it was factfinding or had already made a
5 determination to deploy, but it kind of checked off in my head,
6 like, hey, it's been a while since we've had an event that rose to
7 this level and had an outside team like the NTSB coming in. Just
8 if, you know, there were any considerations of how you could've
9 been supported or integrated better. But I think we ended up
10 exchanging business cards at least on that second day.

11 Q. Right.

12 A. So, you know, it went pretty well in my head.

13 Q. Yeah, so, okay, I may have to -- this is a good number for
14 you in case I come back with some other questions after -- when I
15 talk to the team?

16 A. Yeah, absolutely, that's no problem.

17 MR. KAMINSKI: Okay, well, I'll let you go. Again, I
18 appreciate taking the time to talk with me, sir.

19 MR. MIRELES: Absolutely, and good luck with the rest of your
20 work on this one.

21 MR. KAMINSKI: Thank you, sir, I appreciate it.

22 MR. MIRELES: All right, take care.

23 MR. KAMINSKI: You too, sir.

24 MR. MIRELES: Bye.

25 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: FATAL VEHICLE FIRE & COLLAPSE
OF INTERSTATE 95 NEAR PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA ON JUNE 11, 2023
Interview of Dominic Mireles

ACCIDENT NO.: HWY23FH014

PLACE: Via telephone

DATE: July 6, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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FATAL VEHICLE FIRE & COLLAPSE OF
INTERSTATE 95 NEAR PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA ON JUNE 11, 2023

* Accident No.: HWY23FH014

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Interview of: JONATHAN SUNDERLIN, Lieutenant
Pennsylvania State Police

Via telephone

APPEARANCES:

RONALD KAMINSKI, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

I N D E X

ITEM

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Interview of Jonathan Sunderlin:

By Mr. Kaminski

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I N T E R V I E W

1
2 MR. KAMINSKI: The date is June 21st, Ron Kaminski with the
3 NTSB. I'm going to be talking to -- you know what, give me your
4 name and rank and spell your name please?

5 LT SUNDERLIN: Sure. My rank is lieutenant. My name is
6 Jonathan Sunderlin; first name is J-o-n-a-t-h-a-n, the last name
7 is spelled S-u-n-d-e-r-l-i-n.

8 MR. KAMINSKI: And, why don't you just give me, if you could,
9 you don't mind if I record this?

10 LT SUNDERLIN: No, that's fine.

INTERVIEW OF JONATHAN SUNDERLIN

11
12 BY MR. KAMINSKI:

13 Q. Okay, great. Thank you. And why don't you just give me an
14 overview from the time you got the call and you got out there,
15 what you saw, what you all did and how things went?

16 A. Okay, sure. So, the date of the incident I was assigned as
17 it's called the officer of the day, where one of the commissioned
18 officers from within our troop is assigned to handle multiple
19 different stations, not just the individual station. So, my
20 primary assignment is as the station commander of our troop K
21 media barracks, which is in Delaware County. So, I got a call I'd
22 say probably around 6:30 in the morning, from the shift supervisor
23 that was working at our troop K Philadelphia station to let me
24 know that he was currently out on I-95 with what appeared to be a
25 crash and a loud explosion on the underpass region of the

1 Continent Avenue exit from I-95 north. So, the corporal that was
2 on; Corporal Anthony Lewis (phonetic), who was the shift
3 supervisor, he told me that he was arranging to get units to shut
4 down the highway both north and southbound to prevent anyone from
5 going onto the overpass. At that point, it had not collapsed on
6 the northbound side yet, and then shortly after that, he notified
7 me that it had collapsed.

8 So, I drove to our Philadelphia troop headquarters and did
9 not initially go to the scene because we were still -- I went to
10 our headquarters basically to try and coordinate a unified
11 response from our different state police stations to try and get
12 manpower to cover the different highway exit ramps and to try and
13 figure out how we were going to get some of the backlog bled off
14 of the highway, and then try and work with our PennDOT to see if
15 we could get reinforcements out there. And so, I did more of an
16 investigative portion from our headquarters trying to get in touch
17 with tanker company that we were trying to figure who it was and
18 eventually somebody called from the tanker company saying that
19 they were missing a vehicle and missing a driver and that they had
20 seen on the news about the accident on 95.

21 The rest of my role was organizing our crash reconstruction
22 team, our criminal investigation unit, and our forensics unit to
23 get them out, since it was -- we assumed at that point, it was
24 unconfirmed, but it would have been a fatal incident involving the
25 driver of the truck. After that, I got down to the scene probably

1 around 2 p.m. At that point, we had a temporary command post set
2 up about a block away from the collapse. There was still some
3 smoke in the air and the whole northbound portion of 95 was
4 collapsed down on top of the tanker truck and the southbound side
5 was pretty heavily charred and the engineers were saying that it
6 was -- they had to do an analysis on it, but they deemed it was
7 probably going to be structurally unsafe to reopen. So, from
8 there it was just working with the different agencies and trying
9 to coordinate and find out how much work we had ahead of us at
10 that point, so.

11 Q. Sure. Yeah.

12 A. But I had been in touch earlier in the morning when I working
13 out of our troop headquarters with a couple different agents from
14 the NTSB trying to provide them with updates and I guess at that
15 point the decision had not been finalized whether or not anybody
16 would be coming from your agency.

17 Q. Right, yeah, it seems to take management a while to decide on
18 those things.

19 A. Yeah, yeah, and then once I got down to the scene I did get a
20 call from someone and they said that they were going to be sending
21 a couple investigators up.

22 Q. Right, right. Yeah, you guys were very cooperative out at
23 the scene and we pretty much all left Thursday and Friday was the
24 latest I think. Now, when you closed down -- did you close down
25 the north and -- well, it was northbound, but did you close down

1 the southbound at the same time, do you know?

2 A. So, northbound got closed first before it collapsed and
3 troopers were still trying to get in place and get around the area
4 so that they could come and close down southbound. I don't know
5 whether or not Philadelphia Police Department was able to get
6 anybody out there before we did to help assist with the southbound
7 side, but by the time I got to our troop headquarters the entire
8 highway had been shut down.

9 Q. So that was the Pennsylvania DOT that would have been kind of
10 responsible for setting the closures as well; putting up the
11 signage and all of that?

12 A. Yeah, so they handle all of the signage stuff and I put a
13 request through their District 6 headquarters to basically try and
14 expedite getting as many arrow boards out there (indiscernible)
15 trucks, whatever they could to help out because in that area of
16 northeast Philadelphia there's numerous on and off ramps on I-95
17 and the Philadelphia Police Department was doing the same thing,
18 trying to scramble. They were trying to help close some of the
19 ramps, but then they were trying to relieve some of their corps
20 that were assigned to a district and get traffic units in there
21 until PennDOT could get fully mobilized, because being a Sunday
22 they were short staffed, as well, to get fully mobilized and get
23 the assets that they needed on scene.

24 Q. Right, now is that -- do they have their own dispatch? Who
25 would PennDOT, I imagine like they grouped, or anybody?

1 A. Yep, so they have a -- they divide it up into different
2 districts, so the district that covers the Philadelphia County,
3 Montgomery County, Delaware County area, is District 6 and it's
4 located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

5 Q. Okay, I can -- I'll look that up, yeah.

6 A. Yeah, so they -- we basically -- anytime that we need PennDOT
7 assistance, we call the District 6 headquarters.

8 Q. Okay, and was there anybody on scene that was with the state,
9 which is state police, you think that would be -- have another
10 good statement for me?

11 A. Sure. I know that the Emergency Operations Department from
12 the city of Philadelphia had people there. I can't remember the
13 names of the people off the top of my head that I was speaking
14 with down there, but they took a pretty big role in trying to --
15 we did a couple Microsoft Teams meetings that morning, trying to
16 get all the shareholders and stakeholders onboard so that we were
17 all aware of who all was doing what.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But that would have been -- I wish I could give you a phone
20 number, but the Emergency Operations Center in Philadelphia really
21 really helped coordinate it.

22 Q. Yeah, I was lucky enough to meet somebody there. I don't
23 have their business card with me, but yeah, they put me on their
24 mailing, so I was getting updates I think twice a day.

25 A. Okay, yeah.

1 Q. The operations and what was going on down there. So, yeah,
2 we're -- I know they were very helpful, so.

3 A. Yeah, they did a great job trying to get all the different
4 agencies kind of on the same page.

5 Q. Right. So, you were running things from the barracks then
6 basically and being able to make calls and direct. The
7 communications, everything was good out there?

8 A. Yeah, the communications is great so, that shift supervisor
9 that had originally called me I had him -- once we were able to
10 get all the highway off ramps and on ramps taken care of and
11 manned and posted, so we didn't get any more traffic trying to get
12 on I-95, I had him go to the popup command post that they had down
13 at the scene to be able to relay any of the information through me
14 with the other agencies while I was still trying to be able to use
15 the computer and the phone and have all that at the access that we
16 have at our troop headquarters. And like I said, I didn't get
17 down to the scene until probably about 2 p.m. and that was
18 slightly before the governor made it there, and our state police
19 commissioner.

20 Q. Sure, okay. Okay, well, you've given a good description of
21 everything that went on. I appreciate it and now, I'll get ahold
22 of District 6, get their dispatch information and I think I -- I'm
23 not sure I've gotten yours yet. I don't know if there was going
24 to be uploaded on that secure website or --

25 A. So, that goes through -- I don't know if you've talked to him

1 yet, Steven Scutter (phonetic). He's a civilian employee that we
2 have. So, he does the point of contact for getting any of our
3 phone calls or dispatch records --

4 Q. Yes, I have gotten the phone calls. I was having trouble
5 yesterday downloading some of the other materials he sent, but
6 I'll get back with him on that. I appreciate your time and your
7 service, sir.

8 A. Sure thing. Thank you, sir. If you need anything else
9 please let me know.

10 Q. I appreciate it lieutenant.

11 A. All right.

12 Q. Buh bye, sir.

13 A. All right, thanks, bye bye.

14 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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Investigation of:

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FATAL VEHICLE FIRE & COLLAPSE OF
INTERSTATE 95 NEAR PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA ON JUNE 11, 2023

* Accident No.: HWY23FH014

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Interview of: THEODORE QUEDENFELD, Battalion Chief
Philadelphia Fire Department

Via telephone

APPEARANCES:

RONALD KAMINSKI, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

I N D E X

ITEM

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Interview of Theodore Quedenfeld:

By Mr. Kaminski

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MR. KAMINSKI: Ronald Kaminski, Safety Board.

MR. QUEDENFELD: Yeah, how you doing? This is Ted Quedenfeld
Fire Department.

MR. KAMINSKI: Yes, sir. Hey, thanks for calling me back. I
know --

MR. QUEDENFELD: No problem.

MR. KAMINSKI: You worked last night, so I, you know --

MR. QUEDENFELD: I did, and you just caught me on the water
now. I'm just getting ready to start fishing.

MR. KAMINSKI: Oh, beautiful. So, yeah, Lieutenant McMichael
gave me your contact information. I'm just looking to gather
information and get a statement from you as a first kind of
arriving unit and you're the battalion chief, so, I'm just looking
to get kind of an overview of, you got the call, you got out
there, what you saw, what you did, and what happened, and --

MR. QUEDENFELD: Sure. Do you want to take notes or are you
going to record this?

MR. KAMINSKI: I am going to record. I was going to ask your
permission.

MR. QUEDENFELD: Yeah, that's fine. It's safe time.

INTERVIEW OF THEODORE QUEDENFELD

BY MR. KAMINSKI:

Q. Okay, let's get your spelling of your last name?

A. Yeah, it's Quedenfeld, Q-u-e-d-e-n-f-e-l-d.

1 Q. Okay, and your first name is Ted?

2 A. It's Ted. It's Theodore officially, but it's, yeah, Ted's
3 fine.

4 Q. Okay, sir. Okay. Why don't you start?

5 A. You know we had dispatched, I don't even know the exact time,
6 but shortly after 6, right around 6:15, for an accident response,
7 which is for us is an accident within traffic. As we pulled out
8 of the station I'm stationed at (indiscernible) miles from it. We
9 viewed a column of smoke in the sky from there. As we got closer
10 to first arriving engine; engine 38, they came up the, I guess the
11 onramp on the 95 and they knew something was burning, but they
12 couldn't make it out exactly what it was, 'cause it was down
13 underneath the overpass and just creating a ton of smoke.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. As we got closer, you know, I requested that the box get
16 filled out, which basically for us is a full first alarm
17 assignment, you know, four engines, two ladders, two chiefs and a
18 medic unit.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. As we got down, I could tell that it was some type of truck
21 burning. We couldn't tell right away whether it was a tanker or a
22 tractor trailer.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. The overpass was almost acting like a ceiling does in a
25 dwelling fire, you know, we had to kind of get underneath it to

1 see in the back what was burning, and all I could do was see there
2 was something long and when the wind would shift you could see the
3 outline of like tires or rims, you know, so, we knew it was big.
4 I kind of guessed by the color of the smoke that we had a
5 petroleum product going. We had a lot of fire coming out of storm
6 sewers from the runoff.

7 Q. That's what I heard. There was -- they're blowing off --

8 A. Well, that didn't happen till much later actually.

9 Q. Oh, okay.

10 A. Yeah. Basically these got a first alarm. We put the service
11 when what we call heaviest water lines are deluged 'cause it is
12 actually starting to knock it down as pieces, very quickly. That
13 was in the first 15 minutes we started getting big chunks of 95
14 falling, you know, it was the concrete or the asphalt was just
15 falling and starting to fall, so, we -- I ordered nobody's going
16 underneath this regardless.

17 Q. And how long after you got there did you start seeing pieces
18 falling?

19 A. Probably within the first 10 minutes, easily.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. We -- I'm not even sure we had all of our lines set up, you
22 know, it was that fast.

23 Q. And was the 95 still open?

24 A. When we first got there 95 was still open. I'm sure you've
25 seen the videos of people driving through it. We immediately

1 requested state police to shut it down, but you know, obviously
2 there's a lag. And from one position we don't have the ability to
3 block it.

4 Q. Sure.

5 A. You know, it's not like an accident on 95 and we can just use
6 the truck to block it off.

7 Q. Right.

8 A. But we, yeah, we saw some cars going through it, you know,
9 and then I guess about maybe 20 minutes in is when the major
10 collapse occurred.

11 Q. It was that quick?

12 A. Yeah, it was fast.

13 Q. Wow.

14 A. You know, and it actually, as far as fire suppression, it
15 helped us a little bit in that it smothered the truck, basically.
16 We still had fire burning underneath the slab, but you know, not
17 to the extent that we had prior to the collapse. You know, our
18 hose lines probably, you know, we had it out for the most part in
19 a half hour to 40 minutes, maybe.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. You know, and then it was of course all the letter agencies
22 are starting to show up and you know, we were actually, from the
23 suppression side, I was starting to cut down our assignment, you
24 know, kick companies loose and set up for just leaving an engine
25 or two with just the fire marshal. That's when the explosion

1 started, you know, and it was -- and the explosions actually were
2 all on the east side of the accident; right there on the hill
3 where the onramp to 95, there's a couple of big, big, you know,
4 vaults over there. That was impressive watching manhole covers go
5 flying, you know. And --

6 Q. And you said that started a little bit later, would you say
7 20 minutes?

8 A. Oh, that was at least an hour and half, almost two hours into
9 the incident.

10 Q. Okay, wow, okay.

11 A. You know, 'cause we had shut all of our lines down, basically
12 to keep from flooding the storm sewers. We weren't 100 percent
13 sure where they went. The water department, all they could tell
14 us is that they went towards the river, but that they were PennDOT
15 sewers, so they didn't have a map of them. And we never got
16 anybody from PennDOT to be able to tell us definitively that there
17 were no branches off of them or were heading to any water
18 treatment plant.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. You know, because that became our big question of when we
21 started getting the explosions and started getting the fire, you
22 know, the major fire out of the air. So, what do we want to do,
23 do we want to flood this, you know, or do we want to just let it
24 burn. And nobody could give us a definitive answer of where those
25 lines went.

1 Q. So, how many explosions would you say there were?

2 A. Oh, dozens, dozens. You know, it seemed like you would get
3 an explosion and then it would kind of snuff itself out, but the
4 heat would, you know, cause it to reignite as soon as it got a
5 little oxygen.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. You know, so there were some major ones and then dozens and
8 dozens of minor ones.

9 Q. Okay, okay, wow.

10 A. And what they ended up doing was, as the product that was in
11 there started blowing towards the river, the explosions started
12 following that path.

13 Q. Wow.

14 A. I believe it was down Milner Street. I was on the west side
15 of the incident, so I was never able to, you know, get to that
16 east side.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. And, you know, I was just relying on my chiefs over there
19 just giving me status reports.

20 Q. Right, so did you end up, 'cause you said you started pulling
21 back some of the resources, did you tell them to come back or what
22 did you do?

23 A. No, we ended up, you know, once it was all said and done we
24 left one engine there to assist the fire marshal and it ended up
25 being a, what we call fire ground, basically we had a presence

1 there, I guess about the next 24 hours.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. 'Cause it took them that long to get the driver out and they
4 were using some of the engines to knock down the dust, just you
5 know, knock down the dust, basically keeping a line, you know for
6 safety, you know, if any product was to reignite.

7 Q. So, how many engine units or how many, would it be battalions
8 went out?

9 A. We eventually, we had on the first alarm we had four engines.
10 They were all in service. We had numerous trucks for second
11 alarm, but we did do a special call on top of the first alarm for
12 two more engines.

13 Q. What's a special call?

14 A. Yeah, it just brings more resources, but not the full weight
15 of a second alarm, which is a tremendous response.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. You know we just didn't quite need it.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. We just wanted some extra people there in case we needed
20 them.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. We had the HAZMAT unit there, you know, they bring all their
23 resources, along with the HAZMAT chief, and you know he's a lot
24 who I get my advice from when dealing with the HAZMAT stuff;
25 that's his bread and butter.

1 Q. Yeah, especially with those manhole covers popping off. It
2 was --

3 A. Exactly, you know, and it kind of became a, you know, what
4 are we going to do; are we going to flood it, we going to let it
5 go? And we just decided, you know, there's all the way to the
6 river there were no building exposures, you know, we're like just
7 let it burn. (Indiscernible) keep guys away from it. It will
8 stop what it's doing eventually.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. You know, and we felt that that was the safest, you know, we
11 weren't going to create any side hazards doing that.

12 Q. Right. Right. Okay, and so none of the firefighters, did
13 any of your guys get hurt out there?

14 A. Nah, there were no injuries and we're very fortunate, you
15 know. Right where he crashed created kind of a little bulge, you
16 know, so no product ever backed up to us, you know. I guess we
17 found out maybe an hour in, I guess, the state police informed us
18 they had heard from the guys trucking company that they kind of
19 narrowed it down, it was gasoline tanker.

20 Q. Right. Yeah.

21 A. You know, and you know, Pennsylvania, we were out there under
22 the assumption that, you know, I couldn't have told you gasoline
23 diesel, you know, we just knew it was a hydrocarbon.

24 Q. Right, and you said you could tell by the color of the smoke,
25 right?

1 A. Color of the smoke, yeah, it was dark, you know, dark black,
2 you know, very similar to the tires burning, you know, but we
3 usually deal with an auto just on an extreme scale.

4 Q. So, overall, how would you say you think the response and
5 everything went?

6 A. I think we did pretty good. I've talked to some other
7 chiefs, you know, they had guys call them to pick their brain
8 wanted, you know, looking back I think I could have requested some
9 of our foam units to respond.

10 Q. Some what units?

11 A. You know, we have engines that are foam units, they carry,
12 you know, the foam. It never really became necessary, but it
13 probably would have helped us just to have them there.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. You know our water lines made pretty decent progress. I
16 think so much material had burned even prior to us getting there,
17 you know, it wasn't a terrible, you know, problem. And you know,
18 so it became, -- this is just looking back and critiquing
19 yourself.

20 Q. Sure.

21 A. That's something we definitely could have done differently.
22 You know, other than that, there's not a whole lot we could do.
23 We made a decision real fast. We weren't putting anybody under
24 the bridge, just from the fist-size concrete that was falling very
25 quickly, you know, which then became automobile-size concrete, you

1 know, before it fell.

2 Q. Wow. Right. And did you guys have any kind of after action
3 meeting or anything like that?

4 A. Not formally. We started a couple informal ones with the
5 companies and next week when I go back to work we're going to
6 continue doing that. I thought like that, I've had other guys
7 call me and they say, well, by no choice it looks like you're the
8 leading expert on (indiscernible) fires.

9 Q. Lucky you.

10 A. Yeah, so I said, 30 years and 31 years and I'm now the guy
11 that burned down 95, you know.

12 Q. So, how many stations went out there, I mean --

13 A. Stations go out -- see some stations are single engine
14 companies, some stations are dual, you know, an engine and a
15 ladder, but we had a grand total it was, I want to say six
16 engines, three ladders, two battalion chiefs, the deputy chief did
17 respond, it's the rank above me. Then we had our HAZMAT task
18 force, which is an engine and then they have their HAZMAT truck,
19 they bring a bunch of foam, you know, that they bring, but they
20 never want service, you know, other than monitoring and basically
21 advising.

22 Q. The HAZMAT group did?

23 A. Correct, yeah, it was real nice that they had the HAZMAT
24 chief on the east side of the thing and they were doing monitoring
25 of some of the manhole covers, giving us carbon monoxide readings

1 and they were detecting hydrocarbons and things like that.

2 Q. Right, right. Okay. Trying to think, you gave me a great
3 description, lots of good stuff here, so, I don't have any other
4 follow-up questions. If I do, I'll --

5 A. Yeah, just give me a call. I don't care.

6 Q. Well, I thank you very much and good luck out there. Where
7 you going fishing at?

8 A. I'm down here in Ocean City, Jersey.

9 Q. Okay, very nice.

10 A. Yeah, I had to come down this morning after work, replace a
11 couple of scuppers on the boat. I said, you know, I don't want to
12 fish, just fish the morning and head home.

13 Q. Nice, nice. It looks like a beautiful day.

14 A. Just get away from that black cloud that was following me up
15 in Philly.

16 Q. Well, it looks like a beautiful day out there.

17 A. It's nice. It is. It's beautiful down here.

18 Q. Okay, sir, well I thank you very much, appreciate your
19 service.

20 A. Not a problem. Thank you. See ya.

21 Q. Thank you, sir. Bye bye.

22 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

23

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: FATAL VEHICLE FIRE & COLLAPSE
OF INTERSTATE 95 NEAR PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA ON JUNE 11, 2023
Interview of Ted Quedenfeld

ACCIDENT NO.: HWY23FH014

PLACE: Via telephone

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Jacqueline Roberts
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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FATAL VEHICLE FIRE & COLLAPSE OF
INTERSTATE 95 NEAR PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA ON JUNE 11, 2023

* Accident No.: HWY23FH014

* * * * *

Interview of: CARY BOYD, Captain
Philadelphia Fire Department

Via telephone

Thursday,
June 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

RONALD KAMINSKI, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

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Interview of Cary Boyd:

By Mr. Kaminski

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MR. BOYD: Hello.

MR. KAMINSKI: Hello, speaking to Captain Boyd?

MR. BOYD: Yeah, Cary, how you doing?

MR. KAMINSKI: Good, sir. Hey I appreciate your getting back with me.

MR. BOYD: Yeah, no worries.

MR. KAMINSKI: Yeah, I talked to Battalion Chief Quedenfeld this morning.

MR. BOYD: Okay.

MR. KAMINSKI: Before I left town.

MR. BOYD: Right.

MR. KAMINSKI: If you have a few minutes, you know, and if you don't mind if I record you, so?

MR. BOYD: Yeah, that's fine, just, like I said, I am on duty, so if we get a run you'll hear me I'm gonna have to run that's all.

MR. KAMINSKI: Okay. That's fair enough.

INTERVIEW OF CARY BOYD

BY MR. KAMINSKI:

Q. First -- Captain, what's your station?

A. Where I'm assigned?

Q. Yeah.

A. Okay, I'm assigned to engine 46 on the D Bravo (ph.) Platoon.

Q. D Bravo, okay.

1 A. And that night I was working water tower 38 on the C (ph.)
2 platoon, or was it.

3 Q. Water tower 38?

4 A. Yeah, water tower 38. I was working the C platoon.

5 Q. Okay, I'm not sure I understand what you're telling me, but
6 it just --

7 A. Okay, so when that job came in, I worked that night. I was
8 working overtime in another station.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And then I went right to my normally assigned, which is
11 engine 46 on the B (ph.).

12 Q. Okay, 'cause I was led to believe you were on engine 38, but
13 you're engine 46.

14 A. Yeah, I mean, that night I was working so, I worked overtime.
15 So, for that night I was engine 38 on the C Charlie.

16 Q. Got it. Okay, so, I need you to start from the time you got
17 the call and when you got there what you saw, what you did, and --

18 A. Sure, I was already awake just kind of prepping for my
19 release. I guess it came in around 6:15, or so, 06:15?

20 Q. Yep.

21 A. It was an accident assignment, usually that's engine, ladder,
22 chiefs, medic and a saw company. So, we got State and Continent
23 Avenue for an accident. Engine 38 is right at McGee and Keystone,
24 which is basically on the block. It's a half a block to get to
25 State, so when we pull out we're going south, then we went east, a

1 half a block or so to get to State Road. As soon as we made a
2 left onto State Road, I saw two columns; one really, really big
3 column, just smoke at this time, and then a smaller one, but still
4 significant and there was a space in between them, so I was
5 thinking immediately okay we have two vehicles, you know, post
6 collision. We pulled up. I had no idea. I got 27 years on the
7 job. This was like one of those top ten, what the heck?

8 Q. Okay?

9 A. (Indiscernible) because the entire underpass, I had no idea
10 what was on fire, but every square foot of that underpass was
11 nothing but flame. We couldn't see anything except the fire and
12 then the smoke billowing out. Originally, I just requested two
13 extra engines, because it seemed to me that it wasn't going
14 anywhere, it was going to be a water problem. We set up on and on
15 the I-95 onramp going north, basically facing west. It was
16 probably, I want to say 25 to 30 yards to get to the underpass.

17 Q. Yeah, yeah.

18 A. About that.

19 Q. I was out at the scene this week. I know what you're talking
20 about, the onramp there.

21 A. Okay, yeah, so, immediately I knew we don't have, obviously
22 there's no hydrants up top there, so, I had the guys pulls two and
23 a half off. The plants and the brush and everything was also on
24 fire. So we pulled two and a half out, started a quick initial
25 knockdown. I had my driver, who by the way was literally I think

1 it was his first night driving.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. But he did a heck of a job. Real, real young, inexperienced
4 guys on the back step, too, but they were good. Everyone was --
5 everyone did their job. We ran a water -- supply line down off of
6 Milner.

7 Q. Yeah, you had to cross State Road there, or the entrance
8 ramp, right to get to the hydrants, or where'd you get the water
9 finally?

10 A. The water was almost directly east of us. There was a
11 hydrant down on Milner Street.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. So, we ran it.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Yeah, we ran it over top of the Jersey barriers, down the
16 hill, and then across Milner. So, we were requesting police and
17 state to shut down Milner, to shut down 95, you know.

18 Q. Sure. So, did you see any of the bridge crumbling before it
19 went?

20 A. Oh yeah, yeah. We saw it fall completely. So, we backed up,
21 once we had a good water supply, we actually backed up so we could
22 get the -- and just saw the volume of fire, you know, at first I
23 thought, you know, definitely tell it was something petroleum, but
24 I had no idea the amount whatsoever, had none. I was thinking
25 maybe like a couple of full saddle bags, you know what I mean?

1 Q. Right.

2 A. And we just got there quick, but just the volume of fire, how
3 much it was just, you know, continuing, so we actually set the
4 water tower up and then we had 52s assisted us with that. They
5 gave us an extra supply line. And again, we had again, this kid,
6 it was his first job, he had the water tower going, he had two and
7 a half gallon and an inch and three quarter, 'cause we were
8 putting out brush. Then the manholes started to, you know, ignite
9 and stuff like that.

10 Q. I heard about that.

11 A. But it took, I'm going to say, 20 to 25 minutes before we
12 finally were peering down there and we could see what looked like
13 an axle of some sort, you know what I mean, like an axle or a
14 fifth wheel? It was again, I mean, it was a tremendous volume of
15 fire and basically that was it. We sat there. We knocked it all
16 down. I got relieved on the fire ground and I had to work that
17 day, so I went back to my firehouse and then came back again for
18 my company, who was actually on the fire ground.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And kind of sat there till 11. We were just, I mean it
21 doesn't matter, but we were down by the river as the product was
22 starting to roll down towards the river. The manhole covers were
23 popping and they were big manholes, they're not the little ones.
24 So, there was a tremendous amount of pressure there. Yeah, if,
25 like I said, I could not again, when we first pulled up every

1 square foot that I could see of that underpass was nothing but
2 fire, a heavy fire, and again, we watched it, so, we watched it
3 direct flame impangement (ph.) right on those big, the outside the
4 I-beams, they were sagging within, gosh, I mean, you know, again,
5 15 minutes and we were hitting it with the water tower. It didn't
6 matter. It just buckled. Once that buckled, we all, you know, I
7 mean, the chief was over, Chief Tropiano (ph.), but between the
8 two of us we made sure there was nobody anywhere near the collapse
9 zone.

10 Q. How about 95, the state police, they were trying to close
11 that down, right?

12 A. Yeah, yeah, so what I was told after the fact was the person
13 that might have called it in, might have been a statey, so he had
14 already begun the process of shutting northbound down, which was I
15 think pretty fortunate for us.

16 Q. Sure. Yeah.

17 A. It is, 'cause you don't just shut down 95, I mean, it's not
18 something like, you know, I mean you know all about lead time, you
19 know what I mean? It's like by the time you (indiscernible) it
20 actually happens.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. (Indiscernible).

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. But yeah, we were pretty much all on the same sheet of music.

25 I know that the chief, I went with two extra engines because I

1 didn't think like ladders would help it, but he went right away.
2 He pulled the box, which is four engines, you know, two ladders, a
3 couple of chiefs and stuff like that.

4 Q. Right, right.

5 A. To me, I looked at it was water problem until we realized
6 just how much petroleum product there was then obviously it was a
7 HAZMAT. Yeah, but for the most part I think we were there, you
8 know, really quick. Everybody was, you know, on the piece quick
9 and we got down there, but there was really not too much you could
10 do until you got a lot of water on that.

11 Q. Right, finally knock it down so you could see what you got?

12 A. Yeah, and I'm telling you, it was a solid, I mean, 15 or 20
13 minutes of, you know, and we're flowing a lot of water, you know
14 what I mean?

15 Q. Sure.

16 A. Like I said, we had an inch and three quarter going that was
17 going knocking out the brush fires, and then we had on our side,
18 on the east division, which is how they did it, they sectored it
19 geographically, you know, we had the water, you know, I don't even
20 know what the numbers are coming out of the water tower, but we
21 were hitting it pretty good. And then again, it sagged, it went
22 down pretty quick. There was a lot of sheets blasting that steel
23 that big I-beam.

24 Q. Sure. And it's a fairly new bridge, I understand?

25 A. I think so, again, and the thing is that whole area down

1 there, if you noticed it, it looked kind of new.

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. So, it's all been rearranged from when I grew up and I'm born
4 and raised in Philadelphia, so, and I don't work down at 38s real
5 often anymore, so, I wasn't, especially coming north I was -- I
6 didn't even know 100 percent where I was. I was so focused on the
7 fire I was just trying to give a report that made sense, but it
8 was like there was so much fire, it almost looked like railroad
9 tracks to me. I was thinking, is that, you know, is that a
10 locomotive down there, I mean, you know, or a tanker?

11 Q. Right, yeah.

12 A. And again, at first, you're thinking, hopefully it's just
13 like saddle bags, you know what I mean, and we can knock this
14 down. I wasn't sure what the second column was, till I realized
15 that that was just smoke coming out the other side on the
16 northbound side, you know what I mean, that's all parts.

17 Q. Yeah, I know there's a couple explosions, yeah.

18 A. It was well, yeah, there was a lot of subterranean
19 explosions. We had one that really had us all puckering pretty
20 good. There must have been like a discarded, maybe an old propane
21 tank, and that was right at the bottom of the hill where we were,
22 and that sucker popped and we all just like cringed up and then a
23 couple seconds later it was like shrapnel hitting the top of our
24 helmets and stuff. We're like, whoa, that was -- I said everybody
25 shields down, shields down, and then again, we had a lot of fire

1 coming out of manhole covers; the ones that were right down there.

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. And, you know, I thought it was, I thought we had it pretty
4 much it was just going to be, you know, once the stuff was removed
5 we might have some hotspots we got to wet down, but I guess the
6 product had really made its way into the storm system and that's
7 when --

8 Q. Towards the river.

9 A. I called a guy I was relieving, I'm like, where are you guys,
10 I saw you guys taking off. He goes, oh, they just moved us. He
11 goes, because of the explosions. I'm like, oh, I said, all right
12 I'm coming back, so, I had to take my POB back there so he could
13 drive us back to the firehouse.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. It was a crazy morning.

16 Q. Yeah, whole day.

17 A. Yeah, yeah.

18 Q. So, okay, well, yeah it sounds like I said, I talked to the
19 Battalion Chief this morning and it sounds like you guys did an
20 awesome job out there and --

21 A. Yeah, I mean, like I said, it was definitely it was a water
22 -- on our side it was definitely a water problem. I'm sure they
23 had hydrants that they could access on the other side pretty
24 quickly. The other thing is 52s the second hydrant went down, so
25 we had to wait a little bit. We had to kind of gate down on our

1 -- on the water tower for a little bit, but not much. They were
2 able to backtrack and get -- and pick up another hydrant.

3 Q. Right, but by that point the bridge was probably down?

4 A. The bridge was down, yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, I'm telling
5 you, that thing sagged and it -- we saw it. We could see it
6 through the flames even as we were hitting it.

7 Q. How long before it went down after you got there, what do you
8 think, 20 minutes?

9 A. Twenty minutes maximum, yes, at least maybe like 17 to 18 for
10 the sag, and once the sag was really visible and apparent to us,
11 it wasn't but a few minutes after that, that it --

12 Q. Right, well, I seen videos on TV of people driving at the
13 time when it sagged, the first time, or when it buckled.

14 A. Yeah, yeah, and then the knuckleheads that were on the other
15 side hitting the bumps, they said, they clocked one guy, the
16 stateys clocked one guy doing like 130 down the south side hit
17 that bump.

18 Q. Oh my God.

19 A. Yeah, like it's amazing he didn't lose it and they were like,
20 we're not even gonna chase him because he ain't going anywhere.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. And we're a little busy right now.

23 Q. Yeah, okay.

24 A. Oh yeah, welcome to Philadelphia buddy.

25 Q. Well, I grew up in Chicago.

1 A. So you know, right? It's like Chicago east, that's all it
2 is.

3 Q. Yeah, yeah, so, I assume you're an Eagle's fan too, huh?

4 A. Well?

5 Q. Oh yeah.

6 A. You know, Philly Flyers, 76s and Eagles, but I only got year
7 a seven months left, then I'll be down in Florida. I'll still be
8 a Philly's fan, but I'll be out of here.

9 Q. Very good. Yeah, I got two months left.

10 A. I don't know what I'm -- we got water pretty quick. We did
11 everything we could on the eastside, you know what I mean? Again,
12 it wasn't really going to -- it's a water problem, you know what I
13 mean? There wasn't -- obviously I seen a video from the, I guess
14 the security camera that caught him coming down the ramp.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. Yeah, that was a little tough, you know, looked like maybe a
17 brake failure or something, 'cause you could see he hit that --
18 it's a pretty sharp turn.

19 Q. It's a sharp turn and it, and you know, I guess he's familiar
20 with that area and so, something strange. We're looking at it.
21 We'll figure it out, but, well, I appreciate you taking the time
22 to talk with me this evening and --

23 A. Absolutely, and you got my number if you need anything else.
24 Like I said, I just don't know if there's much, you know, we had a
25 good solid response and you know, what we saw was what we saw.

1 Like I said it was just -- it took a long time to try to even
2 ascertain what it was that was on fire, or what caused the fire.

3 Q. Right, right.

4 A. We had no idea.

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. And again, we didn't know if it was one vehicle, two
7 vehicles, a truck, a tanker, another vehicle, I mean, we just
8 didn't know and there's was no getting in there, let's put it that
9 way.

10 Q. No. No. So, okay, sir, well, I appreciate your time and I
11 guess you're going on vacation. Enjoy your vacation. Safe
12 travels.

13 A. I am. Absolutely. Take care of yourself.

14 Q. You too, bye bye.

15 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: FATAL VEHICLE FIRE & COLLAPSE
OF INTERSTATE 95 NEAR PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA ON JUNE 11, 2023
Interview of Cary Boyd

ACCIDENT NO.: HWY23FH014

PLACE: Via telephone

DATE: June 15, 2023

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Jacqueline Roberts
Transcriber