NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN RE:

THE ALLISION INVOLVING THE : NTSB Accident No. AFRAMAX RIVER ON THE HOUSTON: DCA16FM055 SHIP CHANNEL ON SEPTEMBER 6, : 2016

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INTERVIEW OF: KUMAR ARVIND

September 7, 2016

BEFORE

USCG BRUCE DAVIES, USCG LUKE WISNIEWSKI, NTSB MIKE USHER, Pilot Board Investigation and Recommendation Committee ANANT SHARMA, Aframax River Marine Superintendent

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of G&H Towing Company:

JAY HUFFMAN, ESQ. Blank Rome LLP 717 Texas Avenue Suite 1400 Houston, TX 77002

On Behalf of the Aframax River:

JAMES BAILEY, ESQ.
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On Behalf of the Interviewee and Other Individuals Involved in this Investigation:

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On Behalf of ITC:

STACEY T. NORSTRUD, ESQ. Fowler Rodriguez, Counselors at Law Four Houston Center 1331 Lamar Street, Suite 1560

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2	3:52 p.m.
3	All right, Captain. So it is
4	3:52. We're onboard the Aframax River. We're
5	conducting a post-casualty interview with the captain
6	of the ship. We'll do a roll call, see who is who
7	is here today, and so I will start with myself. I am
8	section Houston/Galveston,
9	Investigations, and I am the investigator assigned to
LO	investigate the casualty.
L1	MR. HATZEL: I am Cameron Hatzel, lawyer for
L2	the pilots.
L3	MR. DAVIES: Bruce Davies, Chief,
L4	Investigations, Coast Guard, Houston.
L5	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Luke Wisniewski, National
L6	Transportation Safety Board.
L7	MR. BAILEY: James Bailey with Eastham,
L8	Watson, counsel for the Aframax River.
L9	MSTR ARVIND: Master, Aframax River.
20	PARTICIPANT: What's that?
21	MSTR ARVIND: Master, Aframax River.
22	CPT. SHARMA: Captain Sharma, Marine
23	Superintendent for Executive Ship Management.
24	MR. HUFFMAN: Jay Huffman with Blank Rome on
25	behalf of G&H Towing Company.

1	(Simultaneous speaking.)
2	MR. USHER: Mike Usher, Pilot Board
3	Investigation Recommendation Committee.
4	PARTICIPANT: (indiscernible).
5	All right, Captain. So we're
6	just going to go over some questioning.
7	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
8	And again, if you have any
9	questions or any issues with us, consult with Mr.
10	Bailey at any time. So I will start with asking a
11	little bit about your background in the maritime field,
12	if you could just elaborate on that, kind of give us a
13	brief history?
14	MSTR ARVIND: I went in 1998 at sea, and I
15	am working since 2013 as a master with Executive Ship
16	Management.
17	2013 as a master?
18	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
19	All right. And what size ships
20	have you sailed as a Master?
21	MSTR ARVIND: This almost same size,
22	Aframax, tanker.
23	And approximately how many
24	trips would you say you have had onboard Aframax ships
25	since 2013?

1	MSTR ARVIND: 2013? I sailed eight ships.
2	Okay.
3	MSTR ARVIND: This is my ninth
4	Since then
5	MSTR ARVIND: Since
6	Since then, so
7	MSTR ARVIND: Yeah.
8	this is your ninth ship?
9	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, it is the ninth.
10	All right. And how many trips
11	would you say you've done, I guess general trips from
12	inside inside of the Houston Channel, Ship Channel?
13	MSTR ARVIND: Inside the Houston Channel,
14	I've done around six, seven.
15	Six, seven? Any issues at any
16	time?
17	MSTR ARVIND: Nothing, not really, sir.
18	And those trips have been
19	onboard this ship, or
20	MSTR ARVIND: The sister ship also, I sailed
21	the sister ship also, (indiscernible), I sailed the
22	sister ship also, and nothing further.
23	And Captain, have you ever
24	sailed inside the Houston (indiscernible)? Have you
25	ever

1	MSTR ARVIND: No, this is my first time
2	(indiscernible)
3	First time doing that? And
4	what day was that, the first time that you visited
5	MSTR ARVIND: On the 4th of September.
6	4th of September?
7	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
8	Where were you coming from?
9	MSTR ARVIND: I came from Saint Lucia.
10	Lucia? And was there any
11	issues during that voyage, Captain?
12	MSTR ARVIND: No, nothing, no issue at all.
13	Any issues prior to that
14	voyage?
15	MSTR ARVIND: Just I ground (phonetic) in
16	Saint Lucia, so I don't know this, but I ground in
17	Saint Lucia, and then I came here.
18	Okay. Have you had any issues
19	before
20	MSTR ARVIND: No, no.
21	aboard this vessel?
22	MSTR ARVIND: I never have.
23	Well, Captain, on the on the
24	voyage on the 4th of September, when you came in, you
25	mentioned you you didn't have any issues, any
ļ	I and the second se

1	concerns?
2	MSTR ARVIND: No.
3	Did you communicate
4	(indiscernible) with the pilot
5	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
6	onboard that vessel?
7	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
8	Okay. And how was that
9	exchange with that pilot?
10	MSTR ARVIND: (indiscernible).
11	What kind of questions did he
12	ask, or what communications did you have with him?
13	MSTR ARVIND: Communications I had no
14	problem
15	No problem?
16	MSTR ARVIND: at all. No problem.
17	Okay. Did he mention anything
18	about the ship handling different, or difficult, or any
19	
20	MSTR ARVIND: No.
21	difficulties handling the
22	ship?
23	MSTR ARVIND: No.
24	All right, Captain. Well, let
25	me reference the 6th of September it was actually

1	the 5th of September, when the voyage started. Can you
2	just go over a little bit about how that went from the
3	time the pilot well, actually, maybe you could go
4	back, before the pilot came onboard, were there any
5	issues with the ship prior to the pilot getting
6	onboard?
7	MSTR ARVIND: No.
8	Nothing was relayed to you from
9	the engineer department or
10	MSTR ARVIND: The engineer department
11	anyone else?
12	MSTR ARVIND: no, nothing on faults,
13	nothing.
14	Any kind of test, any kind of
15	preventative maintenance or any test conducted on the
16	ship
17	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
18	in that time frame?
19	MSTR ARVIND: Before arrival, we conducted
20	this, it was 33 CFR (phonetic), all the tests, pre-
21	arrival check, we carried out in full. No problem at
22	all.
23	You said before arrival. All
24	right, and did you do that prior to departing
25	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.

1	(Simultaneous speaking.)
2	the dock as well?
3	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, the dock also, on 5th,
4	also we did all the pre-arrival pre-departure
5	checks.
6	And other than that, was there
7	any other maintenance going on in the engine room that
8	you were aware of, preventative maintenance?
9	(Simultaneous speaking.)
10	MSTR ARVIND: No, preventative maintenance
11	and all, nothing done in Houston.
12	All right, Captain. Going back
13	to the time do you recall what time the pilots
14	boarded your vessel?
15	MSTR ARVIND: Pilot boarded 2306.
16	2306?
17	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
18	What time were you supposed to
19	sail?
20	MSTR ARVIND: 2330
21	2
22	MSTR ARVIND: 2330, supposed to be our
23	pilot boat, but pilot boat boarded a little early.
24	So 2330, you said?
25	MSTR ARVIND: 2306.

1	Okay. Well 2330 was the time
2	when you were supposed to sail?
3	MSTR ARVIND: 2330.
4	30, okay
5	MSTR ARVIND: 30.
б	2330, you were supposed to
7	sail. And was that the time you actually sailed,
8	Captain?
9	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, we were ready for 2330.
10	You were ready?
11	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
12	Any delays?
13	MSTR ARVIND: No delay at all. We finished
14	the cargo 2130, 2-1-3-0, and after two hours, we were
15	ready, all documentation parts, almost 2300, finished.
16	Okay.
17	MSTR ARVIND: We were ready after that.
18	All right. So when the pilots
19	came to the bridge, and did you guys have a
20	pilot/master exchange?
21	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
22	Okay.
23	MSTR ARVIND: I let them come on 2306. I
24	was on CCR (phonetic), and then after that, I went on
25	top 2312, and and then I did the pilot, master/pilot

1	exchange and all.
2	All right. And what was the
3	PARTICIPANT: I am sorry to interrupt, but
4	can we take a break and identify our newest guest?
5	Yes. Yeah, let's take a
6	well, can you identify yourself?
7	MS. NORSTRUD: Sure. I am Stacey Norstrud
8	from Fowler Rodriguez. We represent ITC.
9	ITC, all right, good.
10	All right, Captain. So at 2330 I am
11	sorry, before that, you said you met with the pilot.
12	Was it one pilot, two pilots?
13	MSTR ARVIND: Two pilots.
14	Two pilots? Okay. Were you
15	communicating with both, or were you just
16	MSTR ARVIND: One main pilot, so I would
17	communicate initially I communicate with both, and
18	then later on, a visit from the head pilot, then I
19	communicated with him.
20	So during the pilot exchange,
21	you were communicating with
22	MSTR ARVIND: One pilot.
23	one pilot?
24	MSTR ARVIND: One.
25	Okay.

1	MSTR ARVIND: Which is in charge.
2	All right. And what was that
3	communication like?
4	MSTR ARVIND: Communication like, no problem
5	at all.
6	Do you recall what information
7	was passed to the
8	MSTR ARVIND: Yes
9	pilot?
10	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
11	Can you tell us, what did you
12	pass to him, or ?
13	MSTR ARVIND: I asked I give the pilot
14	this my (indiscernible) so much. My (indiscernible)
15	6 and 8.6, and this, yeah, they're all in ballast
16	(phonetic) condition, and this cargo (indiscernible),
17	and any inborn traffic. Were we expecting any inborn
18	traffic, and I said not much because nighttime, so
19	that's all.
20	All right. So do you recall if
21	the pilot had any concerns?
22	MSTR ARVIND: No.
23	(Simultaneous speaking.)
24	All right. And to your
25	knowledge, the ship's equipment was operating?

Τ	MSTR ARVIND: Yes. After did I myself, I
2	did this pre-departure, this engine telegraph test,
3	myself did, and dead slow ahead, I give them dead slow
4	ahead after the gangway off (phonetic), because
5	(indiscernible) gangway, so after I said
6	(indiscernible) gangway off, then I did this telegraph
7	test, and in the test, I did dead slow ahead, I
8	stopped, dead slow astern, then I stopped. And then
9	after that, I gave him the standby engine, standby
10	engine I gave, 2336. I tested engine, and then I gave
11	him the standby engine, and after that, I informed
12	pilot we are ready. Our engine is also ready.
13	And during these tests, the
14	engine was in
15	(Simultaneous speaking.)
16	bridge control?
17	MSTR ARVIND: Bridge control, on bridge
18	control.
19	Okay. All right. Do you
20	recall what time you got underway, Captain?
21	MSTR ARVIND: We were underway 2342, 2342.
22	Can you go over that evolution?
23	MSTR ARVIND: Initially, all line casted
24	off, one-by-one all line casted off. After that,
25	(indiscernible), then all line unmoored, and then pilot

give an order dead slow astern. I myself and one pilot on bridge wing, the starboard side, bridge wing, the starboard side, the long side, so myself and the pilot, the starboard side, bridge wing, and inside, one pilot, third officer, and helmsman is inside the bridge, so I give to them their order, dead slow astern.

Then third officer call back dead slow astern, and he give also movement dead slow astern. So I send test RPM indicator from outside this, I let him know, dead slow astern, then I engage the pilot and looking this outside while the ship is moving. Then after that, the ship is moving very fast, just like dead slow never so fast.

Then (indiscernible) and pilot also both are looking at this outside telegraph, them saying I feel it's showing so much for dead slow astern. I said I already gave him dead slow astern only. I asked third officer at that moment, dead slow astern? Yes, dead slow astern, engine on dead slow astern then, but RPM is showing around 80. I am not sure from the distance how much, but it is too much. This is not 30, because 30 is aligned with others.

So again, I asked again, what is RPM? Then he said -- they said, then pilot said, (indiscernible). Then I said not stopping enough. Then I again called,

third officer, why aren't you doing stopping now? Then
-- and then third officer informed me, he came outside
and saying this engine is not stopping. Then, he calls
this engine room and asks what happened. Then I learn
from there, pilot is crying stop engine. Give dead
slow ahead, slow ahead.

Then I run over inside the bridge, and then I call the engine room. I send the engine on slowing. There are these lights, the stop engine. But actually, engine just coming out stopping, but not stopped completely. Then I give them dead slow ahead. Myself, I give them dead slow ahead. And then just I got outside, port side, see to the outside area. This is touching on what is going on.

Then after that, again, I called engine room and I checked with the second engineer on watch. I checked with second engineer. What happened? They say engine is not responding. Then I said give me control immediately, give me control. I said no time to give control, take control.

Then I realized -- then I went outside, and I asked the pilot, better we drop anchor. Then pilot also said to drop anchor, drop boat anchor. Then I informed chief officer, go forward, drop anchor. Then I -- after (indiscernible) second officer, you also go

2.0

forward. Then boat went forward and we dropped anchor,
and in time, they said they're taking control, and
(indiscernible) stop, and then in the meantime, I
dropped anchor. That time, no time to see this taking
control or not taking control. It was hardly two
minutes' time. I give a moment, and then after that,
within two minutes, this all happened.
All right, Captain. You
noticed he took the RPMs immediately after you asked
for dead slow ahead. You noticed the RPMs immediately
were
MSTR ARVIND: Dead slow astern.
I am sorry, dead slow astern.
MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
You noticed the RPMs were not
where they should have been?
MSTR ARVIND: I seen them from outside.
This RPM, astern side.
Okay.
MSTR ARVIND: But you cannot go and see it
from there in nighttime, you cannot see I checked
RPM, how much. But I send (indiscernible) RPM
telegraph showing astern side.
Okay. Then we see this is moving very fast
lastern Then we realize this RPM is showing 70 80

1 Okay. And when you communicated with the second engineer, did he --2 MSTR ARVIND: I communicated with -- I came 3 inside after that, I communicated with second engineer. 4 They say why not stopping? And I give them dead slow 5 Then I send this (indiscernible) stop. 6 7 not responding at all, dead slow ahead. I give slow ahead, in data logger (phonetic) you can see, I give 8 them dead slow ahead also because pilot is insisting 9 you full ahead, full ahead. How can I give full ahead? 10 11 I give them dead slow ahead, not responding at all, then what I can do? 12 Then I talk to second engineer. 13 14 give control. (indiscernible) control, you take control, and then communicate, send them then. 15 have time, don't have choice. 16 Okay. So do you know if the 17 second engineer actually went to the emergency station 18 and --19 MSTR ARVIND: I don't know where he gone. 20 21 gone outside and discuss with pilot. They say we drop 22 anchor, better we drop anchor. Pilot also suggested drop anchor, both drop anchor, then we drop anchor. 23 All right. Now in that 24 25 conversation with the second engineer, did he mention

1	anything to you, or even after immediately after
2	that, did he say Captain, I think we're having issues
3	with this, or I think this is what's going on, or was
4	there any mention of mechanical issues with the engine
5	at that time?
6	MSTR ARVIND: I don't know. I don't know
7	this mechanical issue, I don't know this.
8	MR. DAVIES: Captain, it's Bruce Davies with
9	the Coast Guard Investigations. You said that when you
10	went dead slow astern, that the RPMs kind of raised up,
11	you said between 70 and 80 RPMs, and that was the
12	MSTR ARVIND: Initially, not going 70, 80
13	RPM. Initially
14	MR. DAVIES: Yes, but I am saying it raised
15	up to that.
16	MSTR ARVIND: It raised up to 70, 80 RPM
17	gradually, right.
18	MR. DAVIES: And dead slow astern, what is
19	the RPM it's supposed to be?
20	MSTR ARVIND: 30, 32 RPM.
21	MR. DAVIES: Did you consider hitting the
22	emergency stop at that point?
23	MSTR ARVIND: At that time, I did not
24	realize. At that time, I not thought anything. I just
25	gone and drop anchor. At that time, I not thought. I

just called engine room, I talked to second engineer,
this, what is happening? Engine is not responding.
Then he said give control, give control. Then I said
take control. And then I go outside and dropped
anchor. That time, I not thought not thought
anything.
MR. DAVIES: Okay. So when you dropped
anchor, the engine room had the engine control?
MSTR ARVIND: Yes. The engine room had
taken control, (indiscernible), I don't know. I gone
outside and drop anchor. In that particular case, I
never thought this to stop this, I just gone outside
and dropped anchor, because engine not responding, and
I stopping or not, if we stop, also, there's no have
time because we are in mid-channel.
MR. DAVIES: Okay, Captain. Let me tell
you, we have spoken with the pilots, and the pilots,
both of them told us that there was you were on the
bridge, along with the helmsman. Was there somebody on
the engine or the telegraph?
MSTR ARVIND: Somebody engine, the third
officer.
MR. DAVIES: The third officer. How were
the commands to the engine order telegraph given?
MSTR ARVIND: Through walkie-talkie I give

1	an order to third officer through walkie-talkie, on a
2	channel, walkie-talkie, and then he is communicating
3	with walkie-talkie.
4	MR. DAVIES: Why walkie-talkie? Were you
5	out on the bridge wing at the time?
6	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
7	MR. DAVIES: And the second was the
8	second mate on the engine order telegraph?
9	MSTR ARVIND: Third officer
10	(Simultaneous speaking.)
11	MR. DAVIES: Third officer, third officer,
12	and did he have a radio there?
13	MSTR ARVIND: Yeah, he had a radio.
14	MR. DAVIES: So you would the pilot would
15	give the order, and then you would relay the order to
16	the the third mate, and then he would
17	MSTR ARVIND: He is getting command.
18	MR. DAVIES: All right. Did you ever have a
19	discussion with the chief engineer why the engine let's
20	say ramped up, or let's say sped up faster than you
21	expected, exceeded the RPMs? Did you talk to him about
22	that?
23	MSTR ARVIND: I talked, but he's saying I
24	don't know this, what happened, this mechanical fault,
25	I don't know this, I don't know.
I	

1	MR. DAVIES: The chief engineer said there
2	was a mechanical problem?
3	MSTR ARVIND: I don't know this.
4	(indiscernible), come and they will say this situation
5	
6	MR. DAVIES: Well, I understand you don't
7	know that, but did the chief engineer tell you that
8	there was a mechanical problem?
9	MSTR ARVIND: I don't know. Ask the chief
10	engineer what he's saying. I am not able to say
11	something because I never faced this type of problem, I
12	don't know.
13	MR. DAVIES: Was the chief engineer aware
14	that the engine was exceeding the expected RPMs?
15	MSTR ARVIND: I don't know because I did not
16	talk with chief engineer, I talked with second
17	engineer, so
18	MR. DAVIES: All right. Was the second
19	engineer aware that the engine was exceeding the RPMs?
20	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, second engineer is aware
21	of this.
22	MR. DAVIES: Did he offer any explanation as
23	to why?
24	MSTR ARVIND: I don't know. I asked the
25	chief engineer, but I never asked second engineer. I
J	

1 did not ask. 2 MR. DAVIES: All right. I've got no more questions at this time, but I'll pass it over to NTSB. 3 4 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Hi Captain, Luke Wisniewski, NTSB. I'd just like to go through -- you 5 mentioned in the beginning, let's just go back to the 6 7 pre-departure list. Is that a list that you fill out because --8 MSTR ARVIND: 9 Yes. 10 MR. WISNIEWSKI: -- you said that you -- you 11 partake and participated, or you were the one in charge 12 of that? Is there a list that we can see? Is there a record of that? 13 14 MSTR ARVIND: Yes. 15 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. And how about with the telegraph test, is that also a written procedure? 16 17 MSTR ARVIND: Telegraph logger is there. Αt any moment you can get this logged automatically --18 19 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. MSTR ARVIND: -- a logger is there. 20 21 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Do you have a bell book, or 22 does anyone up on the bridge write down --MSTR ARVIND: We have bell book, but we have 23 24 log also that, due to this, we are not recording in bell book.

This is automatically printing in logger.

1	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. And when you tested
2	the engine before, you said you
3	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, I
4	(Simultaneous speaking.)
5	MR. WISNIEWSKI: You bumped it ahead,
6	forward?
7	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, not full
8	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Yeah.
9	MSTR ARVIND: dead slow ahead.
10	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Right, dead slow ahead.
11	MSTR ARVIND: Dead slow ahead, and then I
12	see RPM, and then I stop, and then dead slow astern,
13	and then I stop. And then after that, I give a standby
14	
15	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. And you said that
16	time was again, standby?
17	MSTR ARVIND: That's that time, 2336
18	somewhere, 2336.
19	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay.
20	MSTR ARVIND: It's written in
21	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. Was there any work
22	that was performed while the the vessel was in port
23	when you tied up on the 4th? Are you aware of any work
24	that was performed in the engine room?
25	MSTR ARVIND: No. In my notice, nothing.

1	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. No no
2	MSTR ARVIND: Nothing.
3	MR. WISNIEWSKI: no one was onboard, or -
4	- okay.
5	MSTR ARVIND: Nobody informed me, nothing, I
6	am not aware of this thing, but nothing.
7	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. And you indicated
8	you were speaking directly with the second
9	MSTR ARVIND: Second engineer.
10	MR. WISNIEWSKI: engineer?
11	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
12	MR. WISNIEWSKI: At the time?
13	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, at the time.
14	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. And on the bridge,
15	you have the emergency
16	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, we have.
17	MR. WISNIEWSKI: stop button?
18	MSTR ARVIND: Yes
19	(Simultaneous speaking.)
20	MR. WISNIEWSKI: For the main engine. Was
21	that pressed at all?
22	MSTR ARVIND: Not from there. I said in
23	that time, I talked, and then at that time, I did not
24	realize nothing. I gone outside, and then he's saying
25	give control in general. Then if you were taking

1	control, then you are wasting of time.
2	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Right.
3	MSTR ARVIND: Wasting of we don't have
4	time. So we dropped anchor, we gone outside and
5	dropped anchor
6	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay.
7	MSTR ARVIND: we discussed with pilot and
8	dropped anchor. I did not press the
9	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. So no one on the
10	bridge pressed that button either, it would just be
11	it would be you?
12	MSTR ARVIND: No, nobody pressed it.
13	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay.
14	MSTR ARVIND: Later on, the engine room,
15	they pressed (phonetic), and then they said they tried
16	to rectify this, but I don't know what they did.
17	MR. WISNIEWSKI: And your communication with
18	the second engineer
19	MSTR ARVIND: By phone.
20	MR. WISNIEWSKI: By phone?
21	MSTR ARVIND: By phone.
22	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. I guess I would like
23	to just continue a little bit more with, could you just
24	go through the events that, after you dropped anchor,
25	when the general alarm went off, when you notified the

1	crew, when they returned to their stations for fire?
2	MSTR ARVIND: As soon as
3	MR. WISNIEWSKI: If you could just go
4	through that
5	MSTR ARVIND: As soon as
6	MR. WISNIEWSKI: chronologically.
7	MSTR ARVIND: I dropped anchor, meantime,
8	I seen this, port side, this flame is coming, this
9	whole fire. Then I they are dropping anchor, I go
10	on the port side, and I see this full of smoke. Then I
11	said, well, I don't know what happened. They say smoke
12	is coming. Then I raised directly this fire alarm, and
13	then I informed pilot also, just we need sore
14	assistance (phonetic), we need more sore assistance
15	(indiscernible). That particular time, we don't notice
16	what happened
17	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay.
18	MSTR ARVIND: due to fire.
19	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Can you go through the
20	notifications that you or your bridge team
21	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
22	MR. WISNIEWSKI: made?
23	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
24	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Can you go through and
25	discuss that a little bit?

1 MSTR ARVIND: Yes. I call, after that, he 2 dropped anchor, and then I called the second officer on top on bridge, and I said you just prepare your faster 3 4 notification, and he said notification. 5 MR. WISNIEWSKI: You know when they -- what occurred, or who made those notifications? 6 7 MSTR ARVIND: He just typing, and then after that, I was busy with fire. I busy with fire, I 8 called, I requested pilot, and then I was crying. 9 This (indiscernible), then emergency was crying this. 10 11 fire, later on it started, and then we are fighting the fire, and (indiscernible) all around the vessel to the 12 The starboard of gangway, it is all, we faced 13 14 fire. 15 MR. WISNIEWSKI: And --MSTR ARVIND: Even the bridge also. 16 fire, even myself and pilot and third officer, all, we 17 are fighting fire on the bridge, bridge wing port side. 18 And how did you feel your 19 MR. WISNIEWSKI: 2.0 ship and crew responded to the firefighting --21 MSTR ARVIND: Yes, they responded very well. 22 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. They responded very well. 23 MSTR ARVIND: Was there any issues with 24 MR. WISNIEWSKI: 25 firefighting capability?

1	MSTR ARVIND: No, no, not (indiscernible).
2	MR. WISNIEWSKI: No, you had fire pressure,
3	fire pressure?
4	MSTR ARVIND: Fire pressure a little,
5	because I am crying increase emergency fire pressure,
6	but because there, I don't know if they are
7	increasing or not because all came out, but this,
8	account of this (indiscernible), but all five monitors
9	are open, and all five at the time, 7565 (phonetic)
10	(indiscernible). Pilot is also crying increase
11	pressure, but this all are open, very difficult to
12	build up the pressure. At the same time, all are open.
13	If we open one, two, then pressure will build up.
14	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Do you know how the ship is
15	configured? Do you have a main fire pump? Do you have
16	a bilge and fire pump that you could
17	MSTR ARVIND: Emergency fire pump.
18	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Yes, emergency fire pump
19	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
20	MR. WISNIEWSKI: that you can combine?
21	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, emergency fire pump, yes.
22	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Were they all running?
23	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
24	MR. WISNIEWSKI: And how was your how was
25	your crew? Were they very good responding to your

1 direction, or to the chief mate? 2 MSTR ARVIND: Yes. I am communicating with the chief officer command, and (indiscernible) sending 3 this -- they are using walkie-talkies, so I am 4 communicating directly with chief officer command and 5 (indiscernible), because other -- they don't have 6 7 walkie-talkies. The second officer later come on bridge, and third officer is there, and I send the 8 third officer down below in CCR (phonetic) to go and 9 try to start this fire pump, this ballast pump, so that 10 11 we can start ballast pump, then (indiscernible), and then water will merit more pressure. 12 Then he informed, this pump room is full of 13 14 smoke. Then I said then stop, not to go, then they Then later on, they're preparing 15 stop. (indiscernible), and they -- some of the crew gone down 16 and then open the valve and all, and then we started a 17 18 ballast pump as well. Is this part of your 19 MR. WISNIEWSKI: procedures to press the ballast tanks up for cooling, 2.0 21 or is it something that you --22 MSTR ARVIND: In case of emergency, what to do. 23 24 MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okav.

They said during the

MSTR ARVIND:

1	emergency, maximum possible accident, you can try.
2	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay.
3	MSTR ARVIND: Because fire pump was not too
4	much pressure, so just as we started this ballast pump
5	also so that at least more water of it on this side.
6	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay. That's all I have
7	right now. Thank you.
8	Okay. I have one follow-up
9	before we open it up. You mentioned you had lookouts
10	on the stern?
11	MSTR ARVIND: Who?
12	Did you have lookouts on the
13	stern of the ship
14	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
15	before getting underway?
16	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, it was the second officer
17	and all crew stern side, they are reporting, they are
18	reporting distance is coming very close, 50 meters, 40
19	meters, they are reporting, second officer.
20	All right. Do you know if that
21	that dolphin was there a light on there
22	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
23	a light, flashing, no?
24	MSTR ARVIND: No, not flashing. This one
25	dolphin had a flashing light, and the other one is not

1	flashing.
2	So the one you hit, did it have
3	a flashing light or
4	MSTR ARVIND: Flashing light.
5	It did? Okay. All right.
6	I'll open it up to I am sorry.
7	MR. DAVIES: I have a couple other
8	questions. For the you said the emergency fire pump
9	was used, correct?
10	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, the fire pump.
11	MR. DAVIES: When was the last time you can
12	recall checking that?
13	MSTR ARVIND: It was during drill, I checked
14	that before this CFR meeting and the CFR tests.
15	MR. DAVIES: Okay. How did you check it?
16	MSTR ARVIND: This this is something that
17	only open (indiscernible) anchor was, and we checked
18	pressure from top, just how much pressure is showing
19	and in what density, fire control depends on how much
20	pressure, so
21	MR. DAVIES: And you were satisfied at that
22	time that that pump
23	MSTR ARVIND: Yes
24	MR. DAVIES: was working correctly?
25	MSTR ARVIND: If two fire monitor

1	(indiscernible), then it is sufficient pressure.
2	MR. DAVIES: Okay. And you said that the
3	fire pump, you had all the the valves open when you
4	were fighting the fire?
5	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
6	MR. DAVIES: Well how many fire teams did
7	you have out there?
8	MSTR ARVIND: How many? Excuse me?
9	MR. DAVIES: How many persons were out there
10	fighting the fire?
11	MSTR ARVIND: Maximum, all the persons.
12	MR. DAVIES: Yeah, how many is that?
13	MSTR ARVIND: How many? It's bridge team
14	and engine room team, and then after that, this
15	other (indiscernible), so all (indiscernible)
16	outside only, they are fighting the fire.
17	MR. DAVIES: I did not look at your deck
18	when I came in. Did you have fire monitors along the
19	main deck, monitors?
20	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
21	MR. DAVIES: Were they all open?
22	MSTR ARVIND: Yes. I was communicating, I
23	was communicating openly. This one, just to go
24	forward, just open this one, just to go at that
25	time, it was full crazy, just
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MR. DAVIES: Okay, Captain. The reason I am asking that question, and I'll be honest with you, the pilot said that the one hose looked like it was very deficient in pressure. Now, if you have all of your monitors open, that may explain why. That's why I am asking the --

MSTR ARVIND: I --

MR. DAVIES: -- question, that's all.

MSTR ARVIND: -- I agree with you. Pilot is saying all the time increase water pressure, increase fire compressor. I was informing -- I call engine room, I informing engine room, increase water pressure, but they say I already increased all. What they increased, I don't know. I also seen not too much sufficient pressure. That's why I realized this ballast pump also open, and then after that, I closed some of the forward monitor, and then later, pressure increased.

MR. DAVIES: Okay. I'm just trying to explain why we asked the question, because of course, the fire system was extremely important. We just had a report that the -- the pressure was deficient. That explains it.

MSTR ARVIND: In this condition of fire, this -- only this from ship side is very difficult to

extinguish. Wildfire all around the fire, if no support from outside, if no support from shore side, then very difficult, continuous while it is also leaking, it's very difficult due to leak and all this fire has spread to this other side forward. MR. DAVIES: Well, what kind of support did you get from the -- from the tugs that were assisting you? MSTR ARVIND: Even these two tugs (indiscernible), the same tug also did the firefighting. They -- and after that, four tugs came onsite in 10, 15, 20 minutes, and then they also supported very well. MR. DAVIES: All right. Again, you were saying that you were speaking with the second engineer, correct? MSTR ARVIND: Yes. MR. DAVIES: During this evolution where we had, let's say, a problem with the -- with the RPMs. Who is normally in charge of the engine room during mooring and unmooring operations? MSTR ARVIND: As per our procedure, it is supposed to be chief engineer, and in case chief engineer (indiscernible) or he's taking rest and all,

because if maneuvering is too much, then second

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1	engineer, substitute is second engineer.
2	MR. DAVIES: Then why was the second
3	engineer apparently in charge in the engine room at
4	this time?
5	MSTR ARVIND: I don't know. I talked with
6	second engineer, I don't know.
7	MR. DAVIES: All right. I will pass it to
8	(indiscernible).
9	Mr. Usher?
10	MR. USHER: Yes, thank you. Mike Usher with
11	the Houston Pilot Board. Thank you, Captain, for being
12	here today, and I'd also like to thank you and your
13	crew for the work that you did on this horrific
14	incident, and I think you responded very well. Thank
15	you that there were no injuries, no fatalities.
16	I have a couple of questions about your
17	lookouts. You had your second officer was on the
18	stern?
19	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
20	MR. USHER: And did you have direct
21	communication with him?
22	MSTR ARVIND: Communicated through walkie-
23	talkie.
24	MR. USHER: Through walkie-talkie, not
25	radio, walkie-talkie?
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1	MSTR ARVIND: Walkie-talkie.
2	MR. USHER: Walkie-talkie. Did he see the
3	jetty as you were getting
4	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
5	MR. USHER: close to it? Did he
6	announce, he said or what
7	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
8	MR. USHER: did he say when he saw it?
9	MSTR ARVIND: Informing this, we are moving
10	fast, this distance is only 100 meters, 50 meters, he
11	is informing.
12	MR. USHER: Okay. Could you say that again?
13	How many meters? How did he how did he announce how
14	close you were getting? What did he say first, 100
15	meters, you said?
16	MSTR ARVIND: First, initially, 120 meters
17	or and then 100 meters, he said. I do not clearly
18	remember how much first he said, but first, 100 or 120
19	meters, he said. And then after that, he's saying
20	continuously, we are falling back, very fast moving up.
21	Then after reporting this, they started saying how much
22	distance. Then initially 120 or 100 meters, I do not
23	remember how much he said.
24	MR. USHER: Okay. So when you were at
25	you were you had sternway

1	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
2	MR. USHER: and when the pilot asked you
3	to stop engine
4	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
5	MR. USHER: is that when you saw
6	excuse me is that when you saw the RPMs go up to 80?
7	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, saw this
8	MR. USHER: Okay, okay.
9	MSTR ARVIND: RPM, very fast-moving.
10	MR. USHER: Okay. And you still had
11	sternway, and you saw the meters. The engine the
12	third officer on the OT (phonetic) with stoppage?
13	MSTR ARVIND: Yeah, I give the
14	MR. USHER: Okay.
15	MSTR ARVIND: the stoppage in order to
16	stop engine.
17	MR. USHER: And then you saw 80 RPMs?
18	MSTR ARVIND: I saw in addition not
19	stopping. This is supposed to if you give the stop
20	engine movement, then hardly three, four second
21	within three, four seconds, this is supposed to come to
22	zero, stop engine. Not stopping. Then I again said
23	stop engine, replying also stop engine, but not
24	stopping. Then the pilot is also planning stop engine,
25	giving dead slow ahead, full ahead. Then I run inside

1	the bridge. Then I send this then he's saying this
2	engine not responding. Then I run inside.
3	MR. USHER: Okay. And you called the second
4	officer in bridge control by telephone?
5	MSTR ARVIND: Second engineer.
6	MR. USHER: Second engineer by he was in
7	the bridge control?
8	MSTR ARVIND: Yeah, I called the engine room
9	
10	MR. USHER: Engine room.
11	MSTR ARVIND: ISP (phonetic) second
12	engineer.
13	MR. USHER: And where was the chief
14	engineer?
15	MSTR ARVIND: I don't know where the chief
16	engineer, I not spoken, so I don't know
17	MR. USHER: Where was the chief officer?
18	MSTR ARVIND: Chief officer is in forward
19	station.
20	MR. USHER: Forward station?
21	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, he was forward station.
22	MR. USHER: Okay. So after you talked to
23	the second engineer by telephone in the engine room,
24	then you went back out to the starboard bridge wing
25	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.

1	MR. USHER: and you
2	MSTR ARVIND: Port side bridge wing.
3	MR. USHER: Or port side?
4	MSTR ARVIND: Just port side to look in this
5	(indiscernible).
6	MR. USHER: Yes.
7	MSTR ARVIND: And then I again came back,
8	and then I again pressed this I starting press I
9	dead slow ahead, and then I again press slow ahead,
10	because pilot is going full ahead.
11	MR. USHER: Where was the pilot at?
12	MSTR ARVIND: Pilot is also just near the
13	door.
14	MR. USHER: In the bridge?
15	MSTR ARVIND: Not inside the bridge, he is
16	outside the bridge, just near the door
17	(Simultaneous speaking.)
18	MR. USHER: Okay. On the starboard side?
19	MSTR ARVIND: The starboard side.
20	MR. USHER: Starboard side?
21	MSTR ARVIND: Starboard side.
22	MR. USHER: Second pilot?
23	MSTR ARVIND: Second pilot is port side.
24	MR. USHER: Port side, okay. So did the
25	pilot you and the pilot identified engine problems,

1	or you wasn't getting engine response for slow ahead?
2	MSTR ARVIND: I give him slow ahead, but not
3	
4	MR. USHER: Okay.
5	(Simultaneous speaking.)
6	MSTR ARVIND: slow ahead.
7	MR. USHER: So did the pilot recommend
8	dropping the anchors?
9	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, just when we going
10	outside, and then when we drop anchor, then pilot also
11	said we
12	MR. USHER: Okay.
13	MSTR ARVIND: drop both anchors, drop
14	both anchors.
15	MR. USHER: Okay. Did you did you feel
16	the impact when you hit the the mooring dolphin, did
17	you feel it?
18	MSTR ARVIND: Impact?
19	MR. USHER: Yes, did you did you feel the
20	ship hit the mooring dolphin?
21	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, because we are dropping
22	anchor. We are dropping anchor and looking at the
23	we never seen this again, this port side.
24	MR. USHER: Okay.
25	MSTR ARVIND: At that time, we are in the

1	pilot is starboard side, and then again I not going
2	port side. No one have time to see it. Then I says,
3	drop anchor. I calls second officer on walkie-talkie
4	(indiscernible). After, he go forward and we drop
5	other anchor also.
6	MR. USHER: How many shackles?
7	MSTR ARVIND: We dropped three seconds on
8	that
9	MR. USHER: Three?
10	MSTR ARVIND: Three seconds on that.
11	MR. USHER: On the water, three on the
12	water?
13	MSTR ARVIND: Three on the water.
14	MR. USHER: Did did the anchor fetch up,
15	stop you?
16	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, anchor took
17	MR. USHER: That is what stopped you?
18	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
19	MR. USHER: Okay.
20	MSTR ARVIND: And same time, they say engine
21	also, they said the you know, they pressed emergency
22	stop, going down, they stopped, but it will take time
23	to stop.
24	MR. USHER: Okay. After after you made
25	impact, after you hit the dolphin and the fire erupted,

1	did did you get an engine order?
2	MSTR ARVIND: No. Then I was basically to
3	fight an extreme
4	MR. USHER: Okay.
5	(Simultaneous speaking.)
6	MSTR ARVIND: Then I
7	MR. USHER: How soon did you come ahead and
8	weigh anchor?
9	MSTR ARVIND: After the picking up anchor,
10	these four, five tug came, came fast, and then in
11	between, from that dock to here. Then pilot asked can
12	we try your engine, use the engine? Then I asked the
13	engine room, can we use the engine? Then they were
14	saying, just we check. Then after that, after 10, 15
15	minutes, they inform me, you can try. Then we use
16	engine, only dead slow ahead.
17	MR. USHER: Did the chief engineer ever come
18	to the bridge?
19	MSTR ARVIND: No. Chief engineer later on
20	came on.
21	MR. USHER: Did you speak with the chief
22	engineer?
23	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, later on I speak with the
24	chief engineer.
25	MR. USHER: Was that when you got to the

1	dock here, or when he was coming
2	MSTR ARVIND: Incoming, incoming
3	MR. USHER: Coming to the dock. Did he
4	did he did the engineer, did he say he had any
5	engine issues, any engine problems?
6	MSTR ARVIND: No. I asked, but he's saying
7	I I don't know this, I don't know this. If engineer
8	don't know, then how I can know? I asked him what
9	happened and why it is: I don't know this, I don't
10	know.
11	MR. USHER: Was he in the engine room?
12	MSTR ARVIND: This mechanical
13	(indiscernible), I don't know.
14	MR. USHER: Was the chief engineer in the
15	engine room when you were in this operation?
16	MSTR ARVIND: I called I talk with second
17	engineer, but chief engineer also, they are not I
18	not talk. I talk with second engineer.
19	MR. USHER: Okay. Okay, Captain, thank you.
20	I have no further questions.
21	PARTICIPANT: No questions.
22	MS. NORSTRUD: I have no questions.
23	MR. WISNIEWSKI: All right, sir. Luke
24	Wisniewski, NTSB. Just wanted to go back a little bit
25	further. Captain, you said this was the first time you

1	were on this vessel?
2	MSTR ARVIND: This vessel, first time, but
3	sister ship, we run, I have sister ship also, so this
4	size of vessel, I have done.
5	MR. WISNIEWSKI: This size
6	MSTR ARVIND: And
7	MR. WISNIEWSKI: a sister vessel?
8	MSTR ARVIND: This owner, I did it with this
9	owner.
10	MR. WISNIEWSKI: With this owner?
11	MSTR ARVIND: Yeah.
12	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Have you ever met okay,
13	so you have you ever worked with this engineering
14	crew before?
15	MSTR ARVIND: No, never, first time, first
16	chief engineer, second engineer, time. All engineers,
17	first time.
18	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay.
19	MSTR ARVIND: I never have before.
20	MR. WISNIEWSKI: And how do you feel
21	comfortable with your engineer, your engineering crew?
22	MSTR ARVIND: Yeah
23	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Are you comfortable with
24	them?
25	MSTR ARVIND: Yes, I am comfortable with

	45
1	them.
2	MR. WISNIEWSKI: No disciplinary issues with
3	the
4	MSTR ARVIND: No
5	MR. WISNIEWSKI: chief
6	MSTR ARVIND: no
7	MR. WISNIEWSKI: second, anyone in there?
8	MSTR ARVIND: No, no.
9	MR. WISNIEWSKI: Okay.
10	MSTR ARVIND: No.
11	MR. WISNIEWSKI: That's all I have. Thank
12	you.
13	PARTICIPANT: No further.
14	PARTICIPANT: If I can ask a couple, I will.
15	Go ahead.
16	PARTICIPANT: Okay. Captain, had you
17	experienced any issues with this vessel having an
18	accelerated RPM after giving a command, a movement
19	command?
20	MSTR ARVIND: An incident before this
21	incident?
22	PARTICIPANT: Before this incident.
23	MSTR ARVIND: Well, I never (indiscernible).
24	PARTICIPANT: Was any such incident or
25	problem with the vessel ever reported to you from
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1	either your your engineering crew, vessel
2	management, ship owners, anybody? Had they ever
3	reported any similar issue prior to this incident?
4	MSTR ARVIND: No.
5	PARTICIPANT: Your chief engineer, he
6	well, let me back up. You all are investigating why
7	this happened with the RPM acceleration, correct?
8	MSTR ARVIND: This problem
9	(Simultaneous speaking.)
10	PARTICIPANT: investigation?
11	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
12	PARTICIPANT: We don't know why it happened,
13	correct?
14	MSTR ARVIND: Yes.
15	(Pause.)
16	PARTICIPANT: Actually, all right, that's
17	all I got.
18	All right, Captain. Lastly, in
19	your personal and professional opinion, why do you
20	think this incident took place? Why do you think this
21	happened?
22	MSTR ARVIND: It's totally bad luck. We
23	never estimated this type of incident, and within
24	three, four minutes, everything happened.
25	All right, Captain. Do you
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1	have any questions for us?
2	MSTR ARVIND: No questions.
3	All right. That concludes the
4	interview. It is 1640.
5	(Whereupon, the interview went off the
6	record at 4:40 p.m.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E

MATTER: Allision Involving the Aframax River on the Houston Ship Channel, Sept. 6, 2016 Accident No. DCA16FM055 Interview of Kumar Arvind

DATE: 09-07-16

I hereby certify that the attached transcription of page 1 to 48 inclusive are to the best of my professional ability a true, accurate, and complete record of the above referenced proceedings as contained on the provided audio recording; further that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this action in which this proceeding has taken place; and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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