



MEMO:

DATE: December 14, 2023

TO: Nancy-Ellen Zusman, CTA Chief Safety and Security Officer

FROM: James Harper, Chief Engineer Infrastructure

RE: November 16, 2023 – Collision on Yellow Line Between Revenue Train and Snow Fighter
CTA Infrastructure Division Report on Early Post-Accident Investigation Tasks and Data Gathering

Event Synopsis and Corresponding Infrastructure

On Thursday, November 16, 2023, at approximately 10:30 hours in the morning, Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Yellow Line Run #593 was operating as a two-car consist (lead car 5600) on a normal round trip towards Howard Terminal. As the train approached Howard Terminal in the southbound direction, it struck maintenance vehicle S500, a non-revenue, diesel powered locomotive used to remove snow from the tracks (also known as a Snow Fighter). There were six CTA employees onboard the Snow Fighter and 31 passengers and crew onboard the revenue train.

This memo provides a summary of the efforts by CTA Infrastructure Division to collect data around the time of the incident, and the results of early post-accident testing and analysis of the various infrastructure systems that were potentially involved in the accident. This report will be supplemented with additional reports that provide details on accident re-enactment efforts and a system-wide assessment of CTA's signal system design.

Accident Scene


Figure 1 shows an aerial view of the accident scene east of where southbound Yellow Line trains approaching Howard Terminal Facility pass under a CTA bridge supporting a turnback "loop" track. The Yellow Line passenger train collided with the southbound Snow Fighter as it was stopped and waiting for signal clearance into the terminal facility. Following the collision, the two vehicles "rebounded" away from each other and came to a stop approximately 20 feet apart. The passenger train sustained extensive damage to the front of the train, indicating a relatively high speed event had occurred. The Snow Fighter had less damage due to the presence of the broom attachment that absorbed much of the collision energy.



Figure #1: Photo of Accident Scene

Yellow Line Route

Figure 2 below shows a map of the Yellow Line route. The Yellow Line provides a connection between the Howard Intermodal Terminal and two stops in the Village of Skokie (Oakton and Dempster). Under typical operations, two two-car trains operate on the Yellow Line with headways of around 10-12 minutes. Trains operate on a dedicated, two-track right-of-way leaving/approaching Howard Terminal in a depression, then rising to run on an elevated embankment structure, and finally running at-grade through a number of grade crossings while serving two stations. The trains reach speeds of 55 mph on a significant portion of the route. Note that CTA's heavy overhaul facility (Skokie Shops) is located approximately at the East Prairie crossing shown in the map in Figure 2 on the next page. Trains entering and leaving the Skokie Shops use the Yellow Line to connect to the rest of the CTA rail network at the Hamlin Crossover.






Figure #2: Route and System Map of CTA Yellow Line



Figure 3 provides an aerial view of the Yellow Line tracks in the vicinity of the accident scene. Southbound trains returning to Howard Terminal (from left to right) operate on a downhill grade in a cut that runs under a number of bridges, including the Custer Avenue Bridge, a commuter rail (Metra) bridge, the Chicago Avenue Bridge, and finally a CTA bridge that allows a turnback loop track to pass over the Yellow Line tracks.





Figure #3: Aerial View of Howard Yard and Yellow Line Track

Location of Collision

Track

Figures 4, 5, and 6 on the following pages provide track plans for the Yellow Line tracks approaching Howard Terminal, and the tracks associated with the Howard Terminal and Yard. Note that southbound Yellow Line trains approaching Howard encounter an approximately 1400 foot radius curve that limits the line-of-sight for train operators (see Figure 7A for a photo showing the perspective of a train operator when approaching the curve). Figure 7 provides the track profile for the Yellow Line tracks approaching Howard Terminal. Note that southbound Yellow Line trains operate on a negative grade of -1.9% as they approach Howard, providing for a more challenging braking environment, coupled with the horizontal curve at the bottom of the grade.



Approximate Location of Collision

Figure #4: Track Plan of Yellow Line Approaching Howard Terminal




Figure #5: Track Plan of Howard Yard




Figure #6: Expanded Track Plan of Howard Yard and Accident Site




Figure #7: Profile of Track Approaching Accident Site



Figure #7A: Operator View of Downhill Grade Approaching Custer Avenue Bridge

Note horizontal curve at bottom of grade



Signal System

Figure 8 provides a single line description of the Yellow Line train control system approaching Howard Terminal. The Yellow Line Train Control system was installed in the 1970's and provides for train detection and cab signaling using a series of sequential audio frequency track circuits varying in length from 300 feet to 2,000 feet. The cab signaling system controls the speed of trains to ensure that they maintain safe spacing with trains ahead, and when approaching civil constraints such as horizontal curves and interlockings. All wayside train control electronics and relays for this section of track are located in the Asbury Signal House located directly under the Asbury Street Bridge.

Onboard the trains, a carborne automatic train control (ATC) package deciphers the speed commands transmitted through the rails and interfaces with train propulsion and braking systems, as well as with a display unit in the cab that provides the operator with information on allowable speed and actual speed. Audible and visual alerts are also present in the cab that indicate to the operator that the train speed must be adjusted. Failure to adhere to these alerts in a timely fashion results in an automatic command to brake the train to a full stop through the application of a maximum service brake (full dynamic braking with the addition of intermittent friction braking).

In the conditions leading up to the accident, the Snow Fighter was stopped in the SK1-9T track circuit waiting for a permissive signal to enter the Howard Interlocking complex. The Incident train was travelling southbound and was approaching the Howard Terminal at a speed of 55 mph. When the SK1-9T track circuit is occupied, the signal system is designed to support an approaching train travelling at 55 mph through the SK1-44T track circuit. Upon reaching the SK1-26T track circuit, the cab signal system removes a permissive cab signal speed, thus telling the train to begin braking to zero speed in order to stop before reaching the western limits of the SK1-9T track circuit (note that at the time of the accident, the Snow Fighter was located 250 feet beyond the western limit of the SK1-9T track circuit).




Figure #8: Train Control Blocks in Approach to Accident Location




Engineering Analysis

Post Accident Investigation of the Signal System

One of the early tasks that was undertaken following the accident was to determine if the signal system had detected the presence of the Snow Fighter as it moved from its location at the Skokie Shops Heavy Overhaul Facility to the Howard Terminal. The CTA has a software system called QuicTrac that is housed at its Control Center to monitor the movement of all trains on the system. This system uses the train control track circuit occupancy information housed at over 100 wayside signal houses, and sends the occupancy information to the Control Center where it is assembled into a train tracking display tool that includes information on train headways.

The QuicTrac information is also shared with another tool called Track Circuit Monitoring (TCM) that presents train movements in a “string line” format and automatically analyzes the movements to detect failures in the signal system (e.g. failure to detect train occupancy).

Figure 9 provides a copy of the TCM tool display for the southbound Yellow Line tracks at the time of the incident. Trains movements are tracked for the southbound direction of travel from right to left in the Figure 9 diagram (e.g., trains leaving the Dempster Terminal Station are shown on the right side of the diagram, and trains approaching Howard Terminal are shown on the left side of the diagram). As the train progresses southbound, it enters and leaves successive track circuits that are labeled at the top of the display. Time is shown on the vertical (“Y”) axis and progresses from top to bottom.



Sleet Fighter Leaving Skokie Shops

Incident Train Travelling Towards Howard


Figure #9: String Line of Track Occupancies Showing Movement of Snow Fighter and Incident Train



Figure 9 confirms that the signal system detected the presence of the Snow Fighter train as it departed the Skokie Shops Heavy Overhaul Facility and began travelling east (southbound) towards Howard Terminal. Note that when the Snow Fighter arrived in the SK1-9T track circuit it stopped and waited for a permissive signal to enter the terminal facility. While it waited in this track circuit, it resulted in the display of a red vertical bar which is a feature of the TCM tool that highlights a track circuit occupancy that does not get released (due to the accident in this case). The red vertical bar in this case confirms that the Snow Fighter’s presence in the SK1-9T track circuit was constantly detected by the train control system from the time it entered this track circuit.

Figure 9 also confirms that the incident train was properly detected by the signal system through its entire southbound trip from Dempster Terminal to the SK1-9T track circuit. Note that the incident train was following the Snow Fighter as it left the Skokie Shop facility, and over time, the headway appears to have shortened as the incident train was able to move faster than the Snow Fighter.

Figure 10 provides an expanded view of the TCM tool in the section of track involved in the collision. Note that the Snow Fighter train was occupying the SK1-9T track circuit for approximately two minutes prior to the arrival of the incident train into the same track circuit.



Sleet Fighter Approaching Collision Site

Incident Train Approaching Collision Site

Figure #10: Expanded View of String Line Chart Showing Track Circuit Occupancies Showing Movement of Snow Fighter and Incident Train



Data from the Incident Train

Figure 11 below provides a display of the incident train's Event Recorder Unit (ERU). Each of the 5000 Series cars has an onboard ERU that collects and stores data on a wide range of vehicle parameters. A laptop is used to download the data and software is used to present the data in a manner that summarizes the data critical to the event. Figure 11 has been annotated to provide additional information (shown in red text) that further explains the data presented and critical changes in the data. Time is shown progressing from left to right on the bottom ("X") axis of the display. Some key data to observe in Figure 11 is the ATC allowable speed, the actual speed of both cars (i.e., the "A" and the "B" car), the position of the Master Controller, and the presence of the various types of braking available (e.g., dynamic braking, friction braking and track brake).

Analysis of the data confirms that the train received an "ATC Allowable Speed" of 0 (zero) mph as it entered the SK1-26T track circuit travelling at 55 mph (as expected per the Signal System design). Within 1-2 seconds, the train operator responded to the zero speed command by transitioning the Master Controller from propulsion to the "Full-Service Brake" position (as noted in the top line of Figure 11). Almost immediately, the train began to experience slip slide conditions (as shown in the solid bars at the bottom of Figure 11) and the dynamic braking began to "oscillate" as required by the "slip/slide" feature equipped on the 5000 Series cars.

At this point, the train was travelling on the downhill grade and the train operator realized that the train was not slowing down fast enough. This understanding by the train operator was complicated by the fact that the train speed sensors were transitioning quickly to zero speed (due to the wheels locking up) while the train was moving much faster. At this point, the train operator moved the Master Controller to the "Emergency Brake" position (as shown in the top line of Figure 11) which resulted in the train applying both its friction brakes and its track brakes.

Note that at the same time the train operator applies the "Emergency Brakes", the dynamic braking system appears to "shut off" as speed sensors indicate a zero speed. After all axles came to low speeds, dynamic braking effort fades due to slow motor rotational speeds. The AC propulsion system has no means to regain the rotational electric fields needed for dynamic braking without previous motoring effort. As the dynamic braking system shuts down, the wheels on the "B" car begin to release, and the associated speed sensor on the "B" car begins to indicate speed again, up to approximately 38 mph. Note that the friction brake on the "A" car remained applied throughout the time the train was in "Emergency Brake" mode, however, the "B" car released some of the friction brake pressure for a period and then re-applied full pressure again. Also note that at some point, the train operator applied the "Emergency Brake Mushroom" button as evidenced by the solid bar in the second line of Figure 11 (this use of the mushroom was redundant with the use of the Emergency Brake position on the Master Controller, therefore had no additional effect on the train's braking at this point as the track brake was already applied).




Figure #11: Event Recorder Data from Incident Train (see Appendix I for Larger Scale Version)

Figures 12a-12e provide data from the incident train’s onboard ATC data logger. Similar to the ERU, the data logger monitors and stores critical data associated with onboard ATC functions. For this data, functions are described along the top (“X”) axis and time progresses from bottom to top of each page along the bottom (“Y”) axis (note that the time of the ATC data logger may not precisely coincide with the time of the ERU). Critical points in the incident train’s movements are highlighted in red in the left margin, including “Loss of Cab”, “Stop Code” and application of “Full Service Brake”, all of which were recorded early in the train’s recognition that the wayside cab signaling system had directed a “zero speed command”.

Figure 12a highlights when CTA Infrastructure Division believes a “true” zero speed was reached, upon the point of collision at time 10:30:45. One column to focus on is the “DETENTS” column which is associated with the position of the Master Controller, with positions including FS = Full Service Braking and EM = Emergency Braking. One additional note is that the ATC data logger speed is associated with the “B” car only, and as shown on the ERU data, this speed sensor appears to somewhat comply with the ERU data that indicates the “B” car wheels began to rotate again shortly before impact. The last data point to note is the “Longitude g” (acceleration) data point at 10:30:49, when an aggressive -1.5 g followed by a +1.9 g force were measured, which is believed to be the time of impact.



U S E R R E T I C R E U E R F E E N
M E A L C A L S F O T O C C I F A D
D B D D Y R A A U R C I S S O I T T E I L E W
E E P P E C R R E C K S T T U T E I L I L E D
S T A V E E C E E T A T U R C D D
P E D 2 R R R Y B A B C C A T T E D A A B C D
I E N M E I I A C O D A S R N I I E L I A A D S
M E T A R O T L C T T D S R C D O I I T D T P
E S R R E P R E N N D C C C A E A D

#	160057	2000-01-01 00:00:09	0 FS U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160056	2000-01-01 00:00:08	0 FS U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160055	2000-01-01 00:00:08	0 FS U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160054	2000-01-01 00:00:08	0 FS U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160053	2000-01-01 00:00:08	0 FS U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160052	2000-01-01 00:00:08	0 FS U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160051	2000-01-01 00:00:08	0 FS U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160050	2000-01-01 00:00:08	0 V	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160049	2000-01-01 00:00:04	0 V	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160048	2000-01-01 00:00:04	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160047	2000-01-01 00:00:04	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160046	2000-01-01 00:00:04	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160045	2000-01-01 00:00:03	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160044	2000-01-01 00:00:03	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160043	2000-01-01 00:00:03	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160042	2000-01-01 00:00:01	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160041	2000-01-01 00:00:01	0 V	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
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#	160039	2000-01-01 00:00:00	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160038	2000-01-01 00:00:00	0 U	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160037	2000-01-01 00:00:00	0	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160036	2000-01-01 00:00:00	0	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	00	00	0mp
#	160035	2000-01-01 00:00:00	0	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	00	00	0mp
#	160024	2000-01-01 00:00:00	0	STOP	0	00000	No Station ID	No Station ID	No Station ID	0.0	0.0	0.0	00	00	00	0mp
#	160023	2023-11-16 10:00:49	0 MP D U	STOP Y	0	19200	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	1.9	0.7	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160022	2023-11-16 10:00:49	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19300	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	-1.5	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160021	2023-11-16 10:00:49	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19200	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160020	2023-11-16 10:00:48	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19225	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160029	2023-11-16 10:00:47	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19200	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160028	2023-11-16 10:00:47	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19150	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160027	2023-11-16 10:00:46	0 CT D V	STOP Y	0	19150	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160026	2023-11-16 10:00:46	0 D V	STOP Y	0	19150	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160025	2023-11-16 10:00:46	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19150	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160024	2023-11-16 10:00:46	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19150	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160023	2023-11-16 10:00:46	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19150	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160022	2023-11-16 10:00:46	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19150	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160021	2023-11-16 10:00:45	0 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19125	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp
#	160020	2023-11-16 10:00:45	1 EM D V	STOP Y	0	19125	YEL Hoverd	No Station ID	YEL Hoverd	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mp

POINT OF COLLISION
(HIGH POSITIVE &
NEGATIVE
LONGITUDINAL
ACCELERATION)

Figure #12a: Vehicle Onboard ATC Event Log (Page 1 of 5)



CTA Post-Accident Engineering Report

December 2023

U S E R T R I C G R E F N
M E A C A L C U F T N R
H E A S F O T O C C I F A D
E A I E U
L X A
D N C E T X R
O U A I A L
N L E C V C L
D Y R A A U R C I S S D I T T E L E W
C R R E C K S T T U T E I L I L E
E C E E T A A T U R C D D
Y D A B C C A T T D A A B C D
I A C D A U N I I E L L A D A S
L C T T D S R C O O I T D T P
E S R R E P R E N N D C C C A E A D

160019	2023-11-16 10:00:45	2 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19125 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160018	2023-11-16 10:00:45	2 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19125 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160017	2023-11-16 10:00:45	2 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19125 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160016	2023-11-16 10:00:45	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19125 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160015	2023-11-16 10:00:45	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19125 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160014	2023-11-16 10:00:45	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19125 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160013	2023-11-16 10:00:45	4 IM D	STOP Y	0	19125 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160012	2023-11-16 10:00:45	4 IM D	STOP Y	0	19100 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160011	2023-11-16 10:00:44	4 IM D	STOP Y	0	19100 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160010	2023-11-16 10:00:44	5 IM D	STOP Y	0	19100 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160009	2023-11-16 10:00:44	5 IM D	STOP Y	0	19100 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160008	2023-11-16 10:00:44	5 IM D	STOP Y	0	19100 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160007	2023-11-16 10:00:44	4 IM D	STOP Y	0	19100 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160006	2023-11-16 10:00:44	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19100 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160005	2023-11-16 10:00:44	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160004	2023-11-16 10:00:43	3 FS D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160003	2023-11-16 10:00:43	2 FS D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160002	2023-11-16 10:00:43	2 D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
160001	2023-11-16 10:00:43	2 D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159999	2023-11-16 10:00:43	1 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159998	2023-11-16 10:00:42	0 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159997	2023-11-16 10:00:42	0 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159996	2023-11-16 10:00:41	1 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159995	2023-11-16 10:00:41	2 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159994	2023-11-16 10:00:41	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159993	2023-11-16 10:00:41	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159992	2023-11-16 10:00:41	3 IM D U	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159991	2023-11-16 10:00:40	4 IM D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159990	2023-11-16 10:00:40	5 IM D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159989	2023-11-16 10:00:40	5 IM D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159988	2023-11-16 10:00:40	6 IM D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159987	2023-11-16 10:00:40	6 FS D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159986	2023-11-16 10:00:40	6 FS D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159985	2023-11-16 10:00:40	6 FS D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159984	2023-11-16 10:00:40	7 FS D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF
159983	2023-11-16 10:00:40	8 FS D	STOP Y	0	19050 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	0mF

Figure #12b: Vehicle Onboard ATC Event Log (Page 2 of 5)



U	M	H	E	A	E	U	L	X	A									
S	M	E	A	D	N	C	E	T	X									
E	C	A	L	C	U	F	T	N	R									
R	E	S	F	O	T	O	C	C	I									
T	U	A	B	D	Y	R	A	A	U									
R	E	E	P	P	E	C	R	R	E									
I	B	R	S	R	E	C	M	S	T									
C	R	T	P	I	E	N	M	E	I									
E	U	M	E	T	A	R	O	D	T									
R	B	O	Q	D	E	S	R	R	E									
h	159944	2023-11-16	10:00:00	04 FS D		STOP Y	0	18725 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159945	2023-11-16	10:00:00	05 FS D		STOP Y	0	18725 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159946	2023-11-16	10:00:00	06 FS D		STOP Y	0	18725 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159947	2023-11-16	10:00:29	06 FS D		STOP Y	0	18700 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159948	2023-11-16	10:00:29	07 FS D		STOP Y	0	18700 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159949	2023-11-16	10:00:29	08 FS D		STOP Y	0	18700 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159950	2023-11-16	10:00:29	09 FS D		STOP Y	0	18700 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159951	2023-11-16	10:00:29	09 FS D		STOP Y	0	18700 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159952	2023-11-16	10:00:28	09 FS D		STOP Y	0	18625 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159953	2023-11-16	10:00:28	09 FS D		STOP Y	0	18625 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159954	2023-11-16	10:00:28	09 FS D		STOP Y	0	0.101 18625 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159955	2023-11-16	10:00:28	40 FS D	275.0mc 06.2mc 2180CPM 13<	STOP Y	0	0.101 18625 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159956	2023-11-16	10:00:28	41 FS D	275.0mc 06.2mc 2180CPM 13<	STOP Y	0	0.101 18625 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159957	2023-11-16	10:00:27	41 FS D	275.0mc 06.2mc 2180CPM 13<	STOP Y	0	0.101 18575 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159958	2023-11-16	10:00:27	42 FS D	275.0mc 06.2mc 2180CPM 13<	STOP Y	0	0.101 18575 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159959	2023-11-16	10:00:27	42 FS D	87.5mc 67.5mc 6860CPM 77<	STOP Y	0	0.101 18575 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159960	2023-11-16	10:00:27	43 FS D	87.5mc 67.5mc 6860CPM 77<	STOP Y	0	0.101 18575 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159961	2023-11-16	10:00:27	44 FS D		STOP Y	0	18575 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159962	2023-11-16	10:00:27	45 FS D		STOP Y	0	18575 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159963	2023-11-16	10:00:26	45 FS D		STOP Y	0	18500 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159964	2023-11-16	10:00:26	46 FS D		STOP Y	0	18500 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159965	2023-11-16	10:00:26	47 FS D		STOP Y	0	18500 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159966	2023-11-16	10:00:26	48 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18500 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159967	2023-11-16	10:00:26	49 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18500 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159968	2023-11-16	10:00:25	49 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18425 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159969	2023-11-16	10:00:25	50 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18425 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159970	2023-11-16	10:00:25	51 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18425 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159971	2023-11-16	10:00:25	51 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18425 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159972	2023-11-16	10:00:25	51 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18425 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159973	2023-11-16	10:00:24	51 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18325 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159974	2023-11-16	10:00:24	52 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18325 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159975	2023-11-16	10:00:24	53 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18325 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159976	2023-11-16	10:00:24	54 FS D	0X 0X 0X 0X	STOP Y	0	0X 18325 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159977	2023-11-16	10:00:24	54 FS D	16.2mc 16.2mc 06920CPM 100<	STOP Y	0	0.112 18325 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159978	2023-11-16	10:00:23	54 FS D	16.2mc 16.2mc 06920CPM 100<	STOP Y	0	0.112 18275 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159979	2023-11-16	10:00:23	54 FS D	16.2mc 16.2mc 06920CPM 100<	STOP Y	0	0.097 18275 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00
h	159980	2023-11-16	10:00:23	54 FS D	16.2mc 16.2mc 06920CPM 100<	STOP Y	0	0.070 18275 YEL Howard	No Station ID	YEL Howard	0.0	0.0	0.0	0X	00	0X	00	00

Figure #12d: Vehicle Onboard ATC Event Log (Page 4 of 5)



CTA Post-Accident Engineering Report

December 2023

U S E R E D C O U N T R Y I N C O R P O R A T E D ... M E A D N C E T X R O U A I A L ... C A L C U F T N R T R N L E C V C L ... S F O T O C C I F A D R C A R C A C O ... D Y R A A U R C I S S O I T T E L E W ... E C R R E C K S T T U T E I L I L E ... S T A V E E C E E T A T U R C I D ... P E D 2 R R R Y B A B C C A T Y E D A A B C D ... E N M E I I A C O A U N I I E L I A O A S ... E T A R O O T L C T T D S R C O D I T D T P ... D S N O D D E E S R R E P R E N N D C C C A E A D

FS BRAKE

STOP CODE

LOSS OF CAB

Table with columns for event ID, timestamp, location, and various status codes. Includes rows for FS BRAKE, STOP CODE, and LOSS OF CAB events.

Figure #12e: Vehicle Onboard ATC Event Log (Page 5 of 5)



Post Accident Testing and Analysis

As a follow-up to the accident, CTA Infrastructure immediately began to perform a series of measurements, tests, and analysis. One of the first tasks was to measure the location of the collision site with respect to the signal system block boundaries. As shown in Figure 8 above, the accident location was estimated to be 250 feet beyond the western boundary of the SK1-9T track circuit. Additional measurements were made to verify the length of each track circuit in approach to the accident site, including for track circuits SK1-44T, SK1-26T, and SK1-15T. Note that field measurements actually revealed that the track circuit lengths in approach to SK1-9T were slightly longer than what was shown on the drawings.

Without having the benefit of the ERU or Carborne ATC data directly following the incident (these downloads were being postponed pending arrival of the National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB]), CTA Infrastructure attempted to verify that the signal system was functioning as designed. Early testing included simulating the movement of approaching trains using track relays inside the Asbury Signal House. All of these simulated tests confirmed proper operation of the house equipment. Subsequent testing focused on verifying that the speed commands being transmitted to the trains through the rails were in accordance with the design, including attempts to look for possible “rogue” signals emanating from the other track or further away on the same track. Using a “Track Sniffer” device, CTA Infrastructure was able to confirm that the speed commands transmitted through the rails were in accordance with the design.

At this point, the NTSB had arrived, and data logs were available, as were highlights of the interview with the train operator. The investigation focus began to move away from a signal system functional failure, and towards the actual braking distance allowed by the signal system design, and the assumptions made in the design regarding rail adhesion and brake rates. It became apparent that the assumptions used in the braking distance design from the 1970’s did not match CTA’s current braking distance criteria, in particular given the downhill grade of 1.9% and the degraded brake rate value of 1.9 mph/s.

Figure 13 below provides a sample of the braking distance calculations associated with “ideal” conditions (1,689 feet) versus the conservative braking distance associated with CTA’s current braking criteria (2,625 feet). Calculations revealed that the maximum safe braking distance that was present would only have resulted in a “safe stop” (stopping prior to the SK1-9T track circuit) had the braking conditions been near perfect (e.g. no need for safety factor and a non-degraded brake rate of 2.8 mph/s). As shown in Figure 11 above, the incident train’s brake rate was interpolated from the vehicle data recorder to be in the range of 0.91 mph/s (even lower than the conservative assumptions in CTA’s design criteria).




Figure #13: Calculations of Braking Distances Approaching Collision Site

The investigation team then began looking for reasons why the brake rate may not have met current CTA design criteria, and focused on the condition of the top of the rail on the downhill grade. Figure 14 provides an example of what appeared to be a residue of leaf materials that had been “crushed” into the rail head over the previous days leading up to the accident. Leaf residue is a known contributor to loss of adhesion between train wheels and the rails.



Figure #14: Leaf Residue on Top of Rail Approaching Accident Location



Conclusions and Recommendations from the Initial Investigation

The following conclusions were derived by CTA Infrastructure from the initial investigation into the accident:

- The incident train impacted the Snow Fighter vehicle at a reasonably high speed that resulted in severe damage to the lead car of the train.
- The train operator's ability to stop the train was affected by the presence of the downhill grade in approach to the accident site.
- The train operator's ability to visualize the hazard ahead posed by the presence of the Snow Fighter was impeded by the horizontal curve in the track just prior to the collision point. Similarly, the operator's line of sight was impeded by the presence of multiple bridges and associated embankments for vehicular and railroad traffic spanning over the Yellow Line tracks approaching the collision point.
- The signal system was confirmed (via a variety of post-accident tests) to be functioning as designed. This includes confirmation that the Snow Fighter vehicle was recognized by the signal system throughout its trip from the Skokie Shops facility to the scene of the collision (i.e. the Snow Fighter was continuously shunting track circuits as expected during its trip).
- The operator appeared to react to the signal system's zero speed command in a timely fashion and to put the train into Full Service Brake as they descended the downhill grade.
- At some point, the operator realized that the Full Service Brakes (i.e. Dynamic) were not performing as needed, and placed the Master Controller into Emergency Brake, triggering the immediate application of the friction brakes and the track brakes.
- The train's braking systems began to react to "false" zero speed conditions from the speed sensors that resulted from the wheels appearing to be in a slipping or sliding condition (speed sensors monitor axle rotation). The unexpected reaction of the brake systems to these "false" zero speed conditions needs further investigation.
- The signal system design for the track circuits in approach to the collision site does not provide for a safe braking distance in accordance with CTA current safe braking criteria (there was insufficient safe braking distances provided per current criteria).
- The rails on the downhill grade in approach to the collision site appear to have been compromised in their ability to provide a reasonable level of adhesion with the train wheels due to a contaminate believed to be associated with crushed leaves.




Recommendations for Further Investigation

The following recommendations for further investigation were derived by CTA Infrastructure from the initial investigation into the accident:

- Once the accident vehicles have been removed from the site, accident re-enactment tests should be performed with a live two-car train from the same fleet (5000 Series). Re-enactment tests should attempt to replicate the conditions leading up to the collision, including simulated occupancy of the SK1-9T track circuit, replication of operator reactions, and replication of the environmental conditions present at the time of the accident. Data logs from the onboard recorders and wayside recorders should be captured. Attempts should then be made to clean the top of rails of the contaminates and re-run the re-enactment tests.
- Further review of the logs taken at the time of the accident should be performed to better understand how the train was reacting to braking commands/conditions leading up to the collision. In particular, a review of the slip/slide logic present on the 5000 Series cars should be performed, and how this logic ultimately affects the train's braking system logic and performance.
- A review of all signal system installations on the CTA system should be performed to verify braking distances meet CTA's current braking criteria. Any installations that are found to have insufficient braking distances should be mitigated by implementing temporary slow zones until such time modifications can be made to bring the braking distances into compliance with current criteria.




Appendix I: Larger Scale View of ERU Log Data Shown in Figure 11





Appendix II: Braking Profiles for Various Braking Criteria Assumptions



Reaction Distance:
 $RD = D_C + D_A + D_{EE}$

Safe Braking Distance:
 $SBD = D_C + D_A + D_{EE} + SF(D_E) + D_{OH}$



MEMO:

DATE: December 15, 2023

TO: Nancy Ellen Zusman, CTA Chief Safety and Security Officer

FROM: James Harper, Chief Engineer Infrastructure

RE: November 16, 2023, Collision on Yellow Line Between Revenue Train and Snow Fighter
Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #1 and Mitigation Efforts Using Test Trains

Event Synopsis

On Thursday, November 16, 2023, at approximately 10:30 hours in the morning, Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Yellow Line Run #593 was operating as a two-car consist (lead car 5600) on a normal round trip towards Howard Terminal. As the train approached Howard Terminal in the southbound direction, it struck maintenance vehicle S500, a non-revenue, diesel powered locomotive used to remove snow from the tracks (also known as a Snow Fighter). There were six CTA employees onboard the Snow Fighter and 31 passengers and crew onboard the revenue train.

Test Train Re-Enactments

Test Train Re-Enactment #1 (November 20, 2023)

This section provides a report on the efforts by CTA on November 20, 2023, to re-enact the collision conditions using a test train and using simulated occupancy of the section of track that the Snow Fighter was occupying at the time of the incident.

Re-Enactment #1 was performed for the following reasons:

- Attempt to demonstrate the effects of slippery rail on the overall braking capabilities of a two-car 5000 Series train.
- Attempt to demonstrate how the train reacts to a typical approach to Howard when there is no train ahead.
- Attempt to demonstrate how a two-car 5000 Series train reacts to the presence of a train ahead by simulating a vehicle in the section of track that the Snow Fighter was occupying.
- Attempt to understand how the slip/slide system on a two-car 5000 Series train can affect train braking performance.
- Attempt to understand how operators may react to a slip/slide conditions using available braking options, and how these differing reactions may affect overall braking performance.



- Attempt to demonstrate that a proposed slow zone approaching Howard will provide a larger safety buffer when a train or maintenance vehicle is ahead.

The test train (head car 5506) was staged at the Skokie-Dempster Station at approximately 1600 on Monday, November 20, 2023. The re-enactment was supported by staff from CTA Signal Maintenance and CTA Track Maintenance.

In addition, the following CTA participants participated in the review:

- Jim Harper, CTA Chief Engineer
- Carrie Wagener, CTA First Deputy Chief Engineer
- Cody Krezinski, CTA Engineer III – Civil / Track
- Brent Frey, CTA Signal Engineer I
- Kevin Carney, CTA Transit System Safety Officer
- Grant Macey, CTA Chief Rail Equipment Engineer
- Chris Hegarty, CTA General Manager, Rail Engineering & Instruction
- Ivan Davis, Senior Manager, Transportation (CTA Test Train Operator)
- CTA Rail Operations Supervisor

The weather at the time of the test was approximately 45 degrees Fahrenheit and overcast. A light rain had just begun when the testing commenced, which the train operator noted to be most problematic from a slippery rail condition.

The signal system track circuits involved in the incident, and in the re-enactment test, are shown in Figure 1 below. The figure includes a note where the zero speed (stop code) command is received when a train occupies the SKI-9T track circuit, which was occupied by the Snow Fighter at the time of the incident. The figure also shows the length of each track circuit involved and the location of the accident relative to the start of the SKI-9T track circuit.




Figure #1: Track Circuits involved in the November 16, 2023 Accident



All temporary slow zones implemented after the accident were removed at the start of the test to simulate the conditions under which the incident train operated. Later test runs re-instated a slow zone to demonstrate that a proposed mitigation plan of reducing train speeds would result in braking distances that maintain safe train spacing. A total of five test runs were conducted as part of Re-Enactment #1. Figure 2 below provides a tabulation of all five test run results.

Test Date 11/20/2023
Test Time 16:00
General Conditions 45F, light rain, overcast
Test Trainset 5505-5506

For all runs: Light rain, slippery rail, train slip-slid most of downhill grade during brake application
Notes: Simulated Location of Snow Fighter was 250' beyond entrance to 9T (any stopping distance beyond 9T greater than 250' (+) (shown in red implies collision)
 Simulated location of Snow Fighter was done using a track shunt at collision location.
 Cells shown in green indicate train stopped safely short of the 9T track circuit ahead

Test Run Number	Simulated occupancy of 9T	Max Speed (mph)	Distance to full stop before (+) / beyond (-) entrance to 9T (feet)	Average Brakes Rate (mph/s)	Collision with Simulated Snow Fighter?	Comments
1	Y	55	67 (-)	2.6	N	Max allowable speed of 55 mph; Full Service Brake applied.
2	Y	-	-	-	-	Test aborted due to release of brakes by RTO.
3	Y	55	324 (-)	3.1	N	Max allowable speed of 55 mph; Full Service Brake applied.
4	N	-	-	-	-	SK1-9T not occupied: Train receives stepdown from 55 mph to 35 mph to 15 mph per design; Stopped at Signal 32 per design.
5	Y	35	552 (-)	3.9	N	Proposed temporary slow zone restrictions in place; 35 mph at top of downhill grade at zero-speed command point (26T).

SK1 track segments, towards Howard: 44T-26T-15T-9T
 "Zero-speed command point (26T bond)" is transition between 44T and 26T, before Custer x-over

Figure #2: Results of November 20, 2023 Re-Enactment #1 Test Runs

Test Runs #1, #2, #3 and #5 were set up with a simulated train in the section of track that contained the Snow Fighter (SK1-9T track circuit). The simulation was performed by forcing the track circuit into an occupied state using control equipment in the signal bungalow. The expectation for the early test runs was that the train would reach a speed of approximately 55 mph and would react to a zero-speed (stop code) cab command at the start of the SK1-26T track circuit at the top of the downhill grade (as designed). Data from the test train for all test runs was recovered and analyzed as part of this review. ATC data and ERU logs for each run is found in [Appendices I – V](#).



Test Runs #1 – 5 (November 20, 2023)

Test Run #1: Maximum Design Speed | SK1-9T Occupied

Test Run #1 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train approached Ridge Avenue Bridge with a green aspect, an allowable speed of 55 mph, and an actual speed of 55 mph on the cab's Aspect Display Unit (ADU) as seen in Figure 3 below.



Figure #3: Test Run #1 – Maximum speed approaching Dodge Bridge

Prior to entering the SK1-26R track circuit, the operator anticipated a stop code command condition and began to apply the Full Service Brake before reaching the command point. Figure 4 below shows the speed at the time the stop code command was detected by the train after entering the SK1-26T track circuit.



Figure #4: Test Run #1 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system

Figure 5 below shows the position where the train stopped at the completion of Test Run #1, which was 67 feet ahead of the occupied SK1-9T track circuit. Note that the train received a 15 mph allowable speed at this location due to the method that was used to simulate the occupancy of the track circuit ahead (the track circuit was not shunted).



Figure #5: Test Run #1 – Location where train came to a stop

Test Run #2: Maximum Design Speed | SKI-9T Occupied

Test Run #2 repeated the steps taken in Test Run #1. Again, the train did not achieve a speed of 55 mph before receiving the stop code command (actual train speed was 47 mph). In this case, the train never came to a full stop as the operator reacted to the 15 mph allowable speed when approaching the SK1-9T track circuit, and moved the train forward several hundred feet before stopping. As a result, this test run was deemed “invalid”.



Figure 6: Test Run #2 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system

Test Run #3: Maximum Design Speed | SKI-9T Occupied

Test Run #3 repeated the steps taken in Test Run #1. The train did not achieve a speed of 55 mph before receiving the stop code command, which was logged at 51 mph as seen in Figure 7 below.



Figure 7: Test Run #3 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system

The train operator reacted to the stop code command by applying a Full Service Brake. The train came to a complete stop 324 feet ahead of the occupied track circuit, which is a significant margin of safety. Figure 8 below shows the location of the train where it came to a complete stop.



Figure 8: Test Run #3 – Location where train came to a stop

Test Run #4: Designed Speed Downgrades | SKI-9T Unoccupied

Test Run #4 removed the simulated Snow Fighter in the SKI-9T track circuit and allowed the train to react to a downgrade in speed as it approached Howard Street Interlocking (as designed). Figures 9-11 below show the allowable speed downgrade from 55 mph to 35 mph to 15 mph. The test train experienced slip/slide conditions during this test run, but the operator maintained control of the train and stopped safely at the signal protecting the entrance to the interlocking (Signal 32).




Figure 9: Test Run #4 – Allowable speed downgrade at 55 mph




Figure 10: Test Run #4 – Allowable speed downgrade at 35 mph



Figure 11: Test Run #4 – Allowable speed downgrade at 15 mph



Test Run #5: 55 mph to 35 mph Downgrade | SKI-9T Occupied

Test Run #5 re-established the simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit and reduced the maximum speed approaching the downgrade to 35 mph (from 55 mph). Figure 12 below shows the actual speed of 35 mph at the point where the stop code command was received.



Figure 12: Test Run #5 – Speed when Zero Speed Command Received from Signal

The train operator reacted to the zero speed command by applying a Full Service Brake. The train experienced a slip/slide condition on this run and came to a complete stop 552 feet ahead of the occupied track circuit, which is a significant margin of safety. This test run was deemed “successful” and demonstrated that a 35 mph slow zone in advance of the downgrade will provide a significant safety buffer in terms of stopping well in advance of a train or vehicle ahead.

Conclusions

The following conclusions can be derived from this series of re-enactments:

- The test train experienced slip/slide conditions on all test runs, similar to the conditions that were experienced by the train in the November 16 accident.
- With no train simulated ahead, the signal system functioned as designed and stepped the train's speed down to 15 mph as it approached the signal protecting the Howard Terminal Interlocking.
- With a train simulated ahead, the train operator was able to stop the train from 55 mph to a full stop well before the limits of the necessary safe braking distance (i.e. before entering the SK1-9T track circuit where the November 16 accident occurred).
- The slip/slide feature impacts the overall performance of the train's dynamic braking system.



- When the maximum allowable speed in approach to the downhill grade in advance of Howard was reduced to 35 mph, the train safely stopped with a large safety margin using only the Full Service Brake (i.e. dynamic brakes with friction brakes only in last portion of braking curve).




Appendices I - V

- [Appendix I: Test Run #1 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix II: Test Run #2 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix III: Test Run #3 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix IV: Test Run #4 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix V: Test Run #5 Analysis](#)



Appendix I: Test Run #1 Analysis

Test Run #1 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #1 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #1		
Criteria	Time	Distance
FS Brake	15:49:29	36969
Loss of Cab	15:49:34	37294
Stop Code	15:49:36	37394
Zero Speed	15:49:45	37519


Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **37 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **550 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **16 seconds**




Test Run #1 ERU Event Log





Appendix II: Test Run #2 Analysis

Test Run #2 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #2 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #2		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	16:05:17	52344
Stop Code	16:05:20	52544
FS Brake	16:05:21	52669
Zero Speed	16:05:46	52994

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **47 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **325 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **25 seconds**



CTA Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #1 - November 20, 2023

December 2023

Test Run #2 ATC Event Log Data Review


U	S	M	H	H	A	E	A	X	X	N	L	U
E	R	C	E	D	D	E	T	I	I	X	O	E
R	E	A	S	C	O	F	U	O	C	I	F	A
T	U	A	D	A	D	Y	R	A	A	U	R	L
R	E	T	S	E	P	E	P	R	A	R	E	C
I	N	T	A	E	R	E	C	E	C	E	D	T
G	W	I	S	E	N	R	R	Y	D	A	B	C
E	U	M	E	T	A	O	D	L	C	T	D	S
R	M	E	D	S	N	D	T	O	E	S	R	R
#	9740	2023-11-20	16:06:00	13	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9747	2023-11-20	16:06:07	13	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9746	2023-11-20	16:06:07	13	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9745	2023-11-20	16:06:06	12	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9744	2023-11-20	16:06:05	12	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9743	2023-11-20	16:06:04	11	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9742	2023-11-20	16:06:03	11	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9741	2023-11-20	16:06:02	12	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9740	2023-11-20	16:06:02	12	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9739	2023-11-20	16:06:02	12	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9738	2023-11-20	16:06:02	13	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9737	2023-11-20	16:06:02	13	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9736	2023-11-20	16:06:02	13	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9735	2023-11-20	16:06:02	13	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9734	2023-11-20	16:06:02	14	D	OK	OK	OK	OK	CS15	Y	75
#	9733	2023-11-20	16:06:02	14	D	806.2ms	74CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9732	2023-11-20	16:06:02	15	D	806.2ms	74CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9731	2023-11-20	16:06:01	14	D	806.2ms	74CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9730	2023-11-20	16:06:01	13	D	797.5ms	75CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9729	2023-11-20	16:06:01	13	D	797.5ms	75CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9728	2023-11-20	16:06:01	12	D	797.5ms	75CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9727	2023-11-20	16:06:01	11	D	797.5ms	75CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9726	2023-11-20	16:06:01	11	D	797.5ms	75CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9725	2023-11-20	16:06:01	11	D	797.5ms	75CPM	397.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9724	2023-11-20	16:06:01	11	D	788.8ms	76CPM	388.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9723	2023-11-20	16:06:01	11	D	788.8ms	76CPM	388.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9722	2023-11-20	16:06:01	11	D	788.8ms	76CPM	388.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9721	2023-11-20	16:06:01	11	D	788.8ms	76CPM	388.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9720	2023-11-20	16:06:00	10	D	792.5ms	76CPM	388.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9719	2023-11-20	16:06:00	10	D	803.8ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9718	2023-11-20	16:05:59	11	D	803.8ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9717	2023-11-20	16:05:59	11	D	803.8ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9716	2023-11-20	16:05:59	11	D	803.8ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9715	2023-11-20	16:05:59	12	D	803.8ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9714	2023-11-20	16:05:59	12	D	803.8ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9713	2023-11-20	16:05:59	12	D	803.8ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9712	2023-11-20	16:05:59	12	D	796.2ms	75CPM	391.2ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9711	2023-11-20	16:05:59	12	D	796.2ms	75CPM	391.2ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9710	2023-11-20	16:05:59	13	D	796.2ms	75CPM	391.2ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9709	2023-11-20	16:05:59	13	D	793.8ms	76CPM	397.8ms	58%	CS15	Y	75
#	9708	2023-11-20	16:05:58	12	D	793.8ms	76CPM	397.8ms	58%	CS15	Y	75
#	9707	2023-11-20	16:05:58	11	D	793.8ms	76CPM	397.8ms	58%	CS15	Y	75
#	9706	2023-11-20	16:05:58	11	D	793.8ms	76CPM	397.8ms	58%	CS15	Y	75
#	9705	2023-11-20	16:05:58	11	D	793.8ms	76CPM	397.8ms	58%	CS15	Y	75
#	9704	2023-11-20	16:05:58	11	D	793.8ms	76CPM	397.8ms	58%	CS15	Y	75
#	9703	2023-11-20	16:05:58	10	D	803.8ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9702	2023-11-20	16:05:58	10	D	803.8ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9701	2023-11-20	16:05:58	10	D	803.8ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9700	2023-11-20	16:05:57	9	D	803.8ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9699	2023-11-20	16:05:57	9	D	796.2ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9698	2023-11-20	16:05:57	9	D	796.2ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9697	2023-11-20	16:05:57	0	D	788.8ms	76CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9696	2023-11-20	16:05:57	7	D	788.8ms	76CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9695	2023-11-20	16:05:57	0	D	792.5ms	76CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9694	2023-11-20	16:05:56	6	D	792.5ms	76CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9693	2023-11-20	16:05:56	5	D	792.5ms	76CPM	398.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9692	2023-11-20	16:05:56	4	D	803.8ms	75CPM	400.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9691	2023-11-20	16:05:56	3	D	803.8ms	75CPM	400.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9690	2023-11-20	16:05:56	2	D	803.8ms	75CPM	400.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9689	2023-11-20	16:05:56	1	D	803.8ms	75CPM	400.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9688	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	D	803.8ms	75CPM	400.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9687	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	D	803.8ms	75CPM	400.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9686	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	D	796.2ms	75CPM	392.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9685	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	D	792.5ms	76CPM	392.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9684	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	mP	792.5ms	76CPM	392.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9683	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	mB	792.5ms	76CPM	392.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9682	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	D	792.5ms	76CPM	392.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9681	2023-11-20	16:05:55	0	FS	792.5ms	76CPM	392.5ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9680	2023-11-20	16:05:54	0	FS	792.5ms	76CPM	397.8ms	58%	CS15	Y	75
#	9679	2023-11-20	16:05:54	0	FS	803.8ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9678	2023-11-20	16:05:53	0	FS	803.8ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	CS15	Y	75
#	9677	2023-11-20	16:05:53	0	FS	796.2ms	75CPM	397.8ms	49%	STOP	Y	00
#	9676	2023-11-20	16:05:53	0	FS	788.8ms	76CPM	398.8ms	49%	STOP	Y	00
#	9675	2023-11-20	16:05:52	0	FS	793.8ms	76CPM	398.8ms	49%	STOP	Y	00
#	9674	2023-11-20	16:05:51	0	FS	802.5ms	75CPM	398.8ms	49%	STOP	Y	00

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BRAKE
RELEASED




Test Run #2 ERU Event Log





Appendix III: Test Run #3 Analysis

Test Run #3 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #3 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #3		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	16:20:15	03183
Stop Code	16:20:18	03383
FS Brake	16:20:20	03508
Zero Speed	16:20:37	03908


Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **51 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **400 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **17 seconds**




Test Run #3 ERU Event Log





Appendix IV: Test Run #4 Analysis

Test Run #4 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #4 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #4		
Criteria	Allowable Speed	Time
Enters SK1-26T	35 mph	16:35:13
Enters SK1-15T	25 mph	16:35:39
Enters SK1-9T	15 mph	16:35:44
Reach 15 mph	15 mph	16:35:48
Zero Speed	0 mph	16:36:21

Total time from entering SK1-26T track circuit to reach SK1-9T track circuit: **35 seconds**



CTA Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #1 - November 20, 2023

December 2023

Test Run #4 ATC Event Log Data Review

U S E R T R I G E R M C A S C O D F Y C C I F A U C T R A C T L O N G R T I B R R E T A D E P E R R I C A T I U E T W 6 L E R F E 1 - 7 4 C C C O B O


Page 118 November 21, 2023

ZERO SPEED

Table with columns for ID, Date, Time, Status, and various performance metrics. Includes rows for IDs 13940 through 13874.




Test Run #4 ERU Event Log





Appendix V: Test Run #5 Analysis

Test Run #5 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #5 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #5		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	16:51:45	64745
Stop Code	16:51:48	64920
FS Brake	16:51:49	64945
Zero Speed	16:52:27	65145


Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **34 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **200 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **38 seconds**



Test Run #5 ERU Event Log





MEMO:

DATE: December 15, 2023

TO: Nancy-Ellen Zusman, CTA Chief Safety and Security Officer

FROM: James Harper, Chief Engineer Infrastructure

RE: November 16, 2023, Collision on Yellow Line Between Revenue Train and Snow Fighter
Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #2 and Mitigation Efforts Using Test Trains

Event Synopsis

On Thursday, November 16, 2023, at approximately 10:30 hours in the morning, Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Yellow Line Run #593 was operating as a two-car consist (lead car 5600) on a normal round trip towards Howard Terminal. As the train approached Howard Terminal in the southbound direction, it struck maintenance vehicle S500, a non-revenue, diesel powered locomotive used to remove snow from the tracks (also known as a Snow Fighter). There were six CTA employees onboard the Snow Fighter and 31 passengers and crew onboard the revenue train.

Test Train Re-Enactments

Test Train Re-Enactment #2 (November 22, 2023)

This section provides a report on the efforts by CTA on November 22, 2023 to re-enact the collision conditions using a test train and using simulated occupancy of the section of track that the Snow Fighter was occupying at the time of the incident.

The re-enactment was performed for the following reasons:

- Attempt to demonstrate the effects of slippery rail on the overall braking capabilities of a two-car 5000 Series train (as noted on the day of the collision, the top of the rail on the downhill grade was still “contaminated” with a material that appeared to reduce the wheel-to-rail adhesion).
- Attempt to demonstrate how a two-car 5000 Series train reacts to the presence of a train ahead by simulating the presence of a train in the section of track that the Snow Fighter was occupying.
- Attempt to understand how the slip/slide system on a two-car 5000 Series train can affect train braking performance.
- Attempt to understand how a two-car 5000 Series train reacts to a slip/slide condition without operator intervention and how this may affect overall braking performance.



- Attempt to demonstrate that the proposed 35 mph slow zones approaching the downhill grade will provide for safer braking distances when a vehicle is located ahead.

The test train (head car 5505) was staged at the Skokie-Dempster Station at approximately 1030 hours on Wednesday, November 22, 2023. The re-enactment was supported by staff from CTA Signal Maintenance and CTA Track Maintenance.

In addition, the following CTA participants participated in the review:

- Jim Harper, CTA Chief Engineer
- Carrie Wagener, CTA First Deputy Chief Engineer
- Cody Krezinski, CTA Engineer III – Civil / Track
- Brent Frey, CTA Signal Engineer I
- Kevin Carney, CTA Transit System Safety Officer
- Grant Macey, CTA Chief Rail Equipment Engineer
- Chris Hegarty, CTA General Manager, Rail Engineering & Instruction
- CTA Train Operator
- CTA Rail Operations Supervisor

The signal system track circuits involved in the incident, and in re-enactment tests, are shown in Figure 1 below. The figure includes a note where the zero speed command is received when a train occupies the track circuit that was occupied by the Snow Fighter at the time of the incident (SKI-9T track circuit). The figure also shows the length of each track circuit involved and the location of the accident relative to the start of the SK1-9T track circuit.




Figure #1: Track Circuits involved in the November 16, 2023 Accident



All temporary slow zones implemented after the accident were removed at the start of the test to simulate the conditions under which the incident train operated. A total of six test runs were conducted. See Figure 2 below for a tabulation of the test results.

Test Date: 11/22/2023
 Test Time: 10:00
 General Conditions: 45F, partly cloudy
 Test Trainset: 5505-5506

For all runs: Rails were slippery but got progressively less slippery as the test progressed
Notes: Simulated Location of Snow Fighter was 250' beyond entrance to 9T (any stopping distance beyond 9T greater than 250' (+) (shown in red implies collision)
 Simulated location of Snow Fighter was done using a track shunt at collision location.
 Cells shown in green indicate train stopped safely short of the 9T track circuit ahead

Test Run Number	Simulated occupancy @ 9T	Max Speed (mph)	Distance to full stop before (l) (beyond (+) entrance to 9T (feet))	Average Brake Rate (mph/s)	Collision with Simulated Snow Fighter?	Comments
1	Y	55	492 (+)	1.3	Y	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran. Train nearly reached Howard Interlocking X32 home signal.
2	Y	55	479 (+)	1.4	Y	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, no track brake
3	Y	55	264 (+)	1.6	Y	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, track brake deployed when simulated snow fighter position came into view
3A	Y	55	218 (+)	1.7	N	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, transitioned to "full emergency" position when simulated snow fighter position came into view
4	Y	35	261 (-)	2.1	N	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran.
5	Y	35	533 (-)	2.9	N	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, no track brake
6	Y	55	414 (+)	1.4	Y	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran.

SK1 track segments, towards Howard: 44T-26T-15T-9T
 "Zero-speed command point (26T bond)" is transition between 44T and 26T, before Custer x-over

Figure #2: Results of November 22, 2023 Re-Enactment #2 Test Runs

All test runs were set up with a simulated train in the section of track that contained the Snow Fighter (the SK1-9T track circuit). The simulation was performed by applying a shunt on the track at the spot where the Snow Fighter was located at the time of the collision. The expectation for the test runs was that the train would reach a speed of approximately 35 mph or 55 mph and would react to a zero-speed cab command at the start of the SK1-26T track circuit at the top of the downhill grade (as designed). Data from test train 5505 for all test runs was recovered and analyzed as part of this review. ATC data and ERU data for each run is found in [Appendices I – VI](#).



Test Runs #1 – 6 (November 22, 2023)

Test Run #1: No Operator Intervention | 55 mph

Test Run #1 was performed with a simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 3 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and as a result the train received a penalty brake a few seconds after entering SK1-26T. The train came to a complete stop roughly 492 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. As seen in Figure 4 below, the Test Run #1 train nearly reached the Howard Interlocking X32 Home Signal (the allowable speed on the train's ADU was 15 mph because the test train had gone past the track shunt). The train experienced roughly 20 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.3 mph/s.



Figure #3: Test Run #1 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #4: Test Run #1 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #2: Full Service Brake | 55 mph

Test Run #2 was performed with a simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 5 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 6 below) roughly 479 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. The train experienced roughly 15 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.4 mph/s.



Figure #5: Test Run #2 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #6: Test Run #2 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #3: Full Service Brake & Track Brake | 55 mph

Test Run #3 was performed with a simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 7 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake and deployed the Track Brake when the simulated Snow Fighter came into view. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 8 below) roughly 264 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. The train experienced roughly 18 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.6 mph/s.



Figure #7: Test Run #3 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #8: Test Run #3 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #3A: Full Service Brake and Emergency | 55 mph

Test Run #3A was performed with a simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 9 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake and then moved the Master Controller to the Emergency Position when the simulated Snow Fighter came into view (the Emergency position causes the train's track and friction brakes to apply). The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 10 below) roughly 218 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter, but still violated the maximum safe braking distance assumed by the wayside signal system. The train experienced roughly 14 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.7 mph/s.



Figure #9: Test Run #3A – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #10: Test Run #3A – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #4: No Operator Intervention | 35 mph

Test Run #4 was performed with a simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 35 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 11 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and as a result the train received a penalty brake shortly after entering SK1-26T. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 12 below) roughly 261 feet before the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly eight (8) seconds of slip/slide conditions and an average brake rate of 2.1 mph/s.



Figure #11: Test Run #4 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #12: Test Run #4 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #5: Full Service Brake | 35 mph

Test Run #5 was performed with a simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 35 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 13 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 14 below) roughly 533 feet before the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly 10 seconds of slip/slide conditions and an average brake rate of 2.9 mph/s.



Figure #13: Test Run #5 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #14: Test Run #5 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #6: No Operator Intervention | 55 mph (Repeat of Test Run #1)

Test Run #6 was performed with a simulated Snow Fighter in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 15 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake shortly after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 16 below) roughly 414 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. The train experienced roughly 15 seconds of slip/slide conditions and an average brake rate of 1.37 mph/s.



Figure #15: Test Run #6 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system




Figure #16: Test Run #6 – Location where train came to a stop




Conclusions

The following conclusions can be derived from this series of re-enactments:


- When entering the SK1-26T track circuit (at the top of the downhill grade where they received a “zero speed” stop command due to a “train ahead” condition) at 55 mph, the test train was not able to brake to zero speed using the Full Service Brake (applied by either the operator [see Test Run #2] or by the signal system [see Test Run #1 and #6]) before entering the SK1-9T track circuit (the limit of the maximum safe braking distance assumed by the wayside signal system). Brake rates for these runs were: Test Run #1 – 1.3 mph/s; Test Run #2 – 1.4 mph/s; and Test Run #6 – 1.37 mph/s (this compares to CTA’s standard braking model brake rate of 1.9 mph/s).
- When entering the SK1-26T track circuit at 55 mph, the test train was not able to stop short of the SK1-9T track circuit, when the Full Service Brake was applied by the operator, and when the Track Brake (or full Emergency Brake) was later applied by the operator as the train approached this safe braking distance limit (see Test Runs #3 and #3A). Brake rates for these runs were: Test Run #3 – 1.6 mph/s and Test Run #3A – 1.7 mph/s.
- When operating at 55 mph, all test runs experienced a “slip/slide” condition for a portion of the run on the downhill grade. Dynamic braking under the slip/slide mode appeared to result in a “pulsation effect” where the braking torque cycled between zero and -1500 ft-lbs (see the below excerpt of the ERU from Test Run #1).



- When operating at 55 mph, all of the test runs sensed a zero speed well before the train came to a full stop. This appeared to be caused by the train wheels being “locked up” and “sliding”. When the zero speed was sensed, the dynamic braking ceased to function, and the friction brakes activated. One or both of the speed sensors sometimes transitioned back to sensing a higher speed, or disappeared altogether (see the below excerpt of the ERU from Test Run #2).



- The use of the Track Brake improved the train’s braking distance, allowing the train to come to a stop nearly 215 feet (nearly half the distance) shorter than when only the Full Service Brake was used (see the below excerpt of the ERU from Test Run #3).



- When the maximum allowable speed in approach to the downhill grade was reduced to 35 mph, the test train (see Test Run #4) was able to automatically brake without operator intervention with a large safety margin. The train experienced slip/slide conditions on the downhill grade for roughly 10 seconds when it entered the downhill grade at this reduced speed, and experienced an average brake rate of 2.1 mph/s. When the operator applied the Full Service Brake after receiving the zero speed stop command with a 35 mph approach speed (see Test Run #5), the train stopped with an even greater margin of safety (average brake rate = 2.9 mph/s).
- The test runs indicated that slip/slide conditions appear to significantly affect train braking performance when entering a downhill grade at 55 mph, to the point where brake rates are well below the degraded rate assumed in the signal system design. When entering speeds were reduced to 35 mph, the train was able to brake within the brake rate assumptions used in CTA’s standard braking model.




Appendices I – VI

- [Appendix I: Test Run #1 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix II: Test Run #2 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix III: Test Run #3 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix IIIA: Test Run #3A Analysis](#)
- [Appendix IV: Test Run #4 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix V: Test Run #5 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix VI: Test Run #6 Analysis](#)



Appendix I: Test Run #1 Analysis

Test Run #1 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #1 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #1		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	10:30:57	46871
Stop Code	10:31:01	47171
Zero Speed	10:31:41	48146

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **52 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**



Test Run #1 ERU Event Log

MASTER CONTROLLER

TRACK BRAKE

ATC ALLOWABLE SPEED

ATC SPEED - "A" CAR ONLY

SPEED SENSOR A

SPEED SENSOR B

EM TRAIN LINE

TB TRAIN LINE

DYNAMIC BRAKE A

DYNAMIC BRAKE B

FRICTION BRAKE A


FRICTION BRAKE B

SLIP / SLIDE A

SLIP / SLIDE B

PEN BRAKE


- EncoderN1 ()
230 (230.000)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- lrlBrakePushbtnN1 = ""
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- AtcAllwSpd (mph)
0 (0.000)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- AtcSpd (mph)
54.00 (54.000)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- SpdSenA (mph)
53.8 (53.800)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- SpdSenB (mph)
54.7 (54.700)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- lmlTA-1/W1 / ""
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- lhl_mdA-1/W14 = ""
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- TdApA (lb-ft)
177.7 (177.700)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- TdApB (lb-ft)
144.5 (144.500)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- BPrsA (psi)
462 (462.000)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- BPrsB (psi)
456 (456.000)
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- WshA = ""
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- WshB = ""
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2
- PenBrk-1/W / ""
2023-11-22 10:48:52.2





Appendix II: Test Run #2 Analysis

Test Run #2 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #2 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #2		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	10:48:39	63023
Stop Code	10:48:42	63173
FS Brake	10:48:43	63273
Zero Speed	10:49:21	63998


Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **53 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **725 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **38 seconds**




Test Run #2 ERU Event Log





Appendix III: Test Run #3 Analysis

Test Run #3 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #3 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #3		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:02:37	09162
Stop Code	11:02:40	09387
FS Brake	11:02:41	09462
Zero Speed	11:03:14	10112


Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **53 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **650 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **33 seconds**




Test Run #3 ERU Event Log





Appendix IIIA: Test Run #3A Analysis

Test Run #3A Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #3A ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #3A		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:19:03	20587
Stop Code	11:19:06	20837
FS Brake	11:19:07	20912
Zero Speed	11:19:38	21387

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **475 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **31 seconds**



CTA Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #2 - November 22, 2023

December 2023

Test Run #3A ATC Event Log Data Review


US E D M H A X X N
SE R E D A MC EAS C O H A E N X X N
TR U E D A M C H A L F D U E N A C X X
JC EN T E D E P E R I O D D U T Y N F O C C A C T I X X
CC CE N T E S P E A D E R I O D E R R C C A A R R L L I U R A T R A
CE U H M E S P E N T A D P E R I O D E R R C C O C C O R R E N F A C C U R A
ER H M E S P E N T A D P E R I O D E R R C C O C C O R R E N F A C C U R A

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Table with columns for ID, Date, Time, Status, and various performance metrics. Includes a 'ZERO SPEED' label in red text.




Test Run #3A ERU Event Log





Appendix IV: Test Run #4 Analysis

Test Run #4 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #4 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #4		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:33:33	31787
Stop Code	11:33:37	31962
Zero Speed	11:34:19	32362

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **33 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**



CTA Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #2 - November 22, 2023

December 2023

Test Run #4 ATC Event Log Data Review

U S E R T R A C E R M H C D E S P E E D M E A S P E R I O D C O D E H A L F P E R I O D E N F O R C C A R R A C T I V E X I N F R L I C D C O U R S E T R A C K D I S T A N C E L O C A T I O N L A T I T U D E L O N G I T U D E U N E R T I C A L C L E A R A N C E B R R R Z R R F E B Q

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Table with columns for ID, Date/Time, Speed, and various status codes. Includes a 'ZERO SPEED' label in red text.



CTA Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #2 - November 22, 2023


December 2023

Test Run #4 ATC Event Log Data Review

U S E R I D	E V E N T T Y P E	D A T E T I M E	M C D E S S A G E S	M E A S U R E M E N T S	C O D E	H A L F D U T Y	E N F O C E S	C C A B A B S E N C E	A C T I V E C O D E	X I E N F R I C A D O S E	T R A F F I C C O N T R O L	D I S T A N C E	N E X T S T A T I O N	R O U T E	L O N G I T U D I N A L	U N D E R L I N E	B R R O W N I N G	B R R O W N I N G		
28405	2023-11-22	11:00:41	00 CT D	46.2m=	1297CPM	35.0m=	75%	STOP Y	0 00	0.095	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28404	2023-11-22	11:00:41	04 CT D	46.2m=	1297CPM	35.0m=	75%	STOP Y	0 00	0.095	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28403	2023-11-22	11:00:41	04 CT D	46.2m=	1297CPM	35.0m=	75%	STOP Y	0 00	0.105	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28402	2023-11-22	11:00:41	04 CT D	150.0m=	400CPM	45.0m=	30%	STOP Y	0 00	0.095	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28401	2023-11-22	11:00:41	04 CT D	226.2m=	265CPM	65.0m=	28%	STOP Y	0 00	0.074	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28400	2023-11-22	11:00:41	04 CT D	245.0m=	245CPM	80.0m=	34%	STOP Y	0 00	0.074	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28399	2023-11-22	11:00:41	04 CT D	136.2m=	440CPM	80.0m=	61%	STOP Y	0 00	0.074	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28398	2023-11-22	11:00:40	04 CT D	136.2m=	440CPM	80.0m=	61%	STOP Y	0 00	0.066	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28397	2023-11-22	11:00:40	04 CT D	11.0m=	4364CPM	10.8m=	100%	STOP Y	0 00	0.045	02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28396	2023-11-22	11:00:40	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		02162	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28395	2023-11-22	11:00:40	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		02087	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	BB	
28394	2023-11-22	11:00:39	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		02087	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28393	2023-11-22	11:00:39	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		02062	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28392	2023-11-22	11:00:39	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		02062	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28391	2023-11-22	11:00:38	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		02062	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28390	2023-11-22	11:00:37	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		01987	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28389	2023-11-22	11:00:37	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		01962	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28388	2023-11-22	11:00:37	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		01962	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28387	2023-11-22	11:00:37	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		01962	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28386	2023-11-22	11:00:37	04 CT D					STOP Y	0 00		01962	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28385	2023-11-22	11:00:36	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00		01962	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28384	2023-11-22	11:00:36	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00		01887	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28383	2023-11-22	11:00:35	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0.055	01887	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28382	2023-11-22	11:00:35	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0.055	01887	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28381	2023-11-22	11:00:35	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0.055	01887	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28380	2023-11-22	11:00:35	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0.055	01887	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28379	2023-11-22	11:00:35	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0.055	01887	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28378	2023-11-22	11:00:35	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0.055	01862	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28377	2023-11-22	11:00:35	04 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0.055	01862	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28376	2023-11-22	11:00:34	00 CT D					CS95 Y	0 00	0X	01862	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28375	2023-11-22	11:00:34	00 mP D					CS95 Y	0 00	0X	01862	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28374	2023-11-22	11:00:34	00 D					CS95 Y	0 00	0X	01862	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28373	2023-11-22	11:00:33	00 D					CS95 Y	0 00	0X	01787	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28372	2023-11-22	11:00:33	00 D					CS95 Y	0 00	0X	01787	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B	
28371	2023-11-22	11:00:33	00 mP D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01787	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28370	2023-11-22	11:00:32	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01762	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28369	2023-11-22	11:00:32	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01737	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28368	2023-11-22	11:00:31	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01662	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28367	2023-11-22	11:00:31	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01662	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28366	2023-11-22	11:00:31	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01662	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28365	2023-11-22	11:00:31	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01662	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28364	2023-11-22	11:00:31	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01662	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28363	2023-11-22	11:00:30	04 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01662	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28362	2023-11-22	11:00:29	04 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01637	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28361	2023-11-22	11:00:28	04 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01562	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28360	2023-11-22	11:00:28	04 mB D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01562	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28359	2023-11-22	11:00:28	05 mB D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01562	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28358	2023-11-22	11:00:28	00 mB D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01537	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28357	2023-11-22	11:00:27	05 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01537	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28356	2023-11-22	11:00:27	05 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01462	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28355	2023-11-22	11:00:26	04 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01462	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28354	2023-11-22	11:00:26	04 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28353	2023-11-22	11:00:26	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28352	2023-11-22	11:00:26	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28351	2023-11-22	11:00:26	00 CT D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28350	2023-11-22	11:00:26	00 mP D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28349	2023-11-22	11:00:26	00 mP D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28348	2023-11-22	11:00:26	00 mP D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28347	2023-11-22	11:00:25	00 mP D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B
28346	2023-11-22	11:00:25	00 D					CS95 Y	180	cpm	0 00	0X	01437	No Station ID	No Station ID	Y 0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	B



Test Run #4 ERU Event Log





Test Run #5 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #5		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:46:53	41612
Stop Code	11:46:56	41712
FS Brake	11:46:56	41737
Zero Speed	11:47:08	42037


Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **35 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **300 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **12 seconds**




Test Run #5 ERU Event Log





Appendix VI: Test Run #6 Analysis

Test Run #6 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response





Test Run #6 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #6		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	12:03:00	48585
Stop Code	12:03:04	48810
Zero Speed	12:03:44	49835


Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **53 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**



Test Run #6 ERU Event Log





MEMO:

DATE: December 15, 2023

TO: Nancy-Ellen Zusman, CTA Chief Safety and Security Officer

FROM: James Harper, Chief Engineer Infrastructure

RE: November 16, 2023 Collision on Yellow Line Between Revenue Train and Snow Fighter
Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #3 and Mitigation Efforts Using Test Trains

Event Synopsis

On Thursday, November 16, 2023, at approximately 10:30 hours in the morning, Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) Yellow Line Run #593 was operating as a two-car consist (lead car 5600) on a normal round trip towards Howard Terminal. As the train approached Howard Terminal in the southbound direction, it struck maintenance vehicle S500, a non-revenue, diesel powered locomotive used to remove snow from the tracks (also known as a Snow Fighter). There were six CTA employees onboard the Snow Fighter and 31 passengers and crew onboard the revenue train.

Test Train Re-Enactments

Test Train Re-Enactment #3 (November 27, 2023)

This section provides a report on the efforts by CTA on November 27, 2023 to re-enact the collision conditions using a test train and using simulated occupancy of the section of track that the Snow Fighter was occupying at the time of the incident.

Re-Enactment #3 was performed for the following reasons:

- Attempt to demonstrate the effects of slippery rail on the overall braking capabilities of the train.
- Attempt to demonstrate how the train reacts to the presence of a train ahead by simulating the presence of a train in the section of track that the Snow Fighter was occupying.
- Attempt to understand how the slip/slide system on the trains can affect train braking performance.
- Attempt to understand how the train reacts to a slip/slide condition without operator intervention and how this may affect overall braking performance.
- Attempt to understand if cleaning rails can affect train braking performance.



The test train (head car 5505) was staged at the Skokie-Dempster Station at approximately 1000 hours on Monday, November 27, 2023. The re-enactment was supported by staff from CTA Signal Maintenance and CTA Track Maintenance.

In addition, the following CTA participants participated in the review:

- Jim Harper, CTA Chief Engineer
- Carrie Wagener, CTA First Deputy Chief Engineer
- Cody Krezinski, CTA Engineer III – Civil / Track
- Brent Frey, CTA Signal Engineer I
- Kevin Carney, CTA Transit System Safety Officer
- Grant Macey, CTA Chief Rail Equipment Engineer
- Chris Hegarty, CTA General Manager, Rail Engineering & Instruction
- CTA Train Operator
- CTA Rail Operations Supervisor

The signal system track circuits involved in the incident, and in re-enactment tests, are shown in Figure 1 below. The figure includes a note where the zero speed command is received when a train occupies the track circuit that was occupied by the Snow Fighter at the time of the incident (SK1-9T track circuit). The figure also shows the length of each track circuit involved and the location of the accident relative to the start of the SK1-9T track circuit.




Figure #1: Track Circuits involved in the November 16, 2023 Accident

All temporary slow zones implemented after the accident were removed at the start of the test to simulate the conditions under which the incident train operated. A total of 13 test runs were conducted as part of Figure 2 below provides a tabulation of all 13 test run results.



CTA Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #3 – November 27, 2023

December 2023

Test Date 11/27/2023
 Test Time 10:00
 General Conditions 25F, Clear
 Test Trainset 5505-5506

For all runs: Freshly power-washed rails
 Notes: Simulated Location of Snow Fighter was 250' beyond entrance to 9T (any stopping distance beyond 9T greater than 250' (+) (shown in red implies collision)
 Simulated location of Snow Fighter was done using a track shunt at collision location.
 Cells shown in green indicate train stopped safely short of the 9T track circuit ahead

Test Run Number	Simulated occupancy of 9T	Max. Speed (mph)	Distance to full stop before 9T beyond (+) entrance to 9T (feet)	Average Brake Rates (mph/s)	Collision with Simulated Snow Fighter?	Comments
1	Y	55	-236	1.8	N	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran.
2	Y	55	168	1.6	N	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, no track brake.
2, Take 2	Y	55	293	1.6	Y	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, no track brake.
3	Y	55	-454	2.3	N	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, track brake deployed early in braking event prior to reaching point where simulated snow fighter could be seen.
3, Take 2	Y	55	50	1.5	N	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, track brake deployed when simulated snow fighter position came into view.
3A	Y	55	53	1.8	N	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, transitioned to "full emergency" position when simulated snow fighter position came into view.
4	Y	35	-518	1.8	N	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran.
5	Y	35	-628	1.9	N	Operator reacted to steady red audible and used full service brake, no track brake
6	Y	55	257	1.4	Y	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran (repeat of Run #1).
7	Y	55	532	1.0	Y	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track brake during slip/slide condition.
8	Y	55	-81	1.4	N	No Operator Intervention; Train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track brake during slip/slide condition.
9	Y	55	453	0.9	Y	No Operator Intervention; train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track brake during slip/slide condition.
10	Y	55	-49	1.3	N	No Operator Intervention; train automatically deployed penalty brake after entering 26T and reaction time ran. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track brake during slip/slide condition.

SK1 track segments, towards Howard: 44T-26T-15T-9T
 "Zero-speed command point (26T bond)" is transition between 44T and 26T, before Custer x-over

Figure #2: Results of November 27, 2023 Re-Enactment #3 Test Runs

All test runs were set up with a simulated train in the section of track that contained the Snow Fighter (the SK1-9T track circuit). The simulation was performed by forcing the track circuit into an occupied state using control equipment in the signal bungalow. The expectation for the test runs was that the train would reach a speed of approximately 35 or 55 mph and would react to a zero-speed (stop code) cab command at the start of the SK1-26T track circuit at the top of the downhill grade (as designed). The rails were previously power washed to determine if cleaning would have an effect on brake rates. In addition, the Vehicle Engineering team modified the slip/slide software to introduce the Track Brake during slip/slide conditions for the final four test runs. Data from test train 5505 for all test runs was recovered and analyzed as part of this review. ATC data and ERU data for each run is found in [Appendices I – X](#).



Test Runs #1 – 10 (November 27, 2023)

Test Run #1: No Operator Intervention | 55 mph

Test Run #1 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 3 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 4 below) roughly 236 feet ahead of the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly nine seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.8 mph/s.



Figure #3: Test Run #1 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #4: Test Run #1 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #2: Full Service Brake | 55 mph

Test Run #2 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 5 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 6 below) roughly 168 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter, but still violated the maximum safe braking distance assumed by the wayside signal system. The train experienced roughly 16 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.6 mph/s.



Figure #5: Test Run #2 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #6: Test Run #2 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #2, Take 2: Full Service Brake | 55 mph

Test Run #2, Take 2, was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 7 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 8 below) roughly 298 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. The train experienced roughly 16 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.58 mph/s.



Figure #7: Test Run #2-Take 2 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #8: Test Run #2-Take 2 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #3: Full Service Brake & Track Brake | 55 mph

Test Run #3 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 9 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake and deployed the Track Brake ahead of when the simulated Snow Fighter came into view. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 10 below) roughly 454 feet ahead of the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly 10 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 2.3 mph/s.



Figure #9: Test Run #3 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #10: Test Run #3 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #3, Take 2: Full Service Brake & Track Brake | 55 mph

Test Run #3, Take 2, was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 11 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake and deployed the Track Brake when the simulated Snow Fighter came into view. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 12 below) roughly 50 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter, but still violated the maximum safe braking distance assumed by the wayside signal system. The train experienced roughly 19 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.54 mph/s.



Figure #11: Test Run #3-Take 2 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal



Figure #12: Test Run #3-Take 2 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #3A: Full Service Brake & Emergency | 55 mph

Test Run #3A was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 13 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake and entered Emergency when the simulated Snow Fighter came into view. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 14 below) roughly 53 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter, but still violated the maximum safe braking distance assumed by the wayside signal system. The train experienced roughly 17 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.83 mph/s.



Figure #13: Test Run #3A – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #14: Test Run #3A – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #4: No Operator Intervention | 35 mph

Test Run #4 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 35 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 15 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 16 below) roughly 518 feet ahead of the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly nine seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.83 mph/s.



Figure #15: Test Run #4 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #16: Test Run #4 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #5: Full Service Brake | 35 mph

Test Run #5 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 35 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 17 below. The operator of the train immediately applied the Full Service Brake. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 18 below) roughly 628 feet ahead of the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly eight seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.94 mph/s.



Figure #17: Test Run #5 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #18: Test Run #5 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #6: No Operator Intervention | 55 mph

Test Run #6 was a repeat of Test Run #1 and was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 19 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 20 below) roughly 257 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. The train experienced roughly 13 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.38 mph/s.



Figure #19: Test Run #6 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #20: Test Run #6 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #7: No Operator Intervention and Modified Slip/Slide Software | 55 mph

Test Run #7 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track braking during slip/slide detection. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 21 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 22 below) roughly 532 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. The train experienced roughly 14 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 0.98 mph/s.



Figure #21: Test Run #7 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #22: Test Run #7 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #8: No Operator Intervention and Modified Slip/Slide Software | 55 mph

Test Run #8 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track braking during slip/slide detection. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 23 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 24 below) roughly 81feet ahead of the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly 11 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.37 mph/s.



Figure #23: Test Run #8 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #24: Test Run #8 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #9: No Operator Intervention and Modified Slip/Slide Software | 55 mph

Test Run #9 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track braking during slip/slide detection. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it nearly reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 25 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 26 below) roughly 453 feet beyond the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have resulted in a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter. The train experienced roughly 10 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 0.88 mph/s.



Figure #25: Test Run #9 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #26: Test Run #9 – Location where train came to a stop



Test Run #10: No Operator Intervention and Modified Slip/Slide Software | 55 mph

Test Run #10 was performed with a simulated train in the SK1-9T track circuit. Vehicle Engineering modified the slip/slide software to introduce track braking during slip/slide detection. The train was given a maximum allowable speed of 55 mph, which it reached before receiving a red cab signal stop code as seen in Figure 27 below. The operator of the train did not apply a braking application (the operator retained the master controller in the propulsion position) and the train received a penalty brake after entering SK1-26T as a result. The train came to a complete stop (see Figure 28 below) roughly 49 feet ahead of the entrance of SK1-9T, which would have avoided a collision with the simulated Snow Fighter and met the maximum safe braking distance. The train experienced roughly 11 seconds of slip/slide conditions and the average brake rate was approximately 1.25 mph/s.



Figure #27: Test Run #10 – Speed when stop code command was received from signal system



Figure #28: Test Run #10 – Location where train came to a stop

Conclusions

The following conclusions can be derived from this series of re-enactments:

- When entering the SK1-26T track circuit (at the top of the downhill grade where they received a zero speed stop command due to a “train ahead” condition) at 55 mph, the test train was not able to consistently brake to zero speed using the Full Service Brake (see Test Run #2 and #2, Take 2) before entering the SK1-9T track circuit (the limit of the maximum safe braking distance assumed by the wayside signal system). Brake rates for these runs were: Test Run #2 – 1.6 mph/s; Test Run #2, Take 2 – 1.58 mph/s (compared to CTA’s standard braking model brake rate of 1.9 mph/s).
- When the maximum allowable speed in approach to the downhill grade was reduced to 35 mph, the test train was able to automatically brake without operator intervention with a large safety margin (see Test Run #4). The train experienced slip/slide conditions on the downhill grade for roughly nine seconds when it entered the downhill grade at this reduced speed, and experienced an average brake rate of 1.83 mph/s. When the operator applied the Full Service Brake after receiving the zero speed stop command with a 35 mph approach speed (see Test Run #5), the train stopped with an even greater margin of safety, with average brake rate of 1.94 mph/s.
- The test runs indicated that slip/slide conditions appear to significantly affect train braking performance when entering a downhill grade at 55 mph, to the point where brake rates are well below the degraded rate assumed in the signal system design. When entering speeds were reduced to 35 mph, the train was able to brake within the brake rate assumptions used in CTA’s standard braking model.
- Prior to running Day 3 of re-enactments, the running rails on the downhill grade were cleaned to remove foreign organic material (leaves) that appeared to have exacerbated the slip/slide conditions experienced by the November 16 incident train. The results of the Day 3 test runs indicated an improvement in average brake rates for the various runs (e.g., the November 22 Test Run #1 Brake Rate = 1.3 mph/s vs. the November 27 Run #1 Brake Rate = 1.8 mph/s).
- Test train braking performance continued to show wide swings in braking distances/rates under the same test parameters (e.g. Test Run #1 and Test Run #6 had same parameters but had nearly a 500 feet difference in braking distance).
- The train’s braking systems (in particular dynamic braking and friction braking) responded to the slip/slide conditions in varying ways, especially if the speed sensors dropped to zero speed as a result of the wheels locking up and sliding. The dynamic brakes appear to “turn off” when zero speed is sensed, even if the train is still moving (sliding) at a high rate of speed. The friction brakes activate as zero speed is sensed, but then behave erratically as the sensed speed increases again.
- When Vehicle Engineering modified the vehicle slip/slide software to introduce the Track Brake during slip/slide conditions for the final four test runs, results varied that included the test train stopping short of the SK1-9T circuit, and also exceeding the circuit and location of the simulated Snow Fighter. In two cases, Test Run #7 and Test Run #9, the vehicle appears to lose all forms of braking.




Appendices I – X

- [Appendix I: Test Run #1 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix II: Test Run #2 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix II –II: Test Run #2 – Take 2 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix III: Test Run #3 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix III – II: Test Run #3 – Take 2 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix IIIA: Test Run #3A Analysis](#)
- [Appendix IV: Test Run #4 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix V: Test Run #5 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix VI: Test Run #6 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix VII: Test Run #7 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix VIII: Test Run #8 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix IX: Test Run #9 Analysis](#)
- [Appendix X: Test Run #10 Analysis](#)

Appendix I: Test Run #1 Analysis

Test Run #1 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #1 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #1		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	10:42:31	46040
Stop Code	10:42:35	46290
Zero Speed	10:43:04	47765

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **53 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Test Run #1 ERU Event Log



Test Run #2 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #2		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	10:55:45	58265
Stop Code	10:55:48	58490
FS Brake	10:55:49	58665
Zero Speed	10:56:22	59790

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **1,125 feet**


Total time from brake application to stopping point: **38 seconds**

Test Run #2 ERU Event Log



Appendix II-II: Test Run #2 – Take 2 Analysis

Test Run #2 – Take #2 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #2 – Take 2 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #2 – Take 2		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:07:43	05379
Stop Code	11:07:45	05529
FS Brake	11:07:46	05604
Zero Speed	11:08:20	06779

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **1,175feet**


Total time from brake application to stopping point: **34 seconds**

Test Run #2 – Take 2 ERU Event Log



Appendix III: Test Run #3 Analysis

Test Run #3 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #3 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #3		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:20:06	16354
Stop Code	11:20:09	16579
FS Brake	11:20:30	18204
Zero Speed	11:20:53	18929

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **725 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **23 seconds**

Test Run #3 ATC Event
Log Data Review

USER TRIC CNC R	EVENT NUM	DATE TIME	M C S P E D	D E T I M E	H E A S P E R I O D	C O D E	R A T E	H A L F P E R I O D	D U T Y C Y C L E	E N F O R C E D C S	C C A R R A B T T R	A C T I V E C O D E	X I E N F O R C E A D S P	X I U A L I D C O D E	T R A C K C U R R	D I S T A N C E	R O U T E I D	E X T S T A T I O N	L O N G I T U D E	U E R I C A L	B R R U Z E R R E F E R E N C E			
#	11897	2023-11-27	11:20:51	10	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18929	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11896	2023-11-27	11:20:51	10	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18929	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
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#	11894	2023-11-27	11:20:51	11	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18879	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11893	2023-11-27	11:20:51	12	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18879	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11892	2023-11-27	11:20:51	12	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18879	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
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#	11887	2023-11-27	11:20:49	17	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18879	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11886	2023-11-27	11:20:49	18	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18879	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11885	2023-11-27	11:20:49	19	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18879	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11884	2023-11-27	11:20:49	19	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18854	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11883	2023-11-27	11:20:48	20	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18854	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
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#	11841	2023-11-27	11:20:42	6	FS	D				STOP	Y	0	00	18679	No	Station	ID	No	Station	ID	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0
#	11840	2023-11-27	11:20:42	6	FS																			

Test Run #3 ATC Event Log Data Review

U S E R T R I G G E R M E N T I D E N T I F I C A T I O N ... X I L I N G ... A C T I V E ... S T A T I O N ...


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Table with columns for event ID, date, time, status, and various system parameters. Includes rows for FS BRAKE and STOP CODE events.

FS BRAKE


STOP CODE

Test Run #3 ERU Event Log



Appendix III-II: Test Run #3 – Take 2 Analysis

Test Run #3 – Take 2 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #3 – Take 2 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #3 – Take 2		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:38:21	28727
Stop Code	11:38:25	28952
FS Brake	11:38:26	29102
Zero Speed	11:39:01	29802

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **700 feet**


Total time from brake application to stopping point: **35 seconds**

Test Run #3 – Take 2 ERU Event Log



Appendix IIIA: Test Run #3A Analysis

Test Run #3A Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #3A ATC Event Log Data

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #3A		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	11:54:41	40852
Stop Code	11:54:45	41077
FS Brake	11:54:47	41252
Zero Speed	11:55:16	42984

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **53 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **1,732 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **29 seconds**

Test Run #3A ATC Event
Log Data Review

U S E R T R I C C E R M A E R T E N T I U M D A T E T I M E M C H C O D E H E A S C O D E H A L F D E U T Y E N F C C A R C C T I U E X I X I N F R A L I C A S D R R E N E X T S T A T I O N L O U E R T I L C A L L B R R U Z E F B O L A T T E R A L E C C C E X T E M T W 6 1 7 4 C C C

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
Table with columns for ID, Date, Time, Status, and various codes. Includes rows for FS BRAKE, STOP CODE, and LOSS OF CAB.

FS BRAKE

STOP CODE


LOSS OF CAB

Test Run #3A ERU Event Log



Appendix IV: Test Run #4 Analysis

Test Run #4 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #4 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #4		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	12:25:25	63977
Stop Code	12:25:29	64127
Zero Speed	12:25:47	64602

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **33 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**


Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Test Run #4 ERU Event Log



Appendix V: Test Run #5 Analysis

Test Run #5 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #5 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #5		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	12:10:04	52902
Stop Code	12:10:07	53052
FS Brake	12:10:09	53102
Zero Speed	12:10:26	53477

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **33 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **375 feet**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **17 seconds**

Test Run #5 ATC Event
Log Data Review

U S E R T R A C C E R E U E N T C I C U M D A T E T I M E M C D E T S P E S D S M E A S P E R I O D C O D E R A T E H A L F P E R I O D D U T Y C Y C L E E N F O C E D C S C C A R R A B T T R R A C T I V E C O D E X I E N F R I D C O A S P X I U A L K I D C O D E T R A C K C U R R D I S T A N C E N E X T S T A T I O N R O U T E I D E X E M T W I 7 4 L A T I T U D E C L O N G I T U D E C U E R T I C A L R F B O B R R U E R F E B O


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STOP CODE

LOSS OF CAB


Table with columns for flight number, date, time, status, and various codes. Includes rows for flight 15197 through 15123, with specific annotations for 'STOP CODE' and 'LOSS OF CAB'.

Test Run #5 ERU Event Log



Appendix VI: Test Run #6 Analysis

Test Run #6 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #6 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #6		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	12:38:37	09541
Stop Code	12:38:41	09766
Zero Speed	12:39:20	11041

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**


Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Test Run #6 ERU Event Log



Appendix VII: Test Run #7 Analysis

Test Run #7 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #7 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #7		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	12:54:47	22341
Stop Code	12:54:49	22566
Zero Speed	12:55:44	24466

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54 mph**


Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Test Run #7 ATC Event
Log Data Review


U S E R I D C C E R	E U E N T N U M	D A T E T I M E	M C D E S C R I P T I O N	H E A D P E R I O D	C O D E R A T E	H A L F P E R I O D	D U T Y C Y C L E	E N F O R C E D C S	C C A R A B T T R	A C T I V E C O D E	X I E N F R I D C O D E	X I U A L I D C O D E	T R A C C U R	D I S T R A N C E	N E X T S T A T I O N	R O U T E I D	E X T R A I N F O R M A T I O N	L O N G I T U D E	U E R I D C H A L	B R R U R Z E R R E F E R E N C E
#	18422	2023-11-27	12:55:15	28 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23741	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18421	2023-11-27	12:55:15	28 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23716	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18420	2023-11-27	12:55:14	29 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23716	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18419	2023-11-27	12:55:13	29 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23691	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18418	2023-11-27	12:55:12	29 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23616	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18417	2023-11-27	12:55:11	29 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23591	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18416	2023-11-27	12:55:11	30 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23591	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18415	2023-11-27	12:55:10	30 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23541	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18414	2023-11-27	12:55:09	30 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23491	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18413	2023-11-27	12:55:08	30 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23441	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18412	2023-11-27	12:55:07	30 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23416	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18411	2023-11-27	12:55:07	30 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23416	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18410	2023-11-27	12:55:07	29 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23416	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18409	2023-11-27	12:55:07	28 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23416	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18408	2023-11-27	12:55:07	28 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18407	2023-11-27	12:55:07	27 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18406	2023-11-27	12:55:07	26 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18405	2023-11-27	12:55:06	25 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18404	2023-11-27	12:55:06	23 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18403	2023-11-27	12:55:06	21 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18402	2023-11-27	12:55:06	20 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18401	2023-11-27	12:55:06	18 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18400	2023-11-27	12:55:06	17 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18399	2023-11-27	12:55:06	16 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18398	2023-11-27	12:55:06	15 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23391	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18397	2023-11-27	12:55:06	15 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18396	2023-11-27	12:55:06	13 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18395	2023-11-27	12:55:06	12 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18394	2023-11-27	12:55:05	11 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18393	2023-11-27	12:55:05	10 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18392	2023-11-27	12:55:05	9 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18391	2023-11-27	12:55:05	8 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18390	2023-11-27	12:55:05	7 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18389	2023-11-27	12:55:05	6 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18388	2023-11-27	12:55:05	5 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18387	2023-11-27	12:55:05	4 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18386	2023-11-27	12:55:05	3 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	U B B		
#	18385	2023-11-27	12:55:04	2 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	U B B		
#	18384	2023-11-27	12:55:04	1 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	U B B		
#	18383	2023-11-27	12:55:04	2 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	U B B		
#	18382	2023-11-27	12:55:04	2 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	U B B		
#	18381	2023-11-27	12:55:04	3 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	U B B		
#	18380	2023-11-27	12:55:04	4 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18379	2023-11-27	12:55:04	5 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18378	2023-11-27	12:55:03	6 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18377	2023-11-27	12:55:03	7 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18376	2023-11-27	12:55:03	8 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23341	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18375	2023-11-27	12:55:03	8 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18374	2023-11-27	12:55:03	9 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18373	2023-11-27	12:55:02	10 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18372	2023-11-27	12:55:02	11 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18371	2023-11-27	12:55:02	12 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18370	2023-11-27	12:55:02	13 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18369	2023-11-27	12:55:02	14 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18368	2023-11-27	12:55:02	15 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18367	2023-11-27	12:55:01	16 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18366	2023-11-27	12:55:01	17 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18365	2023-11-27	12:55:01	18 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18364	2023-11-27	12:55:01	19 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23316	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18363	2023-11-27	12:55:01	19 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23291	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18362	2023-11-27	12:55:00	20 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23291	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18361	2023-11-27	12:55:00	21 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23291	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18360	2023-11-27	12:55:00	22 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23291	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y 0 0 0 0 0 0	B B		
#	18359	2023-11-27	12:55:00	23 MP D				STOP Y	0 00				23291	No Station ID	No Station ID					

Test Run #7 ERU Event Log



Appendix VIII: Test Run #8 Analysis

Test Run #8 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #8 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #8		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	13:17:33	36293
Stop Code	13:17:36	36068
Zero Speed	13:18:16	37643

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **55 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**


Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Test Run #8 ERU Event Log



Appendix IX: Test Run #9 Analysis

Test Run #9 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #9 ATC Event Log Data Review


ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #9		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	13:30:09	48318
Stop Code	13:30:12	48568
Zero Speed	13:31:14	50368

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **55 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**


Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Test Run #9 ERU Event Log



Appendix X: Test Run #10 Analysis

Test Run #10 Track Circuit Diagram and Vehicle Response



Test Run #10 ATC Event Log Data Review

ATC Event Log Data Review – Test Run #10		
Criteria	Time	Distance
Loss of Cab	13:47:16	61518
Stop Code	13:47:19	61793
Zero Speed	13:48:02	63068

Rail vehicle speed at loss of cab: **54 mph**

Total distance from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

Total time from brake application to stopping point: **N/A**

CTA Results of Post-Incident Re-Enactment #3 - November 27, 2023

December 2023

Test Run #10 ATC Event
Log Data Review

U S E R I D	E V E N T N U M	D A T E T I M E	M C D E S S A G E	M E A S U R E M E N T	C O D E	H A L F P E R I O D	D U T Y C Y C L E	E N F O R M A T I O N	C C A R R A B T T R	A C T I O N	X I E N F R C E A S P	X I U A L I D C O D E	T R A C K C U R R E N T	D I S T A N C E	R O U T E I D	L A T I T U D E	L O N G I T U D E	U E R T I C A L	B R R U R R R E F E R E N C E	
#	21984	2023-11-27	13:49:22	0 FS				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21983	2023-11-27	13:48:02	0 FS				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21982	2023-11-27	13:48:01	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21981	2023-11-27	13:48:01	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21980	2023-11-27	13:48:01	0 mB D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21979	2023-11-27	13:48:01	0 CT D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21978	2023-11-27	13:48:00	0 D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21977	2023-11-27	13:48:00	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21976	2023-11-27	13:47:59	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21975	2023-11-27	13:47:59	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21974	2023-11-27	13:47:59	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21973	2023-11-27	13:47:59	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21972	2023-11-27	13:47:59	0 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21971	2023-11-27	13:47:58	1 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21970	2023-11-27	13:47:58	2 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21969	2023-11-27	13:47:57	3 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21968	2023-11-27	13:47:57	4 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21967	2023-11-27	13:47:57	5 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63068	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21966	2023-11-27	13:47:56	5 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63018	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21965	2023-11-27	13:47:56	5 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63018	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21964	2023-11-27	13:47:56	6 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63018	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21963	2023-11-27	13:47:56	6 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63018	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21962	2023-11-27	13:47:55	7 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63018	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21961	2023-11-27	13:47:54	8 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63018	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21960	2023-11-27	13:47:54	9 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			63018	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21959	2023-11-27	13:47:53	9 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62993	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21958	2023-11-27	13:47:53	10 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62993	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21957	2023-11-27	13:47:52	11 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62993	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21956	2023-11-27	13:47:52	12 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62993	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21955	2023-11-27	13:47:52	12 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62993	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21954	2023-11-27	13:47:52	12 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62993	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21953	2023-11-27	13:47:51	12 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62968	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21952	2023-11-27	13:47:50	13 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62968	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21951	2023-11-27	13:47:50	14 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62968	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21950	2023-11-27	13:47:50	15 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62968	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21949	2023-11-27	13:47:49	15 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62918	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U
#	21948	2023-11-27	13:47:49	16 FS D				STOP Y	0 00			62918	No Station ID	No Station ID		Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	U

ZERO SPEED

Test Run #10 ERU Event Log

