



PERSONS FAMILIAR WITH THE CREW OR OPERATION

CEN19MA190

Hicks Ralph

From: Grosf Erik
Sent: Tuesday, July 2, 2019 7:17 PM
To: Hicks Ralph
Cc: Rodi Jennifer
Subject: FW: KA 350i crash KADS

FYI

Regards,

Erik

From: [REDACTED] >
Sent: Tuesday, July 2, 2019 7:03 PM
To: eyewitnessreport <eyewitnessreport@ntsb.gov>
Subject: KA 350i crash KADS

To whom it may concern,

I have greatly mixed emotions about divulging the following information. I am doing so only in the interest of overall aviation safety which hopefully can be increase further by what is learned in whole from this tragedy. I wish to remain anonymous in all respects.

I knew the Pilot Howard Cassady well and began my career with his company Eagle air enterprises about 20 years ago. I last flew with him about 2 years ago.

I have it on good authority that he was suffering from a troublesome right ankle that caused him pain. I was told the doctor was recommending a fusion which Howard was refusing as it would have kept him from being able to apply toe brakes.

It strikes me as quite possible that a right ankle problem may have been a contributing factor in a left engine failure scenario.

Please remember I wish to remain anonymous.

Thank you

Sent from my T-Mobile 4G LTE Device



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 16, 2019, 1415 EDT
Person Contacted: Ron Beck (Flew Recurrent Training with Matthew Palmer)
[REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Beck by telephone. Mr. Beck reported the following:

Mr. Beck flew the last recurrent training with Matt in May, 2019. Matt was low time but was building experience and did a fine job. Fine job with radio communications, use of checklist, understanding procedures. One thing that he hit very hard in recurrent were V1 cuts. I spent hours in the simulator doing that with Matt. Constantly doing V1 cuts in the sim. Matt flew one trip with Mr. Beck, he was a fine young man. Did a good job in the sim and the airplane.

Mr. Beck did not know much about Howard (Cassady); did not fly with him. He knew of him. Tremendous amount of jet time.

Would Matt have a problem with someone with so much time in the right seat? He believed that the personality of Howard could have affected the decisions made in the cockpit. Howard was a "gear up, shut up" kind of guy.

Matt's recent recurrent training was in the -200 simulator.

The interview ended at 1430.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 1, 2019, 1615 CDT

Person Contacted: Mr. Mark Buchy (Flew with Howard Cassady) [REDACTED]

NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Buchy by telephone. Mr. Buchy reported the following:

He flew in N534FF with Howard Cassady about three weeks ago. The flight was to Teterboro, NJ and back. He was in the right seat and Mr. Cassady flew as PIC in the left seat. There were no mechanical issues with the airplane. All operations were normal.

The interview ended at 1620.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: January 23, 2020 @ 1700 EST
Person Contacted: Mr. Mark Buchy (Flew with Howard Cassady) [REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Buchy by telephone. This was a follow-up interview. Mr. Buchy reported the following:

Mr. Buchy flew with Howard on a cross country flight from Addison to Teterboro, NJ about three weeks before the accident.

He could not recall if Howard used two hands on the yoke during rotation. Howard did not ask him to guard the power levers during the takeoff roll or rotation.

Mr. Buchy has about 150 hours in the King Air -350. He is aware of the power lever migration issue in the King Air. On a recent flight he felt that the left engine power lever “wanted to come back.” He tightened up the friction and it was OK after that.

His issue with the power lever friction system is that it is either “extreme or not enough.” A small tweak of the knob and its either too tight (locked down....won’t move) or it’s too loose.

Regarding the time required to go from the before starting engine checklist to #1 for takeoff: If you are proficient you can do it in about 10 minutes and not miss anything. But there is a tendency, especially in the corporate world where the customer wants to “get moving,” for the pilots to “jump in and go” and cut short the pretakeoff items.

The interview ended at 1715.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: September 30, 2019 at 1100 EDT
Person Interviewed: Jason Denny, Contract A&P Mechanic for Flyte Aero LLC
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Denny by telephone. Also on the call were David Mikolajewski (FAA, North Texas FSDO) and Dajuan Sevillian (NTSB, AS-60).

- Mr. Denny works for Flyte Aero LLC on an as needed basis, technically a contractor. He primarily works on the Falcon 2000 and is used on other assignments as needed.
- Mr. Denny first described the oil usage issue on N534FF. On June 20th, 2019, he checked the engine oil levels. On the left engine dipstick the oil level was below the stick...no oil on it at all. Howard (Cassady) was there and looked at him, "stared at me a little..." and asked me to add 2380 engine oil to the engine. Mr. Denny looked around the EE hangar and could find no oil. He then went to Falcon Crest Aviation and Supply and purchased 4 quarts of Exxon 2380 oil on the Flyte Aero account. After adding 2 qts to the left engine, it registered $\frac{1}{4}$ qt below the "2 quarts low" mark on the stick. The right engine was reading $\frac{1}{2}$ qt below the "2 quarts low" mark on the stick...he did not service that engine. Neither engine showed any leakage of oil on the cowlings or on the floor. The airplane then flew later that day.
- On June 24th, he rechecked the engine oil and found both engine levels were about where he left them after servicing on the 20th. There were 2 pilots there getting ready to fly N534FF, but Howard was not one of them. He did not know their names. Mr. Denny asked them to check the oil levels after they returned and make a note of it. The airplane then flew later that day. To his knowledge they did not leave a note after they returned.
- On June 26th, Mr. Denny rechecked the oil levels. The left engine oil level was about $\frac{1}{2}$ qt lower than the after servicing level on June 20th. This was about $\frac{3}{4}$ qt below the "2 quarts low" line on the stick. He added 1 qt and brought the level up to about $\frac{1}{4}$ qt above the "2 quarts low" line on the stick. The right engine level was about $\frac{3}{4}$ qt below the "2 quarts low" line on the stick, or about $\frac{1}{4}$ lower than the level observed on the 20th. He added about $\frac{3}{4}$ qt of oil to bring it up to the "2 quarts low" line on the stick. His plan was to

monitor the consumption over the next 3 to 4 flights to determine the usage on the left engine. Again, there were no leaks observed anywhere so he assumed there was a “consumption issue.” The allowable consumption is 1 qt per 10 flight hours. The airplane then flew later that day.

- On June 28th, he rechecked the engine oil levels and they were where he left them on the 26th. He did not service any oil on that day. He opened the accessory bay on the left engine and there were no signs of oil leakage. No leakage on the cowling or floor either. The airplane was scheduled to fly next on the 30th (the accident flight).
- Mr. Denny confirmed that he did not speak with Howard on the morning of the accident, and he was not at the EE hangar prior to the flight.
- The only maintenance that he performed on N534FF was to apply some temporary leading edge tape to the left wing light lens...it was cracked. The lens was later replaced by another mechanic. He never completed any maintenance log entries on N534FF for any reason, including the oil servicing. He planned to, but he had not.
- He asked for access to the maintenance manuals but never received it. He did not use the maintenance manuals when servicing or repairing N534FF. He didn't think they had any manuals. He did not even service the tires with air.
- If Howard needed maintenance on the airplane, who would he call first? Probably Abe Lawrence.

The interview was concluded about 1130.

From: [REDACTED]
Hicks Ralph
Subject: Fwd: FW: Conf B: Subject: Mechanic Interview for CEN19MA190 Conference Coordinator: Ralph Hicks/ERA
Date: Monday, September 30, 2019 12:33:27 PM
Attachments: [not supported calendar message.ics](#)
[invite.ics](#)

N534FF

Oil related issues as discussed 9/30/2019 with Ralph Hicks.

June 20 2019

I checked the engine oil in the left engine. There was no reading on the dipstick. Howard and I assumed another pilot was there and Howard told me to put 2380 in it. They left. I assumed he had some in the hangar. I found none. I purchased 4 quarts of 2380 Exxon at Falcon Crest Aviation and supply Inc. 4551 Westgrove Addison TX 75001. I put 2 quarts in the left motor which brought it up to around a ¼ below the 2 quart low mark on the dipstick. The #2 motor was reading ½ quart below the 2 quart low mark on the dipstick. Neither engines showed any leakage on the cowlings or on the floor. The aircraft flew this day.

June 24 2019

I checked the oil in both engines and both were about where I left them from June 20th. There were 2 pilots there who were to fly it. I asked them to check the oil when they got back and leave a note as to the quantity so we could find it. Never found a note. Neither engines showed any leakage on the cowlings or on the floor. The aircraft flew this day.

June 26 2019

The #1 engine was about ½ quart lower than when I first added oil reading around ¾ below the 2 quart low mark on the dipstick. I added a quart to bring it up to about ¼ above the 2 quart low mark. The #2 engine was about ¼ of a quart lower at this time as well. I added ¾ of a quart to this engine to bring it up to the 2 quart low mark on the dipstick. My intent was to monitor the consumption over the next 3-4 flights to get a usage on the left motor. Neither engines showed any leakage on the cowlings or on the floor. The aircraft flew this day.

June 28 2019

I checked the oil on both sides. They were both where I left them on June 26th. I opened up the accessory bay on the left engine and found no oil leakage. Both engines showed no signs of leakage on the cowlings as well. The aircraft was scheduled to fly Sunday the 30th.

Jason Denny
FlyteAero Maintenance

[REDACTED]

----- Forwarded message -----

From: ROC <cmctr@ntsb.gov>
Date: Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 1:42 PM
Subject: FW: Conf B: Subject: Mechanic Interview for CEN19MA190 Conference Coordinator: Ralph Hicks/ERA
To: Rigsby, Matthew (FAA) <[REDACTED]>, Mikolajewski, David (FAA) <[REDACTED]>, Cruz Pocholo <[REDACTED]>, Garcia, Juan (FAA) <[REDACTED]>, Jason Denny <[REDACTED]>

All,

We will try to interview Mr. Jason Denny next Monday, September 30, at 1100 EDT (1000 CDT). If his availability changes, we will reschedule.

Thanks,

Ralph

-----Original Appointment-----

From: ROC <cmctr@ntsb.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2019 2:29 PM
To: ROC; Hicks Ralph
Subject: Conf B: Subject: Mechanic Interview for CEN19MA190 Conference Coordinator: Ralph Hicks/ERA
When: Monday, September 30, 2019 11:00 AM-12:00 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where: Primary Access Number: 1-877-446-3914 Passcode: 3164676# (mobile 1-303-586-4335,,3164676#)

Please use this Outlook appointment to invite all participants.
Conferences cannot begin without a Coordinator Passcode.
The Coordinator Passcode for this call: **3164676**

*****This Number and Passcode is For Official Use Only. Do Not Forward to additional Recipients without Permission from the Conference Call Coordinator*****

****Reusing any Conference Bridge Passcode, or changing your scheduled date or time without scheduling with the ROC may result in your being added to another Conference scheduled to use that Passcode****

The Comm Center has confirmed this time with the Conference Coordinator (the requesting party) based on the original email request. The Coordinator must instruct parties - **including the Conference Coordinator** - to call the bridge number listed at the designated time - the Comm Center will *not* call the parties. **Changes, cancellations, or modifications must be done by the Conference Coordinator, after checking availability with the CmCtr.** Accident launches always take precedence and may pre-empt scheduled activities on short notice – **please consider a contingency plan!**

You've been invited to a phone only meeting.

Not at your computer?

You can join by dialing one of the access numbers below.
(CmCtr note: CenturyLink is aware of problems with these links and is addressing them)

iPhone@: [1-303-586-4335](tel:1-303-586-4335), [3164676#](tel:1-303-586-4335)
Primary Access Number: 1-303-586-4335
Guest Passcode: **3164676**
USA/Canada 1-303-586-4335
USA/Canada 1-877-446-3914

Scheduling a Conference Call through the ROC (CALL only)

An Outlook Appointment will be sent for you to invite conferees (limit: 125)
the ROC will reply to this email only if we cannot accommodate the request

The following information is required

Conference Coordinator Name: Ralph
Hicks/ERA
Subject: Mechanic Interview for
CEN19MA190
Date requested: 9/30/2019
Time requested: 1100 am EDT
Duration: 1 hour

Optional date range for recurring

conferences: N/A
Beginning date:
Ending date:

****Reusing any Conference Bridge
Passcode, or changing your scheduled
date or time without scheduling with
the ROC may result in your being
added to another Conference which is
scheduled to use that Passcode****

Requests are subject to availability.
The Coordinator must instruct parties

- including the Conference

Coordinator - to call the bridge
number listed at the designated time

- the ROC will **not** call the parties.

Changes, cancellations, or
modifications should be done through
the Conference Coordinator, who
must in turn notify the ROC. Accident
launches always take precedence and
may pre-empt scheduled activities on
short notice – [please consider a
contingency plan](#)

Ralph E. Hicks

Senior Air Safety Investigator – NTSB
Eastern Region Aviation



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MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 1, 2019, 1045 CDT
Person Contacted: Earl Fonville (CFO, EE Holdings LLC),
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Fonville at the hangar of EE Holdings LLC. Also were David Mikolajewski (FAA Operations Group Member). Mr. Fonville reported the following:

Earl Fonville is Chief Financial Officer for EE Operations, LLC and EE Real Estate, LLC. Earl described more clearly how the aircraft was managed. Earl stated that EE operations, LLC is a subsidiary of Ellard Family Holdings, LLC. EE operations, LLC is the owner of the aircraft. S&H Aircraft, LLC is a sole proprietor owned by Howard Cassady, pilot certificate number [REDACTED]. Howard Cassady was managing the aircraft through S&H aircraft, LLC. Howard Cassady was a long time family friend of the Ellard's. Earl gave James Cassady's (Howard Cassady's son) contact information.

The interview ended at 1330.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: September 25, 2019 at 1700 EDT
Person Interviewed: Earl Fonville
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Fonville by telephone. Mr. Fonville had Mr. Geff Anderson on the line (his attorney). Mr. Fonville reported the following:

- If Howard Cassady has encountered a maintenance issue with the airplane, who would he most likely call about it? He would probably call Textron/Beechcraft or Cutter Aviation on the field.
- Was anyone from EE Operations present (other than the passengers) prior to the flight? No. Abe Lawrence had access to the hangar and would be able to open it before the flight.
- Do you know of anyone who would have discussed an oil usage issue or an oil leak with Howard before the flight, while in the cockpit? Other than Abe Lawrence, no. Mr. Fonville was aware that one of the engines needed servicing with oil a week or two before the accident.
- He knew of Jason Denny but did not believe Mr. Denny had performed any maintenance on the airplane that would require a logbook entry. The only items that Mr. Fonville was aware of was a light lens issue on the left wing and the oil servicing already discussed.
- The flight to St. Pete was purely for personal reasons. It was not a business flight. The Titus and Thelen family members on board were personal friends of Brian and Ornella Ellard, who were also on board. There was no compensation from anyone for the flight.
- Mr. Fonville retained copies of the hangar surveillance video and would be available to show it to investigators if necessary.
- Did Howard ever discuss any issue with the engine throttles (power levers)? No.
- Did Howard ever perform any maintenance of the airplane himself? Not aware of any.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 16, 2019, 1045 EDT
Person Contacted: Andrew Freeman (Flight Instructor for Howard Cassady)
[REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Freeman by telephone. Mr. Freeman reported the following:

Mr. Freeman is a flight instructor for Rich Aviation Services. He flew recurrent training with Howard Cassady in the accident airplane (N534FF) on March 23, 2019.

This was the first and only time he flew with Howard. It was obvious to him that Howard was a career professional pilot. It was obvious that he had gone through lots of professional training before.

They briefed the entire ride before the flight; it was a good briefing of everything they planned to accomplish on the recurrent ride. Nothing stood out as far as Howard's performance. He was "super strong" on King Air knowledge. If there was an area where Howard was weak, it was on the avionics/new technology. They spent some extra time with the external power connected going over the avionics in the airplane. Howard had a good attitude during the training and accepted any advice or coaching well. There were no areas of concern that he noticed.

Howard performed well on the simulated single engine failure on takeoff. Since it was the actual airplane, Mr. Freeman did not pull an engine back on the runway for safety reasons. He would wait until positive rate of climb and gear coming up, about 200 to 300 feet agl, then would pull an engine back. This maneuver, like all the others, was pre-briefed.

The recurrent training would cover a flight review and IPC.

Mr. Freeman also flew previously with Matt Palmer, the accident co-pilot. He described Matt as a “very strong co-pilot.” He was impressed with Matt’s piloting skills and stated that he was a “sharp kid.”

The interview ended at 1100.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: January 23, 2020 @ 1630 EST
Person Contacted: Andrew Freeman (Flight Instructor for Howard Cassady)
[REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Freeman by telephone. This was a follow-up interview. Mr. Freeman reported the following:

Howard Cassady used both hands to rotate in the King Air -350. You use V speeds like a jet and so you transition to both hands on the yoke for rotation. Howard did not ask him to guard the power levers; however, their training was in the simulator.

Mr. Freeman's normal procedure is to discuss power lever creep with students during training. He is aware of the phenomenon. It is a normal part of my briefing prior to the simulator training. He believes that Howard was aware of the issue.

He has never experienced power lever migration in an actual airplane; however he keeps the friction knobs tight. It has happened to a friend in flight.

Mr. Freeman talked about the normal amount of time it takes to get from the before starting engine checklist to number one for departure, assuming a normal taxi distance. He has heard that FlightSafety wants an initial training pilot to be able to complete all items in 35 minutes or less before the check ride. He believes that a totally proficient pilot can do it in about 5 minutes.

The interview ended at 1640.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: September 18, 2019 at 1300 CDT
Persons Interviewed: Abe Lawrence and Jesse Mata (Co-owners, Flyte Aero, LLC)
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Mata at the offices of the FAA North Texas FSDO, Irving, Texas. Also in attendance were David Mikolajewski (FAA Operations Group Member) and Matt Rigsby (FAA Coordinator). Pocholo Cruz (NTSB Maintenance Records Group Chairman) and Juan Garcia (FAA South Florida FSDO) were conferenced in by telephone. Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Mata reported the following:

- Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Mata started Flyte Aero in January, 2017. They are each 50% owners in the company.
- They provide aircraft management services, help keep aircraft clean, refer pilots, clean hangars, arrange catering, etc.
- Their business relationship was with Earl Fonville of EE Operations. No business relationship with S&H Aircraft (Mr. Cassidy's company). Had not heard of S&H.
- Pertaining to N534FF, they washed aircraft, pulled in/out of hangar, took out trash, provided air conditioning cart, helped passengers with their bags, etc. They did not provide maintenance.
- Mr. Lawrence arrived at the EE hangar about 7-7:30 am. He had his father with him, who helps out. Mr. Mata was not at the hangar; he was at the Flyte offices on the airfield.
- The flight crew arrived after they did, and the passengers arrived after that.
- The passengers arrived in separate cars, probably three cars arrived with passengers.
- They had bags for the trip. It was a personal trip to south Florida for the week, so the bags seemed proportionate for the time away. There was also food (Jason's Deli) and some wine in bottles in a cooler.
- Mr. Lawrence did not recall if a mechanic was there before the flight. He is not a mechanic and would not perform any maintenance on the airplane. His father is not a mechanic either.

- Mr. Lawrence did not have a conversation with either pilot about the engines needing or using oil. He also reported that his father was not near the cockpit and had no conversations with the pilots about any maintenance issues.
- There was not a significant oil leak on the hangar floor. The floor is painted and clean. There was a “dime size” drop on the floor after they pulled the airplane out of the hangar, but it could have been from the tug. They wiped it up easily. There was no visible oil evident on the exterior of the airplane.
- There were other aircraft in the hangar; an Aero Commander, a 182, and a SR22.
- The copilot waited in the hangar to greet the passengers to arrive while Mr. Cassady was at the airplane.
- Mr. Lawrence and his father brought the passenger bags to the aircraft door; the copilot loaded them in the baggage compartment.
- There was no scale there and no bags were weighed. They never recalled the crew using a scale to weigh anything on any flight.
- Aircraft preflight: Mr. Lawrence saw both pilots walking around the airplane prior to the flight. At some point both pilots looked at the airplane.
- Mr. Lawrence did not see the airplane taxi out. He had already closed the hangar doors to keep fumes out of the hangar and was inside.
- He knows Jason Denny. Mr. Denny is a contract mechanic on the Falcon products. He was under the impression that Mr. Denny did not have financial agreement with EE; they thought that Mr. Denny was doing looking over the maintenance as a favor.
- Mr. Cassady would call Earl Fonville if there was a maintenance issue with the airplane. Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Mata were not middlemen for maintenance.
- They went to the Flyte building after the airplane taxied out. They did not see the accident but heard the impact; it “shook the building.” They went outside to see where the noise came from and at first they thought there was a fuel truck explosion. Then they eventually realized it was N534FF.
- Mr. Lawrence is a pilot. Worked for Delta, was a simulator instructor. Never made a career of it. Private pilot, 200-300 hours actual flight time.
- Nacelle baggage lockers; boarding side compartment had cooler with food (less than 2 lbs) and the foam inserts, etc. were in the other locker.
- Used a scrubber to clean the hangar floors. Walked behind it, sprayed water on the pads.
- Used an old tug, drive type. Airline type from 50’s or 60’s.
- How was Mr. Cassady acting that morning? He was “upbeat.” He stated that he had just received good news from the doctor regarding his wife.
- No physical issues that Mr. Lawrence could tell. Did not seem to walk with a limp.
- About a week before the accident, Mr. Lawrence saw Jason Denny and asked about the airplane. He asked how the airplane looked and Denny replied that he was surprised how clean it was. He did mention that it “needed a quart” of oil...but did not specify which engine.
- How was maintenance work entered for N534FF? Mostly CAMP records.

The interview ended at 1345.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jennifer Rodi
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Person Contacted: William E Moore – [REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190
Date: July 17, 2019 @ 0915

Narrative:

During the conversation, Mr. Moore stated the following:

- Mr. Moore is a King Air pilot for the state of Mississippi
- About 4-5 years ago they had problems with the throttles levers staying in the proper position
- They had just picked the airplane up from maintenance
- They would tighten the friction locks; however, the throttle would still come back to or towards idle
- During the takeoff climb on one flight, they perceived that they had a right engine failure
- They were able to control the airplane and go through procedures to maneuver back to the airport for landing
- During the emergency procedures they established that the right engine had not lost power or failed, the right engine throttle was at idle
- They were able to advance the throttle and restore power to that engine and landed without further incident
- They were unable to tighten the friction lock up enough to get the throttle levers to stay in place
- He stated that one little bump was all that was required to snap the throttle back towards or to the idle position
- Mr. Moore stated that they went through the records and established that during the maintenance, a service bulletin regarding throttle cable slack had been complied with

- This service bulletin called for a second 3" spring to be added on the back of the fuel control unit on the engine in order to address the throttle slack
- Further inspection established that this spring was "too strong" for the friction lock
- The mechanic removed the spring and they have not had an issue with the throttle levers staying in place since
- When asked, Mr. Moore, stated that it was a common practice during the takeoff for pilots to remove their hand from the throttle levers and use both hands to rotate once V1 was established for takeoff speed



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 11, 2019, 1200 EDT
Person Contacted: Jack Robinson (Knew Howard Cassady)
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Robinson by telephone. Mr. Robinson reported the following:

He was Howard Cassady's business partner for about 30 years. Aircraft management. Some Part 135 work years ago. He had not flown with Howard in 3 ½ to 4 years and had not seen Howard in 2 to 2 ½ years. Jack and his son removed Howard from their business. Howard cost them two clients. There was some animosity from Howard because of that falling out. He stated that some customers did not want Howard flying them any longer. There were some personality conflicts as well as safety issues (Howard flew into some bad weather: that bothered a customer).

They got their King Air type ratings at the same time. Experience together with King Airs.

Howard was the type of pilot who was impressed with someone who could climb into the airplane and takeoff with minimal use of a checklist. He thought that was impressive and he liked to operate that way. Howard was "bad about using checklists." If Howard was familiar with the airplane, he would not use the checklist as much.

Mr. Robinson used an analogy to describe Howard's abilities as a pilot. If Howard had something on his mind, he was "useless" as a pilot. It was like a switch. If the switch was turned off, so was Howard. If the switch was turned on, Howard was sharp. You didn't know why the switch was off or on.

Weight and balance: If Howard was familiar with the airplane, he would generally not do a weight and balance calculation. If he was unfamiliar with the airplane, he would.

He usually verbalized V-speeds and usually took off with flaps.

Howard has problems with his right ankle that has been bothering him for years. Also, he had some narcolepsy; he would nod off in flight from time to time.

The interview ended at 1220.

RECORD OF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VISIT <input type="checkbox"/> CONFERENCE OR <input type="checkbox"/> TELEPHONE CALL		TIME 1:00 PM	DATE 07/03/2019
NAME (S) OF PERSON (S) CONTACTED OR IN CONFERENCE AND LOCATION JASON ROBINSON		ROUTING	
		SYMBOL	INITIALS
SUBJECT KING AIR ACCIDENT (ADS) 6/30/2019			
DIGEST			
KNOWS HOWARD ALL HIS LIFE. HAS PARTNERSHIP IN A COMPANY FOR A LONG TIME. MET MATT SEVERAL			
TIMES VERY CAPABLE PILOT. DESCRIBED BOTH PILOTS LOST CRM AND HOW HE COULD SEE THAT BEING AN			
ISSUE. HOWARD TAUGHT JASON HOW TO FLY THE KINGAIR. DOES NOT MAKE SENSE WHY HE COULD NOT GET			
OUT OF THAT SITUATION. POSSIBLY A LONG TIME BEFORE HE HAD BEEN IN THE KING AIR. WENT TO			
RICH AVIATION FOR TRAINING. HOWARD WAS NOT STRONG ON USING CHECKLISTS. FLEW THE GULFSTREAM			
TOGETHER AND HOWARD NEVER USED THE CHECKLIST. HOWARD WOULD USUALLY USE FLPAS ON TAKEOFF			
WHEN FLEW TOGETHER. MATT WAS BIG ON PROCEEDURES. HOWARD WOULD ALWAYS PULL ABRUPTLY ON			
DEPARTURE, HE WAS NATORIOUS FOR THAT. OPINION THAT HOWARD COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM BECASUE OF			
RUDDER BOOST AND INPUTED THE LEFT RUDDER TO SQUARE IT UP. HOWARD WAS NOT KNOWN FOR			
COMPUTING WEIGHT AND BALANCE.			
CONCLUSION, ACTION TAKEN, OR REQUIRED			
DATE 07/02/2019	TITLE	SIGNATURE	



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 2, 2019, 1300 CDT

Person Contacted: Mr. Jason Robinson (Friend of both pilots) [REDACTED]

NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Robinson at the Marriott Courtyard, Addison, Texas. Also present was David Mikolajewski (FAA Operations Group Member). Mr. Robinson reported the following:

Mr. Robinson had known Howard all his life. Had partnership in a company for a long time. Met Matt several times, very capable pilot. Described both pilots lost CRM and how he could see that being an issue. Howard taught Jason how to fly the King Air. Does not make sense why he could not get out of that situation. Possibly a long time before he had been in the King Air. Went to Rich Aviation for training. Howard was not strong on using checklists. Flew the Gulfstream together and Howard never used the checklist. Howard would usually use flaps on takeoff when they flew together. Matt was big on procedures. Howard would always pull up abruptly at rotation; he was notorious for that. Opinion that Howard compounded the problem because of rudder boost and inputted the left rudder to square it up. Howard was not known for computing weight and balance.

The interview ended at 1330.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 11, 2019, 1600 EDT
Person Contacted: Dustin Salzer (Pilot, knew and flew with both accident pilots),
701-226-1801
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Salzer by telephone. Mr. Salzer reported the following:

Mr. Salzer knew both pilots personally. Howard (Cassady) had contacted him earlier about flying right seat in N534FF, but he had never flown in N534FF.

He flew with Howard a couple of years ago in a King Air -200 to Kingsville (out-and-back). He flew right seat and Howard flew left seat as PIC. Howard did all of the flying, including takeoff and landings. Mr. Salzer operated the radios and navigation.

He stated that Howard did not feel comfortable flying the King Air single pilot; he always took a right seater along.

He described Howard's checklist discipline a "standard" and "pretty much like what we all do."

Nothing stood out about Howard's pilot skills; if anything unsafe had occurred then he would not have flown with him again.

Matthew (Matt) was a "very, very particular" pilot, "almost to the point of driving me nuts sometimes." He stated that Matt was very much by the book when it came to flying. Mr. Salzer flew a C-421 for a company and Matt was his backup. He trained Matt in the 421. They last flew together about a month ago; Matt's father had a V-tail Bonanza and Matt flew him to pick up a Cessna 310 that Mr. Salzer was having maintenance performed on.

He has flown both left and right seat with Matt. They were good friends. Matt never complained to him about Howard. He felt that Matt would not make himself available to fly with Howard if

anything out of the ordinary was going on. Matt had a lot of right seat experience in the -350 and there was talk of him getting typed in the -350.

The interview ended at 1620.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

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Eastern Region Aviation

Date: January 23, 2020 @ 1415 EST
Person Contacted: Dustin Salzer (Pilot, knew and flew with both accident pilots),
[REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This was a follow-up interview. This investigator interviewed Mr. Salzer by telephone. Mr. Salzer reported the following:

Regarding Howard Cassady's rotation technique, Mr. Salzer did not recall anything unusual about it. He flew with Howard in the King Air -200 but not the -300. Mr. Salzer has never flown the -300.

Howard used both hands when rotating. He would not ask the pilot not flying to guard the throttles. The throttles were set prior to the takeoff roll.

Mr. Salzer has heard of the power lever migration issue in the -300, but not the -200. He has never experienced it while flying.

The interview ended at 1420.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: July 12, 2019, 1500 EDT
Person Contacted: Austin Wright (Flew with both pilots) [REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Wright by telephone. Mr. Wright reported the following:

He had flown with both pilots previously and knew both well.

Describing Howard Cassady:

Mr. Wright had known Howard for 20 yrs. Howard and Jack Robinson worked together back in the 90's and 2000's at Eagle Air. They were good at making careers for pilots. Mr. Wright's father also flew with Howard. Jason, Jack's son, and Howard never got along so Howard was "shown the door." Jason did not look at Howard as a professional equal.

Mr. Wright hasn't flown w/ Howard in 4-5 yrs. When Howard left the Ft Worth flying scene he kind of disavowed us all and started over on the east side of town.

Mr. Wright was asked to describe Howard's pilot traits. "You had to know Howard."

He was the "old cantankerous captain." Howard could fly anything. If you could get the airplane started for Howard, he could fly it. Howard was a good "seat of the pants" aviator. Howard didn't like to use a checklist. He just "jumped in the airplane and went." That was Howard's way of flying.

Was he safe? "Absolutely." Howard flew airplanes all over the world for decades. He was a good, competent aviator. Howard "did it his way....his way was better than yours." But he was never belligerent about it....he was a good man.

As far as being a PIC, "I would put my family on an airplane with him."

Howard always wanted good, competent co-pilots flying with him in the right seat. He was probably just a little slower than he used to be.

When Mr. Wright flew with Howard, with Howard as PIC in the left seat, they would swap legs; Howard had no problem with sharing flight time....he was "not a stick hog."

Describing Matthew (Matt) Palmer:

Mr. Wright knew Matt very well. Had known him about 5 yrs. Matt was a "young, ambitious, up-and-coming aviator. Mr. Wright wanted Matt to join him at Baker Aviation, where he worked. He would have been a "good fit." Mr. Wright described Matt as "amicable, professional, and eager."

Matt was excited to be there...in the right seat. Matt had a "moldable personality." He respected the experience and authority of his PIC's.

This was a "big loss...Matt had an incredibly bright future."

Matt had upgraded lately and had gotten some King Air 90 time in left seat. Matt did a lot of work for Shawn Rich at Rich Aviation. He felt sure that Matt had some "left seat call making experience."

Matt always did a great job in right seat....he was like a sponge....great flying habits."

General comments: He has flown the -350 (King Air) recently and stated that if you do not lock the throttles down with the throttle friction as hard as you can, they will slide back on you.

The interview ended at 1530.



MEMORANDUM for RECORD

Ralph E. Hicks
Senior Air Safety Investigator, Operations Group Chairman
Eastern Region Aviation

Date: January 25, 2020 @ 1020 EDT
Person Contacted: Austin Wright (Flew with both pilots) [REDACTED]
NTSB Accident Number: CEN19MA190 – Addison, TX

This investigator interviewed Mr. Wright by telephone. This was a follow-up interview. Mr. Wright reported the following:

He had flown with both pilots previously and knew both well.

Describing Howard Cassady:

It has been several years (> 17) since he flew in the King Air with Howard so he did not recall his rotation technique. He did not believe that Howard would ask a PNF to guard the power levers during takeoff/rotation.

In his opinion, 7½ minutes was not enough time to accomplish the King Air -350 checklist from before engine starting to ready for takeoff.

The interview ended at 1030.