

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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CSX EMPLOYEE FATALITY

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ACCA YARD, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

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Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-006

APRIL 1, 2015

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Interview of: SCOTT DEAN

CSX Acca Yard
Richmond, Virginia

Thursday,
April 2, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MICHAEL FLANIGON
Investigator-in-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL FLANIGON, Investigator-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN JENNER, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

GERY WILLIAMS, Vice President - Mechanical
CSX Transportation

DONALD CASHMAN, Operating Practices Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
Richmond, Virginia

SHANE RICHARDSON, Operating Practices Inspector
Federal Railroad Administration
Baltimore, Maryland

LARRY KOSTER, Manager Florence Division
CSX Transportation

DON GRISSOM, General Vice President
Brotherhood Railway Carmen Division

WILLIAM BATES, Lead Investigator
SMART/UTU

BRUCE ALLISON, Local Chairman
United Transportation Union
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Dean)

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I N T E R V I E W

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2 MR. FLANIGON: Okay, my name is Mike Flanigon, F-l-a-n-
3 i-g-o-n, NTSB, and we're interviewing Mr. Scott Dean, who was the
4 yardmaster on duty on April 1st, about 2:50 or so in the morning,
5 when a fatality occurred at Richmond, Virginia on the CSX
6 railroad.

7 And before we get started, I wanted to make sure that
8 you understood we're going to tape record --

9 MR. DEAN: Yes.

10 MR. FLANIGON: -- or digitally record nowadays, the
11 interview and we'll provide you a transcript for you to look at
12 and make sure it's right.

13 So what I'd like to do before we start is go around the
14 table and ask everyone to state and spell their last name and the
15 organization that they're with. So, starting with Mr. Allison.

16 MR. ALLISON: Bruce Allison, Local Chairman, UTU.

17 MR. FLANIGON: A-l-l?

18 MR. ALLISON: A-l-l-i-s-o-n. Sorry.

19 DR. JENNER: Stephen Jenner, J-e-n-n-e-r, with the NTSB.

20 MR. CASHMAN: Don Cashman, C-a-s-h-m-a-n, FRA.

21 MR. WILLIAMS: Gery Williams, W-i-l-l-i-a-m-s, VP
22 Mechanical, CSX.

23 MR. KOSTER: Larry Koster, K-o-s-t-e-r, Florence
24 Division.

25 MR. GRISSOM: Don Grissom, G-r-i-s-s-o-m, Vice President

1 for the Carmen Division.

2 MR. BATES: William Bates, B-a-t-e-s, SMART/UTU.

3 MR. RICHARDSON: Shane Richardson, R-i-c-h-a-r-d-s-o-n,
4 FRA.

5 INTERVIEW OF SCOTT DEAN

6 BY MR. FLANIGON:

7 Q. Okay, Mr. Dean, if you could start by walking us through
8 the evening. Kind of in your own words, at your own pace, explain
9 what happened. And I think we'd be particularly interested in any
10 interactions that you might have had with the carmen that were
11 involved in -- you know, both the individual that was killed and
12 the one that wasn't, and with the RCL operator who was operating
13 the road. So just kind of walk us through and tell the story. I
14 know you've probably told it to a bunch people and -- but we'll
15 ask you to go through it again.

16 A. Well, the night was a busy night, not unusually busy.
17 It's usually always a lot of traffic. A lot of cars switch on
18 Tuesday night, as well as Thursday night. So it's not unusual,
19 but it was busy. I didn't actually have any interaction with the
20 391, the Y391, myself. I had my trainee talk with him. I was
21 trying to kind of step away a little bit and just watch how he did
22 it so he could get a feel for everything.

23 Leading up to the incident, he -- Eddie called the car
24 inspectors and told them -- it might have been right around
25 midnight, a little after midnight -- gave them Q303, an outbound,

1 and we gave them Q400, I believe was a 30, an outbound as well.
2 Let's see here. 401, Q401, which was in North 2, had come in, had
3 made a couple moves on the south end to set the Richmond cars off
4 and get the cars that were leading on their train, a separate NLT
5 main. They came up here and were swapping out in front of the
6 office, and I told Eddie to give the car inspectors North 2 as
7 well so they could have it when they were finished with the other
8 tracks. So he did that, called them on the radio and gave it to
9 them. 401 came back, got on their stuff, went out the 3 switch,
10 was going back north.

11 Well, while this was going on, we had Q032 was going up
12 to passenger main. Eddie gave that to the car inspectors, or I
13 might have done it; I really don't remember. But one of us told
14 them that it was going up the passenger main, had 17 cars to
15 inspect. 303 came in; 303 left. Y322 came in 2 by the tower, was
16 shoving back, and the Y14. At that time we had Q400 working in
17 the south yard, going to the north yard. 401 was shoving back up
18 to North Acca, and 439 had just come down 4 main because the
19 engine's loose. This was probably around 2:30 in the morning, I
20 would say, somewhere around there.

21 I told Eddie, I said, call the car inspectors to find
22 out where they're at with Q400. Because the crew was already on
23 duty. We were trying to figure out how we're going to swap them,
24 where we're going to swap them, and so forth. I believe Mr. Eskew
25 -- I believe it was Kevin that responded. They were still working

1 on it, but they were up in North Acca inspecting the pig train.
2 They wanted to know where the pig train was because we had stopped
3 them in North Acca to swap. So we told them the train was
4 swapping and it would be moving shortly.

5 So, it might have been minutes after that, I got on the
6 radio and called and spoke with Kevin and I told them we have cars
7 in North 2 that are scheduled to D794, which is our local that
8 leaves in the morning to go north; let me know when we can have
9 North 2 back because I need to get someone on it as soon as we
10 can. And he then told me that he was still working on -- well,
11 they were wrapping up Q400; they would get down there and get to
12 it in a minute or a little bit, or something to that effect, and I
13 said, okay, just let me know.

14 Eddie and I started talking about the carry-all. I was
15 trying to get the carry-alls in place to get the crews moved,
16 because we have two carry-alls and I believe we had about four or
17 five crews on duty, trying to get them in position when the crews
18 are ready to go. Like I said, 401 had coupled up. 401 was
19 leaving. He was going by the office. He might have already been
20 by the office.

21 We were talking back and forth, and the next thing I
22 know, I hear a bunch of clicking on the radio and I heard
23 "Emergency, Emergency." And I looked over at Eddie and I'm like,
24 oh, daggone, Q400 -- or it was Q401 just went into emergency, you
25 know. Then a bunch of clicking again, and then we can make out --

1 we could make out: "No. Stop. No, no." It was something to that
2 effect. I mean, there was a lot of screaming on there. We
3 couldn't really make it out that well. And I heard someone
4 started calling Acca. He was calling Acca. So I responded and I
5 believe that's when Erwin told me that Kevin got struck, Kevin got
6 hit.

7 So, I called the trainmaster, I called Omar, and told
8 him, you know, you need to get down there; Kevin got hit by the
9 train. Hung up with him, called 911, talked to Henrico County
10 Dispatch and told them we needed police, paramedics to come here,
11 you know, as soon as possible; someone got hit by the train. And
12 -- well, I take that back. Let me back up.

13 As soon as Erwin told me Kevin got hit, I called the 391
14 and told him to stop, just stop, stop the movement, stop the
15 movement. Then I called Omar. Then I had called Henrico County.
16 And, you know, they were asking me of his condition, where he was,
17 and I just told the dispatcher I don't know. I said all I know is
18 that he got hit. You know, she asked me about his height, weight,
19 stuff like that, and I was doing the best I could to give her that
20 information. Got off the phone with them and I had called PSCC
21 and told them we needed the CSX police down here as well.

22 And then after that, it was securing everybody in the
23 yard, telling everybody just to come in, you know, just stop
24 movement, stop all movement. So that's about it. And it was
25 pretty much like that up until 6:00 in the morning, when Mike came

1 in and relieved me and, you know --

2 Q. Okay. One thing, you just mentioned a PSEC. Is that
3 Papa-Sierra-Echo-Charlie?

4 A. PSCC.

5 Q. PSCC?

6 A. So Papa-Sierra-Charlie-Charlie.

7 Q. Charlie-Charlie. And what is that?

8 A. That's the Public Service --

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Command Center.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Coordination Center.

11 MR. DEAN: Yeah, Coordination Center. Yeah.

12 BY MR. FLANIGON:

13 Q. Okay, and that's a CSX --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- like an emergency center? Okay.

16 Had you had -- so it sounds like your communications
17 with the individual who got struck was over the radio, no face-to-
18 face communication?

19 A. Yeah, it was totally over the radio. I had not even
20 talked with them on the phone all night. Eddie talked to them on
21 the phone. I think I -- that probably was the only time all night
22 that I had talked with the car inspectors.

23 Q. And anything unusual about the conversation, his voice
24 or what he was saying?

25 A. Not really, no.

1 Q. Just some normal business?

2 A. Yeah. He told me they were wrapping up Q400 and they
3 would be down there -- that would be the next thing they'd get on,
4 they'd get right on it.

5 Q. Yeah. Did you know him from working around the yard?

6 A. I remember him. The time I actually saw him was
7 probably 4 years ago when I worked the ground. You know, because
8 I'd work out there and they'd come out to flag the tracks up and
9 I'd say, hi, how are you, stuff like that.

10 Q. So in terms of working with him as a yardmaster,
11 although you're not working with him face to face, you -- in the
12 past, have you taken an exception with his performance or
13 safety --

14 A. No, not really.

15 Q. -- mindfulness or --

16 A. No. From what I understood from Mr. Craig Wilson, he's
17 one of the better car inspectors they had, so --

18 Q. Okay. I think that's all I've got.

19 MR. FLANIGON: Steve Jenner?

20 BY DR. JENNER:

21 Q. Rather than asking a redundant question, just one for
22 clarification. You hadn't seen or talked to Kevin for a number of
23 years before this?

24 A. Yeah. They -- very rarely do the car inspectors come up
25 here. Sometimes they come up here if there's -- if we've catering

1 food or something like, they'll pop in and say hi. But, Kevin, as
2 far as Kevin, I don't believe I've talked with him in over 4
3 years.

4 MR. FLANIGON: And that's face to face?

5 MR. DEAN: Yes, yes.

6 MR. FLANIGON: You've talked to him on the radio or on
7 the telephone?

8 MR. DEAN: On the radio, yes. On the telephone, on the
9 radio, that's, you know, nightly, on third shift. But as far as
10 face to face, no.

11 BY DR. JENNER:

12 Q. In your recent radio conversations with him, has his
13 mannerisms changed?

14 A. No. No, they've -- I mean, nothing -- up until what
15 happened, nothing out of the night was unusual at all. I mean, it
16 was busy. There's a lot of stuff moving around here at the same
17 time, but it's not unusual for a Tuesday night.

18 Q. Okay, great. And just about yourself, how long have you
19 been a yardmaster?

20 A. Four years -- 4 years in May. It'll be 4 years in May.

21 Q. With CSX?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay. Had you worked as a yardmaster elsewhere?

24 A. No. I was a freight conductor for 3 years previous.

25 Q. During your 4 years here, have there been any other

1 incidents like this?

2 A. Not of this magnitude, no. I mean, your typical run-
3 through switch or derailment or something, but nothing like this.

4 Q. In terms of perceived safety or your perception of
5 efficiency of operations and safety, do you see any difference
6 between remote control operations versus the traditional?

7 A. I think it's more efficient, to be honest with you. I
8 really do. I mean, the rules are in place for safety, and the
9 guys that are down here, most of them have the right attitude and
10 most of them can probably do more work than a two-man operation,
11 you know. It's -- I mean, there's a lot of other non-railroad
12 things that go into that, you know, using their head and taking a
13 break and this and that, whereas, you know, you have a lot of guys
14 out there that just will kind of get in the groove, if you want to
15 call it that, and work.

16 Q. Okay. Is there any type of technology that you're aware
17 of, like motion detectors or anything, that carmen or people
18 working out there can use to let them know that there is train
19 movement or activity going on?

20 A. Not really, no, none that I know. I mean, the rules are
21 in place for safety. I mean, it's -- I worked out there for 3
22 years on the remote box, I mean, and it's -- they're there for a
23 reason, you know. We do this every day all day long and it's the
24 first time in -- since I've been here that this has happened.

25 Q. All right, thank you.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions.

2 MR. FLANIGON: Larry?

3 BY MR. KOSTER:

4 Q. Whenever we -- whenever the -- you said you talked to
5 Kevin, or your trainee talked to Kevin, and you said let me know
6 when I can have N2 and O2 back, correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was that, in effect, giving them a track to work?

9 A. No. They had had the track earlier. They had the track
10 earlier. Most of the time --

11 Q. What were they doing earlier on the track?

12 A. Well, they were working Q303 and Q400, and we called
13 them to let them know they could have it. We've been told here
14 for years now when we have something to give to the car
15 inspectors, to go ahead and give it to them and let them, I guess,
16 figure it out, figure out how they want to do it.

17 Q. Okay.

18 BY MR. GRISSOM:

19 Q. Yes, this is Don Grissom. You said -- in your
20 statement, you said you couldn't remember exactly what time it
21 was, if it was told by your trainee, but they were finishing Q431.
22 What -- do you remember what track that rain was in?

23 A. Q400 was in North 4.

24 Q. That was in North 4. And then, later on, you stated
25 that they were finishing up watching the roll-by, and it looks

1 like Q03231. Is that --

2 A. I believe that's right, yeah. That's the pig train that
3 went north.

4 Q. Okay. And what track was that in?

5 A. That was on the passenger main. They had swapped at
6 North Acca. I believe I called the car inspectors earlier and
7 told them that the train was coming by and instead of -- usually,
8 we stop them right here at AY to swap, and then they go by on
9 north, you know, and they get their inspection. We pulled them up
10 to North Acca on purpose to swap so we could clear up AY to run
11 trains south. That's why we did that.

12 So I believe I told the car inspectors that he was
13 coming by -- I think he had 17 cars -- and I asked them if they
14 look at them. Because if they can't, usually I'll give them a
15 roll-by; I'll look at it. And they said they would get them up on
16 the north end.

17 Q. Okay, getting back to 2 North, you said you gave them
18 this track earlier that night or --

19 A. Yeah. When 401 cut his engines away and cleared the
20 track, we called them -- I think Eddie called them on the radio
21 and told them they could have the track.

22 Q. Do you recall what time that was?

23 A. No. There was a lot, a lot going on. I don't remember.

24 Q. Earlier in the shift?

25 A. It was probably somewhere between, I would say, 12:00

1 and 1:00 in the morning.

2 Q. Okay. Then when they were doing the roll-by, you said
3 you got on the radio and told them to let you know when they
4 finished 2 North, 401; is that correct? Because you needed the
5 cars --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- to go north?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Do you recall what time that was when you asked them?

10 A. Maybe -- I'd say, sometime between about 2:20 in the
11 morning and up to when it actually happened.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. 2:20, 2:30, somewhere around there.

14 Q. And them other tracks they worked on, 9 and 4 North, was
15 that -- did they come in first? Do you know why they worked them
16 first?

17 A. Yeah. Q303, that was the first thing we had built.
18 That was an outbound. Q400 was an outbound. The 391, his first
19 move of the night was to get 9 track solid and put it on the south
20 end plug so we could work it. The 393 got 4 solid and we brought
21 that up to that plug so we could work that. So, that -- we gave
22 the car inspectors those two tracks at that time. And 401 was
23 still coming in the yard setting cars off and we didn't give it to
24 them then because it wasn't ready. As soon as 401 got their
25 engines off of it and pulled up here, cleared the track, we called

1 the car inspectors on the radio and told them they could have the
2 track.

3 Q. So, naturally, it's to get the outbound trains done
4 first and then come back to the inbound inspection? Is that --

5 A. I guess that's how they do it. I guess that's how they
6 -- I mean, depending on who the leadman is down there, you know,
7 sometimes they do things differently.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. Normally, it's common practice, though, for for 303,
10 since he's our origination, to get him done. That's like the
11 priority. We get him done first.

12 Q. So did the remote control operator have any idea that
13 the carman was going in 2 North?

14 A. I don't think so. I don't believe so at all.

15 Q. So, they're --

16 A. When you're up there in that seat, you -- over time, you
17 learn to listen to when somebody is calling the yard office and
18 when somebody's got chatter going back and forth, you know, to
19 somebody else, like a yard job, calling and giving someone
20 permission to come in or something like that. I do not recall
21 hearing the car inspectors get permission to flag that track up.
22 I know we gave it to them. I do not recall them calling the 391
23 and saying, hey, can we flag North 2 out?

24 Q. So, you're saying they're required to call the remote
25 control crew to -- before they flag it?

1 A. Yeah. That's part of his zone. That's part of his
2 active zone, to flag the track out.

3 Q. Now, if they flagged it and they are not required to
4 change the position of the switch, are they still required to --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- contact him?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And --

9 A. That's my understanding anyway is that anytime they
10 touch a switch, whether it's to put a lock in it -- if it's
11 already lined, you know, the right way, the correct way, they
12 don't have to touch it -- they are still required to contact the
13 remote job to get permission to be around the switch, to lock the
14 switch out, flag the track up.

15 Q. Okay. But there's no other procedures to notify -- so,
16 in other words, the only one who would notified the yard crew
17 would be the carmen, to notify them that they're in the track
18 working?

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. Okay, thank you.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions, sir.

22 BY MR. FLANIGON:

23 Q. Just on that, thinking back to when you worked as a
24 remote control operator, that was -- would that have been an
25 expectation, that if the car department or carmen were going to

1 put up a flag and lock a track in your zone, that you would get a
2 call?

3 A. Yeah. Yeah, it's been common practice ever since I've
4 been here. And if there are no remote jobs on duty, they call the
5 yardmaster, you know, and we tell them there's no active zone; you
6 can go ahead and flag the track out.

7 Yeah, the carmen -- I don't know if it's a rule for them
8 or not. I'm not fluent in their rules. But it is common practice
9 around here for them to get permission from somebody, whether it's
10 the remote job on duty or the yardmaster, to touch any track.
11 It's just common practice.

12 Q. Okay, good. And just one more for me. Did you have any
13 kind of job briefing with the carmen that were working there? Is
14 that something that happens?

15 A. No. I personally, I did not that night. Normally what
16 happens on third shift, we'll call down there and we'll talk to
17 whoever answers the phone, whether it be Erwin or Kevin, and we'll
18 give them basically a rundown of what's coming, you know. In this
19 case, it would have been, you know, Q303, we're spotting him up;
20 Q400, we're spotting him up; 401 will be an inbound and we'll give
21 them to you, you know, when the engines are out, when you all can
22 have it. So, normally, that's kind of how it goes. And then, you
23 know, later on, as things progress, we'll call them over the radio
24 or the phone and just get an update.

25 Q. Yeah. And does that include any information on the

1 remote control zone, the status of whether it's active or inactive
2 or --

3 A. No, that's never really discussed. They don't really
4 ask, you know, is there a zone down there. I guess it's just
5 assumed that there's, since we have remotes here around the clock,
6 that's there's an active zone down there.

7 Q. Okay, I think that's it.

8 BY DR. JENNER:

9 Q. Steve Jenner. I just want to follow up on the
10 conversation we were just having. I guess more on the lines of a
11 hypothetical question, and given your experience as a remote
12 control operator, in this situation, if the carmen had contacted
13 the remote control operator saying we're at these switches, what
14 would that conversation have entailed?

15 A. It would've, you know, "Car inspector Eskew calling
16 Y391." He would answer, 391 answering. "Permission to lock and
17 flag out North 2." "Yeah, I'm in the clear; go ahead, you know,
18 lock out North 2." All right, "391 is giving permission to the
19 car inspector to lock out?" "Yes, that's correct." That's pretty
20 much what it would be.

21 Q. Would that give pause to the remote control operator
22 about his next move? Would he need verification that we've just
23 completed the --

24 A. No. No. I can't speak for the remote operator down
25 there, you know. I can't speak for him. If it was me, I'll --

1 well, I really can't say that because I haven't been down there in
2 4 years. Basically all that does, it gives them permission to be
3 in the track and it lets you know that they're working the track,
4 you know. If someone's fouling the lead or in the track and
5 you're pulling out there, there's nothing -- you know, unless you
6 see him real quick and dump it, there's really nothing that can
7 prevent that.

8 Q. But there's no required follow-up call to say we're
9 completed and now we're in the clear?

10 A. Not with them, no. They're supposed to notify us when
11 they're clear of the track and we can have it. The carmen are
12 supposed to notify the yard office when they're clear of the
13 track.

14 Q. Okay. So you get a lot of calls along those lines
15 during your shift?

16 A. Most of the time, you know, the carmen will call on the
17 radio and say, hey, you can have this track back. Sometimes on
18 third shift, we don't get that; I'll be honest. You know, that's
19 why I asked him on the radio let me know when I can have North 2
20 back, because a lot of times on third shift, we don't get that,
21 you know, you can have this track back.

22 Q. Yeah. Well, why is that about the third shift?

23 A. I don't know. It's just the way they run on third
24 shift, I guess. I mean, I've been told that whenever the carmen
25 are done with a track, they're supposed to give it back to us, but

1 it doesn't happen all the time. And, I mean, I can understand it.
2 You know, when they get busy -- if we've given them a bunch of
3 tracks to do and they get busy, you know, sometimes they can
4 forget. You know, people are human, so --

5 Q. Okay, great. Thank you.

6 BY MR. KOSTER:

7 Q. I've got a couple of follow-ups, sir. Koster. When you
8 said that they're required to say they're clear of the track, are
9 you talking about by rule they're required to tell you they're
10 clear of the track or they're just telling you they're clear,
11 they're finished inspecting the track?

12 A. They're finished inspecting the track.

13 Q. Okay. So there's no rule out there that says that the
14 carmen got to call you and say I'm clear of the track or that I'm
15 on the track?

16 A. No. I mean, Craig Wilson has told me before that
17 they're supposed to let us know when they're finished with a
18 track so we can have it.

19 Q. Okay. But that is a courtesy so that you know that
20 they're finished with the track for you to switch?

21 A. I guess. Like I said, I don't know their rules. I
22 don't know if that's a requirement of them or not.

23 Q. All right. Now, you talked about common practice, that
24 it's common practice that they ask to flag a track, but -- or is
25 that supported by the rule book or is that, again, common

1 practice?

2 A. No, it's -- for anybody to touch that zone -- if it's an
3 active zone, for anybody to touch it, they've got to get
4 permission from somebody.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. If the zone is activated, they've got to get permission
7 from the remote job to touch it. And if it's not activated,
8 they've got to call us to let us know that they're going to be in
9 the track. That way, we don't run something in there.

10 Q. But we knew they were going to line -- we knew they were
11 going to work number 2 track, correct?

12 A. Yeah, they -- yeah.

13 Q. Okay. And they were putting the flag up?

14 A. Now, I didn't know that. They had had the track, I
15 would probably say, at least an hour and a half to 2 hours. The
16 last interaction I had with them is that they were still finishing
17 up North 4 and they would get to it as soon as they could.

18 Q. But you said let me know when I can have North 2 back?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Which presumes that you had gave them the track?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. So you knew they were going to put a blue flag on
23 the track and a lock on the switch?

24 A. At some point, yes.

25 Q. Okay. So what I'm trying to get to is common practice,

1 that it's either a rule or it's common practice. So if they're
2 going to operate the switch, they must talk to the RCL operator
3 because it's his zone, correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Does it say in there that he's got to talk to them to
6 put the lock on there when he's not operating the switch?

7 A. Now, that, I don't know. I mean, I wouldn't -- I would
8 guess so. If they're flagging the track up -- they're not going
9 to lock the switch out without flagging the track up, and to flag
10 the track up they've got to get permission to flag the track up.

11 Q. Okay. But you just said that was common practice.

12 A. Well, I don't -- like I said, I don't know their rules.
13 I know they cannot flag up a track without getting permission from
14 the 391.

15 Q. Okay. All right. One last question here. Mike talked
16 about it there, about the briefing when you give them their
17 lineup. Does that -- have you worked, have you ever worked first
18 or second in addition to the third shift yardmaster?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. Do those conversations with those carmen at those
21 different intervals, does it ever involve a safety briefing or
22 just the lineup?

23 A. Just the lineup.

24 Q. Just the lineup?

25 A. I believe they go through a safety briefing when they

1 come on duty.

2 Q. Okay. Okay, I'm good now.

3 BY MR. RICHARDSON:

4 Q. Yeah, one quick question. Shane Richardson with FRA.
5 Now, you talked about sometimes they forget to give you tracks
6 back. And I guess you've been a yardmaster 4 years in May, you
7 say?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. And in that 4-year period, or it may be in the past when
10 you were a RCO, have they ever forgot to get a track and worked --
11 have they ever been out working a track and you say, well, I never
12 gave them that track?

13 A. No. No. I don't -- no.

14 Q. That's never happened?

15 A. No. They -- to my knowledge, they have never gone out
16 there and worked a track that I have not given them.

17 Q. And in order for them to work a track in a zone, they've
18 got to get permission -- you've got to give them the track, and
19 then they've got to ask the RCO before they --

20 A. No, if the the remote job is on duty and the zone is
21 established, they've got to get permission from the remote job to
22 flag the track up. A lot of times, you know, if it's light and,
23 let's say, the remote job is gone at 5:00 in the morning or
24 something like that and the zone is back to the yardmaster, you
25 know, I can hear them down there. They'll call car inspectors to

1 Y391. And I'll call them on the radio and say, car inspectors,
2 the zone is deactivated; you can go ahead and lock the track out.

3 Q. That's all I have.

4 MR. CASHMAN: I've got one.

5 MR. FLANIGON: Sure. You are?

6 MR. CASHMAN: Don Cashman, FRA.

7 BY MR. CASHMAN:

8 Q. So how much (indiscernible) is the lead?

9 A. Yes. How much lead is, is --

10 Q. And I'm past that 3 switch going out. To the clearance
11 point on each track? Is that the way it works, or to the switch?

12 A. To the clearance point. That's my understanding.

13 Q. What about the 1-2? If you go off the lead to a 2 and
14 then 1 cuts off at 2, does the remote zone include that switch
15 into 2 and 1 or does it end when you go past the lead?

16 A. It's my understanding that that's part of the zone as
17 well.

18 Q. Okay.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm going to let Don go. He's
20 got a question.

21 MR. GRISSOM: I have a follow-up. On the night --

22 MR. FLANIGON: And you are?

23 MR. GRISSOM: Sorry. Don Grissom.

24 BY MR. GRISSOM:

25 Q. I have a follow-up question. On the night in question,

1 prior to 3:00 a.m., do you recall what tracks the carmen worked?

2 A. They had worked North 9 and they were working North 4.

3 Q. Did they give you back North 9 when they completed it?

4 A. I don't recall them doing that, no. Now, they might
5 have given it back and Eddie might have, you know, said okay, but
6 I do not recall that.

7 Q. Was that an outbound train?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did that train leave on time? Did that leave before
10 3:00?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And North 4, do you recall if they gave you that track
13 back?

14 A. No. The last conversation I had was we were finishing
15 it up. I don't recall them saying you can have back North 4.
16 Like I said, it was really busy that night. I'm not saying that
17 they did not do it, but I do not recall them giving it back.

18 Q. Okay, thank you.

19 MR. FLANIGON: Okay, I think we're done. So, we are
20 done. Thank you for your time. Appreciate everything. I'm going
21 to turn these off.

22 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: CSX EMPLOYEE FATALITY
ACCA YARD, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA
APRIL 1, 2015
Interview of Scott Dean

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-006

PLACE: Richmond, Virginia

DATE: April 2, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Karen M. Galvez
Transcriber