



## National Transportation Safety Board

Office of Aviation Safety  
Washington, D.C. 20594-2000  
August 26, 2015

### ATTACHMENT 2 to the WEATHER STUDY CEN15LA300

**Interview:** Mr. Stan Rose - General Forecaster, Pueblo Weather Forecast Office, National Weather Service [via telephone]

**Represented by:** Ms. Jennifer Stark – Meteorologist In Charge, Pueblo Weather Forecast Office, National Weather Service [via telephone]

**Date:** August 19, 2015

**Locations:** National Transportation Safety Board headquarters, Washington, DC  
Pueblo Weather Forecast Office, Pueblo, Colorado

**Start time:** 1400 EDT

**Present:** Mike Richards - National Transportation Safety Board  
Mitchell Gallo – National Transportation Safety Board

Mr. Rose confirmed the following information that had been previously provided in his statement to the National Transportation Safety Board:

*I have been a Meteorologist with the National Weather Service for the past twelve years, the last ten of those years at the Pueblo Office. I was working the 'A' Forecast shift on July 2, during the hours of 1200 am to 800 am MDT / 06 UTC to 14 UTC. Among my other responsibilities I issued the aviation forecasts on July 2, 2015 and I responded to phone calls as part of my normal duties.*

On the day of the accident, Mr. Rose was a short-term forecaster and had “other duties.” Mr. Rose stated that he is not a certified pilot. He said he would talk to the accident pilot on a regular basis with short and informal conversations. The accident pilot always asked about the “bad winds”. Mr. Rose indicated that on the morning of the accident, the accident pilot phoned the Pueblo Weather Forecast Office (WFO) and asked “what am I looking at?” Mr. Rose (who

spoke with the accident pilot during this call) stated he knew this meant that the accident pilot wanted to know what the winds were doing. Mr. Rose stated that he indicated to the accident pilot that a cold front was advancing from the north, however he felt that it would hold off. Mr. Rose indicated that he also provided the accident pilot with information from a VAD wind profile. Mr. Rose stated work shift ended at 0800 MDT, and he was not aware of the accident pilot telephoning the WFO that day following the accident flight. Mr. Rose said that he wrote the TAFs all the way to the end of his work shift.

Mr. Rose said that there is a “tricky way” to define a synoptic front in eastern Colorado and that you can see the front on radar. Mr. Rose stated that fronts moving from the north often slow down or stall and do not make it as far south (as the front being discussed on the accident morning) and “occasionally they will accelerate.” Mr. Rose indicated that the front on the morning of the accident was moving considerably faster than the model expected, which expected an 1800Z arrival. Mr. Rose stated that he became “more concerned” when he realized the front was moving faster than he relayed to the accident pilot about 10-15 minutes following their phone conversation. Mr. Rose stated that he told his coworker, “I hope [the accident pilot] calls back.”

When asked about his interaction with the models used for guidance, Mr. Rose stated that he does not have interaction with the models and is just a “user.” In addition, military ASOS/AWOS recordings are not received.

With regard to amending Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF), Mr. Rose stated that he often will not jump on a changing condition, as that condition could change again, and flip-flop back and forth. Mr. Rose stated that he did not just use model guidance to populate the TAFs that morning. Specifically, with regard to the TAF written for Colorado Springs Airport (COS) at 1120 UTC on the morning of the accident, Mr. Rose stated that the model guidance had the wind coming in at 1800 UTC but he had forecasted a wind increase for 1500 UTC. Mr. Rose stated that the front crossed over the Palmer Divide about 1340-1350 UTC. Mr. Rose offered that one flaw of the TAFs is not allowing uncertainty, and indicated that the Area Forecast Discussion is the vehicle for conveying uncertainty in the TAFs.

Mr. Rose stated that he has to telephone the COS ASOS in order to get real-time wind information. He stated that the Monument ASOS is still operational.

Mr. Rose indicated that there is no specific local policy regarding the handling of weather briefings to pilots who call the WFO. Mr. Rose said that other balloon operators contact him two or three times a day. He did not know why the balloon operators contact the WFO and not a Flight Service Station.

**Interview ended at approximately 1500 EDT**