#### Metro Aviation, Inc.

# N911GF – March 26, 2016 Post-Accident Review of Operational Control Center

#### **Summary:**

The absence of accurate weather information prevented the Metro Aviation, Inc. (MAI) Operational Control Center (OCC) from taking action during the March 26, 2016 flight of N911GF. This lack of weather data was caused by a series of events that began with the initial notification of the flight to the MAI OCC from the Haynes Ambulance Communication Center (CC).


At 23:21 the CC submitted an OCF-2 that contained wrongly formatted latitude and longitude for the car accident scene. When importing the flight route data from the OCF-2, the MAI OCC Helper (OH) software only recognized the MAI base identifier of "TRO" (Troy Regional Medical Center) and queried National Weather Service information for reporting points closest to TRO. This resulted in an OH Release Summary that only included current and forecast weather reports for the Troy Municipal Airport (KTOI). The OH software alerted OC Coordinators to wrongly formatted latitude and longitude, but only subtlety by presenting the lat/long coordinate in bold type on the Release Summary. Neither of the Operational Control Coordinators noticed the alert and subsequently sought no further information about the flight.

On the night of the accident, the MAI OCC was staffed with one senior Operational Control Coordinator and one new-hire Coordinator that was still in training. The new-hire Coordinator reviewed the *Release Summary* of the accident flight and it was discovered that the senior Coordinator provided no oversight of this review. Also discovered during the MAI investigation, was the common practice of Communication Centers only providing the first segment of a flight route within the OCF-2 form. CCs would update the route of flight with all segments once further information was known about the patient's final destination. The OCC Supervisor at the time of the accident was aware of this issue, but hadn't evaluated the concern as being critical, as the CCs would in fact update route of flight information once it was known. In the days following the accident, MAI conducted an audit of archived OCF-2s and found nearly all presented a complete route of flight. This was the case on the Hammond/N911GF OCF-2 reviewed after MAI management responded to the OCC following notification that the aircraft was missing. The OCF-2 presented in this document is the actual archived copy of the accident flight and it depicts the complete route of flight. The Metro Aviation Secure Website (MASW)


server logs entries of modifications to the OCF-2; in reviewing those entries, it was discovered the route-of-flight was edited by the Haynes Communication Center near the time the aircraft departed the accident scene.

The following illustrates the above summary:


#### N911GF/Hammond -OCF-1



## N911GF/Hammond -OCF-2



### N911GF/Hammond -OCC Helper- Release Summary



# Metro Aviation, Inc. Secure Website - Server Record

A. Initial flight notification made by OCF-2 from Haynes Ambulance Communication Center

7317314 Flight Com Added the New Flight Tracking Record (157//2:00//tro-31 16.377, 85 56.739//3/25/2016//{ts '1899-12-30 23:21:00'}) - Date:25-03-2016 - Successful Flight Tracking Record Add 2016-03-25 23:21:23.000

B. Update to OCF-2 record near the time the aircraft was departing car accident scene.

7317347 Flight Com Updated the Current Flight Tracking Record (ID: 450766//03/25/2016//{ts '1899-12-30 23:21:00'}) - Successful Flight Tracking Update 2016-03-25 23:59:21.000