NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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IN RE:

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THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING : NTSB Accident No. AMTRAK TRAIN #89 AND MOW : DCA16FR007

EQUIPMENT AND EMPLOYEES :
NEAR CHESTER, PENNSYLVANIA :
ON APRIL 3, 2016 :

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INTERVIEW OF: ANDREW BREUSKENS

Wednesday, April 6, 2016

Sheraton Suites Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

BEFORE

RICHARD HIPSKIND, NTSB DAVID KANNENBERG, FRA MICHAEL TRAINA, AMTRAK ANDREW KEEFE, AMTRAK MATTHEW PORTO, AMTRAK LOU TOMASSONE, FRA TERRY SPRATT, AMTRAK FRAN WALKER, FRA

This transcript was produced from audio provided by the National Transportation Safety Board.

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Interviewee:

Mark Hackett, LORAM Maintenance of Way

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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(5:15 p.m.)

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MR. HIPSKIND: All right. Good afternoon everybody. My name is Richard Hipskind and I am the Track and Engineering Group Chairman for the NTSB for this accident. We are here today, on April 6th, 2016, at the Sheraton Suites Hotel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to conduct an interview with Mr. Andrew Beurskens. And he works for LORAM.

This interview is in conjunction with NTSB's investigation of a collision of Amtrak Train 89 with maintenance of way equipment and employees on April 3rd, 2016 at milepost 15.7 on Amtrak's PW line near Chester, Pennsylvania in Delaware County. The NTSB Accident reference number is DCA16FR007.

Before we begin our interview and questions, let's go around the table and introduce ourselves. Please spell your last name, and please identify who you are representing and your title. I would remind everyone to speak loudly and clearly enough so we can get an accurate recording.

I'll lead off and then pass off to my right.

Again, my name is Richard Hipskind. The spelling of my last name is H-I-P-S-K-I-N-D. I am the Track and

	Engineering Group Chairman for NTSB for this accident.
1	MR. KANNENBERG: David Kannenberg. K-A-N-N-
2	E-N-B-E-R-G. Federal Railroad Administration Deputy
3	Regional Administrator, Region II.
	MR. TRAINA: Michael Traina. T-R-A-I-A-A.
	RSA president and supervisor with Amtrak.
	MR. TOMASSONE: Lou Tomassone. T-O-M-A-S-S-O-
	N-E. Inspector for the FRA.
1	MR. KEEFE: My name is Andrew Keefe. K-E-E-
2	F-E. I'm with Amtrak, Deputy Chief Engineer of
3	Maintenance.
4	MR. PORTO: Matthew Porto. P-O-R-T-O.
5	Director of Safety, Amtrak.
6	MR. WALKER: Brett Fran Walker. FRA Track
7	Safety Inspector.
8	MR. HIPSKIND: And, Mr. Beurskens, would you
9	put yourself on the record?
10	MR. BEURSKENS: Andrew Beurskens. B-E-U-R-
11	S-K-E-N-S. I'm a LORAM superintendent.
12	MR. HIPSKIND: And we have one gentleman who
13	is posting. Terry, would you put yourself on the
14	record?
15	MR. SPRATT: Terry Spratt. S-P-R-A-T-T.
16	I'm Amtrak's Director of Operating Practices. I

1	represent the office of the Chief Transportation
2	Officer, and I'm here strictly as an observer.
3	MR. HIPSKIND: Thank you, Terry. Mr.
4	Beurskens, do you mind if we proceed on a first name
5	basis?
6	MR. BEURSKENS: I do.
7	MR. HIPSKIND: Oh.
8	MR. BEURSKENS: Or I don't, excuse me.
9	MR. HIPSKIND: I took it that you meant it
10	was okay.
11	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, it's okay.
12	MR. HIPSKIND: All right, Andrew. Couple of
13	questions. Do you wish to have a representative with
14	you at this interview?
15	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, I do.
16	MR. HIPSKIND: And would you please put
17	yourself on the record?
18	MR.HACKETT : Mark Hackett. LORAM
19	Maintenance of Way. Director of Ballast Maintenance
20	and Road Bib Services. Hackett, H-A-C-K-E-T-T.
21	MR. HIPSKIND: Thank you, Mark. And,
22	Andrew, do we have your permission to record our
23	discussion, our interview with you today?
24	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, you do.
25	MR. HIPSKIND: All right, let's proceed.

1	Marvin (sic), just kind of give us a background some of
2	your work history. Maybe specifically with LORAM. And
3	take us through your duties and responsibilities. And
4	kind of take us up to how you came to be in the
5	Philadelphia area, okay?
6	MR. BEURSKENS: It's Andrew. You just
7	called me Marvin. I'm a LORAM superintendent. My
8	duties include just upkeep on the machine, interaction
9	with the railroad. Paperwork, as far as hard copies
10	and stuff goes. Running the crew, generally like that.
11	Loram sends us on awhat's the word I'm
12	looking for? A work assignment. Just kind of based on
13	need, so you know. I was assigned to RV11 when it
14	moved from the NS line to Amtrak last year, and that's
15	where I've been since.
16	MR. HIPSKIND: And how long have you been
17	working for LORAM or in your current position as
18	superintendent?
19	MR. BUERSKENS: I worked for LORAM for four
20	years at April 16th. I've been a superintendent for a
21	little over a year now.
22	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Fair to say you've
23	seen a quite a bit of the countryside?
24	Mr. BEURSKENS: Mostly in the Northeast
25	Corridor

MR. HIPSKIND: So, you stay kind of in a 1 2 regional type of a--3 MR. BEURSKENS: The company not so much. 4 I've spent the majority of my LORAM career on Amtrak. Anywhere from Baltimore, up to New Jersey, New York, 5 and out in here in the Philadelphia, Wilmington area. 6 7 MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, fair to say you stay pretty busy or? 8 Definitely. 9 MR. BEURSKENS: Oh yes. MR. HIPSKIND: All right, and just out of 10 11 curiosity do you live within this region? 12 MR. BEURSKENS: No. I live in South Carolina. 13 14 MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Thank you. So, you were working on the NS and then it comes time to take the 15 16 equipment and get over onto Amtrak. 17 Give me a little idea of when that occurred 18 and then you can just kind of pick up talking about the equipment going from Philadelphia if that's where you 19 ended up making a transfer. And just kind of take us 20 21 through the highlights of Friday, Saturday, and then we'll kind of slow down and we'll talk about Sunday. 22 23 MR. BEURSKENS: Okay. The machine moved from NS to Amtrak -- it would've been June or July of 24 25 It was, I'm assuming, assigned to the last year.

Philadelphia area. It took roughly about a month to get there in between switching back and forth. It was dropped off in Bear Delaware and then picked up, moved to Penn Coach Yard. Right there at 30th Street Station.

And I mean that's pretty much how it got into that area. And then as far as working down in Wilmington, the machine's been passed back and forth between Wilmington and Philadelphia just based on need. We'd got a 55-hour outage last weekend, the weekend of the incident. So we had crews doing 12-hour shifts back to back. Me and my crew, we came in, wiped the machine around Friday night, and then moved it down to the area where we were working Friday night.

We did a 12-hour shift, handed it to my relief crew who was there. They did their 12 hours.

We came in on Saturday night to begin our next 12-hour shift, which would be at -- 8:00 p.m. was the start time to roll into Sunday morning.

We got there roughly, you know, 10 to 15 minutes early, 7:45,7:50. Just to kind of go over, you know, what the previous crew had done. What their issues may or may not have been and what not. Got there, we signed off on Will Robinson's job briefing. That was the foreman that was on duty at that night at,

you know, 8 o'clock roughly. You know, this is just me paraphrasing with everything that happened.

We signed off with that. He told us that he had already had taken the track out of service from the previous foreman. We got a copy of his Form D: at the time.

We waited around roughly 15 to 20 minutes so ET would show up. So they could get the ground stick up, take the power out. So we could sign off on them, so we're good to go on that. At the time the only track out of service was Track 2. He got us foul on 1 and 3 Track, which we heard over the radio.

Confirmed with him we had a foul on 1 and 3 because we had a few things that we had to do prior to operating a 12-hour shift. So he got us foul 1 and 3.

We had a watchman posted out there, so we could cross 4 Track side. We crossed 4 with the lookout protection. We went about what we needed to do as far as just, you know, inspecting the machine, making sure there was no leaks, making sure all the operations were good to go.

He lost foul. He checked with us prior to him giving up foul, I believe it was one track at a time. So, we cleared up into our cab. We did our job briefing, as the company requires us to do our job

brief and go over our safety rule of the night and whatnot. While we were waiting on foul to resume, you know, our operations so to speak.

And then once he got foul back, we got permission to start digging. You know, our equipment just takes the ballast out. It's operated off of a belly pack that, you know, we stand out on a platform, we move back and forth, it's all controlled from the front of machine.

We have three guys on my crew. I always position one person up in A Cab to listen. We have a radio that designated for our station and then we have one that's on the Amtrak station. So, we can listen to dispatch, we can listen to getting foul time, not getting foul time and whatnot.

Throughout the night, Will was off to the side of the machine, you know, with the backhoe operator who came in at 11-ish. I can't really pinpoint the exact time he got in. So as we were operating we had foul time on 1 and 3 Track because we don't operate without foul. And I've always preached that to my foreman. It's as simple as that. I refuse to operate without foul time, and they know this.

So it takes roughly on a general day, you know, 30 to 45 minutes to fill up the machine. Then we

were side casting over on 1 Track side. So we'd back up. We cleared, I'm not sure what station it is that was behind us at the time. We'd back up, clear that. Make sure we had foul one side. We'd side cast our spoils, you know, come back in and then go back to work.

Throughout the night Will was always good about making sure that he let us know when he was giving up foul. You know, he always checked with me over the radio, so over the Amtrak radio. So anytime he would go to give up foul, he'd would call me over the radio.

You know, hey, Andrew, we're about to give up 1 Track. Are all your guys clear? And I would do a head count with my crew, make sure we're all in the clear, and then he would give up foul over the radio.

He did always ride with us to go back and side cast our spoils. He'd always bring a watchman with him and he'd, you know, he'd always ride at the rear of the machine. And we pull back up to the job site, we're traveling roughly a quarter mile to go dump our spoils.

And that's pretty much how it persisted, you know, throughout the night with the exception of about 45 minutes to an hour where there was, bad lightning,

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bad wind. You know, it was raining. So we just determined that it was not safe for anybody to be out there at that time.

And that's just pretty much how the night progressed until, you know, Saturday night into Sunday morning.

Sunday morning arrived. Pete, which was the supervisor, he arrived roughly at about 6:00 in the morning. Maybe 6:30-ish. Like I said, I mean it was a lot going on so I wasn't exactly keeping track on him. He showed up. We had finished digging. We were waiting on foul time to get back to work.

Let's see. I'm trying to think of the sequence of events, how the rest of this happened. He showed up. We lost foul on one. This is after we had did our final side cast, which was roughly 6:00, 6:30. We pulled back. Robinson lost foul on 1, so we were in the cab to confirm that he had foul on 1. We were waiting until roughly, maybe about 7 o'clock.

Once 7:00 rolled around, I was starting to get my paper work ready because we're required to do a hard copy at the end of the day, which is basically just overall summary of our operating time, you know, our footage. You know, and whatnot.

So, I was getting that together. Foreman

Yaeger showed up on the scene. Honestly, I'm not sure when he showed up exactly. I had my other crew, I had a relief crew out. They drove in at about 7:15, 7:20. Foreman Yaeger was talking to them off to the machine. It would have been the machine right, so off of 4 Track side.

So, when we lost foul time on 1 Track,

Foreman Robinson wasn't within eyeshot of the machine
at all. I'm not sure where he went. This is kind of
where the crews were coming in and shift change I guess
was starting to happen.

So I just kind of guess that he was over by his truck and whatnot because that's where he'd been much the whole night. And any time I needed to get a hold of him all I needed to do is pull out the radio.

And he'd call me anytime he was losing foul or anything such as that. Throughout the night, too, I'll just go on and

We were using a backhoe to undercut the cribs. Anytime that he needed to give up foul on 3 and 4 Track, because they were using the backhoe to go over 3 and 4 Track, he would always radio check Joe Carter, who was the backhoe operator, make sure, you know, he knew he was giving up foul, he'd wait for Joe to call

this is a kind of side note.

clear and then give up the foul.

There were times Joe wouldn't answer him over the radio, so he'd ask me to radio check Joe, and Joe would always chime in, you know, "Good radio." So, the entire time we lost foul on 1 Track. and I'm kind of jumping around here gentlemen, please forgive me.

I'm just trying to piece everything together in my mind too. The entire time, or anytime we lost foul on 1, once again we'd just quit digging because it just wasn't worth trying to let him undercut and us just, you know skipping ahead. We were just stepping on each other. So waited and let him undercut everything.

When Robinson disappeared the last time, roughly right around shift change, like I said the Foreman Yaeger came on. He disappeared. Pete showed up. He had a track man working with him at the time. I was getting my hard copy together, this is in between the 7:00 and 8:00 hour, which, once again, we blew up at 8:00, so we were just kind of getting into the cool down mode so the next crew could come on.

Roughly about 7:30, Yaeger came over. Pete was down in inside the gage of 3 Track, kind of, going over out work and what not. Because he was trying to get the track to drop so they could come surface it or

what not. That's what I was told.

Pete -- we had about four or five more cribs that were already undercut with the backhoe that we could reach with our arm. Because once, you know, you took all the support off I refuse to roll over it.

Because my equipment's pretty heavy, so you know, it's as simple as that.

Pete was flagging for us to get back down and to finish that last bit of crib. So I guess, he could clear out underneath the tie. He had a trackman working with him which was on 1 Track side -- sorry, I hit the table.

Him and the trackman were using some kind of bar, L-shaped, to pull what was left of the material and smooth it out. Because it was all just loose dirt and whatnot. Pete was working on the 2 to 3 Track side. He had a trackman over there the entire time. We did have a watchman as well.

Foreman Yaeger showed up. Like I said, he came up to the machine. He said, hey can you guys grab these last bit of cribs, Pete wants you to get it. I said well Robinson ain't here. Let me get onto your job brief so I know we're covered. He gave us the job brief and we signed off on it.

Matt, which was my operator at the time,

because me and him had been swapping all night. I'd dig a load, he'd dig a load. Just so we could stay warm and what not.

Matt climbed down to go ahead and operate. We heard Yaeger get the foul on 1 Track side. He told us that we still had foul time on 3 and 4, so all four tracks were out.

I've worked with Yaeger for a long time, you know. I've never had any incidents with him or anything. So I had no reason to assume anything was different.

Matt got down and started to dig. The entire time the backhoe was still sitting in the same position.

The backhoe had not left the track So once again we all just kind of I guess assumed we still had the foul because the backhoe didn't move or anything and the way the watchman was set up.

Pete was still in the gage. Matt got down, we moved the machine forward. Matt began to operate. Just as he went to finish, like I said I had my eyes down. I was up in in the cab. I was typing away, finishing up my hard copy. Just as Matt had picked up the arm to readjust it, put it in the center of the gauge, that's when the train smacked the backhoe.

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1 Prior to that, I heard no train horns or I didn't hear the watchman honk his horn. 2 anything. 3 And then I quess the rest is kind of history after 4 that. MR. HIPSKIND: Andrew, let me try to put a 5 finer point on a couple of things. You mentioned that 6 7 you wide the machine. And for those that don't know, was that a movement through a series of tracks and 8 switches to have the machine facing the right 9 direction? 10 Yes sir. 11 MR. BEURSKENS: When we were up in Penn Coach Yard at 30th Street we were facing -- I'm not 12 sure which direction. We were facing the opposite way 13 14 we were when came down to Philly. They wide the machine so we while we were digging we wouldn't have to 15 16 roll back over the open cribs. 17 That's why we were wide. But it is through a series of switches, and, you know, it routes 18 around to face the opposite way. 19 MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. And as your machine is 2.0 21 facing the work site, generally speaking, as you grab up the ballast and everything, you end up moving in 22 reverse position. You end up backing up as you work, 23 right? 24

MR.BEURSKENS: Yes sir.

MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. And you mentioned too that, I don't want people to get the wrong impression here, but you mentioned a time that you were going to go off duty and you used the term "blew up." And that just means what? MR.BEURSKENS: That's, we're allowed a 12rule as machine operators. So, we're not allowed to go past that 12 hours. So, if we start at 8:00 p.m., we have to be off track, off our machine, by 8:00 a.m. It's just a rule, that's in place. MR. HIPSKIND: It's kind of like an hours of service, but I want to be -- did you say yes? MR. BEURSKENS: Yes. It's kind of hours of service, basically. But you guys aren't regulated MR. HIPSKIND: on any kind of hours of service are you? I mean, from the federal government. You're not regulated? MR. BEURSKENS: No. All right. MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. One thing I want to understand a little bit better, and you had a great explanation on everything, so thank you for all But I think I heard you say that you made your last dump, cast the spoils over there on the other side Was it 6:00 or 6:30? of one. MR. BEURSKENS: Roughly, probably about 6:30

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1 pushing to 7:00. 2 MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. So when you went over there to make that move through the switches, off of 3 two track over to one and do all that. You had to have 4 a foul on 1 Track at that time? 5 The way the machine works is MR. BEURSKENS: 6 7 the entire time we were side-casting, and we stayed on We have a boon on the end of our machine two track. 8 that can pick up and go over to whichever side we need 9 So, we would always have foul when we would pick 10 11 it up, go over to 1 Track side to side cast off to the side of the track. 12 So, let me see if I can draw MR. HIPSKIND: 13 14 the picture. So, when you'd fill up and you'd have to unload your spoils, you would back up about a quarter 15 of a mile? 16 17 MR. BEURSKENS: Yes. But then you would operate a MR. HIPSKIND: 18 conveyor or a boom off of your machine to send the 19 spoils out to cast them on the other side of one? 2.0 21 MR. BEURSKENS: Yes sir. 22 MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, and it's because of the obstruction of that boom over 1 Track that you would 23 have to get a foul? 24

MR. BEURSKENS: Yes sir.

MR. HIPSKIND: All right. I'm with you. But when that's all done, Andrew. And you're done with casting the spoils, you take the machine and you go back that quarter mile back up south. Toward where you left off at the worksite, is that correct? MR. BEURSKENS: That's correct. MR. HIPSKIND: All right. Now here's what I want to know. I thought you said that Robinson called you and said that he had to give up the foul on 1 Track? MR. BEURSKENS: This was at the end of the night. Anytime we would, just to, kind of, I guess to re-elaborate, anytime we'd have to go back to side cast. Robinson would always ride on the back of the machine, which is as per our rules and I believe federal rules as well. I always need a pilot, Amtrak employee at the lead into the a move. So, he would hop onto the back with is watchman and my quy. My quy would pilot us back, we'd stop, we'd side cast. And then we'd, you know, put the swing back into place, we'd pull back it forward. After that final dump, we pulled up, we stopped, Robinson hopped off. He went to wherever he

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1	went to. He called us over the radio, hey, we've got
2	to give up foul on 1. And that's why we didn't begin
3	working when we pulled back up.
4	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, if you can, what time
5	do you think it was, just roughly, when Robinson called
6	you about having to give up the foul on 1?
7	MR. BEURSKENS: Well. If we did our final
8	cast at roughly 6:30, it would then be between 6:30 and
9	7 o'clock.
10	MR. HIPSKIND: But probably closer to 7
11	o'clock?
12	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, if I had to guess.
13	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. So, whenand you're
14	sure that that occurred right?
15	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
16	MR. HIPSKIND: And it was over the radio?
17	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
18	MR. HIPSKIND: It was Will?
19	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
20	MR. HIPSKIND: Robinson?
21	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
22	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, so. When was there
23	ever a time before you left the machine that day that
24	they put a foul back on 1?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes. I was told by my guys
I	I and the state of

1	I didn't actually, physically hear it myself, just
2	because once again I had so much stuff going on. I was
3	told by my guys that they heard over the radio that
4	Foreman Yaeger had put a foul back on 1 Track. And
5	that's why we went back to work.
6	MR. HIPSKIND: Do you know about what time
7	that was?
8	MR. BEURSKENS: I couldn't tell you. I
9	don't want to speculate.
10	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. All right. When did
11	you, were you on the machine when Foreman Yaeger came
12	up to the machine and got in the cab?
13	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
14	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Do you know about what
15	time that was?
16	MR. BEURSKENS: Let's see. We signed the
17	brief when he climbed in, it probably would have been
18	probably 7:45.
19	MR. HIPSKIND: What did you guys talk about?
20	Anything?
21	MR. BEURSKENS: His briefing. Honestly, we
22	just signed it. We signed it, he took the briefing
23	off, went and did what he was doing, and then he came
24	back, climbed up. He was joking with one of my guys
25	about getting out of his seat, just because we have an
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1	assigned seat for the pilot basically. And, you know,
2	roughly two or three seconds later, that's when the
3	incident happened.
4	MR. HIPSKIND: So, let me be clear. You
5	were in the cab
6	MR. BEURSKENS: I was.
7	MR. HIPSKIND: right when the incident
8	happened.
9	MR. BEURSKENS: I was.
10	MR. HIPSKIND: Foreman Yaeger was in the
11	cab. Was there somebody else?
12	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, there was.
13	MR. HIPSKIND: And who was that?
14	MR. BEURSKENS: Corey, he's my general
15	laborer.
16	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Was Corey with you in
17	the cab most of the operating time throughout the
18	night?
19	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes. Due to the weather,
20	yes.
21	MR. HIPSKIND: Likely, everything he would
22	tell us would be everything you've just told us?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
24	MR. HIPSKIND: Fair to say?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: Fair to say.
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1	MR. HIPSKIND: All right. So, when you make
2	your last cast of the spoils. You move south on two
3	track, you're back at the jobsite, andwhatever time
4	it wasyou hear Foreman Yaeger over the radio say,
5	I've got a foul back on 1.
6	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
7	MR. HIPSKIND: Is there any discussion about
8	we know 2 Track is a Form D. We know it's out of
9	service. You know that right.
10	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, yes.
11	MR. HIPSKIND: And you've got their
12	paperwork, right?
13	MR. BEURSKENS: I do.
14	MR. HIPSKIND: To assure you that it is.
15	MR. BEURSKENS: I've got a copy.
16	MR. HIPSKIND: So, what were your thoughts
17	about 3 and 4 Track?
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Like I said, Yaeger assured us
19	that he had 3 and 4 out.
20	MR. HIPSKIND: Out? Or foul?
21	MR. BEURSKENS: Well foul, foul time.
22	Excuse me, foul time. And like I said, I was told by
23	him that he had 3 and 4 Track out. Or he had foul time
24	on three and 4 Track, sorry.
25	MR. HIPSKIND: Well, when you heard the

1	thing over the radio about 1, at some point, when he's
2	in the cab, it's 1, 3 and 4. Right or not?
3	MR. BEURSKENS: No. We only heard about 1
4	Track.
5	MR. HIPSKIND: From?
6	MR. BEURSKENS: From Foreman Yaeger, as far
7	as over the radio.
8	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, but when he comes up
9	into the cab. Is that when you have a discussion about
10	3 and 4? Or do you even have a discussion about 3 and
11	4?
12	MR. BEURSKENS: He told us that he had 3 and 4
13	Track out still.
14	MR. HIPSKIND: When he came up in the cab?
15	MR. BEURSKENS: Not when he came in up the
16	cab, when we signed on his job briefing. When he came
17	up into the cab, I'm not sure what he was coming up
18	there for. I don't know if he was coming up to use the
19	radio or what. When he actually climbed up into the
20	cab was just, you know, seconds before the accident
21	happened.
22	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, when you signed his job
23	briefing is when he told you he had 3 and 4 out. Is
24	that correct?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, that's correct.

1	MR. HIPSKIND: Where were you physically
2	standing?
3	MR. BEURSKENS: I was up in the cab. All
4	three of my guys, me, my operator, and my laborer were
5	up in our cab.
6	MR. HIPSKIND: I just want to separate out
7	time and I want to make sure that you hadn't left the
8	cab to go out away from the tracks.
9	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
10	MR. HIPSKIND: To have a job briefing with
11	him or other people off to the wayside.
12	MR. BEURSKENS: No. the only time we did
13	that was at the beginning of the night with Robinson,
14	which was when we first got there.
15	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Do you know if your
16	operator now there were operators that were coming
17	on to the shift to relieve you right?
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, that's correct.
19	MR. HIPSKIND: Because you're about ready to
20	blow up.
21	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes sir.
22	MR. HIPSKIND: Did you talk to them? Were
23	they part of the job briefing that you had with
24	MR. BEURSKENS: Yaeger? Foreman Yaeger?
25	No, they were not. Because they were still in the
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1	truck at the time.
2	MR. HIPSKIND: Do you know if Foreman Yaeger
3	had conducted part of a job briefing with them prior to
4	you?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: Not to my knowledge.
6	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay.
7	MR. BEURSKENS: But I'm not sure. Again, we
8	didn't really have the time to communicate.
9	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Fair to say that in
10	your mind you had a foul time on 1, foul time on 3,
11	foul time on 4.
12	MR. BEURSKENS: That's correct.
13	MR. HIPSKIND: And main Track 2 is out of
14	service, Form D.
15	MR. BEURSKENS: That's correct.
16	MR. HIPSKIND: And that was your belief as
17	of when you talked to Foreman Yaeger when he came up
18	into the cab?
19	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
20	MR. HIPSKIND: What did you think prior to
21	when he came up into the cab and told you about the
22	fouls?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: Prior
24	MR. HIPSKIND: You knew you were protected
25	on 2 because of the Form D.

1 MR. BEURSKENS: Right, right. 2 MR. HIPSKIND: What was your thought about 1, 3 and 4? 3 4 MR. BEURSKENS: Prior to that, once again we thought we had foul on 3 and 4 Track because we didn't 5 hear Foreman Robinson give up 3 and 4 Track. So, we 6 7 knew one was hot, but we still thought we were protected on 3 and 4 Track. 8 MR. HIPSKIND: You said your head was down 9 at the time of the impact. Did you happen to see the 10 11 locomotive and the backhoe and strike and fire and all that? Or what exactly did you see? 12 MR. BEURSKENS: About the last thing -- the 13 14 first think I see when I looked up was the train going I didn't see the actual impact itself, but I did 15 catch the back end. Or the back three or four cars of 16 the train itself. 17 Okay and after the train goes by 18 MR. HIPSKIND: you on 3 Track, what did you guys do next? 19 MR. BEURSKENS: My first thought was about 20 21 my operator. I was trying to find out where he was. 22 So, my first reaction was I had to call out to my operator because he was still down there. I attempted 23 to reach him over the radio for starters, but I don't 24

think he could hear me over the fact that our machine

1 was running, what just happened. We had suction on. 2 I got down on one track to see where he was I told him to get the box down, get the arm secure 3 4 real quick, and we climbed up into the cab. MR. HIPSKIND: And you stayed in the cab for 5 how long? 6 7 MR.BERSKENS: We stayed in the cab, I mean I couldn't really even begin to tell you. We were in the 8 cab roughly 45 minutes before -- I wouldn't even say 45 9 Well, after we climbed up I used my company 10 11 phone to call my boss to give him the heads-up. So we could start our systematic and stuff. 12 We were in there roughly, I mean, I don't 13 14 even care to speculate about how long we were up there. Once the responders started to show up and what not, my 15 quy that had seen the impact and everything, he was 16 feeling queasy and what not. 17 So, I did get down. This is, you know, 18 after the impact. I got down to cross 3 and 4 Track so 19 I could go talk to some of the first responders to see 20 21 if I could my guys at least over to our truck. So they 22 could sit down, warm up, and what not. I was advised by the first responders, I 23

don't remember if they were Amtrak police or just the

locals or what not, that we needed to stay up in there.

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1 So I climbed back up there. I hanged with my quys 2 until my boss showed up. And then I guess he got permission to let us down. We climbed down and that's 3 4 where we went from there. 5 Andrew, tell us a little bit 6 MR. HIPSKIND: 7 about the -- Foreman Yaeger, prior to the impact, he had come up into the cab. You quys had a discussion 8 about the fouls and then the impact. 9 Tell us a little bit about your recollection of what does Foreman Yaeger 10 11 do after the impact? 12 MR. BEURSKENS: After the impact, the first 13 thing he did was he twirled around. Because in my cab 14 we have a little step up. Where's it's a flat walkway and then you have to step up to get in any seats or get 15 access to any of the radios or anything. 16 around, dropped down. He was visibly upset because of 17 18 what just happened and what we'd all just seen, you 19 know. He was saying, "Oh my God, Oh my God", you 2.0 21 know, and he was getting on the phone. I'm assuming to 22 call, you know, whoever he needed to. MR. HIPSKIND: Did you happen to hear his 23 side of the conversation? 24 25 MR. BEURSKENS: No, I did not.

1 MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. One thing that did stand out 2 MR. BEURSKENS: to me was -- I can't speak exactly when I heard him say 3 4 It may have been after the crash or it may have been -- well, it wasn't before. It was definitely 5 after. 6 7 It may have been when we were all cleared off to the side before we went down to Wilmington Yard 8 because this is a statement he made is, "This is why 9 you can't give a foul without letting somebody know." 10 11 MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, but do you recall when he left the cab? Did he stay with you that 45 minutes 12 13 or? 14 MR. BEURSKENS: No. No we were by ourselves for that, you know, 45 minutes to an hour or how 15 however long we were stuck up in the cab. 16 people that did come up into the cab prior to me 17 18 getting down, was Amtrak police did come up. To take statements from me and my three quys, they took written 19 statements from us. 2.0 Okay, and this comment that 21 MR. HIPSKIND:

you heard Foreman Yaeger make. This is many minutes after the impact and after you had finally left the machine and had went over to the access road?

> MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.

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1	MR. HIPSKIND: So, that could've 45 minutes
2	to an hour later.
3	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, it could've.
4	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. All right. Great job,
5	Andrew. Let's see what some other colleagues have to
6	say. Dave?
7	MR. KANNENBERG: Thanks, Andrew. I'm going
8	to say your timeline has been a real good, a very good
9	help for me. It's probably the best timeline we've had
10	yet.
11	MR. BEURSKENS: Right. Well, you know,
12	forgive me if it's most of that morning was a blur
13	at the end. So, forgive me if it's a little
14	MR. KANNENBERG: I remember seeing you at
15	the site and I'm glad you could make it in. I want to
16	talk a little bit about the job briefing that Yaeger
17	had. Who was all there for the job briefing? And, I
18	guess, let me just start with this. You said were on
19	the cab? When he gave
20	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
21	MR. KANNENBERG: Where was Yaeger during
22	that job briefing?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: He was on the ground. He
24	passed up the job briefing, told us that he had the
25	track out, and we signed it.
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1	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay, he said he had the
2	track out, did he specify which tracks?
3	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
4	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay.
5	MR. BEURSKENS: He didn't specify then, but
6	once again, this is right before we went to operate
7	was when we knew we had foul on 1. And once again,
8	said he had foul on 3 and 4 still.
9	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay. So Yaeger said he
10	had the track out of service. And I'm going to that
11	was Track 2? Track 1 he said in a separate statement
12	that he had?
13	MR. BEURSKENS: No, Track 1. Once again,
14	after it was given up, was my guys had heard. This is
15	what they told me. That they heard that he had taken 1
16	Track back out over the radio.
17	MR. KANNENBERG: Had anybody contacted your
18	guys or they just heard it over the radio?
19	MR. BEURSKENS: I'm assuming they heard it
20	over the radio. I can't
21	MR. KANNENBERG: So they weren't back to
22	work then?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
24	MR. KANNENBERG: Oh, okay.
25	MR. BEURSKENS: No, we didn't actually

1	physically get back to work until Pete flagged us down
2	to have go and dig those 4, 5. Just because, once
3	again, we were on wind down and, you know, we were
4	waiting for our next crew to come in and what not. And
5	I was trying to wrap up my paperwork.
6	MR. KANNENBERG: So, when Pete flagged you
7	down to finish up that little bit of work
8	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
9	MR. KANNENBERG: You
10	MR. BEURSKENS: That's when Yaeger came up.
11	That's when we got on his briefing, and that's when we
12	went back to work.
13	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay. So, did you have
14	Track 1 under foul time at that point?
15	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes. To my knowledge.
16	MR. KANNENBERG: And do you know who's name
17	it was under?
18	MR. BEURSKENS: I was told it was under
19	Yaeger's.
20	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay.
21	I got to X-out something that Mr. Hipskind went over
22	here. You said you just signed the form. Do you know
23	what the track speed was there?
24	MR. BEURSKENS: 110 is what we were told.
25	But that was the prior night from Foreman Smoot, who

1	was our foreman when we moved down into the area.
2	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay. Was that information
3	also shared with Foreman Robinson's job safety
4	briefing?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
6	MR. KANNENBERG: Did it, was his job safety
7	briefing on-track, excuse me. On-track safety
8	briefing similar to Yaeger's where
9	MR. BEURSKENS: No, no, no. We went over it,
10	you know, And what he had, what the gains were. I mean
11	it was a pretty in depth briefing.
12	MR. KANNENBERG: So, let's talk about that a
13	minute then. And I'll try to be brief, fellas. I
14	apologize. But when Robinson had his job briefing, he
15	brought out a piece of paper similar to the one Yaeger
16	had that was signed by both. But he went through each
17	of the boxes.
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, line for line.
19	MR. KANNENBERG: Line for line? And did
20	anybody talk about shunts?
21	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
22	MR. KANNENBERG: Over the entire 55?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: Nobody mentioned anything
24	about shunts.
25	MR. KANNENBERG: You've been up in the

1	Northeast Corridor on Amtrak for quite a while, working
2	with your machine. When you've been working around
3	backhoes that are helping you out, does that happen
4	often as a matter of fact?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: Fairly seldom. I've been on
6	Amtrak for probably two and a half years, and I could
7	probably count on my hands how many times I've seen
8	shunt straps used.
9	MR. KANNENBERG: No, no. My question is how
10	often are machines used to
11	MR. BEURSKENS: Oh, to assist? With Pete,
12	I've
13	MR. KANNENBERG: No, just in general.
14	MR. BEURSKENS: Okay, in general? It just
15	depends really.
16	MR. KANNENBERG: Over your couple years? I
17	mean 50 times, 20 times.
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Oh. Yes, I mean. Less than
19	a hundred I can tell you that, I mean.
20	MR. KANNENBERG: And out of those a hundred
21	times this isn't science, we can't fact check this.
22	Your best estimate because we're really getting a feel
23	for it is all, we're not
24	MR. BEURSKENS: No, I understand.
25	MR. KANNENBERG: How many times were shunts
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1	ever used when you were using another machine to
2	support your piece of machinery?
3	MR. BEURSKENS: Fairly seldom. I mean, very
4	seldom.
5	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay. Once, twice.
6	MR. BEURSKENS: Fifty times? Less than
7	half.
8	MR. KANNENBERG: Less than half. Okay.
9	And I'm just going to tell you what's going through my
10	mind. I'm a little bit confused with the on-track
11	safety. I understand what you're saying, and I'm just
12	trying to square that with other things we've heard and
13	what we know from the dispatcher.
14	So, I'm just going to ask you flat out. At
15	the time of the strike, who do you think held
16	authorities and which tracks and what were those
17	authorities? And that's my last question.
18	MR. BEURSKENS: At the time, Yaeger had foul
19	on 2. Robinson still had 2 out of service, and
20	Robinson had foul on 3 and 4.
21	MR. KANNENBERG: Who had 3 and 4.
22	MR. BEURSKENS: Robinson.
23	MR. KANNENBERG: Robinson did.
24	Okay, then now I have to follow up because I thought
25	you said Yaeger said he had 3 and 4.

1	MR. BEURSKENS: Said he had discussed with
2	Robinson. I wasn't told who actually had 3 and 4 out.
3	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay.
4	MR. BEURSKENS: He said
5	MR. KANNENBERG: And believe me I'm not
6	playing "Gotcha".
7	MR. BEURSKENS: No, no. No, I understand, I
8	understand. No, I was told, just going over it, that
9	we still had protection on 3 and 4.
10	MR. KANNENBERG: So, Yaeger told I think
11	what you just told me is Yaeger told
12	MR. BEURSKENS: Yaeger told us
13	MR. KANNENBERG: Robinson still had 3 and 4.
14	MR. BEURSKENS: He didn't say Robinson. He
15	said we still had protection on 3 and 4.
16	MR. KANNENBERG: Okay. He just said we
17	still have protection, okay.
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
19	MR. KANNENBERG: That's exactly what I was
20	looking for.
21	MR. BEURSKENS: Okay, yes. Just to
22	clarify, sorry.
23	MR. KANNENBERG: Are you kidding me? That
24	was absolutely perfect. Thank you very much, I'm done.
25	MR. TRAINA: Mike Traina. Just one
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1	question. He covered most everything else. You asked
2	for a briefing. They asked you to start sucking, Pete
3	wanted you to hit a few cribs, right?
4	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
5	MR. TRAINA: Before you got out of there?
6	And you were ready to wrap and go, right? So, now when
7	he asked you to clear some cribs that was over the
8	radio?
9	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
10	MR. TRAINA: Oh, that was who
11	MR. BEURSKENS: No, no. That was Yaeger
12	was up at the front of the machine with Pete, you know.
13	And Pete was, kind of, I don't know. I guess he was
14	making some kind of hand gesture or what not. Forgive
15	me, I do talk with my hands. And Yaeger came up and he
16	said he wants us to, you know, finish these 4 and 5
17	Cribs.
18	MR. TRAINA: And you were already on the
19	briefing.
20	MR. BEURSKENS: We were on Robinson's
21	briefing and, again, he disappeared. We weren't sure
22	where he was, so I told Yaeger to let us go ahead and
23	just let us sign on to his briefing.
24	MR. TRAINA: Was he in the cab at the time?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: No, he was on the ground.
I	I and the state of

1	He handed up his briefing to us.
2	MR. TRAINA: When you asked to sign on the
3	briefing you did ask to sign on the briefing?
4	MR. BEURSKENS: I did.
5	MR. TRAINA: Okay, he didn't offer. You
6	asked.
7	MR. BEURSKENS: No, I asked.
8	MR. TRAINA: Was that verbally or over the
9	radio?
10	MR. BEURSKENS: Verbally.
11	MR.TRAINA: Okay.
12	MR. BEURSKENS: It was not over the radio.
13	MR. TRAINA: That's it, thank you.
14	MR. HIPSKIND: Thanks Mike. Lou, you going
15	to go next?
16	MR. TOMASSONE: Yes, just real briefly. Did
17	you see Assistant Supervisor Snyder at all throughout
18	the night?
19	MR. BEURSKENS: I believe it did. I'm
20	trying to picture like a face with a name.
21	MR. TOMASSONE: His name was Kyle.
22	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, Kyle was out there.
23	MR. TOMASSONE: That was the majority of the
24	night?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes he was.
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1	MR. TOMASSONE: You did have contact with
2	him?
3	MR. BEURSKENS: I did.
4	MR.TOMASSONE: Okay. I'm not familiar with
5	the training Amtrak provided you to be on their
6	property. What training did you go through from
7	Amtrak?
8	MR. BEURSKENS: We have an online course we
9	take, which is I guess the standard contractor course
10	for us.
11	MR. TOMASSONE: Okay, do you remember just
12	the general scope of what the training was?
13	MR. BEURSKENS: It just goes over some of
14	the basics and what not. It's good for a year.
15	MR. TOMASSONE: Okay, (unintelligible).
16	MR. BEURSKENS: But it's an online, like,
17	contractor course.
18	MR. TOMASSONE: Okay, and one last question.
19	Did you see Foreman Robinson after the accident?
20	MR. BEURSKENS: No. I did not.
21	MR. TOMASSONE: Okay. That's all I have.
22	MR. HIPSKIND: Thanks Lou, Matt.
23	MR. PORTO: Cross off a couple. You said
24	there is a radio, there's two radios?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, we have two radios in
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1 both our A and our B cab, which is our caboose. 2 always have set to our station, and then one we always 3 have set to our dispatcher's station. 4 MR. PORTO: Okay. Now, towards the end 5 where you said you were inside the cab. Now, is that the same cab, same area where the radio is? 6 7 Yes. MR. BEURSKENS: MR. PORTO: Okay. But did you hear any 8 radio transmissions at all? 9 MR. BEURSKENS: The last -- roughly, no. 10 11 Like I said, my guys did say that they heard Yaeger 12 with the foul time. I don't recall hearing it myself, but once again I was focused on my paperwork so. 13 14 MR. PORTO: All right. Is there any certain person that usually communicates on the radio from your 15 16 17 MR. BEURSKENS: Just whoever's sitting 18 closer, whoever can get to the mic. But, you know, generally, I mean just an example throughout the night, 19 once again, it would've been -- where dispatch called 2.0 21 Robinson to take, you know, the foul back, Robinson 22 would say hey, hold on one second. He'd call us, hey, are you guys in the 23 I'd do my head count, make sure all my quys 24 25 were clear. And then I'd radio back to hey Foreman

1	Robinson we're clear, foul 1 Track. You know, you're
2	good to give it back. And then he would have called
3	dispatch and gave it back to them.
4	MR. PORTO: And you said when Robinson got
5	out of service Track 2, you got a copy of that form?
6	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
7	MR. PORTO: Did Yaeger give you a copy of
8	any form Ds?
9	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
LO	MR. PORTO: No. And when you had the job
L1	briefing with Yaeger, do you recall any other
L2	signatures on it when you went to sign it?
L3	MR. BEURSKENS: Honestly, we put our
L4	signature on it. I can't tell you whether there was or
L5	there wasn't.
L6	MR. PORTO: Okay. And you don't recall if
L7	the relief crew had it prior to you guys?
L8	MR. BEURSKENS: I know John was over there
L9	talking to them. I don't know if they had the job
20	briefing with it or what.
21	Just because we were kind of, you know, we
22	were talking back and forth. Me and my relief crew
23	over the radio. Over our radio, kind of, you know,
24	what was
25	going on if we had any issues or what not.

1	MR. PORTO: And at the time of the incident,
2	you said that it was Matt that was out there?
3	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes. Yes.
4	MR. PORTO: You had the machine on, you were
5	sucking the cribs?
6	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
7	MR. PORTO: Do you recall, or know, the
8	position of the backhoe arm?
9	MR. BEURSKENS: The bucket was facing
10	forward. Yes, so it would have been facing like I
11	said I'm not sure on my direction, whichever way would
12	have been, let's see
13	MR. PORTO: Wait a second. Look forward,
14	like forward would have been the direction you traveled
15	to get from Philadelphia to Wilmington, facing south?
16	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, yes. And then the
17	actual arm he was using to undercut was sitting in the
18	center of the gage.
19	MR. PORTO: The center of?
20	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, the center of 3 Track
21	gage.
22	MR. PORTO: All right, I'm good.
23	MR. WALKER: All right. Fran Walker.
24	You're saying Robinson's always relayed you information
25	over the radio. When to clear out, or when you had a

1	foul?		
2		MR.	BEURSKENS: Yes.
3		(cro	osstalk)
4		MR.	WAKLER: Did you ever hear him
5		MR.	HIPSKIND: Did you say yes?
6		MR.	BEURSKENS: Yes.
7		MR.	WALKER: Did you ever hear him actually
8	talking to	the	dispatcher to get the foul or to clear
9	fouls?		
10		MR.	BEURSKENS: Yes.
11		MR.	WALKER: You did?
12		MR.	BEURSKENS: Yes.
13		MR.	WALKER: So, you actually never heard
14	him on the	radi	to clear Track 3 and 4? So, you're
15	assuming he	hac	d 3 and 4. You did hear him clear 1 when
16	you had to	clea	ar after your side cast.
17		MR.	BEURSKENS: That's correct.
18		MR.	WALKER: So, when you came back to
19	restart up,	you	n heard Yaeger say we have 1 Track now.
20	So, that's	why	you could continue working?
21		MR.	BEURSKENS: Well, my guys said, once
22	again, they	hea	ard over the radio that he took the track
23	back. My t	wo c	guys.
24		MR.	WALKER: Were saying that Yaeger got 1?
25		MR.	BEURSKENS: Yes.

MR. WALKER: So you were probably under the assumption that because Yaeger said you still had 3 and 4 that it was under Robinson's name, or somebody's name? Yes. MR. BEURSKENS: Question about what your MR. WALKER: Okay. knowledge of shunts? Was there any knowledge of shunts in this contractor training you received? Honestly, mine expires this MR. BEURSKENS: So, I've got to get it at the end of the month. I don't remember. Okay, so you've worked you said MR. WALKER: the Baltimore sub division, you've worked in Philly. So, isolated cases, sometimes shunt straps --Shunt straps are used, yes. MR. BEURSKENS: Shunts strap are used MR. WALKER: sometimes, okay. All right, that's all I have. MR. HIPSKIND: Thanks, Fran. Well, Andrew, you've loaded us up with a lot of information and a lot of detail but I want to switch gears here for a couple minutes. As a contractor working for LORAM, I want to understand better. How is it that you're prepared to come over and work on Amtrak property? Do you have to take a day off? Do you have to go to training?

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Do you go on to a computer? How do you get up to speed? How do you get qualified on some of these, like RWP or how to move equipment? about your understanding about what do you do along those lines. MR. BEURSKENS: As far we go, we go up, we do our training, as far as like our OSHA training and everything, up in our home office in Hamil. And then depending on which railroad we're going to, we take our E-Railsafe courses. And then our contractor courses depending on which railroad, once again. Amtrak is a online course. That's, you know, once again it's been almost a year since I've taken it. So, it's just a online qualification course. Okay, and tell me a little MR. HIPSKIND: bit about the content of it. What's the subject matter that's covered? Rail safety. MR. BEURSKENS: There's some signals that are covered. I mean, it's a basic outline of the railroad essentially. The Amtrak railroad. Ιt goes over (unintelligible), it goes over third-rail. MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. But, so in taking that training do you feel comfortable when you're out there

with different crews in different places but doing the

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1	same thing?
2	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
3	MR. HIPSKIND: So, do you have a good feel
4	for when the process, the procedure about on track
5	safety, about protecting tracks, if it it's being done
6	correctly or less than that?
7	MR. BEURSKENS: Generally, yes.
8	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Generally?
9	MR. BEURSKENS: Well, I mean yes. Excuse
10	me.
11	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, all right. Okay. When
12	you were describing Saturday night's work and talking
13	about Will Robinson and using the radio. I thought you
14	said that when he would give up his fouls or get his
15	fouls that he would routinely radio you. And that's
16	how you understood what the status of a particular main
17	track and whether or not it had a foul on it. Is that
18	right?
19	MR. BEURSKENS: That's correct.
20	MR. HIPSKIND: And he was good about that,
21	all night long?
22	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, he was.
23	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, now I'm going to add a
24	little nuance in here. So, he would let you know when
25	he had a foul time applied to a particular track. And

he would let you know.

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MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, the way it worked was, this is how we did it the night.

MR. HIPSKIND: Okay.

MR. BEURSKENS: Was when we first got there, you know, we heard him over the radio. You know, we got one and three, which foul on one and three so we can go do our startup. And then throughout the night, once again after we would side cast or what not if they had to give up foul, he'd call me. You know, Andrew. You know, well let me rephrase this.

We'd hear dispatch calling over the radio.

He'd call me and ask me, if he was giving it up, he'd call me and ask me, hey, Andrew, are you guys all clear. Once again, I would do my head count. Let him know over the radio, Foreman Robinson we're all clear.

Or foul, we're all clear number 1 Track or Number 3

Track or whatever.

And then when they called to give it back, once again, you know, he'd say, Foreman Robinson, you know, he'd take their Form D from it. And then he'd either call us over the radio or I'd respond to him, hey, Foreman Robinson, that's a roger. We got foul on 1 or 3 or whatnot.

MR. HIPSKIND: Did Foreman Robinson ever

1	call you on your cell phone to relay that same kind of
2	information? About whether foul time had been applied
3	on a track? Or taken away from a track?
4	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
5	MR. HIPSKIND: Never?
6	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
7	MR. HIPSKIND: So, your reliance was on
8	things people tell me over the radio?
9	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
10	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. And you're being fed
11	information, whether it's the dispatcher saying it or
12	Foreman Robinson saying it, and that's your handshake.
13	That's your confirmation of I'm okay to go, I'm okay to
14	work. I've got foul time on 1, I've got foul time on
15	3. You really didn't care about foul time on 4, right?
16	MR. BEURSKENS: Right. We had no ability
17	MR. HIPSKIND: For your operations?
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes, no I had no ability to
19	foul 4 Track.
20	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. And you're out there
21	to tell them whether they're doing something right or
22	wrong about foul time on 4 Track, right?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
24	MR. HIPSKIND: Is that right?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: That's correct, yes.

1	MR. HIPSKIND: That's all I've got for right
2	now. Dave, anything?
3	MR. KANNENBERG: Yes, you did mention
4	earlier that you worked a lot with Yaeger I believe?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
6	MR. KANNENBERG: Is that pretty much the way
7	his job briefings usually went?
8	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
9	MR. KANNENBERG: How did his job briefing
10	usually go?
11	MR. BEURSKENS: No, you know, normally
12	they're line for line. You know, this is what we're
13	doing. We'd always have the overview of what the job
14	is. What kind of protection we're going to be taking
15	out. You know, what gains we're working with, when ET
16	will arrive. You know, and what not.
17	MR. KANNENBERG: So when he asked you to
18	sign his form or when he handed to you did he say he
19	was planning on doing a regular on-track safety
20	briefing with everybody at a later time or?
21	MR. BEURSKENS: He didn't mention it, no.
22	MR. KANNENBERG: Did not? Okay. That's all
23	I've got thanks.
24	MR. HIPSKIND: Mike? Lou?
25	MR. TOMASSONE: Just a couple more. I'll
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1	try and be as brief as I can. You've operated on
2	Norfolk Southern, correct? You ran the machine over
3	there?
4	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
5	MR. TOMASSONE: Their safety training, is it
6	comparable to Amtrak's?
7	MR. BEURSKENS: No, it's a little more in
8	depth. We actually have to have a company
9	representative come out and give us the briefing
10	itself, or the course itself. We actually have to have
11	somebody from our training department come out and give
12	a NCSX.
13	MR. TOMASSONE: Okay. Did you hear either
14	Foreman Yaeger or Foreman Robinson complaining about
15	the radios and the reception?
16	MR. BEURSKENS: No. The entire night,
17	Robinson and me had good communication over the radio.
18	MR. TOMASSONE: Okay. Last question. Are
19	you familiar with the Good Faith Challenge?
20	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
21	MR. TOMASSONE: And what is entailed in that
22	and your rights under that?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
24	MR. TOMASSONE: Okay, that's all I have.
25	MR. HIPSKIND: Thank you, Lou. Matt.
	I .

1	MR. TRAINA: Follow up on the radio
2	communication. I know you and Robinson had good radio
3	communication. Did you hear of any issues with
4	Robinson and dispatch and the radio communication?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: No, no.
6	MR. TRAINA: And just to confirm, you
7	probably said it and I just didn't write it down. What
8	time did you start Saturday night?
9	MR. BEURSKENS: 8:00 p.m.
10	MR. TRAINA: That's all I've got, thank you.
11	MR. HIPSKIND: Thanks Matt.
12	MR. WALKER: Fran Walker. You say you
13	worked with Yaeger a lot. Have you ever worked with
14	Yaeger when he's used shunts? With the backhoe or even
15	to cast over the side or something like that?
16	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
17	MR. WALKER: You don't ever recall him using
18	shunts. How about any foreman on Pete's territory?
19	You work with anybody besides Yaeger?
20	MR. BEURSKENS: Let's see I've worked with
21	Foreman Penman, Ryan Pew. I'm trying to think of some
22	of the other ones. Foreman Stacey, I think Zach's his
23	first name, Zach Stacey. And honestly, no. Not to my
24	recollection. I mean, it could've been. You know, I've
25	worked mainly in Philadelphia. So, I mean it, you
	I and the second se

1	know.
2	MR. WALKER: You don't recall the use of
3	shunts anytime down in that territory? You don't
4	recall?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
6	MR. WALKER: That's it for me.
7	MR. HIPSKIND: Thanks, Fran. So, Andrew we
8	are getting close to the end here. You okay with that?
9	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
10	MR. HIPSKIND: But you were out there
11	Saturday morning with Yaeger, right?
12	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
13	MR. HIPSKIND: He that yes?
14	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
15	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, so he was out there
16	Saturday morning. I'm interested, how would you
17	characterize what occurred did that job briefing if
18	there was one held? Saturday morning, not Sunday.
19	MR. BEURSKENS: Saturday morning I wasn't on
20	his job briefing. Because, we relieved. I was on
21	night Foreman Larry Smoot's job briefing. Was Friday
22	night
23	to Saturday morning, and we checked out while we were
24	still on his job briefing.
25	MR. HIPSKIND: His briefing oh, the

1	Amtrak the foreman that was on Friday night.
2	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes sir, yes ir.
3	MR. HIPSKIND: And so as you worked Friday
4	night and then you checked out. And so you weren't
5	present for Yaeger's briefing
6	MR. BEURSKENS: Saturday morning, that's
7	correct.
8	MR. HIPSKIND: Oh, okay.
9	MR. BEURSKENS: We left, our shift started
10	Friday night at 8:00 p.m. We left at 8:00 a.m., so I
11	was not present for Yaeger's briefing Saturday morning.
12	MR. HIPSKIND: I've done these so many
13	times, I've just learned to say this isn't my last
14	question. But did Foreman Robinson call you on Sunday
15	morning?
16	MR. BEURSKENS: No, he did not call me at
17	all. Throughout the 55-hour outage, at all Saturday
18	night or Sunday morning. He never once called me over
19	the phone.
20	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, but did he call you
21	over the radio on Sunday morning to let you know that
22	he gave up his fouls?
23	MR. BEURSKENS: No.
24	MR. HIPSKIND: You're sure about that?
25	MR. BEURSKENS: I'm positive

1	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Gentlemen, any other
2	questions that you might have? All right, hearing none
3	let's go over some questions that I need to ask you,
4	okay?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: Okay.
6	MR. HIPSKIND: I think you've heard these
7	before. Is there anything that you'd like to add or
8	change to anything that we've talked about or discussed
9	here today?
10	MR. BEURSKENS: Not to my knowledge, no.
11	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. And is there anything
12	that we should have asked but did not or other topics
13	that we should have asked or did not?
14	MR. BEURSKENS: No, I mean, pretty much to
15	the point.
16	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Do you have any
17	suggestions for preventing a reoccurrence?
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Just mainly, radio
19	communication should be required. I don't think
20	anything should be done over the phone, at all.
21	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay, but just elaborate on
22	that a little bit Andrew. What's the benefit if it's
23	done over the radio?
24	MR. BEURSKENS: Specifically, us as
25	contractors, you know, if it's done over the
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1 radio--I'll just use my machine as an example. an Amtrak radio in my front cab and my rear cab. 2 If we're making a reverse move and I'm 3 4 driving the machine, that means I'm in the front of the If foul's given up in B Cab over the phone, I 5 machine. And so I'm relayed from either my quy 6 don't know. 7 that's back there with them, or the foreman does it over the radio. 8 On top of that, generally I have three guys 9 I always position one of my quys up in the 10 on a crew. 11 cab to listen for the radio. Just on the off chance 12 that, once again, we're not told. I've never had it happen, but you know. It would just, to me as a 13 14 contractor, it would make me feel a hundred percent better. 15 MR. HIPSKIND: Is it just this simple, you 16 can't hear what you can't hear? If it's over a cell 17 phone, you can't hear it. 18 19 MR. BEURSKENS: Exactly. Yes, I mean yes. To simplify it, yes that's true. If it's done over a 20 21 phone, I can't hear it. I can't verify it. 22 over the radio, I have access to it. Thank you for that. 23 MR. HIPSKIND: Is there anyone else who we should interview? We've interviewed 24

quite a few Amtrak employees at various positions on

25

1 both shifts. But from the LORAM perspective, is there 2 anybody else we should interview? 3 MR. BEURSKENS: Well, my crew. I mean once 4 again, Corey was sitting not but two, three feet away So he'll probably give you the same story I 5 from me. gave you. Or at least from the same perspective 6 Matt's about the only other person. 7 the one who was out front operating at the time. 8 would be the only other one I would take a shot in the 9 dark. 10 Was he in the six foot 11 MR. HIPSKIND: 12 between one and two track when the impact occurred? No, he was in beside the 13 MR. BEURSKENS: 14 gauge of two track. Because the way we operate was we have a platform that stands in front of our machine. 15 So, he was actually operating from the inside the gage 16 of 2 Track. 17 Okay, but he was out front MR. HIPSKIND: 18 right when the impact happened? 19 MR. BEURSKENS: 20 Yes. 21 MR. HIPSKIND: So let me --22 Can I ask a quick --TRAINA: 23 MR. HIPSKIND: Just hold on a second, Matt. So, when you say three employees. It was Matt out on 24 25 the front of the machine, operating. You in the cab,

1	and who was the other
2	MR. BEURSKENS: Corey.
3	MR. HIPSKIND: So, that's the three LORAM
4	personnel that were out there Sunday morning?
5	MR. BEURSKENS: That's the three that were on the
б	machine. I had a relief crew that was in the truck off
7	of 4 Track side.
8	MR. HIPSKIND: And that was two of them,
9	coming in to relieve three of you?
10	MR. BEURSKENS: That's correct.
11	MR. HIPSKIND: Okay. Thank you. Matt?
12	MR. TRAINA: Okay, just occurred to me while
13	we were talking about that. Positioning wise, so Matt
14	was there's a platform attached to the machine.
15	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes.
16	MR. TRAINA: Okay. And then do you
17	MR. HIPSKIND: Did you say yes?
18	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes sir, I'm sorry.
19	MR. TRAINA: Do you recall where Pete, so
20	anybody else was standing?
21	MR. BEURSKENS: Yes. Pete was in between
22	two and three on the shoulder, or he was up on the
23	heads of 2 Track. So he would've been kind of hunched
24	over in between 2 and 3 Track. And he had a trackman
25	working one track side in between 1 and 2 Track.

1	MR. TRAINA: How far from where Matt was
2	standing?
3	MR. BEURSKENS: You figure the backhoe was
4	probably say five feet from the front of the machine,
5	so probably 15, 20 feet out.
6	MR. HIPSKIND: Thank you Matt. Gentlemen,
7	anything else? All right, well listen, Andrew. What a
8	detailed description and I can tell you some of the
9	things you related to us were very spot on. They were
10	very helpful. So we are very appreciative that you
11	took this time to help understand this entire event.
12	And with that, if there's nothing else, I'll
13	close out the interview. Thanks again, Andrew.
14	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
15	off the record at 6:23 p.m.)
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MATTER: Amtrak Train 89 Accident
April 3, 2016 near Chester, PA
Accident No. DC16FR007
Interview of Andrew Breuskens

DATE: 04-06-16

I hereby certify that the attached transcription of page 1 to 61 inclusive are to the best of my professional ability a true, accurate, and complete record of the above referenced proceedings as contained on the provided audio recording; further that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this action in which this proceeding has taken place; and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.



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