

- 7.4.2. All applicable lessons learned from collective fleet experience and addressed in Issue Paper P-9 have been addressed, as follows:

Protection from inadvertent crew action (Issue Paper P-9 Background, para. 2a)

Selection of reverse thrust by the thrust lever requires two separate and distinct operations, lift the reverse lock trigger and pull the lever back. In addition the ARM must be selected, this selection is normally OFF in flight and indicated when in ARM. In addition both main and nose landing gear weight on wheel - WOW switches must be in ground position. Any gear WOW in air position will prevent the T/R to deploy (Reference 2.9).

Throttle Control Unit failure analysis (Reference 2.10) has shown that there are no common mode failures (mechanical failures, contamination, liquid ingestion or foreign object) that would inadvertently provide opening command to the T/R during flight or allow the pilot to pull the throttle to a reverse deploy position inadvertently.

Accuracy and effectiveness of flight deck design and crew procedures (Issue Paper P-9 Background, para. 2b)

Flight deck design and crew procedures were shown to be simple and straight forward for crew operation of the T/R (Reference 2.9)

There is no crew action that can deploy a T/R in flight. The only crew action in flight any time an indication T/R FAIL is provided is to check that the ARM switch is selected OFF and not to use the affected T/R.

Crew may reverse thrust on the opposite engine if the T/R on one engine fails to properly deploy. Certification testing has been done to demonstrate aircraft controllability under this conditions.

When the nose landing gear weight on wheel (WOW) switch will be depressed during landing, a Ready light illuminates. At this time the pilot must move the throttle levers to "T/R deploy" setting.

In most cases crew will not select more than ground idle reverse unless the DEPLOY enunciation is provided and TR FAIL indication is not provided.

Limiting reliance on use of aerodynamics means to keep the T/R stowed (Issue Paper P-9 Background, para. 2c)

There is no reliance on use of aerodynamics means to keep the T/R stowed (Reference 2.9).

Impact of latent failures (Issue Paper P-9 Background, para. 2c)

A latent failure is defined as a failure which is not detected during more than one flight. The latent failures are addressed throughout the analyses including:

The FMEAs (References 2.4 and 2.10) identify latent failures