1		NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD					
2		OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY					
4		OTTIOL OF MARKINE OAT LIT					
5 6		WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594					
7		JUNE 21, 2004					
8 9 10 11 12 13		SURVIVAL FACTORS FACTUAL REPORT					
15 16	A.	ACCIDENT					
17 18 19 20 21 22 23		Location: Staten Island, New York; Pier B1 Date: October 15, 2003 Time: 1520 hours (EST) Vessel: Staten Island Ferry, Andrew J. Barberi Owner/Operator: New York City Department of Transportation Number: DCA-04-MM-001					
24	В.	SURVIVAL FACTORS GROUP					
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36		National Transportation Safety Board Survival Factors Group Chairman: Captain Rob Jones Marine Accident Investigator Office of Marine Safety 490 L'Enfant Plaza East Washington, D.C. 20594 Tel: 202-314-6272 Fax: 202-314-6454 Email: jonesr@ntsb.gov					
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44		U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Richard Gonzalez, Esq. Investigating Officer Coast Guard Activities NY 212 Coast Guard Dr. Staten Island, NY 10305 Tel: 718-354-4229 Fax: 718-354-4224					
45		Email: rgonzalez@actny.uscg.mil					

New York Police Department
Detective Stephen Mattei
120 Detective Squad
Richmond Terrace
Staten Island, NY 10301

Tel: 718-981-2583/3303

Cell: 347-236-2316

NYPD Harbor Unit Sergeant Brian Clifford Pier 1 Brooklyn Army Terminal 140 58th St.

Brooklyn, NY 11220 Tel: 718-765-4100

Fire Department City of New York John (Jack) A. Calderone Battalion Chief Battalion 22 1189 Castleton Ave. Staten Island, NY 10310

> Tel: 718-494-4289 Fax: 718-815-2697

C. <u>SUMMARY</u>

On Wednesday, October 15, 2003 at approximately 1520 (LMT), the 310 foot Staten Island Ferry *ANDREW J. BARBERI*, one of a fleet of seven vessels owned and operated by the City of New York, Department of Transportation, suffered an allision with the south side of the B1 maintenance pier at the St. George terminal on Staten Island. The vessel had departed the Whitehall terminal in Manhattan at approximately 3:00 PM with an estimated passenger count of 1,500, bound for Staten Island. Upon departure from the slip at Whitehall, the propulsion systems, both forward and aft, were set to maximum ahead thrust. This was the normal engine configuration for the trip between Whitehall

- 1 and St. George. The Assistant Captain (or Pilot) was on the bridge and at the controls of
- 2 the ferry as it proceeded through the upper bay of New York harbor. The trip south was
- 3 uneventful until the vessel reached the proximity of the KV buoy. Instead of the
- 4 ANDREW J. BARBERI turning to starboard and reducing speed in preparation for
- 5 docking at St. George, the vessel continued to maintain course and speed until it
- 6 impacted the south corner of maintenance pier B1.

D. <u>Details of the Investigation</u>

1. Medical and Pathological

8 9

7

1.1 Fatal Injuries

10 11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Ten passengers aboard the Andrew J. Barberi died in the accident. An eleventh passenger died on December 6th of 2003 after succumbing to injuries received during the incident. Victims on the main deck of the Andrew J. Barberi received all the fatal injuries. In statements by witnesses it is normal practice for passengers to start queuing up towards the inbound end of the ferry. This would have been the Staten Island end as the Andrew J. Barberi approached the St. George terminal. Survivors of the accident also state that some of them could sense that the ferry was further along than normal on it's regular run but felt that it was just a sense and did not give it much further thought. Additional Survivor's testimony state that some of the passengers might have been sitting and dozing right up until impact and never heard shouts or had any other warning of the impending allision. An accounting for the passenger locations just prior to impact can best be summed up by the following description. Diagram No. 1 shows to the best of EMS/FDNY, NYPD and USCG reconstruction of where the bodies of victims were recovered once the ferry docked in slip 5. No actual markings were made on the vessel during the accident as to the location of the deceased. In interviews the rescue personnel stated that they were more involved with

- 1 the rescue effort and administration of first aid and triage (Def: the sorting of and
- 2 allocation of treatment to patients and especially battle and disaster victims according to
- 3 a system of priorities designed to maximize the number of survivors) for the surviving
- 4 passengers than they were concerned with documenting the location of the deceased
- 5 passengers. Some of the deceased had to be removed immediately from the scene to
- 6 the dock in order for responders to assist other seriously injured passengers.

1.2 DESCRIPTION and CAUSE OF DEATHS:

- 1. A 52-year-old male suffered blunt force trauma of head and torso with subarachnoid
- 12 hemorrhage and rib fractures.
- 13 2. A 50-year-old male suffered multiple blunt trauma of torso with fractures and visceral
- 14 injuries.
- 15 3. A 42-year-old female suffered blunt impact injuries of head, torso and extremities.
- 16 4. A 25-year-old male suffered compression of chest with a ortic laceration.
- 17 5. A 40-year-old male suffered multiple blunt trauma of head and torso with fractures
- 18 and visceral injuries.
- 19 6. A 44-year-old male suffered blunt impact trauma of chest and extremities.
- 20 7. A 35-year-old male suffered blunt impact injuries of head and torso.
- 21 8. A 46-year-old male suffered blunt force trauma of head, torso, and extremities with
- 22 visceral lacerations and fractures.
- 23 9. A 26-year-old male suffered blunt force trauma of head, torso, and extremities with
- 24 multiple fractures and lacerations.
- 25 10. A 44-year-old male suffered blunt force trauma of head with skull fractures and brain
- 26 injury.

- 1 11. A 39-year-old female suffered multiple blunt trauma with complications. * (This victim
- 2 expired approximately two months after the accident).

4

1.3 INJURY TABLE

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Other	Total
Fatal	0	10	0	10
Serious	0	14 ¹	0	14
Minor	0	72	0	72
None	15	1404	5 ²	1424
Total	15	1500 ³	5	1520

Title 49 CFR section 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in death within 30 days of an accident. It defines serious injury as that which requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; involves any internal organ; or involves second- or third- degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.

5

6

7 8

9

10


- ¹ One of the 14 Seriously Injured passengers succumbed to her injuries and died on December 6th of 2003.
- ² 2 NYPD police officers assigned to the ferry. 2 Concessionaires working the snack bar on the bridge deck. 1 Bathroom attendant was employed by the DOT.
- ³ 1500 passengers was the estimate given by the NYPD officers who were assigned to the Andrew J. Barberi and aboard at the time of the accident.

11 12

13

1.4 Location of DOA's as found by responding rescue personnel.

14



15

16 Diagram No. 1

1.5 DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES:

1.5.1 STATEN ISLAND UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

The following is a completed list of the patients treated at Staten Island University Hospital - North on the day of the Staten Island Ferry accident (October 15, 2003).

1. 23 y/o female admitted for observation complaining of lower back pain and left sided flank pain. All diagnostic tests were negative. She was discharged home on 10/23/03.

2. 38 y/o male sustained contusion of right hand. He was admitted for observation and discharged on 10/16/03.

 39 y/o male sustained lower extremity paralysis and upper extremity flaccidness.
 CT revealed C6-C7 fracture requiring surgical reduction and spinal cord decompression. He was discharged to rehab on 11/04/03.

4. 29 y/o male sustained dislocation of left shoulder. His shoulder was reduced and he was admitted for observation. He was discharged home on 10/16/03.

 39 y/o female sustained a traumatic hemipelvectomy requiring emergent surgical intervention and numerous subsequent surgeries. She remained extremely critical in the post-operative period requiring supportive care for multi-system organ failure. She succumbed to her injuries on 12/6/03.

6. 40 y/o female sustained a fractured pelvis and left femur requiring open reduction. Also treated for a fracture to her sacrum and a retroperitoneal hematoma. She was discharged to rehab on 10/28/03.

7. 24 y/o male sustained bilateral lower extremity amputations requiring emergent surgical debridement and above the knee completed amputations. His post-operative course was uncomplicated and he was discharged to a rehab facility on 11/14/03.

8. 61 y/o female sustained a fracture to her right acetabulum and right scapular. She required surgical repair of the acetabulum and was discharged to a rehab facility on 10/28/03.

9. 62 y/o male presented to Emergency Department with c/o pain to right great toe after he states a piece of metal fell on same. X-rays were negative and patient

- 1 requested admission for alcohol detoxification. He was admitted but signed out 2 <48 hours later on 10/17/03. 3 4 10. 40 y/o male presented with pain to right elbow and right scapula region. X-rays 5 were negative and he was treated and released. 6 7 11. 36 y/o female presented with pain to right knee after falling while running away. 8 She was treated and released. 9 10 12. 35 y/o male presented with pain to left hip and foot after striking his left side on a bench. He was treated and released 11 12 13 13. 34 y/o male sustained an abrasion to his right arm. Treated and released 14 15 14. 44 y/o female presents 8 hours post collision with complaints of back pain and headache. She was treated and released/ 16 17 18 15. 45 y/o female complains of chest pain and increased anxiety. She was admitted for observation and discharged on 10/18/03 19 20 21 16. 56 y/o male complains of pain to neck and shoulders. He was treated and 22 released. 23 24 17. 25 y/o male police officer presents with complaint of anxiety and headache. He was treated and released. 25 26 27
 - 18. 24 y/o female complaining of left flank pain after striking her left side. She was treated and released.

29 30

31 32

33

34 35

36

37 38

39 40 41

42

43 44

45

46 47

48 49 50

- 19. 46 y/o female sustained a contusion to left thigh. She was treated and released.
- 20. 22 y/o female presents to ED 4 hours post collision after feeling anxious after arriving home. She was treated and released.
- 21. 19 y/o female complained of generalized body pain and anxiety. She was treated and released.
- 22. 24 y/o, 6 wks pregnant female presents for evaluation after being pushed on the ferry. She was treated and released.
- 23. 41 y/o female complained of generalized pain. She was treated for anxiety and stress reaction and released.
- 24. 17 y/o female complained of pain to right flank and right side of chest after falling. She was treated and released.
- 25. 55 y/o male complains of left hip, leg and ankle pain. X-rays negative and he was treated and released.
- 26. 38 y/o male sustained an abrasion to the right side of his head and complained of blurry vision. He was treated and released.

- 27. 25 y/o female sustained a contusion of left arm. She was treated and released.
- 28. 47 y/o male complained of generalized back pain. He was treated and released.
- 29. 22 y/o male complained of abdominal pain. He was treated and released.
- 30. 22 y/o female sustained a contusion to left knee and complained of back pain. She was treated and released.
- 31. 65 y/o male sustained a contusion of the right wrist. He was treated and released.
- 32. 30 y/o male complained of back "soreness" and left ankle pain. He was treated and released.
- 33. 24 y/o male complained of pain to his back and right knee. He was treated and released.
- 34. 28 y/o male complained of pain in left shoulder and hand. He was treated and released.
- 35. 61 y/o female sustained lacerations to her right leg. She was observed in the ED overnight and released.

ADDENDUM:

In addition to above, the patients below presented to Staten Island University Hospital North site on the days following October 15, 2003:

- 36. Oct. 16, 2003: 43 y/o female presented with generalized muscle and skeletal pain. She was treated and released
- 37. Oct. 16, 2003: 29 y/o male presents with generalized cervical pain. He is treated for a neck sprain and released.
- 38. Oct. 16, 2003: 46 y/o female presents with right knee pain sustained by falling. she was treated and released.
- 39. Oct. 16, 2003: 36 y/o female presents with back and left knee pain. She was treated and released.
- 40. Oct. 17, 2003: 21 y/o female complains of back and bilateral shoulder pain. She was treated and released.
- 41. Oct. 17, 2003: 24 y/o female states that she "bumped into a person and fell". She complains of pain in her right leg but left the ED prior to being seen.
- 42. Oct. 18, 2003: 25 y/o female presents with pain in neck and shoulder. She was treated and released.

- 43. Oct. 18, 2003: 30 y/o male presents with cervical pain. Treated and released
- 44. Oct. 19, 2003: 31 y/o male states he was struck by a falling person and complained of pain in his right leg. He was treated and released.
- 45. Oct. 20, 2003: 47 y/o male complained of generalized body pain and right shoulder pain. He was treated and released.
- 46. Oct. 21, 2003: 14 y/o female complained of generalized muscular pain and was treated for a contusion to her right arm. She was treated and released.
- 47. Oct. 27, 2003: 53 y/o male presents with neck pain. Treated and released.
- 48. Oct. 31, 2003: 42 y/o male presents with pain in left leg. Treated and released.

The following patients presented to Staten Island University Hospital South site on October 15, 2003:

- 1. 52 y/o male admitted with chest pain. He ruled out for MI and was released on 10/16/03.
- 2. 16 y/o female presents with pain in back and left leg pain. She was treated and released.
- 3. 38 y/o male presents with acute stress reaction to incident. He was examined, treated and released.

The following patient presented to Staten Island University Hospital South site on October 16, 2003:

4. 43 y/o male presents with pain to left leg and contusion of knee. He was treated and released.

1.5.2 ST. VINCENT CATHOLIC MEDICAL CENTER

The following is a listing of patients who were treated at Saint Vincent Catholic Medical Centers of New York, St. Vincent's Staten Island Region:

There were a total of thirty patients treated. Twenty-two sustained minor injuries and were treated and released from our Emergency Department. Eight sustained major injuries requiring hospitalizations of greater than 48 hours.

1.5.3 KINGS COUNTY HOSPITAL

3 Injured passengers were transported to Kings County Hospital. 2 were seen for soft tissue injuries and 1 for neck and back pain. All were treated and released.

1.5.4 LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER

3 Injured passengers were transported to Lutheran Medical Center. 2 were seen for soft tissue injuries and 1 for neck pain. All were treated and released.

2. SUMMARY OF INJURED PASSENGERS AND WITNESSES:

A 24-year-old male passenger who rides the ferry daily was walking toward the Staten Island end as the vessel approached the docks. He realized the boat was going really fast with regard to its proximity to the docks as he was making his way down the staircase to the main deck from the saloon deck. He heard someone yell "Oh s____," and knew something was going wrong. He tried to make his way back up the stairs when he heard a crunching noise and got thrown to the ground. By his account he remained conscious throughout the entire incident as the debris was pushing him along to the midpoint of the vessel. When the motion stopped he looked down and realized he had lost his legs. The victim credits an English nurse for saving his life by coming to his aid and applying a tourniquet around his legs. The tourniquet was the belt from the senior mate on the vessel. This passenger heard no warnings of any kind prior to the accident. The passenger nurse remained with him throughout the entire incident trying to assist and make him comfortable in any way possible. She accompanied him while the rescue personnel removed him from the vessel and transported him to the hospital.

A 38-year-old male who is a daily passenger on the ferry was on the saloon deck outside getting ready to disembark. He realized they were coming in to fast and off course and started running back into the ship. As he tried to grab onto a row of seats the force of the impact drove him into the seat faster than expected and he sprained his wrist and has some back pain. He heard a lot of painful screaming from the deck below

after the accident. He witnessed a tugboat coming alongside and trying to assist and help the ferry back to its dock. He was told to move back to the other end of the boat by a crewmember on the saloon deck. This passenger remembers seeing the fire and rescue people on the dock waiting for the ferry to come in. As soon as they docked and the ramps came down they were allowed to disembark.

A 23-year-old female was standing on the saloon deck horseshoe as the vessel approached Staten Island. She sought medical treatment for pain in her left side and a bruised hip, which occurred when the ferry struck the pier. The woman was outside the main doors and realized they were coming in to fast along with some other passengers that were standing next to her. She states she rides the ferry about two to three times a week and is a student. They all thought the vessel would stop in time until they realized that it was now too late and there would be a collision. She remembers police officers telling everyone to move back after the accident and a plainclothes detective assisted (actually carried) her to another area of the vessel. She also states not hearing any warning by announcement or bells of any kind.

A 45-year-old male was riding on the main deck because his car was parked in the Staten Island lot and it was easy for him to get to from the main deck ramp. He was sitting on the New Jersey side about amidships when the impact occurred. As he was running away from the debris he fell as he was jumping over seats and hurt his neck, back, knees and has a constant headache. He remembers hearing announcements directing them to the back of the boat but estimates it was about 30 minutes after the accident. He received assistance from a crewmember, ship's officer and a uniformed policewoman aboard. He remembers another crewmember just walking around as if in shock. He states that the Fire/Rescue, EMS personnel and cops did a great job. Only one complaint this passenger had was that he had to wait for a stretcher.

A 62-year-old male who rides the ferry everyday was sitting on the lower level on the New Jersey side within four rows of the front and realized they were past where they were supposed to dock but felt they must be doing something else. He saw people that were already up front start running back towards him and he felt this was his que to start running also. He got up to start running because now he felt something was wrong but the debris caught up to him and he was knocked down. He thinks a crewmember might have been helping him moving debris. He feels given the extent of the accident that he was tended to in a timely manner.

A 57-year-old male who has been riding the ferry for 25 years was sitting on the lower lever towards the front. He started running when he saw the other passengers running. He remembers hearing no announcements or bells or whistles, but feels the ferry increased its speed just prior to impact. The debris field caught up to him and that is how he injured his ankle. He states he received no assistance from crewmembers just the FDNY.

A 43-year-old female who rides the ferry everyday who lost both legs in the accident had been seated on the saloon deck but had gotten up to prepare for departing the vessel. She was down by the lower doors and could tell by the speed and location and not hearing any arrival announcements that something was wrong so she started running back up the main stairway. The next thing she remembers is four police officers tending to her on the ferry and with her in the ambulance to the hospital. She can't recall seeing any crewmembers before or after the accident. But she does think she was gotten off the ferry and to the hospital in a timely manner. During the interview this passengers' husband was at her bedside and was in the parking lot when the ferry struck. One of his statements was acknowledging the confusion at the onset of the incident in relation to information about his wife's predicament or location. He

understands the complications regarding notification but still wanted it known that waiting on information on an injured loved one is tough and very hard not knowing for hours.

A 24-year-old woman was taking the ferry for sightseeing purposes and the New Jersey side had been recommended for viewing the Statue of Liberty. After the allision she made her way down to the main deck via the New York end staircase and continued to walk towards the Staten Island end. She witnessed the wreckage and some of the deceased and noticed one of the injured motioning to her. The injured passenger had lost both legs and was asking for help. She assisted as best she could as a trained nurse. She used a belt from a mate on board to provide the injured passenger with a tourniquet and made him as comfortable as possible with a lifejacket and continued to reassure him as best she could. She called for oxygen to be administered as soon as the Fire/Rescue personnel boarded and she rode with him to the hospital. One of her strongest recommendations was the need for oxygen to be carried aboard and that there was a lack of any substantial medical supplies.

A male passenger of about 45-50 was on the lower deck Brooklyn side at the time of impact. He rides the ferry daily, but mostly just the Manhattan to Staten Island run. He and another passenger were standing by the forward doors and realized the impact was going to occur and yelled for everyone to move. He thinks that some of the deceased might have been sleeping on the benches and did not hear his warning shouts. As the ferry impacted the pier he crouched down in a fetal position behind a bulkhead. After movement stopped he got up covered in debris and dust and looked about the damage. After the accident it bothered him that there were no horns or whistles alerting anyone. He comments that the police, fire and emergency response was incredible but he remembers almost no response from the deckhands. He feels through technology there should be a better way of keeping track of how many passengers are aboard the ferry.

3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE:

2
3
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Immediately after the allision the crew of the Andrew J. Barberi reacted to the damage and injured passengers around them. The damaged vessel took 23 minutes after impacting the pier to reach its intended berth at slip number 5 where Emergency Responders were awaiting it's arrival. The crew reacted to the allision on a visual basis. There were no alarms, no whistles no PA announcements or instructions over the walkie talkies. The crew was consistent in stating that no direction or instructions as to how to proceed after the accident occurred were given over the vessels PA system. The crew reacted to what they saw before them or where they were otherwise instructed by superiors only when face to face. Captain: At the time of the allision the Captain's exact whereabouts were unknown until the time that he entered the Staten Island pilothouse. The Captain took over the controls from the Assistant Captain shortly after the AC had already begun slowing or stopping the vessel after impact. The Captain then instructed the Senior Mate (Mate No. 1) who had been sitting on the bridge settee at the time of impact to go below and assess the situation. Then the Captain commenced to transfer propulsion control with the Chief Engineer's assistance to the New York pilothouse. The Captain docked the ferry in slip Number 5 at the Staten Island Ferry terminal. Assistant Captain (Pilot): The Asst. Captain was at the controls of the A.J. Barberi when the vessel struck the construction pier. The Senior Mate was on the bridge and witnessed the Asst. Captain manipulating the propulsion controls in reverse or to go astern. Shortly thereafter the Captain came in from the port side door on the hurricane

3.1 Andrew J. Barberi, Summary of Crew Interviews:

deck and took over from the Asst. Captain. Varying accounts of crew testimony have

- 1 the Asst. Captain standing outside the Staten Island pilothouse. The Asst. Captain
- 2 made his way ashore after the vessel docked. He was met on the dock by the SI Ferry
- 3 Port Captain, who tried to stop him but was unable to do so. Two co-workers who were
- 4 sent by the Port Captain later found him at his home.
- 5 **Senior Mate (Mate No.1):** Was on the bridge settee of the Staten Island pilothouse
- 6 when the vessel struck the pier. Once the Captain arrived on the bridge he instructed
- 7 the mate to go below and assess the situation. He came out the pilothouse door on the
- 8 bridge deck and saw passengers in a panic and wanting to know what was going on. He
- 9 tried to assure the passengers that everything was okay as he made his way to the New
- 10 York end and then down the stairs. Saw the destruction on the main deck and the
- injured and started helping whoever he could. He used his belt and made jury-rigged
- 12 tourniquets out of the straps from lifejackets. Helped secure the ferry to its dock and
- then directed EMS to the most critically injured. He then directed the deckhands to get
- 14 everyone that was not involved or too injured up to the next deck so the rescue units
- would have room to work. When the senior mate arrived on the main deck he witnessed
- 16 two deckhands assisting the injured. As he triaged the victims he sent one deckhand to
- 17 retrieve a defibrillator and then later went himself and retrieved a defibrillator from the
- 18 New York end locker. At one point he attempted to get in touch with the pilothouse via
- 19 his walkie-talkie and then later via the shipboard phone at the New York end. No
- 20 indication of a response from either attempt. For the remainder of the accident the
- 21 senior mate directed the rescue personnel to the injured and assisted the injured as he
- 22 could.
- Junior Mate (Mate No. 2): The Junior Mate was making his way up the Brooklyn side
- of the vessel heading for the Staten Island end when the vessel struck the pier. He
- estimates that he was about 15' away from the doors when the allision occurred.
- 26 Estimates about 15 seconds for the length of the event. Ran over to the Jersey side of

where all the damage was and started assisting where he could. Witnessed many injured and deceased with body parts lying on deck. A couple of non-uniformed police, one off duty fireman, an EMT and a nurse all presented themselves to the Junior Mate and asked if and what they could do to help. The Junior Mate called over to a couple of the deckhands and had them gather up passengers that could walk and direct them up to the saloon deck or aft towards the New York end. The area looked very unsafe and unstable to him and he wanted as many passengers out of the area as possible. The overhead gave him cause for concern due to the lack of vertical support. At this point the Junior Mate saw a tug coming and motioned or directed other deckhands and an offduty DOT SI Ferry Mate to assist, whereby he turned his attention back to helping passengers. He then ran down to the engine room and asked why the vessel wasn't moving and he was told by the Chief Engineer that "he didn't know, he had no communication with the pilot house." The Junior Mate then gave the Chief his radio and told them its on channel three. He than ran up to the Staten Island pilot house and informed the Captain that the engine room had his radio and told him what channel they were monitoring. After asking the Captain if he needed any help he went back down below to assist with the injured. He witnessed the Senior Mate and a nurse applying a tourniquet to an injured passenger who had lost both legs. By this time in his estimation the ferry was pulling into its slip and he saw some of the deckhands hooking it up. On the dock waiting were "hundreds and hundreds, of EMT's, cops, firemen." He singled out a fireman who he thought was an officer by his white hat and showed him that the deck need to be secured and shored up since it was not supported. As more and more rescue workers came aboard the Junior Mate turned his attentions back to his vessel duties and was asked by detectives to be taken up to the pilot house to see the Captain. **Deckhand No. 1:** The deckhand was making his way down to the bathroom outside the engine room below the main deck level. After he feels the crash he comes back up to

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

- 1 the main deck just in time to see the pier tearing through the side of the vessel. He runs
- 2 up to the bridge deck and starts telling everyone to put on lifejackets. At this point he
- 3 realizes that since the damage was down on the main deck that the saloon deck might
- 4 fall down so he starts telling everyone on the saloon deck to get from the Jersey side
- 5 over to the Brooklyn side. From here Deckhand No. 1 ran up to towards the Staten
- 6 Island pilothouse to inform them but saw the Asst. Capt come out and probable witness
- 7 the decapitated victim. It was at this point that a NY city police officer made himself
- 8 available to the deckhand and asked if he could help. He instructed the officer to keep
- 9 people from going down there. Deckhand No. 1 then tried to assist the passengers
- 10 further but upon returning to the scene and witnessing some deceased victims and body
- 11 parts he admittedly said he was not much good anymore.
- 12 **Deckhand No. 2:** Deckhand No. 2 was at his station on the Saloon Deck, Staten Island
- end, Brooklyn side. After the impact he helped keep passengers away from that end
- 14 and ushered them back to the New York end. He assisted the Junior Mate in attending
- to injured passengers.
- 16 **Deckhand No. 3:** Had moments before left his station as lookout to prepare for docking.
- 17 He was untying a broken door in preparation for disembarking passengers when he
- 18 realized they were not heading for the slips and not slowing down. At this point the
- 19 Deckhand started yelling and waving to passengers to move back. He realized that if
- 20 the vessel even tried to slow or reverse at this point they would still hit. During the
- 21 course of the impact and then after the allision up until docking his main concern was
- just keeping passengers from going down the damaged stairwell and moving them back
- 23 to the New York end.
- 24 **Deckhand No. 4:** Deckhand No. 4 was at his workstation cleaning the men's room.
- 25 Carried a radio, but no bridge communication to him. He called out for the NYPD
- officers and then ran up to the Staten Island pilothouse twice during the course of the

- 1 accident. Additionally he made one trip down to the engine room. And he also used a
- 2 cell phone to call his mother and let her know he was all right. All of this was post
- 3 accident but prior to docking. Deckhand No. 4 admits to not knowing his emergency
- 4 station.
- 5 **Deckhand No. 5:** Deckhand No. 5 was at his workstation on the Main deck on the New
- 6 York end when the allision occurred. He ran up to the Staten Island pilothouse to see
- 7 what the Captain would want him to do. He relates that the Captain was having trouble
- 8 with the power and asked him to go down to the Engine Room and let the Chief know.
- 9 After that everything was just a blur to him.
- 10 **Deckhand No. 6:** Deckhand No. 6 had been trying to keep the doors closed. They had
- 11 continued to be blown open by the strong winds the ferry was encountering that day.
- 12 After several attempts he decided to sit down on the Main Deck, Brooklyn Side on the
- 13 Staten Island end, which is where he was when the impact occurred. He started helping
- passengers as soon as he encountered them after the crash. At the direction of the
- 15 senior mate he ran to retrieve a defibrillator, (AED, automated external defibrillator).
- 16 Deckhand No. 6 remained on the main deck and assisted passengers where possible
- and then hooked up the vessel when it docked.
- 18 **Deckhand No. 7:** Deckhand No. 7 was working in the lifejacket locker on the bridge
- deck by the snack bar when the allision occurred. He made his way forward toward the
- 20 Staten Island end of the vessel. He saw other deckhand's motioning/directing people
- 21 away from the SI end towards the other end of the boat so he proceeded to do the
- 22 same. He had not yet witnessed any damage. He was standing outside on the forward
- 23 end of the saloon deck and was directed by the Captain who yelled out the window to
- 24 get the Engineer. As he started to do so he noticed the Engineer was already on his
- 25 way up. He continued to move people back on the Saloon deck to the New York end

and then went down to assist on the main deck and helped move benches and debris
out of the way and people back to the NY end of the main deck.

Additional Information:

5

6

At the time of the accident the NYC Department of Transportation had a program in

7 place for vessel employees to receive training in the use of AED's (Automated External

8 Defibrillators). The DOT did not have any training programs for its crew in medical

9 response or first aid training.

10 There were 4 AED units aboard the Andrew J. Barberi: Their locations were in the New

York Pilothouse, Staten Island Pilothouse, Saloon deck Staten Island end, and Main

12 deck New York end.

13 There were First Aid kits in the New York Pilothouse, Staten Island Pilothouse and

14 Machinery Space Control Room.

15

11

3.2 FIRE DEPARTMENT NEW YORK/EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE:

17 18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

16

The Fire Department of New York and it's affiliate Emergency Medical Service (On March 17, 1996, the New York City Fire Department became not only the primary provider of pre-hospital emergency care in the five boroughs, but the largest fire department-based EMS in the country). The FDNY received their first 911 call at 1522 hrs. At 1526 an ALS (Advanced Life Support) ambulance BLS (Basic Life Support) ambulance were dispatched. As additional information was received indicating multiple injuries and a report of one fatality additional units were dispatched. The first EMS unit arrived on scene at 1529. At the time the ferry docked at 1543 there were two BLS units, one ALS ambulance and 1 EMS supervisor ready to board. Units from the FDNY

at the time the Ferry docked consisted of four engine companies, three ladder companies and two Battalion Chiefs. Also the FDNY Fire Boat which had been dispatched at the on set of the alarms, due to a false report of an explosion aboard, followed the ferry to the terminal and tied up in an adjacent slip. Firefighters boarded the Andrew J. Barberi from both levels and conducted a search for victims while performing an assessment of conditions. As the severity of the incident was assessed and this information was relayed to the incident commander he transmitted additional alarms, which brought more and more FDNY/EMS assets to the scene. The total fire/rescue response to this incident was two staff chiefs, three deputy chiefs, sixteen battalion chiefs, sixteen engine companies, ten ladder companies, three rescue companies, two fireboats, a squad company, a tactical support unit, a hose wagon, a fireground rehabilitation unit, a field communications unit, a technical response unit, and a collapse rescue unit. Responding fire/rescue personnel totaled 213. EMS totals for responding units number 59 personnel staffing 9 ALS ambulances, 15 BLS ambulances, and 2 LSU's (logistical support units). The FDNY submitted their standard operating procedures for responding to an incident at the Staten Island Ferry Terminal and also submitted their MCI (Multiple Casualty Incidents) procedures. In interviews they stated that they routinely make runs down to the Ferry Terminal with their vehicles and equipment. They also stated that there was no combined training with Ferry crews or DOT personnel.

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

3.3 NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

The New York Police Department received their first 911call at approximately 1520 hrs. Since terrorist activities of 9/11 two police officers have been assigned to ride each ferry. At the time of impact the assigned officers were up on the bridge deck and first noticed a commotion towards the Staten Island end. As they made their way to what they

perceived was an altercation they witnessed one of the deckhands assigned to that level yelling for everyone to get back that they were going to hit. After impact the two officers continued to move people back on the bridge deck toward the New York end. After ushering people on the bridge deck away the officers went below to see what happened and assess damage. They found the main stairway ripped away and extensive damage wherever they looked. Numerous deceased were visible and other severely injured passengers were strewn about the wreckage. Both officers attempted to assist the injured as best they could with the training they had and the limited first aid equipment aboard.

A summary of the additional responding units can be described by the following. After responding to the initial 911 call units from the 120 precinct continued to arrive as the severity of the accident was realized. Through the course of the accident and rescue effort over 311 NYPD personnel assisted in some manner during the afternoon and evening of October 15, 2003. A breakdown of these personnel is as follows 12 Lieutenants, 33 Sergeants, 216 Police Officers and Detectives and 50 Traffic Enforcement Agents. Responding units consisted of Aviation, SCUBA, Highway, Emergency Service Units and K-9. Actions taken by NYPD personnel included assisting with injured and taking witness statements, interviewing crew members and passengers, shoring-up damaged deck areas to extricate injured, crowd control, traffic control, formed a protected area around ferry terminal from the harbor and dive operations at damaged pier for possible victims. A Family Bereavement center was established under the authority of Executive Officer Patrol Borough Staten Island at the Office of the Staten Island Borough President.

2

3.4 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES, NEW YORK

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

4 At about 1525, the USCG Division Chief in charge of Marine Safety Operations (MSO)

5 received a call from Staten Island Ferry Port Captain that they had a pretty hard whack

at the St. George Terminal. He went to inform the USCG Activities New York

Commander (i.e. Commanding Officer) of this situation and start mobilizing some of the

Coast Guard investigators as calls continued to be received by the Coast Guard. While

arriving at the Terminal the Division Chief MSO receives another phone call from the SI

Ferry Port Captain indicated multiple DOA's. At 1535 USCG dispatches two Forty-one

foot patrol boats to the scene and they arrive at 1537. The Division Chief assesses the

scene once he boards and realizes the FDNY/EMS and NYPD are responding in

number to the accident and injured. The Division Chief MSO then sends his personnel

to insure the integrity of the hull, machinery spaces and topside areas of the ferry, to

document the damage and collect any physical evidence and to start conducting

interviews. At 1553 a 250 yard security zone was set around the Ferry docks (racks)

and shortly thereafter at 1559 the USCG Activities Commander directs the Staten Island

Ferry system to cease operations until further notice. At 1700 that evening the Coast

Guard had 6 of their vessels on scene. 3 - 41 patrol boats, 1 - 65 vessel, 1 - 87

vessel and 1 – 27' vessel. In addition to the vessels listed above a breakdown of Coast

Guard personnel responding to this incident is as follows, 15 Officers, 6 enlisted

personnel and 4 CGIS (Coast Guard Investigative Service) agents.

23

24

4. EVACUATION OF PASSENGERS

1 Most of the passengers were on the saloon deck during the transit from Manhattan and 2 the subsequent allision. The primary boarding area from the Whitehall terminal is 3 through the ferry building, out the doors, across the embarkation bridges on to the ferry 4 and then into the saloon deck. A majority of those aboard also exit onto Staten Island 5 from this same deck. This is the quickest egress from the vessel to public transportation 6 including buses, trains and waiting taxi's. A much smaller number of passengers make 7 their way down to the main deck for easy disembarkation to their parked cars or to be 8 picked-up by a car. 9 When the Andrew J. Barberi struck the pier no one on the main deck heard or was given 10 any warning. First indication to passengers and crew that something was wrong was the 11 sound/feel of the collision and the debris field that started making it's way from the 12 Staten Island/Jersey end of the vessel to the New York end as the ferry's momentum 13 continued to push the vessel into the south corner of the pier. On the New Jersey side 14 of the vessel those passengers that could, ran to the New York end, some surviving but 15 severely injured passengers actually rode or were pushed along with the debris field 16 from the Staten Island end to almost the midpoint of the vessel until they were deposited 17 where they lay. Others were killed on impact or overtaken by the debris as it pushed its 18 way through almost half the width of the ferry and to approximately 210' of the ferry's 19 length. At the onset of the collision many passengers on all three levels ran aft or 20 towards the New York end. Shortly after impact passengers were ushered by Barberi 21 crewmembers and uniformed police officers to the New York end. This was done to 22 keep passengers off the unsupported saloon deck on the New Jersey side Staten Island 23 end to move them away from the damage and injured passengers that needed 24 assistance. As the Andrew J. Barberi turned around now and headed into the Staten 25 Island terminal New York end first it became more apparent to the crew that this would 26 be the easiest way for the uninjured passengers to disembark the ferry and for rescue

- 1 personnel to board. Once the Andrew J. Barberi was in the slip the majority of
- 2 passengers left the vessel from the bridge aprons on the saloon deck. Some accounts
- 3 have a few passengers leaving from the main deck on the lower level into the Staten

4 Island Ferry terminal.
