

Appendix F

Interview Transcript, Captain Bill Bugg

Survival Factors Group Chairman's Factual Report

Metrolink train 111  
Union Pacific train LOF 65-12  
Los Angeles, California  
September 12, 2008  
DCA-08-MR-009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

\* \* \* \* \*  
Investigation of: \*  
\*  
HEAD-ON COLLISION OF A METROLINK \*  
COMMUTER TRAIN WITH A UNION \*  
PACIFIC FREIGHT TRAIN, \*  
September 12, 2008 \*  
Los Angeles, California \*  
\*  
\* \* \* \* \*

\* Docket No.: DCA-08-MR-009

Interview of: CAPT. BILL BUGG

Los Angeles, California

Tuesday,  
September 16, 2008

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to  
notice.

BEFORE: DANA SANZO

## APPEARANCES:

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Washington, D.C.  
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Los Angeles Fire Department  
Liaison with Metro Rail

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California Public Utilities Commission  
Railroad Operations Safety Branch

SGT. NINA SUTTER  
Sheriff's Department  
County of Los Angeles

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I N T E R V I E W

1  
2 MS. SANZO: My name is Dana Sanzo. I'm an  
3 Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board, and  
4 we're conducting an interview for Accident Number DCA-08-MR-  
5 009, the collision of Metrolink train and UP train in Los  
6 Angeles, California.

7 If we could start by going around the table and if  
8 everybody could state their names and their organizations  
9 they're with.

10 MR. BUGG: Bill Bugg, Captain with the Los Angeles  
11 City Fire Department.

12 MR. TAPIA: My name is Carlos Tapia. I'm the Motor  
13 Power and Equipment Inspector with the California Public  
14 Utilities Commissions.

15 CHIEF QUINTANAR: My name is John Quintanar. I'm  
16 Battalion Chief assigned to Metro Rail, LA Fire Department.  
17 I'm assigned to assist with the investigation with NTSB.

18 MR. OJEDA: Jesus Ojeda, Metrolink Safety and  
19 Security Division, also assisting with the NTSB's investigation  
20 process.

21 SGT. SUTTER: Nina Sutter, Sergeant with LA County  
22 Sheriff's Department, currently assigned to Metrolink Bureau.

## INTERVIEW OF CAPT. BILL BUGG

23  
24 BY MS. SANZO:

25 Q. Okay. You can just start with when you were notified

1 about the accident and if you can just take us through that  
2 afternoon.

3 A. Well, we were dispatched at approximately 14:31, I  
4 believe it was. We responded in and responded -- we didn't  
5 respond to the actual address that came out. We responded to  
6 the north side of the tracks. We were the first unit on scene,  
7 followed up by Task Force 87. EMS 15 was right behind us. As  
8 we approached on scene, we noticed that two locomotives were on  
9 fire. We have several patients trapped in the number 1 car  
10 right behind the locomotive, and right off the bat, we noticed  
11 four to five fatalities that I saw right -- immediately. We  
12 were assigned to the extrication group, which basically meant  
13 we were going to go in and start extracting some of the  
14 patients out of the car. In the process of that, a couple of  
15 the members started doing fire suppression and pulled some  
16 lines and were starting to put the fire out on the locomotives.  
17 One of the members had heard, they thought they heard some  
18 pounding on the -- coming from the locomotive, and when they  
19 approached it, they noticed there was somebody inside. So  
20 myself and another fireman, Jesse Franco (ph.), Ken Konaval  
21 (ph.) was another fireman, and Captain Denise Jones, she was on  
22 the hand line keeping the fire knocked down while they got an  
23 ax and started breaking the front windshield out. It took a  
24 few minutes to get it broken out because it was very thick and  
25 I guess it's bulletproof glass. So we worked on that, and we

1 finally were able to get the window out. The first gentleman  
2 that came out, I don't know if he was the engineer or  
3 conductor, he came out. He had some pretty severe injuries. I  
4 assisted him over to a care area. The other gentleman that was  
5 in the car, he was not able to get out. So the two  
6 firefighters had gone in and carried him out of the train and  
7 brought him over to the care area. Once we got them taken care  
8 of, we kind of moved over and our focus was on that -- the  
9 first passenger car with the -- with most of the damage. It  
10 was -- at a glance, we had probably six people in, I guess it  
11 would be the right side of the train. It was rolled over on  
12 the right side, and we had an upper and lower. So we had six  
13 people that were alive but were entangled in the car. So we  
14 went to work with the jaws, trying to spread and get them freed  
15 up so we could get them out. We laddered that same car, and we  
16 had a crew that went up on the top part, which was actually the  
17 left side of the car, and started extracting patients from the  
18 top part of the car. Altogether we probably, gosh, I don't  
19 know, took probably 8 to 10 people out that were alive at that  
20 point. We had a few fatalities that we had to remove to access  
21 some of the patients that were still alive. We worked for  
22 probably three hours non-stop there, and we were getting people  
23 out of the train and then transporting them over to the care  
24 area. We didn't get involved too much in the transportation  
25 from the actual crash site to the care areas where they were

1 doing the triaging. We worked for about three to four hours,  
2 and then they pulled us off. They send us for rehab, and at  
3 that point, most of or all of the patients that had survived  
4 had been taken out, and at that point, it just became body  
5 recovery. We were reassigned to body recovery and then worked  
6 on and off there until about 2:00 in the morning, just trying  
7 to extricate some of the victims that were still in the train.

8 Q. And if I can go back a little bit. Can you describe  
9 the fire and smoke conditions when you first arrived on scene?

10 A. It was pretty -- mainly the two locomotives were the  
11 bulk of the fire, but being that the one locomotive, the  
12 Metrolink, had been pushed back into the other car, it was kind  
13 of exposing that car that had patients in it, too. So -- and  
14 we were just working on the north side because we couldn't  
15 really get around the way the train was. 96 I believe was the  
16 other company that was first dispatched. They came from the  
17 south side, and they were fighting fire on the other side of  
18 the train. So we kind of were hitting it from both sides. We  
19 got it knocked down, and then we just had lines out in case it  
20 flashed back on us because we had a lot of fuel. I mean, I  
21 think they hold about 2,000 gallons of fuel, and there was a  
22 lot of fuel all over running. We were walking through fuel,  
23 and we were trying to get patients out and so --

24 Q. And how about any smoke conditions you might have  
25 observed in the freight locomotive?



1           A.    Once we got the window out, there was a lot of smoke  
2   in there.  In fact, we started cutting the window and hollered  
3   in there and then we couldn't -- nobody was responding.  So we  
4   kept working, and we finally, we got it open enough and we  
5   hollered in, and we were asking the one gentleman to try and  
6   kick it out from the inside, and he was kicking on it, but it  
7   wasn't, it wasn't working.  And we were able to finally get the  
8   rubber strip around the window, a hold of that, and peel that  
9   off and pop the whole window out, and when we did get in, there  
10  was a lot of smoke inside that car, inside the front of the  
11  locomotive.  We also, like I was saying, we tried -- there was  
12  a dome on top of that car that we thought was like a skylight,  
13  and one of the members was trying to cut that with a saw to  
14  access into it, but it turned out that didn't actually go into  
15  the car.  We never did figure out what that did.  It was -- we  
16  figured some antennas or GPS stuff might have been located in  
17  there.

18           MS. SANZO:  Well, I'll take a pause and we can go  
19  around the table and -- for the group to ask follow-up  
20  questions if they'd like.

21           BY MR. TAPIA:

22           Q.    Any comments on the equipment that you were using to,  
23  to separate or cut off steel to get to the patients?  Any  
24  problems with that?

25           A.    Some of the stuff that cut, some of the steels and

1 the metals in the train, it just -- it had a difficult time  
2 cutting it. We ended up using saws to cut through some of the  
3 metal rather than the shears. We have shears that will cut  
4 through metal, but it -- some of it was so hard, it wouldn't  
5 cut it. And we had spreaders that push, but it seemed like the  
6 metal in that train had such a high strength and a memory that  
7 we would stretch, push it out of the way, and as soon as we'd  
8 retract the spreader, it would come right back about halfway.  
9 It was a lot of memory in the metal.

10 Q. So the saws that you used, they worked okay?

11 A. The saws, we used rotary saws, and we used jig -- not  
12 jigsaws. Like a sawzall saws that we carry. They're called  
13 tiger saws. They actually cut through some of the aluminum  
14 pretty, pretty easily. The steel they don't cut through. Some  
15 of the steel in those cars was just -- on the locomotive, when  
16 the locomotive went in, there was a lot of heavy steel on that  
17 locomotive that just -- none of our stuff really would cut it.  
18 And we had so much fuel around, we were a little hesitant to  
19 use torches or anything like that --

20 Q. Sure.

21 A. -- because of the fuel.

22 Q. Okay. Thanks.

23 CHIEF QUINTANAR: A couple of questions.

24 BY CHIEF QUINTANAR:

25 Q. After you arrived on scene, estimating your knockdown

1 time, what would you say on that?

2 A. Probably in the first 10 minutes, we had it knocked  
3 down.

4 Q. And I know we're all EMTs and so forth, but can you  
5 describe the injuries to the engineer and/or conductor?

6 A. The first gentleman that came out had a large  
7 avulsion on his back, which there was a large chunk of skin out  
8 of his back, and he asked me, he said, he said his back was  
9 hurting very badly, and he asked me how bad it was, and I said,  
10 well, you've got a -- I didn't really want to tell him how --  
11 it wasn't a pretty sight, but he was obviously able to walk out  
12 of there with some assistance. So the other gentleman didn't  
13 say anything. He was just kind of -- they were both kind of in  
14 a daze and disoriented and, you know, we guided them out of  
15 there. The other gentleman, like I said, I didn't see any  
16 physical injuries on him, but I imagine he had some pretty  
17 traumatic injuries from -- internal injuries, and he wasn't  
18 able to move. He was non-ambulatory. So we had to carry him  
19 out of there. The two firemen that were actually breaking the  
20 window went in, in the smoke, and I remember one of them said  
21 the smoke was so bad that he put his hood up over his nose  
22 because the smoke was pretty heavy.

23 Q. Uh-huh. Did they sustain any inhalation injury to  
24 the best of your knowledge?

25 A. Not that they were complaining about. They were not

1 in there probably for more than 45 seconds to a minute. They  
2 went in, they got him, and they pulled him right out.

3 Q. Uh-huh. Did you see a third person?

4 A. I did not see any -- well, not inside the locomotive.  
5 There was the engineer from the Metrolink that when we came up  
6 was underneath. The train was on top of him, and he was  
7 obviously deceased. He was laying on his back, arms up, and he  
8 was trapped I'd say waist down.

9 Q. Uh-huh. But you didn't see any third person from the  
10 freight?

11 A. No.

12 Q. And I think you answered this, but I'll just go over  
13 it. Did any of those two individuals on that freight,  
14 engineer/conductor, did they receive any burns or any --

15 A. I did not see any burns on them.

16 Q. Okay. So that the fire did not --

17 A. The fire was pretty much on the outside of the car,  
18 and I think because the metal and everything, they did get  
19 smoke in there. There was a lot of smoke, but I don't think  
20 the fire -- we never took the line inside the car and put any  
21 fire out. It was all exterior.

22 Q. Were you aware of any victim thrown from the train  
23 and was treated by the fire department or first responders?

24 A. I heard that somebody was either thrown or jumped,  
25 but I never saw anybody or talked to anybody that treated them.

1 Q. Uh-huh. And other than what you just said, did you  
2 hear any more information on the person? Was he -- I'm  
3 assuming he was from the Metrolink car. He wasn't --

4 A. That I don't know. I -- some -- we never -- there  
5 was, there was so much going on in such a short period of time,  
6 that we kind of got -- we'd get on one task, finish that one,  
7 and there was another one right there that we would jump on.  
8 So we were kind of confined in that area of the two locomotives  
9 on the north side and that first car.

10 Q. We heard from witnesses that stated that you received  
11 a lot of assistance from law personnel, both Sheriff and LAPD.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you describe that at all?

14 A. Yeah, they were actually a lot of help because what  
15 happened was we were getting these patients out, and we wanted  
16 to move them away from the crash site, but we were short of  
17 medical equipment, backboards, stretchers, gurneys, disaster  
18 litters, and our rescue had come with us but they had left it  
19 back a ways. So I grabbed one of the guys, and I said, go get  
20 the rescue and bring it up here so we can get the equipment off  
21 of it, and we stripped it of all the backboards and stretchers,  
22 and I came -- I run out, grabbed them, and I talked to EMS 15  
23 and told them we need people to transport patients and we need  
24 backboards and we need equipment up there because at that  
25 point, it seemed like it took a little bit. It's probably not

1 as long as it seemed to get that stuff, but I grabbed  
2 everything we had on rescue 87 and took it up there, and there  
3 was several police officers and sheriffs there. I think there  
4 was the sheriffs from the helicopter had showed up and he had  
5 come up. In fact, one of the gals that was very critical,  
6 myself, one of the sheriffs and one of my paramedics, we got  
7 her on a backboard and got her to care area. She was -- I  
8 didn't think she was going to make it. She was very, very  
9 critical. But I had taken the backboards and got up on -- by  
10 the tracks there, and we had several patients still sitting up  
11 there, and asked the police officers and sheriffs if they could  
12 get them on these boards and start moving them to the triage  
13 area so we could get these patients, you know, going through  
14 the system and get them transported.

15 Q. So you would, you would remove the patient, the rider  
16 from the car itself, the affected car, turn them over to a law  
17 enforcement personnel. Would he take them to the triage area,  
18 that grassy area --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- or would he take them directly to the helicopter?

21 A. No, they were taking them to the triage area.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. And we had initially set out a salvage cover right  
24 there where we were placing people, but there was really no --  
25 there was no care. We didn't have the time to be treating

1 these patients because we had several patients that we had to  
2 get out of the car, and what we needed was people to get them  
3 from there to the care, the triage area.

4 Q. So you were triaging -- the term triaging, you were  
5 actually triaging.

6 A. We were because we had -- I was kind of roaming  
7 around and we would -- I was helping get -- in the beginning  
8 stages, we were actually lifting these people down from what  
9 was the left side of the train, which was actually the top when  
10 it rolled over, and we were kind of handing them down the  
11 ladders and carrying them over and putting them on the salvage  
12 cover, and a couple of them -- one -- the first person we took  
13 out, he passed away within minutes of us getting him there on  
14 the tarp, and then we had a couple of others that came out that  
15 were, I mean they were real critical, and I said if we don't  
16 get them out of here, they're not going to make it. So we just  
17 grabbed them, put on boards and got them out of there, but we  
18 didn't really have the time to get some of the other people,  
19 you know, with fractures, and they had to sit until we could  
20 get the police and stuff to start moving them.

21 Q. We heard that there was a morgue established to the  
22 south, I guess you might say. I guess when you ran across a  
23 dead person, then transferred it to the Sheriff's Department to  
24 the morgue.

25 A. Right. Yeah, they set up a morgue on the south side

1 right at the tracks there, but we actually had a couple of  
2 fatalities that we had moved out of the train that had passed  
3 away that were on the north side, and we eventually, when we  
4 got a little more -- we had some time, we transferred those  
5 patients over to the other side where the morgue was.

6 CHIEF QUINTANAR: That's all I have.

7 BY MR. OJEDA:

8 Q. When you arrived at the scene, were the locomotives  
9 still running?

10 A. No. That was one thing that I noticed. They were  
11 not running, and I don't know if -- the Metrolink, that  
12 engineer, he was crushed -- I assumed he was the engineer  
13 because he was right at where the engineer would be sitting,  
14 and it was kind of a window, it looked like he came out the  
15 window.

16 Q. Uh-huh.

17 A. The other two gentlemen, I thought they might have  
18 shut the train down. One of my firemen had got up on the top  
19 and found the electrical shutdown and flipped that breaker to  
20 cut the power off because we've had a little bit of training  
21 with getting the power shut down before we start working on  
22 them because there's some high voltage issues. So he had got  
23 up on top and was able to shut the power down to the freight  
24 train. But the other one was already shut off. I don't know  
25 if there's -- if they shut off, if they have something remotely



1 or --

2 Q. No. Someone else shut them off.

3 A. I don't know -- the Metrolink, the front of that car  
4 was so damaged, and I mean can they do it from the back of the  
5 train?

6 Q. No. They can do it from different ways. Each side  
7 of the locomotives and the inside of the cab where the engineer  
8 sits.

9 A. Right.

10 Q. And then you can also do it from inside the engineer  
11 compartment.

12 A. Right. But see that -- it was rolled over on its  
13 side. So the left side was up in the air. Unless somebody got  
14 up on top and did it from the other side. They may have. I  
15 don't know.

16 Q. Okay. So at that time the locomotives were off and  
17 you guys were not worried about the -- like you said, the high  
18 voltage going through.

19 A. Right. We did think about that later when we were  
20 extracting patients and cutting because there was so much metal  
21 and things, you know, the question was raised did somebody get  
22 the power shut off, but that car was so entangled with the  
23 first passenger car, that it was almost impossible to figure  
24 out what was what.

25 Q. Okay.

1           A.    I mean, part of the trucks were -- I think when the  
2 locomotive, it rolled over on the side, and then went in, part  
3 of those trucks were out high, I mean pushed into the car and,  
4 you know, we were just trying to figure out what was what.  
5 There was some stainless steel lines that looked like they  
6 might either be airlines or have electric line in them. They  
7 were twisted up, and we didn't want to cut them because we  
8 didn't know if they were high voltage.

9           Q.    You had been the first engine to arrive. Who made  
10 the notifications to stop the railroad, to shut down all  
11 trains?

12          A.    Actually the first engine to arrive was 96s. They  
13 arrived on the south side. They were first on scene, but it  
14 took them probably three to four minutes to get actually to the  
15 crash site from where they were. The first address that came  
16 in was on the south side where those homes were, but they had  
17 to go up through those lots and cut a fence and then get a  
18 ladder down through a gully and then come back up. So we kind  
19 of met them about -- we were at the site at about the same  
20 time. They were coming in from the south and we were on the  
21 north side. But I don't know, I assume that the IC had taken  
22 care of that but there was, there was a lot of chatter on the  
23 first -- we had one tactical channel and communications were a  
24 little bit of an issue right in the beginning until they  
25 started breaking it up into groups and putting people on

1 different TAC channels. I know when I came in, once I made  
2 access, I got on the radio and said, you know, the best access  
3 is from the north off of Canoga and Rinaldi because we could  
4 drive right up to the incident. I don't even know if that got  
5 out because there was so much traffic, but I know some people  
6 heard me because they started coming in that way.

7 Q. And I have one last question. Were your guys able to  
8 work on the two cars that were upright, and if they did, did  
9 they have any difficulties opening the doors or the windows?

10 A. I remember the doors were open when we drove in  
11 because they were -- there was some civilians there, and they  
12 were assisting some of the ambulatory patients out of the car,  
13 but those doors were open, but I remember that that car was  
14 about 40 or 50 feet separated between the -- from the -- I  
15 guess -- I call it the first passenger car behind the  
16 locomotive, and I assumed it hit and then was pushed back, but  
17 I remember seeing those doors open. I never got back to those  
18 right away. They had 96s, the other company that came in from  
19 the south, they had got in and one of their paramedics had gone  
20 through and was triaging patients in there, and they had some  
21 critical patients in there that I think ended up passing.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 BY SGT. RUTTER:

24 Q. What was your time of arrival?

25 A. Well, we kind of guesstimated about 16 or 1437. I

1 don't have anything in my paperwork.

2 Q. How did you know to arrive through the school?

3 A. Coming in, I was looking at the map and I -- where  
4 they described it was at, right in the curve, I looked at the  
5 map and I said -- I thought to myself this looks like a much  
6 better access because on the one map it showed a road  
7 paralleling that track on the north side. So we figured -- but  
8 it looked real narrow. And I thought, well, we'll -- I tried  
9 to call 96, the first company dispatched, and I asked them,  
10 because it's their district. I said is it a better access on  
11 the north side, and I didn't get no response. So I figure, you  
12 know what, we're going to go for it. If it works out great, if  
13 not, we'll go back around, but at least we'll know, you know,  
14 and we can let everybody else know. So we did. When we got to  
15 Canoga and Rinaldi and there were people out there waving, so I  
16 thought, okay, that's a good sign. So we went down Rinaldi and  
17 the gate was open. Somebody had opened that gate, and we were  
18 able to drive right in. And --

19 Q. Were there any deputy personnel or law enforcement on  
20 scene at that point?

21 A. I didn't see any cars there. There was nothing --  
22 when we pulled in there, there was nothing, nothing there but  
23 three containers that were sitting there. I don't know what  
24 they were for but they weren't part of the trains. They were  
25 just -- I don't know if they were the school's or what. But

1 there was no other vehicles when we pulled in.

2 Q. Did you see walking wounded walking through the gate?  
3 I know there are pictures of the media, there were people  
4 walking south towards Chatsworth station on the tracks.

5 A. Yeah. I did see some people kind of wandering around  
6 and they -- everybody was just dazed and confused. They were  
7 just kind of wandering around, and I didn't -- the way I look  
8 at it, something like that, if I have walking wounded, you  
9 know, we try to -- we told them, hey, go over to the grass and  
10 sit down on the grass and wait there, and we're going to get  
11 people there to take care of you. But we kind of went past  
12 that. Our concern was the fire because we knew we had cars  
13 involved, and we wanted to get the fire knocked down.

14 Q. Okay.

15 MR. TAPIA: Can I jump in and ask a question?

16 MS. SANZO: Certainly.

17 BY MR. TAPIA:

18 Q. When you used -- when you called Engine 96 and you  
19 got no response, did you use the standard radio?

20 A. I was using my standard radio, but he was probably --  
21 well, he may have been trying to talk on another channel  
22 because the first company that gets on scene, he's talking to  
23 the dispatch on a different channel, giving them a size up on  
24 what he's got, and he had plenty to be talking about.

25 Q. Sure.

1           A.    So I assumed he was busy, and that's pretty much what  
2 I figured the communication problem was.  Just that there was  
3 so much going on in such a short amount of time that radio time  
4 was at a premium, and rather than keep trying to get through to  
5 him and just tie the radio up, I just made a decision to go  
6 that route.  And the rest of our task force, which is an aerial  
7 truck and two pumps, they heard me trying to contact them to  
8 see if that was a better approach, and they had looked at the  
9 map and they were thinking the same thing I was thinking and  
10 said, okay, he's going -- it sounds like he's going that way,  
11 and they went that way, which worked out because they pulled in  
12 within a minute behind me, and they had -- they brought a line  
13 in, a supply line for fighting the fire which worked out good.

14           Q.    Thank you.

15                   BY CHIEF QUINTANAR:

16           Q.    What was -- I'm curious.  Were you, were you still on  
17 the radio when you heard the size up or did you do the size up?

18           A.    No, 96 gave the size up.

19           Q.    Uh-huh.

20           A.    And --

21           Q.    And it went something like?  Do you remember?

22           A.    He basically got on scene, and it took him a minute  
23 to get to it to where he could actually see what he had.

24           Q.    Uh-huh.

25           A.    And he said we have a passenger train and a freight

1 train that have collided and have derailed. They had fire. I  
2 remember him saying they had fire.

3 Q. Uh-huh.

4 A. And just several trapped patients, and he was trying  
5 to go around and describe what he was seeing, and I think about  
6 that time, Battalion 15 had got on scene. But I never did  
7 hear -- they switched it, and I believe -- if I remember right,  
8 they made it a Channel 9 response right off the bat, and then  
9 once I got on scene, we went to channel 17 because that was the  
10 TAC channel which we were all talking on. So anything that was  
11 said after that, I wasn't scanning 9. I just went to 17.

12 Q. On that map, and this was asked of me and I don't  
13 know the answer to this. Maybe you do. On that map that you  
14 were looking up, does it have mile markers for the train? Did  
15 you --

16 A. I don't think so. In fact, we have brand new maps at  
17 the station, and it doesn't show that road on our brand new  
18 map, but the map I had on my rig showed it.

19 Q. Good.

20 A. And I thought that was odd because it was perfect. I  
21 mean, it showed it clear as day that this road going off of the  
22 road going to the school, just veered right off and paralleling  
23 the tracks right there.

24 Q. Because we use mile markers on light rail and the  
25 subway.

1 A. Uh-huh.

2 Q. Because that's how, that's how, you know, ROC (ph.)  
3 gives it to OCD, OCD comes in with mile marker 22 or whatever,  
4 and then they know exactly who to send and so forth using their  
5 (indiscernible). So I was just curious about that.

6 CHIEF QUINTANAR: That's all I have.

7 MR. OJEDA: Let me do a follow up to that. Do -- now  
8 yours doesn't have mile markers, and you're referring to the  
9 charts?

10 CHIEF QUINTANAR: Well, I was just curious because he  
11 mentioned that he saw the curve on his map, and I was just  
12 curious, does that map --

13 THE WITNESS: I can probably -- it was page 355.  
14 They might have the same map here. We could look at it right  
15 now.

16 CHIEF QUINTANAR: Okay.

17 THE WITNESS: -- and see.

18 MR. OJEDA: That's a very good question.

19 THE WITNESS: Let me grab it and see what it says.

20 (Off the record.)

21 (On the record.)

22 BY CHIEF QUINTANAR:

23 Q. So do you know if -- because I didn't realize that  
24 they were -- and some -- in fact, my wife and my daughter were  
25 talking about it, and they said that some direction was given



1 to the people that self-evacuated to go down to the station,  
2 and I thought, no way, we would never tell them to just --

3 A. No.

4 Q. But you mentioned that -- you started to mention and  
5 I guess you saw them, you're pulling up, you saw some people on  
6 the track heading, I guess it would be east?

7 A. Well, I didn't see a whole lot of them going down  
8 there, but my engineer said, he had gone -- we had sent him  
9 back to lay because -- and he went back to the hydrant there,  
10 and he saw people walking, just kind of in a daze, you know,  
11 bloodied and, you know, and just walking. It's like they were  
12 just, you know, dazed.

13 CHIEF QUINTANAR: Can you confirm that then?

14 SGT. SUTTER: Well, I had seen it on the media.

15 CHIEF QUINTANAR: Okay.

16 SGT. SUTTER: That they were walking and they were  
17 talking about people missing in terms of the counts. There was  
18 at least three to four minutes before, maybe five, before  
19 anybody got to the scene.

20 CHIEF QUINTANAR: Right.

21 SGT. SUTTER: And people could have walked off. I  
22 mean we had civilians in the neighborhood assisting people  
23 getting out and people just walking away. There was one guy  
24 from the news, within two hours I think he was home, talking to  
25 the news, yeah, I was on the train. I was fine, you know, just

1 walked off.

2 THE WITNESS: And he -- and my engineer did say he  
3 saw people, and he was telling them to go over to the grass  
4 area and sit there and we'd get people over there to take care  
5 of them.

6 BY MR. OJEDA:

7 Q. As far as maps are concerned, they had the latest  
8 (indiscernible), it's probably a big chore to get maps with all  
9 the streets, but is there anything in place to get maps updated  
10 with streets and new construction and all that?

11 A. We actually -- these are our most recent maps that  
12 we've just got within the -- this year. And these have --  
13 they're color maps, and there were some issues with them, but I  
14 find that because most of them they do off of satellite type  
15 stuff. So I'm amazed that they don't have this road here,  
16 because any -- for us, any access road, you know, we just don't  
17 deal with surface streets. We look at access, and if it's an  
18 access road, then it should be on there because --

19 Q. You need information of anything --

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. -- that would get you there. Okay.

22 A. But I don't see anything as far as mile markers here  
23 on this map as far as the railroad.

24 BY MS. SANZO:

25 Q. If I could next ask about when and how were you able

1 to get information about the contents of the freight train?

2 A. Right off the bat, (indiscernible) because we were so  
3 overwhelmed with just getting the patients off the train. When  
4 things kind of started getting -- we started gaining a little  
5 more control, I had my AO and one of my guys get in and try and  
6 look up some information on it, and they got -- we actually --  
7 I called for another hazmat task force, and 4 from downtown was  
8 on the way out, and they were working on it, and when they got  
9 there, they had a consist when they showed up, and they started  
10 walking the train and matching it, and none of the cars matched  
11 down that consist. So then they got a hold of, I think it was  
12 Southern Pacific or Union Pacific, and they got another one  
13 from them, and that one turned out to be wrong, and finally  
14 they got a representative from Union Pacific there who got in  
15 touch with somebody at a high enough level that they were able  
16 to get one and then that matched. But it took probably -- that  
17 was probably two hours into the incident before we actually had  
18 accurate information on the consist. He, he -- what he was  
19 told was or what he told us was that that train was kind of put  
20 together from three different trains in Oxnard, and they handed  
21 the consist to the engineer and it was on the locomotive, but  
22 we never got that from them. They -- like I said, they were  
23 just -- they weren't even -- I can't really say how long we  
24 actually got them out there, and it was smoky and dark in  
25 there, and the last thing we were worried about was that.

1 MS. SANZO: I'll ask the group if there's any more  
2 questions you'd like to ask?

3 BY MS. SANZO:

4 Q. Just one last one for me, if you could give any  
5 advice to any other departments that might have to respond to a  
6 rail incident, what would you tell them to plan for or to  
7 prepare for?

8 A. Well, with the rail, I think the thing you have to  
9 plan for is, after being to this one, is a lot of accidents you  
10 go to, you don't have so many critical patients. We had an  
11 unbelievable amount of critical patients. Normally we'll get  
12 so many walking wounded, and then we'll get the minor care or,  
13 you know, delayed care that have broken bones, but I mean here  
14 we were dealing with trapped patients that had severe, life-  
15 threatening injuries that they had to be extricated from the  
16 train, and it (indiscernible) the whole thing because -- at one  
17 point I actually thought, because everybody hears about it,  
18 that we were going to have to get some people in there to do  
19 amputation and get these people out to save their lives. I  
20 mean, that's what I was thinking for a while in there. It's  
21 just -- it got to that point.

22 MS. SANZO: I'd like to thank you very much for your  
23 time today. This is incredibly informative and thank you very  
24 much.

25 THE WITNESS: You're welcome.

1 MS. SANZO: That will conclude the interview.

2 (Whereupon, the interview in the above-entitled

3 matter was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:           HEAD-ON COLLISION OF A METROLINK  
                                  COMMUTER TRAIN WITH A UNION  
                                  PACIFIC FREIGHT TRAIN  
                                  September 12, 2008,  
                                  Los Angeles, California  
                                  Interview of Capt. Bill Bugg

DOCKET NUMBER:           DCA-08-MR-009

PLACE:                    Los Angeles, California

DATE:                     September 16, 2008

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to the recording accomplished at the hearing.

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Kathryn A. Mirfin  
Transcriber