

Delta Air Lines  
LaGuardia Airport- Queens, New York  
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DCA15FA085

**NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

ATTACHMENT 8

CABIN SAFETY INSPECTOR INTERVIEW SUMMARY

Pages 5

Members of the Survival Factors Group conducted the following interviews at Delta Air Lines Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia on April 21, 2015.

**Interview: Charlene G. Watt, FAA Cabin Safety Inspector**

**Date: April 21, 2015**

**Time: 1307**

**Location: Delta Airlines Headquarters; Atlanta, Georgia**

**Present: Emily Gibson (NTSB), Kelley France (Boeing), Brad Riddle (Delta Air Lines), Kathy Tibbs (FAA)**

**Representative: N/A**

During the interview, Ms. Watts stated the following:

She was the Cabin Safety Inspector (CSI) for Delta Air Lines Certificate Management Office (CMO) for the last 13 years. She was one of the original CSIs for Delta Air Lines before the merger with Northwest Airlines. She worked in the FAA office in Hapeville, GA. Her duties and responsibilities as a CSI include regulatory oversight, certification, and evaluation of the Delta Air Lines flight attendant training and policy and procedures. There were currently 2 CSI's and they split the responsibilities. They had primary and secondary duties for different areas of responsibility. She was the primary for training. The flight attendant manual was an accepted manual and both CSI's had oversight the manual. Both had a very high workload.

The FAA Office was located within 3 miles of the Delta Airlines offices. She was not responsible for any other certificate at that time. She assisted with the Comair certificate, very briefly, until they assigned someone else.

Delta Air Lines was very responsive to FAA input and suggestions.

The CSI characterized her workload as very high and that most of her performance duties were spent in Atlanta with training, surveillance, and, most recently with the electronic flight manual validation period.

Her quarterly work assignments were scheduled through the Safety Assurance Systems (SAS) Program as they were transitioning from the previous Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) system. Most of her responsibilities were in Atlanta, with the other CSI observing training in the Salt Lake City (SLC) Training Facility.

SAS was still in the growing stages, however, she did not believe the oversight was any less. She was assigned items to accomplish each quarter. The system was labor intensive, but mostly because it was new. Inspectors were assigned oversight work by the Principals and looked to data from reporting systems to determine special emphasis on topics. For instance, recently there was a heavy emphasis on enroute surveillance for the purpose of conducting checks on manuals and procedures.

Most of her interactions were with management in training, procedures, safety, and ASAP and other various facilitators.

The flight attendant manual was an accepted manual, not an approved manual. If content was not acceptable to the FAA, it was discussed and handled appropriately. The manual did not go for print unless one of the CSIs had a chance to read and accept.

The FAA had no role in approving instructors, but would address and issue if they observed something unacceptable. All instructors were calibrated per AQP guidance. Flight attendants were required to meet or exceed training. There are no set number of hours in training.

The CSI monitored ground school, including emergency training. She stated the Emergency Event Management Validations (EMV's) were very thorough and depict evacuation, smoke and fire event, or any potential emergency. Delta Air Lines trained to other events in addition to a "severe emergency"; they also trained to non-normal or unanticipated events.

The CSI characterized the quality of the training as "superb" and believed that AQP was better than "traditional hours training" as required by Subpart N&O of the Part 121 Regulations.

She categorized the incident at LaGuardia as a non-normal event.

CRM training was interwoven into all training; it was not a "stand alone training." Delta Air Lines conducted a Threat and Error Management (TEM) Module. It was more effective than stand alone because it was not "silo-ed." It was more realistic to see how CRM worked in various situations. There was no joint training with the flight operations group.

The FAA monitored inflight training a couple times a month, however, the last time she observed was last year. The other CSI had observed training many times this year. They also observed proficiency checks and would like to have observed more line checks but due to load factors, she ends up in the flight deck. She was looking forward to her last enroute inspection, as she was going to be able to observe a new hire flight attendant but, once again, she ended up having to sit in the flight deck due to load factors.

The CSI also ensured training was in compliance with training manuals. The AQP Training Manual was approved by the POI, CSI, and Kevin Kelly, a manager in AFS280. Delta Air Line's Security Program was also part of AQP. Delta Air Lines was the first airline to have an approved AQP program for Security.

If changes were made to the training program, they would be submitted by the training manager as a revision/change. It would be reviewed by the CSI and then stamped as approved and returned. She would observe the training course before it is given to the flight attendants.

There were approximately 250 instructors but reiterated the training managers would know the accurate number. Aircraft mockups were approved and maintained according to the aircraft maintenance program.

The last time she had to criticize or require a change to training or procedures was during the merger with Northwest Airlines. She could not think of a specific example but said the merger process (in 2008) was one of the smoothest processes. Delta Air Lines conducted a gap analysis and worked very well in bringing the two groups together. Delta Air Lines training developed an Aircraft Qualification Program. The Northwest Airlines flight attendants went to Delta Air Lines to train on Delta Air Lines aircraft and the Delta Air Lines flight attendants went to Northwest Airlines to train on the Northwest Airlines aircraft. At the time of the merger, the FAA had 3 CSIs. Some of the lessons learned were not with the airlines specifically but the merging of the 2 FAA offices and how they conducted their business.

The merger was completed in 2008, the single operating certificate was in 2010, and in May of 2012, the cabin crews started flying together. Delta Air Lines started intermingling flight attendants in training at the time of the single operating certificate.

She was informed, initially, of the accident by media (TV) and was then contacted by her POI. Since the accident, there had not been any changes to policy or procedure. She did not have any items of concern before the accident.

The POI checked her oversight work and he ensured she was providing adequate oversight.

Delta Air Lines conducted 62.5 hours of emergency management training in initial training and 8 hours in recurrent training, specifically in event management, first aid, proficiency evaluations, and door training. Five different scenarios were conducted that last at least 2.5 hours. 4 hours of online training was conducted prior to classroom recurrent training. This training had to be completed and validated via computer entry in order for the flight attendant to attend the class.

Quarterly Computer Based Training (CBT) was also given to flight attendants on new issues or reminder issues, hot topics, or delivery of new aircraft. This training was developed by Inflight Learning and reviewed by CSI's. Some of the data captured was gathered from the Delta Air Lines Safety Reporting System (SRS). This quarterly training was over and beyond any regulatory training.

Delta Air Lines had approximately 22,000 flight attendants. It was hard to understand why some FAA offices had so many more CSIs and Delta Air Lines only had two. Another CSI would have been beneficial.

She was the primary CSI on the ASAP program. Inadvertent slide deployments, flight attendants forgetting manuals, and minimum staffing issues by stepping off the aircraft were the main issues. Data from ASAP was used to develop training for flight attendants.

Flight attendants were to stay at their door positions during emergencies but also taught situational awareness so they have to use their best judgment in any situation. "You cannot stay in one spot and burn to death if that is the situation." They were trained to "no doubt, get out." The flight attendants did not feel threatened by the company for expense of a blown slide or possible injury during evacuation if it was something that needed to be done.

Flight attendants were not required to operate all doors every year in AQP but the doors not operated hands-on were covered in CBT quarterly. Hands-on training for the doors not covered was accomplished the following year. Training records were kept electronically and the FAA had oversight of the records process. If there was a need to review records she was able and had access.

There was not anything she could think of that would help in the investigation and that from all accounts she felt the flight attendants did a great job. This accident was a “very unique situation” as the flight attendants did not hear instruction from the cockpit like, “stay seated, stay seated.” This would make a very good training scenario. “It would be a perfect example as EMVs drive home training.” Cockpit to cabin communication was heavily trained and emphasized at Delta Air Lines on both the flight attendant and flight operations side.

There were 30 operations inspectors and 2 cabin safety inspectors for Delta Air Lines. Any inspector can conduct surveillance on flight attendants. They can inspect manuals including the electronic flight manuals (EFB’S). There were 2 other CSIs shown on the Delta Air Lines certificate, however, they are on detail with another FAA division. She was unsure of the process or equation on how the FAA backfills positions.

She had no oversight responsibilities of the passenger manifests.