

Delta Air Lines
LaGuardia Airport- Queens, New York
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**NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

ATTACHMENT 4

FLIGHT ATTENDANT INTERVIEW SUMMARY

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Members of the Survival Factors Group conducted the following interviews at Delta Air Lines Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia on April 22, 2015.

Interview: Carol Ann Terraneo, Flight Attendant

Date: April 22, 2015

Time: 1103

Location: Delta Airlines Headquarters; Atlanta, Georgia

Present: Emily Gibson (NTSB), Kelley France (Boeing), Brad Riddle (Delta Air Lines), Kathy Tibbs (FAA)

Representative: Thomas Tobin, Attorney

During the interview, Ms. Terraneo stated the following:

The trip was the first day and first leg of a three-day trip. She was off the day before but because she lived in West Palm Beach, Florida, she commuted to Atlanta the day prior. She was the onboard leader for this trip.

Once she arrived at the airport, she proceeded to the crew lounge to sign in. She received her paper work regarding wheelchairs and other special assist passengers. This paperwork was automatically generated and not the same paperwork as the departure paperwork that was received at the gate.

She conducted a flight attendant briefing. She asked the flight attendants if they had any medical background or language skills that may be beneficial during the flight. They introduced themselves and checked their badges.

Once they arrived at the gate, they learned the flight was delayed. The pilots met them at the gate and conducted a briefing. It was a standard briefing with discussions of entry to cockpit and being familiar with red and yellow emergencies, with yellow being prepared but no risk to aircraft or passengers.

It was during the briefing she learned of the severe weather. She did not know if there would be any further delays or if they were going to cancel the flight. She had no interaction with any of the passengers at the gate.

Once the aircraft arrived, the F/As boarded and checked the equipment, catering, and stowed their luggage. It was hectic since the aircraft was late.

After all passengers were onboard and ready to depart, the captain's oxygen mask was damaged and needed replacing. They were told this delay would not affect the arrival time in to New York. The boarding process was "fine." She remembered one wheelchair passenger in 10C but he had walked on the aircraft "ok." There were a couple empty seats in first class.

A passenger, seated in 1B, was anxious to get to LGA for business. This passenger had received text messages that the weather was declining. She was very talkative and friendly. Lap children

were seated in the aft, but she did not remember how many specifically. It was “typically” in the pre-departure report. The first class passenger count was “off” in the departure report because a passenger had declined an upgrade from coach to first class after boarding.

The inflight portion of the flight was “fine.” The captain called to make sure everything was secure and they were ready for landing, there was not much more information given. She assumed he wanted to be sure they were secure due to the weather however no weather briefing was given to her. She thought F/A 2 had picked up the call and heard the same information.

She did not remember any severe turbulence or anything unusual. It was fine when they touched down, but then she “did not hear the motions for when they were supposed to be slowing down.” They were not on a “smooth path, but a very bumpy runway.” It “seemed to be different.” All of a sudden, it was “so severe and bumping along.” When she looked out her window, she “kept seeing something go by.” She wondered if they were going to hit something; “if the wing was going to hit something.”

Suddenly, “they just stopped, not severely, but just stopped.” She was glad she “was in one piece and the aircraft was in one piece.” She grabbed the interphone and started yelling, “stay seated, stay calm.” The passengers listened and seemed to adhere to her requests. There was no screaming or jumping into the aisle. She continued those commands for a short while.

Because passengers were adhering to her commands, she asked if anyone was injured. Someone pointed to the middle of the cabin so she went back to check. The person appeared to be crying but not injured.

The cockpit door opened and the passenger in 1B motioned the captain wanted to speak with her. She went back to the front of the cabin and saw the water. The captain asked about the forward doors being a usable exit and she said they were not available. The captain asked about the other exits so she went back to assess. She saw the flight attendants in the back checking on passengers and moving forward.

She went to the 2L door and saw snow and something black. She was unsure what the blackness was. She told the captain “all they could do was try it, but she did not know for sure.” F/A 3 had also come forward and he asked her the same question but to also assess the tailcone.

The captain grabbed the megaphone, handed it to her, and told her to start an evacuation. As she began speaking, she realized the people in back could not hear her. She moved closer to the windows to tell the passengers to evacuate through the right side windows. She told the passengers seated at the right windows to open them and put the windows in the seats. A passenger asked her if he should open the exit and she said yes.

She noticed one window exit at the aft right wing was protruding into the row so she moved it across the aisle. She started her commands, and told the passengers to put on coats, remove high heels if necessary, as she did not know how slippery the wing would be.

She stopped a few passengers who looked like they would be good “able bodied passengers” and asked them to stand outside to help people off.

Firefighters were at the wings on ladders yelling at passengers to hurry and get away. At some point, the firefighters told her there was fuel leaking under the left side wing area. She did not want to tell passengers and have them panic so she moved them along faster. The captain asked to try the tailcone exit if possible. The tailcone was normally the last exit to be used, but they did not have any other exit to choose from.

F/A 3 tried to open the tailcone but water was “leaking in.” She saw only water and closed the door. She was giving the symbol for bad exit. She could not see F/A 2. After a passenger said to F/A 3 the water may have been from a firefighters hose, she retried the exit. F/A 3 opened the tailcone again, did not see water this time, and pulled the manual inflation handle.

Since she thought a slide was there and usable, she sent older passengers and children to the back as she thought it would be easier to get off. It was not until after they were off that she realized that the tailcone slide was not there.

After all passengers were off the aircraft, she went forward to get a few of her personal things and then exited through the tailcone. She had the evacuation plan with her, but knew they were at the airport where they would not need anything else. The firefighters came on before she had exited with the pilots.

The passengers were already on buses when they got off the aircraft. They put them on the same bus as the passengers but pulled off onto another bus with the pilots. Then someone told them they needed to move to another bus with passengers. They took them off that bus as well. She thought “there must be a plan because I am standing out here in the cold, in a skirt, and heels.” A large recreational vehicle used as the command center was brought; they were eventually moved to this vehicle. The police asked for identification. The Delta Air Lines representatives kept them separate from the passengers. They eventually took them all to the terminal.

She was not aware of any injuries. She was a little stiff, but probably because she was not perfectly positioned when she threw the window exit across the aisle.

Everyone kept asking her for a passenger count. She thought it was a total of “129 plus 5 crew.” She ripped off the top portion of the departure report with the most up to date information for the flight and gave that to someone. It was the police or someone in uniform who kept asking for the count.

She did not believe the emergency lights or exit lights came on. She did not turn them on. It was light in the cabin and she did not want to send people to an exit that they could not use.

If she had anything to add or if there were any safety suggestions, she said “not really” and that “this instance was such an unusual circumstance.” She said they were so limited with the number of exits they had. The training kicked in and the lesson learned was the inability to

communicate. They were very fortunate that it was a small aircraft. She was at the cockpit door and could use a megaphone. She could not recall a specific procedure in the manual on what to do for this incident, but taught, “no doubt, get out.” This was not that type of situation.

Interview: Tamika (Latrice) Witcher, Flight Attendant

Date: April 22, 2015

Time: 0940

Location: Delta Airlines Headquarters; Atlanta, Georgia

Present: Emily Gibson (NTSB), Kelley France (Boeing), Brad Riddle (Delta Airlines), Kathy Tibbs (FAA)

Representative: Thomas Tobin, Attorney

During the interview Ms. Witcher stated the following:

This was the first day of a three-day trip. It was also the first leg of the trip. She did not work the day before. Her report time was 7:15-7:30 am in Atlanta. She could not remember her position; she was not the flight leader but did occupy the jump seat at the 2L door.

The flight attendants signed in at the crew lounge and had a crew briefing. The flight attendants went to the gate house area in Concourse T. The flight was delayed. She was eating breakfast. The captain and first officer were already at the gate.

The flight attendant preflight briefing was normal as required by Delta Air Lines. She could not remember if the captain or first officer had a briefing with them. She remembered there being a delay. She had little interaction with the passengers. She did not remember anything significant about the weather. She was talking to the first officer and gate agent about the snow in New York but the comments were in passing.

They boarded the aircraft and conducted the pre-flight checks of equipment. To her recollection, the checks were fine or they would have had to make notations. The boarding process was normal/typical. She was sure there were "pre-boards" but could not remember. There were lap children and no special briefing was given to them that she could recall.

The inflight portion of the flight was typical and there was nothing out of the ordinary. The captain called to the cabin after final descent. She picked up the handset and heard him say he wanted to ensure everything was secure, that the galley was secure, and that the flight attendants were seated and buckled. He stated he thought it would be a little rough landing. All of the flight attendants were in their jump seats and buckled when he called. No additional announcements were made to the passengers that she could recall.

Prior to landing, she was sitting at the 2L jump seat, facing aft. Four passengers were seated in front of her. As they were descending, she could look out the window of the exit. Everything was "white in front of me; the trees and the land." She asked the passengers in front of her if they were buckled tight as it "might be a little rough on landing."

Initially the landing felt a little different but when the brakes were applied "it was a little bumpy and felt as though it was not as controlled." She thought at that point, "We're going to hit something in order for this plane to stop." She had to remain controlled in order to get through this. She did not remember any screams of passengers or what their reaction was, and she did not

recall a hard impact. It “just came to a stop.” She was thinking about where she was seated, about passengers, about the fact that she was at the rear as opposed to the front. It took a moment to assess what just happened, the state of the aircraft, and the passengers. She was still in her jump seat and buckled. She did not hear anything from the flight deck or from the lead flight attendant.

She picked up the handset to say commands; “stay seated and stay calm”, but there was no power. She tried calling up front but was unable.

She and F/A 3 went through the cabin and told people to stay in their seats and to stay calm. She was checking to see if everyone was all right. She checked on those passengers sitting near a row where the passenger service unit panels had come down above their heads. The panels were about 3 or 4 rows up from her jump seat on the left side. Those passengers said they were fine. She checked on the lap child. She did not recall any passengers being out of their seat.

She did not recall how long she stayed in her jumpseat area before moving forward. F/A 3 was standing up at the tailcone and F/A 1 was also out of her jumpseat. There was no communication with the flight deck.

By the time F/A 2 made her way to the front of the cabin, the flight deck door was open. She did not talk with him at that point. F/A 1 and the captain were assessing the front doors.

At that time, she saw the water outside of one of the first class passenger windows and the mangled wing. She then understood why the forward doors were not usable.

All of the flight attendants were in the front so she made her way toward the back of the cabin. She recalled something about using the right side of the aircraft. There was no talk of the tailcone at that point.

The passengers were calm. She never made it all the way to the back because one of the passengers stopped her and said one of the first responders wanted him to open the window. She told them “no, we are going to wait until our captain instructs us to evacuate”. She could see people running up to the plane.

F/A 3 was telling people to get off their cellphones. F/A 1 had the megaphone and knew they were getting ready to evacuate using the right windows. F/A 1 was speaking into the megaphone, but they could not hear what she was saying. She had the emergency preparation card in her hand. She told the passengers at the window that they would be evacuating and would use the windows.

F/A 1 came back to the window exits, so she went to the 2L door and began telling people to get their coats. At some point F/A 1 was asking “what about the other exits?”

She did not know who opened the window exits. She was positioned between the windows and her exit conducting “crowd control” and telling passengers to leave their bags.

She looked out the 2L door. The viewing window was now covered with snow and she could see the wing was tangled up in the embankment. No responders were outside of that door. She knew she could not use that exit as a viable option.

She was in the aft part of the cabin with F/A 3 when the tailcone door was opened. F/A 3 heard a “whooshing” sound and saw water coming in. F/A 3 did not know what that was so she closed the door. Passengers were still going out the windows.

She did not see the tailcone from where she was positioned. One of the passengers, who had been seated in front of her jumpseat, said, “I think that’s the firemen hosing us down.” They realized they could open the door again. F/A 3 reopened the door and went out.

She was not sure who communicated the tailcone was a good exit, but a passenger from the last row of the aircraft was assisting. Once she knew it was a viable exit, she began sending people through the tailcone.

It was not a long period of time to get the passengers off of the aircraft once the tailcone was open. The captain came back to ensure everyone was off the aircraft. One passenger was still onboard assisting and she told him to get off. She checked the lavatories and advised the captain that all was clear.

F/A 3 was still in the tailcone area as they talked about what to take off the aircraft. She took her “red book” and a small bag. She took a quick look around the aircraft and exited out the tailcone. That is when she realized there was no slide for people to go down. She was the last flight attendant off the aircraft. A first responder helped her out.

It was freezing cold. Most passengers were already on shuttle buses. There were many people around. They were shuttled to a bus, then to a car, then to another shuttle bus, then to another vehicle. They were shuffled around a lot. There was someone from either NTSB or the Port Authority that was trying to separate them from the flight deck.

They were put with passengers on a shuttle bus and then told to get off. They stood in the snow and told to get on another shuttle bus. They were pulled off that bus and stood in the snow again. There was a lot of discussion about jurisdiction and someone said they were not going to be separated from the flight crew. They were finally able to go to a command center type recreational vehicle with the pilots. They were not allowed to go to the terminal. It was not the NTSB, it was either the Port Authority or the police. They felt like they were “watching us.” One person said they were assigned to “not let you out of my sight.”

There were multiple requests for the passenger manifest. When they were asking, it was the like a sound of “barking and intimidation.” She felt they were treating them “like a terrorist.”

The airport did not seem to have a policy or procedure to handle the accident. F/A 1 gave them a portion of the departure report that she had torn off.

She did not feel, at that time, she had any injuries. Although now has tense moments.

F/A 3 used the megaphone in the back and she thought the floor path lighting and emergency lights were operable.

They are taught two situations on the aircraft, “evacuate when you hear a command from the flight deck or evacuate when there was imminent danger or structural damage, that was text book, but in our case it was neither. There needs to be a third scenario in training. Something like this accident where we are taught to continue to assess until given direction.” This event also encompassed a “weird wait time.”

She could not recall procedures for when the aircraft loses power.

Her training “kicked in, it was the most powerful thing I had and knowing not to panic, that I had everything I needed to handle the situation.”

Interview: Rebecca (Becky) Ann Ramirez, Flight Attendant

Date: April 22, 2015

Time: 1207

Location: Delta Airlines Headquarters; Atlanta, Georgia

Present: Emily Gibson (NTSB), Kelley France (Boeing), Brad Riddle (Delta Air Lines), Kathy Tibbs (FAA)

Representative: Thomas Tobin, Attorney

During the interview Ms. Ramirez stated the following:

The trip was the first day, first leg, of a three-day trip. She had finished a similar trip the day before. She had 12 hours between the trips and had a good sleep the night before. She was the aft tailcone flight attendant.

She went to the crew briefing in the lounge. She met the other flight attendants. She had not flown with them before. Normal safety items were discussed, like positions and emergency equipment. They met the pilots at the gate. They were waiting for the plane to arrive as it was delayed. The pilots talked about normal safety items and introduced themselves. There was talk about the weather because other flights were cancelled that morning. There were no passenger interactions at the gate.

Her preflight duties were normal and everything was fine. During boarding, she helped F/A 1 in the front with pre-departure beverages and coats. Prior to the flight they had discussed who would help and it was decided she would assist. It was a normal boarding process. They had a wheelchair passenger and infants, although not sure how many. There was no special briefing given to parents with infants. It seemed like boarding was slow and did not know why.

Cruise flight was normal. She did not recall speaking to the captain in flight or during decent. F/A 1 and F/A 2 had information regarding being secured for landing. The captain had briefed earlier in the morning there was a weather issue; it was “snowy” and “might be a bumpy landing.”

The actual landing seemed “perfect” from the aft jumpseat. She was in a position where she could not see out a window. In 25 years of experience, “this felt normal.” She was looking forward and it felt normal, until touch down. It felt like they “hit ice”, “like a car that hits ice and there was no control.” From the moment the wheels hit the runway it kept sliding. She thought “we’re going to go off the runway.” They were “bouncing” and she knew they were off the runway. It was “bumpy like a hayride”.

When the aircraft finally stopped, “it did not seem like a long time had passed, it did not feel like a big forward motion, or a big impact.” She heard something clicking on the left side, “like a fence.” Suddenly, they “just stopped, almost gentle.”

She began to yell, “stay seated, stay calm.” Everyone was quiet and “you could hear a pin drop.” She was still buckled in her jumpseat. It felt like a long time that she yelled her commands. She

was waiting for a command but she got nothing. She did not see F/A 2 but saw F/A 1 get out of her jumpseat. She knew she needed to check on passengers. She began to walk backwards up to the cockpit checking on passengers.

She passed F/A 2 but did not say anything to her. She just kept doing what she saw F/A 1 do, check on the passengers. She thinks F/A 2 got up right after she did and it seemed that everyone was ok.

The cockpit door had opened while she was moving forward. The pilots were still sitting in the cockpit seats. She asked them if they were ok and the captain said “yes, we need to figure out which exits are usable to evacuate.” She told the captain the over wing window exits on the left hand side were wrapped in a fence, 1L was all water, 1R was in a fence, but the over wing window exit on the right hand side was ok. The captain asked about the tailcone and she said “I don’t know.” He said, “We need to prepare to evacuate.”

At that point she “had a mission to open the exit and evacuate.” When she got to the back of the aircraft, everybody was on their cell phones. She began screaming, “Get off your cell phones right now, we need to evacuate, we need to prepare to evacuate, you need to listen to us, get your coats on, get the baby’s coat on.” She also put her coat on.

She grabbed her flashlight and opened the tailcone door. She saw water. She thought they were “going in the Hudson” because she just saw water from the cockpit. She heard a “whooshing” sound. She immediately shut the door and yelled “bad exit go forward”. She had passengers move forward. She could not see anything forward of all the people. She heard a man’s voice, “I think it’s the fire trucks spraying us down.” She opened the exit again and could “see the sky and the snow but no slide.”

At some point, she must have had the megaphone because she gave it to a passenger and said “here, keep people back until I get the slide.” The barrier strap was not secure. She walked down the catwalk, pulled the aft jettison handle even though the tailcone was not there. She kept saying “give me a slide, give me a slide.” She pulled the red inflation handle. A firefighter was there yelling at her to “jump.” She had a few words with him. He made it sound as if there was a sense of urgency but she knew there were a lot of people to get out.

She was still “fighting” with the inflation handle. She finally was able to pull the inflation handle and the slide “exploded.” She could not see the slide. She did not understand the attitude of the aircraft at the time and did not realize until after she exited the aircraft why she could not see it. She had people come toward her and told them to “sit on your butt, jump.” It was a calm evacuation. A lot of people evacuated out of that tailcone. She even saw first class passengers exit through the tailcone.

She saw the pilots coming toward her and F/A 2. She grabbed her “red book” and exited out the tailcone. She said the firefighters caught her in the same way as the passengers. The passengers were already on the buses. There were a lot of firefighters in fire suits and first responders.

Post incident was “the difficult part for me.” She was in shock. She was cold and people were yelling at her. She was told to get on a bus with the passengers. She was asked where the captain was that they were supposed to stay together. It was a crowded bus. Someone said to get off and find the captain. They got off that bus but did not know why as someone started yelling at her to get in a pick-up truck. The three flight attendants were in the truck. She was shaking and cold. She did not see the captain and first officer so decided to get out of truck to look. F/A 1 yelled at her to get back in, so she did. Someone came to tell them to get out of the truck and get on another bus. There were a lot of Port Authority people. They were yelling for a manifest. They looked like police officers. One of the officers yelled in her face for a manifest. He was so close and yelling she almost slapped him. They were demanding the manifest and number of passengers.

They were told to get on another bus. Two people from Delta Air Lines arrived and took them to the captain and first officer. She stated the Port Authority kept yelling at them that they had jurisdiction. She was shaking as it was getting “pretty crazy.”

The Delta Air Lines person told them they had a place where they all could go together. They went to a camper type vehicle. It was snowing. Finally, they were able to get out of the cold and sit down. They finally asked if they were okay. They went to the terminal.

Everyone was safe and she did not know of any injuries. She had neck and back injuries from helping people off. She remembered a man coming with a child or infant. She took the infant and leaned over to give to the firefighter. She felt like a “mack truck” had hit her at the time, but was fine now.

She did not recall if the emergency lights came on. She thinks there should be some type of technology out there that would allow them to communicate better. “Megaphone are old and although easy to work, a secondary communication system needs to be developed.” There should be a better way for the slide to unfold, perhaps use stairs.

The post-accident handling was more traumatic for her than the actual evacuation. There was no human element. They were treated as if they “were terrorists.” The Port Authority needs to “scrap their training and start all over.”

Her training helped and she felt like she was prepared. She did not know of any non-communication procedures on the manual.