Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation G-IV
Bedford, Massachusetts
May 31, 2014
ERA14MA271

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ATTACHMENT 12

INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS

15 - Pages

Attachment 11 Statements and Interviews

DATE: 6/5/2014

TO: A/C TRAINING MOORE

CC: DEPUTY DILLON

FROM: **C. HARMON**

RE: Authorization to act as the alternate training officer for the Mass and National EMS Training Program

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I on Saturday may 31, arrived on scene as driver operator of E-4 turned on all exterior lighting that is available on e4 to light up area. I then went up to tanker 7 to assist water supply line to crash 9. I then went back to E-4 . relocated E4 to east side bldg. 1840 to connect my 4inch supply line to E-6 per Capt. Sanchez request. Deployed 1200 ft. of 4 inch supply line towards scene. Water supply was then established to tanker 7 . when Lexington ladder truck arrived I went over to relocate rescue -3 vehicle so that Lexington ladder could set up. Then I returned to E-4 to monitor water supply.

1. .
2. .

Chad Harmon
F/F Driver Operator
Hansom AFB
Fire Department

Signed: [redacted]

DATE: 6 JUNE 2014

TO: DEPTY CHIEF DAN DILLON

FROM: FIRE CAPTIAN, D. CAMILLI JR.

RE: AIRCRAFT MISSHAP ON GOLFSTREAM 4 OFF RUNWAY 11 ON 31MAY, 2014

Responded with my crew of 3 to a report of an aircraft crash at the end of runway 11, once on at the scene of the crash there was a large amount of fire in the sky and I and my hand lineman went over to tanker 7 and pulled the hose off and began to fight the ground fire in the grass area. Once the fire was out we proceeded to the aircraft and the embankment and proceeded to fight the fire on the wooded area around the aircraft itself. Additional foam hand line came off of crash 9 and started to apply additional foam to the aircraft further knocking down the fire and concentrated it on the rescue side engine that was still burning. I worked with the other Captain to ensure we had adequate agent capability and accountability of members actively fighting fire.

Once the fire had darkened down and Lexington Fire Department was on arrival on the other side of the embankment, they had indicated that the nose of the aircraft was still in tacked and that the door/crew entry was still intact and that they were having a hard time opening it. The crew stated "something about needing a key" and they requested "via the radio" for assistance from Hanscom Fire to gain entry. Hearing this and being able to see them I got my hand lineman and stated get our saw and we're going over to open the door. I then radioed to command that I was heading over to assist the Lexington crew.

Once on the other side of the ravine and meeting up with the Lexington Fire Ass't Chief and the Lieutenant. They brought me into the nose of the aircraft. Once at the crew door it was closed. The primary assessment was that the crew entry handle was closed and that the outer seal of the metal strip was intact and had not been affected by fire. I instructed my hand lineman to take the halegan bar and put the pointed end against the silver dot and had the Lexington Firefighter hit it with a flat head ax. The door was supported and when the button was depressed the handle came up and we opened the door. The door swung down at us and we had found a patient slumped over at the entry way. The door was not moved any further and the patient was not moved as well. I informed command of what we had found.

With finding that patient at the door and the cockpit and the glass unable to see in, a ladder was used to climb up on top of the nose and attempt to look inside. With no clear visual inside the cockpit I ordered that the front window of the cockpit be removed so that we could see if the pilots were still inside. My hand lineman and climbed up and began to cut out the window. Once the window was removed I climbed up the ladder and saw that the two pilots were still in their seats. I informed command that there were no survivors. Myself and my hand line man then stood by with the Lexington Fire Crew until ordered back to the other side of the ravine.

Dominic Camilli Jr.
Fire Captain
Hansom AFB

Signed [redacted]

DATE: 6/5/2014

TO: A/C TRAINING MOORE

CC: DEPUTY DILLON

FROM: J. CARLONI

RE: Authorization to act as the alternate training officer for the Mass and National EMS Training Program

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I Firefighter John Carloni (.

1. "on satuday may 31. I responed as driver operator on the P-23 crash vehicle ,upon arriving at the scene ,Iapplied foam to the main body of fire.until knocked down to a point where fire crews could get closer to the scene, also hit spot fires on the grass area on the way in to the crash site . Continued to apply agentand water as directed by operations personel close to the aircraft until fire was out.
2. .
3. .
4. .

John Carloni
F/F Driver Operator
Hansom AFB
Fire Department

Signed: [redacted]

TO: Deputy Chief Dan Dillon

SUBJECT: Aircraft Incident Statement 31 May 14

FROM: Firefighter (GS-07) Mark Moseley

On 31 May 14 at 2220hrs I received a phone call informing me of the aircraft crash at Hanscom Field. I immediately left for the fire station and arrived at 2300hrs. Once I arrived at the station, I met up with Firefighters Dale Smith and Pat Steen. We took HAZMAT 11 to the fire department storage (Bldg. 1820) and retrieved 5 bags of booms for fuel runoff containment. We then proceeded to the incident and reported to the Operations Commander (Asst. Chief Paul Seguin) For further assignment.

I was tasked with relieving the Crash 9 crew chief. I proceeded to C-9 and received a one to one brief with the crew chief I was relieving and assumed those duties. At this point the C-9 crew, along with one firefighter from E-4, was tasked with controlling spot fires on the aircraft. We continually monitored the aircraft from the runway side bank of the ravine and applied water as needed. After the spot fires were out and the entry operations on the flight deck were completed we applied water to cool the aircraft and associated scene.

Once we determined the aircraft has sufficiently cooled and under the advisement of a MASSPORT Fire Department A/C we shut down the cooling operation to limit any further environmental impact (fuel runoff) on the affected area.

At this point we were relieved and went to rehab. After rehab we reported back to the command staff and started breaking down equipment. We were careful not to disturb the debris and damage caused by the crash that was in the field leading up to the ravine. At this point I was relieved and returned to the station with the rescue crew.

This statement is my account of the events that occurred on 31May14 at the Aircraft Crash at Hanscom Field.

[redacted]

Mark Moseley [redacted]

Firefighter GS-07

Hanscom AFB, MA

At 21:42:43 the Hanscom Tower report an aircraft crash on take-off, end of Runway 11, and the aircraft was on fire. Hanscom initial response included a Senior Fire officer, Crash 10 and Crash 9 (ARFF vehicle), Engine 4 and Engine 6, tanker 7 and foam trailer. Additional resource were requested and obtained from the local communities surrounding Hanscom Field. The ARFF vehicle immediately approached the aircraft and began fire attack operations. The pumper and engine crews were assigned to establish resupply, from a hydrant, tanker and the foam trailer. The aircraft came to rest straddling across a ravine, making rescue and firefighting operation very difficult. The senior fire officer request immediate assistance from mutual aid sources and requested recall of off duty firefighters. Firefighters attempted to enter the cockpit area to search for survivors/victims. Tower report seven SOB at time of takeoff. When the crew cut the front window of the cockpit they could identify the two crew members, flight attendant and at least two of the passengers. Unfortunately there were no survivors. The firefighting/rescue operations was terminated at approximately 03:45 and command turned over to federal investigators. On 1 June 2014 @ 0900 Hanscom Rescue, Chief 1, Chief 2, Engine 4 and Crash 10 along with Bedford Engine and Rescue, Waltham Rescue were back on scene to assist Massachusetts State Police, FBI & NTSB with victim recovery. Fire units also provide fire protection standby over the next few days while the aircraft was being recovered.

[redacted]

Paul A. Seguin, GS-11
Assistant Chief of Operations
66th ABG/CEF
Hanscom Fire
3 Robins Street
Hanscom AFB, MA. 01731
[redacted]

5 June 2014

On May 31 2014 I responded to an aircraft incident on hanscom air force base, the follow information is an account of my duties that evening. I was on a hand line near the rear of the aircraft along with another crew member. After the fire was under control and suppressed enough I then was tasked to go to the other side (nose of aircraft) to assist with opening the crew door. Once on this side I used the pick end of a halogen tool to pop out the door handle. There was little to no resentence to lift up on the handle freeing the door locks. I then stepped backed and allowed a hanscom fire crew chief to step in and take a visual for victims. The next assignment for me was to use a rescue saw and cut out the pilots (rescue side) window to get a visual for any other victims. After the window was removed a hanscom fire crew chief then had me come down so he could look inside.

[redacted]

Steven Koberski

GS-7 Firefighter HAFBFD

SUBJECT: Aircraft Incident 31May14 (Individual Statement)

From: Fire Fighter/Haz-Mat Technician (GS-07) Todd Grierson

To: Deputy Fire Chief Dan Dillon

Responded to a reported aircraft crash at end of runway 11 as crew chief of Rescue-3.

Driving to crash site, found a minor debris field with what appeared to be either parts/pieces from aircraft or pieces from airport equipment and/or fence at/near end of Runway 11. Rescue-3 parked to the far left of crash site and walked/searched (Primary Search) all the way up to the aircraft fire (bank of river) for any potential victims. None found.

Upon arrival at crash site, found heavy smoke and fire coming from a crashed aircraft. Reported over radio as such to all in coming units. Reported over radio minor explosions occurring from aircraft where I observed/heard 4-5

I assisted Crash-9 and 10 as to where to lay foam streams until initial handline could be deployed safely and effectively. Once handline was deployed, myself and Rescue-32 did another primary search closer to aircraft on the runway side of Shawsheen River, due to we were unable to get across river at that point with fire on aircraft and in water laid with aircraft fuel/fire. Primary search completed and none found. Reported as such to Command

Assisted 3 Hanscom Fire Fighters with setting up handline to apply agent to aircraft. When line was in operation Rescue-32 and I did a secondary search and found none, reported to command.

Was requested by command to help Lincoln Fire with bringing booms to river to lay across. Helped 2 fire fighters from Hanscom Fire and 3 guys from Lincoln Fire, bringing booms through bushes and putting across Shawsheen. Lexington fire was putting their ladder into operation to extend ladder over river to allow handline operation a better water/foam stream access. At this point, fire appeared to be extinguished with minor flare ups that were monitored by the handline operators. .

Once no more flare ups were observed and fire was declared out was advised by Operations command (Ch-2) to return to station to re-service vehicle(s).

This statement is true to the best of my ability.

[redacted]

Todd Grierson

Hanscom AFB Fire Department

Fire Fighter/Haz-Mat Technician

On Saturday, May 31 2014 I responded with my crew to a reported aircraft crash at the end of Runway 11. My Crew was Firefighter Patrick Steen, who drove the Engine, Firfighter Shane Lewis who drove Crash 10 (P-19) and Firefighter Craig Fessendon who drove tanker 7. I rode with Firefighter Lewis in the crash truck.

Before leaving the station we noted substantial fire toward the end of the runway. Upon our approach to the Scene I noted fire in the grass leading up to and throug a fence and into what at first appeared to be a culvert. We were careful on approach to stay out of any debris field.

Once on scene and within range of our roof turrets we began applying agent on the fire. When I felt like the truck was in a good position to fight the main body of the fire, I got out of the TRUCK, went to the edge of the culvert as close as I dared to get an Idea of what was happening. I yelled as loudly as I could to see if anyone was able to hear me and to see if anyone answered me back. There was no response from my calls. At That time there was what seemed to be a minor "Secondary explosion" and I moved back to the Crash truck.

After the initial fire attack was underway I went to the command vehicle and assisted Chief Seguin with the deployment and direction of the resupply operation, directing Engine 4 to lay a large diameter hose from the hydrant to Tanker 7, I had Firefighter Steen go back to the Station and bring the foam supply trailer to the Scene.

11 to

Interview:	Mr. Bob Hildreth, Fire Chief, 66th Civil Engineer Squadron, Hanscom AFB, Bedford, MA
Date:	23 July 2014
Location:	Fire Station, Hanscom AFB, Bedford, MA
Representative:	None
Present:	Peter Wentz (NTSB), Deputy Chief Dan Dillon (HAFBFD), Bob Kenyon (HAFBFD), Glen Haffner (HAFBFD), Keith Leonhardt (Massport), Ted Costa (Massport Fire (BOS))

Chief Hildreth was asked how the primary "crash" phone was operated. He stated the primary emergency phone rang down to five locations: 1) Hanscom fire 2) Massachusetts State Police 3) Airport Operations 4) Air Force Command Post and 5) Action Ambulance.

Chief Hildreth was asked why the tower called back to the fire dispatcher 27 seconds after the initial call and asked if they (the fire department) received the initial call. Chief Hildreth stated that he could not explain the second call. He asked his dispatcher and the dispatcher had no explanation. Chief Hildreth stated "he (the dispatcher) was confused."

Chief Hildreth was asked if there was anyone in the Air Force that would be the equivalent of an FAA Part 139 inspector. Chief Hildreth stated that the Inspector General (IG) conducted inspections every 3 to 5 years at Hanscom AFB. Chief Hildreth was asked if the IG conducted timed ARFF response drills. Chief Hildreth replied "no, and I can tell you why, it's because I do not have an ARFF mission. I'm only structural." Chief Hildreth was asked if the Air Force IG knew about the Massport DoD contract. Chief Hildreth replied "no." Chief Hildreth was asked if anyone conducted timed ARFF trials. Chief Hildreth responded by pointing to Mr. Leonhardt and stated that the airport operator can.[1]

Chief Hildreth was asked about Lexington fire trying to enter cockpit at 23:28:08 and why it took 1:47:46 to try and gain entry to the airplane. He stated he was not at the airport but that Deputy Dillon may know. Deputy Dillon stated that he arrived on scene and asked Ms. Kerry Fadden several times for a manifest. He stated she called for the manifest but she never received it. Keith Leonhardt stated that Kerri Fadden called flight support and they did not give her a number of persons onboard.

Deputy Dillon stated he asked Commander Seguin about the flight deck and whether someone could be alive. Deputy Dillon was asked at what time he left the airport property and went outside the fence to locate the airplane on the other side of the ravine. Deputy Dillon stated they did not know how to get around to the other side so he requested a map. Chief Hildreth stated that "we have never physically been over to that side of the ravine." Chief Hildreth also

[1] Mr. Leonhardt explained that each year the Hanscom fire department conducted? actual timed events from throughout the year and that those times were averaged and provided to the FAA before the annual Part 139 inspection.

stated that if the accident had happened at the other end of the 11/29 runway he would have known how to get off of the airport property because he had responded to an accident at that end in the past.

Chief Hildreth was asked about radio communications. He stated that the Air Force has a low band VHF primary radio and a mid-band UHF mutual aid radio. Chief Hildreth stated that all four mutual aid fire chiefs were working under unified command with Deputy Dillon. Chief Hildreth was asked if mutual aid can talk directly to the HAFBFD dispatcher or the ATCT and he replied "no." Chief Hildreth was asked if there is a standard operating procedure (SOP) or procedures manual that mutual aid companies would follow while assisting HAFBFD. Chief Hildreth stated "no," although the HAFBFD had a number of mutual aid radios to hand out to incoming mutual aid fire departments. Chief Hildreth stated that did not happen on May 31, 2014. Chief Hildreth stated that this was a known problem and they have been trying to fix it for ten years.

Interviewee:	Mr. Jim Podolske, Air Force Fire Chief
Date / Time:	November 21, 2014 10:01am – 10:57am
Location:	Telephone interview
Representative:	None
Present:	Peter Wentz (NTSB), Phillip Davenport (FAA), Keith Leonhardt (Massport), Ted Costa (Massport Fire (BOS))

Mr. Jim Polodiske was the Air Force Fire Chief and was responsible for policies and procedures for 180 Air Force installations and just under 10,000 firefighters. He had oversight for the entire Air Force firefighting organization. He stated Chief Bob Hildreth's supervisor would be the base engineer or a GS 13, GS 14 equivalent at Hanscom AFB. Mr. Polodiske stated that the Air National Guard had 67 bases and 57 were joint use facilities, meaning that the airfields wre combined with FAA and municipal airports. The Air Force had installations in all 50 states and 7 continents. Hanscom Air Force Base's ARFF contract was unique and "the only one like that." The others were joint use where the Air National Guard and civil aviation both use the airfield. Mr. Polodiske was asked if Hanscom Air Force Base had any military aircraft that flew in and out on a daily basis. He stated that Mr. Mike Davis (the commander at Hanscom AFB) told him that only one Boeing 707 flew once or twice a month. It was housed in a hangar at Hanscom.

Mr. Polodiske stated that his predecessor, Chief Warner, worked with the FAA to develop an approved document for inspecting joint use airfields and developed the DoD contract. Both the Air Force and the FAA looked at the training and the inspections and Chief Warner signed the document that was in place at the time of the accident. Mr. Polodiske was asked if the two firefighters and one crash truck designated in the contract would be enough fire support to effectively fight an aircraft fire. He stated that the Air Force fire department would, in addition to the two firefighters, send other resources to support the incident and that the contract only paid for those two firefighters and one truck.

Mr. Polodiske was asked about IG inspections. He stated that the IG no longer conducted physical inspections of installations. The IG process used a a management inspection criteria tool (MICT) software program where the commander checked off lists of items. He stated it was a lot of point and click and the information was saved in a software-style report. The local installation then performed a self-inspection. The Air Force had completely changed the IG inspection from what they used to do. The IG started doing the MICT process for a few years ago. It was being critiqued and changed on a daily basis. The software program is used to manage risk.

Mr. Polodiske was asked if Chief Hildreth had an ARFF mission. He stated that because of the contract with Massport that the Air Force was responsible for fire protection of the Bedford airport. When told that Chief Hildreth stated in an interview that he did not have an ARFF mission, Mr. Polodiske stated that because the Air Force does not fly in and out on a daily basis, Chief Hildreth's main responsibility was to protect the structural buildings of the installation, but that because of the DoD contract the fire department was also responsible for airfield fire protection under the DoD contract.

He was asked if the IG reviewed the DoD joint use airfields triennial exercises as part of their inspections. He stated that they did review the triennial exercisess and it was part of the MICT inspection. He was asked whether would the IG question the local department if, during a triennial inspection, there were discrepancies found with the Air Force fire department.

Mr. Polodiske was asked whether he knew about the VHF/UHF radio communication issues. He stated that he had never heard to the radio issue but that the Air Force had a communication squadron to take care of issues like this and, if needed, the HAFBFD could file an Air Force form 132-15. The communications squadron would then come up with a solution to enhance radio communications. Mr. Polodiske was asked why the HAFBFD had problems finding the gate to leave the airport property and locate the accident airplane. He stated that HAFBFD should have done an AFTO form 88 study to predict and plan for an off-airport incident. He stated they would then know how to conduct ARFF operations off-airport. The Air Force has an FDS training plan that was used to train all 180 installations.

Mr. Polodiske was asked how the Air Force trained for aircraft entry and rescue. He stated they performed aircraft familiarization egress drills on all mission-assigned aircraft and hands-on firefighting drills. He also stated that the Air Force would do familiarization training on civil aircraft at joint use bases. When asked about how much foam the HAFBFD used on the night of the accident, Mr. Polodiske stated he did not know how much was used but that he had read an email stating they had 300 gallons left over and that they used 3% foam. He also stated the ARFF vehicle should have been able to resupply with water two times before running out of foam. He was asked if the FAA had ever reviewed the Air Force's FDS training program and he was not certain if that had been done. Mr. Polodiske was asked about the risk analysis and if they follow the NFPA standards for off-airport operations training and he stated that the fire chief should have a plan of attack for both on-airport and off-airport incidents. He stated that each fire chief should have a standard of cover plan for their base of operation.

Interviewee:	Laurie J. Dragonas (Federal Aviatin Administration, Lead Airport Certification Safety Inspector, New England Region)
Date / Time:	September 26, 2014 10:06am – 11:03am
Location:	Telephone interview
Representative:	R. Brook Lewis (FAA Senior Attorney)
Present:	Peter Wentz (NTSB), Phillip Davenport (FAA), Keith Leonhardt (Massport), Ted Costa (Massport Fire (BOS))

Ms. Dragonas started with the FAA in Decemeber 1991. She worked as support staff in general aviation. In 1996 she worked in the FAA airport planning unit in Alaska and became an FAA Part 139 inspector in New England later that year. She became the lead inspector for the New England region in 2010.

Ms. Dragonas attended the FAA Part 139 inspector course twice, once while working in Alaska and again in April 1996. Ms. Dragonas also attended recurrent FAA 139 training annually.

Ms. Dragonas stated that the New England region oversaw 21 airports with 6 of those airports operating under DoD ARFF contracts. The 6 DoD contract airports are Portsmouth, MA (PSM), Westover Metropolitan (CEF), Westfield-Barnes Regional (BAF), Bangor International (BGR), Burlington International (BVT) and Hanscom Field (BED). Ms. Dragonas stated that Part 139 required an annual inspection. Twenty of the 21 airports were inspected on an average of every 12 months while one airport was inactive (Bridgeport, CT).

Ms. Dragonas stated an FAA Part 139 inspection was conducted every year starting in July. Ms. Dragonas set the schedule for the year starting Oct 1st. She coordinated 6 months ahead of time. Two weeks ahead of the inspection she sent out a letter to the airport manager and reminded the airport manager about the airport paperwork that will be reviewed during the inspection. She also informed them if other inspectors would be joining the inspection.

On the day of the inspection she conducted an in-brief with the operations manager, airport manager, representatives from the FBOs, control tower and the USDA biologist if there are wildlife issues. During the in-brief the different inspections (such as the fueling inspection) are scheduled. They coordinated what night they will do the lighting inspection and let the tower know time to schedule the tower manager interview.

When there was a DoD contract for ARFF at the airport, the FAA did not inspect the fire station, perform timed vehicle responses or examine firefighting equipment. It was up to the airport operator to provide the paperwork to the FAA inspector per the Part 139 CertAlert that was issued in July 2012. Depending on the size of the airport, an inspection could take 1.5 days to 1.5 weeks. Boston Logan took about 1.5 weeks, but for most airports it usually took 3 days. Bedford's last inspection was March 2014. It was a joint inspection done by Ms. Dragonas and John Mercq (a part time inspector and also a project engineer). He did just enough inspections to keep his qualification. Ms. Dragonas stated that she gave him the Bedford inspection

because it was close to his home and so that they could work together to evaluate each other's skills. The inspection was March 25 through March 27, but Ms. Dragonas did not attend on the 26th.

Ms. Dragonas stated that the Bedford inspection was simplified due to the DoD contract, and that they "followed the CertAlert." FAA inspectors will not inspect DoD facilities, equipment, vehicles, or timed drills. In accordance with the agreement, the airport operator provided the inspector with 3 pieces of paper which are reviewed. In almost every instance they looked the same. The only difference was the types of vehicles and the names of firefighters. Ms. Dragonas stated that in one instance the FAA inspector did not like the paperwork and returned it because it only had the last names of the firefighters. It was resubmitted the next day.

Ms. Dragonas stated the last full inspection of the fire department at Bedford by the FAA was Jan 2009 by an inspector named Luarie Supmeyer who is no longer in the region. The CertAlert provided information on what FAA inspectors can and cannot do in an inspection. It did not provide any guidance to the airport operator on how to conduct an inspection. It also did not give the FAA inspector any guidance on how to work with a DoD contract operator.

Ms. Dragonas stated that all 6 airports in the region with DoD contracts operate the same as to the Part 139 inspections. She also stated the airports in the region have revamped their airports emergency plans (AEP) to be in line with NIMS. The airport emergency plan advisory circular was rewritten to provide current information. All the airports AEP's were in review. It generally took several reviews, submitting back and forth, before the FAA felt the plan was acceptable.
In this region Mr. Kelly Slusarski reviewed all airport emergency plans. Ms. Dragonas reviewed all of the wildlife plans. She had not reviewed the AEP for Bedford. At the time of the accident Bedford was operating under an old plan and were probably going back and forth with Mr. Slusarski about their revision. The current plan in their manual was dated 2005. The March 2014 inspection had one discrepancy and it had to do with fuel trucks that did not meet NFPA standards. Two of the trucks were owned by Signature and did not have a forward hinge on the dome cover. When a violation was discovered the FAA inspector will give the operator a letter of correction (LOC) and date to fix the discrepancy that both agree upon. The letter was written on March 14, 2014 and was corrected by April 15, 2014.

Ms. Dragonas stated that firefighter services can be provided to an airport by different means, city owned, airport operator provided or contractor provided. There are three sections in the AEP that refer to ARFF requirements – 1.) Index, Equipment and Agents, 2.) Operations, and 3.) Personnel. ARFF personnel were required to know the safety and movement areas of the airport. The movement area does not go outside the airport and was the runways and taxiways on the airport. ARFF personnel should be familiar with all areas on the airport and anything on the grid map which was in the AEP. Bedford had a grid map in their AEP. Ms. Dragonas expected that firefighters were training with a grid map as part of their familiarization training. She stated "as an inspector, I don't look for a grid map. A grid map is for firefighters, EMS, control tower personnel to explain quickly where things are located." Ms. Dragonas was asked if ARFF personnel should know where all the emergency gates were located at each airport, she

responded that all ARFF operators should know the layout of the airport and where all the gates are located.

Ms. Dragonas believed firefighters should receive aircraft familiarization on every air carrier aircraft that flies into their airport. GA aircraft familiarization is not required. FAA inspectors inspect the airport operator's ability and knowledge of their own airport. When she inspected an operator she rode along and watched that the airport was following the 139 inspection checklist. Ms. Dragonas would have the operator tell her what is correct or incorrect about each portion of the 139 inspection and what would pass or fail.

When looking at light systems, she first ensures it is operational. For anything that was mounted in the safety area, she checks to see that the mount is frangible and no more than 3 inches above grade. Items outside of the safety area may have a frangible mount but it's not required by 139. The FAA does not oversee the airport triennial drills, but they do try to attend as many as possible. The FAA only requires certain class airport to conduct triennial drills, but the airport operator does not have to have the FAA approve the drill and there is not a time limit when the airport must report any drill discrepancies to the FAA. The 139 inspector will review the triennial drill or tabletop at the next 139 inspection.