

Docket No. SA-522

Exhibit No. 7-U

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C.

Airbus Report
“AAL587 Crash: Study of Aeroelastic Scenarios”

(7 Pages)

①



A-NTSB

009410

DEPARTEMENT : ██████ SECTION : GO :	REFERENCE : 529.0206/2002 EDITION : 01 PROJET : REF. PROJET : O.F. : ATA : -- CLIENT :	TOME : REV :
PROGRAMME : OU AFFAIRE : DATE : 6/06/2002		
TITRE : AAL587 Crash : Study of Aeroelastics scenarios		
AUTEUR(S) : ██████████		
<p>RESUME :</p> <p>The aim of this document is to provide for different initial failure scenarios an aeroelastic analysis, which could help to determine in which conditions dynamic loads induced by the aeroelastic behaviour added to steady loads could participate to the understanding of AAL587 Crash.</p> <p>In a preliminary part a presentation of used data and nominal aeroelastic behaviour is shown. As appendix all certification documents concerning aeroelastic justification are mentioned.</p> <p>The second part investigates different scenarios :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - S1 : Failures of all servo-controls leading to a rudder free to rotate - S2 : Split of the rudder in two parts with a separation occurring above the servo-controls - S3 : S2 plus the loss of the rudder bottom part <p>For each scenario an aeroelastic analysis is performed.</p>		
MOTS CLES : AEROELASTICITY		
LIENS :		
NATURE : NT	LANGUE : F	ANNULE REMPLACE : N
DOCUMENT EXTERNE		PAGES A ARCHIVER :
EMETTEUR : EDITION : 01 REF. : DATE :	APPROBATION Nom : ██████████ Sigle : ██████████ Date : 18/06/2002 Visa :	APPROBATION Nom : ██████████ Sigle : ██████████ Date : 18/06/2002 Visa :

AIRBUS, AN EADS JOINT COMPANY
WITH BAE SYSTEMS

AIRBUS France
SOCIETE PAR ACTIONS SIMPLIFIEE
AU CAPITAL DE 76 558 233 EUROS
RCS N° 393 341 532 TOULOUSE

SIEGE SOCIAL
316 ROUTE DE BAYONNE
31060 TOULOUSE CEDEX 03, FRANCE
PHONE +33 (0)5 61 93 55 55

Le contenu de ce document est la propriété d'AIRBUS FRANCE. Il est fourni à titre confidentiel et le secret industriel quant à son contenu doit être gardé. Il ne doit en aucun cas être utilisé à d'autres fins que celles pour lesquelles il est fourni et les informations qu'il contient ne peuvent être divulguées à des tiers non habilités. Il ne peut être, en partie ou en totalité, reproduit sans autorisation écrite d'AIRBUS FRANCE. © AIRBUS FRANCE 2002. Tous droits réservés

The content of this document is the property of AIRBUS FRANCE. It is supplied in confidence and commercial security on its contents must be maintained. It must not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied nor may information contained in it be disclosed to unauthorised persons. It must not be reproduced in whole or in part without permission in writing from AIRBUS FRANCE. AIRBUS FRANCE Trade Secrets or Commercial or Financial information, 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (4). © AIRBUS FRANCE 2002. All rights reserved.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 4

2. INPUT DATA 4

3. NOMINAL AEROELASTIC BEHAVIOUR 4

4. AEROELASTIC INVESTIGATIONS ON DIFFERENTS SCENARIOS 4

4.1 S1 : FAILURE OF ALL SERVO-CONTROLS LEADING TO A RUDDER FREE TO ROTATE..... 5

4.2 S2 : SPLIT OF THE RUDDER IN TWO PARTS 5

4.3 S3 : SPLIT OF THE RUDDER IN TWO PARTS PLUS LOSS OF RUDDER LOWER PART 5

5. CONCLUSIONS 6



1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this document is to provide for different initial failure scenarios an aeroelastic analysis to determine in which conditions dynamic loads induced by the aeroelastic behaviour added to steady loads could participate to the understanding of AAL587 Crash.

In a preliminary part a presentation of used data and nominal aeroelastic behaviour is shown. As appendix all certification documents concerning aeroelastic justification are mentioned.

The second part investigates different scenarios :

- S1 : Failures of all servo-controls leading to a rudder free to rotate
- S2 : Split of the rudder in two parts with a separation occurring above the servo-controls
- S3 : S2 plus the loss of the rudder bottom part

For each scenario an aeroelastic analysis is performed.

The third part analyses the tasks to be accomplished to complement existing studies.

2. INPUT DATA

The aeroelastics analysis presented in this document are based on an Aircraft Rear Part Nastran Finite Element Model (FEM) including Rear Fuselage, Vertical Tailplane+Rudder and Horizontal Tailplane+Elevator. Such model is fully adapted to the studied aeroelastic mechanisms.

The unsteady aerodynamic model is based on Doublet Lattice Method and includes an adjustment of control surfaces hinge moments.

Flutter calculations are performed with 1% of modal damping and the equation is solved using p-k method.

3. NOMINAL AEROELASTIC BEHAVIOUR

A modal analysis, using NASTRAN solver, of the Aircraft Rear Part FEM in nominal configuration was performed giving :

- A Fin Bending Mode at 6.62Hz (See Figure 1)
- A Rudder Rotation Mode at 12.58Hz (See Figure 2).

A flutter calculation was performed using the first 39 flexible modes with unsteady airloads at Mach 0.38 (See Figure 3). No instability and no loss of damping with speed increasing is shown.

4. AEROELASTIC INVESTIGATIONS ON DIFFERENTS SCENARIOS

Three scenarios are studied :

- S1 : Failures of all servo-controls leading to a rudder free to rotate



- S2 : Split of the rudder in two parts with a separation occurring above the servo-controls

A-NTSB

- S3 : S2 plus the loss of the rudder bottom part

009413

The objective of this chapter is not to explain in which conditions such scenarios could occur but, taking as initial hypothesis each one, to study the induced aeroelastic behaviour.

4.1 S1 : FAILURES OF ALL SERVO-CONTROLS LEADING TO A RUDDER FREE TO ROTATE

This scenario considers the rudder as free in rotation after the failure of all servocontrols.

In such conditions the modal analysis shows :

- A Rudder Rotation Mode at 0Hz (See Figure 4).
- A Fin Bending Mode at 7.06Hz (See Figure 5). Compared to the nominal configuration a small increase in frequency is noticed and, concerning the mode shape, we can observe that the rudder rotates in opposition to the fin bending, which is characteristic for an unbalanced control surface behaviour.

A flutter calculation was performed using the first 39 flexible modes with unsteady airloads at Mach 0.38 (See Figure 6). A coupling appears between Rudder Rotation and Fin bending modes : the aircraft remains stable with a minimum damping around 1.2% at 360kts CAS.

4.2 S2 : SPLIT OF THE RUDDER IN TWO PARTS

This scenario considers the rudder as splitted in two parts with a separation occurring above the servo-controls.

In such conditions the modal analysis shows :

- A Rudder Upper Part Rotation Mode at 0Hz (See Figure 7).
- A Fin Bending Mode at 7.17Hz (See Figure 8). Compared to the nominal configuration a small increase in frequency is noticed and, concerning the mode shape, we can observe that the rudder upper part rotates in opposition to the fin bending, which is characteristic for an unbalanced control surface behaviour.
- A Rudder Lower Part Rotation Mode at 14.64Hz (See Figure 9).

A flutter calculation was performed using the first 39 flexible modes with unsteady airloads at Mach 0.38 (See Figure 10). A coupling appears between Rudder Upper Part Rotation and Fin bending modes : the aircraft is unstable with a critical flutter speed at 240kts CAS and a damping loss gradient around 2%/10kts.

4.3 S3 : SPLIT OF THE RUDDER IN TWO PARTS PLUS LOSS OF RUDDER LOWER PART

This scenario considers the rudder as splitted in two parts with a separation occurring above the servo-controls as in scenario S2 but with additionally the loss of the Rudder Lower Part.

In such conditions the modal analysis shows :

- A Rudder Upper Part Rotation Mode at 0Hz (See Figure 11).

Ce document est la propriété d'AIRBUS FRANCE : il ne peut être communiqué à des tiers et/ou reproduit sans autorisation préalable écrite d'AIRBUS FRANCE et son contenu ne peut être divulgué © AIRBUS FRANCE 2002

The content of this document is the property of AIRBUS FRANCE. It must not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied nor may information contained in it be disclosed to unauthorised persons. It must not be reproduced in whole or in part without permission in writing from AIRBUS FRANCE. © AIRBUS FRANCE 2002. All rights reserved.

- A Fin Bending Mode at 7.26Hz (See Figure 12). Compared to the nominal configuration a small increase in frequency is noticed and, concerning the mode shape, we can observe that the rudder upper part rotates in opposition to the fin bending. But this opposite rotation of the Rudder Upper Part is significantly reduced compared to S2 scenario.

A flutter calculation was performed using the first 39 flexible modes with unsteady airloads at Mach 0.38 (See Figure 13). A coupling appears between Rudder Upper Part Rotation and Fin bending modes : the aircraft is unstable with a critical flutter speed at 235kts CAS and a damping loss gradient around 2%/10kts. Compared to S2 scenario behaviour the coupling appears slightly worse with a loss of 5kts in flutter critical speed.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Aeroelastic analysis was performed at mach 0.38 to identify potential flutter issues from initial failure hypothesis in the context of AAL587 crash study support. This study performed on a A300 Rear Part Aeroelastic Model demonstrates that :

- In case of servo-controls failures leading to a rudder free to rotate, the aircraft remains free of flutter. A Lateral Fin bending and Rudder Rotation modes coupling appears with sufficient margins and an acceptable minimum damping at very high speed (360kts CAS).

With a Rudder split in two parts upside the upper servocontrol, combined or not with the loss of the Rudder Lower Part, a strong instability appears at 240kts CAS from the coupling of Rudder Upper Part free Rotation and Lateral Fin Bending modes.

A-NTSB

009414



6. APPENDIX

6.1 SUMMARY OF A300-605R AIRCRAFT FLUTTER JUSTIFICATION

The summary of A300-605R whole aircraft flutter justification has been produced in Ref.1.

The absence of Fin and Rudder flutter has been shown on the basis of normal cases and failure cases analysis validated by test results.

The analysis cases are reported in two documents :

- Ref.1 : Normal cases and double hydraulic failure of rudder actuators.
- Ref.2 : Structural failures on spars, frames and skin of Vertical tail resulting in loss of stiffness, and water ingress in rudder.

Those documents proves that A300-605R meets requirements of FAR25-629, 343-b(3) and 251 (b).

Ref.1 : "A300-600R Summary of Flutter Divergence and Reversal Justification 00//X-003-10-109S32 Ed01"

Ref.2 : "A310-200/300 Flutter calculation in failure cases MBB-UT Bremen 00X003-77007/C22 - Iss2&3&Appendix1"

A-NTSB

009415