NTSB Meetings

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Scaled Composites History

- Founded by Burt Rutan 33 years ago
- Develops "proof-of-concept" aircraft
 - Prototypes/demonstrators not mass production
 - Relies on efficient design/building for simplicity and safety
 - Designs are further refined through test flights
 - Test flights conducted under experimental permits/certificates
- Successfully designed & tested 30 manned aircraft
- Recognized for breakthrough aircraft
 - Proteus & GlobalFlyer
 - SpaceShipOne





Scaled's Culture & People

- Carefully selects employees with multi-disciplinary expertise
 - Roughly half are pilots
 - Allows participation in different aspects of projects
 - Safer and more efficient than "siloed" approach
 - Test pilots are also engineers, often involved in designing the prototype being flown
- "Question, don't defend"
 - Every employee responsible for quality and safety
 - Uses industry-recognized methods to assess safety






SpaceShipTwo – Background

- Originated in 2006 to create a prototype for Virgin Galactic's program goals
- Evolved from SS1 design
 - Simple, proven technologies
 - Feather system
- Explanation of SS2 nominal flight procedures





SpaceShipTwo – Background





Probable Cause Of Accident

• Unanticipated early unlock of the feather locks



SS2 Crew Was Well-Trained

- PF04 pilot and copilot were fully qualified
 - Thousands of hours of flight time
 - Prior flights in SS1 and SS2
 - Highly-credentialed aerospace engineers
- Extensive training for PF04
 - Review and revision of documentation
 - Numerous formal and informal simulator sessions
 - Other training (high-G/unusual attitude, WK2, CRM)
- No evidence of personal issues/distractions





SS2 Was Carefully Designed

- Used proven technologies to limit potential failures
- Feather system was rigorously evaluated
 - Safety-critical for reentry
 - Avoided complex components that could increase risk
- Feather locks were a fundamental design feature
- Design was successfully tested 50+ times
- Feather system successfully actuated on 9 test flights
- Case study Glide Flight 16



Feather Procedures

- Awareness of need for locks during start of boost
 - Repeatedly discussed by engineers and test pilots
 - Test pilots understood early unlock could be catastrophic
- Feather unlock procedure was fundamental to SS2
- 1.4 Mach number provided safe margins
- Scaled/VG evaluated alternatives
 - Procedural mitigation offered advantages
- Procedure was repeatedly documented
- "Challenge-response" procedure not practical
- Repeatedly practiced in sims without incident





Scaled's Safety Culture

- Scaled's safety principle: Question, never defend
- Communicates lessons learned across projects
- Performs incremental envelope expansion in flight test programs to help mitigate risks





Scaled's Safety Culture

- Systems Safety Assessment
 - Used industry-standard methodology and FAA guidance
 - Included functional hazard, fault tree, and common mode analyses
 - More rigorous than hazard analysis required for experimental rockets
 - Analyzed human and software error in accordance with FAA guidance
 - Assumed that standard tasks would be performed correctly
 - Quantified human error in responding to functional hazards
- FRRs
- Pre-flight checks





Compliance With Regulations

- Operated under a valid FAA Experimental Permit
 - Confirmed by the FAA, in writing, post-accident
- Scaled worked closely with the FAA throughout
 - Numerous pre-application consultations
 - Draft permit applications and systems safety assessments
 - Permit issued in May 2012
 - Condition relating to updated hazard analysis satisfied before PF01
 - Permit renewed without that condition in May 2013
- July 2013 waiver
 - Not requested by Scaled
 - Did not explicitly list conditions
 - Waiver renewed; FAA continued to work with Scaled
- FAA representatives present at test flights, simulator sessions





Recommendations

- Scaled is committed to learning from the accident
- Recommendations for enhanced safety procedures
 - Training, Communication, and Documentation
 - Any possibility of immediate catastrophic loss of the vehicle
 - Test pilot compliance with training/currency requirements
 - Flight test training sim session data relating to human performance
 - Vehicle and procedure changes
 - Human Performance and Procedures
 - Evaluating mitigations for single crew actions w/potential catastrophic loss
 - Human performance expert
 - Human performance limitations in systems safety assessments
 - Emergency Response
 - Improve understanding of local assets; criteria for enhanced response





Actions Already Implemented

- Following the accident:
 - Grounded all test aircraft and conducted return-to-flight FRRs
 - Instituted formal recurring return-to-flight FRRs
 - Test pilots now report to the Director of Flight Operations
 - Evaluated parachutes and established standard configuration
 - Standardized parachute training and instituted initial and recurrent training requirements
 - Aircrew training now documented in a central online folder





Questions

