



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: William Siegel**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### Narrative:

Mr. William Siegel was contacted by phone on June 18, 2014, at 2045 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED]. He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED]. He indicated he is type rated in the accident airplane.

He indicated that the airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and the maintenance records are located in Birmingham, AL. The airplane is on the CAMP program, and is maintained by Jet Harbor located at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. When flying they used the Flight Safety Checklist.

He indicated that Robin G. Smith of Jet Contrails was giving recurrent checkrides. His pilot certificate number is [REDACTED]. He (William Siegel) has taken a checkride with Mr. Smith in the accident airplane and during a checkride he would give an engine cut after V1 speed when the flight was 10 to 15 feet above ground level. He indicated that Mr. Smith always briefed what was to be performed during a checkride.

He indicated both pilot receiving the checkrides were contract pilots for his company. He provided the following information about them:

Kenneth Rousseau – Pilot certificate number [REDACTED]. He flew right seat with his company and had about 20,000 hours flight time.

William Christopher – Pilot certificate number [REDACTED]. He flew right seat with his company and had between 12,000 and 15,000 flight hours. He also flew the Astra, Challenger, and would fly as a captain in the Westwind.

He indicated that the airplane is used as a corporate/executive airplane and has been owned since 2003 (FAA Records indicate the airplane was purchased on April 10, 2003). The airplane is equipped with winglets, and is configured with a total of 10 seats plus the lavatory seat equipped with a restraint. The airplane has 5 chairs/seats and a couch that seats 3.

He provided the following timeline for June 18, 2014 – Mr. Smith flew into BHM and landed about 1000. They had an early lunch about 1100, and he estimated that the flight departed BHM between 1230 and 1300. He indicated that they put on extra fuel, and estimated that they had enough fuel for about 3 hours.

Based on the circumstances of the accident, to him it sounded like a dutch roll occurred. He also wondered if Mr. Smith pulled an engine.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: William Siegel**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### Narrative:

Mr. William Siegel was contacted by phone on June 22, 2014, at 1300 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED]

He indicated that the airplane empty weight is possibly on his computer; the weight and balance was done manually. He thinks the BOW was 13,400.

On the accident date the fuel load at takeoff was 4,800 pounds because he fueled the airplane from his own fuel farm. Before fueling the fuel load was 2,800 pounds and they added 300 gallons. No fuel was in the tip tanks. The airplane holds 8,812 pounds of fuel. The main fuel tanks are between the cabin and are bladder. The wings gravity feed to the fuselage.

During the typical checkride, Mr. Smith is in the right seat. He would give an engine cut when the flight was between 20 and 30 feet above ground level (agl) as a positive climb rate occurs and the landing gear is coming up. Mr. Smith would ease the thrust lever back.

He indicated he might have pictures of the cockpit and will provide.

With respect to both airman getting checkrides, both were qualified as captains. He indicated that he always flew from the left seat and would have a contract pilot in the right seat. On trips that he was not available, Christopher would fly from the left seat.

With respect to the thrust reverser annunciators, blue lights indicated they were armed and red lights indicated they were unsafe. The annunciator for the thrust reversers was located in the middle of the panel and were split type lamps. The switches to arm the thrust reversers were under the throttles.

He indicated that he has flown the airplane since 2003, and since then there have not been any issues with the thrust reversers. He indicated that the thrust reverser system has an accumulator that will allow for 1 cycle of the reversers. The thrust reverser system is designed so that if one thrust reverser were to open, the system would bring the power for that side back to idle.

With respect to William Christopher, he had attended CAE SimuFlite located in Dallas, Texas. He quit using the training schools because 2 days of training took 5 days total.

He indicated that he has flown with Mr. Rousseau since 1987, and with Mr. Christopher since 1997, 1998, or 1999.

He was asked to provide the following data:

1. From the training manual the cockpit display
2. Weight and Balance
3. Pictures of the cockpit of the accident airplane
4. Copy of Checklist utilized

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: June 30, 2014**  
**Person Contacted: Michael Jansen**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### Narrative:

Mr. Michael Jansen was contacted by phone on June 27, 2014, at 1625 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED]. He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED]. He stated that he was a safety officer in the U.S. Air Force, and was familiar with the accident investigation process.

He stated that on the date and time of the accident, he was inside the cockpit of a DeHavilland DHC-8-106, N984HA that was on taxiway W5 facing east. He was the pilot-in-command of the airplane and experienced a failure of the left engine after takeoff between 1,000 and 1,500 feet from HSV. They returned single engine and landed uneventfully about 1845 UTC. While on the ground, he observed the accident airplane doing pattern work, but he did not personally witness the takeoff sequence. He did state that crew members that were around his airplane witnessed the takeoff sequence and got his attention. He witnessed the fireball.

He mentioned that he asked crew members to write down immediately what they had seen or heard so they would not forget. I asked him for their contact information and he advised he would provide.

I also asked him for his statement concerning the left engine as it sounded as if it were a safety issue. He advised he would provide.

The digest was e-mailed to him for review on June 27, 2014, at 1730 EDT. He responded on June 30, 2014, at 1057 EDT, with, "Concur."



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: William Siegel**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### **Narrative:**

Mr. William Siegel contacted NTSB by phone on July 10, 2014, at 1547 EDT. The phone number was not recorded.

He indicated that during checkride flights and engine cut, Mr. Smith always blocked the rudder.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: William Siegel**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### **Narrative:**

Mr. William Siegel was contacted by phone on December 10, 2014, at 1725 EST. He was called at [REDACTED]

He indicated that with respect to his audition of the cockpit voice recorder, he heard Mr. Christopher's voice on the inbound leg to Huntsville, and also heard the issue about the lack of brakes after landing there. He heard the left seat pilot's swap seats, and Mr. Rousseau was heard going through the checklist.

He indicated that Mr. Rousseau was qualified in the left seat, and both had done the same type of checkride with Mr. Smith the year before.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: William Siegel**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### Narrative:

Mr. William Siegel was contacted by phone on December 15, 2014, at 1159 EST. He was called at [REDACTED]

He confirmed that the airplane had 4,800 pounds of fuel on-board when it departed BHM. He indicated that the typical fuel burn for a 1 hour 20 minute checkride type flight is 1,500 pounds-per-hour. We discussed the weight and balance that he sent to NTSN on 6/22/2014, and he indicated that fuel burn changes the center of gravity minimally.

With respect to the seating location of the pilot in the back, he estimated that Mr. Christopher would be seated in the couch which is located on the right side of the airplane cabin.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.





## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: Chris Scott**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### Narrative:

Captain Chris Scott contacted NTSB on March 28, 2015, at 1330 EDT. He called from [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. He provided a work phone of [REDACTED] and an e-mail address of [REDACTED].

He indicated that he was in a fire truck that was at the disabled airplane, and he responded to the accident site. He was the first person on-scene and was the on-scene commander. He didn't recall the engines still running when he arrived, but he doesn't remember any loud noise once arriving on-scene. He personally did a 360 degree walk around the scene and had need to draw attention to the engines as far as an issue that needed to be addressed. To extinguish the fire they used AFFF 3 percent with water. They did not use dry chemical or Halon. They did not spray any agent in the engines to get them to flame out. He did notice a ground fire and pooling of fuel fires, but no engine fire.

Parts of the airplane were on-fire, and he saw on the ground the oxygen tank and 2 bodies. He also saw 1 person in the airplane.

The digest was reviewed with him/her during the call and he agreed with the content.



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: Lawson Adams**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### Narrative:

Mr. Adams was contacted by phone on May 19, 2015, at 1334 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED]. He provided an e-mail address of [REDACTED].

He indicated that he has flown since 1978, and is an airframe and powerplant mechanic. He did hold an IA but gave it up. They own a Westwind II.

He indicated that he is interested in this case, and knew the PPE was aggressive. He talked with Dale Printy of Worthington Aviation about the accident, and was surprised about the V1 cut on the runway. Dale Lawson indicated that on a long runway that would not be a big deal. He indicates that he gives a V1 cut in the air.

Dale Lawson told him that he told NTSB there has never been inadvertent thrust reverser deployment.

He relayed a story involving Dick Washer, who was a training pilot and who experienced inadvertent thrust reverser deployment. He indicated it occurred in the early 1980's.

He speculated that if the training pilot was aggressive, and pulled back the thrust lever aggressively and there was slop in the system, the thrust reverser could have deployed. He indicated that Dick Washer has since passed away.

He indicated that the other day he did a check of his airplane ([REDACTED]) with hydraulic pressure and the accumulator. He checked to see if he brought the piggy back lever out of the stow detent, whether he could move the power lever forward. He could, but the thrust reverser did not deploy until he got the thrust lever to the idle detent.

He knows of maintenance where slop in the piggy back levers is loose, and on occasion when you move the power lever to idle, the piggy back lever could come out of the stow detent.

He indicated that he worked for Texaco for 21 years as the flight department manager in Houston, Texas. During that time he had 3 Westwind aircraft in their flight department (Texaco). There was 1 Westwind in Houston. He retired from there in 1999, and then went with Medical Holdings in 1999. While there, they also operated a Westwind (██████████). He was with Med Holdings from 1999 to 2013 as Chief Pilot, and then in 2013 he claimed social security. He still flies for and manages Medical Holdings.

The digest was reviewed with him/her during the call and he agreed with the content.



## RECORD OF CONVERSATION

**Timothy W. Monville**  
**Sr. Air Safety Investigator**  
**Eastern Region**

---

**Date: April 13, 2016**  
**Person Contacted: William Siegel**  
**NTSB Accident Number: ERA14FA300**

---

### Narrative:

Mr. William Siegel was contacted by phone on October 28, 2015, at 1216 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED]

He indicated that with respect to an engine cut, Mr. Smith would typically grab the knob of the thrust lever and not the piggy back lever because it was down.

He indicated that he was scheduled for a deposition on 11/9 or 11/10/2015.

He indicated that after the engine cut, you would need some left rudder input despite having full airplane nose left rudder trim. He questioned to himself when the airplane began rolling to the left why didn't the crew bring back the left thrust lever. If there was right rudder and left aileron input applied, that condition would result in a cross control situation.

He indicated that the rudder is effective between 70 and 80 knots, and the rudder trim for takeoff would be neutral.

With respect to the crew change while on the ground, that would normally never occur.

With respect to checklist usage, he required a challenge response to checklist items with his company.

With respect to the piggy back levers, they pop up over center to open, and then require you to pull them aft. That action would not require a great force, but they would not move on their own.

The digest was reviewed with him during the call and he agreed with the content.