



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Timothy W. Monville
Sr. Air Safety Investigator
Eastern Region

Date: May 12, 2017
Person Contacted: Daniel A. Haug
NTSB Accident Number: ERA17CA149

Narrative:

Mr. Haug was contacted by NTSB on April 12, 2017, at 1033 EDT. He was called at [REDACTED] and left a voice mail message. Mr. Haug returned the call the next day at 1226 EDT, calling from [REDACTED]

At the beginning of the phone call he was advised that the NTSB is a federal agency mandated by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents, and NTSB has no authority to take any action against any individual. He was also informed that the purpose of an NTSB investigation is for safety only, and any person NTSB talks with has the right to representation. He indicated that he has AOPA Pilot Protection Services, and he obtained an attorney on April 11, 2017. He also indicated that he had an in-depth discussion with his attorney on April 12, 2017. He indicated that he has nothing to hide, is willing to talk, and his attorney gave him permission to talk with FAA.

He was advised to consult with his attorney and ask if he could be interviewed by NTSB. He advised he would. He later indicated a conference call with him, his attorney, and NTSB would occur at 1500 EDT on April 19, 2017.

On April 19, 2017, at 1500 EDT, a conference call was held with Mr. Haug, his attorney (Bob Blodinger), and NTSB. The conference call was made to [REDACTED] using PIN 51415. Mr. Blodinger provided a phone number of [REDACTED] and e-mail addresses of [REDACTED]

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Mr. Haug asked several questions about the NTSB Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report, and indicated that he has completed 95% of it. The insurance adjuster took the maintenance records, and he is still pending information concerning the ELT. He was advised the questions would be addressed after obtaining information from the interview.

He provided an address of [REDACTED], Culpeper, VA [REDACTED]. His cell phone is [REDACTED], and his date of birth is [REDACTED]. His private pilot certificate number is [REDACTED], and he has ratings for airplane single engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane issued 12/12/2016 (due to losing his wallet). He has been flying since 1982, has about 1,951 hours total time, and 359 hours in make and model. He is 6 feet 1 inch tall.

The airplane is registered to SEJ Warbirds LLC, which he created to own the airplane. He is the sole principal owner. He has owned it since January 2014, and since then, has accrued 359 hours in it, which is based at CJR. The canopy slides aft, and the release is on the left side of the cockpit. The rear seat has to release his canopy and push forward.

He was contacted in the fall of 2016, asking if he could take Mr. John Reed Reavis, Jr., who is not a pilot on a local flight, but that could not occur at that time. It was decided to attempt the flight in the spring.

He provided the following timeline of events for the accident date:

He (Mr. Haug) is the unit leader for the Capital Wing of the Commemorative Air Force. He arrived at CJR before 0900, and had meetings between 0900-1030, 1030-1130, and 1130-1230. About 1230, he looked at the METAR for Culpeper Regional Airport (CJR), and noted the winds were OK. He did a preflight inspection of the airplane from memory while in the hangar, and tugged the airplane out of the hangar to the terminal. He discussed with Mr. Reavis and his family members information about the planned flight, and Mr. Reavis was brought to the airplane. Because he routinely gives rides, he performed a thorough passenger briefing which took about 10 minutes. The briefing was done at a slow pace, and included mentioning that for landing, the canopy would be opened all the way. After the briefing was concluded, Mr. Reavis (74 years old) was buckled in the rear seat by the 5-point harness, and a helmet was placed on his head. He (Mr. Haug) boarded the airplane, and told Mr. Reavis that because the engine was cold, they would remain on the ramp with the engine running at idle for a while. After the engine was started, he listened to the CJR automated weather observing station (AWOS) which indicated the wind was from 320 degrees at 5 knots with gusts to 15 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear sky, and runway 04 was the active runway. After the engine came up to operating temperature, he taxied to runway 04, where he performed an engine run-up. Because the rear seat had an installed control stick, he told Mr. Reavis not to touch it. During his flight control checks (box check) before takeoff, when moving the control stick he could feel Mr. Reavis legs, but he did not interfere with the checks. There was no flight plan filed for the intended flight, which was operated under Part 91. He did not get a formal preflight weather briefing, and indicated there is no Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) for CJR. The local TAF is Quantico located 30 miles to the east, Dulles located 30 miles to the north, and Charlottesville located 30 miles to the south. He also used a weather channel App for wind for CJR the evening before, and noted the wind was

from the west-northwest between 13 and 14 mph. Throughout the day, he looked at the windsock on the terminal, and reported the winds did not strike him as abnormal.

He departed from runway 04, and reported the winds were OK. He flew west of CJR, and flew for about 20 minutes, during which time, he let Mr. Reavis handle the flight controls. He elected to return to CJR, and did a "high break" at traffic pattern altitude and remained in close traffic pattern for runway 04. He turned onto downwind, and when turning downwind to base, he informed the passenger to open his canopy, which he did. He turned onto base, and final, and because of the crosswind from the left, he maintained a left wing low attitude during final. While on final approach with full flaps extended (40 degrees) he could not see the windsock, reporting he glanced once, though the wind did not seem unusual. He was asked if he asked for a wind check before landing, and he indicated that because the airplane was only equipped with 1 radio, and due to congestion in the traffic pattern, he did not. He reported there was a 80 degree crosswind from the left or 320 degrees at 5 with gusts to 15. He performed a wheel landing touching down first on the left main landing gear, followed by the right main landing gear. The tailwheel began coming down, and he was not sure if it was on the runway yet. At that time the left wing raised dramatically as if being caused by a wind gust, and he noticed the right wingtip had contacted the runway. He added power to abort the landing, and because the right wing was dragging the runway, the airplane pivoted to the right. He indicated that he could not get the left wing down. He then reduced power, and the airplane continued to pivot to the right while the left wing was still elevated. The airplane went off the right side of the runway, and rolled into a swale causing the airplane to dig in and nose over. He watched the ground come up, and a broken fuel line soaked his clothes of fuel. He released his 5-point harness, and tried to get out of the inverted airplane. He unbuckled his parachute, and crawled to the back. Mr. Reavis appeared to be unconscious; however, he came to after calling his name. Mr. Reavis unbuckled his harness and started taking off his parachute. About that time, bystanders arrived and helped pull the passenger from the airplane and clear of the wreckage. EMT's then showed up about the time the passenger was pulled clear of the wreckage.

With respect to injuries, Mr. Haug experienced cuts and bruises, and was taken to a hospital by ground ambulance to be checked out. Mr. Reavis was taken by air medivac to a trauma center. Mr. Reavis, who is taller than Mr. Haug was in the intensive care unit (ICU) at a trauma center for 5 days after the accident, and was released on Thursday 4/13 to a rehabilitation center. Mr. Reavis sustained a crushed vertebrae, brain bleeding, and will be in a neck brace for 3 months. The contact for Mr. Reavis is his daughter (Miann), whose contact is [REDACTED] Per his daughter, he has no recollection of the accident. While inverted, Mr. Reavis helmet was not touching the ground, but his helmet did have dirt scrapes on the exterior surface.

Postaccident, he was told the accident occurred about 1340 EDT, and estimated he was airborne between 15 and 20 minutes.

He was asked if there was anything mechanically wrong with the airplane that caused the accident and he indicated there was nothing wrong. The airplane was just out of an annual inspection, and since then, he had flown it to Sun-'N-Fun. He offered that the passenger did not interfere with the flight controls at any portion of the flight.

He was asked how fast the airplane was travelling when it went inverted. He estimated it was travelling between 60 and 70 mph, while he touched down between 60 and 65 mph.

With respect to his questions regarding the ELT, he was not sure of the model. He indicated it is installed behind the passenger's head.

He was asked if he knew how the accident could have been prevented. His attorney indicated he did not want him to answer that question.

With respect to weather, based on his past experience, he has looked at the nearby TAF's, but he decided to look at the weather channel APP for more accurate winds at CJR.

He has been flying out of CJR for many years, and there are Blue Ridge mountains nearby.

The digest was e-mailed to the pilot and his attorney for review on April 27, 2017, at 1650 EDT. He replied on May 1, 2017, at 1450 EDT with, "Mr. Monville, Mr. Blodinger and I have reviewed, and are content with the report. Yes, the sentence with the yellow highlight is correct – I arrived at KCJR airport that morning[.] thank you dan haug [REDACTED]."