ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/15/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1115

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Connie Johnson

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: EMS for Rescue Squad

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

I was outside the truck when the helicopter came. It circled around. Landed on the road with the nose facing westbound lane. Did not watch the takeoff.

Truck on eastbound land on I-26.

Didn't really watch the helicopter closely. It circled around and landed. Not circling 2 -3 times. It was told by radio to land in front of the fire truck. I don't know if they took one lap or not.

It was still dark. It was still foggy. Just from the distance you could tell there was fog. Aircraft had their lights on. It was a slight fog. It wasn't a heavy fog when they came in. Saw them come in.

10 - 12 minutes tops by the time they took off. Just an estimate. I didn't have a watch. 5 - 7 minutes to evaluate the patient. 5 more minutes preparing for the takeoff.

I didn't assist loading the patient on the helicopter.

I remember looking up and not seeing it. They heard like a loud noise like a car wreck.

Fog. Did it get worse or better? It appeared it was getting better. Not extreme change.

After takeoff, we cleaned up the gear. We went back to Lawrence County. It appeared to have heavier fog that where we were.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/15/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1130

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Chris Johnson

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: EMS for Rescue Squad

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

They came in and circled. Nose facing Spartanburg. In the eastbound lane. Departed toward the rest area. The front search light was on. Identified landing zone with search light. Nothing out of ordinary.

Weather. I didn't have any problem seeing the helicopter or the treetops. A light fog. At 0615 – sheets of fog. From ground it was only a light fog.

In wasn't a steep approach. Over the landing zone. For the most part straight down. 75 feet straight down at most.

I maintained landing zone security. From landing to takeoff. 15 -20 minutes.

Picked up. Cleared the tops of the trees. Almost to treetop. Then went westbound by rest area.

Fog. It never changed enough to catch my attention. No problem seeing the treetops, especially with light on. Watched aircraft as it lifted, cleared zone, and then I stopped watching.

Any sharp bank? No.

I could see the treetops at interstate.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/15/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1330

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Cpl Mark Horme

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Sheriff Department

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Night sun was on. It wasn't that bright because of the fog. It landed in front of the fire truck. #1 lane.

Watched him take off. Turned away. Then I heard the tree strike. Saw him lift off.

Saw him coming in about 1-2 miles away. Saw a faint light coming from that direction. Crossed I-26. He did 2 sweeps. Circles prior to landing.

Night sun on probably 500-600 feet away. Night sun. You could tell there were clouds blocking the beam. Had it on for 2 miles. Cut it off crossing the westbound lane. Turned it back on prior to landing. Foggy when it did landing. Not real thick. Where we were it wasn't thick, but it was coming down. A couple hundred of feet up it was pretty thick.

Fog was coming down and steadily descended down. Lifted off in a diagonal direction across I-26. It didn't take off towards the rest stop. I didn't see him in a turn.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/15/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1625

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Samuel Pruitt

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Sheriff Department

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Saw aircraft coming in. May have circled before landing. Landed eastbound lane facing west. Above rest area.

Loaded patient. Maybe 10 minutes. He lifted up. Straight up. Turned to right. Made counterclockwise turn. Left bank.

Night sun? Landing. Clear until treetop level because the light blurred and spread out. Then it was clear again below the trees.

Didn't hear anything. Slightly foggy at tree top level but not on the ground.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 0945

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Scott Francis

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Spartanburg 911

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Med-Trans One in Greenville in fog but not us. Spartanburg was clear. You could see the stars.

Yellow status when we came in at 2000. Spartanburg was yellow status. Need to check weather status.

Checked weather. Habit of reading weather. Weather was southwest of I-26. Helicopter crew was aware of it when we came in.

I received call. Newberry called up. Can Regional 1 take flight? Asked Adam to give a call. Med-Trans couldn't get out due to weather.

I was running down to get an address. Use Delorme. Looked up I-26 rest stop. Got coordinates. Newberry called out coordinates.

Misty called Regional 1 and gave coordinates. Aircraft got lat/long before aircraft left. Scott telling Adam what to tell them.

Richland County was fogged in. Greenville was fogged in. Told Adam to tell Regional 1 that Greenville Med-Trans 1 didn't fly due to fog.

Before we've had a flight where they got on deck and got fogged in and couldn't get off deck for 2 hours. And where the turned around when they ran into fog.

Weather: The pilot has the final say so.

Adam talked to Dave. I got distance and heading and gave them to Misty.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 0945

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Adam Frank

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Spartanburg 911

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

I talked to David. I told him he had a call. Can you go?

Near Newberry. He asked Bob to check weather. I heard the tones in the background. Read him the lat/long. Where on I-26 it was located.

I told him Med-Trans 1 wouldn't fly.

David was thrilled to fly. No sounds like they were worried. Happy to be flying.

David picked up the phone on the second ring. He sounded awake and alert. Talked to him most. 5 minutes. Bob checked the weather. We'll fly.

David sounded happy as all get out. Get to go on another flight again.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 0945

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Misty Gettig

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Spartanburg 911

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Called Regional 1 and gave coordinates.

ETA 2 minutes.

0524 at landing zone on scene.

0505 or so liftoff.

I check on them. In air for 15 minutes. They said 2 minutes out. 1+45 fuel and 3 souls. No transmission from then on. Only thing else was a broken squelch.

Normally call when they lift off. Sometimes they call when they get airborne.

Making sure I get lat/long and distance and heading.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 0945

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Craig Jeremiah

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Pilot

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Known him about 4 years. Both flying for Air Evac.

Ask him to do something, he'd get it done. He didn't play around with weather. He loved this job, but not to put his life at risk. That's why he left Air Evac. Forced to fly in weather and aircraft that he deemed unsafe.

I begged him to stay at Air Evac. I trusted Bob. He'd do the job and do it safely. He knew aircraft.

Flew with him in Bell 206. Piloting skills were excellent. One of the civilian trained pilot I really have a lot of respect for. He had the touch. Part of it. Pilots who are mechanical. Pilots who feel what the aircraft is doing. That was Bob.

Bob's the reason I'm here. When Bob left. He didn't like being pushed in weather that wasn't flyable or in aircraft not maintained. I respected his decision. He said he worked for Med-Trans. Fly new equipment and DON'T push you to fly in bad weather. He tried to get me to join him at Med-Trans. I interviewed with Don and Bert. They couldn't be more adamant to back pilots.

Weather minimums. If you're weather minimums are higher – you're the PIC. It was 180 degrees from Air Evac.

Bob did my local orientation. Dual controls in N508MT. We flew all over coverage area landing zones and lay of the land. North of Spartanburg you need 4,000 feet minimum before coming up here. Watch for fog in the morning. We have bad fog. It you couldn't see tower, don't even think about lifting to check unless you can see the tower clearly.

Weather computer. 3 windows open to weather all the time. Metars, local weather, and regional weather.

He left Monday morning and came back to work at night. Sat on table outside of building. Talking. Debriefing. Hot and humid – fog. He referred to himself as "Biggest Weather Chicken there is." He was a CFI. Took it seriously. But he flew R-22's and R-44's. He was an excellent teacher. We'd talk about days events. LZ's. He knew the area.

I want to impress on you that there are pilots you know who are "Cowboys" and there are pilots you'd fly with anytime. Bob was one of those pilots you'd fly with anytime.

He started flying out days. Bob Blessum flew mostly during the nights. Bob Giard flew mostly during the days. "Day Bob." When they got a full compliment of pilots then he flew nights too.

My first week down here in Spartanburg. Tuesday was 1<sup>st</sup> day in N503MT. Hired into Kentucky and transferred to Spartanburg in July. Flew opposite him only one week. Everyday had conversations about weather. He wanted me to know about weather patterns. I didn't know area here. I don't have problem saying no to flights. Discussed fog. Bob said fog would form sometimes in north but not in south. Talked about temperature and dew point spreads. Calm winds. Thunderstorms in afternoon.

He turned down missions with temp/dewpoint spread stuck on top of each other.

Surprising he'd launched out with the temp/dewpoint spread of 22/22. Trying to see.

VFR early morning. If I encounter anything I'll turn around. He took off to do a weather check. Found weather. If he was the slightest bit uncomfortable he'd turn around. He just didn't say that he was a "weather chicken," he practiced it.

If Columbia is reporting bad weather, Greenville reporting bad weather, Spartanburg weather can be VFR here. We can take off and look. Bad further south and if I encounter anything I can turn around. He always displayed to me: Turn around if weather bad. Saw him takeoff in the past and turn around 2 minutes later. He'd return. I respected him so much. Didn't have to worry about it.

A lot of area where there's no reporting stations.

Instrument flying skills? We're not paid to fly on instruments so we don't get into those conditions.

Did he like night flying? Yeah.

7 days on and 7 days off.

Never felt pressured from Med-Trans to take a flight.

All pilots authorized to pull chip plug, add hydraulic fluid. Need to pop safety wire to pull chip detector. Don't safety wire chip detector.

Bob said, "You're going to love working here." Richard always here. Asking if aircraft is okay. Richard is the mechanic at Spartanburg.

Maintenance: Fluids, chip detectors, light bulbs, snow deflectors, removing seat.

Aircraft were well maintained.

I love flying the B-407. Clean. Flew well.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1115

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Tom Adams

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Pilot

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Bob and I worked together in Indiana at Air Evac. He quite Air Evac. Not working for awhile. He called me to come down and work here. A lot better than Air Evac. I started working here about a month later than Bob. I started in June 03.

- 1. I never felt pressured to fly in bad weather. Turn a mission down for no good reason and no questions asked. Air Evac wanted a weather brief. Asked questions.
- 2. Bell 407's. New aircraft. A couple hundred hours on it. Air Evac B206L's. Richard, the mechanic, made big difference. Meticulous.

Flight crew here was new and easy to work with.

Bob was really a laid back guy. He internalized a lot of things. Not real forceful. He and David didn't get along.

I don't believe a minute it was bad weather. Bad judgment for direction of flight. Interstate in front of you. You have a safe landing zone. "Why not take off over the road instead of the trees?"

Lighted rest area. Reduced visibility. Can't believe for a second that he would take off in bad fog.

Lighted area. Accelerated into a dark hole. If you look inside for a second – one second – head one way – body follows. Distracted for a second. Not to takeoff down the interstate is mind boggling. I have the whole lane to myself. I've told the patrolman to stop westbound lane to takeoff.

He took off into a black hole. He took off over the trees.

I set Radar Altimeter to 300 feet. Lowest I'll fly is 1,500 feet msl. Lowest agl is 300 feet agl. If I hit 300' I pay close attention to my altitude. A can still auto with a turn at 300'. Sometimes the radar altimeter would sound when you didn't want it to.

Bob wouldn't launch into bad weather. One mission I know for certain. He picked up patient. Got to the zone. Call ambulance to get patient. He wasn't one to mess with weather.

My weather minimums are higher than company's. His was too. I have more experience with marginal weather.

If fog doesn't develop by 2 -3 in the morning, it not going to go to zero/zero.

Weather reporting stations are spread out. If bad to the west, progressing toward you.

Bob wasn't going to be flying around fog. Don't believe for one minute. If he couldn't see the ground, he's not going to go.

David was overzealous. Not push the weather kind of guy.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1200

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Bob Blessum

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Base Manager and Pilot

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Base manager since start on May 7, 2003. I flew nights. Bob flew days. 1<sup>st</sup> part of June the other pilots arrived. Let him fly days so he could get familiar with area. Good guys. Excellent. Hadn't known Bob.

Bob had excellent attitude. If we needed to change dates his response was, "Whatever it takes." Excellent working relationship. He was assistant base manager. On his box in the office there was a tag that said assistant base manager. Always reliable. Always ahead of time. He as always there 0710 or 0715 day or night. Very positive attitude about everything.

His approach to weather. He checked it very thoroughly. Checked 3 services. Would not fly in marginal weather. Very cautious.

Med-Trans approach to weather: Don't take chances. No pressure.

Guaranteed that Rob would not have gone if it was 300' broken.

Is it typical to launch out of GSP is IFR? If it was clear to the east I could go but not launch to the west.

Never flew with Bob. Once road in the back to Greenville.

I've only worked for Med-Trans for EMS. Ex-Vietnam. Military. 20 years away from flying. Started flying for Med-Trans in 1998.

Bob was very thorough. By the book. CFI. The way it should be. If there was any kind of weather, he would not have landed. He wasn't the kind to take a risk with weather. Very cautious. Very proficient pilot.

I feel there's something missing. Too good of a pilot. Even if one of the crew didn't have his helmet on he wouldn't take off. Strictly by the book. Methodical.

Direct 18 minute flight. Don't believe it was weather.

Safety is way up high on the mission. Safety is mission #1. Nobody will second guess you. If any crewmember feels uncomfortable, turn around and come back. No questions asked.

Pilots performing maintenance? Although we were signed off to do it, but only if mechanic wasn't available. In remote sites. Like chip detector. Very seldom do. Not going to call mechanic from Greenville to add a quart of oil.

Bob flew to Charleston. Chip detector. Wiped off chip detector. 2 ground turns. Light came on.  $3^{rd}$  time. Worked okay. Flew back.

I have all entries signed off. Tom Adams. Bob. Rob – in Texas now.

Knowledge and compatability to do work. But it doesn't mean that we're going to do it. We've only added oil. Bob did clean a chip detector.

INTERVIEWED BY: 11/4 )44

**ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182** 

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1300

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Ken Norman

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Pilot

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Background. Military. 7 years helicopter and National Guard. Fixed wing: 608. Helicopter: 2400.

Total: 3000.

Hired by Med-Trans in November, 2003.

Absolutely love it. Best civilian job I've ever had.

What makes it so good? Working conditions. Very relaxed. Don't feel pressured. Called Dir. Of Operations quite a few times. In Kentucky I turned down quite a few flights because of weather. No questions asked. None needed. I was base manager in Kentucky. Talked with Bert quite a bit. Talked with them on a daily basis for just about a month.

Pay? Industry average. The industry is changing. Ex-military pilots are scarce. Markets are pushing salaries up.

There were opening in Kentucky for \$2,000 more per year but intangibles kept me at Med-Trans. Very friendly company to work for.

Why do you like working for Med-Trans.

- 1. Good equipment.
- 2. 51% rule. Any person in crew can "Throw the flag" and refuse mission. We're "not fighting and fighting an evil empire."

Approach to weather: The published minimums are recommendation. The pilot's prerogative to decline a flight. Nobody ever questions it.

How long have you known Bob? January 2004. Started working in North Carolina. Never flew with Bob.

Bob's personality? Really friendly. Very conservative guy. Always talks about weather, NOTAMS. Not a sloppy or lazy aviator. He gave you a good brief. Tell you what's going on.

Bob's approach to weather? His biggest this is towers. If you can't see the top of the tower (near the base) don't even try. If you can, do weather check.

If VFR at reporting station, doesn't mean it's VFR en route.

Did it surprise you that he took off in weather? He would have had to have good weather. From Spartanburg to I-26, it must have been good weather. Don't think he encountered any visibility problems. His time was good. Cruise at 130 kts.

Set Radar Altimeter to 500' agl in flat lands. At night 1500-2500' agl. Set Rad Alt at 1500'.

Area by accident: Black hole. Bob was the most conservative of the 4 pilots. No outside sources for situational awareness.

Bob's relationship with crew? Once pager goes off – no personalities get in the way. Leave egos behind.

Had training in maintenance. Light bulbs and chip detectors. I haven't had to do any maintenance at all.

I don't miss American Eagle. That was a "cold empire" to work for. Very impersonal. Very big.

Absolutely love this job. Great company. 7 days on and 7 days off. And that's flexible. Open time. Other pilots will pick it up. 4 pilots at base.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1330

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Don Savage

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Med-Trans Chief Pilot

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Full time Chief Pilot since November 2001. In January I stopped flying the line. Not doing 7 days on and 7 days off.

Chief pilot. I provide proficiency training every 4 months. 2 more instructors hired for proficiency training. Every base every 4 months. Every 4 months helps keep crews sharp.

Chief pilot doesn't give check rides. 2 training pilots are line pilots.

Pilots get one check ride per year.

Maintenance training for pilots? All bases have it. Most pilots are not authorized to change batteries. Only after conferring with maintenance.

Company's approach to weather? New hire – we talk about weather, maintenance, pressure to fly, politics. As you get more comfortable their limits will expand. Any question – don't go. Expanding limits – normal.

True philosophy of company: No pressure to fly. No pilot ever counseled for not flying. Nurse or medic can terminate a mission.

GRW weather? Check all weather bases. Launch and turn back if weather is bad.

Radar Altimeter. 400-500' at night. 200' day.

Former military. 23 years. Gave checks rides.

Bob had 50 hours of instrument time.

Not company policy to push weather.

We teach pilots to go down the road in EMS. Even in the day. You have landing areas. There's your lights. Get enough altitude and then turn on course. B-407 night takeoff. Straight up. Get away from obstacles and transition.

B-407. Great aircraft. Power. Speed. Bad weather – slow down 1<sup>st</sup> thing.

41.5 miles at cruise speed. No weather problems.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1345

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Allison Beardsley

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Flight Crewmember.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Had flown with Bob. Bob very safe. True safety. Communicates.

Never felt scared or unsafe.

Never flew into bad weather. A couple of times he launched but turned back due to fog.

Work for hospital. Never flew EMS before. No problems with Med-Trans.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1350

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Rebecca Plutt

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Flight Crewmember.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Flew with Bob often. Bob an excellent pilot. Very cautious. Communicated we us in back. Made sure we were in or out of our belts.

Had us listen to ATC. Approach to weather was very cautious. Never flew in any weather that I considered marginal.

One flight we landed. Got patient on board but it started to get foggy. Patient went be ground transportation and the helo stayed until the fog cleared. 2 hours.

Never any problem with Med-Trans. No problem of flying in weather.

51% Rule. All have the right to call off flight. Tell them we want to go back. We'll go back. Trusted Bob completely. No doubts about his keeping us safe.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1400

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Jim Mobley

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Flight Crewmember.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Flew with Bob a good bit. Stickler for safety. Very much about safety. He never broke minimums. Not IMC. Not anything I feared or against rules.

Never flew with him when there was fog.

No problem with Med-Trans.

No personality conflicts with flight crew. Enjoyed flying with him.

He was the most cautious night pilot than anyone else.

If weather was questionable he would side on the side of cautious. Very cautious.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1405

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Matthew Schell

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Flight Crewmember.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Flew with Bob many times. I'm one of the original flight crew.

Bob's approach to flying was very safety conscious. "Anai" Outstanding. Made sure we were all buckled in, equipment secure. Thorough check of equipment.

He generally circled the landing zone. We always got a LZ brief. He would ask for LZ brief.

He would call us on scene when we landed. After clear of trees he would call us off scene. He'd ask us to call off scene.

I felt utmost confidence flying with Bob. Felt very safe. He was very cautious at night. At night, any doubt he'd make sure.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1405

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Toby Bishop

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Flight Crewmember.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Flew with Bob quite a few times. He was a perfectionist. Most cautious of the pilots.

Flown in bad weather? Yes. A few times. Union County. Adjusted around a thunderstorm cell. Once in fog up in Cherokee County. Sat down for 20 minutes for the fog to dissipate before flying to zone.

Any problems with Med-Trans? The mechanic Richard has a conflict with Brannen. He turned in 2 week notice.

I always felt comfortable with Bob. General weakness. Little more skittish than the other pilots. More cautious at night.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1445

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Doug Silk

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Program Manager.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Flew with Bob as much as other pilots. Very safe. Mindful of crew interaction. Cautious approach to weather.

He orbited LZ prior to landing. A lot of crew interaction.

He was one of the first pilots. From day one, Med-Trans has been very supportive of a safe operation. Any questions – immediately addressed.

Maintenance good? Yes, from my perspective.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1445

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Mike West

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Training Coordinator for Spartanburg 911

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Window for launch? Any stated time for launch? Nothing we have in writing. We tone them out. Phone straight to them 24 hours a day.

From the time we tone them out, it's usually within 2 -4 minutes they're launching.

"Yellow" status. Primarily weather and maintenance. Must check with crew first before telling people Regional 1 will launch. No definite assurance that they will launch.

Do you have any requirements to tell them about weather conditions? As a practice, we won't tell them what type of call is involved.

Site for launch. GPS coordinates. Once liftoff – ask for coordinates. Location. Frequency. Private line.

Every 15 minutes aircraft contacts dispatch and provides ETA, destination, fuel on board, souls on board. Turns bright pink if not calling by 15 minutes.

Requirement to share weather information? Nothing in writing.

Pilots check the GSP weather (Greenville).

Regional One. Only helicopter we work with. Can transfer to Med One in Greenville.

Med-Tran One was the one who we would call before Regional One came on line. Enough traffic for Regional One. 50 a month. Shocked us. Once they were used.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/20/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 0940

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Casey Chavez

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Newberry EMT

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

One concern approaching helo. Spot light was shining directly at us. Couldn't see if the plot ws giving us the thumbs up to enter the helicopter. Couldn't see if he was giving us the thumbs up or down. Night sun still on. Had to wait 30 - 60 seconds.

Takeoff: Got into hover. Kind of unusual. Straight toward interstate. Sounded normal.

2<sup>nd</sup> time used Regional One. Hot load. Engine still running. Once below helicopter he started speeding up again.

No indication of anything wrong. All the flight crew were real cheerful. Seemed routine.

Looked like to me that the helicopter just went right into the fog.

Helo. I watched it into the zone. Didn't land in designated landing zone. Gave he a good quarter mile stretch to land in. They landed on the eastbound lane, facing westbound lane. Between ambulance and sheriff's department cars. No flares marking the zone. At interstate we don't use flares.

Straight down or shallow approach? Shallow approach. Not anything close to straight down.

Patient to helicopter? General procedure. It usually takes 3-4 people. She was on the spine board. Plenty of straps.

4 of us. Slide our board onto theirs. Don't have a removable board. There's swings out. Slide our board on their silver board. She swings it around and slid it forward. Her body on our board. Protect her neck and spine. Real hard plastic and fiberglass. We retrieve our board later. She wasn't heavy. She was a pretty small girl.

Usually have 3 straps. Chest, waist, and feet. Not likely the patient was combative. We use spider straps. Immobilize patient to board. Plus 3 straps in helicopter. Plus she was 4 mg of morphine.

By the time we got patient in, it was running full throttle. Flight paramedic said pilot was checking GPS coordinates.

Kept Night Sun on during time on ground. Light so bright you could feel heat.

Flight nurse lead us to the helicopter. All four approached helicopter. On our stretcher rolled out.

Lifted off. Hovered 10 seconds. Saw them get over the tree line. Headed westbound over the westbound lane. Generally helicopters go on direct route of travel. Helicopter sounded good. Got in our truck to get out of the interstate.

Once helicopter got in the air you could see some fog. Fog above the tree line. Noticed over the tree line. Dispatcher said, "Disappeared." Fog was there so you could see it when it landed.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/20/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1000

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Steve Grigsby

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Newberry EMT

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Nothing more than Casey's statement.

Weather conditions: Where we were at didn't see foggy. Could see fog in landing lights that we couldn't see before. Hazy, but nothing you'd have difficulty driving in.

Departure. Didn't notice.

You could see paint job on helicopter when they left. They were right over us when I looked up.

Everything seemed routine. Only EMT since October.

VVIA/11.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/20/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1440

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Dennis Rouse

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Truck driver who witnessed the accident flight.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Truck driver. Every morning to Columbia.

Approximately 0530 at rest area. Stopped in line. 75-100 yards from helicopter. Shut truck down. Heard helicopter. Once it started to power up, once it cleared the tops of other trucks, moving slowly.

Headed across I-26. Spot light and stuff on. Turned back North toward Spartanburg.

Saw tree line. Gradual type of descent in the tree line. Gradual descent into the tree line. As he disappeared into tree line – crash, loud boom, yellow/reddish flame in trees.

Engine didn't sound like it was missing, sputtering, or any other kind of power loss.

Took place less than a minute. Maybe 90 seconds. Less than 90 seconds.

Weather conditions: It wasn't that foggy. Down in the valleys it got a little foggy. Not real thick.

His spot light was on. You could see fog. You could see the silhouette of helicopter. There was slight fog and haze in the area.

Cleared the trucks.

How high above the trees? Maybe 350-400 feet above the ground. Looked like right above the tree line. Trees - 200 feet tall. He wasn't much above the tree line. From where I was sitting, he was right above the tree line. From my distance he might have been higher above the trees.

Helicopter's forward motion changed. Pitch in blades, nose. Level forward motion for a short period of time.

Straight and level flight with forward movement, then it just started coming down. As he was moving forward he was descending at the same time.

Rest area. Turned to north.

Assumed making a turn out towards woods. Straight and level. Pitch it forward to go forward. Straight forward momentum. Flying level and descended into the trees.

Accelerating? I would say no. His progress wasn't going faster and faster.

Guess on height of the trees. Right at the top of the trees.

Slow, precise movement. Very slow, precise. No abrupt banking of helicopter. Slow methodical precise movement of helicopter.

Still had spot light on. Slow descent into the trees.

100 people had to see it.

No abrupt movement.

Any change in sound of helicopter? No. As far as I could tell, it was running like a top. I didn't hear any distinctive sputtering.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/15/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1500

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Dennis Rohlfs

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Med-Trans President and CEO

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Every 120 days recurrent flight training. Either Dir of Ops, Chief Pilot, or 2 training pilots fly with each pilot every 120 days. Not check ride.

One check ride annually.

Every month. Written exam. Computer based training.

Training philosophy: Annually, autorotation once a year not enough. 180 days not enough. 90 days, the autorotations are crisp. 120 days, good, acceptable autorotations.

Back-up B-407 aircraft used for training.

Tell Pilots: Do not take flight if you're not comfortable. Not worth risking 3 people for 1.

Pilots paid salary. No incentive to go. Turn down a flight. No questions asked.

Safety information?

Safety designee at each base. 120 day training sessions also address safety issues.

Not designated training person but 4 people looking at safety issues every 120 days.

I go to any new site.

2002 - Added 3 new sites.

2003 - Added 3 new sites.

Rapid growth.

Standards for hiring. Contracts spell out minimum requirements.

Spartanburg started May 3, 2003.

Where did you find pilots? HR posts jobs locally, regionally, and nationally.

I meet with new hires. Before program starts I go to each site for opening ceremonies.

Tennessee requires 3,000 hours. Med-Trans requires 2,000 hours helicopter, 500 turbine, 200 night.

All VFR operations. IFR training not a requirement. We train IMC unusual attitudes. 1.0 hour during initial training.

Training. Not instrument training but unusual attitude and inadvertent IMC procedures.

Inadvertent IMC procedures: 1. Climb 2. Confess 3. Gentle turn back to direction you came from.

Unusual Attitude (Foggles): 1. Instructor puts you in unusual attitude 2. Recover.

Pilot: 1500 hours in R-22. 500 hours EMS.

Require 200 hours night time. Not just over the city. We fly with pilot at night on foggles.

No perception of pressure. No one ever disciplined for denying mission. If you're pushing it, you're fired.

Craig and Bob left Air Evac because of perceived pressure.

All flights considered Part 135, not 91. Is it written down? No. Not written down but understood.

Part 135 weather minimums for all flights. Is it written down? No. Understood.

INTERVIEWED BY:

11/1/10

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1445

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Richard Miller

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Regional One Helicopter Mechanic.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Bob's capabilities? Relatively low time. Barely over 2,000 hours. T/O and landings – little shaky. Always attentive. Always knowledgeable. He didn't like to fly in "iffy" weather conditions.

If he would have had more information about Columbia aborting, I don't think he would have flown.

22/22 is a bad condition. A lot more communications could had taken place. Hour of the day. 5 AM shift.

Good pilot. Very attentive.

Easy to make mistakes.

300' hover before takeoff. Stan Cross. 300 feet, then transition.

Spartanburg helo pad sits inside a hole. Lift straight up out of the hole. 300' hover before transitioning.

Tom wasn't pulling up to 300 feet. He was going to 100 feet.

Ever flown with Bob? Several times. 6 times. Not scene flights, inter-hospital.

He flew like a 2000 hour pilot. Not as smooth as a more experienced pilot. B-407 from a R-22. It gets some getting used to.

Always weather conscious. He would decline a flight for weather.

Why are you leaving company? I don't get along with the mechanic in Greenville. Oil and water. Don't mix. Constant friction. My last day is 7/18/04. Accepted a job with Air Logistics.

Med-Trans: Good operation for as small as they are. They try to find quality mechanics. Safety concerned about aircraft. Concerned aircraft is in airworthy status.

Bell 407. Older ship is in Kentucky. Extremely good job of keeping aircraft up. They have a good group of mechanics here. Even Brandon was thorough, but slow.

Good group of pilots. Tom is kind of abrasive. Ken and Bob B. are smooth. Tom is a very good pilot.

Bob was least experienced. Outside distraction seem totally distracted.

Night pilots don't see me unless there's a problem. Unless there's weather and there's maintenance I can do.

Med-Trans: Very good company to work for.

4/1/04: Started working for Med-Trans. Couldn't stand working with Brandon.

It's up to the pilots to make determination for weather. If someone in the crew wasn't happy, they didn't lift off.

Never saw Bob fly anything that was in the "Yellow." They don't do a lot of night flights.

Dissemination of information between locations. It doesn't make sense with weather conditions.

ACCIDENT NUMBER: CHI04MA182

INTERVIEW DATE: 7/16/04

TIME OF INTERVIEW: 1230

PERSON INTERVIEWED: Kim Ahearn

RELATIONSHIP TO ACCIDENT: Girlfriend of pilot.

SUBJECT: Events concerning the accident of N503MT

Everyday he was asleep in the afternoon. He didn't seem fatigued. He had slept. He was going to the gym for workouts the last couple of months. Almost every day.

We have been together since helicopter school. Very conservative. CFI. Taught on Robinsons. Even taught Japanese students.

Safety: Big issue.

He left Air Evac because it was really unsafe.

Med-Trans doesn't give a hard time for turning down a flight. He said he was a "Weather Chicken."

All his pilot friends say he was one of the safest pilots they knew. Safety was issue for him. Especially with people on board.

He got along with others. Internalized a lot. Would do anything for anybody. Would be there to help him out.

Hadn't talked with me about not getting along with David. Had not mentioned Glenda to me at all.

Scaturday July 10th

SAM - relieved of right shift by Craig Jeremiah drove to Boiling Springs fitness Center worked out for 2 hrs

in Jest up; had at some time prior grilled steaks at home. Was home until after 6pm arrived at work at 7:10 pm.

Outside a Craig (at base) until 8pm.

Sunday July 11th
TAM - at base swapping out à Craig
discussing nights events + weather
out look for day.

BEAM - Les Security Guard arrived + he + Bob went next door to do ground school for Guardo private helicopter pilot.

Noon-arrived home, slept on couch + watered Mascar Race

6.30 pm - lyd to go to work

7: 10 pm - arrived at work to supposed a Chang

Morriay July 12th 10 Am - Craig at base to swap out Outside and prince table à Craig France 720 Am until 8 or 830 Am discussing the weather - esp. Fog of prior night and teaching Craig Now he judged the fog to help determine possibility of mussion GU NO GO decisions. Went to Bailing Springs Litness Center + worked and for a band 2 hours . At 5pm he was asleep on the couch when I (Kim) arrived home the was home + talking to his Son on the phone until io: 30pm then lift for work 710 pm all base to swap aux ( Caig) East out at pichic table à Craig 4 discussed the weathers - possibilities more tog.

To Mr. Marty Crouch; FAA

Mr. Crouch the following is an account of what I witnessed on Tuesday July 13<sup>th</sup> at approx. 5:35-5:40 am. Traveling eastbound on I-26 I was stopped in traffic about 75-100 yards from the beginning of the entrance ramp to the rest area. After setting still for approx. 5:00 minutes, I heard what I knew was a helicopter taking off. I could see the Helicopter after it rose above traffic, I watched as the helicopter slowly moved across the interstate as it was also gaining altitude, it also had its search light on. After getting to a point of just north of the Westbound side rest area parking lot, the helicopter pointing north and just above the tree line started its forward progress. As I watched, the Helicopter never seemed to gained any altitude, it appeared to me that it slowly flew into the trees. As it flew below the tree line, within seconds I heard first the sound of collision then saw a flash of light which was followed by a continuous glow in the woods.

This is what I saw on that Tuesday morning. Please feel free to contact me @

if there are any questions that you may have.

Dennis W. Rouse

Inman, SC 29349

Date:

14 July 2004

To:

Mark Gann, Instructor Pilot

From:

John Carey, Pilot 378

Re:

Regional 1

Pursuant to your directive, the following pertains to my actions relating to the events of the early morning hours of July 13<sup>th</sup>, 2004. At approximately midnight, my crew advised me that they were tired and ready to turn in for the evening and were interested to know the weather conditions, and if we would be accepting any calls that night.

At approximately 0005, I walked outside to visually check the conditions around our base with my flight nurse Bonnie Garner. I observed a great deal of ground fog developing over the area, rolling very rapidly over the tree tops, which was also being silhouetted by lights and the rotating airport beacon from Donaldson Center Airpark (GYH). I commented to Bonnie, that the fog was developing and that I did not want to risk launching in these conditions. I returned to my office and checked the weather via the Internet. Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport (GSP) was reporting a temperature and dew point at that time, which was the same; approximately 23/23, well within a 3-degree spread of which, would be conducive of creating fog.

Judging these conditions from this information alone, I recognized that it would be a great risk to my aircraft and crew to attempt a launch. At 0025, I made a command decision and advised Dispatch to take us to a 'Red' status (out of service).

At approximately 0620, I received a tone from Dispatch. Shortly after that tone, Dispatch advised me over the air, to "10-21 Dispatch A.S.A.P." (call via landline). I did so immediately and was told that Regional 1 was down in the area of Newberry. They wanted to know if we were able to fly and assist in a search and rescue attempt.

They also advised me of the coordinates to search, which were North 34.27.08 and West 81.41.20. After checking weather for the area, it appeared to be workable.

I immediately informed my crew of the situation and advised them, that we were going to attempt a S.A.R. flight for Regional 1. I called dispatch and confirmed that we were going to attempt a search. I lifted off at 0628 and flew towards the above coordinates. While in route, I came to a point approximately 25 miles along my 45-mile waypoint and noticed that proceeding any further would be a risk to my aircraft and crew due to heavy ground fog. The fog extended from the surface to about 500 feet and was a solid blanket as far as I could see to the horizon. The chief reason for this concern, was in the event of an engine failure, I would have had no forced landing options due to 0 visibility of the surface. At that time, I gave a position report to my dispatch and told them that we were turning around and unable to proceed due to weather conditions.

I arrived back at base at 0652 and was advised by my paramedic John James, Jr., that all souls on board Regional 1 had perished and that further attempts to search would be pointless.

This is the extent of my actions and involvement in this matter. Please feel free to disperse this memorandum to any party with a legitimate need.

To: NTSB officials

From: John T. James, Jr.

EMT-P

MedTrans One

Date: 14 July 2004

Re: Mission# 40-040721

On 13 July 2004 around 0615 – 0620 hours, MedTrans One Flight Control activated our tones and requested that we contact them ASAP via telephone. The duty pilot, John Carey, contacted them as requested while Bonnie Garner and myself prepared for the possibility of a call.

Upon exiting his private quarters, he advised that the Spartanburg Communications Center had lost contact with Regional One and had requested that we assist with a search for the aircraft. As he performed a weather status check, I contacted our program manager, Dana Morrison to advise her of situation.

N407CR lifted off from base at 0628 hours with J. Carey, B. Garner, and myself on board. At the time of take off, the sun was above the horizon – sky was relatively clear with good visibility. As we approached the Fountain Inn area, patchy areas of ground fog were present – visibility was still excellent. However, as we entered further into the Laurens area, we noticed that the ground fog became denser ahead of us (it actually appeared as though it became a complete layer). Due to this change in the weather conditions, the decision to abort the flight was made at 0643 hours. Flight Control was notified via UHF radio with a position report relayed (34 35 00 / 82 03 38). We arrived back at base at 0652 hours.

To whom it may concern,

I was on duty as the flight nurse for Med-Trans One on the morning of July 13, 2004. At approx. 6:15 am we received a tone and message from our flight control to "10-21" dispatch ASAP". John Carey, pilot, called dispatch and received information that Regional One helicopter was reportedly missing and possibly down. We were being asked to help search for the aircraft. Coordinates were given to us and John checked the weather. At approx. 6:25 we lifted off to coordinates that were near mile marker 66 on I-26 near the Laurens County/ Newberry County line. Upon leaving our base visibility was very good. Clear ski with no fog noted. Approximately 1/2 way to Laurens, although visibility was good, some fog was noted in spots near the ground. While in flight, our dispatch called us and stated that we had been cancelled per Regional One's dispatch. Upon talking to our dispatch, they stated they had not been in contact with Regional One helicopter, and therefore we proceeded on towards the original coordinates. Once we got closer to Laurens, which was only about 1/2 way to our designated coordinates, the fog became a solid layer on the ground below us. Although we still had good visibility out in front of us, because we had lost visibility with the ground we turned around and aborted the mission. Flight control was notified. We returned to base at approx. 6:50am.

Bonita G. Garner, RN, CEN, EMT-P

Bornes Lama La

On 07/13/04 I was the duty pilot at Careforce 1 EMS helicopter based at Richland Memorial Hospital. Columbia SC. At 04:39am I got a call from Peggie Hanson our Communication Specialist stating that Newberry Co EMS was requesting our services for a scene flight at 305dg 41 nm from Richland Hospital position Lat 34-24.64 N / Lon 081-42.19 W. I accepted the flight at 04:40am based on available information from or company computer based Meteorlogix Mx Vision Aviation Sentry - helicopter edition, weather reporting system. We were put on standby and Kirsten Bell (Flight Nurse), David Gowans (Flight Medic) and I walked out to the aircraft, N911RC a Bell 230 Helicopter. (This helicopter is approved for single pilot IFR but due to Auto Pilot problems we were using it for VFR operations only). At 04:42am we were requested to go to the scene and my crew reminded me that this patient would have be taken to Spartanburg, as Richland Memorial hospital was on a Trauma Diversion. We lifted for departure at 04:43am flew for 2 minutes before I decided to cancel the flight due to halo's on some lights in the distance which would signify the formation of fog. I landed back at Richland Hospital at 04:46am. I rechecked the weather after landing to find that the reported visibility had dropped from 7 miles to 2 miles at Greenville but was still reporting 7 miles visibility at Spartanburg.

Sincerely Michael Twomey
Careforce 1 Safety pilot / Omniflight Helicopters
Office: Mobile:

1.1-16-04 10:24 Figh-Cara Force One

803-434-7247

T-699 P 003/005 F-321

Careforce Communications Five kichland Madical Park Dr. Columbia, SC 29203

Transport Request: Division: Careforce

Request #: 0407-1237-A

Priority: Emergent Auroraft: N911RC

Type: Scane

Location: NEWBERRY COUNTY

Kinards, SC 29355 Disposition: Abort WX

Ref Agency: Newborry County Ema Requestor: Newberry County Ems

Callback: (803)276-2222/

Req Unit: Emergency Units at Scene: MEDIC 1

Red Agency: Graenville Mem Hapt

Greenville, SC 29601

Red MD:

Rec NO Tel: (464)455-7725/

Red Unit: Emergency Department

Rec U Tel: (\$64)455-7725/

Crew 1: Gowans, David

Crew 2: Ball, Kirston

Filot 1: Twomey, Micheal

Comm 1: Henson A, Paggie

Call Rovd: 07/13/04 @ 04:39

Notify Plt: 07/13/04 @ 04:40

Wx Confirm: 04:40

Dispatch: 04:40 Liftoff: 04:43 HOSP

Arrive 1: 04:44 SCENE \* Depart 1: 04:44 SCENE

\* Arrive 2: 04:45 HOSP

In Service: 04:46

Completed: 04:46 07/13/04

Ar Bedside: Do Bedside:

Total Miles: 0 ara

Loaded Miles: 0 sm

Weather: VFR, Night

Patient Information

Pathent 1:

History: 29355

Name: ,

Address:

Account: 5511

DOB: / / Age: Sex:

Wat: SS:

Cat: Trauma (Adult) Dx: Multiple Trauma

Next of Kin:

Contact:

Pers. MD:

Med. Info

Race:

04:40 Queuef Page Abl1 Call Email: CAREFORCE RESPOND N911RC 305DG 41nm Scene Newberry County Ems Newborry, SC LAT: 34-24.64'N LON: 091-42.19'W FLIGHT # 5511

04:40 N911RC: Dispatched from Richland Mem Hapt

04:43 Depart: 34°01.67'N 081°01.99'W ETE: :20 Fuel:1:40 Souls: 3

04:44 Abort at: 3 ° .00'N 06 ° .00'W Abort WX

04:44 Depart: 3 ° .00'N 08 ° .00'W ETE: Fuel:1:34 Souls: 4
04:45 Queued Page Aall Call Email: N911RC REQUEST ABORTED Scene NEWBERRY COUNTY Abort WX
04:46 Arrive: 34°49.02'N 082°24.87 W Greenville Mem Hept

04:46 Request Completed

Juli-:6-94 10:25 From-Care Force One 803-434-7247 T-898 P 005/005 F-321 \_\_\_\_\_ Notifications >\_\_\_\_ Notified: Other Numbers: HOME PHONE Trauma : \* Trauma : ( ) -1 WORK PHONE Security : Unit Trauma Transport : Attend : Who:

B Fax : Jul 16 2004 11:26 Fax Station : FAA/FSDD-13 p , 5

How Called: 800 Line

Alternate Arrangements: NOT Offered; NOT Accepted

Transported by

Jul 16 04 10:11p

LIFEREACH





# **Fax**

To: Bill Roberts

Fax:

Phone:

Pages: 2

RE: Statement

### Message

If you have any questions give me a call. Thanks

> Heyward Lindler Aviation Site Manager

Life Reach 1 At Providence Hospital 2435 Forrest Drive Columbia SC 29204 Phone Fax 8

Jul 16 04 10:11p

Received Fax :

LIFEREACH

803 256 5473

-

p. 2

July 16, 2004

To whom it may concern:

I started my twelve-hour night shift rotation with Life Reach, an air medical transport service operated by Air Methods Corporation, at 1900 on July 12, 2004. I had just completed a flight from Orangeburg County to Augusta, Georgia and back to our base at Providence Hospital in Columbia, South Carolina at approximately 0430 on July 13, 2004. Shortly before 0500 on July 13, 2004, I was contacted by our dispatch for a flight request to Newberry County. I initially accepted the flight request, because the weather information available to me along my route of flight did not indicate adverse conditions and my own observation from my prior flight confirmed that information. However, during the dispatch process, I was informed that another Columbia, South Carolina based air medical transport service had responded to this same request and aborted enroute due to weather. At that time, I declined the request, citing the report from the other pilot.

Brian A. Price Pilot Life Reach