

**IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
FLIGHT 1420,
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS, MD-82, N215AA
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS
JUNE 1, 1999**

DOCKET NUMBER SA-519

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF LITTLE ROCK FIRE DEPARTMENT

The following Proposed Findings of the Little Rock Fire Department ("LRFD") pertain to the information contained in the Airport and Emergency Response Group ("AERG") Factual Report and the Air Traffic Control Group ("ATCG") Factual Report. These findings concern the involvement of the LRFD in the aftermath of the crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 on June 1, 1999, and are respectfully submitted for the consideration of the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB").

1. On June 1, 1999, the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting ("ARFF") station located at the Little Rock National Airport ("LRNA") was manned by the number of personnel and equipment required by 14 CFR Part 139. *See*, Exhibit 16B to Docket No. SA-519.
2. The weather conditions on the evening of June 1, 1999, and the early morning hours of June 2 were extremely unfavorable. Heavy rain was in progress at the LRNA both immediately before American Airlines Flight 1420 landed, and during the effort to locate the aircraft. Evidence of the weather conditions is depicted in the videotape taken by a LRNA security camera at the north end of the LRNA concourse.¹
3. Upon being contacted by the air traffic controller on duty on June 1, Mr. Kenneth Kaylor, LRFD personnel proceeded to their Red Ball units, engaged the lifting mechanism of the

¹ This tape has previously been submitted to the NTSB, and the LRFD respectfully asks that it be made a part of the evidence contained in Docket No. SA-519.

automatic door opener, and proceeded out of the ARFF station. This occurred immediately after the call from Mr. Kaylor, with no delays encountered.

4. Mr. Kaylor's initial communication to the LRFD ARFF personnel was that an American Airlines MD-80 landed on Runway 4R, but that he could not see the aircraft.
5. Because Mr. Kaylor did not know even the general location of the aircraft, the Red Ball units proceeded toward the approach end of Runway 4R, where they did not find the aircraft.
6. Upon arriving at the approach end of Runway 4R, and not locating the aircraft, the ARFF personnel asked if they should sweep the runway.²
7. After receiving permission from Mr. Kaylor to proceed on the runway, ARFF personnel traveled slowly toward the departure end of Runway 4R. Their speed was limited due to a lack of visibility and the amount of standing water on the runway.
8. ARFF personnel ultimately observed a glow from the departure end of Runway 4R, and discovered that the aircraft had departed the runway, gone down a rip-rap embankment and come to rest. Because the trucks were unable to drive down the embankment, the Red Ball units reversed direction and proceeded back to a connector road on the east side of Runway 4R located at Gate No. 34. ARFF personnel exited their Red Ball units, unlocked the perimeter security gate, which required about 20 seconds, and proceeded on the perimeter road to the wreckage area.
9. As the Red Ball units approached the aircraft, the bumper and roof turret equipment was engaged on the main fire near the fuselage, which was extinguished in approximately 60

² This is according to interviews with ARFF personnel summarized at Section 4.2.1 of Exhibit 16A to this docket.

seconds. ARFF personnel then used one-inch booster lines to extinguish additional small fires, requiring only about 30 seconds, and continued to apply foam to prevent reignition.

10. According to a transcript of the fireground tape, recorded by the Little Rock OES, from the time of initial notification, approximately 2358:20, until foam was first applied to the aircraft, approximately 0009:50, 11 minutes and 30 seconds expired.³
11. The on-scene commander, District Chief Larry J. Tyner, responded from Little Rock Central Fire Station to take command of the incident. He instructed the Little Rock Communications Center to perform the notification list and advise Metropolitan Emergency Medical Services (“MEMS”) that he needed all available ambulances.
12. In his deposition given in multi-district litigation styled *In Re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 1999*, given in MDL Docket No. 1308, on May 18, 2000, Mr. Kaylor, testifying under oath, engaged in the following exchange under questioning by counsel for American Airlines, Mr. William C. Brown, III:⁴

Q. Okay. Now, when you cleared the fire trucks, the emer—the rescue vehicles out on the runway can you show us which – which taxiway you sent them up, or which taxiway they went up?

³ These times are taken from the Fire Ground tape provided to Mr. Lawrence D. Roman on June 22, 1999. A copy of the tape transcript, along with a cover letter from then Acting Assistant Fire Chief W. A. Davis, is attached to these proposed findings.

⁴ At the hearing held by the NTSB on January 26 through 28, 2000, the parties were advised that Mr. Kaylor would be unable to testify at the hearing on the advise of his physicians. At pages 167 and 168 of his deposition that he was aware of the NTSB hearing but was never contacted to testify by the NTSB. He recalls that he may have had a contact from his union representative concerning testifying, but did not recall the substance of the conversation. He did remember that the conversation would have been with Kay Wiley, the NATCA representative in Little Rock. Subsequently, Mr. Kaylor met with the ATCG on August 2, 2000, to discuss his role in this docket. A transcript was not made of his interview. In addition, the LRFD was not notified about the meeting and did not have an opportunity to question Mr. Kaylor. The LRFD requested to be present at any interview of Mr. Kaylor in a letter dated June 14, 2000, from District Chief J. T. Cantrell to Lawrence D. Roman and Scott J. Dunham.

- A. Well, I don't recall exactly which one then went up, but they went out – they went out one of these two here, either Tango or Uniform (indicating).
I don't know. I don't recall which one they did go out.
- Q. Did you watch them go out?
- A. I watched them proceed – proceed out of the barn and go out to the east up to Runway 4 Right.
- Q. Did you see them once they got out to the taxiway – it appears to be Romeo – there?
- A. Did I do what with them? I am sorry.
- Q. Did you – did you see the vehicles at that point?
- A. I don't recall. I had gotten the accident incident notification binder and opened it up and was starting to look for the accident checklist that we have to complete.
- Q. Did you see the vehicles turn right onto Taxiway Romeo proceeding down to the approach end of 4 Right?
- A. No, sir, I did not.
- Q. Are you aware of the alert positions that these vehicles take on the airfield when there is an emergency declared, an inbound airplane declares an emergency.
- Y. Yes, sir, I am.
- Q. And are there alert positions along Runway 4 Right that – that are identified by number?
- A. Yes, sir, there are.
- Q. And do you know what those alert positions are?

A. As far as number-wise?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. No, sir, I don't -- we have it in a tower on a chart, but outside of that --

Q. Okay.

A. -- not that I -- I have not committed to memory.

Q. I understand. When you directed them to look for the airplane, did you consider giving them one of the alert positions so that they would know which way to turn on the runway?

A. No, sir. When I rang out the crash phone, I just told them that I had them -- just had -- this is the tower. I had an American MD-80 to land on Runway 4 Right. He is not -- I cannot see him, and he is not talking to me. Would you please make sure -- go make sure he's okay.

Q. On the initial notification, did you tell them that you had seen him going past midfield?

A. On initial notification? No, sir, I did not.⁵

13. In the interview Mr. Kaylor gave to NTSB personnel on August 2, 2000, Mr. Kaylor also conceded, at page 14 of the addendum to the Factual Report, that he did not tell the ARFF personnel where he last saw the aircraft.⁶

14. Given the testimony of Mr. Kaylor under oath, it is apparent that he did not provide the LRFD ARFF personnel with information that he last saw Flight 1420 at the midpoint of


⁵ This exchange is found at pages 194 through 196 of Mr. Kaylor's deposition, which has previously been provided to Lawrence D. Roman and Scott J. Dunham. Copies of relevant pages were provided to the previous Investigator in Charge, Gregory Feith, and all parties under cover letter of June 14, 2000. A copy of the letter and attachments is included with these proposed findings.

⁶ He also advised the ATCG Chair that he did not testify at the hearing in January on recommendation of his doctor.

Runway 4R. Had he done so, ARFF personnel would have known to proceed to the departure end, thereby lessening the response time to the accident scene.

15. Due to the weather conditions of June 1 and 2, 1999, and the fact that the LRFD was not notified that Flight 1420 had cleared the midpoint of Runway 4R, the LRFD acted reasonably in proceeding to the approach end and sweeping up the runway as quickly as possible. The sweeping operation was hampered to a large degree by standing water on the runway as well as a driving rain storm. Had the LRFD been aware that the plane had passed the midpoint, the trip to the approach end of 4R could have been completely eliminated. Mr. Kaylor candidly conceded in his deposition in MDL 1308, where he was placed under oath, that he did not provide this information to the LRFD.
16. The response of ARFF personnel was completed as quickly as possible given the weather conditions, as well as the lack of information provided by the air traffic controller.

Respectfully submitted,



J.T. Cantrell
on behalf of the Little Rock Fire Department

ATTACHMENT 1



City of Little Rock

Fire Department

1000 W. 7th St.
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3995
501-918-3710
Fax 501-371-4485

Fire Prevention

June 22, 1999

Mr. Larry Roman
National Transportation Safety Board
120 MacBeth Drive
Charlestown, West Virginia 25414

Dear Sir:

In the accompanying data, in particular the computer-generated run-logs for the American Airlines 1420 incident, you will notice there is a dichotomy in times based on the fact that the computer logs are, in many cases, typed post dispatch or post incident. There was an inconsistency in this and the accompanying data regarding central dispatch versus MEMS dispatch versus Tower time. Therefore, we consider that the time-logs and the tape transcription of the radio time-log from central dispatch should be the prime source of data.

Sincerely,

W. A. Davis
Acting Assistant Chief
Little Rock Fire Department

WAD:cg

**FIRE GROUND TAPE
AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 1420
JUNE 1 - 2, 1999**

Communications, Red Ball 2.

Red Ball 2, go ahead.

2358:20 We're responding to an alarm from the tower on American hit on four right, that they've lost contact with, we're investigating.

Red Ball 2, information, are you the only unit responding or are the other Red Ball units responding also?

Three units.

Red Ball 2 do you want all airport units to respond?

2359:40 Red Ball 3, Red Ball 1.

One.

Respond from this.

2359:50 That's affirmative.

Okay, did you get that?

Rescue 1, we're out to the airport.

0002:00 Ten-four Rescue 1.

0002:02 Red Ball 1, Red Ball 1, go ahead.

Dispatch, Rescue 1.

0002:40 Rescue 1.

Advise which runway.

Advised four right, four right.

Central, Red Ball 1.

Central, Red Ball 2.

0003:30 Red Ball 2, go ahead.

Red Ball 2.

0003:50 Red Ball 2 to (inaudible), I lost you.

We need all traffic stopped. We'll have to call for full response.

Aircraft that we cannot locate.

Central to Red Ball 2.

Red Ball 2.

Red Ball 2 are you there?

0006:20 I'm loosing you, I keep loosing you.

Red Ball 2, have you located the plane?

0006:30 They're at the end of the runway on the north end, burning.

Red Ball, you have located it?

0006:40 It went off the run, the end of the runway, it is burning, sitting on the ground.

Central, copy.

Central, Engine 2 is going to the airport.

Engine 2, what was your traffic sir?

0007:30 We're headed to the airport.

Ten-four.

Where do we need to go?

(Inaudible) headed to that crash site.

0007:40 Dial 1-7-44, 7-42.

Forty-two, go ahead.

0007:50 This aircraft is off the northern end of runway four right. He's on the ground outside of the airport. The aircraft is on the ground, he is burning, it is a alert three.

0008:00 Central send the appropriate response to the north side to the proper authorities.

0008:10 Ten-four, 7-42.

This is Red Ball 2, it appears to be in the river, we haven't gotten there yet, we're trying to get to it.

(Inaudible)

0008:30 This is 7-43, put all my companies on fire ground two on El Dorado.

Ten-four, all units responding at 42 El Dorado, four-two El Dorado Drive go to fire ground two please.

Forty-two, show me responding to the airport also, notify 7-40 also please.

Ten-four, 7-42.

Engine 2 to Rescue 1, do you want us to bring the wave runners?

0009:10 That might not be a bad idea. We're at gate 32 now, we're in the gate 32 now.

0009:20 (Inaudible) the wave runners.

0009:30 Three-two to Rescue 1, is that airplane inside the airport gate or is he on the other side of Roosevelt?

0009:40 It's on the river end.

0009:50 It's not in the river, it's sitting on the river bank down end, we're ^{pulling from} ~~pretty far~~ on it now.

0010:10 B2, Central 0-5 PD advanced down at the airport, tell them we need perimeter security set up around the airport please, around the airport gates on the (inaudible) runway.

Ten-four.

0010:20 Security to 44, are we going to x the wave runners, unless you want them special.

Forty-four copies, I'm in route now to the scene.

0010:30 Engine 13 responding to airport.

0010:40 Ten-four, Engine 4, 2, 6, 13, Rescue 1, Red Ball 1, Red Ball 2 and Red Ball 3, and 7-60, and 7-44 show your responding, number one airport.

0010:50 Communications, 7-44.

0011:00 Red Ball 1 to unit 7-44.

Go ahead.

0011:10 We have a (inaudible) we need a rescue crew (inaudible).

That's affirmative, we've got help coming as quick as we can. How many people did you say we had?

0011:20 (Inaudible) at least 50 or 60.

0011:30 Forty-four copies.

(Inaudible).

0011:40 I'm on the scene, set up a command post.

0011:50 Red Ball 1, Rescue 1, is the runway shut down at this time?

Red Ball 2, it is (inaudible).

0012:00 Rescue 1, Red Ball 1, I'm not sure if the runway is shut down or not.

0012:10 (Inaudible)

Copy we're on the scene with the Red Ball units at this time.

0012:20 Pump 2, you out of water?

0012:30 (Inaudible).

0012:40 Red Ball 1, 7-44.

0012:50 Red Ball 1 to Rescue 1.

0013:10 (Inaudible).

Forty-two to 44, are you on the scene yet?

0013:30 That's negative, I'm almost there.

Where are you going to set up your command?

0013:40 I'll probably go on in to the R station, I've, I'm going to pass it here in just a minute, I'm going to be passing it and I may do it there, but I'll probably go on to R.

0013:50

0014:00 Forty-eight this is central, you do have MEMS on the wait?.

Stand by sir, I'll find out.

0014:10 I'm going to need all the units they can muster together also their supervisor.

Ten-four.

0014:20 Unit 2 to Rescue 1.

Unit 2 to Red Ball 1.

0014:40 Seven-forty-four.

(Inaudible).

0014:50 Information sir, we have the supervisor, and MEMS has one unit responding, and working on a call out for more units.

0015:00 I'm trying to get a confirmation on how many souls were aboard on this plane. What did I understand a while ago, did I understand 60?

0015:10 I did not catch it sir.

(Inaudible).

0015:20 Seven-forty-four, can you give me a confirmation on your people on board count?

0015:30 Seven-forty-four, let me check with (inaudible), see if we can't get something from the airlines, we've got people standing everywhere.

Confirmed, what size fire are we talking about here Captain Holly?

0015:40 We're talking about MD-80, (inaudible), lots of people.

Affirmative, we've got everybody on the way anyway, let's just forget about the number right now.

0015:50 (Inaudible) to Rescue 1.
Rescue 1, go ahead.

0016:00 (Inaudible), MEMS got here pretty quick.
Seven-forty-four.

0016:10 Yeah.
Can you advise when you find out exactly how many souls are on board?

0016:20 Yes I will, but uh, go ahead and send all the MEMS units that are available. Tell them we need them all.
(Inaudible), this is Red Ball 2.
Red Ball 2.
Engine 2 is on the airport.

0016:40 Engine 7-44 I'll be at the airport station, I'll have command at the R station, so send all parties that need to come to the command post, send them to the R station

0016:50 command post. Also notify Mr. Bill Flowers at the airport and Mr. Chris White.

0017:00 In the process of doing that. 44, I need to know roughly how many passengers and the size of the craft and if you're going to need anything from public works or anything like that.

0017:10 The best that I could understand is it's a plane that's the size that would carry at least a hundred people. Uh, I understood the first time, if I'm not standed corrected, that

0017:20 there was probably at least 60 people. So it's between 60 and a hundred people probably.

0017:30 Ten-four, copy that. Also, need to know if you're going to need public works out there.
Affirmative.
Ten-four. Also, MEMS has been advised to send all there units.

0017:40 Forty-four copies.

0017:50 Forty-two to 44, have you made arrangements for these other pumps to get out there to the Red Ball units to dump there water?

0018:00 It looks to me like they're going on the runway, it's obvious where they need to go from the looks of it, I haven't heard anyone call in for any help on that. Let me check with you and I'll get back.

0018:10 Well, we're going to need PD at all these gates also to let our units in and keep the people out that shouldn't be in there.

0018:20 Affirmative, I'll check it when I get on the map, I'll be looking.
Unit 13, to 7-44 on the scene.

0018:30 That's affirmative, what gate, can you tell me what gate you're going to need to use there to get to it if they need you?

0018:40 Red Ball 1, 7-44.
Seven-forty-four, go ahead.

0018:50 Advise these pumps on what gate they need to use to come in to enter to get to you folks and advise them if you do in fact need water, more water at this time.

0019:00 Well, we need water we (inaudible) we feel

0019:10 That's affirmative. Red Ball 1, just take charge of those companies as far as having them refill and how many companies you need on the airplane itself.

0019:20 Seven-forty-four, Red Ball 1, the plane has landed about a thousand foot off the end of the runway.

0019:30 Repeat that. Red Ball 1, repeat that message.

0019:40 The plane is approximately uh, a thousand feet off the end of the runway.

0019:50 Affirmative.

0020:00 Engine 4, we're almost on the scene we came in gate 29, veer to the right, stay to the right, follow it around.

0020:10 Engine 2 to Engine 4, we're going around the perimeter road.
Engine 4, copy.

0020:20 Two to 44, contact that tower and make sure that in fact this runway is closed to traffic.

0020:30 Uh, did you want engines here to do this?

END OF TAPE

ATTACHMENT 2



City of Little Rock

Central Fire Station

624 South Chester Street
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3995
501-918-3700
Fax 501-371-4485

June 14, 2000

Mr. Lawrence D. Roman
Special Investigator, Airports
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SWP
Washington, D.C. 20594

Mr. Scott J. Dunham
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SWP
Washington, D.C. 20594

Re: In the Matter of the
Investigation of American
Airlines, Inc., Flight 1420,
McDonnell Douglas, MD-82, N215AA
Little Rock, Arkansas
June 1, 1999

Docket Number SA-519

Gentlemen:

As the technical representative of the Little Rock Fire Department ("LRFD"), a party to the referenced docket, I have been made aware of some additional evidence which I am respectfully asking that the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") consider during its deliberations. I am directing it to Mr. Roman as he is the Chairman of the Airport and Emergency Group, of which I am a member. I have included Mr. Dunham as he is Chairman of the Air Traffic Control Group, and the new evidence pertains to that group. The evidence consists of statements made under oath by Mr. Kenneth Kaylor, the air traffic controller who was on duty at the time Flight 1420 crashed on June 1, 1999.

As you recall, prior to the beginning of the public hearing on January 26, 2000, Chairman Jim Hall stated that the NTSB had given serious consideration to the request of the parties that Mr. Kaylor be called to testify. However, he stated that he had been informed that Mr. Kaylor was under medical care and that it was his doctor's judgment that he should not testify. In a deposition given in MDL Docket No. 1308 here in Little Rock, Mr. Kaylor testified that he did not recall being asked if he was needed to testify at the hearing. Neither did he mention anything about being under directions from his doctor not to testify. This testimony is found at pages 167 and 168 of his deposition, copies of which are attached.

Mr. Lawrence D. Roman
Mr. Scott J. Dunham
June 14, 2000
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Regardless of whether he was able to testify then, Mr. Kaylor has now made statements in his deposition which are very enlightening and which we believe bear on the NTSB's deliberations in this matter. Because of the confusion over whether Mr. Kaylor could have testified, and the fact that he did not appear at the public hearing, we believe that, in the interest of developing a complete factual record, good cause exists for receiving Mr. Kaylor's deposition testimony into evidence.

As reflected on page 196 of his deposition, Mr. Kaylor candidly states that, in his initial contact with the LRFD emergency response units (Red Ball 1, 2 and 3), he did not advise that his last visual contact with Flight 1420 was at the midpoint of runway 4R. This information was not delivered to the fire fighters until later, after they had already proceeded to the approach end of 4R and were preparing to sweep the runway toward the departure end.

Mr. Kaylor also testified that he was aware of the alert positions LRFD units assume on the airfield when an inbound aircraft declares an emergency. The alert positions are numbered and cover the entire airfield, including runway 4R. Mr. Kaylor noted that he had this information available on a chart in the control tower. He testified that he did not consider advising the LRFD units of the appropriate alert position that would have enabled them to know the correct end of the runway to which they should proceed. This testimony is found at pages 195 and 196 of Mr. Kaylor's deposition, which are attached for your review.

This information is very important due to the statements made during the investigation and public hearing that the LRFD personnel initially proceeded to the wrong end of the runway. Based upon the information provided to the Red Ball units by Mr. Kaylor, the decision to proceed to the approach end of 4R and sweep up the runway was entirely logical, and consistent with LRFD policies and procedures, since Mr. Kaylor had previously told the fire fighters that he did not know the location of the aircraft. We believe it is appropriate and important that you consider this testimony, especially given the fact that there is a statement attributed to the other air traffic controller who gave a statement to Mr. Dunham's group, Michael Holland, that he noticed that the fire trucks had gone to the approach end of runway 4R rather than the departure end where he [Kaylor] believed the aircraft was located. Mr. Kaylor's deposition testimony does not indicate that he believed the aircraft was at the departure end.

While we do not criticize Mr. Kaylor, we believe the record needs to contain all pertinent information before the NTSB renders a decision. It is for this reason that we respectfully ask that Mr. Kaylor's deposition testimony be included in the record before a final report is issued by the NTSB. I should also note that our counsel advises that Judge Henry Woods, who is presiding over MDL Docket No. 1308, has ruled that the deposition testimony of the air traffic controllers may be publicly disclosed, but that the complete deposition must be released rather than piecemeal. It is for this reason that I have submitted the entire deposition of Mr. Kaylor, with certain relevant pages attached separately.

Mr. Lawrence D. Roman
Mr. Scott J. Dunham
June 14, 2000
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We do not believe including this information would be burdensome, but would provide the NTSB with all pertinent evidence for the public record. Since we understand the public docket is never closed, and that pertinent evidence is always welcome, we respectfully ask that you either accept the attached deposition into the NTSB record, or reconvene the public hearing so that Mr. Kaylor's testimony can be included in the record. We would at least request that you conduct an additional interview with Mr. Kaylor. If the latter option is chosen, we believe that the technical representatives of the parties should be present.

If there is some other method or procedure through which the attached information should be submitted, or if it should be directed to others with the NTSB, please advise and I will comply with your directions. In the event that other parties have comments or objections concerning our request, I am providing them with copies of this letter. I am also copying Mr. Gregory Feith, the Investigator in Charge of this docket. Since I understand that the other parties have a complete copy of Mr. Kaylor's deposition, I am only providing them with the pertinent excerpts which are referenced in this letter. The same is true for Mr. Feith.

On behalf of the LRFD, thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



J. T. Cantrell
District Chief
Little Rock Fire Department

JTC:dab

Enclosures

By Federal Express Delivery

cc/enc: Mr. Gregory Feith
Federal Aviation Administration
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
American Airlines, Inc.
Allied Pilots Association
Association of Professional Flight Attendants
National Weather Service
Little Rock National Airport

ATTACHMENT 1

1 Q. Five to six months after that?

2 A. Something like that.

3 Q. Were you aware of the NTSB public hearing
4 here in Little Rock at the end of January?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Were you asked to testify at that hearing,
7 sir?

8 A. By whom?

9 Q. By the NTSB.

10 A. They never contacted me.

11 Q. Did anyone ever contact you about testifying
12 at the NTSB public hearing here in January?

13 A. I think there was talk of it. I don't know
14 if they said they wanted me there or anything, if
15 that's what you mean. I don't recall anybody telling
16 that to me.

17 Q. Did anyone from the -- your union discuss
18 that with you?

19 A. The union rep may have. I don't -- I may
20 have had a brief conversation with her. But --

21 Q. Do you know who -- I'm sorry.

22 A. I don't recall exactly what the conversation
23 was.

24 Q. Do you remember who you had the conversation
25 with?

1 A. That would have been Kay Wiley.

2 Q. And who is Kay Wiley?

3 A. She's the NATCA representative of Little
4 Rock.

5 Q. Did you tell Ms. Wiley that you did not want
6 to testify at the hearing?

7 A. I don't recall what -- exactly what our
8 conversation was about. It was about the hearing, but
9 I don't know exact -- I don't remember the contents of
10 that conversation.

11 Q. Did you read anything in the newspaper about
12 your not testifying at the hearing?

13 A. No, sir. I have -- I do not read the
14 newspaper articles.

15 Q. Since you received counseling and gone back
16 to work, you have -- have you performed any duties as
17 an air traffic controller in the tower?

18 A. In the tower, I have, yes, sir.

19 Q. Okay. And what duties were those?

20 A. Just normal duties. Working traffic.

21 Q. So in addition to the training role that
22 you've described for us, you also -- do you work a
23 regular shift as an air traffic controller?

24 A. No, sir. That's -- if they need help or I
25 have time to go up and do it, then I do it. My main

1 barn and go out to the east up to Runway 4 Right.

2 Q. Did you see them once they got out to the
3 taxiway -- it appears to be Romeo -- there?

4 A. Did I do what with them? I'm sorry.

5 Q. Did you -- did you see the vehicles at that
6 point?

7 A. I don't recall. I had gotten the accident
8 incident notification binder and opened it up and was
9 starting to look for the accident checklist that we
10 have to complete.

11 Q. Did you see the vehicles turn right onto
12 Taxiway Romeo proceeding down to the approach end of
13 4 Right?

14 A. No, sir, I did not.

15 Q. Are you aware of the alert positions that
16 these vehicles take on the airfield when there's an
17 emergency declared, an inbound airplane declares an
18 emergency?

19 A. Yes, sir, I am.

20 Q. And are there alert positions along Runway
21 4 Right that -- that are identified by number?

22 A. Yes, sir, there are.

23 Q. And do you know what those alert positions
24 are?

25 A. As far as number-wise?

1 Q. Yes, sir.

2 A. No, sir, I don't -- we have it in the tower
3 on a chart, but outside of that --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. -- not that I -- I have not committed to
6 memory.

7 Q. I understand. When you directed them to look
8 for the airplane, did you consider giving them one of
9 the alert positions so that they would know which way
10 to turn on the runway?

11 A. No, sir. When I rang out the crash phone, I
12 just told them that I had them -- just had -- this is
13 the tower. I had an American MD-80 to land on Runway
14 4 Right. He is not -- I cannot see him, and he is not
15 talking to me. Would you please make sure -- go make
16 sure he's okay.

17 Q. On the initial notification, did you tell
18 them that you had seen him going past midfield?

19 A. On initial notification? No, sir, I did not.

20 Q. At some point later, do you recall telling
21 the --

22 A. I did later on.

23 Q. You have to let me finish the question.

24 A. I'm sorry.

25 (Discussion off the record.)