June 12, 1995 B-U01B-15283-ASI

Mr. Thomas Haueter, AS-10 National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza SW Washington D.C. 20594

BOEING

Subject:

Photos USAir 737-300 N513AU Accident Near Pittsburgh -

September 8, 1994

Reference: Letter B-U01B-15280-ASI Purvis/Haueter, June 9, 1995

Dear Mr. Haueter:

Further to the reference letter, please find enclosed photographs of the crew oxygen bottle and portion of three floor track segments for the crew seats on the subject airplane. (There are eight of these floor track segments per airplane; four for the captains seat and four for the first officers seat.) These photos were taken by Rick Howes last week while working with Mr. H. Hughes at the reconstruction sight in Pittsburgh.

Each print is labeled on the reverse side for specific identification in case you want to discuss a particular print on the phone, or if you request additional photo reproduction from us.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

FLIGHT TEST.

John W. Purvis

600

Director, Air Safety Investigation Org. B-U01B, Mail Stop 14-HM

Telex 32-9430, STA DIR PURVIS

Enclosure: 25 - 5 X 7 inch colored prints, REG #RH08-1 through RH08-25

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group P.O. Box 3707 Seattle, WA 98124-2207

June 9, 1995 B-U01B-15280-ASI

BY FACSIMILE:

Mr. Thomas Haueter, AS-10 National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza SW Washington, D.C. 20594

BOEING

Subject: Field Notes USAir 737-300 N513AU Accident Near Pittsburgh -

September 8, 1994

Reference: a) Telecon Howes/ Haueter, June 8, 1995

b) Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation,

dated December 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Haueter:

Per the reference (a) telephone conversation, please find enclosed field notes from Rick Howes providing his observations of the crew oxygen bottle and positions of crew seat track found during a visit to the reconstruction site on last Tuesday and Wednesday.

As discussed with you before, the 737-300 forward outflow valve is normally perating in flight. The valve closed when the cabin air recirculation system if the crew elects to turn off will open if the recirculation system is inoperative ine 737-200 airplane, which the system in flight. The forward outflow valve has no cabin air recirculation system, is normally open in flight as indicated in flagnote 5 on page 21 of reference (b) report. Therefore we would not expect soot deposits on the forward outflow valve for the subject airplane if there was a pre-impact fire under the floor in the pressurized area forward and outside of the forward cargo compartment. We believe that the crew oxygen bottle would be the only potential fire source in this area that could impact controlled flight from the time of the upset to airplane impact. There is no indication of a fire warning or crew comments of a fire on the CVR. Also, from Rick's observations of the lack of sooting and charring on the oxygen bottle, we believe that the oxygen bottle was a not a source of fire in this area forward of the forward cargo compartment.

Rick's observations for the crew seat track segments may be useful to determine a crew seat position, but we believe that more information can be gathered by an engineering examination of the actual hardware. We also believe that a further attempt should be made to locate more crew seat track components before or while the wreckage is relocated by USAir. These seat

Page 2 Thomas Haueter B-U01B-15262-ASI

tracks were requested from the beginning of this investigation to determine the actual seat position of both crew members prior to impact. This information will also be useful in establishing the rudder pedal position prior to impact.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

BOEING

5,

FLIGHT TEST

John W. Purvis

Director, Air Safety Investigation Org. B-U01B, Mail Stop 14-HM Telex 32-9430, STA DIR PURVIS

Enclosure:

Rick Howes Field Notes on Crew Oxygen Bottle and Seat Track Sectors found at the reconstruction site on June 6 and June 7, 1995

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- THE BOTTLE WAS EMBOSSED WITH THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

> REE 108.7 1-89 5 63 93

PLACARD WITH S/N 0055

THERE IS IMPACT DAMAGE (DENT
AND SCRAPES) TO THE TANK BONY.

THE REGULATOR IS BROKEN OF

FLUSH WITH THE TOP OF THE

TANK. THERE IS NO SIGN

OF FIRE (SOOTING OR CHARRING)

ON THE TANK BORY.

THE FRACTURE SURFACE OF THE REGULATOR SHAPIK (LEFT IN THE TANK) HAS ONE HOLE (20.16 INCHE) IN THE CENTER OF THE SHAPIK WITH TWO SURROUNDING HOLES (20.10 INCH DIA.),

- THE BOTTLE IS DE-PRESSURIZED.

CREW SEAT TRACK DOCUMENTATION

- 1. LABELED "CAPTAIN'S SEAT TRACK ABOY"
 FOUND NEAR THE COCK PIT LAYOUG
 ON THE AI HANGER FLOOR.
- -12" LONG SECTION OF TRACK MOUNTED

 TO FLOOR STRUKTURE. WEB OF

 TRACK IS TORN APPROXIMATELY HALF

 HE LENGTH OF THE LOWER FLANGE.
- TO THE UPPER FLANGE WAS FOUND

 TO THE UPPER FLANGE WAS FOUND

 LOCATED 3.3 INCHES A FROM THE

 LENTERLINE OF THE STOP TO THE

 EDGE OF THE BRACKE CLOSEST TO

 THE STOP. THE BRACKET IS TRAPPED ON THE TRACK.

 OF THE TRACK

 OF THE TRACK

 STRUCTURE THE FOLLOWING MARKING

 IS PRESENT!

2A 059 8171 155 3 D16 A 48697 IPECO 6 PT B 232 N 302 - 2005

(THE LAST NUMBER IS THE BOEING PART NUMBER FOR THIS TRACK.)

- 2. A PAIR OF SEAT TRACKS WERE FOUND ON THE AI HANGER FLOOR STILL MOUNTED TO FLOOR STRUCTURE NEAR THE FLIGHT CONTROLS LAYOUT AREA.
 - BOTH TRACKS ARE "BROKEN-OUT"

 AT THE THIRD HOLE FROM THE END

 OF THE SEED. THE THIRD HOLE IS

 LOCATED APPROXIMMTELY 4.5 INCHES

 FROM THE CENTER-LINE (E) OF THE HOLE

 TO THE CENTERLINE OF THE STOP.