a good reason to point the nose down 160k and try for a straight-in from base. Whether that was the logic is unknown but I can see where there can be reasons to do that. None of those alternatives were discussed in this topic and I think we simply assumed the pilot should have used max glide and stayed high as long as possible.

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Re: any news on a down Evo 38DM? (#p17660)

by **Jeff Edwards** » Fri Oct 14, 2016 9:36 pm

The military teaches and has taught for decades the SFO (single engine flameout) pattern. Fly best glide to airport. Spiral down; arrive at high key at x airspeed; low key at y airspeed and land. Unless you are on fire, there is usually no reason not to do that. Works for gliders to space shuttles. Unfortunately powered pilots suck at this maneuver and usually end up hurt or worse because of it. When I was a designated pilot examiner and pulled the power lever to simulate an engine failure I could tell within 30 seconds whether the applicant could make the chosen landing site or not. Many could not because they were flopping around flying until they ran out of airspeed and altitude. If the FAA required this maneuver to be taught in the private pilot Practical Test Standards we would have fewer accidents. IMHO it is not 25 other reasons.... It is usually because the pilot does not know how to manage energy and flight path engine out. A 14 year old glider student does better than95% of the powered pilots.

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Re: any news on a down Evo 38DM? (#p17744)

by **Jeff Siegel** » Tue Oct 18, 2016 7:04 pm

Hi Guys,

here is my official statement to the FAA:

On October 1st, 2016, my fiancée Beth and I were travelling home from Raleigh, North Carolina (KRDU), to Ogden, Utah (KOGD). We made a fuel stop at Allen County airport in Iola, Kansas (K88). The first leg of the trip was seamless.

When we landing at K88, I approached the fuel pump as I would have normally, putting my credit card in, getting it authorized and then turning on the pump and filling the tanks. This time was different. Once I authorized my credit card, I hit the button to turn on the pump (opposed to the normal lever). Thinking I had done everything correct, I went to fill up the tanks, but only a trickle of fuel came out. I repeated this process 5 times. Each time holding the button in a little longer because I heard another pump turn on about 100 feet away, but each time I took my finger off the button, the other pump stopped.

I called the airport manager and asked if there was something I was doing incorrectly. He told me he could drive down and check it out if I was willing to wait 20 minutes. I agreed. When he got to the airport, he made some adjustments and finally got the pump playing. I asked him what was wrong with it and he said he had not sold jet fuel in a week and there was air in the lines that he had to bleed out. He also mentioned something about filters and the company that provides the fuels, but I'm not sure on his exact words.

We filled all three tanks of the plane, the right tank first, then the left, then the aux tank. The total

fuel taken was around 147 gallons. This gave us about 193 gallons on startup. I taxied up to the runway, did the normal run-up procedures and we took off. Everything was normal on takeoff. I took off on the left tank.

As we climbed out I called ATC to pick up the IFR flight plan I created using ForeFlight app. ATC cleared me to my destination and gave me a climbing attitude. At some point I switched to the right fuel tank. Around 11,000 feet I heard the pitch of the engine drastically change. Immediately following that was an alarm from the engine monitoring instrument (MVP50) which showed me the oil pressure had gone to 0. There were no signs or indications, no burbling or funny things happening with the instruments, the engine had just lost full power. The fuel pressure as indicated by the MVP50 was still strong, although it only measures the electric and mechanical fuel pumps, not the main engine pump. The ITT was also not something I took note of, which means it did not skyrocket into the red because I would have noticed that.

I pushed the nose over, switched fuel tanks from the right to the left. I turned on the igniters and held the start button down. Nothing happened at all. I called ATC and declared an emergency. I did a direct to on the Garmin back to the airport we took off from. The ATC controller also directed me on a vector back to the airport. I feathered the prop and it completely stopped. I also noticed a billow of smoke out of the right exhaust pipe. By the time all this happened we were down to about 6500 feet and 8-9 miles to the airport. When we got to 6 miles from the airport I decided we were not going to make it back to the airport based on our rate of descent and the distance to the airport. I did put the gear down at some point during this time.

I saw an open dirt road and decided we were going to go for that road. We came in a little faster than I expected and the open road became tree lined and we clipped a tree, spun around and slid down the road to a halt.

The cabin was fully in tact with the exception of the co-pilot window which got shattered at some point between the tree and the ground. I opened the door and got out. Beth had a few injuries which we were not sure of the severity at the time. I scrambled to find my phone and call 911. Some locals showed up and helped us out.

All this being said, a few things were pointed out in this forum I can address for you:

The NTSB is not doing an official investigation until early November. Our best conclusion is that it was fuel contamination, possibly just water. This was the second leg of a trip, the plane operated within norms the first leg. The takeoff was normal. It was a very strange occurrence, with no indications even seconds before it happened. In retrosepct, the airport fuel situation was suspect.

First lesson I learned coming out of this is a simulated engine out is not the same as a real engine out, not even close. Maybe if you have military training it's different, but for me, I spent the first few minutes saying "What the F#$% just happened, is this real? Ok...what do I need to do to make this right". I was not scared, I was quite calm and collected, but I was a little nervous and that means things were not flowing like I would expect them to.

I changed tanks, I also attempted a restart. Did I do it 100% right?... I have no idea...this was my first time trying to restart a dead engine in the air.

If you've ever been encumbered by Aviate - Navigate - Communicate...take that feeling to a new level... There's a lot going on and limited time.

I did feather the prop and it completely stopped, it was definitely not the first thing I did.

Being that I was nervous I could not recall whether 1 notch of flaps was better for glide or not, I played with the flaps...I probably created more drag than necessary.

I decided we were not going to make the airport, given our descent rate and the distance. I had a choice between fields and roads. I chose a road that had an empty section. My #1 concern was not to hurt anyone outside the plane. My #2 concern was to put us on the ground safely and not flip us. The empty section of road was smaller than I anticipated and we ended up clipping a tree with the wing.

I am saddened that we lost the plane, but after second guessing myself for over a week, I decided I could have done everything by the book and we could have both perished. The outcome was good. I don't believe this was in any way an issue with the plane, nor do I believe I could have prevented the engine out.

I am very pleased with the strength and resilience of the airplane. Obviously played a major role in saving us. I also have a new found appreciation for BRS parachutes in planes, what if it was night, or over mountains or water?

My best advice coming out of this is that practicing engine outs once a year is not enough. Even twice a year would have been much better. I was almost 1 year from recurrent training which I was signed up for. I fly the plane a lot. I put on 95 hours in the last 90 days. These situations you don't think about because of the bulletproof stats of the engine. I hear also from a lot of cocky pilots that they can handle whatever is thrown at them with engine issues...maybe it's true, but maybe it's not. Do yourself a favor and be more on top emergency situations.

-Jeff

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Re: any news on a down Evo 38DM? (#p17745)

by **Gabriel Silverstein** » Tue Oct 18, 2016 7:17 pm

Thanks you for sharing that detail, Jeff.

I am curious as to typical training as other do it. I had actual real engine turned off in flight practice in my first 10 hours, having no previous turbine experience. I hope I never need it but it was very helpful and I review the procedure regularly. I agree it isn't the same as simulated.

Hopefully Meadowbrook can get the FBO on the hook for this and maybe start offering hull coverage again...

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Re: any news on a down Evo 38DM? (#p17746)

by **Rob Huntington** » Tue Oct 18, 2016 7:25 pm

Jeff-

Thank you for sharing what was a truly horrific experience, but one that had the best outcome imaginable--you and your fiancée Beth were safe and relatively uninjured. I had a very minor incident early in my flying career (ground loop after a broken tailwheel spring) and can say with certainty that there are plenty of "armchair quarterbacks" who will second guess everything you did. One of your