

STATEMENT FROM JOHN SCOTT WEDEMEYER

5305 Incident Report

Crew: Scott Wedemeyer Pilot Flying-PF

Location: ATW, Landing Runway 30, RNAV/GPS Runway 30

Sir,

I'm giving you the following information to show the experience and background that I have and used to make the decisions that I made at the time of the incident.

J. Scott Wedemeyer:

Total Flying Time in Years- 24

Total Flying Time in Hours- 6180.5

Total Flying Time in Gulfstream- 1119.8

Gulfstream Type Ratings – GIV, GV, G450, and G550

Total Time G550- 555.2

Total Gulfstream Landings-191

Total G550 Landings- 90

Experiences:

Four Combat Flying tours

Two years with Navy Flight Demonstration Team (Blue Angels)

Three year tour as an Instructor Pilot

High Time F/A-18 Pilot in the Marine Corps over twice as much as all contemporaries

Post Graduate Safety School Trained

President of Three F/A-18 Mishap Boards

Flight Safety Every 6 months

Accidents or incidents prior to this event- Zero

A/C 5305 Decision Not To Go Around inside the Final Approach Fix

The Auto Pilot was engaged and the approach to landing was normal. After lowering the gear and completing the landing check list. We got an **L Hydraulic Quantity Low** CAS Message just inside the FAF. I had seen this same CAS message in a different airplane a week before at the service center. I selected the Hydraulic Synoptic Page on the #2 DU and noticed the hydraulic quantity decreasing. Shortly after, an amber **L Hydraulic System Fail** CAS message appeared. The Co-pilot was reading the QRH checklist. Throughout my 20 year military carrier I was always taught that if you had a problem inside the final approach fix and your gear was down it was always better to land. We lost several aircraft because pilots delayed their landings. At Flight Safety in the GV and GIV training that I receive every 6 months I have never been giving a scenario with a system malfunction were I would go around in side the final approach fix. At this time my mindset was that the A/C had a L Hydraulic leak and knew the QRH Checklist said first

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thing in Bold to **Continue flight to nearest suitable airfield and land** and from training at Flight Safety the biggest concern was getting your gear down. We were already in a landing configuration below 1000 feet above ground level (AGL) and this aircraft already had autopilot/trim problems. I understood that once we got the Aux Pump on we would have normal Ground Spoilers, Brakes and NWS. My mindset and plan at this time was to continue the approach.

A/C 5305 Decision to go around after landing

When we landed I selected the Right Thrust Reverser and I pushed the rudder pedals twice, we had no brakes and about the same time I visually saw the 3000 feet remaining board and decided there would not be enough room to stop using the emergency brakes. So I attempted to go-around by advancing throttles to MCT. At 100 knots if the engines took 10 seconds to spool up we would need 2000 feet. I have done this in the simulator. At Flight Safety the only training I had using Emergency Brakes was on a 12000 foot runway and never had to pop the tires to stop. I was concerned that pulling the Emergency Brakes Handle at this short distance would lock up the tires and could possibly ground loop the airplane or pop one side and pull us off the runway. I truly thought from my experience and training from Flight Safety that doing a go around at that time was the best option.

A/C 5305 Decision not to use the Emergency Brakes before going off runway

The Co-pilot felt there wasn't enough runway to get airborne. The Co-pilot pulled the throttles back. I estimate approximately 1000 feet of runway remaining when throttles were pulled back. At this time I knew we were going off the runway and I needed to be able to steer the aircraft away from a ditch and a couple obstacles, approach lights and a few small buildings. I reached up and deployed the right thrust reverser and used the rudder to steer. I also decided not to pull the Emergency Brakes to prevent the aircraft from sliding with the cross wind and hitting the ground with any Yaw motion which could cause a roll over and I did not want to slide straight ahead into the approach lights. I also felt I could better steer the A/C away from obstacles without the Emergency Brakes being pulled. I felt that once we were in the snow the drag would slow us down. The aircraft departed the end of runway 30 at approximately 95 KIAS on runway heading near the centerline. I steered the aircraft to the right and eventually came to a stop after the left main landing gear collapsed.

John Scott Wedemeyer