

Statement regarding United Airlines Flight 880 (IAH – LHR, divert to SNN),  
August 30, 2016

We were in cruise flight level FL340 and had just passed N46 W040 (0202Z). Air was smooth seat belt sign off. All meteorological indications were as predicted and planned. Winds were in the realms forecasted and OAT's the same. Pre-flight I had reviewed the weather package from WSI, and there was no indication to expect turbulence at this point in our flight, nor were there any PIREPs or ATC advisories. Radar was on in AUTO mode and tilt about 1 degree down. As per dispatch and briefing plan all was going as expected on TRAK X (Xray). There were no indications anything would be different.

A crew change had just taken place and I (Capt. Burke) had just exited the cockpit for my crew rest about 2 minutes prior when we encountered severe turbulence. I was standing in the forward galley briefing the flight attendants that I was going on break and where I would be if needed. During this briefing is when we encountered the initial jolt and then an additional 4-5 jolts and oscillations.

I was trying to hold on but was thrown to the floor by door 1L and was trying to secure myself. During this 30-45 seconds (I estimate) I saw the other flight attendants scurry to jump seats and FA Eric Wulf just wedge himself between the left forward galley and the hallway that leads to the cockpit while water bottles were flying out of the cabinets in the galley.

As soon as the turbulence subsided I heard the cockpit to cabin call and I answered the interphone at door 1L. FO John Wofford summoned me to the cockpit immediately to which I entered approximately 2 minutes after the severe turbulence encounter started. I entered the cockpit and told both FO's stay in your seats, to keep flying the jet and I assessed the situation at hand from the jump seat. (FO Jeff Schmidt was PF and FO John Wofford was PM).

We had EICAS messages. I saw we had a LT GEN OFF indication with UTIL BUS OFF lights. My first question is have we lost the left engine. They responded no and I concurred. I asked them for a QRH and I told them to keep flying and I will work the checklist. I worked the QRH 60.22 procedure to restore LT GEN power to the aircraft. It did restore power. I also started the APU as a backup. With this procedure complete we started getting calls from the rear of the aircraft that we had injuries and both to PAX and FLT Attendants.

Once all was established in the cockpit and stable I called to the back to let the FA's know I was going to the back of the plane to assess overall command of exactly what we had in the back. Once I left the cockpit I checked on the FA's up front and proceeded to the back to find what we had. First I observed them all a bit shaken up and recovering themselves while attending to the aircraft and PAX needs.

Seat belt sign was on and I observed mostly everyone (PAX) seated and belted in. I was able to make my way to the back of the airplane without any delays. Once in back galley I observed two flight attendants complaining of injuries and then one additional coming back dripping blood from the top of her head and complaining about being nauseated and needing to go into the LAV by door 2R. Another FA Michael McGovern (u048319) was attending to their needs- himself also injured. (Michael told me he was an Emergency Room Nurse). I asked him to report to me what he was seeing and his findings. FA Eric Wulf working up front escorted me and stayed right with me in the back of the plane the whole time as a helper (and for security reasons) as we were seeing exactly what we had.

After about 15-20 minutes in the back I returned to the cockpit to assess over all what we had up front and to inform pilots flying what was going on in back and to establish a call to dispatch on the initial medical conditions and coming up with a plan.

Now more reports were coming to the cockpit from the other FA's in the back about possible PAX injuries and more details of the injured FA crew's status I returned to the back of the aircraft to once again check in with FA Michael McGovern, get from him his medical assessments personally and to walk through the cabin talking to passengers specifically as to the needs and how they were.

I felt in the interest of obtaining prompt medical attention for multiple passengers and crew, that in the interest of safety we needed to divert to SNN Ireland. At that point we were still somewhere about 2 ½ more hours remaining to a LHR arrival. I returned to the cockpit at this time.

After talking to dispatch and advising them we may have approximately 15-20 injured passengers we agreed a SNN medical diversion was our best course of action.

We contacted Shannon ATC through SATCOM- told them what we had and needed a medical diversion to EINN. We asked them to communicate further through CPDLC. He told us on SATCOM he had to move a flights altitude and he would get back to us shortly. Approximately 3 minutes later we got direct clearance to EINN off the tracks via CPDLC.

Diversion into SNN was without incident. Flight was met by UAL Staff and medical "First responders" and they briefed me as to the way they wanted to attend to the passengers and those who needed medical attention. The First responder Commander asked we deplane all passengers who were OK and ask the injured to remain seated so that they may be identified to and by first responders.

In closing: Over all I feel the crews both pilots and FA's handled this very professionally and appeared to function in roles that they needed to in the current moment and what was needed for the overall flight as it was completed.

Capt. Monte D. Burke  
02 Sept 2016  
IAHFO

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August 30, 2016

On 30 August, while at cruise at FL340, we encountered severe turbulence. I was the pilot flying. We did not have any turbulence or weather forecast for the area. We were approximately 50 miles East of N46W40 on NAT X. We had the radar on and no weather showing for at least the last 2.5 hours, nor any ahead of us. The seat belt light had been off for over 2 hours and it was completely smooth. Without warning, we encountered severe turbulence. The PNF immediately turned on the seat belts sign. The autopilot disengaged. I silenced the warning and began to hand fly. The radar still showed no weather nor traffic on TCAS. The Left Engine Generator turned off and so did both utility buses. The turbulence lasted for about 30 seconds. When we were out of the turbulence, the PNF called for the Captain to return to the cockpit. We accomplished the appropriate checklists and called the flight attendant stations to check for injuries. The three of us coordinated with our dispatcher. Since there were injuries in the passenger cabin, all of us determined the best decision was a divert to EINN and not to continue to London. We were cleared directly off of NAT X to EINN after declaring an Emergency. We did not encounter any weather or turbulence after the event, except for scattered layers of clouds near EINN. The landing was uneventful and medical personnel met us at the gate.

First Officer Jeffrey J. Schmidt

## Statement Regarding United Airlines Flight 880 (IAH-LHR), August 30, 2016

On the evening of August the 30th 2016 I was the first officer on flight 880 and the pilot monitoring. I had just finished my crew rest break and had been back on the flight deck for a few minutes leading up to this event. The flight conditions were smooth and devoid of any turbulence for approximately two hours leading up to this event. The seat belt sign had been placed in the off position during this time.

The weather radar was operating in the AUTO mode with the TILT showing -1. There was not any radar returns presented. The radar was clear.

When I returned back to the flight deck we were approximately 50 miles East of N46W040 at FL340. As a crew we had a positive exchange of the flight controls and a briefing. Captain Burke then left the flight deck to begin his crew rest break. Shortly after Captain Burke left the flight deck we encountered immediate severe turbulence. This severe turbulence lasted approximately 25 seconds.

We had the left generator fail caution message and a left autopilot failure. We never had a loss of control and I would estimate that the loss and gain of altitude was -300 feet to +300 feet. Shortly after this event Captain Burke returned to the flight deck. As a crew we ran the appropriate checklists.

As a crew we started to evaluate the aircraft, crew, passengers and the scope of the injuries. The only medical personnel that we were aware of was one of our flight attendants. After assessing our passengers and crew, we along with dispatch decided that Shannon, Ireland was our best option. We landed in Shannon, Ireland without further problems.

First Officer John Wofford