June 19, 2013

David Tochen, Esquire General Counsel National Transportation Safety Board 490 L'Enfant Plaza Washington, DC 20594

Dear Mr. Tochen:

Enclosed with this letter is a Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800.

We look forward to your consideration of its contents and to your response. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely

Henry F. Hughes

Senior NTSB Investigator, Retired

The TWA 800 Project

Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project 6/19/2013

Contact:

Henry F. Hughes Senior NTSB Investigator, Retired

Thomas F. Stalcup, Ph.D.

Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project 6/19/2013

The Petitioners, which include investigators from the original National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation, family members of crash victims, former airline crash investigators, and concerned scientists, hereby request Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800. This petition is based upon new and material evidence and analyses that refute the NTSB's original findings and is submitted in accordance with NTSB Reg. §845.41(a).

NTSB Reg. §845.41(a) states:

Petitions for reconsideration or modification of the Board's findings and determination of probable cause . . . will be entertained only if based on the discovery of new evidence or on a showing that the Board's findings are erroneous.

The Petitioners have reviewed the FAA radar evidence along with new evidence not available to the NTSB during the official investigation and contend that the NTSB's probable cause determination is erroneous and should be reconsidered and modified accordingly.

New evidence includes:

- 1. Two new analyses of FAA radar data,
- 2. Twenty FBI eyewitness interview summaries apparently not previously available to the NTSB.
- 3. Analysis of "spike-tooth" fractures found in multiple locations.
- 4. Evidence of explosive residue detected in multiple locations other than the forward cargo hold and floor boards.

Furthermore, based on a critical analysis of the new evidence, NTSB finding #8, which states "that witness observations of a streak of light...was burning fuel from the accident airplane in crippled flight..." will be shown to be erroneous.

New Evidence and Analyses

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Two new analyses of the FAA radar evidence demonstrate that the explosion that caused the crash did not result from a low-velocity fuel-air explosion as the NTSB has determined. Rather, it was caused by a detonation or high-velocity explosion.

On page 260 of the NTSB Final Report the fuel-air explosion that caused the crash is described as an "overpressure event," which caused a forward wall of the tank to fracture "at its upper end and...rotate forward about its lower end." After this wall and other adjacent nearby fuel tank walls were recovered in large sections and analyzed, NTSB investigators working with scientists contracted by the NTSB concluded that the explosion was a low-velocity event or deflagration. Had the tank detonated, the NTSB investigators and outside experts surmised, the recovered center tank wreckage would have been significantly more fragmented.

The official probable cause for the crash therefore rests on the determination of a low-velocity overpressure event that resulted in failure of the center fuel tank at the forward aspect and that because of the location of the failure, forces would be directed longitudinally forward with respect to the airplane.

The radar evidence however, shows that a far more powerful and sideways projected explosion occurred simultaneously with the loss of the aircraft's electrical power, which sent debris perpendicular to the accident aircraft's flight path, traveling approximately 1/2 mile due south.

We have found no NTSB analysis of or accounting for this high-speed debris in the NTSB public docket or the final report.

Additional new material evidence includes a collection of twenty FBI eyewitness interview summary documents. Many of the witness statements summarized in this collection describe a firework or streak of light that ascended to where TWA Flight 800 exploded.

During the course of the initial investigation, the NTSB investigators as well as parties to the investigation were denied the opportunity to interview eyewitnesses or to review FBI form 302 eyewitness summary documents. At this crucial time, within two weeks of the crash and after interviewing hundreds of eyewitnesses, FBI investigators were finalizing a report that concluded there was a "high probability" that a missile caused the crash. ¹

An internal CIA memo dated July 30, 1996 and attached to this petition discusses an FBI report being finalized at the time with the conclusion that there is "high probability that the incident was caused by a MANPAD [shoulder launched missile]". One of the FBI agents involved in the witness interviews and a co-author of this FBI report was described in the CIA memo as a former military pilot with radar and avionics experience.

The failure of the NTSB to provide investigators access to all of this data in the critical early stages of the investigation was unprecedented in that it violated well established NTSB policy and customs regarding data availability. Such a denial of data has never occurred prior to or since the TWA Flight 800 investigation.

We are attaching FBI form 302 witness summaries to this petition. These new witness summaries contain descriptions of rising streaks of light and other observations that do not corroborate the official crash sequence determined by the NTSB. Observations in the attached witness documents, combined with the observations of an important grouping of witnesses among the 670 summaries that the FBI ultimately provided to the NTSB during the investigation should be reviewed and collated to determine if the eighth finding in the NTSB report is, as we believe, erroneous and does not fairly summarize witness observations.

More than 100 spike tooth fractures were found on various aluminum wreckage items from areas throughout the aircraft. According to the NTSB Structures Group Factual Report (Exhibit 7A), "spike tooth characteristic[s] are indicative of a very rapid strain rate produced by a high energy event." We have found no NTSB report or analysis describing an event in the official crash sequence that could have caused these fractures.

We determined that the NTSB has not adequately investigated or accounted for the spike tooth fractures. Our analysis highlights a grouping of these fractures that remain unaccounted for in the official scenario. This grouping of fractures was found on wreckage items that landed in the earliest debris field and hit the water at relatively low velocities. These fractures most likely occurred while the aircraft was in the air. In the officially proposed crash sequence, there is no mention of any high energy event.

We urge the NTSB to conduct and publish the necessary analysis to determine the minimum energy and velocities required to generate representative spike tooth fractures on aircraft components landing in all three debris fields and to show which segment of the official crash sequence contained sufficiently high energy to create these fractures throughout the jetliner.

A large number of aircraft wreckage items tested positive for explosives. PETN, for example, was reportedly detected on the aircraft's right wing and on at least one floorboard. According to investigators who worked inside the reconstruction hangar, RDX was detected on a canvas cargo bay curtain. The NTSB final report only mentions three items testing positive for explosives—a "piece of canvas—like material and two pieces of floor panel"—and suggests they were deposited during a "dog-training explosive detection exercise" that allegedly took place inside the passenger cabin of the accident aircraft six weeks before the crash. However, during such an exercise, explosives would not have been deposited on a curtain in the cargo bay, on the right

² NTSB Final Report on the crash of TWA Flight 800, pg. 118, 2000

wing, or on other wreckage items outside the passenger cabin.

Our investigation has determined that there were approximately 100 or more explosives detections. The NTSB should immediately request all evidence and information from the FBI regarding these detections, treat each detection as new evidence, and then thoroughly study and document them. A comprehensive report should then be published that explains the origin of each detection inside and outside of the passenger cabin. The NTSB should also carefully review all documents pertaining to the "dog-sniffing" exercise to verify how conclusively they prove that the exercise was, in fact, conducted on the jetliner that became TWA Flight 800. Our investigation has determined that the exercise did not, in fact, occur on that aircraft.

Concerns and Recommendations

During this review, we urge the NTSB to isolate and study all of the witness accounts that include descriptions of an ascending streak of light. These are very critical eyewitness accounts, since the NTSB previously determined that they included observations of the earliest moments of the crash. Unlike the majority of witnesses who only saw events near the end of the crash sequence, many witnesses in this early grouping described the trajectory of the ascending light and the characteristics of the explosion that apparently initiated TWA 800's demise.

Since the NTSB announced at its final hearing on the crash in August 2000 and stated in its eighth finding in the final report that the ascending light that eyewitnesses saw was TWA Flight 800 in crippled flight, it is important to compare these eyewitness accounts with what can be deduced about Flight 800's final moments.

In addition to an analysis of eyewitness evidence presented in this petition, and in a further effort to establish whether or not Finding 8 is accurate, we request that the NTSB conduct a detailed review of the Witness Group Chairman's August 2000 Sunshine hearing presentation. We believe that an objective review of the transcript will show that the Witness Group Chairman misrepresented the observations of important eyewitnesses, omitted important details from the accounts of airborne military witnesses, and significantly understated the number of witness accounts that conflicted with the official crash sequence.

Since the language in Finding 8 was provided by the Witness Group Chairman, we believe that his performance at the Sunshine hearing should be taken into account when considering whether or not that finding is accurate.

We also have serious concerns regarding the validity of the debris field database. The NTSB originally contracted Oceaneering to create and maintain the wreckage recovery location database, and then later assigned two NTSB employees as "project coordinators" for this effort. One of the two NTSB project coordinators was observed changing wreckage recovery location data for various wreckage items without informing or consulting the NTSB Group Chairman responsible for that wreckage.

That Group Chairman and several group members complained to NTSB management and a meeting was ultimately held to rectify the situation. According to the Group Chairman and the group members who attended this meeting, none of the location changes were satisfactorily justified. To this day, those location changes remain unchanged in the database. We request that this issue be revisited and that the database be revalidated.

We are concerned that the NTSB did not require certain investigative groups to provide analyses of their findings, which are required per the NTSB's own investigative protocols and which have been provided in all previous NTSB investigations. The NTSB should immediately order that these necessary analysis reports be produced.

Finally, we are deeply concerned that the NTSB has never met with the medical examiner to discuss the NTSB's findings or probable cause determination, as is customary to facilitate the official manner of death determination for the death certificates of the TWA 800 victims. Because of this lapse, the manner of death for all 230 victims is still pending. We urge the NTSB to meet with the Suffolk County Medical Examiner so that these death certificates can be finalized.

Should you have any questions regarding this petition or any of the information contained herein, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time.

Sincerely,

Henry F. Hughes
Senior NWSB Inve

Senior NVSB Investigator, Ret.

The TWA 800 Project

New Analysis: Radar Tracking of High Velocity Debris

Within 8.5 seconds of TWA Flight 800 losing electrical power, a heavy concentration of light debris began appearing on the FAA radar between 1/3 and 1/2 mile due south of and almost perpendicular to TWA Flight 800's flight path. The majority of this debris stopped most of its horizontal motion and began falling to the ocean 1/2 mile south of where TWA Flight 800 lost electrical power. As it fell to the ocean, the wind carried this debris toward the SE for more than ten minutes. The Islip, White Plains, and JFK radar sites recorded the debris as it fell. When plotted over time, the radar returns from this debris appear as a distinctive, diagonal band, as shown on the NTSB radar plot below.




Figure 1: NTSB radar plot from page 44 of the Airplane Performance Study (Exhibit 13A). The band of debris in question has been circled by the petitioners with a thick black line.

At the 1997 NTSB hearing in Baltimore, NTSB investigator John Clark testified that the above-mentioned plume of radar returns (circled with a thick black line above) was "consistent with the explosion" that caused the crash. However, Mr. Clark did not provide a scientific basis for that conclusion nor did he attempt to further characterize that explosion by presenting an analysis of the subject radar returns. Our analysis of the speed and direction of the circled radar returns presented below demonstrates that the explosion responsible for the propagation of these returns was, in fact, a high velocity explosion—a detonation. The official NTSB theory for the crash is based on the assumption that the explosion in question was a low-velocity explosion or deflagration of fuel—air vapors and therefore cannot account for this radar–recorded detonation.

Ground Speed Calculation

To calculate the ground speed of the radar-recorded debris, Flight 800's position at the time of the explosion must be determined, as well as the time and position of the debris. All of this information can be obtained either directly or extrapolated from the raw radar data.

TWA Flight 800 exploded within approximately one second of the Islip radar site receiving its last secondary return (secondary returns indicate an aircraft has electrical power). Based on a linear extrapolation of the Islip radar returns from the last secondary return, TWA Flight 800 was 8.66 nautical miles south of the Islip radar antenna at the time. Approximately 8.5 seconds later, the Islip antenna recorded a radar return 9.12 nautical miles south of Islip antenna and due south of Flight 800's position when it lost electrical power. This was the first of a cluster of returns essentially perpendicular to TWA 800's track recorded by both the Islip and White Plains radar facilities.

If as stated by the NTSB this cluster of radar returns represents debris leaving the airframe during or after the initial explosion, its average ground speed was approximately (9.12 - 8.66)/8.5 nautical miles per second or 195 knots (100.3 m/s).

Error Analysis

To determine the uncertainties associated with the velocity of this debris as determined by radar, we calculated the upper and lower limits of the debris speed, based on the accuracy of FAA radar sites published by the NTSB in the "Addendum I to Main Wreckage Flight Path Study".

That Addendum lists the azimuth and range accuracies for the Islip, White Plains, and JFK radar sites as +/- 1/2 the azimuth change pulse (or ACP which is 0.04 degrees) and 1/16 nautical mile respectively. For brevity, we will focus on the Islip radar site; however, a similar analysis can be conducted with data recorded by the White Plains

site.

Since the returns in question appear nearly due south of where TWA Flight 800 lost electrical power, only an analysis of the north-south displacement is necessary. Therefore the accuracy of each radar hit in the north-south direction must be determined.

TWA Flight 800 was approximately 9 miles south and 20 miles east of the Islip radar antenna. The north-south portion of the range accuracy is \pm (1/16 nautical miles)*sin (theta), where theta is $\tan^{-1}(9/20) = 24.23^{\circ}$. Therefore, the north-south accuracy based on the range accuracy is \pm 0.026 nautical miles.

Since TWA Flight 800 was approximately 22 nautical miles away from the Islip antenna, the maximum azimuth accuracy is $\pm -22 \sin(ACP) = \pm 22 \sin(0.04) = \pm 0.0154$ nautical miles. And the north-south portion of the azimuth accuracy is $\pm -0.0154 \cos(24.23) = \pm 0.014$ nautical miles.

Combining the two sources of error results in a total north-south accuracy of Islip radar returns in the vicinity of the crash of TWA Flight 800 of \pm 0.014) nautical miles = \pm 0.04 nautical miles.

When considering this source of error, the minimum ground speed of the debris is (9.08 - 8.7)/8.5 nm/second or 161 knots and the maximum is (9.16 - 8.62)/8.5 nm/second or 211 knots. Therefore, the Islip radar site recorded debris exiting the area of the aircraft, traveling approximately 1/3 to 1/2 of a nautical mile at an average ground speed of between 161 (82.8m/s) and 211 knots (108.5m/s).

Vector Analysis: Determining the Debris' Speed Relative to TWA Flight 800

To determine the average speed of this debris relative to the accident aircraft over the 8.5-second period, vector analysis is necessary. Before the explosion, any material on the aircraft that could become debris travels at the same velocity as the aircraft since it is still part of the aircraft. Therefore the aircraft velocity must be considered when calculating the speed of the debris within the aircraft's reference frame.

Since Flight 800 was traveling ENE (approximately 71 degrees from true north) at 385 knots (198 m/s), its northern speed component was 385* cos (71) = 125 knots (64.3 m/s) and it is labeled 'i' in Figure 2 below. Since the debris was moving due south, its velocity (161 to 211 knots) must be added to the accident aircraft's northern velocity component (125 knots), yielding a minimum speed of 286 knots (147 m/s) and a maximum speed of 336 knots (172.9 m/s) in the south direction relative to the aircraft.

The eastern speed component of Flight 800 can be calculated in a manner similar to the northern speed component using $385*\sin(71) = 364$ knots. It is labeled 'j' in Figure 2

below.

Using the Pythagorean Theorem, the average speed of the debris relative to the accident aircraft was between 463 and 495 knots or between 238 and 255 m/s.




Figure 2: Addition of Flight 800 and debris velocity vectors. The blue line labeled C represents the debris' velocity relative to Flight 800. Lines A and B represent the ground velocities of the debris and Flight 800 respectively. Lines i and j represent Flight 800's northern and eastern speed components.

It is important to realize that the velocities discussed above are averages over 8.5 seconds. Because of the extreme forces of air resistance at those speeds and because the debris was likely very light since it can be seen drifting with the wind for more than ten minutes, its initial exit velocity was most likely considerably greater than its average speed over the 8.5 second interval. In fact, we show below that the exit velocity of the debris was far greater than the speed of sound (supersonic). Consequently, the explosion that ejected this debris was a detonation, not a fuel-air deflagration.

Even in the physically unlikely case that the average speed of the debris over eight and a half seconds represented the initial exit velocity of this debris, its velocity would have been more than twice that of the pressure wave created by a fuel-air deflagration. This is known because Dr. Melvin Baer of Sandia Laboratory, on behalf of the NTSB, calculated that the fuel-air deflagration resulted in a pressure wave traveling approximately 100 m/s.³

Furthermore, the NTSB proposed fuel-air deflagration caused the front wall of the center wing tank to rotate forward and downward, thus projecting any debris in a forward direction relative to the airplane. There is no sideways displacement of any aircraft wreckage from the alleged fuel-air explosion cited in the NTSB Sequencing Study or any other NTSB report.

Comparison with Official Scenario

As described above, the officially proposed fuel-air explosion was a low-velocity event or deflagration. This finding was reached by all the relevant experts who analyzed the wreckage, as well as by scientists who conducted real-world and simulated explosion tests. Their finding was based on the fact that most of the fuel tank structures⁴ were recovered in large sections. Had the proposed explosion been high-velocity or a detonation, the fuel tank's structures would have been significantly more fragmented.

Dr. Melvin Baer of Sandia Laboratory was contracted by the NTSB to generate computer simulations of the proposed explosion, and in 1998 he issued the report "A Combustion Model for the TWA 800 Center-Wing Fuel Tank Explosion". As noted above, based on his computer modeling and a review of the aircraft wreckage, Dr. Baer determined that the velocity of the officially proposed fuel-air explosion would have been just 100 m/s.

Dr. Baer added that it was unlikely the explosion would accelerate any wreckage items to that speed because of inertia and other physical effects. Nevertheless, in an attempt

Private email communication between Dr. Melvin Baer and independent investigator Dr. Tom Stalcup. Dr. Baer provided a flame speed of 100 m/s for the deflagration, but said that it would be unlikely that any debris reached this velocity from the deflagration alone.

The exception was the left wall of the center wing fuel tank, called the left side of body rib (LSOB). This wall was severely fragmented, but pieces were curled inward, into the center wing tank, a finding that is inconsistent with this damage resulting from an internal explosion of the center-wing fuel tank.

to provide the NSTB's official scenario the best possible chance of matching the radar evidence, we will present a graphical simulation (Figure 3 below) which allows wreckage to reach this speed during the fuel-air deflagration and provides other exceptions.

- 1) Instead of the officially proposed explosion being forward moving as determined by the NTSB, we will assume its direction was rearward and to the right (see the red arrows in Figure 3).
- 2) We will prescribe an exit velocity equal to the explosion velocity: 100 m/s.
- 3) We will ignore the effects of air resistance outside the aircraft.




Figure 3: Maximum deflagration wave expansion at three points in time in TWA Flight 800's reference frame. Air resistance is neglected outside the aircraft to provide a best-case scenario for the NTSB's crash sequence. The red arrows point to hypothetical debris ejected by the deflagration. The 747 icons are not to scale.

In Figure 3, the circles represent the maximum expansion of the officially proposed fuel-air deflagration. The red dotted lines represent the maximum horizontal distance any piece of debris could have traveled in the first moments after the explosion. The hypothetical wreckage item colored red at the lower left edge of each circle represents the most dense and streamlined wreckage fragment, since the effects of air resistance would be lowest for such fragments. But as can be seen, even a fragment with those properties would still be more than one kilometer away from where radar sites recorded the debris plume at 8.5 seconds.

Since TWA Flight 800 was traveling about two times faster than the wave propagation speed of the proposed fuel-air deflagration, nothing from that deflagration could have reached the position where radar sites recorded the debris in question, which is represented by a large irregular shape on the left axis of Figure 3, about 800 meters south of the position of the initiation of the explosion. As discussed above in the *Error Analysis* section, the actual position of the debris detected on radar at 8.5 seconds could have been anywhere between approximately 1/3 and 1/2 of a nautical mile due south of the explosion, or between 700 and 1000 meters south of the explosion.

Ballistics Analysis

Since the aircraft began breaking up at 13,800 feet in altitude, air resistance at that altitude must be considered when studying any debris ejected from the airframe by the initial explosion. Formulas based on well understood aerodynamic principles can be used to estimate a range of possible exit velocities for the debris detected by radar. Using a computer program like the one described by Marion and Thornton's text⁵ on classical dynamics, we generated theoretical ballistics curves with data points spaced at five millisecond intervals.




Figure 4: Three ballistics curves fit to north-south position vs. time from the Islip and White Plains radar sites. This plot only shows the north-south distances and speeds. Flight 800 was heading ENE at 385 knots. The small blue squares are a composite of Islip and White Plains FAA radar returns.

Multiple curves fit the data because objects of various shapes and sizes were likely

⁵Classical Dynamics of Particles and Systems, Third Edition, Jerry B. Marion and Stephen T. Thornton, Harcourt Braces Jovanovich, Inc, 1988, page 65.

ejected from the initial explosion and each would have different inertial and aerodynamic properties. Three ballistics curves fit the data well, each with exit velocities greater than Mach 4 (four times the speed of sound). Curves with exit velocities below Mach 4 and with low drag forces relative to their mass would not decelerate fast enough to fit the data. Curves with high drag forces relative to their mass and with exit velocities less than Mach 4 would not reach the earliest and southern-most debris recorded by radar.

Implications of the New Radar Analysis

We analyzed a dense cluster of radar returns that the NTSB confirmed was created by the explosion that caused the crash.

Two separate analyses show that debris tracked by multiple FAA radar sites moved too far, too fast, and in the wrong direction to have resulted from the officially proposed fuel-air deflagration. A vector analysis shows that even when air resistance is neglected, nothing in the official crash scenario can account for this radar evidence. An analysis that considers air resistance indicates that the debris left the area of the aircraft at a speed greater than Mach 4 (four times the speed of sound). Nothing in the official crash scenario can account for this very high velocity.

Erroneous Finding in NTSB Final Report: Finding 8

Finding 8 states that the "streak of light reported by most of [the streak of light] witnesses was burning fuel from the accident airplane in crippled flight during some portion of the postexplosion preimpact breakup sequence..."

We conducted a detailed review of the eyewitness evidence and determined that this finding is incorrect. A far greater number of witnesses who reported a streak of light gave testimony consistent with the streak originating at the surface or horizon rather than where the accident aircraft lost electrical power. Many reported that after rising off the surface, the streak of light climbed sharply and fast, exploding at its apex. The accident airplane did not rise sharply or fast off of the surface, and the NTSB final report mentions no explosion during crippled flight except for the eruption of fuel as TWA 800 descended to the ocean.

In an apparent attempt to match the official crash sequence to eyewitness observations, the NTSB generated simulations of the aircraft climbing in crippled flight. However, these simulations diverge from the radar data precisely when the climb begins, indicating that no such climb occurred.⁶ There are also unexplained control surface

⁶ See the Figure 28d on page 99 of the NTSB Final Report on TWA Flight 800 and similar plots from NTSB Exhibit 22C and its Addendum. The simulation data in all of these plots diverges from

manipulations that appear to be more an effort to make the accident aircraft climb than to factually establish the aircraft's post-explosion flight path. A case in point is the official NTSB animation based on one of these simulations. It correctly shows the aircraft banking left after losing electrical power, but then—without explanation—shows the aircraft turning back to the right in order to perform a climb.

Such a climb in the simulated aircraft resulted in a commensurate decrease in ground speed of the airplane. This decrease in ground speed caused the simulated aircraft to fall far behind where FAA radar sites actually recorded the accident aircraft position supporting a conclusion that the aircraft did not climb at this point.

A few pilots in the air and some witnesses on the ground were watching TWA 800 before it exploded, and none reported seeing it climb sharply as depicted in the simulation. The NTSB Witness Group interviewed one such eyewitness at length. Captain David McClaine was asked if he saw any part of the accident aircraft climb, and he answered no.⁷

To determine whether or not the motion of the streak of light was consistent with the path of the accident aircraft, the streak must be compared to a valid simulation of the accident aircraft's post-explosion motion. FAA radar sites tracked the aircraft heading ENE and turning left just after losing electrical power. Since there was no loss of ground speed early in the crash sequence to account for any significant climb, the aircraft then likely rolled over and headed downward.

Since a majority of the streak of light eyewitnesses said that the streak rose upward (many saying that it rose off the surface of the water), it is clear from a thorough review of the FAA radar tracking of the accident aircraft and the eyewitness evidence, including the new witness documents provided with this petition, that the observed streak of light could not have been burning fuel from the accident airplane in crippled flight.

An Accurate Accounting of the Streak of Light

Two separate NTSB reports found a significant percentage of witnesses who said the

the radar data points during the simulated climbs.

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Witnesses Group Chairman Factual Report, Appendix Z, Interview transcript Capt. David McClaine, March 25, 1999. During his NTSB interview, McClaine estimated that TWA Flight 800 exploded at an altitude of between 13 and 15 thousand feet. Its flight data recorder failed at the moment of the first explosion, just after recording an altitude of 13,800 feet. McClaine was asked if "any structure or anything else of this thing zoom[ed] up 1,000, 1,500, 3,000 feet at that time." McClaine answered "No."

streak of light rose off the surface or horizon⁸ moments before Flight 800 exploded and fell to the ocean in flames. Therefore, it is important to both consider the possibility that a light did rise off the surface of the water near the flight path of Flight 800 just before it exploded and to determine what the entire event would look like to witnesses in the vicinity of Flight 800 watching from vantage points in the air, on the water, or on land.

In such a scenario, witnesses observing the entire sequence would see a light appear on the horizon and rise upward in the vicinity of Flight 800. Then the aircraft would explode, continue its momentum to the east and begin a descent to the ocean. At some point during the descent, as was determined by the NTSB and seen by eyewitnesses, the wings of the aircraft would break away releasing fuel that would ignite into one or more fireballs.

Nearly all of the 670 eyewitness accounts reviewed by the NTSB match the crash scenario described above. According to the NTSB Witness Group Study, 599 (89%) saw the large fireball or fireballs at the end of the sequence. Two hundred fifty-eight (39%) saw a streak of light and a large majority said the light ascended. Between 25 and 96 of the 258 said the streak of light originated at the surface or horizon.⁷

Most of the witnesses observed the fireball because it was the brightest event and occurred at the end of the sequence. Witnesses compared it to the setting sun or described it as a waterfall of flames. Many witnesses who saw earlier events continued watching until the fireball(s) disappeared in the distance. Entire groups of people reported seeing the fireball(s) after one member of their group pointed to the sky.

According to witnesses, and as determined by the NTSB, the rising light was one of the earliest events in the sequence. Many described it as a point of light. For anyone to see such a streak originate on the surface, they had to just happen to be looking directly toward the streak's point of origin as it started climbing. There would have been no other visual clues to look in that direction, as this was determined to be the first visual event.

A majority of people in groups with one person directing attention to it could have missed seeing it rise off the surface, because by the time their attention was directed toward it and they saw it, the streak may have already been in mid-flight and far above the surface. Therefore, the NTSB's statistic of between four and fourteen percent of the

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According to the original NTSB Witness Group Factual Report released in December of 1997, "102 [witnesses] gave information about the origin of the streak...96 [or 94%] said that it originated from the surface." According to the NTSB Witness Group Study released in February 2000 which relied on a more strict interpretation of the eyewitness accounts, out of 27 witnesses who gave information about the origin of a streak of light and who had unobstructed views to the surface or horizon, 25 (93%) said rose off either the surface or horizon.

total number of eyewitnesses seeing the streak's point of origin appears to be a reasonable estimate.

At the final Sunshine Hearing on the crash in August 2000, NTSB Witness Group Chairman Dr. David Mayer mentioned 56 eyewitness accounts that "didn't seem to fit" the NTSB's scenario. These same eyewitness accounts, however, fit well into the scenario described above. In fact, nearly all of the witnesses who observed a streak of light described a scenario that essentially matched the above scenario.

New Eyewitness Evidence

We have obtained twenty FBI eyewitness interview summary documents (FBI form #302s) from the crash of TWA Flight 800 that we could not locate in the NTSB's public docket. We are therefore providing them to the NTSB as an attachment to this petition. To avoid confusion and any conflicts with existing NTSB witness documents that are numbered 1 to 755, we have numbered these documents 800 to 819.

In eight of the twenty FBI 302 summaries that we are submitting with this petition, eyewitnesses describe a rising streak of light before seeing the fireball(s).

New Photographic Evidence

One FBI interview summary provided with this petition mentions that an eyewitness provided the FBI with several photographs of a light or lights in the sky when TWA Flight 800 exploded. We urge the NTSB to request from the FBI this and any other photographic and video evidence the FBI received during its investigation into the crash of TWA Flight 800. All witness, photographic, video, or other evidence of lights or rising streaks off the East Coast of the United States before, during, and after the crash of TWA Flight 800 are relevant, and a thorough investigation into each event could lead to determining the actual cause of the crash.

NTSB Witness Group Sunshine Hearing Presentation

On August 23, 2000 at the NTSB Sunshine hearing in Washington, D.C. on the crash of TWA Flight 800, Witness Group Chairman Dr. David Mayer inaccurately described the observations of important eyewitnesses and omitted crucial details from the accounts of military eyewitnesses who were airborne at the time of the explosion. His conclusions

⁹ Witness Group Presentation by Dr. David Mayer, NTSB Sunshine Hearing, August 23rd, 2000

should be completely disregarded and a new, unbiased and accurate analysis of the witness testimony must be made and evaluated alongside the new and material evidence we are providing to this case.

We have listed some significant problems with the Witness Group Chairman's Sunshine hearing presentation below, and we urge the NTSB to conduct a detailed review of that presentation to identify and correct all of the problems.

Errors and Inaccuracies

Witness 649's FBI file includes four sketches and several FBI witness summaries. It is one of the most thorough and comprehensive set of eyewitness documents in the NTSB docket. The sketches and summaries describe an object ascending and traveling westward, spanning over ten degrees horizontally before approaching a second object that was at a position and altitude consistent with where Flight 800 lost electrical power. An explosion occurred where the two objects apparently met.

At the sunshine hearing, the Witness Group Chairman testified that Witness 649's observations "certainly do sound like a missile attacking the airplane." However, the Witness Group Chairman then discounted this witness evidence by incorrectly stating that witness 649's horizontal view of the accident was limited to just a few degreesbetween "two flagpoles". The Witness Group Chairman used this incorrect information to conclude that the witness could not have seen the initiating event because it did not occur between these flagpoles. The word "flagpole" does not exist in witness 649's NTSB or FBI file, nor did this witness indicate to investigators that his observations were ever restricted to a degree that would render him unable to observe the initiating event. Based on the same incorrect information, the Chairman further concluded that witness 649 did not see a missile.

Although Witness 649 did reference a *telephone* pole in the description of where the rising projectile originated, Witness 649 never cited an adjacent telephone pole as a limit of his observations nor did he describe any significant visual obstructions. In fact, Witness 649 indicated that the projectile rose over and beyond other telephone poles, apparently colliding with TWA Flight 800 above structures in the distance, which were well to the right of where the projectile originated, and well below the line of site to the airborne collision. Critically, from Witness 649's perspective, the structures were on a line of site between 196° and 209° magnetic, and Flight 800 lost electrical power on a bearing line of approximately 197° magnetic. Clearly, the Witness Group Chairman misspoke and/or misconstrued the evidence, and Witness 649's FBI file should not have been excluded from consideration.

Neither the Witness Group Chairman nor anyone from the NTSB ever interviewed Witness 649. When Dr. Mayer was Chairman of the NTSB Eyewitness Group, only one out of 670 eyewitness was interviewed by the NTSB. NTSB personnel never returned

to Witness 649's location or to any other eyewitness locations to obtain bearing lines to events in the sky based on the landmarks given.

The Witness Group Chairman provided blatantly inaccurate testimony about the observations of Witness 649 and erroneously discounted some of the most compelling and potentially reliable eyewitness evidence surrounding this tragic incident.

Airborne Military Eyewitness

The Witness Group Chairman's Sunshine hearing testimony should also be questioned and re-examined because he omitted important details provided by an experienced airborne military eyewitness who was in close proximity to the crash and who provided very compelling evidence of a missile strike.

On January 11, 1997, the original NTSB Eyewitness Group interviewed Major Frederick Meyer of the New York Air National Guard. According to the NTSB transcripts from this interview, Major Meyer was in a Black Hawk helicopter, descending into Gabreski Airport, when he saw a streak of light heading toward the area where TWA 800 crashed. At the end of a trajectory consistent with the streak of light, Major Meyer reported he observed explosions that he described to the original eyewitness group as:

"...hard explosions. This looked like flak¹⁰. It's a hard explosion. It's like an HPX explosion, as opposed to soft explosion like gasoline..."

Major Meyer testified during his NTSB interview that while in Vietnam, he "flew a UH-2 Kaman Seasprite rescue helicopter". And during his tour, he had seen "three different types of missiles...SAM-1s, SAM-2s, and SAM-3s". He also testified that he could distinguish between different types of explosions, saying that some things "resemble anti-aircraft fire and other things are soft explosions; like if you saw somebody hit a fuel storage depot".

Even though Major Meyer was uniquely qualified to identify the type of explosion(s) that caused the crash, the Witness Group Chairman never mentioned these crucial details during the Sunshine Hearing Witness Group presentation.

Instead the Witness Group Chairman simply said Major Meyer "saw an explosion and a second explosion, and a large fireball".

Flak is the explosion and ejection of shrapnel by a military explosive within an anti-aircraft shell.

Later during the hearing, NTSB Chairman Jim Hall mentioned a letter that Major Meyer sent to the NTSB stating that he felt the NTSB "ignored the eyewitness information". When Chairman Hall asked if this was true, the Witness Group Chairman answered "Absolutely not." Then a short time later, Chairman Hall asked the Witness Group Chairman "what did the helicopter pilot tell?" The Witness Group Chairman responded saying "He observed a streak in flight for one or two seconds and then he saw the enormous fireball develop."

Once again, the Witness Group Chairman failed to inform the NTSB board members of Major Meyer's expert testimony, in which he compared the explosion(s) that caused the crash to military ordnance. Given his years of combat experience and his vantage point, Major Meyer's testimony should have been seriously considered and discussed with the Board at great length, but it was not.

Significant Understatement of Witness Accounts that Conflict with the Official Crash Sequence

The Witness Group Chairman testified that there were fifty-six (56) witness accounts "that didn't seem to fit" into the official crash sequence. These 56 witnesses said they saw a streak of light rise off the surface and/or climb straight up or nearly so. However, this number significantly under counts the number of witness accounts that directly conflict with the official crash sequence. In his count, the Witness Group Chairman failed to include a significant number of eyewitnesses who described a streak of light heading in a direction that conflicted with the accident aircraft's flight path.¹¹

Table 1 below provides raw NTSB statistics of the trajectories of the streak of light described in twenty-five eyewitness accounts that do not match the crippled flight path of the accident aircraft. These additional witness accounts brings the total to eighty-one (81) eyewitnesses providing observations that conflict with the official crash sequence. Further, if the work of the original NTSB Witness Group Chairman Norman Wiemeyer were considered, there would very likely be more than one hundred (100) eyewitness accounts that conflict with the official crash sequence.

Witness 386 is a good example of an eyewitness who reported a streak of light trajectory that conflicted with the official crash sequence, but was not included among the fifty-six witnesses the NTSB said conflicted with the official crash sequence. The

¹¹

These witness accounts do not have the Eastern component ascribed to TWA Flight 800 as it allegedly climbed in the official crash sequence. As the streak rose upward, many eyewitnesses said it moved westward, and many others said it moved to the south: two directions the officially climbing aircraft never traveled.

following is excerpted from this eyewitness' NTSB file:

"It seemed like it came off the horizon and rose slowly, weaving as it continued upward. At first they thought it might have been a flare, but realized that it was too huge. It traveled diagonally at an approximate 70 degree angle going in a westerly direction...

The object rose in the sky for approximately six (6) seconds, leaving a white smoke trail in its wake. It then disappeared from sight for approximately 1/2 second. After that time, without a sound of an explosion, a large oval ball of fire appeared just above the area where the object was last seen. ...[Witness 386] thought that the ball of fire came down traveling in an easterly direction. The ball broke into two separate balls of fire before it hit the water."

Witness 386 said the streak weaved as it climbed westerly (just as Witness 649 had reported and sketched). Flight 800 in crippled flight never traveled in that direction. Official crash sequence animations show TWA Flight 800 traveling in a slowly developing curve as it traveled east-northeast.

Witness 386's account and many others like it that clearly do not fit into the official crash sequence were not included in the 56 witness accounts that the Witness Group Chairman said did not fit.

Witness Number	Trajectory
319	as if further south"
523	"north"
232	"north"
524	"north"
499	"north"
226	"northwest"
345	"northwest"
637	"south"
715	"south"
276	"south"
492	"south"
467	"west"
179	"west"
385	"west"
540	"west"
135	"west"
88	"west"
648	"west"
90	"west"
506	"west"
658	"west"
521	"west"
535	"west"
386	"west"
127	"west"

Table 1: Twenty-five additional witnesses who reported a trajectory for the streak of light that is inconsistent with the trajectory of TWA Flight 800 in crippled flight. Taken from the NTSB Witness Group's raw eyewitness statistics.

Witness Group Analysis not Dependent on Climbing Aircraft

The Witness Group Chairman concluded that the ascending streak was TWA Flight 800 as it "maneuvered in crippled flight". However the NTSB could not simulate the aircraft performing a steep climb while matching FAA radar tracking. 12 In essence, the

See the Figure 28d on page 99 of the NTSB Final Report on TWA Flight 800 and similar plots from NTSB Exhibit 22C and its Addendum. The simulation data in all of these plots diverges from the East-West vs. Time radar data points during the simulated climbs.

radar evidence showed that the accident aircraft did not climb appreciably or at all after losing electrical power.

NTSB Chairman Jim Hall asked the Witness Group Chairman: "if you could show that the airplane did not climb after the nose departed, will that change your analysis?"

The Witness Group Chairman responded "No sir..."

This meant that without the airplane climbing to explain the ascending streak of light, the Witness Group Chairman would not change his analysis. Therefore he would have to either conclude that most of those who reported an ascending streak of light did not actually see it ascend or that the observed *rising* streak was the horizontally and downward moving aircraft.

The Witness Group Chairman's willingness to overlook such a significant number of eyewitness observations that clearly contradict an officially proposed scenario, to present grossly inaccurate accounts of what other eyewitnesses saw, and to omit crucial details from the observations of an expert military eyewitness when directly questioned about this witness' observations from the NTSB Chairman is troubling.

Findings

- 1. The explosion that caused the crash was external to the aircraft.
- 2. FAA radar sites recorded fast-moving debris that traveled perpendicular to the flight path, just after Flight 800 lost electrical power. A ballistics analysis of this debris plume shows that the explosion that accelerated this debris was high-velocity, a detonation. No mechanism or event in the official low-velocity fuel-air explosion theory can account for this radar evidence.
- 3. A significant number of credible eyewitness accounts are consistent with an external event.
- 4. The CIA produced an inaccurate crash animation, without consulting with Boeing, the aircraft manufacturer. The group at the CIA who produced the animation were not qualified to simulate aircraft flight paths.
- 5. Both the CIA and NTSB crash sequence simulations are inaccurate since they diverge from the radar tracked flight path and deviate from the tolerances imposed by the FAA radar tracking. The simulations do not match the observations of the witnesses with descriptions of the early crash sequence.

- 6. There remain significant anomalies in the way this investigation was conducted. There were numerous violations of customary and normal investigative protocol, which are contrary to the provisions set forth in title 49 CFR 830 and NTSB Board orders.
- 7. Contrary to legal directives set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, the NTSB allowed their investigation to be superseded by the FBI's investigation.
- 8. The NTSB's probable cause determination for the crash of TWA Flight 800 is not supported by the physical evidence, the witness statements, or other facts.

Summary

A preponderance of hard evidence, including radar and forensic evidence, combined with dozens of corroborating eyewitness accounts, refute the NTSB's probable cause determination for the crash of TWA Flight 800. The NTSB concluded that an electrical short circuit initiated TWA 800's demise. The source of that short circuit was never found and no hard evidence supporting the official probable cause has ever been presented. The available hard evidence, which is corroborated by eyewitness accounts, indicates that at least one detonation outside the aircraft initiated its destruction.

Two new analyses of the radar evidence presented in this petition clearly show proof of this high velocity explosion or detonation. We have found no analysis of this radar evidence in the NTSB's final report or any other NTSB report or study.

We have also determined that the eyewitness evidence was misrepresented, resulting in inaccurate conclusions being drawn and conveyed by both the CIA and the NTSB. It should first be noted here that contrary to established NTSB policies and procedures, eyewitness evidence was not made available to NTSB investigators and other parties during the critical early stages of the investigation. The Witness Group Chairman assigned to present the NTSB's final conclusions based upon eyewitness evidence interviewed only one out of 670 eyewitnesses. At the Sunshine Hearing, the Witness Group Chairman misrepresented eyewitness observations and presented inaccurate conclusions based on those misrepresentations.

The new evidence and analyses presented in this petition show that the NTSB probable cause determination and findings are erroneous. Therefore, according to NTSB policy and legal directives, the NTSB must reconsider its probable cause determination of the crash of TWA Flight 800.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 7/20/96 was interviewed at the Long New York City Police Department, Sixth Precinct, 233 West 10th Street, New York. New York. by Detective and of the Federal Bureau of Special Agent was advised of the identities of the Investigation. interviewing agents and provided the following information: On Wednesday, July 17, and his female friend 1996 at approximately 8 p.m. walked his/landlord's dog Montauk, Long Island, 1051 Oceán Front, Long to the beach by Chauncy's Restaurant sat near the lifeguard Beach, Long Island. stand approximately 80 feet from Chauncy's Restaurant and were was facing the ocean watching the ocean and airplanes. noticed a glowing was facing inland when stated that the object was flying object fly overhead. lower than the airplanes and went from an inland location ladded that it swerved a traveling out to the ocean. stated that he could couple of times then disappeared. not hear anything only the loud roar of the waves. that he was encouraged by his friends to contact the authorities when reports of a possible missile strike were reported by the stated that he has had some military experience media. in Great Britain. Entered by New York, New York Investigation on 7/20/96 File # 265A-NY-259028

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
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
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
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
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





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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcription	8/6/1996
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcription	07/24/96	
On July 20, 1996,	Date of Bi	rent	
Social Security Account Number Manorville, New York (NY)	(SSAN)		
	or the rederal		b€ -36
interviewed by Agents and of Investigation (FBI). On July 26, 1996		contacted	b70
for a routine follow-up interview by Agent	and N	New York	
Police Department Detective	Tor	covided	
the following information:	<u> </u>		
works as a full time Pa	carescue/EMT-I	for the	
New York Air National Guard (NYANG) curre	ently at the ra	ink of	
Tech Sergeant, 106th Squadron based in Wes	sthampton, NY.	On July	
17. 1996, he was involved in routine train	ning at the bas	se. At	
approximately 8:05PM he executed a parach	ute jumo from a	<u> HC-130</u>	
aircraft and landed at a drop zone north of	of the base. <u>A</u>	ln <u>HH60</u>	
helicopter was scheduled to pick him up for	or additional t	raining.	
At approximately 8:35PM to 8:40PM he was	facing south to	wards the	
ocean, when he saw an orange/red object de	escending rapid	TA OUT OI	
the sky. The object was moving downward	at a slight and	ne in an	
eastbound direction, away from	He curned to) i d 3 (0)	
who was standing on the drop zone with his see that?" The object appeared like a pe	m and asked, "I	nich did	
see that?" The object appeared Tree a pe	vised the object	rt moved	
not change its shape or size. ad like a meteor, falling from a height of e			
thousand feet (8,000'-9,000').	escribed it as	screaming	
out of the sky. He watched it for live t	o six (5-6) sec	conds at	
which point it exploded into a massive fi	reball in the	sideways	
direction At that point he realized it	was an airplane	e. The	
chiect never changed shape or speed until	it exploded.	The plane	
then fell out of his view and he observed	black smoke r	ising. He	
did not hear any sound when the plane exp	loded.		
		<u></u>	
The helicopter that was to pick	up and		
	pproximately o		
hour later the helicopter returned and	and	entered	
it and headed out to the crash site. App	toxrmacery rore	cy (±0) e which	
minutes later they found the wreckage and had drifted in a southwesterly direction	from the area	they were	
initially located. A fishing trawler cou	ld be seen nic	king up	
initially located. A fishing trawler cou	Ta be been pro-	up	
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Investigation on 07/20/96 at Westhampton, New	York	···	
File # 265A-NY-259028			
SA			
	Date dictated 07/20/	96	

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bodies at this point. As no survivors were observed, no rescue operations were undertaken.

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FD-302 (Rev. 3-10-82)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcription	7/29/96
Work Te enhanc number	fter being advis that the nature of TWA Flight 8	none number Interviewed Sed of the Of the
stated that as Preside of Commerce, he was attending a club fur Yacht Club, Bellbort Lane, Bellport, New July 17, 1996. In advised that at he was standing outside on the south we looking at the sky in a southeasterly downer he observed what appeared to be a plane. He stated that the bright light direction and that it looked similar to whitish-silvery glow. In now belief metal which was burning.	nction at the Be w York, the ever 8:31PM, on July randa of the Yac irection facing bright headlight was facing a we	ort Chamber ellport ing of 17, 1996, the Club the bay of a esterly
stated that he observe fireball of solid mass the size of a ba-fall and break into two fire masses des flame dripping from the sky". a was larger that the left mass and that he saw what appeared to be a large sect	sketball which l cribed as a "cm dvised that the through the left	pegan to rtain of right mass rfireball,
stated that he did not his observance nor did he hear or feel	see any smoke t anything unusua	throughout L.
advised that at the ti incident had occurred over the Smith Popossibly a mid air collision between twelephoned Suffolk County Police at 911 crash to notify them of same.	oint Park and the To airplanes. He	at it was ≘
vestigation on 7/22/96 at Long Island, Ne	ew York	
le# 265A-NY-259028	Date dicrated 7/23/	96
SA (KCM: meg) (NCM)	Date dictated 7/23/	フロ

FD-302 (Rev. 3-10-82)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

				Date of tr	anscription	8/1/96	****
		alle a	STATE OF THE PARTY				h
of the in	terviewin	esidence. Aft g agents and t wing informati	er bein he natu	advised	of the	York, was identity iew,	E
Shinnecoc approxima slightly the frame stated he the end o pictures. 800 plane Investiga film: had processin release t	southwest of his can be lieves of the roll do Later in crash. It taken the g center he film to A receipt bar	vised he had he each down from P.M. while facing to while facing to state amera as he so he took approached the evening had not because he was given to the eyeloping of interviewing the each of black to be a size of Birth is tone Island	been at the his house taking the directed by the local of least of of lea	me on July picture tion to ticed a be picture four to call of light as arned of ed the Fesure what the picture film agreed for pote for the f	y 17, 1 s of hi the oce all of e. six pi ight in a yello the TWA deral B to do y res to to a pi to obtai ntial e ilm.	996. At s friend, an, light in also ctures at the w flame. Flight ureau of with the the media. hoto in and videntiary	
vestigation on 7/	31/96 \	at Hampton	Bays, No	ew York			<u>-</u>

FD-302 (Rev. 3-10-82)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

		Date of transcription	7/26/96
		•	
	_		. 1
On July 22, Birth o	E	New	Date of be
home telephone Security Account Number	, work te	rephone was interviewed by	Social
Agent (SA)		was first advise	d of the
identity of the interview	viewing agent a	no that the nature	of the
interview was regarding crash. provide	the following	ginformation:	u airpiane
8:30 PM, ne was working New York, as a member Fireman 106th Civil En	ng at Gabreski . of the Air Nat	17, 1996, at approx Airport, Westhampton ional Guard - New Yo I - Fire Department	n Beach, ork State
advis	sed that at app	roximately 8:30 PM,	July 17.
1996, he was seated in	n a stationary	crash truck on the	first
finger past the T-hand the airfield.	ger facing sout	n on the southern po	ortion of
observed what appeared candle about tree line flare had a consistent stated that the flare seconds, possibly as appeared almost static he exited his truck to	to be a red five bearing in a second to brightness and appeared for a long as 30 second to a second to	southeasterly direct d left no trail of a period of at least nds, and at a latter nt. Upon seeing the	oman Lion. The Smoke. He 15 to 20 r part
ball of fire which sendropping from the sky	parated into two	e sound. The two di	ls
balls were in his vis	ion from five t	o ten seconds.	
7/22/05	Hampton Bays	New York	*****
estigation on 7/22/96 at		, non lorn	
265A-NY-259028	(Ve)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
SA	mam (kcm)	Date dictated 7/22/9	6
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

		Date of transcription	07/24/96
deck which faces the s	ately 8:20 or 8:30 south shore. If a white ball shock tention. If a white ball shock tention	her residence provided the provided the provided the provided that it has been been been been been been been bee	in e following on his inner with e sky and looked all west to 1 sighting. tion, ition the Then a e ball. arthquake at the coldent eur over
			_ in
Investigation on 07/19/96 at			
File # 265A-NY-259028 SA by SA	AB:hrg)	Date dictated 07/19	
by SA	1 14/11 3/		<u> </u>

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcription	07/26/96
On July 21, 1996,	Date of Bi	rth (DOB)
telephone was advised of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the furnished the following information:		of the then
On July 17, 1996, at 8:00 PM LILLY'S FISHING STATION, Adelaide Avenue, York, and parked in the parking lot to wait this time, was facing south watching in the water. At approximately 8:40 PM, appeared to be a red flare begin its ascendine (half way between the water and the parking the direction of the flare-like object (FLC at a distance of seven-eight (7-8) may was straight up for approximately three (3 rate of speed and terminated in a bright when the water which turned to thick black smoke from the point of explosion and to his left lost sight of the flames below the head of the point of the flames below the head of the point of the flames below the head of the point of the flames below the head of the flames below the flames the flames below the flame	t for a frient the boats are observed to above the boats of explosions. The FI seconds and the explosion. After the that also of (easterly).	nd. During ad jet skis ad jet skis averizon averizon buth from averian buth from at a high at an averian
advised that he thought the vicinity of Dune Road to his south although distance from him was 7-8 miles. state boats (not commercial) and jet ski's were front but he said that there was nothing understand that he did not see a point in the water and that it appeared to have distance halfway to the point of explosion the FLO was red in color but he was unable trail.	h his estimat ated that sevin the water nusual or peont of origin originated at atat	ee of its veral small to his vuliar. of the FLO to a
Investigation on 07/21/96 at East Moriches, New	York	
File X 265A-NY-259028		
by I SA hrg Da	ite dictated 07/21	/96
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

v.g.		
	Date of transcription	7/30/96
On July 24. 1996.		home
telephone number was in He was advised of the identity of the inature of the interview. He then proving information:	nterviewed teleph interviewing agen ided the followin	t and the
On July 17, 1996, at about 8: was surfing with his brother, friend at Smith's Point, and was paddli stated that he saw a "flare" in the sky "Holy shit, what is that? Is that a fl consistent color of red, about three to star, went "more straight up" for about distance about half of a finger length and a half inches. The "flare" then dra approximately three inches at an arm's observed a flame off the back of the fi times the size of the "flare". It took	to the South and are?". The "flam of our times the one second, and at arm's length, opped straight do length and lare - a "tail" at two to three second and the second and second all the second are second and second all the second approximate of all to the hor heard	size of a covered a about one win cout three conds from sticed the exploded at an fiery e size of ller piece of lier piece of the conds. The cout of t
•		
		• ••
•		
investigation on 7/24/1996 at New York, New York	ork (tele	phonically)
File 265A-NY-259028 - 300 - 1688	Date dictated 7/30/	1996
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcription	8/26/96
	. 6. 2-4	
1	of birth:	home b6
address: ship cellular telephone		truck b7c
cellular telephone number	contact number	
was advised of the identities of	the interviewing	Agents
and of the nature of the interview.	advised as	follows:
He has been the f	ishing boat CALLI	-FIN-
ELIZABETH for the past two months. The of Montauk, New Y	s CALLI-LIN-ELIGA	pein is registered
and has its home port. It is operated	however out of	Point
Judith, Galilee, Rhode Island. It is	a fishing vessel	that
trawls for souid, butterfish and fluke	. During the sum	mer
months, it spends a considerable amoun	t of time off the	coast of
Long Island, New York.		
-		<i>a</i>
At approximately 8:20 p.m. t	he evening of Jul	y 16,
1996, the CALLI-LIN-ELIZABETH left Poi	nt Judith and pro	r 1006
Fire Island, Long Island, arriving at The crew fished the waters in that are	7:00 p.m., bury r	when thev
realized there was not enough fish lef	a uncii 5.00 p.m. t to make remaini	na
profitable, so they departed, heading	east. planning to	return to
Point Judith to change nets.	Carried Farming	
Totale bacter to change more	·	
At approximately 8:20 p.m.,		
came up the b	ridge and asked	if
he had seen two flares in th	e sky. The Capca	1111
responded in the negative. who arrived on the brid	ge a few moments	after
and had heard qu	estion said that	what they
(he and had seen could not	be flares because	they were
too big.		
_		
went	on to report to t	ne Captain
that they had observed two (2) large,	separate and dist	inct
fireballs in the sky a few degrees off	the starboard st	challe in
ship. They also said that at the time the sky, the ship was approximately si	v /6) miles east	of
Shinnicock Inlet, Hamptons, Long Islan	d.	0 2
Billimiteder finitely mamp tone, foregreen		NY - 259028 -
vestigation on 7/22/96 at GALILEE, RHODE	TGT.AND	700 - 1514
restigation on 7/22/96 at GALILEE, RHODE	. TOTIONIA	302 - IU+ 4
.#265A-NY-259028		
WSA	7/00/0	26
SA	Date dictated 7/22/9	70
· France		
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and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.	j.	- サカムじか・ひそう

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Continuation of FD-302 of	, On	7/22/96	_, Page .	

The crew wound the net up onto the ship, turned the ship around and headed west in the direction of the fireballs. At that time the fireballs were not visible.

After turning the ship, called the Shinnicock, Long Island. Coast Guard station and reported the sightings, since had estimated the fireballs to be approximately five (5) miles behind the ship when they were observed, this placed the fireballs in the general vicinity of that Coast Guard station. Shinnicock Coast Guard advised that they had no knowledge of the incident but requested the Captain report any subsequent findings noted that the boat radio traffic indicated other boats reporting similar sightings. He believes that these reports were coming in from pleasure craft.

As they proceeded west, they heard reports of "fire on the water" over the boat radio which was set on Channel 16, VHF.

also heard several people contact the Coast Guard station at Moriches, Long Island, to report that whatever was in the water was still burning. At some point during their approach they heard that the Coast Guard cutter, ADAK, was dispatched to an area approximately eight or nine miles southeast of Moriches Inlet.

At approximately 9:00 p.m., Moriches Coast Guard station called a Coast Guard cutter and advised that the object in the water was a 747 and then designated Channel 6, VHF, as the working frequency.

At approximately 9:20 p.m., about five (5) miles from the airplane, noticed that his shipboard radar, which registered objects up to six (6) miles in every direction indicated that other boas were converging on the area. The ship's radar did not show any vessels moving away from the area. At the time of the original sighting of the fireball by his crewmen, the radar did not show any other boats or ships in the area that the CALLI-LIN-ELIZABETH was located in.

From five (5) miles off, from the burning airplane looked like a large orange search light. The wind was blowing in a southeasterly direction and the crew could smell the smoke as they approached the area.

Upon arriving in the vicinity of the airplane, at approximately 9:55 p.m., there were six to seven boats in the area including two (2) 41' Coast Guard cutters. Two (2)

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265A-NY-259028				
Continuation of FD-302 of		, On _	7/22/96 , Page	3
radar was feet were wreckage. search the Later, the	rs were hovering so lo reading them as boats shooting into the sky called the C southeast section of Coast Guard called to because there would	. Flames as high and debris was floast Guard who advite the debris line for advise that they	as eighteen (1 loating from th rised him to for survivors. y should search	ıe
ship (appr aboard so area which which they SUFFOLK CO	The CALLI-LIN-ELIZABE after arriving in the coximately 100 feet) they hailed a small for took the body aboard odd take aboard and DUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPART and spotted a third both the control of the cont	e area. Due to the hey could not easing the state of the state of the subsequently turns when the subsequently turns are subsequently turns and subsequently turns are subsequently turns are subsequently turns are subsequently turns are subsequently turns and subsequently turns are subsequently turns and subsequently turns are subsequently turn	e size of the ily get the bod e boat in the nd a male body ed over to a amed the "VESSE	
could no l	They searched for ano number of boats in to longer safely operate July 18, 1996, and p	the area, the Capta so they broke off	ain felt they at approximate	:ly
	One mile off Point Ju	home telephone:	, w	<i>i</i> ho
Point Judi waiting or out of the Judith and	that whiting fish were the the dock to intervie recommended fishing remained there until tely 8:30 p.m., July 2	cold that <u>CHANNEL</u> or them. area without dock: returning to Poin	6 NEWS was took his vessel ing at Point	
through Ju or abandor	did not notice tly 18, 1996, and had ned vessels. He has b	not heard of nor speen	sels from July seen any stoler	16 1

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

,	\	Date of transcription	10/22/96
On October	21 1006	DOB	
POB Austria.		igs, California	92263
telephone	was contacted t		
above address.	was advised of		
interviewing agent,		and advised tha	
interview was in refe	erence to the Trans	World Airlines	(TWA)
Flight 800 crash on (voluntarily pr	
following information	1:		
	ndvised that he holds	Ph. D's. in	<u>and</u> .
and teaches	it the	6(2	
California on a part	time basis.	further adv	ised that
he is currently in t	ie process of writing	ja book.	
On 07/17/9	stated t	that he was out	for an
evening walk while v	isiting friends, some	where in the v	icinity of
East Moriches, New York	ork. when he noticed	a flash of lig	ht
ascending from the o	cean which was follow	wed by a small	explosion
and then a larger exp		advise	d that he
was unable to hear e	ither explosion.	further	advised
that the sky was over	cast and visibility	was approximat	ely ten
miles at the time of	the explosions.	would n	ot provide
the address of the i	ndividuals that he wa	as visiting on	Long
Island, nor could he	<u>remember</u> the exact]	Location of the	township
where they reside.	ladvised tha	at he was visit	ing his
	, address unknown, wh	no lives in the	: New York
City area.			
1	. L. L. A. Ll. L. myan. 63 dad	LL 000b-4	
	stated that TWA fligh	nt 800 was snot	down by a
U.S. Navy Aegis miss ship which was locat	ile which was launche	sa irom a daide	u missile irti mile
from where TWA fligh	t con area w-105 <u>. ar</u>	DIOXIMACETY CIT	that area
"W-105" is a warning	eres off the couther		
and is utilized for	military operations.	including miss	ile
firing.	urther advised that	he attained thi	is
information from		es the Welwood	Murray
Memorial Library, Pa	lm Springs, Californ	ia, telephone ((619) 323- b6
8296. He believes t	hat (LEU) ret	rieved this inf	formation b70
from the Internet.	This information was	mailed to TWA	by
along with	a letter describing	what he observ	red on
07/17/96. TWA then	mailed this data to	the New York of	fice of
			<u> </u>
Investigation on 10/21/96	PALM SPRINGS, CA	(telepho	nically)
File # 265A-NY-259028		Date dictated _10/22/96	5

by <u>SA</u>			

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7/31/96

On 7/21/96, called the 800 number and reported that on 7/17/96, he saw what appeared to be a Roman candle go up and burst into balls of flame. was on a sailboat at the time. (control no. 1779)
On 7/31/96, Easton, MD, was interviewed telephonically by SA New York Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his observation on 7/17/96. furnished the following information.
During 7/14/96-7/28/96, were on a boating trip. On 7/14/96, they left Annapolis sailing on "TARKA" (WCEB011). By Wednesday evening on 7/17/96, they were about 22 miles off of SHINNECOCK. was on the companion way about 8:30-8:45 p.m. He was looking toward the land when he saw what appeared to be a Roman candle or a flare come up from the horizon in an angle leaving a streak of light. The flare went off leaving a trail of red glow behind it and burst into red flame about a size of a beach ball. A second or two later, he saw another flare. It was lower than the the first flare. Then streaks of light fell into water dispersing black, heavy smoke.
stated that he could not tell from where he was whether the flare came up from land or water. He further stated that as he faced the land the first flare ascended from his left to his right and a second flare went in the same direction.
initially thought this occurrence was only about 2-3 miles away from where he was given the size of the flare. He could not each the Coast Guard on Channel 22 because of another communication being transmitted at the time.
location at the time was latitude: 40-28-62, longitude: 72-22-79. He calculated that he was approximately 16 miles from the occurence of the flare. He also heard a radio message companies elicopter belonging to the National Air Guard who WITH/TEXT WITHOUTTEXT WITHOUTTEXT
11 77 7/6

was at the scene in about four minutes. Its life raft which served as a locator was latitude: 40-39-03, longitude: 72-38-43.

07/28/96

Date of transcription

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

On July 21, 1996, also known as (aka) white, female, Date of Rirth (DOR) residing at Long Island, New York, telephone was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, which was to ascertain her knowledge and observations regarding an explosion which occurred on July 17,
1996, at approximately 8:30 PM. Thereafter, provided the following information:
on July 17, 1996, was watering plants in the front yard of her residence which is located on the northern shore of Shinecock Bay. At approximately 8:30 PM, observed a bright, hot orange elongated ball of fire falling toward the horizon south, southwest of her location. The fireball was quite elongated and was visible to for approximately five (5) seconds until it disappeared into the horizon.
estimated that the elongated fireball was approximately two (2) miles away. This estimate was based on the large size and clarity of the elongated fireball. advised that the actual explosion occurred approximately ten (10) miles from her location. heard no noise associated with the elongated fireball.
Upon viewing this fireball, immediately yelled to her husband, who was inside the residence at the time. was present during the interview and concurred with the observations made by
described the fireball as cyndrical in size, red/orange in color and descending downward, curving east prior to disappearing into the horizon. No noise was heard by regarding the fireball.
two (2) miles away at the time of the occurrence. estimates the actual explosion occurred approximately fifteen (15) miles away.
Investigation on 07/21/96 at Hampton Bays, New York
File # 265A-NY-259QAR //
by SA Date dictated 07/24/96

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265A-NY-259028		
Continuation of FD-302 of	. Oa 07/21/96	, Page b6 b7C
they recall any	could not provide any addirding the explosion. They were advised the other information/observations related to ontact the Federal Bureau of Investigation	at if the

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

·	Date of transcription	8/8/96
		b6
On July 28, 1996,	Date of Birth	
(NY) 11951, telephone number	Social Secu	rity Island
Railroad, Hillside Avenue, NY telephone n	umber i 800-140	and the
information:		7
his father-in-law, , and , and approximately 8:30 pm observed a flash/ball of fire followed by flames. Tout/and fell vertically when another flas appeared. This second ball of flames were vertically toward the water. The two flasted only approximately ten seconds in approximately six to seven miles away from flames were in a southeastern direction from the second of the second	his ball of finch/ball of finch/ball of flame at out and fell shes/balls of the sky. the sky. crom and	ches). At then a re sizzled es flames was The nd were at the sky.
did not see the point of origin informed the Agents that he thought the igun at first. did not hear an observe the object which was on fire.	or the frames a	m a flare
At approximately 7:45 pm (approximate) inboard high speed boat go inlet, direction unknown, prior to the basky. did not remember seeing the but recalled a White male and White femal speed boat (no further descriptions given	alls of flames ne boat after t le being on boa	in the he flames rd the
26	SSA-NY-259028-SU SSANCIED HIDDED SERIALIZED FILED	B362-2706
riffer Tc	NOV 1 2 1996	2
Investigation on 7/28/96 at Mastic Beach, Ne	w York (teler	phonically)
File # 265A-NY-259028' ()	7/20//	26
bv`	Date dictated 7/28/9	

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

	Date of transcription 7	//30/96
/		
	e of Birth	one
was advised of the identiti agents and the purpose of the interview. the following information:	then furni	shed
to two miles east of Smith Point Park with 8:30 pm and 8:45 pm, was looking sout a flare-like object (FLO) described	neast when he o the FLO as red	etween bserved dish-
white in color ascending in a straight line angle (from perpendicular) from his vantage immediately faced back towards the shore (note time. I directed attention back	orthward). At to/the southea	 that st
where he observed an explosion at approximation thousand feet which he described as two housand advised that as the explosion quickly separated into two reddish-orange sections observe the two sections until he lost sight	se-sizes in dia descended, it continu	meter. ed to
ocean. advised that the explosion was light up the sky and the ocean. Approximate lost sight of the explosion, he heard which lasted from one - two seconds in dura	ely one minute a thunder-like	. to after
stated that he did not see origin, its termination point, nor a smoke did not observe any boat traffic.	trail. Addition	nally,
	265A-NY-25902	8-SUB
•	SEARCHED INDEXES SERIALIZED FILED	8-SUB 302-
UPLOADED	MAR 2 5 19	ام
WITHTEST PAGE		1011
Investigation on 7/22/96 at Bayport, New York		
File # 265A-NY-259028		
XSA	te dictated 7/25/96	
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Date of transcription 8/8/96	
and the same of th	
On July 26. 1996. Date of Birth was	
advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview then furnished the following information:	
On July 17, 1996, was on a boat located at Great Gun Dock, Moriches, New York. Also on the boat was	
At approximately 8:45 pm looked southeast above the dune line and noticed what appeared to be a rocket ascending straight up. The rocket was silver in color with sparks coming out of the end. estimated the distance to the rocket location was 3-4 miles. observed the rocket ascending for a lengthy period of time and then develop into a whitish glow. The glow then turned into a massive burst of reddish flames which descended towards the ocean.	
At no time did see a smoke trail from the ascending rocket and theorized that a small aircraft was involved.	

	V.F		3/26/97		265A-NY-259028-SUB SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED TO FILED FEB 2 7 1997 FBI - NEW YORK	302- 3271
Investigation on	7/26/96	at _	Southampton,	New York		
File A 2652 by SAS	A-NY-259028 /JDF/d	ap		Date dictated	7/26/96	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/24/96
ij
On July 22, 1996, White Male,
Date of Birth Home address was
contacted. was informed of the identity of interviewing
Agents and furnished the following information:
had gone down to Robert Moses Beach, Field number 5 on July 17, 1996. arrived at the beach a little after 6:00PM. said that at approximately 8:30PM, he saw a flash out of the corner of his eye. said that at the time this occurred, the sun had gone down beyond the horizon but there was still light in the sky.
was looking directly out to the water when he saw the flash. He initially thought that it could have been a camera flash going off or a lightning bolt in the distance. said that the flash came from southeast of his position.
said that when he looked in the direction of the flash, he saw a small white star point followed by a fine-line smoke trail. The smoke trail may have been slightly wavy at the edges. was unsure of the distance of this object but initially thought that it had occurred on his side of the horizon. said that the star point and the smoke trail were arching in a north easterly direction. When observed the star point, it was on a downward arch. said the white star point was brighter than the smoke trail which followed it.
initially thought that this star point was some type of flare. The star point disappeared and two-three seconds later saw a bright orange ribbon slash across the sky at the same point. The orange ribbon appeared to be slashing toward This event seemed to last two - three seconds and then the object began dropping, straight down. said the object was orange/red in color and seemed to be rotating and turning end over end as it descended. said the object appeared more "wavy and fiery" as it descended beyond the horizon. did not see the object strike the surface of the ocean.
Investigation on 7/22/96 at
Elle # 265A-NY-259028
AH: meg)
by SA Date dictated 7/23/96

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

b6 b7C

265A-NY-259028	
Continuation of FD-302 of	, On 7/22/96 , Page <u>2</u>
observed an unusual boat opera described the boat as about hundred feet in length. boat because it appeared unusu	rlier in the evening, he had ting about 200 yards off-shore. an "old ugly iron-hulled trawler" said that he noted the al. It was a trawler but had no cabin appeared rusty and decrepit. and the bow was very round.
not see any person on the boat	rve the name of the boat and did
provided two representing the events he obs	diagrams which he had made erved the night of July 17.

it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

b6 b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 7/29/96
Date of Rinth (DOR)
Date of Birth (DOB)
home residence of
OGM WAREHOUSE, 164 Waverly Avenue.
Patchogue New York 1772, telephone (home) [work] Social Security Account Number (SSAN)
(work) Social Security Account Number (SSAN) was interviewed at his place of employment and was
advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the
nature of the interview, which was to ascertain his knowledge and
observations of the evening of July 17, 1996. Thereafter, provided the following information:
provided the rollowing information.
stated that at approximately 8:30 pm to 8:35 pm, on July 17, 1996, he was sitting on his pool diving board looking
at the sky from behind his house, facing and looking in a southwesterly direction, when he observed what appeared to be
five or six shooting stars, white in color, with 20 to 30 feet
white tails trailing behind. further stated that the shooting stars came down one after another approximately two
shooting stars came down one after another approximately two seconds apart. advised that the shooting stars fell one
after another except for two which fell together; however, all
were white in color. stated that the total time duration of the stars in his sight before they were out of sight was
approximately 15 to 20 seconds. further stated that the
shooting stars seemed to travel from the northeast to the
southeast at an 80 degree angle (approximately), three miles away from his location. stated that he saw no smoke and heard
no noise, as the shooting stars travelled southwest over the roof
at his house and over the developments disappearing from sight. advised that he saw nothing go from the ground
from sight. advised that he saw nothing go from the ground up and that the shooting stars moved quickly across the sky, each
one in sight for only a second.
265A-NY-259028-SUB 702 -
UPLOADED SERIALIZED RILED RILED SERIALIZED RILED R
WITH/TEXT
WITH/CUT MAR 2 5 1997
BY FRIENDS IN TONS
Investigation on 7/22/96 at Patchogue, New York 100
File # 265A-NY-259028
SA J. L.
by SA cam Date dictated 7/24/96
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

Print Form

PETITION

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project, June 9, 2013

stigator - TWA F800 Cabin Interiors
stigator - TWA F800 Cabin Interiors
-

PETITION

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

The TWA 800 Project , July 15, 2012

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

Name VERNON L. GROE Signature

date: 8 JAN 13

(Titles, qualifications): NTSB MEMBER, 1983-8A

Address:

ARLINGTON, VA 22202

Email address:

PETITION

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The TWA 800 Project , July 15, 2012

Name <i>CHAP</i>	US V. WETC	<u>√</u> M DSignature	James,	14200	
ate: 01-	17-13	<u></u>			
Γitles, qualific	ations): Fonce	usic Pann	DLOGIST		
ddress:					
A	LPIOT NO	07620			
					
mail address:			. /		

FINDINGS

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Henry F. Hughes	
NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired)	
Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transported Airlines	
Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines	
Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator	
LIST MICHEUSON	7-15-12
Ancelyn Sorenson	7-15-12
	7-15-12
VOLER LEMMER	7-15-12
Margaret Ginghano	7-15-12
NAMON Kerry	7-15-12
The the second	1/10/12
Marjoria Krukar MARJORIE KRUKAR	7-15-12
Port Mystice	7-15-12-

PETITION

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The TWA 800 Project	$\ell \sim \ell$
Name: SANDRA-JACO.	OS O NSignature.
Address:	So h 7 M 9 Phone Number:
Date: $9/2/32/3$	
<i>i</i> / /	

TWA Flight 800 Petition

ase add my name as petitioner to the Peti	tion for the Reconsideration and Modificati	on of the National T	ransportation	
ety Board's Finding and Determination of	he Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Fligh	t 800		
<u>Name</u>	<u>Adress</u>	Phone #	<u>Signature</u>	<u>Date</u>
Vorma Westall	Portola Valley, Ca 94028		Mornade Justall	9-4-12
JOANN BARTER	SARATOGA, CA 95070	r	De Lact	9,4.12
CARLA GOWDY	es GATOS CA 95032.	·		SGT- 5,2012
A SVA	afrid es		Montey and	191520

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NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired)	
Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines	
Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup	
Physicist and Independent Investigator	. f
KENNETH MICORE	SOMERTA
Should for the same	
JACKOLYN B. STADTMAN	
and patient par	, Sonoma, CA 95472
PAULINE BRECKINGIDGE	7 172
(D) (C) (C)	, Donoma, CA 954;
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PETITION

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The TWA 800 Project	
Name: MOON AGB, MONT, Signatu	What I MANIETT
Address:	Phone Number:
Date: $9-3-12$	

TWA Flight 800 Petition

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accide	nt investigation of TWA 800 .			
Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition		***************************************	sportation	
Safety Board's Finding and Determination of the Name	Probable Cause for the Crash TWA FII Adress	Phone #	Signature	Data
ALAIN DUGUAY	NY11415 BLVI		SIGNALUIE	- 09/09/12
SUSAN VENTRELLA	VÁLACA, CA 95445		Ston ball	09/15/12
Tony Ventulla	ι	LI .	Town Vontalla	09-1572
	ualala, Ca. 95445	2	Win Selson	09-18-12
Susan D. Haldornar	\	">	will an amount	09-18-12
	alala (4 95445	F	Julie Orwano	9-20-12
STEVE HARDER	THE SEA RANCH		Juil Line	9/20/12
Paul Skellet	9544 Gualala (+5 707 Ca.	Pac Creat	9/20/12

TWA Flight 800 Petition

Please add my name as petitioner to the P	etition for the Reconsideration and Modification	of the National Transpor	tation	
afety Board's Finding and Determination	of the Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Flight 8	00		
<u>Name</u>	<u>Adress</u>	Phone #	<u>Signature</u>	<u>Date</u>
JAMES R. HOHMANN	St. Louis Mo. 63139		7. Huma	5Ept 15
Paul Robinson	Chestotield Mo		Marine I and the second of the	15 5 gt.
JOHN KRAKOWSK;	KIRKWOOD MO 63122		and l	9/15/2017
Lavid Uldrick	Belmont, CA 9400Z		w vyu	9/20/12
	•			

TWA Flight 800 Petition

l hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the a	eccident investigation of TWA 800 .		ر در برد. برده النون استان برند برند برند بازد کار برند بازد کار برند بازد کار کار بازد کار بازد کار بازد کار - در برد برد بازد از این استان برند برند بازد کار برند کار برند بازد کار کار بازد کار بازد کار بازد کار بازد ک	
	Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification	T	portation	AN
Safety Board's Finding and Determination Name	of the Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Flight 80 Adress	Phone #	Signature	into a second
GREGO TOSEllo	ENALAIA.	FIIOIGA	Signature (8/30/ 2012
Laure Petkovio	Chyport DE		Equita D. Aktic	9-2-12
Nes/Sillh	NY NY 10/28	, .	Jew July	9/2/12
LAND CENERIZIO	75EUAY 141			9-2-1
DARY ANN Wilson	Kew GARDENS, NY 11415		m. a 1.11	9/3/12
Juan HARRIS		4	<u> </u>	9/3/12
BARBALA DAHAL	Kow gardons, Ny 11415			9/13/12
Dunna Sheritz	Krew Garden N.V. 1146		m do	9/1/12
Nawcy McLean	Rancho Santa Maegarita) Colif 92688	7		7 11/2
Susan Linares	Belmont Grand		Mix Tille	9/20/12

TWA Flight 800 Petition

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the	e accident investigation of TWA 800.			
	Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification		Transportation	Name and the state of the state
Safety Board's Finding and Determination Name	on of the Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Flight 80 Adress	Phone #	Signature	Date
Hams	CALESS	9 6 H 4/4 C 1-55 . 14	**************************************	
MIRRY NOREM	FAIRFAX, 6A 94930		Live y	9/3/12
Module Themas	CONTECS OA BOSTY		- House	9/4/12
Dave Carnaghi	St. Louis, mo 63/18		DA	9/6/12
HARRIS	-HC1:30 NYILLE, FC 32210			9/14/201
iamela Fisher	certor ville, anio	,	Frank .	9/15/20/2
Janis R. Williams	Peorla, A2 85381		ARWINAMA	9/15/12
Ligalorusso	NV. NV (0028		John Was O	9/15/1
Allan Bigglan	Cherterfield mo63019		W 19 cgl	9/15/1
Toriya Schwartz	Walnuthell IL62893			9/17/16
Lucille Uldrick	Belmont, CA 94002		Quein 115	?/20/12

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 4:54 AM, Rick Carlton wrote:

Hi friends -

I have received an alternate form and method for submitting the TWA-800 petition.

This subject is very important to many of us in aviation, and there are many mysteries surrounding this "crash" and investigation. I am urging you to take this small step to insure that justice has been served. Ours is in the mail.

Many thanks,

Rick Carlton

METHOD 1:

Copy, print, fill out this short form, add address, phone #, e-mail, etc., and snail mail to Bill Smith.

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800. Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project

Name James A. Barber	_ Signature
date: 8/24//2	
Address	
Rellevue, WA United Airlines Captain (retired), etc.	9-8006

You are welcome to add any other title or degree like former Navy or Air Force Pilot, Flight Surgeon, Scientific titles or degrees, etc. anything that would indicate that you are knowledgeable and experienced in aeronautics and the associated fields, which would indicate that you understand the subject and disagree with the findings. It would not be helpful to make political comments on this form, so resist the urge.

Add your address and phone number or email address.

METHOD 2:

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National **Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800**

The TWA 800 Project July 15, 2012	
Name Tudent Tight	_ Signature
FREDERICK P. MEYER	
date: 8/23/2012	
United Airlines Captain (retired)	•
CASTLE NOCK, CO.	

80100

PETITION

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Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project , July 15, 2012

Name DENS J. CMALLEY Signature

date: Aug. 21, 2012

United Airlines Captain (retired)

La Mesa, CA 991941

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as Petitioner for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National
Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Causes for the Crash

date August 25, 2012

of TWA Flight 800.

The TWA 800 Project July 15, 2012

Name Harold C. Lloyd, Jr. Signature

United Airlines Captain (retired)

USAF Flight Examiner Pilot Colonel (retired)

Islamorada FL 33036

- 1. The explosion that caused the crash was external to the aircraft.
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NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired)	
Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines	
Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator	
KWUNOWNER HILL	- ALMNEC 418c
CAPTRETUAL 29 AUGROIL	<u>.</u>
Roberta S. Van Wormer Blue Deborah S. Van Wormer Blue	Elpine, CA
Deborah S. Van Wormer Blue	4 A Upin

TWA Flight 800 Petition

ease add my name as netitioner to the Pet	ition for the Reconsideration and Modification	of the National T	ransportation	
Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Safety Board's Finding and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash TWA Flight 800				
Name	Adress	Phone #	Signature	Date
Ursuja Jinith	Belinout, Co. 94002		· Casuka Imik	7/26/12
Willian F. Valar	San Francisco (d. 17412)		Antilla 1	840/2
Wignia R Was	SE CK 94123		Wigner R Wes	8/26/1
Steve Calhour	112 10 angelology G 95		Ste Caller	8/26/1:
Sally Kogs				P.X.1
	BE/ment, 04 94002	650	and the	8-28-1
JANUETA VANPELL 1	MenloPARK CH 94025		Jan 12 12 1	8/39/12
MARY K. BIMBA T	POSTER CITY, CA. 94404	-	- Mary K. Kimba	8/29/12
wy SMITH-RENNEDY ,	FOSTER CITY, CA 94404		Just Xmade	3/29/12
arica Vaunders	Essler City, Car 94404		Maria Maria	8/29/1

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Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project July 15, 2012

Name_

Signature

George E. Nolly, Captain, UAL, Retired

Doctor of Business Administration

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800 The TWA 800 Project.

Aug 23, 2012

Name: David E. Ott___

Signature ____

date: 8/23/2012

<u>United Airlines Captain</u> (retired)

Incline Village, NV 89451

A control of the c

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Henry F. Hughes NTSB Senior Accident Investigator (Retired)

Robert A. Young Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines

Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup Physicist and Independent Investigator

Clinton Tup / Michigino, 48036 Michael Dekroup

> Chinton Twp. Michigan 48036

ETHEU WITE May 301/6 My 45-10 Warren M1 48038 Bob longe 8.001 James 1045514748 101 45014 plansith M - 1xxx JOSEPH O. BUCCAL Henry W. Ball 33776 ALKEMS CLIVTEN TWP 48036 Fraser 711 48026 Su la 3372 1022 MB Freser -3024 Francy From traver My Asia Rebin Lenge in lange City Rachesterfield 48751 capar mi SANTA LONGO 450 41319 JuleCT Jerry Longo 48038 Brockway Mich 48097 Michele Longo Brockway Mich 48097 Carissa Longe Clinton Tup MJ

48038

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Captain James Speer
Pilot and former Airline Pilots Association Aircraft Crash Investigator
1 . DD
J'emas of peco

PETITION

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Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project

Name: Carl A Hankwitz

Signature:

Date: August 29, 2012

Address:

Marana, AZ 85658

Email:

Certifications:

Retired FAA Aircrew Program Designee: B-747, B-737

Retired Standards Captain, United Airlines: B-747, B-737

Prior Lt., United States Coast Guard – Rescue Acft. Cmdr.

The TWA 800 Project

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Please add my name as petitioner to the

Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's

Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800.

Name George W. Howell, Jr	
Signature Taylor	and the same
Date: August 26, 2012	
Address:	, Rolla, MO 65401
Title: (Captain, United Airline	s (retired)

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Henry F. Hughes	
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Robert A. Young	
Former Director of Flight Safety, Transworld Airlines	
Dr. Thomas F. Stalcup	
Physicist and Independent Investigator	
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Suzanne Berube	Sonoma CA 95476
George A. E. 14 Tolling	2. Donona, CA 95476
Kathy Hillback Ely Mody/Ticchactly	SOMEMA CA 95476
TAMES D. PATRICK	SONOMA, CA 95478
Protection of the second	- Sama Rose CA 9540
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PETITION

I hereby petition the NTSB to reopen the accident investigation of TWA 800.

Please add my name as petitioner to the Petition for the Reconsideration and Modification of the National Transportation Safety Board's Findings and Determination of the Probable Cause for the Crash of TWA Flight 800

The TWA 800 Project , June 9, 2013

Name DENNIS F. SHANAHAN Signature	D	5 M	
date: JUNE & 2013			
(Titles, qualifications): M.D. M.P.H.			
Address:			
CARLSBAD, CA 92009			
Email address:			

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	Name Tom ERICKS UM Signature date: 9-4-12
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The TWA 800 Project July 15, 2012

Name ALAN L. BLACK	Signature
date: AUGUST 24,2012	
United Airlines Captain (retired)	
BLAINE, WA 98230	
ine iwa 800 Project July 15, 2012	
Name_Richard L. Carlton))
Signature Signature	
date:_August	
23,2012	
United Airlines Captain (retired)	
Name_Jill A. Carlton	
Signature	
United Airlines Flight Attendant (retired)	
Vero Beach, Fl. 32963	

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Captain	Ray	Lahr
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Pilot and former Airline Pilots Association Aircraft Crash Investigator

Capr. Non

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Name H. RAY LAHR Signature date: Aug 24, 2012

Address:

United Airlines Captain (retired), etc. WWIT NAYPILOT, ALPA SAFETY REARESENPATIVE

You are welcome to add any other title or degree like former Navy or Air Force Pilot, Flight Surgeon, Scientific titles or degrees, etc. anything that would indicate that you are knowledgeable and experienced in aeronautics and the associated fields, which would indicate that you understand the subject and disagree with the findings. It would not be helpful to make political comments on this

form, so resist the urge.

Add your address and phone number or email address.