



March 1, 2018

On May 15, 2017 Trans-Pacific Jets received the news that we lost an airplane. As the news came in we learned that we lost more than an airplane. We lost co-workers, colleagues and friends and others lost more. While the potential for loss of life is always present in aviation we were not mentally prepared the events that transpired that Spring day at Teterboro, New Jersey. Despite our efforts to provide guidance and policy for the operation of aircraft the events of the day presented a chain of decisions that led to the loss of life. Coming to terms with the reality is something we struggle with today.

As an operator we had developed a number of policies and practices to mitigate risk and provide for the safety of our crew. In spending many days transcribing cockpit recordings and studying the information obtained by the NTSB we have discovered a continuing theme throughout the investigation. The crew was presented with an aircraft with no material deficiencies to operate on a clear and sunny day. There was no pressure on either crewmember to perform that afternoon. Perhaps the foundation of the low stress conditions provided the perception of a relaxed duty event.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) were published and provided for all crewmembers at Trans-Pacific Jets. The SOP manual is issued to all pilots at initial training and reviewed during the course of the training. The initial training for operations in company aircraft are performed within a flight simulator through a contract training provider and offer the guidance to operate the aircraft and assess the crewmember's performance in the airplane and strict adherence to procedures as published. Following the simulator training, captains will then be assessed over a normal flight to again assess their adherence to industry standard practices and company SOP prior to conducting revenue flights with passengers onboard.

The root cause of the crash is a practice in aviation that is currently the leading cause of accidents. Procedural Intentional Non-Compliance (PINC) is a practice in which the crewmembers are fully aware to the guidelines in which they are required to perform yet consciously disregard them. For either personal or professional reasons a decision is made to pick and choose which policy to follow and which will be disregarded. From the beginning of the cockpit recordings we are able to determine that very few of Trans-Pacific Jet's General Operations Manual (GOM) or SOP were followed. We know that the first officer was acting as the flying pilot, but was not authorized to do so. Procedural callouts were not adhered to, non-standard phraseology was used and compliance with "sterile cockpit" guidelines were not.

Further, the crew lacked a general situational awareness to the conduct of the flight. The geographical distance of the airports was not what would require a cruising altitude of FL270 and the conversation regarding altitude and the requests to air traffic control for higher altitude tells me they were unaware to the actual distance or flight time between Philadelphia and Teterboro. Unaware, yet the distance and estimated flight time are included on their flight release and given to them when planning the flight and filing an IFR flight plan.

The inherent risk to an otherwise average operation was exacerbated by their own continuous string of poor decision making and PINC. Numerous times throughout the flight the first officer realized he was in a situation that exceeded his comfort level and tried to turn over the control of the aircraft to the captain. At each attempt to relinquish control, but the very last, the captain disregarded the first officer. When the captain finally did take over he was so far behind the aircraft he could not have been in a proper mindset to safely and effectively complete the flight from the position it was in over Teterboro airport.



In our attempt to further attenuate the circumstances that led to the accident in Teterboro Trans-Pacific Jets has implemented a number of changes to our organization and manual system.

- Pilots must sign for receipt of the manual and acknowledge an intention of compliance with the directives of the manual.
- Our training program has been revised to include a presentation on Procedural Intentional Non-Compliance.
- Annual training will review and analyze the accident and how discuss how Standard Operating Procedures can reduce the risk of every operation of the aircraft.
- In an effort of quality assurance pilot route checks will now be performed at 6 month intervals rather than the FAA mandated 12 months.
- The Safety Management System (SMS) has been expedited for full implementation.
- A third party safety auditor has been retained for periodic safety inspections, records audits and recommendations toward systemic improvement .
- All flights will be conducted under the same guidelines. Whether the flight is with passengers or just to reposition the aircraft. There will be no differentiation regarding the requirements for the flight crew.