ATTACHMENT 1

OPERATIONS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT

CEN14FA046

RECORDS OF CONVERSATION
(14 pages)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 29, 2014
Person Contacted: Bobby Busenburg
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:
A telephone interview was conducted with Mr. Bobby Busenburg, who provided a short familiarization flight to Dr. Perry Inhofe in June 2013. The flight was a brief flight from RVS to TUL, or about .3 hours. The two both flew out of RVS and knew each other on sight but did not otherwise interact on a regular basis.

Dr. Inhofe had contacted Mr. Busenburg since Mr. Busenburg flew an MU-2B-60. Mr. Busenburg was going to reposition an MU-2B and invited Dr. Inhofe to fly along. They moved vehicles prior to flight so they could drive back to RVS in a car. In total, they spent about 1.5 hours discussing general questions about MU-2 system, and operation costs.

During the flight, Mr. Busenburg described the system and the different checks on the airplane. Mr. Busenburg "was floored" with Dr. Inhofe's level of systems knowledge and knowledge of the NTS checks. He assessed that Dr. Inhofe had a good grasp of the MU-2 systems. During the flight, they discussed the MU-2's history and Dr. Inhofe was familiar with both the history and the MU-2s reputation.

Dr. Inhofe had called Mr. Busenburg at least once to discuss general questions to include flight training. Mr. Busenburg got the impressions that Dr. Inhofe was talking to other pilots about the MU-2, but he did not know who they were.

His experience with Dr. Inhofe led Mr. Busenburg to think that Dr. Inhofe would have made a "really, really good" MU-2 pilot. Dr. Inhofe had told Mr. Busenburg that in reference to piloting the MU-2,"If I'm going to do this, I'm going to do it right." He also mentioned to Mr. Busenburg that after he completed training he would be looking for a mentor pilot and asked Mr. Busenburg if he would not mind flying with him occasionally. Mr. Busenburg accepted and said that he would. There was no further communications between the two.

Mr. Busenburg was surprised that Dr. Inhofe was flying the airplane solo. He felt that while Dr. Inhofe was confident to fly the airplane, Dr. Inhofe understood that this airplane was a “step up” from the airplanes he had flown before. Dr. Inhofe had previously mentioned that he did not have experience with turbine airplanes and would likely be flying higher and faster than before. Mr. Busenburg described Dr. Inhofe as approaching the MU-2 with humility, understanding that this airplane was different.

---END---

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: 27 January 2014
Person Contacted: Mark James, Intercontinental Jet Service
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:

In a telephone interview with Mr. Mark James, Director of Operations for Intercontinental Jet Services, he stated that he was unsure how many Pilot Checklists were on-board the airplane.

He was also unsure if any of his personnel had performed a maintenance test flight, but would research the subject.

In addition, he stated that all documentation pertaining to work accomplish by the company was provided to the NTSB IIC Aaron Sauer.
---END---

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 29, 2014
Person Contacted: David Koehn, CFII
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:

Mr. Koehn flew with Dr. Perry Inhofe for several flights in preparation for Dr. Inhofe's Flight Instructor – Multi-Engine Airplane. Hereafter, Dr. Inhofe will be referred to as "the pilot."

In a telephone interview with Mr. Koehn, he stated that Dr. Inhofe's pilot skills were "really good." He was "very thorough, very studious and was a perfectionist." It was evident during their training that the pilot studied a lot. The pilot was known to self-study and showed up prepared for instruction. The pilot equated flying closely with his medical profession and expected himself to study and know everything he could about a topic prior to showing up.

During the training, Mr. Koehn commented again that the pilot was a "good pilot with no bad habit." He was the last pilot Mr. Koehn would expect to be in an accident due to his level of skill.

Mr. Koehn thought that the pilot's multi-engine flying was fine. He could appropriately pilot the Piper PA-44 that they utilized in training and were preparing to use for the pilot's evaluation flight. He estimated that they trained together for about 8-12 hours total.

They trained for the flight examination and complete all the items for the Flight Instructor's Practical Test Standards. All items were performed to standards and the pilot had no problems meeting the requirements.

Mr. Koehn also described the pilot as a "humble pilot" who approached a new airplane like the PA-44 ready to accept instruction—not argumentative about new procedures. The pilot did not seem the type of pilot to "push the odds." Mr. Koehn stated that the pilot was thorough and studious. The pilot continually referenced the manufacturer's checklist.

Finally, Mr. Koehn stated that the pilot was very studious and took notes during their instruction. The pilot was easy to teach" and would ask "why" if he didn't understand a topic.

---END---

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 28, 2014
Person Contacted: Shawn McDonell
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:

In a telephone conversation with Mr. Shawn McDonell, owner and flight instructor with Professional Flight Training, he stated the following:

Concerning the condition of the pilot's MU-2, Mr. McDonell makes a point as part of the pilot's familiarization with a new MU-2 (new being anytime a pilot is flying a specific MU-2, even if they are familiar in make and model) is for the plot to examine the rigging of the airplane's engines. Mr. McDonell would have the student confirm that the engines are rigged right and that both engines' gages and throttle were near symmetric. Mr. McDonell commented that N856JT's engines "matched well." He reported no asymmetrical rigged or adverse yaw during power lever movement that were caused by the airplane.

During his training with Dr. Inhofe, Mr. McDonell flew from the right seat on every flight. He demonstrated the first engine start by discussing the engine start procedures and then started the right engine discussing what a pilot looks for during an engine start. The student would then start the left engine. Following the first series of engine starts, the student would be responsible to start both engines on the remaining flights. Dr. Inhofe's training adhered to this protocol. During the engine starts, Dr. Inhofe would be responsible to properly utilize all switches including the run-crank-stop (RCS) switch. Mr. McDonell reported no difficulties concerning Dr. Inhofe understand of engine start procedures.

When asked about how the airplane's level and switches felt, Mr. McDonell stated that he did not operate all of the switches consistently to positively assess condition of the switches. Of the times that Mr. McDonell did actuate the airplane controls he remarked that "everything seemed normal to me."

Concerning the airplane's takeoff power setting, Mr. McDonell stated that there was not a noticeable split between the engines. "Everything was matched up really well."

When asked about running the power assurance chart, Mr. McDonell remarked that on the day that they performed a power assurance check per the chart, they were able to obtain 100% torque and were not limited by any temperature. They were able to achieve 100% torque on all takeoffs.

When asked about possible yawing tendencies during takeoff and landings, Mr. McDonell commented that the MU-2 series airplane is very pitch sensitive, so most yaw can be attributed as pilot induced. N856JT had no yawing tendency during the training.

When asked to discuss the airborne NTS test, Mr. McDonell explained that he first discusses the test with the student. The student will then move the RCS switch and completed the remaining items. Dr. Inhofe performed both NTS tests really well and the shutdown time noted was 16 seconds (within limits).

EXPLAINATION OF FLIGHT GRADE SHEETS

Mr. McDonell explained that the recorded Hobbs time on the flight grade sheets were calculated off of the landing gear being in the up/retracted positions. The Time In and Time Out, was the time from when the starting moving from the parking spot to when they shut engines down.

AIRPLANE MANUALS

Mr. McDonell reported that the pilot utilized the manufacturer's one-page checklist, pilot's checklist, and flight manual. He knows that the pilot had one copy of each available during the flights. Mr. McDonell did not know if Dr. Inhofe had more than one copy of the manuals and checklists.

PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT TRAINING BOOK

Mr. McDonell stated that he gives students a book to assist with their training as study material and reference book. He created the book by copying and combing multiple pages from the checklist and flight manual. His purpose was to locate all of the key material in one location. He created it mainly to assist students with the ground safety checks. It is utilized during the preflight to provide more detail to the required steps. After the safety tests are completed, the book is rarely used again. All further references are made to the pilot's checklist.

PILOT'S USE OF MANUALS AND CHECKLISTS

When asked about the pilot's use of checklist, Mr. McDonell recalled that Dr. Inhofe normally utilized the one-page checklist. During flight, Dr. Inhofe normally stored the checklist

in the pouch to the left side of the pilot's seat. The AFM was normally flown with it stored behind the right pilot's seat. Mr. McDonell stated that the checklist was utilized multiples time during the flight so its location shifted, but was located near or between the pilots.

GATED SWTICHES VS. TOGGLE SWITCHES

Mr. McDonell commented that during the flight training, he discussed the Main Valve Switches (gated-style switches) and the Tip Tank & Outer Wing Tank Switches (toggle-switch switch). Mr. McDonell had discussed that some pilots can confuse the switches. He recalled that Dr. Inhofe commented that he did not understand how a pilot could confuse the switches between they did not feel or move the same.

---END---

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 28, 2014
Person Contacted: Shawn McDonell
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:

In a follow-up telephone interview with Shawn McDonell, he stated that he wanted to clarify the use of his generated checklist in regard to training in the MU-2B.

He began by stating that he understands the SFAR requirement for the use of the "blue" pilot checklist and that he does not ignore that checklist. He created his checklist as a learning tool or training aid to assist pilots new to the MU-2B. He began creating the checklist to expound on different portions of the pilot checklist as well as minimize time on the ground with pilots.

He stated that typically for the first flight, they would fly solely with his created checklist. The checklist is solely utilized from preflight through to engine shutdown. When asked if he uses it in conjunction with a manufacturer's checklist during that first flight, he stated that he did not because his checklist consisted of the accepted checklist and the flight manual.

When asked about his revision schedule, he stated that his checklist has not been revised since its creation.

When asked whether utilizing this checklist for flight went contrary to the SFAR requirement, he stated that he was not aware that using his training aid was contrary to the SFAR requirement. His intention was to provide a checklist that students could easily utilize during the initial portions of training. He stated that most pilots transition from his checklist by flight #2 and almost all by flight #3.

When asked if he was had to tell a pilot to transition from his checklist to the accepted checklist, he stated that a situation like that had not occurred.

Mr. McDonell expressed frustration over the slow change and update to different portions of the accepted checklist. He did not perceive that change to the checklist could be easily accomplished.

We discussed how the utilization of his checklist as the sole checklist for the first flight, likely crossed the SFAR's requirement:

> All training conducted for the Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane must be completed in accordance with the applicable MU-2B series checklist listed in table 1 of this SFAR or an MU-2B series airplane checklist that has been accepted by the Federal Aviation Administration's MU-2B Flight Standardization Board.

Mr. McDonell stated that he had not considered that using his checklist went against the SFAR requirements.

---END---

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 30, 2014
Person Contacted: Clay Roark, MU-2B-26 pilot
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:
Mr. Clay Roark is the owner of an MU-2B-26 airplane. He received SFAR initial training from Professional Flight Training (PFT) from the end of May to June 2013. Following the accident involving N856JT, he returned to PFT for recurrent training in December 2013. Mr. Roark stated that as an initial training student he received a 3-ring binder and abbreviated checklist from Shawn McDonell. McDonell's created checklist was in the airplane but was not utilized as the sole checklist during any of the flights. He was adamant that it was never utilized as the sole checklist. He recalled that Shawn instructed him that the blue checklist was the official checklist and needed to used.

Mr. Roark said that Mr. McDonell instructed both stall recovery methods; to minimize altitude loss and emphasis on AOA.

Mr. Roark described Mr. McDonell was a patient instructor who takes time to ensure that his students for the SFAR materials.

---END---

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 29, 2014
Person Contacted: Jennifer Wise, CFII
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:

Mrs. Jennifer Wise is a Designated Pilot Examiner for the Federal Aviation Administration. She evaluated Dr. Perry Inhofe's (hereafter referred to as 'the pilot') multi-engine instructor rating on October 6, 2013. During the interview, Mrs. Wise recalled the following.

When asked about her overall assessment of the pilot's flying skills, she remarked that the pilot was "very good, very methodical, extremely detailed, patient, and did everything properly." She perceived that he flew the proper way and strove to fly properly.

During the ground portion of the evaluation, Mrs. Wise had the pilot brief in detail several topics. Among them were, Vmc, systems, engine shut-downs, and airborne restarts. The pilot briefed everything correctly and provided good instruction. She could not recall any notable strengths or weaknesses during the evaluation flight.

The pilot had briefed, demonstrated, and instructed engine out procedures. He covered inflight engine shutdowns to include shutting an engine down to feather and then restarting the engine. He performed the tasks correctly and met the FAA standard.

The pilot had also brief, demonstrated, and instructed stalls. Mrs. Wise could not recall if Vmc (minimum control speed) and stall speed were near the same during the flight. The pilot did brief Vmc and its relationship to the stall.

The pilot instructed the difference in stall recovery procedures from minimum altitude loss to the newer procedure to reduce AOA in order to recover from a stall. He understood and instructed the topic appropriately.

During the evaluation flight, the pilot flew with and referenced the manufacturer's checklist. He was "very attentive" with his use of the checklist.

Mrs. Wise thought that the evaluation flight was "excellent" and thought it was one of the better checkrides that she had given recently.

Mrs. Wise reported that the pilot had not discussed his purchase of an MU-2 with her.

---END---

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jason Aguilera
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: January 30, 2014
Person Contacted: Tony Wolf, MU-2B-20 pilot
NTSB Accident Number: CEN14FA046

Narrative:

In a telephone interview with Tony Wolf, he stated that he is co-owner of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-20 airplane. He had previously flown a Beech Baron and once he purchased the MU-2B, he completed his SFAR training at Professional Flight Training with Shawn McDonell in July 2013. Mr. Wolf received study materials and an abbreviated checklist that was created by Shawn McDonell to be used during their training. During his training he mostly used McDonell's created checklist to pilot the airplane. While they would reference the Mitsubishi checklist occasionally, they primarily flew with McDonell's checklist. He felt that Mr. McDonell wanted to utilize his checklist for the flights. Mr. McDonell did inform Mr. Wolf that there was a requirement to have the blue and white checklist in the cockpit.

Mr. Wolf initially liked Shawn's checklist due to its flow, it did make most steps easier. Since the MU-2 accident in Owasso, Mr. Wolf now flies exclusively with the FAA-approved checklist.

Mr. Wolf remembered being training utilizing AOA as a stall recovery. He could not recall if another procedure was instructed.

Mr. Wolf discussed loss of engine procedures where Mr. McDonell emphasized the need to neutralize the spoilers to reduce drag. Another method was to automatically dial in 3-4 turns of rudder trim to straighten the airplane.

Mr. Wolf was satisfied with the training he received from Mr. McDonell. He described Mr. McDonell as a good, patient instructor who took time to explain and work with him.

---END---