# NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

# OFFICE OF RAILROAD, PIPELINE &

### HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INVESTIGATIONS

Washington, D.C. 20594

DCA 11 FR 004

REAR END COLLISION OF CSXT Freight Trains (TRAIN Q19423 with CSXT TRAIN Q61822)

On CSXT Transportation Monroe Subdivision Mineral Springs, North Carolina

May 24, 2011

OPERATIONS GROUP FIELD NOTES REPORT

Prepared by: C. Wayne Workman, Operations Group Chairman

Event: CSXT freight train collided with a standing CSXT freight

train

Date: May 24, 2011

Company: CSX Transportation (CSXT)
Location: Mineral Springs, North Carolina

Train: Train Q19423 (northbound--striking) with Train Q61822

(northbound-struck)

### **Operations Group:**

C. Wayne Workman, NTSB Group Chairman-National Transportation Board NTSB, IIC

Dr. Steve Jenner NTSB Human Performance

Bill Setser

CSXT Florence Division Assistant Division Manager

Joe Corcoran
Federal Railroad Administration

Kimble Jackson, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen

Jim Herndon, United Transportation Union United Transportation Union

# **Accident Summary:**

#### **Synopsis:**

On May 24, 2011, at about 3:35 a.m., eastern daylight time, northbound CSX Transportation Monroe Subdivision train Q19423, struck the rear of northbound CSX Transportation train Q61822, which had stopped at milepost SG 314.0. The accident occurred in Mineral Springs, North Carolina, approximately eight miles south of the CSXT Monroe Yard. The striking train Q19423 consisted of twelve intermodal cars and the struck train Q61822 consisted of nine general manifest cars. Each train had two

crewmembers—a train engineer and train conductor both located at the front of the lead locomotive. The engineer and conductor of the striking train were killed; the conductor and engineer of the struck train incurred minor injuries. The accident resulted in a fire of the two Q19423 locomotives and also included an equipment fire of the striking train. There were no hazardous materials in either trains consist. Total monetary damages were estimated at about \$1.6 million.

# CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT

At 01:20 a.m. May 24<sup>th</sup>, a track light was left on behind the S61623, a northbound train, between Richardson Creek (SF 303.9) and the S/E Marshville (SF 295.4). Due to the track light at this location, the following timeline occurred;

- 01:10 S61623 went by the S/E of Marshville The track light was reported to the Engineering Signal Specialist (ESS) in the Florence Division Operations Center by the FC Dispatcher. The ESS instructed the dispatcher to bring one more train through that location to see if the track light would go out on its own.
- 01:24 Q69621 was given permission by the signal at Richardson Creek (SF 303.9) moving in a northbound direction toward the S/E of Marshville (SF 295.4)
- 02:32 Q69724 (southbound) took siding at Marshville to await the arrival of the Q69621.
- 03:03:50 Q61623 (northbound) went by the N/E of Waxhaw (SG 318.4)
- 03:07 A signal maintainer was dispatched to the location of the track light by the ESS and gave an ETA of 0352.
- 03:13:23 A signal was received in the field at the N/E of Waxhaw for the Q61822
- 03:15:10 Q61822 (northbound) went by the N/E of Waxhaw (SG 318.4)
- 0319 Q69621 went by the S/E of Marshville and the track light did not go out after the train cleared the block between Richardson Creek and the S/E of Marshville
- 03:20:25 A signal was received in the field at the N/E of Waxhaw for the Q19423
- 03:24:15 Q61822 stopped at milepost SG 314.0

- 03:26:54 Q19423 (northbound) went by the N/E of Waxhaw (SG 318.4)
- 03:31:57 Q61623 went by the S/E of Monroe (SF 306.2). The train pulled to the N/E of Monroe (SF 305.3) to await the arrival of Q69721
- 03:34:53 Q19423 impacts the rear of Q61822 standing at SG 314.0
- 03:35 Q69724 was given permission by the signal at the S/E of Marshville moving in a southbound direction toward Richardson Creek
- 03:37:46 FC Dispatcher receives a call from Q61822 crew informing him that they see fire at the rear of their train

# **INJURIES:**

The engineer and conductor of the struck train CSXT Q61822 sustained minor injuries and were transported to Carolina Medical Center. The engineer of the striking train Q19423 as killed in the impact. The conductor was life flighted to Carolina Medical Center, Charlotte, NC where he also died.

Injury Type	Q19423 Train Crew	Q61822 Train Crew
Minor Fatality Critical	0 2	2 0

# **DAMAGE:**

Locomotives \$950,000 Equipment \$623,000 Track \$43,000 Total Damages \$1,613,000

# PERSONNEL INFORMATION:

### Q618-22

#### Engineer

 $36 \text{ year old Hired} - \frac{7}{3}/2000 \ 10 \text{ years } 10 \text{ months service}$ 

Last 6 months averaged 4 O-test (total 8 tests) / No Failures

Last Video Contact – 5/4/11 – May Safety Focus & BNSF Incident

2011 F2F Rules class - 5/4/11

Test done In the last 6 months (Dec 1, 2010 to May 24, 2011)

0 - Authority

0- Banner test

2- Signal test last one 2/11

#### Conductor

49 year old Hired -9/4/2005 - 5 years 8 months service

Last 6 months averaged 2 O-test (total 4 tests) / 3 Failures (103-I & GS-14)

Last video Contact – 5/3/11 – May Safety Focus/ Waycross incident

2011 F2F Rules class – 5/3/11

Test done In the last 6 months (Dec 1, 2010 to May 24, 2011)

0 - Authority

0- Banner test

0- Signal test

#### Q194-23

#### Engineer

35 year old Hired out -7/3/2000 10 years 10 months service

From January thru May 24<sup>th</sup>. engineer made 44 trips on the Monroe Subdivision which included 3 deadhead trips.

Last 6 months averaged 4.3 O-test (total 13 tests) / No Failures

Last Video Contact – 5/11/11 – May Safety Focus

2011 F2F Rules class – 3/1/11

Test done In the last 6 months (Dec 1, 2010 to May 24, 2011)

1 – Authority Test last one Jan 2011

1- Banner test last one Feb 2011

3- Signal test last one Jan 2011

#### Conductor

33 year old Hired out -7/31/2005 5 years 10 months service

Last 6 months averaged 7.5 O-test (total 30 tests) / No Failures

Last Video Contact – 5/11/11 – May Safety Focus

2011 F2F Rules class - 3/1/11

Test done In the last 6 months (Dec 1, 2010 to May 24, 2011)

- 0 Authority Test
- 2 Banner test last one done April 2011
- 9 Signal test last one done April 2011

# **OPERATING RULES:**

CSXT operating department employees are governed by CSX Transportation Operating Rules & Signal 'Aspects and Indications, effective January 1, 2010.

.

#### **Applicable Rules**

The following rules are germane to this incident:

#### 34. Communication of Signals and other Important Information

Employees must maintain a lookout for signals or conditions along track affecting the movement

of their train.

### 34-A. Required Announcements

1. Within the Locomotive Cab

Employees in the operating cab of an engine must communicate the following information to each other, including the track name or number in multiple-track territory:

- a. The name of each signal governing the movement of their train as soon as the signal aspect is clearly visible and again just before passing it.
- b. The name of each sign displayed in connection with:
- (1) TWC authority,
- (2) Yard limits,
- (3) Temporary speed restrictions, and
- (4) Work forces limits
- c. The observance of burning fusees.
- 2. By Radio

A crewmember in the operating cab of an engine must announce by radio the following conditions or occurrences:

- a. The name and location of each block and controlled point signal.
- b. Train entry into each TWC authority, from any location.
- c. Train departure from each TWC authority, as soon as the authority is reported clear to the train dispatcher.

- d. Passenger train arrival and departure at passenger stations.
- e. The presence of cars loaded with pulpwood or poles in the train when approaching trains and equipment on adjacent tracks.
- f. Train entrance into a passing siding.
- g. When stopping, and each fifteen minutes after being stopped, on a main track or passing siding. These announcements must include the train ID, engine number, and direction of travel. In multiple track territory, the track name or number must be included in the announcement. Crewmembers not in the operating cab must acknowledge signal and TWC announcements. If a crewmember fails to acknowledge a communication, the engineer must determine the reason at the next scheduled stop.

#### 225. Movements Requiring Restricted Speed

A signal indication requiring Restricted Speed applies until the leading end of the train reaches the next governing signal. When a signal aspect requiring Restricted Speed is displayed by a signal governing movements into non-signaled territory, it will apply:

- 1. To the movement of the entire train through turnouts and crossovers, and
- 2. Until the leading end of the train reaches the end of signaled territory

### 228. Absent or Imperfectly Displayed Signals

A signal imperfectly displayed must be regarded as the most restrictive indication that can be conveyed by that signal.

# **Exceptions:**

- 1. If only one indication is possible, this indication will govern.
- 2. When the arms of a semaphore signal can be seen, they will govern;
- 3. When one colored light is displayed in the cluster of lights of a color position light signal, it

will mean the same as two lights in the cluster; or

- 4. When one or more lower units of a color light signal aspect is dark, the aspect will be observed as though the lights that should be displayed were displaying red. This does not apply to Rule C-1290
- a.A signal imperfectly displayed must be reported promptly to the train dispatcher. If a fixed signal is absent from the place where it is usually shown, movement must be governed by the most restrictive indication that can be given by that signal. This absence must be reported to the train dispatcher immediately.

**Restricted Speed**: A speed that will permit stopping within one-half the range of vision. It will also permit stopping short of a train, a car, an obstruction, a stop signal, a derail or an improperly lined switch. It must permit looking out for broken rail. It will not exceed 15 MPH.

### SIGHT DISTANCE TEST DATA:

On May 26, 2011, the Operations/Human Performance group met to develop and review a protocol for conducting sight distance tests. The group convened after performing a hi-rail trip along with the track and engineering representatives along the accident route from the Northward Absolute signal at Waxhaw, N.C. and the estimated collision point of Monroe Subdivision milepost SG314.2. The sight distance test began at approximately 4:50 a.m. on May 27, 2011. After detailed job briefing preceded the actual testing. Signal Maintainers were instructed to darken signal SG316.0 while the investigative team boarded the test locomotives at the North end of Waxhaw, N.C. and other group investigators positioned themselves at Collins Road appropriately 1000 feet in advance of signal SG316.0 to assist in the identifying the first location the dark signal at SG316.0 could be identified. Other investigators positioned themselves at the estimated point of impact with a simulated obstruction device to represent the end of train Q61822 ahead would have been located.

The weather at the time of the start of the tests was overcast and dark with temperatures in the 70's.

CSXT provided two locomotives of the same class (CW40-8) that was operated in the lead of train Q19423 for the tests. Dr. Steve Jenner, NTSB, Joe Corcorcan, FRA and Kimble Jackson along with the locomotive engineer and train conductor were on the leading locomotive to perform the visual tests described below.

Signal SG 316.0

Time 05:15 a.m.

General concurrence of the ability to observe dark signal SG316.0 - 964 feet

Simulated Obstruction Device at the estimated point of impact Time 05:35 a.m.

- 1. Engineer observed the simulated EOT device and reflection on light on the track 450 feet
- 2. Conductor observed the reflection of light on the track 419 feet
- 3. Conductor observed simulated EOT device 364 feet.

#### **Operations Group - Acknowledgment Signatures**

The undersigned designated *Party to the Investigation* representatives attest that the information contained in this report is a factually accurate representation of the

information collected during the investigation, to the extent of their best knowledge and contribution in this investigation.

<u> </u>   s	Date
C. Wayne Workman, NTSB	
<u> \s\ </u>	
Bill Setser, CSXT, ADM, Florence Division	
<u>\\s\\</u>	Date
Joe Corcoran, FRA	
\\s\\	Date
Kimble Jackson, BLET	
,	
11.11	D .
\s\	Date
Jim Herndon, UTU	