

Factual Report – Attachment 2

Witness Statements

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

DCA17FA076

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1.0 Loader Statement

I first handled the the Ameristar MD80 early afternoon when I was able to get back to Avflight East.

The aircraft had been serviced with basic ground needs, and our crew was starting the process of loading luggage.

I went planeside once it was apparent that there was a large luggage load.

I began the process of loading the fwd cargo bin with Dan Dahl. I checked the aft luggage compartment to see what had been loaded and I found that the rear luggage compartment was full.

A member of the flight crew was supervising the loading of the luggage and told us that we could not put the large trunks in the fwd bin because he was concerned about the aircraft being nose heavy. We then moved the trunks to the mid bin. I loaded as many bags as I could in the fwd bin with Dan Dahl keeping count.

Once the loading of the FWD bin was complete I observed the loading of the mid bin. It was a tight fit to get everything loaded and towards the very end a member of the flight crew re-stacked the mid bin, loaded the last of the luggage and closed the compartment.

After that was done, we moved all of the ground equipment out of the way, and a member of my team marshalled the aircraft out.

The next encounter with the aircraft was after it had left the runway.

Michael Farley
3/10/17

2.0 AvFlight Statements

~~Yves St. Pierre~~

Dan Dahl

Was in a meeting at the time of the accident. I observed the aircraft begin the take off roll, and it never left the ground. I saw the brakes applied, and they did when it overran.

I was taking count of bags as we loaded them. We were instructed to load them in 5 separate compartments. Section one being the tail end of the main bin, 2, the forward section of the back bin, 3, the mid section of the back bin, 4 was the middle bin. I kept count of that bin until the crew instructed us to reorganize the heavier bins from the front bin to the mid bin. Extreme reorganizing occurred, the #4 compartment had 40 bags. The number 5 compartment was the front bin. At the end of my count I had 29 bags in compartment 1, 27 in compartment 2, 7 in compartment 3, 55 in compartment 5. I was unsure of the final count for 4, the Associate crew member was the final loader of baggage. After the removal of all ground equipment, I double checked in the cockpit that their paperwork had been taken care of. I was told it had already been completed. The crew closed the main door and I unbolled the aircraft out.

Dan Dahl 3/8/17 [REDACTED]

① ② ③ ④ ⑤
29 27 7 40 55

2.1 Ground Handler Qualifications

Ameristar Charters

Ad Hoc Passenger Ground Handler Qualification

This certifies that Steven Stricker is qualified to act as a contract passenger ground handler for Ameristar Charters (AAC) without supervision in the following capacities:

Check (✓) as applicable

The following items may be authorized by either a Flight Crewmember (pilot) or Flight Attendant:

- Ground Security Coordinator (Must be qualified with a FAR 121 Air Carrier to act in this capacity)
- Verification of ID with Passenger Manifest (See PHM §1 & 3 and trained in accordance with PCSSP §4.1)
- Completion of Boarding Passes (See PHM §3)
- Tagging of checked bags (See PHM §2)
- Passengers Requiring Special Assistance (See PHM §5)
- Child Restraint Seats (See PHM §5)
- Unaccompanied Minor (See PHM §6)
- Alcoholic Beverages (See PHM §6)
- Authority to Refuse Transportation (See PHM §6)
- Exit Row Seating (See PHM Appendix A)
- DOT 382 Rules (See PHM Appendix C)
- Carry on Baggage requirements including weighing of bags (See PHM Appendix B)
- Check this box if AAC personnel perform all of the functions listed in this column.**

Name of AAC Employee

Signature of AAC Employee

Date of Authorization

Disposition of Form

The Duplicate of STAPLE this form to the HTP network and return to Ameristar headquarters in ADS.

Instructions:

Any time that AAC personnel train someone to perform task(s) listed on this form, the person's name that is being trained is printed in the space provided at the top of this form. A check mark is placed next to each item that has been satisfactorily trained. The signature of the person being trained is required on the line titled "Signature of Ground handler" as well as the name of the FBO, that he/she is affiliated with, and the three-letter code of the airport, i.e. DAL. A separate form for each person trained is required.

The Director of Operations (D.O.) is responsible for reviewing this process and making changes as necessary. If there are any recommended improvements or suggestions to this process, please use the back of this form and return to the D.O.

PHM 4
12/15/15

The following items may only be authorized by a flight crewmember (pilot):

- Cargo And Baggage Loading – Get bag count (See AOM Vol I)
- Aircraft Main Door Opening
- Chocking of Aircraft and other equipment (See AOM Vol I)
- Belt Loader – chocked, do not touch aircraft, and not positioned under aircraft
- Bags should be about 2 inches from ceiling
- Aircraft Parking Hand Signals (See GOM Chapter 6)
- Pushback of aircraft (See Ground Service Manual)
- Security measure to be taken
- EWS (See Section 2)

M. RADLOFF
Name of AAC Qualified Pilot

Signature of AAC Qualified Pilot

3-8-17
Date of Authorization

Signature of Ground Handler

FBO: Av Flight

Three Letter City Identifier: YIP

Did this FBO/station provide the necessary personnel and equipment to meet AAC's procedural requirements? YES NO

Did this FBO/station follow the instructions given to them? YES NO

If "NO" is checked for any of the above questions, please explain on the back.

3.0 ARFF Statements

Statement of events for Flight AII9363

By Lieutenant James Crova

Firefighter Freudigman and I watched Flight AII9363 staged at the North end of the Airfield. We discussed if he was going to get clearance to take off because the air traffic control tower at Willow was evacuated due to high winds earlier in the day. After several minutes the Aircraft taxied onto the runway. We both watched the Aircraft take off from separate rooms in the fire station. During take-off I observed the Aircraft having a problem getting lift and lost view about $\frac{3}{4}$ into its take off. I immediately went into the bay and looked out the windows and watched the Aircraft trying to stop producing a lot of smoke from the wheels. Firefighter Freudigman and I immediately started to head for the ARFF vehicles and I believed we were dealing with a hot brake incident.

As we were leaving the station I notified CENCOM about the incident and a size-up was given before our arrival. Upon our arrival I observed the Aircraft sitting on its belly with several chutes deployed. The majority of the passengers were off the Aircraft and walking in the field. No fire was visible at any time. Incident command was established and additional resources were requested from Metro Fire, Police, and Ops.

I exited the vehicle and looked at both engines for hazards, than tried to find the Captain. He was near the front of the Aircraft and we talked about any remaining people on board. He said the plane was searched and no one was still on board. I asked if anyone was injured and there was no reports of major injuries. A head count was requested by the crew. An inspection of the right side of the Aircraft was performed and no hazards were present. I entered the Aircraft from the right over wing exit to conduct a primary search. The seats, lavatories, and cockpit were searched. CENCOM was given an update, busses were requested for the passengers, and to notify FAA because the ATC was not in service. I proceeded to the triage area and they had people standing in a line counting. The pilot said the Aircraft had 109 souls, 5 crew, 1 pilot and 1 copilot, also the fuel and batteries were off. People from U-M said no one was missing.

A team physician approached me and stated they have one patient with a leg laceration and he wanted his equipment off the Aircraft. He was going to suture the wound and the patient did not want to be transported. Two men

Statement of events for Flight AII9663

By Firefighter Karl Freudigman

Around 14:45 hrs. I went to look at the schedule for the Aircraft that was supposed to depart at 14:30 hrs. I looked out the kitchen window and noticed the Aircraft sitting on what appeared to be the intersection of Runway 27 and Runway 23L. I went into Lt. Crova office and mentioned that the Aircraft was still sitting and wondering if the pilot was having trouble trying to talk with ATC because ATC was evacuated due to extremely high winds.

After a while Lt. Crova looked out and said the Aircraft was moving. I took a pair of binoculars to watch the Aircraft.

As the Aircraft traveled down the Runway I noticed that the Aircraft was not gaining any lift. I went into the station and said that the Aircraft wasn't going to make it and he was going to brake hard. When I was half inside the door I heard his reverse thrusters and said to Lt. Crova that he's down and let's go. Lt. Crova and I immediately departed station 700. Lt. Crova tried to contact Willow ATC but the tower was still empty. We proceeded to the Aircraft via Taxiway Bravo to the service road at the rollout end of 23L. ARFF 1 was set up on the rear of the Aircraft. All the passengers and crew were safely evacuated from the Aircraft. No fire was seen.

Firefighter Karl Freudigman 3/8/17

4.0 Flight Follower Statement

N786TW / YIP

03/10/17

The flight plan, releases and associated paperwork were prepared by another flight follower as part of her training process. The paperwork was reviewed by another flight follower and myself before it was sent to the flight crew in YIP. The paperwork included flight plans for two legs that were to be flown (YIP-IAD-LAF). The plane was parked at the Ameristar maintenance facility on the west side of the field. When the flight crew was ready to reposition the plane to the east side, I called the PIC and told him that we were unable to file the flight plan for the first leg and I would get him new paperwork for that leg soon. The flight crew repositioned the plane to the east side. When the new paperwork for the first leg was ready, it was also reviewed by another flight follower and myself. Then, we were notified about the power outage at the FBO on the east side. The paperwork was sent to the Ameristar maintenance facility on the west side and an Ameristar employee drove to the east side and delivered it to the flight crew. It was also emailed to the PIC so he could review it before the paper copy was delivered. The passengers began arriving early. The majority of the phone conversations from that point on were between our GSC and myself regarding passenger screening. When the screening was complete, the GSC called to notify about one "no-show" on the passenger manifest. At that point, the passengers were on the plane. We were about to go through our shift-change in flight operations and I passed this trip down to another flight follower. I had no further contact with the flight crew.

John Darren Diehl

Flight Follower

5.0 Flight Attendant Statements

Name: Charlene Johnson
Position: IR
Incident: Forward jump seat

After all passengers were boarded and aircraft doors closed I began my safety demo. After the completion of my demo I proceeded to the forward galley to ensure all carts were secure, galley doors locked, and lav empty. I sat in my jump seat, secured myself under the captain's command: "Flight attendants please be seated for take-off." After the lead flight attendant commenced work the flight deck (co-pilot) I got in the brace position ready for taxi and take-off.

We began taxiing and increasing speed slowly at all of a sudden the aircraft brakes were applied. All passengers and forward flight attendants were thrust forward. The aircraft continued forward. All of a sudden I heard a sound that sounded like tires were blown. Then I was hit by my seat violently at least 3x. The aircraft continued operating and I began shouting my commands (along with the flight attendant) "Heads down, stay down!" Once the aircraft came to a complete stop I began evacuation duties (did not hear evacuation commands from the flight deck). While shouting "heads down, stay down" I went to my IR door prepared conditions and attempted to open. The door opened slightly but closed due to high winds. I attempted to open again and was successful. I pulled the red metal handle but the slides did not deploy. I turned around, blocked my exit to ensure no passengers attempted exiting my door.

(P1)

Flight 9363

3/8/17

Jeffrey Zerke

Lead Flight Attendant - Seated @ 1L

The initial roll for take off seemed normal. Suddenly the braking was intense. We knew the take off was aborted. I do not believe we ever left the ground. The extreme braking seemed to last 5 seconds. I remember thinking I hope we have enough runway left. About that same moment I felt a change beneath us. I hesitated a second, hoping we would not go any further. Unfortunately our momentum kept us moving ahead. After the first rough hit, ~~we~~ started ^{rolling} heads down stay down. There seemed to be 2 more rough jolts and we came to a stop. I turned to Charita and told her to GO! Open your door.

Neither of us heard any command from the flight deck to evacuate. We initiated at 1L & 1R. I opened my door (no issue) when I pulled the red inflation handle, the handle either broke or slipped out of my hand. I remember reaching down a second time grabbing the cord and my slide inflated quickly.

Pax were right behind me. I sent people out my exit. I saw and heard 1R was inop. I stepped into the galley to not slow egress. As the children came forward, I told them they need to go down the slide now.

The pax were incredibly calm and responsive. They left their personal belongings on the aircraft. I would guess 30-40 people evacuated out of 1L.

I believe the head coach stood at the bottom of the slide and assisted other pax off the slide. Everyone ran away from the aircraft.

(AUGUST 3/9/17
[REDACTED])

Delessa "Tennie" Hampton Flight Attendant D

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

L2 Door

Prior to take off the plane was swaying
Due to the extremely heavy winds.
During takeoff the plane felt very heavy as the
pilot ran down the runway. It seemed to
want to take off seemed like we slightly
lifted. But couldn't stay up. I felt a strong

firm brake it was intense and sudden. The keel
going at first it felt as if we were still on the runway
then I felt a jump, jerk, bump follow by another
jump, jerk bump movement. This time I saw
debris in the air. Small things pop up like pens,
pencils, rocks etc. We finally stopped then I heard:

EVACATE, EVACATE, EVACATE

I got out my seatbelt immediately
looked out the port window and opened the
door. Once I opened the door I looked
out and noticed the engine was going or
sounded very noisy. So I hesitated
to pull the red tab because I thought it
might not be safe. But then realize it was the
wind causing the noisy sound. I made to pull.

I pulled the tab and the slide inflated.

With no problems, started yelling commands

I do remember telling the first passengers
near me to stand back. Passengers did

everything I asked of them quickly.

No one took luggage to start jumping and
running for from the plane. I saw many

people jump down slide then get

behind me. My slide was stable.

I will say I yelled them to move

I said commands, but not in

the word formation because each

person I had to say something different

to get them to move and recognize get out now.

David Ladenberger

Flight Attendant B : Tailcone Position

I was flying in the back at the tailcone. During boarding the band sat in the back. So back there were all collage students. Mostly ages 18 to 21.

When we first departed I put up the red seatbelt like strap blocking the aft jumpseat and tailcone. I sat in my seat and put my seatbelt on, and shoulder straps.

As we began moving the airplane everything started normal. Then I felt ~~the~~ hand breaking. At that time I thought it was an aborted take off. Then the breaking got harder and harder. I braced myself.

We came to a complete stop and I heard the pilots say Evacuate, Evacuate.

I did not see any smoke and I did not smell anything.

I got up and felt and accessed the tailcone door and did not ~~feel~~ feel heat. When I went to open the tailcone door it would not open due to debris and the seatbelt blocking the door. RJ (The GSE) was right there and starting to yell Exit Blocked, Go Forward!

6.0 Onscene Statements

03/09/2017: Interviewed Evan Helsey with the Wayne County Airport (operational department). He stated the following:

- He was at the Hanger 1 office and saw the airplane hit the grass area on the other side of the airport.
- He responded, and the ARFF crews were already at the airplane. He showed up about 4-5 minutes after the accident, and the passengers were off-loading.
- The passengers were then scattered all around the grass area. He saw the flight crew, but didn't talk to them or hear anything they had to say.
- He did not notice any injuries from the crew or passengers.
- The pilots were at the door when he got there, assisting in the evacuation. When he saw them leave the airplane, he did not see them carrying anything with them.
- The flight attendants left in an Avflight van. The mothers and small children were taken to a local FBO, and many just walked over to the Kallitta hanger. He did not see where the pilots went.
- He said the weather was clear and very windy. He knew the ATC tower had been evacuated and there was a NOTAM issued for it. He was not sure who issued the NOTAM.
- It was not a busy day at the airport due to the winds, according to their day shift.
- When he saw the accident airplane taxiing out, he could not believe someone was trying to takeoff in those winds. He did not see any previous landing airplanes.
- He had only been with his current department for 8 months, so he was not sure when the last airport drill had occurred. He did not know of any planned in the near future.

3/10/2017: Interviewed N555NP Baron pilot who arrived YIP around the accident time: Larry Galizi was an insurance representative who was flying into YIP at the time of the accident. He was interviewed on 3/10/2017 with FAA Ops Group member in attendance (██████████), Kalitta insurance guy. (██████████). For the interview, Mr. Galizi stated the following:

- o The weather was VFR and windy.
- o He checked in with approach control, and was advised that the YIP tower had been evacuated.
- o He attempted to contact the tower, and instead made position reports over the frequency. He set up for a right downwind to runway 27 when he heard the accident airplane announce on the frequency they were beginning their takeoff on 23L.
- o He was on short final to runway 27 when he saw the MD83 roll down the runway for takeoff. He did not see the rejected takeoff or excursion, but did see the dust as the airplane overran the runway.
- o When he was approaching the airport, he tuned the ATIS frequency, but it did not broadcast anything.
- o The winds were strong, but for his landing on runway 27, they were steady, and the landing was smooth.
- o He heard the accident airplane make its takeoff announcement to traffic in the area, and it sounded like a typical position report.
- o The interview lasted 20 minutes.