

Docket No. SA-533

Exhibit No. 2-K

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Interview Summaries of Empire Training Manager and Check Airmen

(10 Pages)

ATTACHMENT
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Persons Interviewed: Tim Castro
Check Airman
Hayden, ID

Date of Interview: February 26, 2009 about 1130 PST.

Captain Castro was interviewed by telephone. The following is a summary of information he provided:

- The morning of the interview he had returned from Rapid City, SD. When he departed they had been experiencing freezing rain, snow and mist.
- He started out as a flight instructor and then went on to fly in King Air 200s for Simplot Aviation in Boise, ID.
- He then flew cargo for Pocatello Aviation Center and then H&H Aviation.
- He has been with Empire for 14 years.
- He was a first officer on the F27 for 2 years and then became a captain on the F27 in 1997.
- He transitioned to the ATR in October of 2003 but the airplane did not come on line until 2005. In the mean time he went through 3 recurrent training events.
- He has accrued approximately 10,500 hours of flight time.
- He was trained at Flight Safety and did his type ride with a Flight Safety check airman.
- During systems class in ground school they talked about icing "a lot." They talked about the different levels and talked about severe icing and the severe icing cues. They also talked about SLD.
- He receives recurrent icing training every year on-line. It includes the ground deicing program and a test.
- He advised that when the water droplet size exceeds the specified droplet size used for certification of the airplane it can cause aerodynamic problems and a ridge of ice can build aft of the protected surface. He advised that pilots should be wary when there is warm air aloft, orographic lift, or an unstable atmosphere.
- He wondered however, why the Flight Safety training materials said that flight in freezing drizzle or freezing rain was prohibited but that Empire's manual did not prohibit operations in these conditions.
- Takeoff in freezing drizzle did not concern him.
- He did not receive the Be Prepared for Icing document.
- He had never had a "real" flap problem but if he did he would "go missed and do the QRH."
- He did portions of the accident first officer's IOE. She did a good job following the procedures and prepared the cockpit adequately.

- He also did a portion of the accident captains IOE in the F27 in 2003. He believed him to be a confident crewmember.
- He was familiar with the V-speeds for the different configurations.



Todd G. Gunther
Air Safety Investigator

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Persons Interviewed: Dan Paulson
Check Airman
Hayden, ID

Date of Interview: February 26, 2009 about 1030 PST.

Captain Paulson was interviewed by telephone. The following is a summary of information he provided:

- He started out with Empire 25 years ago as an instructor at their FBO in Missoula, MT. He flew the C152, Piper Seneca, C340, C414, and the Twin Otter.
- He also flew smoke jumpers.
- He is type rated in the F27, Shorts, and ATR.
- He has approximately 10,000 hours of flight time.
- He and Steve Martini were the first two to do "training and checking" for the company on the ATR.
- He received his initial training on the ATR at Flight Safety 5 to 6 years ago. The instructors were flight safety employees. Steve Jobs ran the program at Flight Safety and gave him his initial checkride.
- Bill Tubbs the POI received his ATR training after He and Steve Martini did.
- The curriculum included CRM, systems, and meteorology.
- They covered "a fair amount" of icing and discussed the Roselawn accident.
- Steve Jobs told them of his encounter of an icing upset he had back when you waited before cycling the deicing boots.
- You need to be "respectful of the ice." You need to be proactive.
- You should be looking at all times for ice on the side window, splashing of water on the windshield, and a decrease of speed or performance.
- He has had ice form on the side windows.
- He has "never been spooked by ice" on the ATR.
- He has done departures in light freezing rain, and been "concerned a little." He has not however, departed in freezing drizzle or freezing rain.
- He gave the accident first officer flight training and a check ride.
- He did receive the Be Prepared for Icing document at Flight Safety.
- He heard about SLD and SCDD when he attended the operators conference in Miami.
- In icing on the ATR they should have been above Red Bug.
- He would have used the stabilized approach criteria.
- He also would prioritize emergency and abnormal procedures.
- Pilots that come out of Flight Safety do not know how to do an engine failure at V1 in icing. The students that he was receiving from them would climb out at acceleration speed instead of accelerating to Red Bug.

- He believed that the accident first officer was average for a student received from Flight Safety and that she was weak on systems knowledge. He stated that he was not impressed with Flight Safety's systems training. Her flight control was good though, and she took the normal amount of time to train.
- He believed that the accident captain was very competent and knowledgeable but that he should have delayed to run the checklists and QRH.
- There is still also documentation that says to turn off the deicing boots when the icing light flashes. You actually need to wait to shut off the deicing boots. You should shut them off when you have exited icing conditions.



Todd G. Gunther
Air Safety Investigator

Interview: Nicolas Peterson, Empire Airlines Line Captain and Check Airman

Interview date: July 23, 2009

Time: 1650 EDT

Location: Telephone interview

Present were: Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Represented by: Mark Dombroff - Dombroff, Gilmore, Jaques, and French

In the interview, Capt. Peterson stated the following:

He became a flight instructor in 1998 for about a year and a half and then worked as a charter pilot in South Dakota for one year. After that, he flew for CSA, a FedEx feeder, and flew the Cessna 208 for two years. He was hired by Empire Airlines in August 2002 as a Cessna Caravan captain. He was typed in the ATR 42 and 72. He became a check airman about 10 months prior to this interview. He had 6400 hours total time, 2400 hours of which were in the ATR.

Prior to the accident, Capt. Peterson was paired with F/O Cornell no more than 10 times. They flew several days of regular flying, but no training flights; the route was Seattle-Ketchikan-Sitka-Juneau. Capt. Peterson said all of the flights were normal and nothing occurred that was out of the ordinary. There were no emergency or abnormal events on any trips. He did not recall the weather conditions during the trips and whether they flew in icing conditions.

Capt. Peterson stated that F/O Cornell was open to his input and she asked a lot of questions regarding the flight during their pairings. Her questions led Capt. Peterson to believe that she was relatively inexperienced.

During the pairings, F/O Cornell never had to assert herself to him. Asked if he felt that she would assert herself if it was necessary based on the circumstances, Capt. Peterson did not answer. Asked later in the interview about F/O Cornell's CRM skills during the trip pairings, he said he had not flown enough with her to be able to answer that.

Asked if F/O Cornell was someone that he enjoyed flying with, Capt. Peterson said yes.

Capt. Peterson did not recall F/O Cornell discussing with him anything about the ATR that she felt was unusual or abnormal. She did not discuss anything about icing conditions.

Capt. Peterson was asked to compare F/O Cornell's proficiency/flying skills with that of other pilots at her level. He said she was on par with other first officers who came to the job straight from flight instruction. Asked what characteristics first officers have that indicate they came from flight instruction, he said new pilots that have single pilot IFR experience were more self-reliant and need less coaching. Asked if F/O Cornell was more self-reliant and needed less coaching, Capt. Peterson said no, she was the opposite of that.

Capt. Peterson stated F/O Cornell's greatest strength as a pilot was that she was non-confrontational. In terms of an area where F/O Cornell could improve, he said she could employ the skills she already knew without asking so many questions.

Capt. Peterson characterized F/O Cornell's personality as extremely mellow. He never heard anyone complain about flying with her. He never heard F/O Cornell complain about working for Empire Airlines or flying the ATR.

Capt. Peterson has flown with F/O Cornell as an observer in the jumpseat, but not as a crewmember. He did not discuss the accident with her.

Capt. Peterson knew Capt. Holberton and had spoken with him since the accident but had not spoken directly to him about the accident. He socialized with Capt. Holberton outside of work.

Asked if he ever witnessed F/O Cornell not use a checklist or miss checklist items, Capt. Peterson said no and that she was pretty good at that.

Regarding F/O Cornell acting as a pilot monitoring and whether she did an adequate job, Capt. Peterson said when he flew with her and on the flight that he observed after the accident, she did her job to the level that it had to be done.

During their trip pairings, he and F/O Cornell alternated flying legs, and said they almost always did this unless there was a significant weather concern on takeoff or landing.

Capt. Peterson received training at Flight Safety in Houston, Texas. Asked about the training he received on icing, he said they provided the required ATR procedures for icing. He said they had ground school and simulator training. He said all approaches were in to Memphis. He said there was an entire day of icing training and there were approaches done in icing conditions but he could not recall specific approaches. Asked if any approaches were conducted under moderate or severe icing, he said only the simulator instructor would know the level of icing that was on the airplane.

Capt. Peterson received CRM training from Flight Safety which lasted a day or two. Asked what topics were covered, he said it was typical CRM with a PowerPoint presentation.

Asked to describe the quality of the training and the instructors, he said it was greatly varying. Asked if there was anything that he wished would have been covered in training, he said it depended on the instructor when he was there. Capt. Peterson attended training at Flight Safety in October or November 2005 for initial training for 3 ½ weeks, and had been there several times since then for recurrent training. Since January, he had not been to recurrent training there but had so for check airman training.

Capt. Peterson had experienced icing conditions in the ATR, including moderate and severe icing conditions. Asked how the airplane responded, he said he never had an unexpected reaction from the aircraft in any icing conditions, including severe. Asked what the normal indications were, he said turboprops accumulated ice on the propellers creating vibration and reduced performance. He said there visual and audio warnings for ice accretion. He said there were specific checklists for entering icing conditions, ice accretion, leaving icing conditions and airframe clear of ice, and there was also a separate QRH checklist for severe ice. He stated the checklists were required to be completed when experiencing icing conditions.

Capt. Peterson had not experienced any flap malfunctions when flying the ATR. If a malfunction was experienced, he said there were various flap malfunction checklists in the QRH and also memory items associated with flap malfunctions.

Asked to describe the safety culture at Empire Airlines, he said he had nothing negative to say and thought they made an honest effort to promote safe activities. He said in thousands of hours of flying, he had never been questioned about a weather decision of his. Asked if there were pressures from Empire Airlines for on time departures or arrivals and quick turnaround times that would jeopardize safety, he said there was always pressure to be on time, that was their job, but if he had any safety concerns such as maintenance or weather, he never received pressure to go on a flight that would negatively affect safety.

Capt. Peterson said he liked working for Empire Airlines.

Capt. Peterson did not have anything else to add to the interview.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Person Interviewed: Nicola Phillips
Training Manager
Hayden, ID

Date of Interview: February 25, 2009 about 1131 PST.

Captain Phillips was interviewed in person. The following is a summary of information she provided:

- Is from England.
- Attended Progress Flight Academy in South Africa and then moved back to the United Kingdom.
- Continued her training at the Airline Career Academy in Lakeland, FL.
- Taught at the Comair Academy both Part 61 and 141.
- Then became a first officer at Skyway.
- When "911 happened" she was furloughed as a pilot.
- She then became a ramp agent for skyway and later when things improved went back to being a first officer.
- She was a first officer for 2 years on the Beechcraft 1900 and then upgraded to captain.
- She then became a check airman and then later a senior check airman.
- She began her employment with Empire on April 28, 2008.
- She was type rated by the company in the ATR and has 83 hours flying for Empire, and as of the date of this interview, has flown in Southeast Alaska and out of Rapid City, SD.
- As part of her duties she will fly "regularly."
- When she came to the company they did not have a training program for Flight Safety's instructors, so she wrote it for the company.
- Her training consisted of basic indoctrination, CRM, systems, and differences training. She was given a check ride by Steven Seats from Flight Safety.
- Her IOE was with Dave Suko. Keith Peliter conducted the IOE portion that was observed by Bill Tubbs the POI.
- Heather Cornell, the accident first officer, was administered her check ride by Nicola while Bill Tubbs gave the check ride for check airman.
- At Flight Safety she was taught about ground de-icing.
- Steve Seats also told her about an uncommanded roll that he had experienced in the airplane.
- The "Be Prepared for Icing" document was not distributed while she was at Flight Safety. She received it later at Empire.
- She was aware of visual clues for severe icing which included ice on the side windows, spinner, and aft of the protected surfaces.

- She was aware that there was verbiage in the GOM regarding light freezing rain, and light and moderate freezing drizzle and that they could operate in it.
- She advised that on the 1900 that they could not do freezing rain or mixed icing until it was included in the holdover tables.
- She “probably” may have heard of FAR 25 appendix C.
- She was “cautious” in icing.
- “SCDD and SLD will form ice.”
- She had seen the FCOM and AFM in the Empire library but had never had her own copy. She had “checked it” in the airplane.
- She was provided a PH from Empire and would carry it with her though it was not required to be onboard.
- She thought that Heather Cornell did well on limitations, and systems, including the use of the deicing system when she gave her the checkride in August.
- You are supposed to verbalize the “Entering Icing Checklist.”
- The “Escape Checklist,” was located on each side of the cockpit, and some of it is a memory item.
- She had flown both the ATR 42 and 72 as PIC, and had encountered “light to moderate” icing. She had encountered it in one of the airplanes that was not equipped with an ice evidence probe. There was “4 to 5 inches of ice” on the spinner, with “flecks on the wiper,” and nothing on the side windows.
- She had flown with an experienced first officer Herb Ballou and a check airman Nick Peterson when this occurred.
- She could not remember if there was a warning in the PH regarding freezing drizzle and freezing rain.
- At Skyway they had two binders that they were required to carry. They contained the company procedures, MEL, and deicing procedures as well as the profiles and normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures. They also were issued separate systems manuals but she did not have to carry them.
- Skyway also provided her with Jeppesen navigation charts. They would receive the revisions every two weeks. At Empire, she would have to purchase them and then they would reimburse her.
- She was comfortable with using Jeppesen products but stated, “Don’t ask me to use NOS,” as she was not comfortable with them.
- They hold a conference call with the instructors and check airmen twice a year.
- She is currently writing a LOFT program for the company.
- During training in the simulator she did get a flap “problem.” They had prebriefed it prior to the simulator session. The flaps did not come down during one approach. They went it to holding then used the QRH and then landed. She stated that, she would have expected the accident flight crew to do the same procedure.
- When giving a checkride to the Flight Safety instructors, they also did the procedure and she stated that the Flight Safety instructors also teach it the same way as they fly it.
- She liked the Be Prepared for Icing document, and believed that it was good for training.
- The checklist for entering icing is located on both control wheels.

- If you are in approach mode you are in "High Bank mode" and if in icing, you should be Red Bug plus 10 knots.
- She believed that, "We should have the Pilot Handbook on-board" the airplanes.



Todd G. Gunther
Air Safety Investigator