Exhibit No. 2-J

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C.

Interview Summaries of Director of Operation and Chief Pilot

(7 Pages)

ATTACHMENT 9

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Person Interviewed: Randy Lanfell

Director of Operations

Hayden, ID

Date of Interview: February 25, 2009 about 1400 PST.

Captain Lanfell was interviewed in person. The following is a summary of information he provided:

He started flying in 1978.

• By 1981 he was flying commercial operations in Alaska.

• He then spent approximately 6 years with NPA dba United Express eventually becoming NPA's chief pilot.

• He and Bill Tubbs the POI for Empire worked there together.

• He then went back to Alaska and was the chief pilot for two other operations prior to coming to Empire.

• He has flown Cessna singles, the Twin Otter, the J31, and had flown on two Part 121 certificates.

 He had approximately 14,000 hours of flight time and was type rated on the J31, EMB120, F27, and the ATR.

 He received his training for the ATR at Flight Safety and took his checkride in the simulator with a designee.

• Training was approximately 1 month, which included two weeks of ground school and 6 simulator sessions.

 He was aware of the severe icing cues including loss of airspeed and icing on the side windows and commented that when he was being trained at Flight Safety that icing training was integrated throughout the course and that they talked in depth about the Roselawn accident.

 He did not recall if there were any warnings in the AFM regarding freezing drizzle or freezing rain.

• He understood the significance of SLD/ SCDD.

He had a basic understanding of Part 25 certification.

 He did not know what the associated micron size of freezing drizzle/ freezing rain was.

He was familiar with Empire's ground deicing program.

• He has never been comfortable with icing and flies the ATR the way that ATR says it should be flown.

The Caravans do not operate in freezing precipitation.

 The statement in the GOM, which allowed the ATR to operate in freezing drizzle and freezing rain, came from a query from the Caravan pilots requesting guidance. He utilized the titles from the holdover tables for the verbiage.

- In the F27, they used a company flight manual, de-ice manual, and checklists.
- The PH was a result of the ATR coming on-line. It consisted of 3 volumes. Volume 1 and 2 were for the ATR 42. Volume 3 was for the ATR 72.
- The PH however, is not required to be on-board.
- The AFM is on board. "It is hard to get to" and were it is stored, "is not a great library spot."
- The company produces its own QRH because of differences between passenger and cargo operations.
- He had not done any "training or checking" at Empire.
- He expected that the crew would have known about SLD as well as the icing cues Associated with severe icing and was surprised that they could not answer the questions about it during their interviews.
- He viewed them both as being competent.
- He would have gone through the flaps failure procedure instead of trying to land.
- He attended the ATR operations conferences "early on." He attended the icing conference in Miami with Steve Martini and Dan Paulson.
- While being trained at Flight Safety he did receive the Be Prepared for Icing document.
- He had occasional contact with ATR.
- He would talk to Mike Garrett at the Seattle ACO.

Todd G. Gunther Air Safety Investigator

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Person Interviewed: Steve Martini

Steve Martini Chief Pilot Hayden, ID

Date of Interview: February 25, 2009 about 1159 PST.

Captain Martini was interviewed in person. The following is a summary of information he provided:

- He started at Empire 24 years ago.
- He attended North Idaho College in 1985 and was hired at Empire.
- He began by fueling aircraft and handling baggage.
- He went to flight school at Empire's flight school and received all of his ratings there.
- He started flying the Metroliner carrying freight between Spokane, WA and Portland, OR and later transitioned to Empire's passenger operation flying between Coeur d'Alene, ID and Boise, ID.
- He later ran the charter department.
- He then transitioned to the right seat on the F27 and was based in Santa Barbara, CA.
- He then went to the left seat in the Metroliner and remained in that position for 2 years and then transitioned to the left seat on the F27.
- He then began flying the SD360 between Spokane, WA and Yakima, WA.
- He then went to Europe as a Check Airman to help start up the Express Air operation out of Germany.
- He became the Part 121 Chief Pilot 14 years ago and also started with the training department at that time.
- He would teach Empire's ground schools and basic indoctrination classes and also became an IOE Check Airman and later became a "full fledged," Check Airman.
- He would conduct initial training on the F27 as well as the new hire ground schools.
- When the ATR came to the airline he and Dan Paulsen received their check airman certification for the ATR, and became the first check airman on the aircraft type for the company.
- Approximately 6 months ago, he became the Chief Pilot for the 135 operations also. He then left the training department to concentrate on his primary duties as Chief Pilot for both the 135 and 121 operations as he was doing a lot of flying.
- The Captain of the accident flight had always followed the SOPs at the airline and his checkrides had always been up to ATP standards. He also believed that

the Captain of the accident flight had never failed a checkride, was at one time a crew base supervisor, and was at one time a "full check airman" in Portland, OR.

- Captain Martini received all of his initial training on the ATR at Flight Safety Int'l.
- The training on icing was "in-depth," with a lot of information being provided on the Roselawn accident.
- They went through multiple icing scenarios, and he got the impression from Flight Safety that the Roselawn accident had been partially caused by the flight crew's lackadaisical attitude.
- He was also told at Flight Safety how the ATR in the Roselawn accident had been in a descent with the flaps set at 15 degrees, turning, when they got "the horn," then they retracted the flaps, and the airplane rolled.
- If he had been operating the Lubbock accident flight, the icing that accreted at altitude would have concerned him.
- His concern would have been heightened by the freezing drizzle.
- On occasion he had seen freezing drizzle, freezing rain, and freezing fog. During the winter there was a tendency for freezing drizzle and freezing fog to exist.
- He did see pictures during training at Flight Safety of freezing drizzle and freezing rain on the spinners and windows of the ATR.
- When Empire first started operating the ATR they would get questions from the crews regarding operations in icing conditions.
- He remembered that they were still operating the F27s when the de-icing boot procedures changed.
- Flight operations would occasionally talk to Mountain Air Cargo regarding operations with the ATRs but had never spoken with American Eagle or Continental Express about operations with the airplane.
- Every 6 months Steve Wilson at FedEx would hold a meeting to discuss operations but they were generic in nature and mostly dealt with issues other than operations in weather.
- As far as he knew, they had no direct contact with ATR before the accident.
- In "Basic Indoc," the pilots would review the ADP, FAA's Handbook of Meteorology, the NASA tailplane icing video, operations in icing for corporate aircraft video, and handouts of flight releases to familiarize the pilots with the format.
- The pilots were originally receiving the "Be Prepared for Icing Video," but they found out that they had stopped distributing them so Empire was now distributing it to all of the pilots and dispatchers on CD.
- As the Chief Pilot, he was concerned as to why the accident flight crew did not know anything about SLD.
- While he was in training on the airplane he wondered if they "really wanted to operate these things," but over the last three years, "nothing was raised to me as a concern."
- He was concerned as to how the flap asymmetry was handled and why the captain of the accident flight was looking for circuit breakers when he "needed to run checklists."
- Empire currently does not do LOFT, but it is something that they are working to include in training.

• They strive to train the way that they fly.

- Documentation that would be carried on the airplane would fall under the Director of Operations responsibilities. He as the Chief Pilot modified the checklists to ease the transition from the F27 to the ATR, while the DO did the QRH and he then reviewed it.
- There were not a lot of changes between the ATR supplied QRH and the Empire QRH. Most of the changes removed the information that was only pertinent to the passenger airplane and did not pertain to cargo operations.
- He and the DO had begun having discussions with the Manager of Training about possible changes that could be implemented from information that was garnered from the accident.
- FedEx does audits which are conducted by the field administrators but they had to do with ramp operations, and loading procedures, etc.
- He believed that they had never contracted for an outside safety audit.
- Other than the FSDO they received no other FAA oversight.
- He did attend a "Be Prepared for Icing Conference," 5 years ago but had not been to any other operators conferences.
- The DO took care of the MELs, and he as the Chief Pilot had never attended an MEL meeting.
- He believed that they were fortunate to have Bill Tubbs as their POI as they
 worked well with him.
- He knew that they had two impending enforcement actions. One was for Hazmat and the other was for ORM. Neither had anything to do with flight operations.
- They were giving an on-line winter operations test before each winter flying season.
- Since the accident they have plans to revisit CRM training with Flight Safety.
- The new hire first officers were receiving 6 simulator sessions, a check ride in the simulator, 2 takeoffs and landings in the airplane, and then 20 hours of IOE before being released for line operations.
- They had been discussing lately the quality of training with Flight Safety.
 Sometimes the new first officers systems knowledge was "below par." As a result Empire has been having the IOE check airman review systems with them.
- Flight Safety would sometimes switch instructors. Empire does not agree with this practice.
- Flight Safety Uses the Empire SOPs and Manuals during training.
- Nicola Phillips, Empire's training manager is training the Flight Safety instructors Empire's procedures to help alleviate some of the problems that Empire has been encountering.
- Empire has 5 IOE check airmen.
- The students had been receiving icing training during CRM, during systems, and during "icing stalls," in the simulator.
- He liked the "Be Prepared for Icing" CD that the company was distributing.
- He did notice that they would only check their own airspeed bugs when setting up the speed bugs on the bezel surrounding the airspeed indicator and the internal bug. They would however do "Challenge/Response Procedures" with

frequency changes, altitude changes, headings, but not with setting of the airspeed bugs.

• Empire did not mandate that the flightcrews fill out the TOLD card.

• He advised that you must maintain "Red Bug" or above in icing with a "zero flap malfunction" and that you "must fly the airplane."

• They had just started doing an Internal Evaluation Program (IEP), 2 weeks ago which had been implemented before the accident.

• Empire has been having "some standardization issues" with Flight Safety. Empire did not however, have the training contract with Flight Safety. FedEx did.

Todd G. Gunther Air Safety Investigator