Docket No. SA-533

Exhibit No. 2-G

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Interview Summaries of First Officer Heather Cornell

(16 Pages)

ATTACHMENT
6

72 hrs previous-
-Went to bed at 6 AM Saturday morning
-Woke up about 2:30 PM on Saturday
-Picked up Rodney Holberton at airport about 4 PM
-Worked out at the hotel for about an hour around 5 PM
- Went to the store at about 7 PM
-Relaxed in the hotel until I went to bed at 6 AM Sunday morning
-Woke up about 2 PM Sunday afternoon
-Went to Ricky Fisher's (mechanic) house for dinner at about 7 PM until 10 PM
-Relaxed in the hotel until I went to bed at about 6 AM Monday morning
-Woke up about 3 PM Monday afternoon
-Got ready for work.

Night of the Accident-
We showed up for work at about 6:45. When the weather was too bad to get into Lubbock we were redispatched to El Paso. The plane was loaded up and we flew to El Paso. They unloaded the plane and we flew empty to Alliance Fort Worth. We got into Alliance and had a few hours to wait. We got back out to the plane at about 2:20. We did our acceptance checks and preflight. They loaded the plane and we took off. This was my leg. The takeoff was normal. Our final altitude was FL 180. We started picking up ice. We asked for lower and descended down to 14,000. In the descent the ice was starting to come off. As we got closer, we picked up the ATIS. The ATIS was reporting information P and said due to rapidly changing conditions, to get weather from approach and tower. Approach told us weather was wind 040 at 10 kts with visibility 2 ½ and overcast 500 ft. Runway 26-8 was closed. They started vectoring us for ILS 17R. Once we descended to 5000 ft we started picking up ice again. All of our ice equipment was on. We were vectored onto the localizer. I called for flaps 15, landing gear down, landing checks. During the landing checks Rodney noticed the flap indicator was still showing 0 flaps. He got his flashlight and started looking for circuit breakers and trouble shooting. Meanwhile the autopilot had captured the localizer and glide slope. At about 1,000 ft, I got stick shaker and added power. At that point I was about to go around and asked him "Should I go around" he said "No" and then asked if I wanted him to take the controls. I said yes and at about 800 feet gave the controls to him. The previous stick shaker had disconnected the auto pilot. We broke out of the clouds at about 500 feet and saw the runway to the left of us. He started going for the runway and the plane started getting uncontrollable. He got stick shaker again. I don't really remember anything between that time and when the plane came to a stop. Once the plane stopped, Rodney yelled get out, get out. I got out of my seat and got the top hatch open. I looked out and saw the raging fire on the right side. I was getting ready to throw the rope out the left side even though the distance was a longer drop. At that time Rodney suggested we try the cargo door first. I ran and unlocked the cargo door and we both pushed it open. We jumped out and ran to FedEx.

I hope this is what you were looking for. If you have any more questions my number is [redacted]

Thank You, Heather Cornell

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Person Interviewed: Heather Nicole Cornell
ATR-42 First Officer, Empire Airlines
Salt Lake City, UT

Date of Interview: January 29, 2009 about 1438 CST.

Ms. Cornell was interviewed in person. The following is a summary of information she provided:

Ms. Cornell stated she is based in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is referred to as a "floater base." Flights Crews often dead head to other cities to begin there trips and arrive by commercial air carriers. Empire dispatchers send facsimile flight releases to the flight crews prior to each flight. She did not know the difference between flight followers and dispatchers. She stated she was sure the dispatchers are licensed dispatchers.

She stated this was her first time flying with Captain Holberton. She stated she has flown with six to seven other captains previously. She completed her Initial Operating Experience (IOE), flying out of Spokane, Washington for two days, Portland, Oregon for two days, and portions of Southeastern Alaska, with three different IOE Captains.

She arrived for duty at the Midland International Airport, in Midland, Texas on January 26, 2009, at 1845 CST for a nonscheduled cargo flight from Midland, Texas (MAF), the Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport in Lubbock, Texas (LBB), to the Fort Worth Alliance Airport, in Fort Worth Texas (AFW), back to LBB and ending in KMAF. However the first leg was changed to the El Paso International Airport, in El Paso, Texas (ELP) due to freezing drizzle in LBB which resulted in the Caravans rerouting to ELP because operating limitations prevent operations during freezing drizzle.

The flight crew departed ELP and arrived in AFW. The approach was down to minimums at AFW. The crew later departed AFW enroute to LBB and encountered rime ice at Flight Level 180. She stated they lost some airspeed and requested a lower altitude. The ice dissipated at 14,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). She stated they did receive an ice aural warring chime and the level three ice protection was activated. The captain reported moderate icing to ATC and she noted ice on the wind screens and the spinner of the propeller. Ms. Cornell stated ice on the window shaped like fingers when they were at 18,000 feet MSL. The Captain reported moderate rime ice to Air Traffic Control, Center. The propellers were already set to eighty six percent RPM with the ice protection activated.

Ms. Cornell was the flying pilot on this flight because the Captain, Rodney Holberton, had flown the two previous flights. She stated their was some discussion between her and Captain Holberton, as to whether she had 100 hours of flight time in the ATR-42, otherwise she would not be qualified to fly an instrument approach down to the published approach minimums. She stated she believed she had about 100 hours and was allowed to fly the approach into LBB. There were no flap problems when the flight departed from AFW.

The LBB Automated Airport Terminal Information Service (ATIS), Papa stated the current weather could be obtained from Air Traffic Control (ATC) due rapidly changing weather conditions in LBB.

Ms. Cornell stated ATC informed them the Back Course Localizer (BC Localizer), was out of service and Runway 26 and 8 was closed. She said, ATC reported weather of 040 degrees at 10 knots, 500 feet overcast above the surface, 2 ½ statute mile visibility. She stated she did not remember the breaking action reported prior to the accident, nor the light freezing drizzle. She stated they began to pick up ice at 6,000 feet MSL and they did receive an ice aural warning chime. She stated level three ice protection was again activated. She stated the Icing light came on and remained on throughout the approach and she stated the chime was heard. She also stated level two icing stayed on the entire time. ATC gave two vectors to correct for a significant wind shift between 6,000 to 5,000 feet MSL. She then called for flaps 15 degrees, gear down and before landing checklist. The captain noticed the flaps failed to travel to the selected position. She noticed the aircraft accelerated which was unusual when the flaps are lowered. The captain realized the flaps were still in the retracted position. The Captain began to trouble shoot the flap problem. Ms. Cornell suggested they initiate a missed approach, but the captain decided to continue. Ms. Cornell stated there was a checklist procedure for the flaps but it was not used. When asked why the procedure was not followed, she stated it was the Captains decision.

She was asked if there was a flap asymmetry problem or indication and she responded she did not know. She also stated the speed references for a no-flap approach was not briefed. She also stated she knew they had to stay above the red bug airspeed because that was the minimum speed for icing conditions.

Ms. Cornell stated she did see ice on the propeller spinner, but could not remember if ice was present on the side windows.

The stick shaker activated 1,000 feet above the ground and apparently disengaged the autopilot. She did not remember how many times or how long the stick shaker activated. At 800 feet Captain Holberton asked if she wanted him to take the controls. She agreed because he had much more experience with the aircraft. She stated they were right of course and the runway was to the left. They corrected the off course condition and state she saw the approach lights as they broke out of the clouds. Then she stated "the aircraft became uncontrollable and the stick shaker activated a couple

of times and I don't know where we hit. We skidded and when the aircraft came to rest."

Ms. Cornell stated the Captain received two stick shaker indications after he took control prior to the accident. She also stated "the aircraft felt out of control". After the accident the Captain attempted to call Air Traffic Control Tower on the aircraft radio but the aircraft radios were apparently inoperative.

The First Officer opened the cockpit escape hatch and saw the flames from the right engine which hindered their escape route. The escaped through the forward cargo door and walked approximately 1600 feet to the Federal Express Cargo ramp and waited for emergency medical service.

Ms. Cornell stated she was not sure when asked if there were any FAA Operations Specification, and Pilot Operating Handbook restrictions for operating in icing conditions. She did state the level two icing procedure is required when visible moisture is present in temperatures where icing can occur.

Ms. Cornell stated she had been with Empire Airlines approximately six months and she had only experienced icing conditions in this aircraft a few times during cruise altitudes. She stated the ATR-42 was the first icing equipped aircraft she has flown. She said she has about 2,000 hours and was a Certified Flight Instructor with SpanaFlight in Puyallup, WA, before she was hired by Empire Airlines. The aircraft she flew previously were not equipped for flight into known icing conditions. She graduated from Utah Valley with a Bachelors Degree in Aviation Science. She stated she had little or no previous experience in icing conditions. She stated she didn't remember what the flight school taught regarding flight into known icing conditions. She also stated she did not remember if she checked her side window for ice. She did not know the acronym SLD.

Ms. Cornell was asked which aeronautical publications they use and she answered Jeppesson Sanderson and United States Government Flight Information Publication. She stated the pilots can use either of the two aeronautical charts and the flight crews are responsible for purchasing their own publications and are reimbursed by Empire Airlines. She also stated they sometimes print their instrument approach charts online for use in the aircraft. She was asked what you do in case of a diversion to an alternate airport. She stated, "We have the trip kit in the aircraft." She stated she did not know where the trip kit came from or who purchased it. The trip kit is a set of United States Government Flight Information Publications that were found unopened. The flight crew was apparently relying on computer copies of the approach charts obtained online. She was asked if Empire Airlines provides aeronautical charts to the flight crews. She answered "no, they purchase them and they are later reimbursed." She was asked if she was reimbursed for purchasing her charts, and she stated that she had been reimbursed. She was asked regarding enroute charts and if Empire Airlines provides them. She answered there is one enroute chart they both share.

Ms. Cornell was asked if she understood what high minimum requirements were for first officers who have less than 100 hours in an aircraft. She stated she did not know. She also stated she wasn't sure if she currently had 100 hours in the ATR-42, but she "discussed this with the Captain and he allowed her to fly this portion from AFW to LBB.

Ms. Cornell stated she believes she was adequately trained by Empire Airlines as a flight crewmember especially in the areas regarding stalls and abnormal flap operations which was conducted in the ATR-42 flight simulator. Additionally, no flap landings were also performed in the aircraft. She had no additional comments during the conclusion of this interview.

[redacted]

Todd G. Gunther
Air Safety Investigator

[redacted]

Gordon D. Morris
Aviation Safety Inspector

[redacted]

Steven J. Martini
Chief Pilot, Empire Airlines

Questions to the crew:

To FO

Did you use the wipers during the approach? If yes, which mode (HI or LO)

During your interview, you described ice accretion on the propeller spinner. Are you able to remember the proportion of the spinner recovered by ice: one quarter, half or more?

Did you apply the "entering icing procedure" or the "severe icing procedure" at FL180 on the leg from Alliance to Lubbock?

Below 6000 ft, when you re-entered in icing condition, was it the same kind of ice accretion (than at FL 180)?

Did you try to reengage the auto pilot after its disconnection? If yes, when the Captain said "don't do that", was it related to this action?

After the autopilot disconnected, did you notice any change in the handling characteristics of the aircraft?

Was there any difference in roll control?

During the final approach did you notice an "aileron mistrim" alert on the ADU panel?

Did you experience icing conditions on the previous leg from El Paso to Alliance? If yes, could you describe it?

Was the aircraft clear of ice on the ground in Alliance? Did you check the flight controls with a flash light during the pre-flight check?

Did you anticipate icing conditions before takeoff from Alliance? Did you select level 2 for this takeoff?

During your training at flight safety center what icing training did you receive?
Did you receive a specific module on icing? How long was the module and what information was included?

Did you receive the document "be prepared for icing"? If yes by who and when?

To pilot in command

Did you use the wipers during the approach? If yes, which mode (HI or LO) (and the FO?)

Did you apply the "entering icing procedure" or the "severe icing procedure" at FL180 on the leg from Alliance to Lubbock?

Below 6000 ft and during the approach, what do you remember precisely about icing conditions and the effect on the aircraft?

When you detected that the flap position was at zero, what was the required minimum speed to be maintained in icing conditions?

If you had to execute a go around in such conditions, what was the required minimum speed to be maintained?

When you said to the FO during the final approach "don't do that", what was it related to?

During the final approach did you notice an "aileron mistrim" alert on the ADU panel?

Did you experience icing conditions on your previous leg from El Paso to Alliance? If yes, could you describe it?

Was the aircraft clear of ice on the ground in Alliance? Did you check the flight controls with a flash light during the pre-flight check?

Did you anticipate icing condition before takeoff from Alliance? Did you select level 2 for this takeoff?

Did you receive the document "be prepared for icing"? If yes by who and when?

DID THE CREW LOOK AT THE FLAP POSITION INDICATOR OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT.

FO Answers:

No wipers

I don't remember the amount of ice on the spinners.

We applied "entering icing conditions" checklist at FL180.

Below 6000 we did not have the ice around the front windows like we did at FL180, but that is all I remember.

We did not reengage the autopilot. When the captain said "don't do that" he was referring to the stick shaker I had just gotten.

Can't remember

I think we had some aileron control to the left

We did not notice

I don't think so

The plane was checked during the preflight and was clear of ice

Level 2 was selected for takeoff out of Alliance

During one of our simulator sessions, we used icing speeds for the flight

Interview: Heather Cornell, Empire Airlines First Officer
Interview date: August 11, 2009
Time: 0830 PDT
Location: Empire Airlines, Hayden, ID
Present were: Katherine Wilson, Todd Gunther, Leah Yeager – National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Vincent Ecalle – Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA); Dominique Falque – ATR; Douglas Dymock – FAA; Steve Martini – Empire Airlines
Represented by: Mark Dombroff - Dombroff, Gilmore, Jaques, & French

In the interview, F/O Cornell stated the following:

When asked about the weather information that was received prior to departing Alliance for LBB and en route, F/O Cornell stated that they got their dispatch that comes with all of their weather. She could not recall the specifics of what was included. She said prior to arriving at LBB, they got the LBB ATIS that stated due to the rapidly changing conditions they had to get the weather from approach or tower. She said when they contacted approach they gave them the conditions at LBB. She could not recall exactly what the weather conditions were but thought it was overcast at 500' and visibility was 2.5 miles, or similar to that.

Prior to departing AFW, F/O Cornell was asked if she was concerned about the icing conditions en route to LBB or at LBB, however, she could not remember.

Asked if she was concerned about landing on runway 17R although winds were 010, she stated no.

F/O Cornell did not recall the indicated airspeed on short final.

She thought the stick shaker only activated once when she was at the controls. Asked what action she took when the stick shaker activated, she stated that she added power and asked Capt. Holberton if they should go around.

F/O Cornell had flown into LBB the week prior to the accident but she did not encounter any icing conditions.

Asked what checklists were used during the approach into LBB, she stated that they used the descent and approach checklists.

When asked what indication they had that there was a flap anomaly, she stated that Capt. Holberton was doing the landing checklist and when he looked at the flap indicator it said zero.

In F/O Cornell's previous interview, she stated that the QRH checklist for flaps inoperative was not used and that decision was made by the captain, that there was no briefing of the speed references for a no flaps approach, and that the airspeed needed to be above red bug. She was

asked if she discussed with Capt. Holberton the use of the QRH, she stated she wanted to clarify that she did not think it was not his decision to intentionally not use the checklist but it was a matter of time and things were happening fast. She said under normal conditions they did not brief the no flap landing speed. It was not something they pulled out and planned every time they came in to land. By the time they realized they had they had the flap issue, the sequence of events happened so fast it was just not something that was never used or pulled out.

She said if they had gone around, they would have had time to use the QRH and get themselves situated and get their speeds. After Capt. Holberton decided that a go around was not an option, there was not enough time to use the checklist in the timeframe left.

Asked why she suggested to the captain that they should go around, F/O Cornell said because they had a flap issue and they needed to figure out their speeds and get themselves situated. Asked if his response to continue the approach concerned her at all, she said that she got the impression that he had a reason for it and was not because he just wanted to get on the ground; they had the gear down, no flaps and an icing situation. She felt like he had a good reason for why he did not want to go around and was not being stubborn.

Asked again if she thought she should have suggested going around after he took the controls, she said she did but did not verbalize it. She did not know why but she did not.

When asked what the airplane's altitude and relationship to the runway was when Capt. Holberton took over the controls, she said they were on the localizer already and she remembered hearing the 1000' call when she suggested to go around so she thought they were at about 800-1000'. Asked if the approach was stable, she responded that they had gotten the stick shaker so she would not consider that was stable and prompted her to suggest the go around but as far as course and glidepath she believed they were.

Asked about the company procedures for when to go around when they had an unstable approach, she said any time they were full scale and a stick shaker would be a "go around" situation.

F/O Cornell thought she had experienced icing conditions on a previous flight during cruise flight but it was not moderate to severe.

On the CVR, Capt. Holberton contacted LBB Ops and they said that they did not know your flight was coming in. F/O Cornell was asked what they implications (if any) were to Ops not knowing that a flight was arriving. She stated she did not know and had not experienced that before.

F/O Cornell stated that Empire Airlines paid for her expenses to stay in Midland, Texas, for the few days prior to the accident flight. She had flown the week before and stayed the weekend until her next trip.

She said that she acclimated herself the week before to sleep in the days and be up at night for her trip the week prior to the accident and continued that sleep pattern through the accident trip pairing. She indicated that she felt rested on the day of the accident flight.

She said her normal sleep schedule was to go to bed around 10 or 11 PM and wake at 8 or 9 AM, give or take a few hours on each end. She said she needed about 7 hours of sleep per night, when not working, to feel rested. Asked if she considered herself to be a morning or an evening person, she said she considered herself to be an evening person.

She stated that she flew all over the system and her schedule was typically during the day but it changed each month and the accident trip pairing was not an unusual schedule.

F/O Cornell said she had not previously been disciplined or commended for her performance and had not been involved in any other emergency situations.

F/O Cornell had not experienced any major changes to her health, financial situation or personal life, good or bad, in the year prior to the accident.

Asked to rate her health at the time of the accident, F/O Cornell said that she was healthy. She did not have any visual or hearing problems. She was not on any prescription medications at the time of the accident and had not taken any non-prescription medications in the 72 hours prior to the accident flight that may have affected her performance. She had an alcoholic beverage about 2 weeks before the accident flight and did not smoke or use illicit drugs.

F/O Cornell said the workload on the day of the accident was pretty normal until everything started to happen. She said the workload on approach was high but it was something that she felt that they could handle. Asked if the weather or flap anomaly contributed more than the other to the workload, she said they both contributed equally. If they had clear skies, it would have been much easier to handle. And if they did not have the flap problem, the icing would not have been an issue.

She had not flown with Capt. Holberton prior to the accident trip pairing.

Asked what Capt. Holberton's personality was like, she said he was outgoing and was not shy or quiet. She said prior to the flight, his mood was fine, happy and it did not change during the flight.

Asked to compare Capt. Holberton's proficiency as a pilot compared to other captains she had flown with, she said he was good. She had not witnessed him not use a checklist, other than the QRH in this case, or cut corners. She said he did not seem rushed to land the airplane.

Asked what Capt. Holberton's greatest strengths were as a pilot, she said his experience. She said he had been doing this for years and he knew how to handle situations. Regarding areas that he could improve upon, she said she did not know.

F/O Cornell never heard anyone complain about flying with Capt. Holberton.

Asked about Capt. Holberton's CRM skills, she said he asked her opinion about things and tried to get input. She felt comfortable speaking up to him and said at the beginning of the flight in Midland he told her if she saw anything that I'm doing to tell him and if he saw anything that she was doing.

F/O Cornell received her training at Flight Safety. Asked about training specifically related to icing, she said in the simulator they flew with icing settings and speeds and in ground school they learned about all the icing equipment on the airplane, when to use it and how to use it.

She did not think she received the "Be Prepared for Icing" document from Flight Safety.

She said they received two days of training on CRM that covered "everything" but could not recall the specific topics covered.

Asked to describe the quality of the training and the instructors at Flight Safety, she felt it was okay but she had not been through 121 training before so she had nothing to compare it to. She felt like she was prepared and taught well. She said the instructor she had was teaching her first class and if she did not know the answer to something she would ask someone.

Asked about the company's procedures related to sterile cockpit rules, she said that below 10000 feet or cruise altitude, whichever is lower, they were only to have work related conversations. She thought in general that pilots on the line adhered to sterile cockpit rules.

She thought fatigue was discussed during CRM training.

F/O Cornell had attended recurrent training at Flight Safety after the accident. She said they flew with icing speeds a little bit more than they had previously. She could not remember specifically if after the accident they trained her on SLD.

After the accident, she had a 709 ride with the FAA and a line check with the company prior to being released back on the line.

She did not have any concerns about flying the line after the accident.

F/O Cornell said she liked working for Empire Airlines. She said there were not any external pressures from the company to depart or arrive on time.

Prior to the accident flight, she said her mood was fine. She said Capt. Holberton did not seem tired or not alert.

Asked to describe the safety culture at Empire Airlines, she thought it was a pretty high priority and they had all kinds of means to relay safety concerns to the designated safety person. Asked how the company responded to safety concerns, she responded fine she guessed. She never had any direct concerns at the company and said maintenance was always addressed. If there was a problem they fixed it so there was never a need. Asked if they received any internal newsletters or emails regarding safety concerns and what was being done to correct them, she could not recall anything specifically. Asked about the company's policies on fatigue, she said they would call dispatch.

Regarding the weather package received from dispatch, F/O Cornell was asked if she looked at it. She said she was sure she did. She did not remember seeing any information about light freezing drizzle but she knew that they were authorized in their ops specs to fly in light freezing drizzle. She said after the accident they were not allowed to fly in it and she would not do it anyway. Asked why that was, she said she read more about it and freezing rain is not "such a great thing".

Asked why she asked Capt. Holberton if she should go around, she said they got a stick shaker and that was the policy to go around with the stick shaker. She said it was her way of saying she wanted to go around "without stepping on toes".

Asked what she was trained to do if faced with a malfunction and when on approach close to the runway, she thought it depended on the situation. Asked what she would do if she was in the situation now and she was PIC, she said she probably would have go around. Asked why, she said because they had no flaps and they had to figure out their landing speeds, get themselves readjusted and landing distances.

Asked if she verified the bug speeds after the brief, F/O Cornell said that Capt. Holberton briefed the approach because at the time they thought the approach was to minimums and they were not sure if she had 100 hours to fly the approach to minimums. She said they got the weather and it was not at minimums so they decided she would fly the approach. She said when he briefed the speeds, she did not double check them. She guessed she did not because she heard they were not right.

She said they received no flap landings in training. Asked what she would do for a no flap landing, she said in the simulator they would know that it was coming and they had their speeds all ready to go so it was a matter of getting the plane on the ground.

She did not remember if she was taught to look for popped circuit breakers.

AFCS, the screen located in the middle under the glare shield, was where the pilots controlled the flight director and autopilot. She said it tell pilots when the autopilot is disconnected and trim conditions. She did not remember any annunciations, messages or flashing messages up there. She did not remember attempting to re-trim before or after the flap problem and did not remember if she had to hold with wheel hard.

Asked if Capt. Holberton should have used the QRH, she said after he decided that a go around was not the best option, they did not have time. Asked if she thought he should have gone around, she said "I guess". She said if they had known that they had an asymmetry problem at the time, she said probably not. At the time they did not know they had an asymmetry problem and just thought they had no flaps. She did not recall the procedure for a flap asymmetry in the QRH. Asked if she would have handled it differently if she had known it was an asymmetry problem or had a flap jam or unlock, she said probably not.

Regarding Capt. Holberton's cockpit discipline, she said they did not talk that much. Asked if she was concerned about him using a flashlight to look at the circuit breakers, she said "a little bit". Asked why, she said it seemed like they should have been a little bit more focused on landing the airplane.

Asked how long it took to upgrade at Empire, she thought it depended on who it was and if they needed captains or not.

She had not flown with Capt. Holberton since the accident.

She said prior to the 709 ride, she did a week of recurrent training. She did not think there was any talk of handling conditions with super cooled liquid drops or SLD during recurrent. Asked if she received training for flap problems, she said they did some more no flap landings.

She had gotten an aileron mis-trim annunciation in the ATR and when that happens she trims it.

Asked if she noticed the position of the wheel while on approach when on autopilot, she said the autopilot kicked off when the flap problem happened. Prior to and once the flaps were selected, she did not remember anything about the position of the control wheel.

Asked to clarify when she saw the workload on the flight changed from normal to high, F/O Cornell said it was probably about the time they realized the flaps did not come down.

F/O Cornell said initial training was a whole month. She thought they had 6-8 simulator sessions during training. When she went through initial training, she was in the simulator with another first officer who was also in training. She said that during training they followed Empire's SOPs. The instructors were from Flight Safety.

She said that after she got her type rating she received two days of flight training in the airplane and one check ride at Empire.

She said Capt. Holberton did the approach briefing because the policy was if the first officer had less than 100 hours and the weather was down to minimums, the captain had to fly the approach. In the accident flight, they were unsure of the number of hours she had so the captain briefed the approach because he would be flying it.

She said she did not know they had a flap asymmetry problem until someone told her after the accident. They thought they had a no flap situation.

Asked what the SOPs were from Empire if faced with a problem, she said to use the QRH which they did not use in the situation of the accident flight.

Asked if the airplane was flying normally after the autopilot disconnected, she did not remember.

She did not remember if the airplane was correctly trimmed.

Asked what she felt when the captain asked if she wanted him to take the controls and he took the controls, she said she felt like they had an emergency on their hands and he had 20 years of experience and she was trusting that he was making the right decisions.

Asked if there was anything she hoped to learn from Flight Safety right after initial training that she did not, she said it was not something that Flight Safety could have done. It was a short amount of time to learn a whole bunch of information and it was still a learning process after she finished.

Asked if she attempted to reengage the autopilot, she said she did not think so.

She did not have anything to add to the interview.

The interview ended at 0932.