Docket No. SA-533

Exhibit No. 2-F

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Interview Summaries of Captain Rodney Holberton

(18 Pages)

ATTACHMENT
5

Synopsis leading up to the accident in Lubbock Texas. This statement is prepared by Captain Rodney Holberton.

Flight Crew Holberton and Cornell assigned to flight 8284 (N902FX) from AFW to LBB. Crew showed about 1 hour prior to departure to Lubbock Texas. Preflight completed, along with acceptance check items done. Aircraft was loaded, and all paper work completed normal checklists were done and the aircraft taxied out for departure 10 minutes early. Departure and climb to altitude were all normal. At flight level 180 the aircraft began to pick up moderate rime ice. Level 3's were added and icing check list completed. After a period of time maybe about 20 to 25 minutes the crew elected to descend to 14,000 feet and we no longer accrued ice. About 40 miles out from Lubbock we began the initial descent. Most of the ice at this time had sublimated or was removed by the deice boots. Several altitudes changes and a turn onto the finial approach course were made for the ILS to 17R. Light freezing perception began to accrue on the aircraft. Just prior to FAF and glide slope intercept Flaps 15, gear down check were called for and preformed the auto pilot was on just outside of this point. During my scan I noticed that we didn't have the flaps indicating 15, I checked the flap handle and made sure it was in the detent and it was. I informed the first officer that we had no flaps. I got the flashlight and checked the circuit and found none to be popped. At this time I moved the handle to the closest position of the indicator which was back to "0" or up. Knowing the conditions of both the environment and aircraft I asked the first officer if I should complete the landing, she agreed and I took control of the aircraft. This was right at the 1000' call. At this time I found the aircraft auto pilot off and high and to the right, after making the correction and having the aircraft on course I wanted to make sure I called for the correct checklist when simultaneously I had the approach light and runway in sight along with a "terrain ahead" call, followed shortly by the stick shaker. I added power and then aircraft seemed normal again followed again by the stick shaker and more power added. Just prior to the threshold the aileron control made several oscillations just prior to the aircraft impacting the surface. Once the aircraft came to a complete stop an attempt was made to leave via the emergency crew hatch but found that the cargo door was still operational and the crew used the main door. Once outside the aircraft and a safe distance I called and reported the accident to Empire Dispatch.

72 HOURS LEADING UP TO ACCIDENT AT LBB
FOR RODNEY HOLBERTON

Saturday, 01/24/2009

0600 PST – got up, showered, ate breakfast, was driven to airport for..
0815 PST – departure of SWA flight 2535 to Las Vegas, NV
1020 PST – arrived Las Vegas, NV had about 1 hour layover, departed
1125 PST – for Midland, TX
1535 CST – arrived Midland, TX , drove to hotel, checked in, visited with Heather for an hour or so. Went to store and purchased some groceries for next few days due to availability of microwave and frig in room.
1900 CST – ate dinner in room, watched TV
2300 CST – went to bed

Sunday 01/25/2009

0800 CST – got up, went down to breakfast in hotel, then to hotel gym for a workout. Went back to room and showered, read the newspaper. Called fellow co-worker to confirm dinner plans for that evening.

1200 CST – ate light lunch, drove around town and did some light shopping.

1715 CST – left hotel with Heather to go to fellow co-workers home – Rick Fisher – for dinner
1730 CST – arrived for dinner
2130 CST – left and returned to motel by..
2200CST – and went to bed

Monday 01/26/2009

0400 CST – got up, watched some TV, made a small snack, read book

0600 CST – went to hotel lobby had breakfast and short workout in hotel gym, sat in spa next to pool for 20-25 minutes

0730 CST – back to room, showered, dressed. Did misc. paperwork, read newspaper, watched TV

1000 CST – went to store purchased lunch for work that night and then back to hotel.

1100 CST – in bed asleep

1630 CST - woke up, had a meal, showered, got lunch and self ready to go to work.

1820 CST – met Heather in lobby to go to work

1845 CST – arrived at airport and began flight crew duties

1945 CST - departed MAF for ELP

2115 CST – landed ELP

2230 CST – left ELP for AFW

Tuesday, 01/27/2009

0030 CST – arrived AFW, closed out flight with dispatch, ate lunch, watched TV

0230 CST – arrived back at aircraft, and resumed flight crew duties

0313 CST - departed AFW for LBB

0435 CST – accident occurred on LBB airport.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW

Person Interviewed: Rodney N. Holberton
ATR-42 Captain, Empire Airlines
Salt Lake City, UT

Date of Interview: January 29, 2009 about 1600 CST.

Mr. Holberton was interviewed in person. The following is a summary of information he provided:

Mr. Holberton stated he arrived in Midland, Texas on a Southwest Airlines dead head flight on January 24, 2009 and was met by Heather Cornell. He had dinner with a friend and went to sleep. He woke up around 0400 CST and worked out around 0800 to 1000 CST. He slept and got up around 1600 CST. He and the first officer met around 1600 CST on January 26, 2009 and reported for duty at Midland International Airport, in Midland, Texas on at 1845 CST for a nonscheduled cargo flight from Midland, Texas (MAF), to Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport in Lubbock, Texas (LBB), to Fort Worth Alliance Airport, in Fort Worth Texas (AFW), back to LBB and ending in KMAF. However after checking the weather the first leg was changed to El Paso International Airport, in El Paso, Texas (ELP) due to freezing drizzle in LBB causing the Caravans to reroute to ELP. They arrived in ELP and unloaded all the freight except for the six hundred fifty pounds of ballast.

He stated they repositioned from ELP and arrived in AFW where they waited until the freight was loaded for the return flights to LBB and MAF.

The captain stated the flight releases are facsimiled to the crews. The dispatchers are licensed but are more like flight followers.

The Captain stated crew later departed AFW enroute to LBB and encountered rime ice at 18,000 Mean Sea Level (MSL). He reported moderate rime to Air Traffic Control (ATC). He stated, "the ice was moderate bordering on severe." They selected level three icing protection which includes engine continuous ignition. The Captain stated they lost some airspeed and was able to maintain 180 knots indicated airspeed. He then requested a lower altitude. The captain requested a descent down to 14,000 feet MSL and was in the clear. He stated substantial amounts of ice came off the aircraft. Normally they indicate two hundred to two hundred ten knots at cruise, and they were indicating one hundred eighty knots.

He received the Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) Papa for LBB. The ice light on the memo panel began to flash after five minutes and he deselected level three ice protection. The ATIS reported rapidly changing weather and the current weather could be obtained from ATC. ATC handed off the flight to LBB approach control and cleared them to descend to 6,000 MSL. LBB ATC informed them of the freezing drizzle conditions in LBB. The weather had improved to five hundred feet overcast ceiling with two miles visibility, and a ten knot tail wind. They were cleared for the ILS Approach to runway 17R and cleared to descend to 5,000 and were vectored for the approach to runway 17R. The captain stated ATC had to give additional vectors due to a wind shift from 6,000 feet to 5,000 feet MSL. The captain briefed the approach. He selected flaps 15 degrees and noticed the flaps were indicating zero. He said he repositioned the flap handle several times and checked the circuit breakers with a flash light while they were descending on the approach. He then placed the flap handle in the up or retracted position because he did not want the flaps to inadvertently travel during the approach. The captain stated he did not reset the speeds for a no flap approach and continued despite the first officer's suggestion to go around. The captain stated he based this decision due to the runway conditions, icing conditions, and the flap problem. He stated "I just wanted to land as soon as possible." The captain was asked if he followed the abnormal checklist procedure for the flaps, and he responded he did not and said "I was too busy and didn't know which checklist to run first or the speeds." He said he looked over and saw the first officer flying the approach when it should have been coupled to the ILS. He was confused as to why the autopilot had disconnected without hearing the aural alert. The captain stated he noticed they were slightly right of the localizer course. He then asked the first officer if she wanted him to take the flight controls. She responded yes. The captain stated after he was established on course he checked the Advisory Display panel for the reason why the autopilot was not displayed. He said "I made a judgment call not go around because "things started piling up and it was better to land than to go around." He said the stick shaker activated, so he added power. The stick shaker activated again and he added more power. Then the aircraft impacted the ground.

The captain was asked how much flight experience the first officer had. He stated he believed she was qualified. He was asked if the first officer was high minimum restricted. He stated he believed she had 100 hours.

The captain was asked if he knew of any Operations Specifications restriction regarding icing. He said, "I just didn't want to make a wrong decision." The captain stated he had no lateral control. He stated, "the controls were almost snatched out of my hands." He also stated he was "caught off guard that the autopilot had disengaged and he did not know why he didn't hear the aural alert and the first officer was off course while hand flying the approach."

The Captain was asked if he followed the flap checklist and he responded by saying no. The captain said they did pick up ice on the airframe at all altitudes except 14,000 feet MSL. He said he saw two inches of ice on the windshield wiper probe in the shape of a finger. The captain also indicated this aircraft was not equipped with an ice evidence probe. He was then asked if he thinks ice evidence probes should be mandatory on all ATR aircraft. He answered, "it does make it easier to see the ice." The captain stated they did receive an ice detect indication and there is a procedure on the control yoke. He was asked if they had any problems with the flaps in AFW. He answered no. He also stated he had never experienced a flap problem like this before in the ATR.

The captain stated he was aware of the freezing drizzle conditions in LBB and stated he was aware of the freezing drizzle before he selected the flaps to 15 degrees. There were no other aircraft in the area during this time. He was aware there was still ice on the airplane before they reentered icing conditions in LBB. He said "I could not remember if we had level three ice protection selected during the final descent." He was asked if he noticed ice on the side windows and answered "the afts aren't heated."

The captain stated regarding which aeronautical approach publications they use Jeppesson Sanderson and United States Government Flight Information Publication. There were some government charts already in the aircraft but he did not know how they got there. There were also various approach plates printed from a computer but he also did not know who printed them. He stated he prefers Jeppeson Sanderson approach plates.

The captain stated he is from Portland, Oregon and usually flies around that area.

The captain was asked to describe the role of Empire Airlines dispatch. The captain stated they advise him where to go and they send a release package they both sign. They reroute them on occasions but the flight crew knows about it before they contact them. When asked about how they track flights and if they have live weather information, the captain stated they have ARINC and track them on flight aware.

The captain was asked if he knew or heard of SLD (supercooled large droplet, icing over 50 microns). The captain said, "I've heard a lot of acronyms.

The captain was asked if Ms. Cornell was his regular first officer. He answered, no, he had not flown with her before prior to the start of this series of flights.

The captain was asked questions regarding the portion of the flight just prior to the accident. The captain stated the propeller RPM's were set full forward to maximum, the landing gear was down and the flaps were at the zero degree

setting. The captain was asked if the first officer's stick shaker activated. He stated "no."

The captain was asked if he experienced any control problems, such as pitch, roll, or yaw. He stated "no."

However when asked the question again he stated the aircraft was out of control the last 500 feet before impacting the ground in a nose level pitch attitude. He stated "he had no lateral control and the controls were almost snatched out of his hands."

The captain was asked if he checked the flap extend indicator. He stated yes but it appeared the flaps did not move so he placed them in the up or retracted position. He was told the flap selector was found in the 15 degree position after the accident. He stated he thought they were in the zero position or retracted and he did not remember anything else.

The captain apparently had extensive experience flying in icing conditions with 13,000 hours in various aircraft including BE-18, Caravans, F-27, and the ATR. The captain has an estimated 1500 hours as pilot in command in the ATR and over 6,000 hours in the Caravan. The captain stated he had about 600 hours as a first officer in the F-27. He stated the restriction for the Caravan no freezing drizzle, F-27 and ATR freezing drizzle was permitted.

The captain was asked with regards to any AIRMETS. He responded, "yes he noticed something but he could not remember what it said.

[redacted]

Todd G. Gunther
Air Safety Investigator

Gordon D. Morris
Aviation Safety Inspector

[redacted]

Steven J. Martini
Chief Pilot, Empire Airlines

Questions to the crew:

To FO

Did you use the wipers during the approach? If yes, which mode (HI or LO)

During your interview, you described ice accretion on the propeller spinner. Are you able to remember the proportion of the spinner recovered by ice: one quarter, half or more?

Did you apply the "entering icing procedure" or the "severe icing procedure" at FL180 on the leg from Alliance to Lubbock?

Below 6000 ft, when you re-entered in icing condition, was it the same kind of ice accretion (than at FL 180)?

Did you try to reengage the auto pilot after its disconnection? If yes, when the Captain said "don't do that", was it related to this action?

After the autopilot disconnected, did you notice any change in the handling characteristics of the aircraft?

Was there any difference in roll control?

During the final approach did you notice an "aileron mistrim" alert on the ADU panel?

Did you experience icing conditions on the previous leg from El Paso to Alliance? If yes, could you describe it?

Was the aircraft clear of ice on the ground in Alliance? Did you check the flight controls with a flash light during the pre-flight check?

Did you anticipate icing conditions before takeoff from Alliance? Did you select level 2 for this takeoff?

During your training at flight safety center what icing training did you receive? Did you receive a specific module on icing? How long was the module and what information was included?

Did you receive the document "be prepared for icing"? If yes by who and when?

To pilot in command

Did you use the wipers during the approach? If yes, which mode (HI or LO) (and the FO?)

Did you apply the "entering icing procedure" or the "severe icing procedure" at FL180 on the leg from Alliance to Lubbock?

Below 6000 ft and during the approach, what do you remember precisely about icing conditions and the effect on the aircraft?

When you detected that the flap position was at zero, what was the required minimum speed to be maintained in icing conditions?

If you had to execute a go around in such conditions, what was the required minimum speed to be maintained?

When you said to the FO during the final approach "don't do that", what was it related to?

During the final approach did you notice an "aileron mistrim" alert on the ADU panel?

Did you experience icing conditions on your previous leg from El Paso to Alliance? If yes, could you describe it?

Was the aircraft clear of ice on the ground in Alliance? Did you check the flight controls with a flash light during the pre-flight check?

Did you anticipate icing condition before takeoff from Alliance? Did you select level 2 for this takeoff?

Did you receive the document "be prepared for icing"? If yes by who and when?

DID THE CREW LOOK AT THE FLAP POSITION INDICATOR OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT.

Steve, I will just go in descending order of the question. I show 12 of them.

1. No for both of us.
2. Entering icing procedure.
3. It seemed to be minimal as most of the ice had come off, and accumulation decreased. During the descent we passed through multiple cloud layers.
4. Vmhb red bug
5. Reduced flap landing speeds from the QRH, Vmhb approach, Vmlb landing.
6. I can only assume the stick shaker, but don't recall making this statement.
7. No, the aircraft was being hand flown.
8. No ice or aircraft ice issues on the previous two legs of the flight.
9. I did not do the preflight, Heather did and this was a topic of discussion with the temperature so low at or near freezing. Heather stated that the aircraft was "Clean" when she returned to the Flightdeck.
10. Yes
11. I have no record of, or remembering receiving this document.
12. If your asking about in flight, no. At night even with the ice light on there are too many shadows and would be difficult to determine the position of the flap or flaps and to what degree they would be in.

Interview: Rodney Holberton, Empire Airlines Captain
Interview date: August 11, 2009
Time: 1030 PDT
Location: Empire Airlines, Hayden, ID
Present were: Katherine Wilson, Todd Gunther, Leah Yeager – National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Vincent Ecalle – Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA); Dominique Falque – ATR; Douglas Dymock – FAA; Steve Martini – Empire Airlines
Represented by: Mark Dombroff - Dombroff, Gilmore, Jaques, & French

In the interview, Capt. Holberton stated the following:

He said they received the weather package from dispatch prior to departing Alliance. Asked if there was any unusual weather along the route of flight or at the destination, he said other than the freezing drizzle in LBB, no. When asked if he was concerned about the freezing drizzle at LBB, he said he was always concerned about adverse weather but it was something he had encountered before.

Asked if he had any concerns about landing on runway 17R although winds were 010, he said he took that into consideration and knew the landing distance would be further.

He did not recall the indicated airspeed on short final.

He had never flown into LBB before.
During the approach, he said the normal checklists were used – descent, approach and landing checklists.

Capt. Holberton said he knew there was a flap anomaly because the flap handle was in the 15 degree detent and the flap indicator indicated zero.
Asked why he chose not to complete the QRH once the flap anomaly was detected, he said he needed F/O Cornell to help him fly the airplane. He said they were on short final and he was looking at the end of the runway and the lights. He needed her to have the call outs and it "happened so quick".

Asked if that was the normal procedure to look for a popped circuit breaker that possibly caused the anomaly versus using the checklist, he said he had to start someplace. Asked what he was trained to do by Flight Safety when encountering a flap problem, he said he had to determine what the malfunction was and then handle it via the checklist.

Asked why he decided to continue the approach versus going around, he said he had not really determined what the issue was at that point. Asked what he was trained to do in that case, he said to determine what the anomaly was and handle it via the checklist. Asked if he was trained to go around if on approach and a problem occurs, he said yes.

He did not recall what he meant when he stated in his previous interview that "the aircraft felt out of control". He said it would be pure speculation on his part.

He said the approach was stable until he took the controls from F/O Cornell. He did not recall the airplane's position in terms of the altitude and relationship to the runway but he said the airplane was lined up with the runway centerline.

Asked what actions he took when the stick shaker activated while he was at the controls, he said if the stick shaker activated that he would have added power.

Asked if he had previous experience flying in icing conditions, he said that most of his time was in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. He had encountered moderate to severe icing previously. He said how the flight controls felt when in icing conditions depended on the speed – sometimes they could feel heavier and sometimes lighter.

He vaguely recalled contacting LBB Ops on approach to LBB. Asked if that typically happened that Ops would not know that a flight was arriving, he said it depended on the circumstances.

Capt. Holberton stated that the company paid his expenses in Midland, Texas, for the several days prior to the accident flight.

He said he felt rested on the evening of the accident flight. Asked what his normal sleep schedule was when working, he said he was a big into napping and when he did a night trip he would swing the clock around 12 hours.

He said he needed about 6-8 hours of sleep to feel rested when not working. Asked what is sleep schedule was when not working, he said it depended on where he was at. Asked if he considered himself to be a morning or an evening person, he said it depended on what activities he was involved in but he would say more of a late night person.

Asked whether he preferred to fly during the day or night, he said he preferred to fly during the day but that was not possible with the way the schedule was. He said he did not have a usual work schedule or usual days off and that the schedule he had when scheduled with F/O Cornell was not unusual.

Capt. Holberton had never been disciplined for his performance or been involved in an accident or incident. He said he received a commendation from FedEx managers that would thank him for the job that was done well. They had a "Bravo Zulu" which was an atta boy on paper which he thought he received for handling of a flight and that the freight was not late.

In the year prior to the accident, he did not have any major changes to his health, good or bad. He did have a negative change to his financial situation in the year prior to the accident but said he would have to check when that was. He also experienced changes in his personal life when his wife became ill and a pet died in the family. He said he would have to go back and look when his wife became ill and that his pet died about a year before the accident.

Capt. Holberton rated his health to be excellent at the time of the accident.

He said he had to wear corrective lenses and was wearing reading glasses at the time of the accident.

He said his hearing was slightly deteriorated but he did not wear a hearing aid. There were some sounds that after many years in the airplane had diminished his hearing.

He was not taking any prescription medications at the time of the accident.

He recalled having 1-2 beers the night before the accident. He did not smoke or use illicit drugs. In the 72 hours prior to the accident, he did not take any non-prescription medications that might have affected his performance.

He said workload on the day of the accident was normal and during the approach it was high. Asked what contributed to the high workload, he said takeoffs and landings were high workload and the entire scenario elevated it.

He had flown two prior legs with F/O Cornell prior to the accident flight.

Asked what F/O Cornell's personality was like, he said she did her duties and he did not have any issues with her; nothing stuck out. He said she was quiet but that was "her all the way around". He said they hardly knew each other before the flight but he did not think her mood was anything unusual and her mood did not change during the flight.

Asked to compare F/O Cornell's flying proficiency to other first officers at her level, he said she did not do anything unusual and she performed like everyone else.

He never witnessed F/O Cornell not use a checklist or cut corners on a flight.

Asked what F/O Cornell's greatest strengths were as a pilot, he said he would ask her to do something and she did it. He could not say any areas that he thought she should improve upon. He never heard anyone complain about flying with F/O Cornell.

Regarding F/O Cornell's CRM skills, he said there was not anything noticeable.

Capt. Holberton received his training at Flight Safety in Houston, Texas. He attended recurrent training there most recently in March 2009 and prior to that in March 2008. Asked about his training related to icing in March 2008, he said he was trained on whatever was in the curriculum. He said there was both ground school and simulator training but did not recall any specifics. Regarding icing training he received in March 2009, he said there was the normal stuff and a little more emphasis on icing. Asked to expand on that, he said the maneuvers were all performed with icing speeds.

He received the "Be Prepared for Icing" video and paper via the mail. He thought he received them from Empire Airlines but was not sure because he received so much information.

He said he received training on human factors related topics, such as workload and fatigue, during initial training at Flight Safety but he could not remember the topics covered.

He rated the quality of the training and instructors at Flight Safety prior to the accident as "good". Asked if he noticed any differences in the training or the instructors after the accident, he said they were all good and the accident was a topic of discussion.

He said he did not receive CRM training during recurrent training but he received two days of CRM in initial training. He did not recall the specific topics covered.

Asked what training he received on sterile cockpit rules, he said it was in their training program and in their books, and that at this level they knew what the rule was.

Asked if he thought pilots on the line adhered to sterile cockpit rules, he said they did when he was there.

Capt. Holberton had flown since the accident. To be released back to the line, he went back through complete recurrent training at Flight Safety and Empire Airlines and also did a 709 ride with the FAA.

When Capt. Holberton was asked how he liked working for Empire Airlines, he said it was an excellent company. He said there were no pressures from the company to depart or arrive on time. At the time of the accident, he did not have any pressures from her personal life that may have affected his performance. He said his mood before the accident was excellent and it did not change during the flight. He said F/O Cornell seemed alert prior to the flight.

Asked to describe the safety culture at Empire Airlines, he said it was excellent. When asked how the company let personnel know about safety concerns, he said voicemail, email, and bulletins.
Regarding the company's policies on fatigue and what he should do if fatigued before a flight, he said they would not accept the flight. Regarding any repercussions about not taking a flight for fatigue, he said they might get a sigh but most of them knew if they were not feeling well they were not going to take the flight. There were plenty of opportunities for them to replace a crew member.

Asked if he participated in any of the company's safety initiatives, such as workshops or seminars or reported any safety problems that led to a policy change, he said voicemail, email, ops bulletins and company recurrent ground training. He said he was sure that he reported safety concerns but did not know the specifics. He said there could be some safety issues in which damage could be caused, if a change in a vendor, or a new location. Regarding the company's response to safety concerns, he said the company responded immediately by looking into it. Asked if there was a time when a safety concern was reported but the company did not respond, he said no. He had not heard any legitimate complaints from pilots about safety concerns they had.

Capt. Holberton did not recall a flight with Capt. Moroney on Jan. 14-16, 2009, until it was mentioned that he elected to let her fly all of the trip legs. Asked in general why he would suggest that the other crewmember would fly the legs rather than him, he said if a pilot wanted to build flight time. He would not suggest that they fly them but he would be more than happy to offer them and they would usually take them up on him. Regarding the flight with Capt. Moroney, he said he was cordial. It was their base, they were the captain, and when they are a captain no one wanted to sit in the right seat but he did not have any problems with it. He said the flights were so short and they did not get many takeoff and landings.

Asked what he thought would be a good procedure for crews to follow if they find themselves in a similar situation, he responded that he would need to have all the available information including the CVR and FDR and then go from there.

When he flew with Capt. Moroney on the Anchorage flight, he clarified that she was the PIC. She logged PIC time and Capt. Holberton logged SIC time. Asked if there was a company policy of who was the PIC when two captains were on board, he said there were a number of issues there and scenarios and it would have to be discussed with dispatch and the chief pilot. Asked why he flew in the right seat, he responded because there was not first officer.

He said they did not specifically receive training as a captain in the right seat even if they had not been a first officer in the airplane; however he may have sat in the right seat in a simulator at Flight Safety for a captain's checkride in the ATR.

Capt. Holberton said the financial change that he experienced was not instigated by the company, like reduction of schedule or equipment differences, and that it was not a financial change to him personally but there was to his household.

He did not recall if he received training on a flap anomaly prior to the accident. After the accident, he received a flap asymmetry. Asked if he remembered from training before or after the accident, if he was familiar with the QRH for flap problems, he said it was in the QRH. Asked if they were separate checklists or the same checklist, he said "it's in the checklist". He said the name of the checklist was a flap unlock and flap asymmetry.

He said he vaguely recalled the stick shaker activation. Asked if he heard or felt it, he said he felt it. He did not hear the autopilot disconnect. He confirmed that he had a loss of hearing.
Capt. Holberton received a class 1 medical since the accident, on March 11, 2009. He received a spoken word hearing test by the AME. He never saw an independent physician to check his hearing.

Asked if the hearing loss was high or low frequency, he said a small amount of both. Capt. Holberton did not wear a watch. Asked if he could hear an analog watch tick, he listened during the interview in his right ear and said no.

He did not recall if he tried to reengage the autopilot.
Asked if he tried to re-trim the airplane, he said that would be airmanship 101 and if his hands were on the controls he would have re-trimmed the airplane without even thinking about it.

Asked to clarify if he thought he re-trimmed, he said whatever control pressures were on the airplane, yeah they would have [he trailed off]. He did not recall if the control forces were excessive.

Asked if he recalled anything on the ADU, any messages or anything flashing, he said no.

He said F/O Cornell's hand was on the control wheel when the autopilot was engaged, but also said it was night and he really was not looking at her hands.
There was not an angle of control anomaly or rolling moment when he took the controls.

Asked if he verified bug settings during the briefing after they each set the bugs on each of their sides, he said they both set them and the speed card was laying right there but he could not say one way or the other. He said he did not recall the discussion of whether F/O Cornell had 100 hours.

Regarding F/O Cornell asking if she should go around and him deciding to continue the approach, he said he was not sure that they did not have flaps, but that it was just indicating zero flaps.

Asked to clarify if he received training at Flight Safety on flap anomalies prior to accident, he said the instructors had the opportunity to induce just about any failure in the simulator and he did not recall what they did with him.
Asked if her experienced any other emergencies or abnormals in the ATR, he said there had been failures but he would have to go back through his logbook to see what those were.
Capt. Holberton was asked if he had made the decision to go around, what would his actions have been. He said the missed approach calls but he really could not say. Asked if he would reference the QRH, he said if he knew what the malfunction was.

Asked what the procedure was if a pilot could not determine what the malfunction was, he said he did not think they had anything where they did not determine what the malfunction was.
Asked if there was anything in the GOM, he said he would have to check.

Capt. Holberton said he was prompted to take the flashlight and look at the circuit breakers because the flap handle was at 15 and the indicator was at zero.

Capt. Holberton's 709 ride was conducted in a simulator. He completed a flap unlock anomaly during the ride and that icing was covered.

He had flown the F27 before the ATR and the 208 before that. He had been a full check airman.
He said he trained and checked to use the QRH in emergencies.
Asked what he would expect a pilot to do, he said to determine what the malfunction was. Asked if the flap anomalies were all on one checklist in the QRH, he said he would have to get it out and look at it.

Asked if he had flown airplane 902 before, he said they all looked the same and he would have to go back and research the aircraft records. He did not recall any deferred maintenance on the

accident airplane but was reasonably sure that there was not. He said there were no prior circuit breaker problems and that he was just trouble shooting. He stated he also looked at the overhead trying to determine if there was actually the problem. A number of things were going through his thought process like was it hydraulics.

Asked if he had ever deferred anything on an ATR, he said he would have to talk to maintenance control and look at the records. There was a probability of it. He did not recall the last time he rejected an airplane. He said it happened very infrequently that he would turn down an airplane prior to a flight. He said maintenance was there and the plane was usually powered up.

Asked about the company's policy regarding resetting circuit breakers during flight, Capt. Holberton said it was at the pilot's discretion except for ones that have to deal with fuel pumps.

Asked if he attempted to reengage the autopilot, he said he doubted it but he did not know for sure.

He said the normal procedure would be for the flying pilot to brief the approach.
He said the stabilization altitude at the company was 1000'.
He thought the conservative maneuvering speed was 160 but he would have to look at the book.

Capt. Holberton clarified that the financial change he experienced in the year prior to the accident did not impact his performance.

He was concerned about the freezing drizzle and anytime there was adverse weather but he had encountered it before. Asked what freezing drizzle meant to him, he said it could contaminate an airplane in a negative way.

Capt. Holberton did not recall putting out a PIREP on the moderate bordering on severe icing encountered at 18000'.

Asked how he knew what airspeed to fly on approach, he said he did not recall.

He did not recall if they flew at red bug speed on the approach.

Capt. Holberton did not have anything to add to the interview.