

Attachment 2

to Operations/Human Performance Group Chairmen's Factual Report

Crew Statements

DCA09MA021

Captain David Butler Statement requested by NTSB Regarding Continental Flight 1404

The following is what happened to the best I can recall. I was the pilot flying and First Officer Chad Levang was the pilot monitoring.

He and I arrived at DEN on December 20, 2008 on time for an 1800 MST departure. I went downstairs to Operations to get the paperwork and did the walkaround preflight inspection and found no discrepancies. The FO prepped the cockpit. We briefed the taxi out, with anti-ice due to ice and snow on the ramp, called for taxi from Ramp control, who directed us to 3W where we were to contact Ground control, who instructed us to taxi to 34R. Pushback, start and taxi out were uneventful and wing and engine anti-ice were secured as the taxiway was clear and we had briefed a reduced power takeoff. Checks were completed and we were given "Position and Hold" for a couple of minutes due a previous departure on 34R. We were cleared for takeoff with a wind of 270 at 27 knots steady, which I acknowledged to the FO as 27 knots of crosswind. Of note, this was within the dry runway limits of 33 knots, but different than the ATIS, which was only about 20 minutes old and had called for winds 270 at 11 knots. Once cleared for takeoff, I set the power for takeoff, first to approximately 40% N1, which took several seconds for the engines to spool together, and then to approximately 70%, at which time I engaged the autothrottles.

Initially, the takeoff roll was relatively smooth, with no shimmying or shaking of the aircraft. However, at about 90 knots (prior to the monitoring pilot's 100 knot call out), I felt the rear end of the aircraft slip out hard to the right and the wheels lose traction. It felt like a slick patch of runway, or a strong gust of wind, or a combination of both, had pushed the tail hard to the right. The aircraft tracked left and I countered with right rudder to full right rudder. The aircraft did not respond to the control inputs and continued to track hard toward the left runway lights. In the vicinity of the left runway lights, as a last resort, I reached down and tried to use the nose wheel steering to steer the aircraft back to the right. This was also ineffectual. From the time the aircraft cut loose at runway center until it began exiting the runway left seemed like somewhere between a second and a few seconds. I did everything in my power to keep the aircraft on the runway.

As the aircraft left the runway, I either called for rejecting or aborting the takeoff, closed the throttles and deployed both thrust reversers. To keep the wings level and reduce sideways slide off the runway, I also used the yoke to control the ailerons. When the aircraft left the runway, the ride was bumpy and violent. As it came to a stop, the cockpit was totally dark and quiet. I was dazed and in extreme pain. I was initially helped by the FO to get off the aircraft via the 1 L slide and to walk toward the fire station. After some period of waiting there, I was driven off by ambulance.

Signed: _____

DAVID G. BUTLER

Date: 1/12/09


Statement of First Officer Chad Levang requested by NTSB on Continental Flight 1404

The Continental Airlines runway excursion accident on Flight 1404 occurred on Dec. 20, 2008. I was the pilot monitoring and Captain David Butler was the pilot flying. The following is what happened to the best of my recollection.

We arrived at the airport at approximately 1705 local time and proceeded to the gate. After all the passengers were off, we headed down to the aircraft. The captain had to go to operations to get the paperwork for the flight so he opted to do the walk-around. I proceeded with the safety checks and the receiving aircraft flow. The captain returned to the cockpit and did his portion of the receiving flow. From the paperwork and PDC we loaded the routing and other appropriate information into the FMC and then we briefed, paying particular attention to the fact that there was ice on the ramp and that we would start both engines and taxi out with the ice protection on. The captain then called for the receiving aircraft checklist, which we subsequently accomplished.

Shortly after the receiving checklist the gate agent asked to close and we received the passenger count. The ground crew called to say that their walk-around was complete and all doors and access panels were closed. We did the before start flow and checklist and called for pushback. Ramp cleared us to push for a west taxi, and we advised the ground crew and started the push. On the push the ground crew cleared us to start both engines, and we did. We came to a stop and cleared off the ground crew. We then ran the after start flow and checklist and called for taxi from Ramp control. Ramp told us to taxi to 3W and contact ground. Approaching 3W, I contacted Ground with the current ATIS - to the best of my recollection the winds were 270 at 11. (I do not recall the code). Ground instructed us to taxi to 34R via F. As we were taxiing north on F the captain called for and we accomplished the before takeoff checklist. Because there was no more ice or any form of precipitation on the taxiway or the runway and because we were not in icing conditions we turned off the engine and wing anti-ice during this flow. We continued taxiing and nearing F1 I contacted Tower. Tower instructed us to position and hold runway 34R.

We were in position on 34R for two or three minutes and then we were cleared for takeoff. Our takeoff clearance was something to the effect of "Winds 270 at 27 cleared for takeoff runway 34R." I do not recall the heading they gave us. The captain said something like "Crosswinds at 27, are you ready?" (Although this was different than the earlier ATIS, for a dry runway, it was within limits.) I indicated I was ready and the captain advanced the throttles to approximately 40% N1. After both engines were



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spooled the captain then advanced the throttles to approximately 70% and engaged the autothrottles. The captain then called Check Power. I, the MP, visually verified takeoff power of 90.9% N1 and confirmed Power set 90.9%. (I then noticed an ordinary subsequent .1% or .2% decrease). I then monitored the airspeed indicator for my next call of 100 knots. Around 90 knots I glanced outside to see if the takeoff roll was progressing normally. I noticed a slight deviation left of centerline but we seemed to be correcting back to the right. Before I had a chance to look back at the airspeed indicator for the 100 knots call, the aircraft abruptly swung approximately 30 degrees left with the tail to the right and we were heading for the left side of the runway. To me it felt as if there was absolutely no directional control. As we neared the left edge of the runway I felt with my right foot that full right rudder was being input. The right rudder pedal was fully depressed.

We exited the runway and the next thing I remember is hitting the first big bump. It seemed as if the aircraft nose rose into the air and then the next big bump occurred. Shortly thereafter we came to a stop and the captain and I were both unable to move for quite awhile because of the pain we were in. I could hear the evacuation in progress in the back, but was still unable to move, and the cockpit was completely dark.

Eventually, I opened my window and threw out the rope because I thought that I might have to get out of the plane that way. However, when I saw the fire on the right side I decided to try the cockpit door. As I was getting out of my seat I thought I heard a knocking at the door. I opened the door and saw the deadheading captain who I thought must have knocked. I helped my captain out of his seat, down the ramp, and up the hill to the fire station (also with the help of the deadheading crew and flight attendants). From the fire station, I was taken via ambulance to the hospital for treatment.