NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

May 14, 2012

Group Chairman's Factual Report

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

ERA12MA122

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A. ACCIDENT

Operator:	SK Logistics, Inc. dba SK Jets
Location:	Green Cove Springs, Florida
Date:	December 26, 2011
Time:	0554 eastern standard time[1]
Airplane:	Bell 206B, Registration Number: N5016M, Serial #: 2636

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C. SUMMARY

On December 26, 2011, at 0554 Eastern Standard Time, a Bell 206B, N5016M, operated by SK Logistics, d.b.a. SK Jets, collided with terrain while maneuvering near Green Cove Springs, Florida. The certificated airline transport pilot and 2 passengers (a doctor and a medical technician) were fatally injured. The on-demand air taxi flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the planned flight to Shands Cair Heliport (63FL), Gainesville, Florida. The flight originated from Mayo Clinic Heliport (6FL1), Jacksonville, Florida, about 0537.

D. DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION

An Operational Factors investigator traveled to the accident company's headquarters at St. Augustine Airport (SGJ) on December 27, 2011, started to form an Operational Factors / Human

[1]All times are eastern standard time (EST) based on a 24-hour clock, unless otherwise noted. Actual time of accident is approximate.

Performance Group, requested documents and information from the company, and scheduled interviews with company personnel for the first week of January 2012.

The Operational Factors / Human Performance Group met on January 3, 2012 through January 8, 2012 at the company headquarters to conduct interviews of company personnel and collect factual information. The group included members of Operational Factors and Human Performance from the NTSB, a member from the FAA, and a member from SK Jets, Inc.

The group was provided a tour of the company headquarters facility including pilot briefing rooms, pilot forms, administrative area, safety briefing bulletins, pilot read file items, and crew overnight accommodations. The company Director of Safety provided a briefing on flight crew use of safety reporting forms and the Flight Risk Analysis Tool (FRAT) for both helicopter and fixed wing operations and the group received a short briefing on the use of BART software for tracking crew flight and duty time, training records, and qualifications.

From the company, the group collected a fuel farm log, a sample weight and balance, copies of the company training manual, operating manual, operations specifications, normal and emergency checklists, recent and pertinent bulletins, the trip sheet for the accident flight, and the accident pilot's flight time summary, 3 month time and duty record, training records, and a copy of weather reports accessed on the accident pilot's laptop computer the morning of the accident. From the FAA, the group received copies of the accident pilot's certification record, medical history, and information from the NPTRS (National Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem) for the accident pilot and the company.

On January 3, 2012 through January 8, 2012, the group conducted 16 interviews[2]. The interviewees included company pilots, company management and administrative personnel, a former employee, and the accident pilot's spouse.

On January 24, 2012 the group interviewed the Mayo Clinic Organ Procurement Coordinator on duty the morning of the accident.

In early February 2012, the group learned that the accident company had filed for bankruptcy protection and was no longer conducting flight operations. During the bankruptcy, employees were released from service and the company no longer had any employees to take part in investigative activities with the Operational Factors / Human Performance group.

On February 23 and 24, the group conducted interviews with two former employees of SK Jets, and the Executive Director for LifeQuest; an organ procurement office.

On February 27 and 28, interviews were conducted with three employees of the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, the most recent FAA Principal Operations Inspector (POI) assigned to SK Jets, and a former POI of SK Jets.

On March 29, 2012 interviews were conducted with the Director of Audit Programs and the Director of CHEQ (Charter Evaluation and Qualification) for ARGUS International, Inc.

[2] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries.

E. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.0 History of Flight

The pilot departed St. Augustine Airport about 0515 enroute to Mayo Clinic Heliport Jacksonville, Florida to pick up two members of an organ procurement team for transport to Gainesville, Florida. The flight then departed Mayo Clinic Heliport Jacksonville, Florida about 0537 with the pilot and two passengers on board for a flight to Shands Cair Heliport Gainesville, Florida. The flight was conducted under visual flight rules and, after the pilot contacted Jacksonville Approach to inquire about restricted airspace along his route of flight, there was no record of further radio contact between the accident pilot and local, regional, or enroute air traffic control facilities.

The aircraft flight track diverged to the south of a direct track between 6FL1 and 63FL and the altitude of flight varied from between 450 and 950 feet above ground level.[3] The aircraft impacted terrain at an approximate elevation of 118 feet near Green Cove Springs, Florida at approximately 0554.

2.0 Flight Crew Information

2.1 The Pilot

The pilot was 68 years old and was the founder and president of the company. He had learned to fly at age 16 and later joined and flew for the U.S. Army. After his discharge from the Army, he continued to fly and later founded SK Logistics in 1997 and entered into a business agreement with Mayo Clinic Jacksonville to provide organ procurement transport services.

On his most recent FAA medical dated October 5, 2011, the pilot reported 10,000 hours total flight time. SK Jets records indicated the pilot had logged a total of 11,343 hours total flight time including 1,648 hours in a Bell B206.[4]

A review of the FAA NPTRS indicated that the pilot had been involved in a previous accident with a helicopter at St. Augustine airport in June 2008. However, an FAA Form 8020 indicated the accident occurred in December 2007[5]. NTSB records also indicated the accident occurred in

[3] Refer to Air Traffic Control radar plots contained in public docket for this investigation (NTSB Docket Management System < http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/dms.html>).
[4] See Attachment 2 – Flight Time Summary.
[5] See Attachment 3 – FAA Form 8020.

December 2007.[6] A search of the National Driver Registry found no record of driver's license suspension or revocation.

2.1.1 The Pilot's Certificates and Ratings Held at Time of the Accident

AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT (issued May 6, 2008)
AIRPLANE SINGLE AND MULTIENGINE LAND
LR-JET, LR-60
COMMERCIAL PRIVILEGES
ROTORCRAFT-HELICOPTER INSTRUMENT HELICOPTER

MEDICAL CERTIFICATE FIRST CLASS (issued October 5, 2011)
Limitations: Holder shall wear corrective lenses

2.1.2 The Pilot's Certification Record

FAA records of the Pilot indicated that:

There were no airman certification records available for the pilot prior to June 2, 1997.

Flight Instructor – Rotorcraft-Helicopter certificate was originally issued on June 2, 1997.
Commercial Pilot – Airplane Single and Multi Engine Land – Instrument Airplane Rotorcraft-Helicopter – Instrument Helicopter certificate was issued on August 1, 1997.
Flight Instructor – Rotorcraft-Helicopter – Instrument Helicopter certificate was issued on September 3, 1997.
Airline Transport Pilot – Airplane Single and Multiengine Land – Commercial Privileges – Rotorcraft-Helicopter – Instrument Helicopter certificate with a LR-JET type rating was issued on August 17, 1999. A LR-60 type rating was added on July 19, 2004.

2.1.3 The Pilot's Training and Proficiency Checks Completed

Last recurrent ground training: January 25, 2011
Last Line Check in B206: September 15, 2011
Last Demonstrated Competency Check B206: September 15, 2011

The pilot received a Notice of Disapproval on July 19, 2004 when he failed a practical test for a LR-60 type rating to be added to his Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate. He was unsatisfactory in the areas of steep turns and approaches to stalls. He was retested on July 19, 2004 and passed.

[6] See Attachment 4 – NTSB Factual Data Collection Report MIA08CA040.

Interviews[7] with the chief pilot and assistant director of operations indicated the pilot received an unsatisfactory rating on a helicopter recurrent check ride conducted by the FAA 2-3 years prior to the accident but no record was found.

Following an aviation accident that occurred in December 2007[8], the FAA conducted a re-examination of the accident pilot's qualification to hold a commercial pilot certificate in July 2008[9]. The re-examination was satisfactory.

2.1.4 The Pilot's Flight Times

The pilot's flight times, based on SK Logistics employment records[10]:

Total pilot flying time	11,343 hours
Total Pilot-In-Command (PIC) time	11,048 hours
Total rotorcraft time	3,646 hours
Total Bell B206 time	1,648 hours
Total night flying time	3,288 hours
Total instrument flying time	3259 hours
Total flying time last 24 hours	0 hours
Total flying time last 7 days	0 hours
Total flying time last 30 days	2.5 hours
Total flying time last 60 days	3.7 hours
Total flying time last 90 days	10.7 hours
Total flying time last 12 months	97.1 hours
Total night flying time last 30 days	1.0 hours
Total rotorcraft night time last 30 days	1.0 hours
Total night time last 90 days	3.1 hours
Total rotorcraft night time last 90 days	1.0 hours
Total instrument time last 90 days	0 hours

Employment records indicated the pilot had logged 3 night takeoffs and 3 night landings in a helicopter in the preceding 90 days.

[7] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries page 76 and page 83.
[8] See Section 10 – Company History of Accidents, Incidents, and Violations.
[9] See Attachment 11 – FAA 44709 Letters.
[10] See Attachment 2 – Flight Time Summary. The pilot's personal logbook was not acquired during the investigation.

3.0 Weight and Balance

A weight and balance manifest was not recovered from the accident flight. The following information was obtained from a sample weight and balance reconstructed to simulate the conditions at the time of the accident[11]:

Basic Operating Weight	2080.2 lbs
Passenger Weight	398.0 lbs
Baggage & Cargo	40.0 lbs
Zero Fuel Weight	2518.2 lbs
Fuel	340.0 lbs
Estimated Total Weight	2858.2 lbs

According to operator and manufacturer guidance, and based on the assumed weight & balance calculations mentioned above, the aircraft appeared to be within approved center of gravity and weight limits for the flight.

4.0 Aerodrome Information[12]

The Mayo Clinic Heliport (6FL1) was an uncontrolled heliport located about 13 miles southeast of Jacksonville, Florida and owned by Mayo Clinic for private use. Heliport communications were conducted on unicom frequency 123.05. There were no published instrument procedures or weather reporting capabilities.

The Shands Cair Heliport (63FL) was an uncontrolled heliport located approximately 3 miles southwest of Gainesville, Florida at an estimated elevation of 94 feet and owned by Shands Hospital for private use. Heliport communications were conducted on unicom frequency 123.05. There were no published instrument procedures or weather reporting capabilities.

The closest public use airport was Palatka Municipal Airport (28J) located 2 miles northwest of Palatka, Florida, and approximately 14 miles southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 48 feet. Airport communications were conducted on CTAF[13]/Unicom frequency 122.8 and meteorological information for the airport was available via AWOS-3[14] on frequency 119.2.

5.0 Meteorological Information[15]

A lap top computer found at the accident pilot's residence was opened to an internet website, aviationweather.gov, with weather data displayed from the Aviation Digital Data Service (ADDS).[16]

[11] See Attachment 5 – Sample Weight and Balance.
[12] Airport and heliport information obtained from U.S. Department of Transportation <aeronav.faa.gov> and <www.airport-data.com> accessed January 18, 2012.
[13] CTAF – Common Traffic Advisory Frequency.
[14] AWOS – Automated Weather Observation System.
[15] Refer to Meteorological Group Chairman's Factual Report for additional information.

The data included METARs[17] for SGJ, Craig Airport (CRG), and Gainesville Airport (GNV), and TAFs[18] for CRG and GNV.

The METAR for the departure airport, SGJ, at 0327 local time reported 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 1,700 feet, and a broken cloud ceiling of 7,000 feet.

The METAR for GNV, the closest weather reporting station to the destination heliport, at 0353 local time reported wind from 060 degrees at 3 knots, visibility 6 miles, mist, overcast ceiling at 1,600 feet above ground level, temperature 17 degrees Celsius, dew point temperature 14 degrees Celsius, and altimeter 30.21 inches mercury. The TAF at GNV for the accident flight's estimated time of arrival at 63FL called for wind from 030 degrees at 6 knots, visibility better than 6 miles, and an overcast cloud ceiling of 800 feet. The TAF also included a TEMPO[19] during the estimated arrival time calling for visibility of 4 miles, mist, and an overcast cloud ceiling of 400 feet.

6.0 Company Overview

The company was founded by the accident pilot in 1997, was the holder of an Air Carrier Certificate issued by the FAA to SK Logistics, Inc., and conducted operations under the business names SK Jets, and SK Helicopters[20]. The company was authorized by the FAA to conduct on-demand airplane operations and on-demand rotorcraft operations in accordance with the requirements of FAR Part 135.

According to the Operations Specifications, as of December 19, 2011, the company's fleet consisted of four fixed wing aircraft and three helicopters, including one Agusta A109 which, according to interviews, had been out of service for 3-5 months due to maintenance, one B206 committed to a fire management contract at Eglin Air Force Base, and the accident helicopter which had been acquired by the company in December 2011.

SK Logistics was an IS-BAO[21] registered operator by the International Business Aviation Council and had been awarded a platinum rating by ARGUS International, Inc.

7.0 Company Procedures

The company procedures were contained in the SK Logistics General Operating Manual (GOM) available to each pilot. Additional guidance was provided to company personnel through the Operations Specifications issued to SK Jets by the FAA, a training manual for each fleet type, and various bulletins and information posted in the company headquarters crew room.

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[16] See Attachment 6 – Laptop Weather Data.
[17] METAR – Aviation Routine Weather Report.
[18] TAF – Terminal Area Forecast.
[19] TEMPO – Temporary condition expected during the forecast time period.
[20] The company was commonly referred to as "SK Jets".
[21] IS-BAO – International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations.

7.1 Flight Release

The company used a two-tiered flight release system which included procedures accomplished by a flight releaser, and procedures accomplished by the pilot in command. The GOM Section A, page A-2, paragraph A.1.4 stated in part:

> *The person exercising operational control will perform the following procedures before releasing the flight:*
>
> *a. Check the Operations Specifications to ensure that the planned destination is authorized (B050) and that the aircraft is qualified.*
>
> *b. Verify the flight meets all legal requirements including flight time and duty limitations by checking BART Software.*
>
> *i. BART is a flight operations management software used to track all aspects of a Part 135 charter operation including trip scheduling, pilot training records, flight crew time and duty, and pilot currency requirements*
>
> *c. Verify aircraft times and cycles to ensure that no required inspections will be over flown by comparing the current CALM report (form 104) vs. the latest aircraft times on the flight log (also shown in the "Aircraft Times" file).*
>
> *d. Check the aircraft grounded list (form 114) saved in the "Aircraft Times" file to verify the aircraft is airworthy and ready to fly (not down due to an inspection or open discrepancy).*

And, the GOM Section A, page A-3 stated in part:

> *The PIC will check or complete the following items:*
>
> *a. Weather*
> *b. Flight Planning*
> *c. Aircraft Performance*
> *d. ATC Coordination*
> *e. Airport Navigation Facilities*
> *f. NOTAMs*
> *g. Customer Service*
> *h. Weight and Balance and Loading*
> *i. Double Check Time and Duty Requirements*
> *j. Verify Aircraft Airworthiness*

Interviews with company personnel indicted that flight releasers were not certificated FAA dispatchers and did not assist with obtaining and reviewing weather information for flight planning.

7.2 Aeronautical Weather Data

SK Jets listed approved sources of aeronautical weather data in the GOM and Operations Specifications. The SK Logistics GOM, Section L, page L-2, paragraph L.3, Weather Data, stated in part:

> *SK Logistics, Inc. will use the U.S. National Weather Service, a source approved by the U.S. National Weather Service, or a source approved by the FAA (WSI, www.fltplan.com, Universal Weather, ARINC, D or FSS) for all flight planning.*

And;

> *Automated weather reports are available at selected locations; however, not all AWOS sites are approved for FAR 135 operations. Check with the servicing FSS for details on AWOS, weather, and departure procedures.*

The Operations Specifications paragraph A010, Aeronautical Weather Data[22], stated in part:

> *c. The certificate holder is authorized to obtain its aeronautical weather data for the control of flight operations using the approved qualified internet communications providers (QICPs) listed in Table 2*

Table 2

Qualified Internet Communications Provider
FltPlan.com
WSI
DCT DUATS
CSC DUATS
Universal weather and Aviation, Inc
ARINC Direct

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 00-45 G, Aviation Weather Services, included guidance on the dissemination of aviation weather products. The AC stated, in part "In the interest of safety and in compliance with Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, all pilots should get a complete weather briefing before each flight." And, "prior to every flight, pilots should gather all information vital to the nature of the flight. This includes an appropriate weather briefing obtained from a NWS certified pilot weather briefer at a FSS/AFSS[23] or Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS)."[24]

Interviews with company personnel indicted that each pilot was responsible to obtain his own weather data prior to conducting a flight. There was no record kept by the company of the

[22] See Attachment 7 – Operations Specifications A010.
[23] FSS/AFSS – Flight Service Station/Automated Flight Service Station.
[24] Advisory Circular (AC) 00-45 G, issued February 11, 2010 and including change 1 dated July 29, 2010.

source of weather referenced by the accident pilot. His laptop computer was found at his residence with the last viewed page from the Aviation Digital Data Services (ADDS) website.[25] The chief pilot stated in an interview[26] that ADDS was not an approved source of weather for company operations. Some pilots stated in interviews that they used weather sources that were not approved in the GOM or Operations Specifications as a supplement to the approved weather.

7.3 Helicopter Operating Minimums

The accident helicopter was certificated for visual flight rules and according to company personnel, was not approved for flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). The Operations Specifications paragraph A003 authorized the use of helicopters for on-demand, day and night flight in visual flight rules (VFR). Interviews indicated the company had previously been issued Operations Specifications Part H, which authorized IFR helicopter operations, and that the accident pilot had been the only instrument rated helicopter pilot at the company. A review of NPTRS confirmed the FAA had withdrawn the issuance of Operations Specification Part H due to the company not having qualified a pilot in command under CFR Part 135.297[27], in a helicopter, for over 12 months.

The SK Logistics GOM, Section V, page V-10, paragraph V.14, VFR Helicopter Minimums stated in part:

> *Unless otherwise approved by the Director of Operations or Chief Pilot, the following weather minimums will be used for VFR flight in the helicopter*
>
> *1. Day – Normal VFR Weather Minimums as per 91.155 or other applicable regulations*
> *2. Night – 1000 Foot Ceiling and 3 miles visibility*

When the company manuals did not dictate limitations, operations were governed by the applicable Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR).

Title 14 CFR Part 91.155 stated that no person may operate a helicopter under VFR in Class G airspace at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface at night unless the flight visibility was at least 3 miles and stated, in part:

> *A helicopter may be operated clear of clouds if operated at a speed that allows the pilot adequate opportunity to see any air traffic or obstruction in time to avoid a collision.*

[25] See Section *5.0 Meteorological Information*, for weather data obtained from accident pilot's laptop computer.
[26] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries, page 73.
[27] Title 14 CFR Part 135.297 stated, in part, that no certificate holder may use a pilot, nor may any person serve, as a pilot in command of an aircraft under IFR unless, since the beginning of the 6th calendar month before that service, that pilot has passed an instrument proficiency check administered by the Administrator or an authorized check pilot.

Title 14 CFR Part 135.205 stated that no person may operate a helicopter under VFR in Class G airspace at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface at night unless the visibility was at least 1 mile.

Title 14 CFR Part 135.207 stated that no person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter.

7.4 Flight Time, Duty and Rest Rules

The GOM included guidance on flight and duty time limitations. The GOM, Section R, page R-20, paragraph R.11, stated in part:

> *SK Logistics' crewmembers shall follow the flight and duty time limitations as described in FAR 135.265 and 135.267(c). All crew members are expected to manage their personal time so as to be well rested when they report for work.*

Duty time and rest were also elements of the FRAT[28] form that was required to be completed prior to each flight. The GOM, Section R, page R-6, paragraph R.3.3 stated in part:

> *This form shall be filled out by the PIC prior to each flight. When the risk for a flight exceeds the acceptable level (risk factor > 20), the pilot will call the Director of Operations or Chief Pilot to further evaluate the flight and ensure it can be operated safely while also trying to reduce the risk further.*

A copy of the FRAT form for the accident flight was not recovered.

Interviews with company personnel indicated that flight crewmembers were afforded 10 hours of rest prior to a flight assignment and that the company provided enough days off in a calendar quarter to remain within the limitations of 14 CFR Part 135.

The former director of operations for the company stated that crews were scheduled on "a rotating call basis using a 10 hour look back for rest." He stated that the company "could not assign rest periods because they did not know when the work was going to be there" and that they "did not schedule rest periods where a crew member was free from being on call" but they made sure the crew members had 13 days off in a calendar quarter.[29] The former director of operations and other employees interviewed stated that once a crew was called with an assignment, they "looked back" to see if they had 10 hours rest before starting the trip.

No written guidance was found in company manuals regarding the application of non flight time company work in the calculation of flight time and duty limitations and no company manuals provided to the investigation indicated a written policy or procedure existed for scheduling of flight crewmembers rest prospectively.

[28] See Attachment 8 – Flight Risk Analysis Tool.
[29] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries page 97.

FAA records obtained from the NPTRS indicated that in January 2010, the chief pilot had expressed concern to the POI regarding the company's application of rules regarding required rest periods.[30]

8.0 Mayo Clinic Contract

The company had entered into agreement with Mayo Clinic Jacksonville to provide organ procurement transport services. Interviews with personnel from both SK Jets and Mayo Clinic Jacksonville indicated that the two companies had worked together for many years but they only started a formal bidding process for the contract in 2006. The contract was for 3 years and was put out for bid again in 2009. SK Jets had been the winning bidder in 2006 and 2009.

The first part of the bid process focused on safety and service issues and included a request for information (RFI) to collect and review information from prospective vendors. After a team reviewed the RFI, a request for proposal (RFP) was issued to a bidder to provide additional information focused mainly on business issues and pricing.

Interviews with Mayo personnel indicated that the vendor providing transport services was required to conduct IFR operations with all aircraft to be utilized and that at least one captain and one co-captain were required for each flight[31]. The interviews indicated the agreement did not differentiate between helicopter and fixed wing operations.

The RFI required each bidder to respond to questions regarding transport services to be provided. A review of the RFI completed by SK Jets indicated an answer in the affirmative in the section labeled *Flight Coordination Services*, which stated, in part:

> *All aircraft responding to Mayo Clinic Jacksonville requests must be certified and equipped for IFR operation, and staffed with no less than two pilots (a captain and a co-captain) per flight.*

9.0 Independent Auditing

SK Jets had received audits from ARGUS International, Inc. (ARGUS), and was awarded a Platinum rating; the highest rating offered by the auditing company. According to their website, ARGUS International, Inc. was "a specialized aviation services company with global expertise whose mission is to provide the aviation marketplace with the information needed to make informed decisions and manage risk."[32]

ARGUS maintained a database of participating operators in order to evaluate their history, pilot information, and aircraft information. The company used FAA and NTSB databases to verify

[30] See Attachment 13 – NPTRS Rest Rules FAA Follow Up Letter.
[31] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries, page 118.
[32] Website of ARGUS International, Inc. <http://www.aviationresearch.com/AboutARGUS.aspx> (accessed April 24, 2012).

the information they collected and monitored. In order to maintain a Platinum rating, an operator was required to meet the standard, provide all information needed to evaluate the company and the pilots, and keep that information current within 90 days at all times. According to ARGUS personnel, they never state whether a company is safe, they just rate them based on the information collected. [33]

Interviews with ARGUS personnel indicated that audits were normally conducted every 24 months and audits of SK Jets had been conducted in September 2006, October 2008, and January 2011. The interviews revealed that SK Jets may have been temporarily reduced below the Platinum rating following the October 2008 audit. Details of the audit were not disclosed.

A proprietary rating system was used by ARGUS to consider an operator's history of prior accidents and incidents. Previous accidents and incidents were considered for a period of 10 years but the score associated with a particular event "moderated"[34] after 36 months.

10.0 Company History of Accidents, Incidents, and Violations

A search of FAA records for enforcement data regarding SK Logistics Inc., revealed 9 records of violations in the 10 years prior to the accident. The record of violations included[35]:

- 2 violations in the Flight Operations category
- 3 violations in the Drug Testing category
- 4 violations in the Records / Reports category

A search of FAA records for accident / incident data pertaining to SK Logistics, Inc. returned records of 3 accidents between March 2002 and December 2011[36]. Two of the accidents occurred while the company was conducting operations under 14 CFR Part 135 and one occurred while conducting 14 CFR Part 91 operations.

The FAA accident / incident data did not include information regarding a previous accident involving the accident pilot operating a helicopter at St. Augustine airport. NTSB records indicate that he was the pilot of an Agusta A109 helicopter, N109SK that was substantially damaged in an accident which occurred at SGJ on December 22, 2007 during night, instrument meteorological conditions. [37]

11.0 FAA Oversight

The FAA North Florida Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) in Orlando, Florida was responsible for the everyday oversight of SK Logistics, Inc. The Principal Operations Inspector

[33] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries, pages 137-148.
[34] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries, page 146.
[35] See Attachment 9 – FAA Enforcement Data.
[36] See Attachment 10 – FAA Accident / Incident Data.
[37] Information obtained for investigation MIA08CA040 from website of National Transportation Safety Board < http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/databases.html> accessed January 9, 2012.

(POI) for SK Logistics stated in an interview he had been in that position since September 2011 and was responsible for about 9 air carrier certificates during that time. He said that about 10 percent of his time spent on surveillance of air carriers was devoted to SK Logistics and he considered them to be a "normal Part 135 air carrier".[38]

A review of FAA's NPTRS revealed that during oversight of SK Logistics, Inc. in the 10 years prior to the accident, the FAA conducted the following records of activity:

- 30 inspections pertaining to Technical Staff Administrative Functions
- 1 inspections pertaining to Organizational Certification
- 217 inspections pertaining to Organization Technical Administration
- 118 inspections pertaining to Airmen Certification oversight
- 221 inspections pertaining to Surveillance
- 15 inspections pertaining to Investigations
- 2 inspection pertaining to General Technical Functions

The NPTRS included a complaint in 2006 claiming safety issues at the company related to scheduling, flight time, duty, and rest rules and violations of federal regulations. The NPTRS report indicated FAA POI investigated and could not substantiate the allegations during inspection.[39]

F. LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

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[38] See Attachment 1 – Interview Summaries, pages 129-130.
[39] See Attachment 14 – NPTRS Safety Issues Complaint.